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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The need to think can never be stilled by allegedly definite insights of “wise 
men”; it can be satisfied only through thinking, and the thoughts I had 
yesterday will satisfy this need today only to the extent that I want and am able 
to think them anew.’ [Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 88]
Often dissertations are not the most pleasant books to read. Their scientific 
character, their nuance, their urgency to discuss all sorts of phenomena towards 
their very grammar and syntax, or their academic style of writings is boring and 
tedious. Admitted – to open this dissertation with such remark is quite tricky. 
It can be read as a warning to the reader: be aware, this is a dissertation! Or it 
comes back to the writer as a boomerang: did I manage to offer something that is 
actually readable – or even more: something that is nice to read? As is clear from 
the book itself: I did not manage to reduce the amount of words, which makes it 
probably an extra challenge to start reading. However, part of the size is caused by 
the trial to make this dissertation actually readable. I always had in mind to urge 
and clarify the issues at hand through clear examples, personal experiences or 
literary reflections, as if it is an extended essay. 
Somewhere in 2005, I promised a Dutch website to review the dissertation 
of the architectural historian Wouter Vanstiphout, Maak een stad, on the figure 
of the architect J.H. van den Broek. It was published shortly before the summer, 
and I decided to take it with me on our holiday trip to Crete. Although I was used 
to take not only ‘literature-light’ with me on journeys, taking a dissertation to 
read on the beaches of that beautiful Greek island was quite a gamble. Lucky me, 
it worked out well. Even better, particularly the introduction to this dissertation 
did read as a whodunit on how the ideas beyond the initial plan of the disserta-
tion were taken down by new insights deepened from documents studied at the 
archives of the Rotterdam municipality and the Dutch Architecture Institute. 
Scientific research can be intense, unpredictable, and even thrilling. Although 
the research presented here is not based on archival investigation (only to a very 
limited part), but better can be described as literature study, an exploration of 
the the realm of thoughts and theory, in order to open up a different perspective 
on ideas about the public aspects of architecture, some of these thrilling aspects 
I recognize also in my own journey. Not that I can write like Vanstiphout, his 
dissertation as well as the dissertation of his promotor, the architectural historian 
Auke van der Woud, Het lege land, always has been an example of high standard 
for me, challenging me during the actual work of writing this dissertation.
 
Looking back, it is not so clear where my own journey started, but when asked 
to pinpoint at least an early moment of ambition to bridge architecture and 
philosophy, I have to mention my time as a student in Delft, and particularly my 
membership of the C.S.F.R., a protestant Christian student association with ‘local 
branches’ in different cities of the Netherlands. I became a member only in the 
second year of my studies, particularly since I was full of  doubts about Christi-
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anity, religion, science, and society, and was eager to discuss these doubts. The 
C.S.F.R. form me was the right place to be that time: at the core of this student-so-
ciety was the will to study, to investigate and debate the deep and thrilling 
questions of life. We organized ourselves, besides a series of general lectures and 
broader conferences, in small groups, that met each other once a week in order to 
discuss readings from the Bible and beyond, often encircling particular theme’s. 
Every month another book, reflecting upon the propositions behind as well as its 
consequences for our own everyday lives and believes. For me, that has been the 
way to discover, investigate and discuss a broad range of theological, philosoph-
ical, historical and political issues, as well as novels and reflections on the arts. 
It is through these extensive studies and discussions that I explored the fields of 
literature and philosophy, sociology and theology. It also is through these studies 
that I developed a fascination for Christians like Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Kaj Munk 
and Martin Luther King jr. – exemplary figures that were able to stand up against 
Nazism, Racism, and other wrongs in society, inspired by their reading of the 
Bible and understanding of the life and death of Christ. To stand up and resist, to 
speak and act – that inspires me. 
Parallel to that, this more fundamental reflections I missed in my studies. I 
experienced myself being immersed in architecture at the Faculty – and although 
I really loved it, I also experienced the study felt short on particular the questions 
behind these nice, thrilling, and innovative projects (it was the end of the nineties, 
the very moment Dutch architecture was celebrated around the world, particularly 
because of its remarkable forms, its inventiveness, innovation and courage). What 
good is this for the world?   
At the C.S.F.R. we were also good in organizing lectures and conferences. I 
myself, together with Jacco Zwemer, Thomas van Dijk and others, once organized 
a conference in order to celebrate the 50th anniversary of our student association, 
putting forward the theme of tolerance. We coined that specific theme since we 
recognized several urgencies, both in our own protestant background as well as 
in society these days. Within the religious world, we recognized a huge impasse 
in celebrating diversity as well as a certain reluctance with the approach to other 
religions on the one side, or the eagerness to diminish differences that there 
undeniable are there and that are worth discussing. The same could be argued 
about society in the end of the nineties. A neo-liberal spirit dominated the cultural 
and political landscape of The Netherlands and other Western countries, which 
somehow found its apology in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the 
Last Man. This spirit did not leave so much room for differences, or it was in a 
modus of superfluous indifference. Religion particularly was treated as redundant, 
something of the past that quickly will fade away. The question in these cases 
surely was how to deal with differences in view, in Christianity particularly with 
minorities. Is there room in society to differ, to explore and expose different 
worldviews? Coincidentally, after we had worked for about two years on the 
conference, just two months before the conference day was about to happen, the 
events of 9/11 pushed the theme in a very terrible and unimaginable way. The 
theme of tolerance (the room for plurality in society), the individual ability to 
stand up and act, no matter its consequences, as well as the happenings of 9/11 
find their echo in this dissertation study. 
The C.S.F.R. has brought me deep and long lasting friendships. First, certainly, 
with the three other members of the board, Johan Morren, Abjan Jacobse and 
Arno Nobel. For one year the four of us took responsibility for the organization 
and thematic issues. We were ambitious, issued even theme’s like ‘the meaning 
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of life’, and ‘the deity of Jesus’. We still meet, together with other members of 
our generation, Mathijs Bos, Willem-Pieter van Breugel, Pieter Quist, Bastiaan 
Roodenburg, Eric ten Voorde, Jacco Zwemer, in order to discuss the newest 
publications or classical books that raised our attention, although I have to admit 
that I could not join the meetings in the past three years particularly because of 
writing this dissertation. I owe a lot to our meetings and discussions, and I look 
forward to continue our conversations. While writing this dissertation, I always 
had in mind that it should be book that we could put on the table and can discuss 
together. In a way, it also is an apology to you of my view on architecture – how 
important the build environment actually is. I never could explain, until this 
moment.  
Probably the first time I heard of Hannah Arendt has been also in the context 
of C.S.F.R. meetings. The very moment a group of students, a bit further in 
their studies, finished their studies, they started to discuss the Vita Activa, The 
Human Condition, as a trial to reflect upon their coming working-life. Amongst 
these students Martijn van den Boogaart, Arjan Gooijer, Reinhard Hameeteman, 
and Aart Nederveen, that has been dear friends along the route of my journey. 
By mentioning your names, I want to express my gratitude for all the amicae et 
amicique that I met at the C.S.F.R., first in Delft, and later in other cities, older 
and younger generations. All the meetings we had, the arguments we shared, the 
collaborations in various projects, have had their undeniable impact on my own 
views on the world. 
However, philistine as I was, I also bought the book of Arendt, but stored 
it immediately on my book shelf for a couple of years untouched, until the very 
moment that I started my graduation project on the former sugar factory in 
Halfweg, exactly halfway between Amsterdam and Haarlem. I graduated in 
a studio organized by the department of Urbanism, specifically by professor 
Han Meyer (in collaboration with professor Bruno DeMeulder of the Catholic 
University of Leuven). He offered us the possibility to read the first draft of what 
would become the first volume of a series of handbooks on urbanism – and in 
that draft, suddenly Arendt’s name came up in a brief reflection on the distinction 
between public and private spaces. The name, of course, immediately attracted my 
attention, as well as the brief note in that text on her recognition of an in-between 
realm, the ‘social’ realm, that affected both the private and the public spaces. 
Only after my studies, when professor Umberto Barbieri, offered me a position 
as a researcher at the Chair of Public Building, and I started to think about a 
research-proposal that would end in a dissertation. Hannah Arendt’s distinction 
between the public, the private and the social came back to mind. From that 
moment onwards, I started reading Arendt. In the meantime, lots of other projects 
attracted my attention. But they – organizing the lecture series ‘Architectural 
Positions’ in 2007, editing the anthology Architectural Positions: Architecture, 
Modernity and the Public Sphere in 2009 (both together with Tom Avermaete 
and Klaske Havik), joining the editorial board of the architectural journal OASE 
in 2007 (Tom Avermaete, Pnina Avidar, David de Bruijn, Dlaine Camp, Joachim 
DeClerck, Michiel Dehaene, Christoph Grafe, Klaske Havik, Anne Holtrop, Job 
Floris, Johan Lagae, Ruben Molendijk, Bruno Notteboom, Véronique Patteeuw, 
Gus Tielens, Christophe Van Gerrewey, Tom Vandeputte, Jeroen Visschers, 
Hüsnü Yegenoglu, and our graphic designer Karel Martens, often helped by Aagje 
Martens), publishing the pamphlet Levend Landschap, Manifest voor stad en 
land (together with Johan van der Zwart and Clemens Driessen, 2012), collabo-
rating with David Mulder and Max Cohen de Lara of the Amsterdam-based archi-
10
tectural office XML in a studio on parliament-buildings – helped me to become 
much more specific about the debate on architecture, the city and public space, 
and how the writings of Arendt might contribute on our reflections upon that 
debate. 
Obviously, my colleagues and the several student-assistants I met in Delft, first 
at the Chair of Public Building chaired by first Umberto Barbieri and later Michiel 
Riedijk, later at the Chair of Methods and Analysis, chaired by Tom Avermaete, 
as well as those that I met during other collaborations within our Faculty, have 
largely contributed towards the development of the arguments I present in this 
dissertation. They have contributed consciously and unconsciously, with their 
own projects, writings, discussions. There are too many of you to mention, let be 
clear that I am grateful to you all, even if I only mention the names of people I 
have collaborated most extensively with: Dick van Gameren, Esther Gramsbergen, 
MaartenJan Hoekstra, Susanne Komossa, Esin Komez, Marc Schoonderbeek, 
Pierijn van der Putt, and Leeke Reinders, as well as the staff and guest teachers 
of the Chair of Methods and Analysis: besides Tom Avermaete and Klaske Havik, 
Oscar Andrade, Lilith van Assem, Edwin Gardner, Robert Gorny, Jorge Mejia 
Hernandez, Lieke van Hooijdonk, Dominique Pieters, Armina Pilav, Dorina 
Pllumbi, Herman Prast, Elsbeth Ronner, Mike Schäfer, Jules Schoonman, Lara 
Schrijver, Willemijn Wilms Floet, Chris Woltjes and Leonardo Zuccaro Marchi. 
The sphere in our Chair is open, ambitious and challenging, on the basis of 
acknowledging the range of experiences and capacity that each of us represents. 
That, actually, is an extraordinary atmosphere, for which I am grateful everyday 
(even if I was often to busy writing this dissertation or organizing all other 
projects I participate in, to join you for lunch). Great memories I particularly 
have to our Methods & Analysis participation in the Venice Biennale of 2014, 
curating the exhibition on the ‘balcony’, as well as to the half year that Yoshiharu 
Tsukamoto and Momoyo Kaijima from the Tokyo based architectural office Atelier 
Bow-Wow attended our chair as visiting professor. 
I, obviously, owe a great debt to the range of students that I met during 
teaching studio, seminars and lectures, both in the bachelor as well as in the 
masters of the architectural track at our Faculty. Your responses, questions, 
practical issues, ambitions, critics and sometimes naivety challenged me to 
continue, rethink and not take anything to easily or for granted. 
The project of writing this dissertation lasted so long that professor Umberto 
Barbieri, at the very moment of finishing this writing, has been retired already for 
a while. It is however Umberto that offered me the freedom to go my own path, 
for which I am very grateful. The same counts for professor Hans Achterhuis, with 
whom I had several conversations about Hannah Arendt’s ideas from a philo-
sophical perspective. Achterhuis is a well-known philosopher in The Netherlands, 
and I contacted him just prior to his retirement as professor of philosophy at the 
University of Twente, in Enschede. Also after his retirement, we had a couple 
of meetings which were challenging and inspiring – they made clear to me how 
particularly the human activity of ‘work’ is within the writings of Arendt, and 
how that notion could function as a frame to investigate the field of architecture. 
However, writing took too long, and also professor Achterhuis could not figure as 
promotor anymore. I however remember the meetings, his willingness to follow 
me on my journey to bridge the fields of philosophy and architecture. 
My reflection upon the relationship between actual public spaces and Arendt’s 
reflection upon the public realm has been fueled beyond imagination through a 
three-months visit to the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at 
AT HOME IN THE WORLD ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
11
Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson (NY) during the fall of 2009. Together 
with my wife and eldest son we could stay in New York during this visit, where 
we explored Central Park, the Hudson Park, and street life in Hell’s Kitchen 
extensively, enjoying a perfect Indian Summer and particularly looking through 
the eyes of our one-year-old. Together with the two other visiting research-fel-
lows, Eveline Cioflec and Silvia Zappulla, we joined a class discussing Arendt’s 
book The Human Condition, taught by the initiator of the Arendt Center, Roger 
Berkowitz. Our conversations not simply opened my perspective to the philo-
sophical and political issues at stake, but also introduced me to the later writings 
of Arendt. That had shifted the work on this dissertation: it shifted from simply 
investigating public space towards the broader issue of public aspects of architec-
ture and design. During our conversations – not only with the three of you, but 
also with other students and Faculty of Bard – it became clear to me how much 
Arendt’s writings are embedded in the reality of the world, and how that is related 
to the core of the field of architecture. If architecture can contribute to the public 
interest, it is here in this understanding and embracing the reality of the world. In 
other words, it showed me the very human condition of architecture, the societal 
and political relevance of architecture even beyond the actual case of public space. 
I remember particular one case in class, discussing in particular the case of IKEA 
– mass customization, powerful globalization, but with rather good design (and 
the threat of ‘being fashionable’). The rides to Rhinecliff station, offered by Noah 
Chasin, who taught architectural and art history at Bard at that time, helped me 
to relate my experiences with Arendt to the actual circumstances in architecture 
in Europe and America. My journey through Arendt, framed in the beautiful and 
quiet campus of Bard, somehow is tangible in this dissertation too. It starts with 
the concrete question of public space, but it in the second part of it, the focus is 
re-directed to the broader question of the public aspects of architecture. Or in the 
words of Arendt: the very worldliness of the work of architecture. 
After my stay at Bard, Roger Berkowitz and I continued our conversations. He did 
read and reflect upon bits and pieces of my writings, enabled me to contribute to 
the blogs of the Arendt center, and even invited me to lecture at one of the yearly 
conferences he organizes at the Arendt Center. We met couple of times, in New 
York as well as in Amsterdam. In all of these meetings, Berkowitz showed his 
ability to clarify Arendt’s writings and connect them to everyday experiences, the 
city, and developments in the political circumstances in America and Europe. 
These conversations have helped me to grasp the writings of Arendt more 
profoundly. Particularly Berkowitz’s reflections upon Chapter 5 has helped me to 
make myself more clear. It particularly helped also to challenge the main sources 
of thinking about public spaces in Architecture: the notion of the public sphere as 
coined by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, as compared to the notion 
of the public realm, that Arendt urges. 
During my stay in New York, I also was able to meet professor Jerome Kohn 
of the New School of Social Research. Kohn has been the student-assistant 
of Hannah Arendt, and since then has put lots of effort to make her writings 
accessible to the world, particularly by publishing a series of distinctive collections 
of her essays. Also with Jerome Kohn I was able to continue our conversation 
afterwards: each time I visited New York, we were able to meet over coffee, lunch 
or dinner, and discussed pieces of my writings. Via him, I also met the writer 
Rochelle Gurstein and her husband, the artist Jack Barth. Rochelle and I were 
invited together with Jerome Kohn to share our reflections upon the public-pri-
vate distinction during the previously mentioned conference at the Arendt Center 
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in 2015. From the first meeting onwards, during which we prepared our contri-
butions to the conference, we started a conversation on Arendt, actualities, the 
world, the arts, politics, English language, European culture, the experience of 
writing, that continues until today – every time we meet again. We regularly meet 
with the four of us, in a tiny Indian restaurant at 2nd Avenue. The spices fuel our 
conversations. Besides that, Jerome Kohn took effort to extensively read and write 
comments on the sixth chapter of this dissertation. His questions and suggestions 
has helped to make this chapter much more coherent and clear.   
In New York, I also was able to meet the British-American architectural 
historian Kenneth Frampton as well as the Canadian architect George Baird 
during my stay in New York. It is well known in the field of architecture that both 
Frampton and Baird are influenced by the writings of Arendt. Moreover, they 
are the main protagonists of Arendt within the field of architecture. Somehow, 
my work reflects and elaborates their proposals. Particularly with George Baird 
I developed an extensive conversation on Arendt and architecture. I was able to 
visit him afterwards a couple of times at his home in Toronto, where we not only 
had thoughtful discussions on my texts, the current state of architecture, politics, 
the city, and so on, but where he also drove me around to show the architectural 
and gastronomic highlights of Toronto. His wife, Elisabeth, who welcomed me in 
their house with the warmest concerns, proved to be an outstanding cook – the 
whole of Canada already knew, but I only touched upon that through experience. 
Many thanks to you, George and Elisabeth. I am very happy that you are able to 
join me during the defense ceremony of this dissertation – and that the Faculty 
granted you to participate in the promotion committee, despite your formal 
retirement at the University of Toronto. You are active as ever, traveling around 
and still teaching. Many, many thanks for your guidance along this route! 
Now that this PHD-project has come to an end, I am of course eager to make 
it public. The ambition to make it actually readable, also meant something for 
the 'real book', the graphic design, the 'real book' that I had in mind. In times of 
e-books, I am still thrilled by real books, by real things that has a certain touch, 
weight, smell. I am very gratefull for the support I got from the graphic designer 
Klaartje van Eijk turning my pile of word-documents into an actual book in a 
rather smooth way. She helped me, voluntarily, finding a good printer, nice paper, 
reflected upon my first drafts for the lay-out of the chapters, discussed with me 
the cover, and simply shared many good advises about the lay-out program. 
Your experiences has been very helpful for me. I look forward to continue our 
collaboration! 
I want to mention specifically also three of my students of the 2017 Copenha-
gen-studio, Max Gelibter, Bronya Meredith, and Josh Stevenson-Brown, together 
with some of their friends. They allowed to proof-read the chapters of this book 
in order to correct the my mistakes in the use of the English language. It certainly 
prevented me from lots of doublures (The wrongs that still are out there, are 
certainly mine). Your job has been terrific. The effort you put in close-reading my 
texts makes me speechless.
A dissertation is meant to contribute to our common insight in specific scientific 
fields and to evoke responses. The first to respond is the committee that is invited 
to judge my writings. I am grateful to them, George Baird, Margaret Crawford, 
Hilde Heijnen, Michiel Riedijk, Cecilia Sjöholm, as well as Carola Hein, who 
acts as reserve member to the committee. To read this enormous work carefully, 
and granting it defensible, required lots of effort from your side. Only during the 
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defense, I will get learn your exact responses, and these aspects that attracted and 
convinced you, or these parts that need to be questioned, challenged, re-directed. 
It has to be said: you did not know the sheer size of my dissertation at the very 
moment of accepting the invitation. It probably took more of your time than 
expected. I am aware of the amount of work I putted on your shoulders through 
this invitation – it makes me even more grateful to the effort you had to do in 
order to judge my writings, to come to Delft in order to start a public discussion 
about my reflections.    
Most extensively I of course have been discussing my thoughts over the years 
with Tom Avermaete, who after the retirement of professor Barbieri became not 
only the daily supervisor but also the promotor of this dissertation. The conversa-
tions we have had has been both inspiring as challenging. I don’t know anybody 
else, Tom, that has the capacity to read and understand quickly the potential of 
the writings, as well as their inherent deficiencies and shortcomings. You were 
able to digest my texts, and see relationships that I not yet had discovered, as 
it often also prevented me to shortcut my writings, or being  superfluous. Your 
outstanding knowledge of the field of architecture and beyond, ranging from 
contemporary practices to architectural history, and from architectural theory 
to architectural criticism, as well as your knowledge of the fields of philosophy, 
sociology, politics (in several contexts around the globe) left me sometimes in awe. 
There are no words to descirbe how I enjoy(ed) our conversations - how they are 
sharp, thrilling and inspiring. Thank you, Tom!
In the final phase, I asked Klaske Havik and Arjan Gooijer to help with preparing 
the defense-ceremony and being present at that very moment as ‘paranimf’. 
Klaske, you somehow represents the academic field in which this dissertation is 
written. As a great colleague, I remember many discussions about architecture, 
landscape, tools of architecture, in particular literature, the public and so on 
and so forth. Working together actually is a delight. We share a broad view upon 
our profession, the urge to cross borders, as well as the need to find a different 
approach to architectural practices. From the many words I need to express 
myself, you easily shortcut it to less than half… 
Arjan, you represent my group of friends that have supported me along my 
jouney in many ways. Many of their names I have mentioned already. At this 
point, I specifically wanted to mention our 'architecture' group: together with 
Alwin Kaashoek, and Walter de Vries, we have had intense discussions about 
the current state of our profession, the potentialities of our cities. We had a 
nice sequence of traveling around in the Netherlands and abroad (particularly 
during snowstorms) to see and experience profound architectural, urban and 
landscape edifices that fueled our conversations. Great memories I nurture on our 
experiences with Dom Hans van der Laan. But in the car or during dinner, the 
conversations easily also went to the political developments in The Netherlands, 
to theological reflections on specific issues, and the actual challenges the churches 
we attend face today. Besides that, Arjan, you not only helped me to finish my 
writings by simply being the post-box to which I could send my production at the 
end of each day, but also with your comments on the parts you actually did read, 
your inspirings stories from everyday practices, and simply by being such a good 
friend. 
Finally – this work never could have been done without the support and challenge 
of my family. Here I need to switch to my mother tongue, that can express much 
more precisely the language of love. 
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Op allerlei manieren hebben mijn ouders, Niek en Aria Teerds, mijn ontwik-
keling gestimuleerd. Niet altijd met veel woorden, maar met duidelijke onder-
steuning en zorgen hebben jullie altijd klaar gestaan, vanaf het moment dat ik 
de universiteit betrad. Ik kwam thuis boordevol kritiek op alles, ook op alles wat 
er zoal gebouwd werd. Het ontlokte jullie wel eens de opmerking: als jij straks 
afgestudeerd ben, wat zal jij dan maken? Deze dissertatie is wellicht het antwoord 
– ook dit behoort tot het vakgebied van de architectuur. Het weerspiegelt mijn 
zoektocht naar vaste grond in het veld. Niet dat ik hier ‘de juiste architectuur’ heb 
gevonden, maar wel de reden waarom het noodzakelijk is ons uberhaupt druk te 
maken over architectuur. De appel valt daarmee niet al te ver van de boom. Er 
werd, binnen ons gezin, niet vaak iets ‘zomaar’ gedaan, zonder dat het daardoor al 
te ernstig werd. In alles wat jullie doen, proberen jullie het goede te doen voor ‘de 
naaste’. Er is in jullie altijd ruimte om je belangeloos in te zetten, jullie huis staat 
altijd open voor diegenen die even ruimte nodig hebben. Dat boden jullie ook 
mij, om nu dit proefschrift eens af te ronden. Het kwam er slechts een keer van… 
Mijn dank gaat hierbij overigens ook uit naar mijn broer Jan (en Annelies) en zus 
Annemarie (met Meindert) – voor gesprekken, vragen, en alle alledaagse dingen 
waar broers en zussen zich druk over maken. 
Via Mirjam heb ik er ook familie bij gekregen – allereerst wil ik haar vader 
noemen, die ik nog steeds elke dag mis. In de korte tijd dat ik hem heb gekend, 
is hij als een vriend voor me geworden. Aan een blik hadden we genoeg om 
elkaar te begrijpen. Prachtige gesprekken voerden we, waarin we elkaar op een 
prettige wijze aanvoelden. Hoe hij zijn ziekte in geloof en optimisme droeg is 
nog steeds een groot voorbeeld voor me. Corrie, en later Joop, hebben me ook 
altijd gesteund, zich ingezet voor ons gezin in de hectiek van alledag, of van 
verhuizingen en verbouwingen. Net als mijn schoonzussen en zwagers, Janneke 
en Christiaan, Marloes en Willem-Pieter en Jorien en Henk-Jan – in alles wat 
we met elkaar hebben meegemaakt is de onderlinge band alleen maar sterker 
geworden. 
Tenslotte is daar natuurlijk mijn gezin – mijn drie stoere zoons: Levi, Micha en 
Abe. Ik was al bezig met het schrijven van deze dissertatie voordat jullie geboren 
werden. Arendt schrijft bijzondere dingen over 'geboorte': met elke geboorte 
verandert de wereld, is er hoop op vernieuwing, worden nieuwe mogelijkhedne 
ontsloten. Dat effect hebben jullie zeker op mij gehad: als baby al lieten jullie, 
met jullie kwetsbaarheid, me anders naar de wereld kijken. En wat voor nieuwe 
werelden hebben jullie vervolgens voor mij ontsloten: van Cars tot Minecraft, 
van Lego Starwars tot alle ins- en outs van de 'hulpdiensten'. Daarmee is mijn 
bestaan verreikt, ook al waren mijn gedachten er niet altijd bij. Terecht vroegen 
jullie wel eens wanneer dit boek nu eens af zou zijn. Nu ja, nu dus. 
Mirjam, jij hebt dit hele project mogelijk gemaakt. Je ruime academische 
ervaring heeft echter zeker geholpen mijn eigen positie binnen de muren van 
de universiteit te begrijpen. Je hebt me uit de wind gehouden (en er weer terug 
in geplaatst) als dat nodig was. Op de momenten dat ik mij terugtrok – in het 
klooster, bij mijn ouders, in de bibliotheek, op zolder – lag er nogal wat op 
jouw schouders. In de ingewikkelde schema’s die ons leven tekenen, en die niet 
altijd gemakkelijk in elkaar te passen zijn, is dat een enorme prestatie. In dat 
spitsuur weet je aandacht te vragen voor wat echt belangrijk is, en tegelijkertijd te 
prikkelen om vooruit te komen en helder te formuleren. Je wist de juiste vragen 
te stellen, vertrouwen te geven, en uit te dagen. Als ik ergens 'at home' ben, dan is 
het bij jou. 
From me, to you. 
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SAMENVATTING 
(DUTCH SUMMARY)
In het najaar van 1999 bezocht ik voor eerste keer de Verenigde Staten van 
Amerika. Ik had juist een jaar lang wat minder tijd aan mijn studie architectuur 
besteed, om  in plaats daarvan me in te zetten als voorzitter van de kleine studen-
tenvereniging waarvan ik lid  was. Met veel genoegen en existentiële betrokken-
heid plaatsten we zwaarwichtige theologische en filosofische onderwerpen op de 
agenda van onze leden, onderwerpen waarover we artikelen schreven en lezingen 
en discussies organiseerden. Tegelijkertijd was ik penningmeester geworden 
van het International Design Seminar (INDESEM), een week-lange internati-
onale ontwerp-workshop dat op initiatief van Herman Hertzberger sinds 1986 
tweejaarlijks wordt georganiseerd op de Faculteit Bouwkunde in Delft. Na deze 
uitdagende week in Delft, met sprekers als uiteraard Herman Hertzberger zelf, de 
architecten Rem Koolhaas (Rotterdam), Annette Gigon (Zürich), en Jean Marc 
Ibos and Myrto Vitart (Parijs) vertrok een van de mede-commissieleden, Daan 
Zandbelt, voor een half jaar naar Chicago om er te gaan studeren. Samen met de 
voorzitster van INDESEM, Renate Pekaar, besloot ik hem er te gaan bezoeken 
– onze broodnodige vakantie na alle inzet. Een uitgelezen kans ook om kennis 
te maken met een land dat in de Nederlandse cultuur en media altijd nabij is. 
Chicago was overweldigend, net als New York, waar we op de terugweg naar Delft 
een tussenstop van vier dagen maakten. Of is dat een understatement, en kan 
ik in retrospectief zeggen dat deze kennismaking met de Amerikaanse cultuur 
beslissend is geweest voor mijn reflectie op de domeinen van de stad, cultuur, en 
samenleving, en de rol van de architectuur binnen die domeinen? Zeker, maar dan 
moet in het bijzonder ook één specifieke dag halverwege ons achtdaags verblijf in 
Chicago genoemd worden. Met zijn drieën huurden we een auto om twee hoogte-
punten van de moderne architectuur in de directe omgeving van de stad te gaan 
bekijken die we met enige regelmaat tijdens onze colleges voorbij hadden zien 
komen: het Farnsworth House ontworpen door Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (Plano 
Ill., 1951) en het Johnsons Wax Administration Building, ontworpen door Frank 
Lloyd Wright (Racine WI., 1939). Een dag gekenmerkt door uitersten. Vroeg in de 
morgen reden we de stad uit, de lange kaarsrechte wegen af, die we vanaf het café 
in de Hancock Tower onder het genot van een goede wijn al hadden afgetuurd tot 
aan de horizon. Tot dan toe was onze mobiliteit beperkt gebleven van het gedeelte 
binnen de Loop (de bekende bovengrondse metro die de binnenstad van Chicago 
omcirkelt) met hier en daar een tripje erbuiten, naar een universitaire campus of 
één van de vele villa’s ontworpen door Frank Lloyd Wright. Deze autorit was de 
eerste kennismaking met het Amerikaanse landschap (als we Lake Michigan, dat 
direct grenst aan de binnenstad, even niet meetellen). Of beter gezegd, de eerste 
kennismaking met de eindeloze Amerikaanse buitenwijken – het ritme van de 
houten huizen, de glad geschoren gazons, en de Amerikaanse vlaggen. 
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Mooier dan het Farnsworth House was bijna niet denkbaar – de eenvoud van 
witte constructie en compositie, omgeven door een herfstbos met dieprode en 
oranje-gele kleuren. In Racine, waar we kort na sluitingstijd van het kantoor 
aankwamen, liet de nachtportier ons nog binnen, na onze poging hem te 
overtuigen dat we juist voor dit gebouw uit Nederland waren gekomen. De lichten 
gingen niet aan, maar in de schemering mochten we tussen de bureaus rondlopen, 
voelen aan de bijzondere kolommen, ons vergapen aan de raamconstructie. Hoe 
overweldigend kan architectuur zijn. In de tussentijd, voordat de portier ons 
binnen kon laten, aten we pizza in een pizza-bakkerij om de hoek, tussen tal van 
buurtbewoners die er XXL pizza’s en XXL cola’s naar binnen werkten onder het 
ongezellige licht van een TL-balk en schreeuwerige cola-reclame. 
De ervaringen van deze reis hebben me niet meer losgelaten, gefascineerd als 
ik raakte door de Amerikaanse cultuur, de uitgestrektheid van het Amerikaanse 
landschap en de tastbaarheid van de Amerikaanse droom in de spiegelende 
wolkenkrabbers, de in serie geschakelde individuele paradijsjes, de malls en haar 
parkeerplaatsen, de drive-thru’s en haar reclames, en tegelijkertijd de keerzijde 
van dit alles, de grimmige wijken waar blok na blok is gesloopt, huizen dichtge-
timmerd, het metrostation gebarricadeerd, en mannen op kratten onder de luifel 
van het afgebrande tankstation hangen. Mijn onderzoek dat ik jaren later oppakte, 
en dat zich heeft gekristalliseerd in deze dissertatie, kan gezien worden als een 
langdurige verwerking van de ervaring van die dagen. In bepaald perspectief was 
het een schokkende ervaring, opgeroepen door deze kennismaking met de lokale 
bevolking in de buitenwijken van Chicago, van Plano en van Racine. Het verschil 
met de bewoners van appartementen aan de Lake Shore Drive en de werknemers 
die de kantoren bevolkten in het centrum van Chicago en die we op zondag langs 
Lake Michigan zagen joggen, of in de lunchpauze in de gym zagen spinnen, kon 
haast niet groter zijn. De segregatie van Chicago hadden we al ervaren. Toch 
drukte de trip naar de buitensteden van Chicago de vinger nog veel sterker op de 
achterkant van de blinkende wereld. 
Met in het achterhoofd deze ervaring start deze dissertatie met een hernieuwde 
tocht door het Amerikaanse landschap, deze keer in de omgeving van Orlando 
(FL.). In dit eerste deel van de studie (hoofdstuk 2 en 3) staat de publieke ruimte 
centraal. Juist in het Amerikaanse landschap staat deze ruimte onder druk. 
Theoretici spreken wel over het verlies van publieke ruimte.1 Hoewel elders in de 
wereld, van Europa tot met name Azië, dergelijke ontwikkelingen ook zichtbaar 
zijn (en soms zich zelfs nog scherper aftekenen), komt het debat over de publieke 
ruimte voort uit de ontwikkelingen in de Amerikaanse stad en het sub-urbane 
landschap. Het landschap wordt er gedomineerd door wat we ‘enclaves’ kunnen 
noemen, gated communities, shopping malls, historic districts, business districts. 
Ruimten die eenheden op zichzelf zijn, soms letterlijk afgegrendeld van de 
omgeving. Dit is niet alleen een ruimtelijke karakteristiek, maar ook in gebruik, 
sociaal gezien zijn het enclaves. Mensen met min of meer dezelfde achtergrond 
en uit dezelfde sociale klasse wonen of werken, winkelen of ontspannen er zich, 
terwijl ze tussen deze enclaves heen en weer reizen in de eigen private ‘cocon’, 
de auto. Dit beeld staat in scherp contrast met het ideaal dat door de theoretici 
verbonden wordt met de publieke ruimte. In de publieke ruimte is verschil juist 
essentieel, stellen zij. Wil de publieke ruimte ertoe doen, dan moet het een ruimte 
zijn waarin we de ‘ander’ kunnen ontmoeten, kennis kunnen maken met verschil, 
ideeën en visies kunnen uitwisselen. Dit ideaal staat nadrukkelijk in de context 
van de Westerse Democratische organisatie van de samenleving – die kan er 
immers niet alleen in bestaan dat via de weg van de representatie de verschillen 
1.  
De titels en ondertitels van boeken 
die in de Jaren negentig zijn gepub-
liceerd rondom dit thema spreken 
boekdelen, om een paar voorbeelden 
te noemen: Richard Sennett, The 
Fall of Public Man, New York:, W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1977);  Michael 
Sorkin, (red.), Variations on a Theme 
Park, The New American City and 
the End of Public Space (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1992); Bruce Robbins 
(red.), The Phantom Public Sphere 
(Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1993); Don Mitchell, ‘The 
End of Public Space? People’s Park, 
Definitions of the Public, and Democ-
racy’, in: Annals of the Association 
of American Geographers, Vol 85, 
No.1 (March 1995); Maarten Hajer 
en Arnold Reijndorp, Op zoek naar 
nieuw publiek domein, Analyse en 
strategie (Rotterdam: NAi Uitgeverij, 
2001); Lieven De Cauter, The Capsual 
Civilization, On the City in the Age 
of Fear (Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 
2004) 
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worden uitgevochten in de neutrale ruimte van het parlement. De democratie 
bestaat allereerst uit de ontmoetingen op straat, pas daarna uit de ontmoe-
tingen in het parlement, zo is het idee. De twee belangrijkste bronnen voor deze 
stelling zijn de studies The Human Condition van de Duits-Amerikaanse filosofe 
Hannah Arendt (1958) en Der	Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit van de Duitse 
filosoof Jürgen Habermas (1962).2 Met name de Engelse vertaling van Habermas’ 
analyse die in 1989 als The Structural Tranformation of the Public Sphere op de 
Amerikaanse markt verscheen,3 zwengelde het debat aan, waar het via de filosofie, 
politieke theorie ook in de domeinen van de stadsstudies en architectuurtheorie 
terechtkwam. Habermas (net als Arendt, overigens) is pessimistisch over de 
huidige staat van wat hij de publieke sfeer noemt – een somberheid die door de 
Amerikaanse theoretici ongetwijfeld herkend werd in de ontwikkelingen in de 
Amerikaanse stad en het Amerikaanse landschap. Met andere woorden: de theorie 
van Habermas en dagelijkse ervaring van de Amerikaanse samenleving, stad en 
landschap joegen het genoemde sombere discourse over de openbare ruimte aan. 
Habermas begint zijn analyse in de opkomst van de burgerij in de 18e en 19e 
eeuw. Door toegenomen welvaart en vrije tijd kreeg een deel van de bevolking 
tijd voor het bezoeken (en organiseren) van discussies over actualiteiten in de 
(nieuwe) cafés, salons en theehuizen – een praktijk die vooral in de steden Berlijn, 
Wenen, Londen en Parijs floreerde. Van belang is hier de uitvinding en ontwikke-
ling van de drukpers: wat besproken werd, werd aangereikt door ‘nieuwe media’: 
de krant en romans. Habermas’ stelling is dat die gesprekken, deze uitwisseling 
van standpunten, een nieuwe sfeer tot stand brachten tussen de traditionele 
maatschappelijke sferen van de overheid en de markt. In de nieuwe situatie 
hadden de overheid en de markt rekening te houden met deze publieke sfeer, 
beter gezegd, met de geldende opinie die in deze sfeer ontwikkeld werd via de 
gevoerde gesprekken. Het publiek was dus een nieuwe, zelfstandige kracht op het 
toneel, waartoe de andere krachten zich moesten verhouden om hun legitimiteit 
te behouden. Habermas is echter somber over deze publieke sfeer: ze komt, net als 
het domein van de overheid, onder invloed van de sfeer van de markt. De publieke 
sfeer verliest haar kracht ten opzichte van de andere domeinen, waarbij het 
gesprek en de uitwisseling van standpunten in de publieke ruimte verloren lijkt 
te gaan. Deze schets van de opkomst en ondergang van de publieke sfeer viel, niet 
onlogisch, in vruchtbare aarde in het Amerikaanse discourse. Bewust of onbewust 
was daar de verandering van het Amerikaanse landschap, waarin de segregatie 
en daarmee het verlies aan gedeelde ruimten met de dag duidelijker werd. Dat 
debat wordt in het begin van deze studie in kaart gebracht. De fundamentele 
vraag, die in de loop van deze studie nadrukkelijker aan de orde komt, is op welke 
manier architectuur er eigenlijk toe doet in dit perspectief. De studie begint echter 
eenvoudigweg met een inventarisatie van wat we in dit landschap tegenkomen en 
op welke manier deze artefacten gewaardeerd worden. 
De reden om mijn studie in Florida te starten is triest: het bericht van de dood 
van Travyon Martin begin 2012. Martin, een zwarte Amerikaanse tiener, werd 
doodgeschoten door een wijkwacht, die de bewuste avond achterdochtig rondjes 
reed door de gated community waarin hij woonde. Martin was niet gewapend, 
noch was hij iets crimineels van plan: hij was op bezoek bij zijn vader en liep 
heen en weer om een zakje Skittles te kopen bij een winkel net buiten het terrein 
van de gated community, en gebruikte daarvoor een sluiproute, een informele 
route, die rechtstreeks bij de winkel uitkwam, zonder de officiële toegangspoort 
tot de community te passeren. De zaak riep in Amerika vurig protest op, vooral 
omdat de nachtwaker snel weer vrijgelaten werd en het er niet naar uit zag dat 
2.  
Hannah Arendt, The Human Con-
dition (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1998 [1958]) – in het 
Nederlands verschenen als: Hannah 
Arendt, Vita Activa, Mens, bestaan en 
bestemming (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij 
Boom, 1994); Jürgen Habermas, 
Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit.	
Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie 
der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft 
(Neuwied/Berlin: Luchterhand, 
1962) – in het Nederlands pas recent 
vertaald als: Jürgen Habermas, De 
structuurverandering van het pub-
lieke domein (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij 
Boom, 2015) 
3.  
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere: 
An Inquiry into a Category of Bour-
geois Society (Cambridge (Mass.): 
MIT Press, 1989)
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er een serieus proces zou komen. De protesten waren het begin van wat later de 
‘black-lives-matter’ beweging zou worden, een beweging die protesteert tegen 
racisme in de samenleving en vooral ook binnen het politiekorps. Voor mij was 
het bericht, dat tot in de Nederlandse kranten doordrong, een teken van het 
failliet van de enclaves die het Amerikaanse landschap domineren. Met name 
de Amerikaanse stads-theoreticus en activist Mike Davis heeft dit landschap 
omschreven als een gemilitariseerd landschap. Angst, zo niet paranoia, heerst in 
de suburbs en binnensteden, stelt hij.4 Het heeft het landschap herschreven in een 
verzameling enclaves, omheind door muren, hekken en wachtposten, toegankelijk 
via poorten met portiers, camera’s, en ontworpen als afzonderlijke paradijsjes. 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik dergelijke enclaves, die ik tegenkom onderweg door 
Florida (toegegeven, via Google maps en Google streetview) – van de mall tot de 
luchthaven, het pretpark tot het historic district. Ik concludeer uit deze ervaringen 
dat er inderdaad geen (stedelijk) netwerk is dat de enclaves bij elkaar brengt en 
houdt, geen gemeenschappelijke ruimtes meer lijken te zijn, waarin verschillende 
mensen (en met name vreemden) elkaar tegenkomen, laat staan ontmoeten. 
Het vreemde is gevaarlijk geworden en moet daarom buitengesloten worden. 
De enclaves kennen allemaal eenzelfde patroon: een letterlijke terugtrekking uit 
de wereld, achter muren en hekken, een nadruk op veiligheid die leidt tot een 
toename van segregatie en ten slotte het benadrukken van de binnen-wereld
door er juist een soort paradijselijke oase van te maken. Zeker in het laatste 
decennium wordt er veel moeite gestoken in het ontwerp van de enclave. De 
gated community wordt zorgvuldig ontworpen, terwijl de winkelcentra zich 
steeds vaker en spectaculairder moeten vernieuwen om binnen de aandacht van 
de consument te blijven.5 Dit enclave-landschap resulteert letterlijk in ‘left-over 
space’, ruimte die overblijft buiten de poorten van de enclaves, waar de uitgeslo-
tenen noodgedwongen moeten verblijven. Deze ruimte wordt vervolgens door de 
enclave-bewoner als ‘gevaarlijke ruimte’ ervaren, waardoorheen men slechts met 
de auto reizen kan. In andere woorden: in deze constellatie is het vreemde nooit 
nabij. Ik karakteriseer dit landschap als ‘postmodern’, hoewel de strikte scheiding 
van functies en sub-urbanisering natuurlijk een uitvloeisel is van de Moderne 
benadering van de stad.6 Wat echter tastbaar aanwezig is, is het verlies van geza-
menlijkheid. Er is geen verhaal, geen structuur meer wat samenbindt, wat boven 
het individu uitgaat, of het moet het kapitalistische verhaal zijn.  
Het derde hoofdstuk verlegt de blik naar de binnensteden, die opmerkelijk 
genoeg momenteel in de Westerse wereld een revival ondergaan. In dit hoofdstuk 
komt de politieke dimensie van de publieke ruimte wat nadrukkelijker naar 
voren. Waar de Amerikaanse stad, met als meest trieste voorbeeld Detroit, tot 
voorkort een patroon kenden van leegloop van de binnenstad in het voordeel 
van de buitenwijk, is er nu een omgekeerde trend aan de gang. Er komen nieuwe 
inwoners van het centrum en de daaromheen liggende wijken. De mensen willen 
weer wonen waar het gebeurt, waar reuring is en keuzemogelijkheden, waar men 
verschil tegenkomt en nieuwe uitdagingen aan kan gaan. Deze omkering wordt 
ondersteund door een economische theorie rondom de ‘creatieve klasse’, zoals de 
nieuwe stadsbewoners door de econoom Richard Florida wordt genoemd. In zijn 
boek The Rise of the Creative Class stelt hij dat de stad het economisch potentieel 
voor het Westen heeft: creativiteit is cruciaal – en creativiteit wordt geprikkeld 
door ontmoetingen met anderen – onverwachte ontmoetingen voor onverwachte 
vergezichten, wendingen, doorbraken.7 Daarvoor is de stad met zijn koffie-
barretjes, restaurants, cafés, bioscopen, theaters, musea, zijn publieke ruimte, 
waarin jan-en-alleman door elkaar loopt, de uitgelezen plek. Nieuwe kansen 
dus voor de publieke ruimte en het daaraan verbonden politieke ideaal van 
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ontmoeting en uitwisseling tussen vreemden. Het overduidelijke succes van de 
stad heeft echter zijn keerzijde: de prijzen van vastgoed (en voor levensonder-
houd) gaan drastisch omhoog, zodanig dat noch oorspronkelijke bewoners, noch 
de pioniers van de nieuwe stedelijkheid, noch de middenklasse het zich op lange 
termijn kan veroorloven in de stad te wonen. Dit wordt het proces van gentrificatie 
genoemd. De stad wordt de woonplaats van de lagere klasse die in de buitenwijken 
geen kant op kan, en de hogere klasse, die zich het leven in het centrum kan 
veroorloven. Met andere woorden: de segregatie in de stad neemt hand over hand 
toe. In zijn nieuwste boek signaleert Florida deze hevige segregatie, die op een 
of andere manier duidelijk maakt dat de woningmarkt kwetsbaar is. De nieuwe 
stedelijke crisis noemt Florida de toenemende segregatie.8 Dergelijke segregatie 
is ook de oorzaak voor de toenemende spanningen tussen de buitenwijken en de 
binnensteden, zoals deze bijvoorbeeld tot uitbarsting kwamen in 2005 in Parijs en 
Londen. Met deze plunderingen en protesten zijn we aangekomen bij het politieke 
perspectief achter de publieke ruimte. In zijn begrip van publieke ruimte scherpt 
de Amerikaanse architect Michael Sorkin de politieke dimensie aan. Publiek wordt 
een ruimte pas als er gedemonstreerd kan worden, stelt hij, als deze ruimte geeft 
aan politieke actie.9 Meer nog dan de spanningen tussen buitenwijk en binnenstad 
geldt voor dit perspectief het voorbeeld van het jaar 2011, toen opvallenderwijs in 
het Westen de Occupy-beweging de aandacht trok met protesten en bezettingen 
van (semi-)publieke plaatsen in de stad, en in de Arabische wereld de revolutio-
naire protesten in een reeks van landen rondom de Middellandse Zee. Met name 
via de Occupy-beweging komt de vraag naar het ontwerp van de openbare ruimte 
aan de orde. Veel hedendaagse ruimten zijn prachtig vormgegeven, maar bieden 
ook weinig mogelijkheid tot toe-eigening. Op welke manier draagt architectuur 
bij aan een publieke ruimte die ook daadwerkelijk door het publiek toegeëigend, 
gebruikt kan worden? Het slot van dit hoofdstuk gaat te rade bij het ontwerp van 
Parc de La Villette in Parijs, een ontwerp van de architect Bernard Tschumi uit 
1986. Het park zit ingenieus in elkaar, geeft veel mogelijkheid tot toe-eigening van 
ruimte, naast dat er ook ‘vaste programmaonderdelen’ zijn. Verschillende routes 
lopen door het park, terwijl het park ook een eigen routing heeft. Beide aspecten 
zorgen ervoor dat er mensen komen met verschillende bestemmingen – van 
buurtbewoners die er even uit willen, tot bezoekers aan het wetenschapsmuseum, 
van bewoners van verderop die met hun fiets het park doorkruisen op weg naar 
het centrum van Parijs, tot bezoekers die het kronkelpad aflopen. De analyse 
belicht, naast deze twee aspecten (route en programma), ook de ogenschijnlijke 
eenheid, de tastbaarheid van de geschiedenis, de manier waarop het park is 
ingebed in de stedelijke structuur, en tenslotte de ogenschijnlijke eenheid van het 
geheel. Ondanks dat het park een ‘succes’ is, intensief gebruikt door een variëteit 
aan mensen, kan niet gesteld worden dat het een park is voor iedereen en dat alle 
mogelijke praktijken er een plaats kunnen vinden. Ook in een dergelijke, ontegen-
zeggelijk openbare ruimte, gelden restricties. 
De belangrijkste aspecten met betrekking tot de publieke ruimte zijn hiermee 
aan de orde geweest. Architectuur, zoveel is duidelijk geworden, draagt bij aan de 
ervaring van deze publieke ruimte, maar tegelijkertijd ook aan de on-mogelijkheid 
ervan. Ook al passeerden enkele ‘instrumenten’ van architectuur de revue om 
‘verschil’ toe te laten in de openbare ruimte, hoe architectuur zich op meer funda-
menteel dan pragmatisch niveau verhoudt tot het politieke en het publieke bleef 
onduidelijk. Het ideaal van uitwisseling is, ook in succesvolle publieke ruimten, 
niet gegarandeerd. Vanaf dit moment in de studie wordt de blik verlegd naar 
het gedachtegoed van de andere bron van discussie over de publieke ruimte, de 
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filosofe Hannah Arendt, die in het debat over ruimte, stad en architectuur slechts 
miniem aan de orde komt. Arendt is in het architectonische discourse met name 
geïntroduceerd door de Brits-Amerikaanse hoogleraar architectuur geschiedenis 
Kenneth Frampton, de Canadese architect en hoogleraar architectuur George 
Baird, en recent in de theoretische reflectie op het vak door de Italiaanse architect 
Pier Vittorio Aureli.10 
De keuze bij Arendt te rade te gaan om de verhouding tussen architectuur 
en het publieke domein te begrijpen verdient enige uitleg. Achter die keuze 
gaat een fundamentele aanname over de architectonische professie schuil en 
heeft bovendien methodische consequenties. Er zijn grofweg twee scholen in de 
architectuur: de eerste benadrukt de autonomie van het veld, terwijl de andere 
stelt dat architectuur altijd afhankelijk is van factoren buiten het eigen domein. 
Mijn keuze om een bron van buiten de architectuur te gebruiken als lens om het 
vak te analyseren plaatst deze studie in het tweede perspectief. Inderdaad is dat 
de aanname: architectuur mag dan een eigen kennisdomein zijn, ontwikkeld 
in eeuwen omgang met ruimte en gebouwen, steden en landschappen, het 
vak opereert niet autonoom. De totstandkoming van gebouwen wordt, naast 
architectonische overwegingen, ook beïnvloed door bijvoorbeeld economische 
principes, culturele perspectieven, sociale factoren en politieke uitgangspunten. 
De keuze om vanuit de filosofie naar architectuur te kijken betekent wel dat er een 
brug geslagen moet worden tussen twee verschillende kennisdomeinen. Arendt 
zelf spreekt nauwelijks over architectuur en de meeste reflecties op haar werk 
brengen geen verbinding tot stand met haar perspectief enerzijds en de stad, het 
landschap, en de concrete publieke ruimte anderzijds. Deze studie, kortom, leest 
concepten uit een filosofisch perspectief (die bovendien inmiddels bijna 60 jaar 
geleden geformuleerd zijn) en brengt deze naar een architectonisch perspectief. 
Daar zit het gevaar in om de concepten (a.) te letterlijk te nemen, of (b.) te vrij. 
Kortom, de vraag is op welke manier wordt recht gedaan aan beide perspectieven 
en kunnen ze toch op elkaar betrokken worden? Dit is geen nieuwe vraag, maar 
een die, zoals de Duitse filosoof Hans-Georg Gadamer stelde in zijn bekende boek 
Wahrheit und Methode (1960), in alle interpretaties van (historische) teksten 
aan de orde is: een hermeneutische kwestie. Arendt zelf was zich bewust van de 
afstand tot haar bronnen. Ook zij gaat in haar werk terug naar de bronnen van 
bepaalde fenomenen – haar bronnen zijn vooral de Klassieken – en is zich terdege 
bewust dat deze bronnen in een andere context en tijd geschreven zijn, dan de 
vragen die zij aan deze teksten stelt. Deze afstand is alleen maar toegenomen door 
de moderniteit, stelt zij. Ze omschrijft de moderniteit als het doorsnijden van 
de banden van traditie, waardoor de kloof tussen het verleden en heden groter 
wordt en deze slechts zelfstandig denkend kan worden overbrugd.11 Die denkbe-
weging is noodzakelijk, stelt ze. Ook al worden we niet meer geleid door traditie, 
het verleden bepaalt nog steeds het heden. Onze verwachtingen worden nog 
steeds gevormd door de geschiedenis, ondanks de toekomst-gerichtheid van de 
moderne tijd. Tegelijkertijd beseft Arendt dat een dergelijk denkproces enkel kan 
betekenen dat wat we uit bronnen uit het verleden naar het heden brengen een 
fragmentarisch resultaat kan opleveren. Slechts fragmenten kunnen opgedoken 
worden uit het verleden – de fragmenten kunnen nooit in zijn gehele betekenis, 
die het vroeger heeft gehad, begrepen worden. Arendt komt tot deze reflecties 
naar aanleiding van het werk van de Duitse filosoof en literatuurcriticus Walter 
Benjamin, die ze uit Parijs kende, toen ze er beide woonden en werkten, op de 
vlucht waren voor de opkomst van het Nazisme in Duitsland. Ze omschreef zijn 
methode, die ze met instemming bespreekt en duidelijk ook ziet als een beschrij-
ving van haar eigen benadering, als een ‘fragmentarische historiografie’.12 Dit 
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geldt ook min of meer voor deze studie, die terug gaat naar een van de originele 
bronnen van het debat over openbare ruimte, en fragmenten uit die bron opduikt 
en aan de oppervlakte brengt in het architectonisch discourse. Het opduiken van 
deze fragmenten levert nieuwe gezichtspunten op en aspecten, die geherwaar-
deerd en gearticuleerd zouden moeten worden. Het openen van deze perspec-
tieven en het bespreken daarvan binnen een architectonisch kader, zonder te 
komen tot een alomvattende theorie, is het belangrijkste doel van deze studie. 
Tegelijkertijd geldt dat dit architectonisch kader ook nieuw licht werpt op Arendts 
reflecties. Het belang van de concrete, tastbare ruimte, van objecten en (kunst)
werken, wordt in het veld van de filosofie immers weleens over het hoofd gezien.13 
Een architectonische reflectie kan bijdragen om deze aspecten weer in beeld te 
krijgen en nog dichter met Arendts intrigerende studies te verbinden.    
Arendt wordt in 1906 geboren in de Duitse stad Hannover, groeit op in Königs-
berg, de huidige Russische stad Kaliningrad. Ze studeert filosofie en theologie 
in Berlijn en Marburg, onder andere bij de bekende filosoof Martin Heidegger. 
Ze schrijft in Heidelberg een dissertatie over het  begrip ‘liefde’ in het werk 
van Aurelius Augustinus in Heidelberg, onder begeleiding van de filosoof Karl 
Jaspers. Hoewel het politieke haar aandacht niet trekt, komt ze als Joodse steeds 
meer in aanraking met de beperkingen die het Nationaal Socialisme in de jaren 
dertig aan deze bevolkingsgroep oplegt. Dat roept haar weerstand op, waardoor 
ze zijdelings in aanraking komt met de Joodse als ook met de Communistische 
beweging. Ze wordt opgepakt en vastgezet door de Gestapo, maar komt na een 
aantal dagen vrij. Naar aanleiding van deze ervaring vertrekt ze uit Duitsland, om 
via Parijs in New York te belanden. Haar hele latere oeuvre kan gelezen worden 
als een reflectie op haar ervaringen en deze gebeurtenissen in haar moederland. 
Ze publiceert bekend geworden politiek getinte studies als The Origins of Totali-
tarianisme (1951), The Human Condition (1958), On Revolution (1963). Vooral 
haar reflectie op het proces van Adolf Eichmann, gepubliceerd als Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), en haar omschrijving van 
deze ‘ingenieur’ als ‘gedachteloos’ roept heftige reacties op, zowel binnen de 
Amerikaanse gemeenschap als ook vanuit Joodse hoek, maar vestigt ook haar 
naam als weerbarstige en eigenwijze denkster. Het is voor haar aanleiding om nog 
dieper in deze analyse te duiken. Gedachteloosheid is het gevaar van de moderne 
tijd, stelt ze. Deze studie heeft ze, door haar onverwachte dood in 1975, niet af 
kunnen schrijven. Twee van de drie delen zijn geschreven, en worden postuum 
gepubliceerd als The Life of the Mind (1978).
Voor een reflectie op openbare ruimte is vooral The Human Condition van belang 
– het is, zoals hierboven gesteld, een van de primaire bronnen in dit debat. In 
deze studie maakt Arendt onderscheid tussen drie verschillende vormen van 
menselijke activiteit: arbeiden, werken en handelen. Arbeiden heeft te maken met 
de cycli van natuurlijke processen, met overleven. Werken heeft te maken met het 
weerstand bieden tegen de natuurlijke cycli. Het produceert dingen die blijven, 
die een zekere permanentie hebben. Dat is essentieel, stelt Arendt. Zonder dat 
een dergelijke permanentie de natuurlijke cycli doorbreekt, is menselijk leven 
niet mogelijk. Werken schept een wereld-van-dingen. Deze wereld is nadrukkelijk 
gemeenschappelijk, de context van de mens in meervoud. De mens is niet alleen 
op aarde, hij is deel van een menselijke gemeenschap. Tezamen wordt de wereld 
gevestigd, wordt aan de natuur weerstand geboden. Deze wereld-van-dingen is 
daarmee ook de noodzakelijke context van het publieke leven, dat centraal staat 
in de activiteit van het handelen. Het handelen is het politieke bezig-zijn, gericht 
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op en gevestigd in de wereld. Het handelen wordt noodzakelijkerwijs gevolgd door 
spreken. Zonder gesprek is handelen niet mogelijk. 
In deze dissertatie wordt Arendts reflecties op de politieke, publieke, culturele, 
fysieke en mentale structuren uitgewerkt in drie hoofstukken. Het eerste, 
hoofdstuk 5, pakt dit begrip van het ‘handelen en spreken’ op. Handelen heeft 
slechts zin in de publieke ruimte, waar het voor anderen zichtbaar en hoorbaar is. 
Wil actie (Arendt gebruikt in het Engels het begrip ‘action’, in haar eigen Duitse 
vertaling ‘Das Handeln’, de Nederlandse vertaling kiest ook voor ‘handelen’, 
en mist daardoor de activistische echo die zeker hoorbaar aanwezig is in 
haar begrip) impact krijgen, dan moet er door anderen met bijval gereageerd 
kunnen worden. Ik betoog in dit hoofdstuk dat Arendts concept in feite een 
heel ‘ruimtelijk’ concept is. Om dat te verduidelijken zet ik Arendts lezing 
van de openbare ruimte naast Habermas’ perspectief, dat ik eerder besprak. 
Centraal in Habermas’ concept staat niet actie maar inter-actie, communicatie. 
Hoewel het in zijn voorbeeld van de cafés, salons en koffiehuizen om concrete 
gesprekken gaat, verliest dit gesprek al snel zijn realiteit en ruimtelijkheid. Dit 
gesprek wordt immers voor een groot gedeelte gevoerd op opiniepagina’s van 
kranten, in tijdschriften, op televisie, op fora op internet en via sociale media. 
De rol van nieuwe media (in zijn analyse van de 18e en 19e eeuw dus de krant) 
spelen een belangrijke rol in zijn beeld van de openbare ruimte. Zij informeren 
het publiek met betrekking tot de actualiteiten, politieke en bestuurlijke zaken. 
Het gaat bij Habermas tenslotte om die ‘publieke opinie’, de tegen-macht ten 
opzichte van regering en markt, die gevormd wordt door de uitwisseling tussen 
het geïnformeerde publiek. Dat is in feite het meta-perspectief, waaraan alle 
lokale ontmoetingen, gesprekken en discussies bijdragen. Arendt tekent echter 
nergens zo’n meta-perspectief waaraan de ontmoetingen in de openbare ruimte 
moeten bijdragen. Ze houdt het juist klein en lokaal. Het gaat erom dat we aan 
elkaar verschijnen in woord en daad. Arendt noemt de publieke ruimte dan ook 
de ruimte van verschijning. De verschijning is niet zozeer gebonden aan onze 
lichamelijke gestalte, maar vooral aan de manier waarop we handelen en spreken. 
Niemand handelt en spreekt hetzelfde, hoe we dus aan de ander verschijnen is 
uniek. Publieke ruimte is volgens Arendt dan ook per definitie een plurale ruimte: 
ieder verschijnt op een eigen manier, op een eigen positie in die ruimte. Geen 
twee perspectieven vallen samen. Omdat dit handelen en spreken persoonlijk is, 
blijft Arendts beeld van de ‘verschijningsruimte’ concreet ruimtelijk, en dus ook 
aanleiding om dit binnen de architectuur te agenderen. Voor Arendt is verschijnen 
het doel, en pluraliteit het resultaat, al stelt ze meteen dat handelen essentieel is: 
handelen houdt de mogelijkheid open voor verandering. Als actie weerklank vindt, 
kan het onvoorstelbare gebeuren. Dat is ook de reden waarom deze ruimte onder 
druk staat: ze is oncontroleerbaar en onvoorspelbaar. De verschijningsruimte is 
echter niet gebonden aan een concrete, gefixeerde ruimte. Het is niet zo dat ze 
alleen maar plaats kan vinden op pleinen of in parken, die ontworpen zijn voor 
een dergelijk doel. In tegendeel: het staat of valt met mensen die bij elkaar komen 
en temidden van elkaar aan elkaar verschijnen. Dat is een bevrijdend perspectief, 
aangezien een dergelijke ruimte op zijn minst in theorie ook binnen enclaves 
kan ontstaan. Het verschil dat Arendt benadrukt is ook meer aan de persoon 
gebonden, dan aan de sociale klasse, ras, achtergrond, opleiding of anderszins, 
dat in het gangbare debat centraal staat. Waar laat dit perspectief ons echter met 
betrekking tot de architectuur?
George Baird heeft erop gewezen dat ons dagelijkse gebruik van de stedelijke 
ruimte ver weg staat van wat Arendt voor ogen heeft met haar begrip ‘handelen’.14 
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We gebruiken ruimten intuïtief, op de automatische piloot en ervaren haar vaak 
niet bewust, laat staan dat we er zijn om in actie te komen. Hij maakt om deze 
gedachte uit te werken de stap naar reflectie op de architectuur, meer dan op de 
ruimte. Architectuur is de achtergrond van onze ruimtelijke activiteiten. Tege-
lijkertijd wordt het op één lijn gezet met de kunsten. Maar waar kunst (over het 
algemeen) om bewuste aandacht vraagt, daar is een dergelijke aandacht voor 
architectuur afwezig. Baird refereert hierbij aan de bespreking van architectuur 
door Walter Benjamin in zijn bekende artikel Het kunstwerk in het tijdperk 
van zijn technische reproduceerbaarheid.15 Waar andere kunstvormen de 
onverdeelde aandacht van de beschouwer opeisen, wordt de architectuur slechts 
als achtergrond ervaren, terwijl we gericht zijn op heel andere zaken. We zijn 
onderweg, zijn in een bespreking, zijn aan het werk, of aan het winkelen – archi-
tectuur is er altijd, maar onze waarneming ervan is onbewust. Architectuur kan 
mensen dus niet bewustmaken van de ruimte, van het publiek, van de ander, laat 
staan tot actie aanzetten – als dat al de ambitie van het architectonisch project 
was. Hij laat echter zien dat die actieve houding in de openbare ruimte zomaar tot 
stand kan komen. Een onverwachte gebeurtenis, een evenement of wat dan ook 
kan ons van het ene op het andere moment bewust maken van wat er om ons heen 
gebeurt. Hoe we aanwezig zijn in de openbare ruimte, is dan ook variërend op 
een spectrum van alertheid tot afleiding, van actief tot verstrooid. Baird komt met 
een drietal aspecten van ruimte die bijdrage aan het potentieel van de gebruikers 
om in actie te komen: zichtbaarheid, continuïteit en nabijheid – aspecten die 
overeenkomen met mijn analyse van Parc de La Villette. De verstrooide houding 
in de stedelijke publieke ruimte sluit aan bij wat Arendt stelt: een leven kan niet 
volledig in het publieke licht geleefd worden. Het verliest haar diepte, wordt een 
schaduw van zichzelf. Er is een private ruimte nodig waarin het zichzelf weer 
kan hervinden, zich kan voorbereiden om opnieuw aan de wereld te verschijnen. 
Arendt noemt deze private ruimte donker (in tegenstelling tot het licht van de 
publieke ruimte), niet vanuit een negatieve waardering, maar omdat ze hier 
verschijning en transparantie aan het publieke verbindt, en terugtrekking en 
bescherming (ook vanuit het zicht van de ander) aan het private. Die bescherming 
biedt ook de ruimte aan aspecten van het leven die niet uitgesproken kunnen 
worden, die met het natuurlijke te maken hebben: leven en dood, geboorte, liefde, 
pijn en verdriet. Dat zijn zaken die niet in het publieke kunnen komen, zonder 
hun wonderlijke diepgang te verliezen. Met andere woorden, de publieke ruimte 
kan niet zonder de private ruimte, en vice-versa. Arendt stelt immers ook dat een 
leven, volledig geleefd in de private ruimte, niet volledig tot haar recht komt. 
Uit deze overwegingen kom ik tot de conclusie dat de verschijningsruimte gaat 
om een moment en een beweging: het is het moment van de ervaring van het 
publieke, de ervaring van het publieke domein. We zouden het de ontologische 
ervaring van het publieke kunnen noemen. Arendts spreken over de verschijnings-
ruimte heeft een meer fenomenologisch karakter. De ontologische ervaring, die 
dus opgeroepen wordt door de verschijning, is essentieel, stelt Arendt. Alleen 
waarin in gezamenlijkheid de wereld wordt ervaren, wordt ook haar realiteit 
duidelijk. Al die verschillende perspectieven op het ene object, die ene wereld, die 
allemaal vanuit de eigen positie iets van dat object blootleggen, verzekeren ons 
van de werkelijkheid, als ook van haar complexiteit. Het is ook beweging: verschij-
ning is geen constante, het is letterlijk de overgang van het ene domein naar het 
andere. Van het private naar het publieke, van de ene publieke ruimte naar de 
andere. Die grensovergang is een aanknopingspunt voor een architectonische 
benadering. Immers, verschijnen is concreet, werkelijk en ruimtelijk – de ervaring 
van verschijnen, van de grensovergang, is daarom op zijn minst ook een architec-
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tonische ervaring. Architectuur trekt grenzen en bepaalt hoe deze vormgegeven 
zijn. Ze kunnen flinterdun en transparant zijn, of dik en ondoordringbaar, ze 
kunnen ruimtelijk worden en een ruimte in zichzelf, het kan een serie ruimtes zijn 
en tezamen een sequentie vormen. De talloze mogelijkheden die de architectuur 
biedt, kunnen bijdragen aan die ervaring van verschijning in het publieke en de 
terugtrekking in het private domein. Arendt noemt dit overigens het pre-politieke 
van de architectuur. Op een van de spaarzame momenten omschrijft Arendt de 
publiek ruimte als voorwaarde voor het publieke leven en trekt daarbij de lijn 
naar de opvattingen over het publieke leven in de Griekse Polis. Deze ruimte 
moet ‘zeker’ zijn, alvorens de participanten handelend en sprekend erin kunnen 
verschijnen. Deze zekerheid wordt enerzijds geboden door de wetten, die het 
publieke leven regelen, maar anderzijds ook door muren die haar beschermen 
tegen gevaar van buitenaf. Deze ‘bescherming’ gaat aan het politieke handelen 
vooraf – wetgeving en architectuur zijn dus pre-politiek, volgens Arendt.     
Nu we tot de conclusie kwamen dat de drempel, de grens, het potentieel van 
architectuur is, naast dat ruimte natuurlijk haar essentie is, richt ik mijn blik 
in hoofdstuk 6 op architectuur (grens én ruimte) als ‘object’, als resultaat van 
‘werken’. Architectuur behoort immers, volgens Arendt althans, tot deze categorie. 
Architectuur produceert objecten (ruimten, structuren, tekeningen, maquettes) 
die een zekere permanentie hebben, weerstand bieden tegen de natuur. Ze 
vormen, letterlijk, een wereld, een gemeenschappelijk geheel. De eerdergenoemde 
architectuurhistoricus Kenneth Frampton onderscheidde in zijn lezing van 
Arendts The Human Condition een duidelijke parallel binnen het architectonisch 
veld tussen arbeid en werk enerzijds en bouwen en architectuur anderzijds.16 
Bouwen en architectuur is een vrij algemeen geaccepteerd onderscheid binnen 
het architectonisch discours, een onderscheid dat verschil maakt tussen 
het alledaagse bouwen en uitzonderlijke gebouwen, gebouwen waarvan de 
betekenis niet verder reikt dan de eigen bestemming, en gebouwen waarvan de 
betekenis daar ver overheen reikt en op esthetische wijze aan ons appelleert. Het 
onderscheid is door de Britse architectuurhistoricus Nicolaus Pevsner op scherp 
gezet als het onderscheid tussen een fietsenstalling (bouwen) en Lincoln Cathedral 
(architectuur).17 Frampton laat zien hoe binnen het architectonisch veld sinds de 
18e eeuw inderdaad een onderscheid komt tussen de architecten die zijn opgeleid 
aan een ingenieursopleiding en architecten die opgeleid zijn aan een kunst-
academie. De eerste gingen doelmatig te werk, de tweede waren voornamelijk 
bezorgd om het vraagstuk van schoonheid. De laatste school lijkt de slag te hebben 
gemist: tijdens het modernisme in de architectuur werd doelmatigheid (en een 
bijbehorende esthetiek, dat wel) het ultieme doel. Frampton laat echter zien hoe 
economische principes meer en meer de architectuur beïnvloeden. Voor Arendt 
behoort de economische wetenschap tot de organisatie van het huishouden, 
bij de categorie van het ‘arbeiden’ dus. Frampton heeft daar een sterk punt te 
pakken: hoe meer de economische principes hun werk doen binnen het veld, hoe 
minder architectuur gekenmerkt wordt door de lange duur. Opdrachten worden 
slechts in gedeelten aan architecten gegeven, of architecten krijgen zelfs slechts 
de verantwoordelijkheid over de gevel, of over de ontwikkeling van ideeën. De 
uitwerking wordt door aannemers zelf gedaan, of door bureaus die bekend staan 
om efficiëntie en kostenbewust zijn. De stap is logisch, maar het opknippen van 
verantwoordelijkheden desastreus voor de coherentie van de plannen en de moge-
lijkheden daadwerkelijk iets van publieke betekenis te maken. Inderdaad lijkt er 
dus een verschuiving gaande binnen het veld van ‘werk’ naar ‘arbeid’, waarbij ook 
binnen de gebouwde omgeving iets van ‘omlooptijd’ zijn intrede doet. 
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Ook Pier Vittorio Aureli benadrukt de toenemende invloed van economische 
theorieën op de stadontwikkeling. Sinds het uitbreidingsplan van Cerda voor 
Barcelona (het alom bekende gridplan), stelt hij dat in de stedenbouw het 
algemene en generieke centraal is komen te staan, in plaats van het letterlijk 
vormgeven aan het stadsleven. De stedenbouw is economisch gedreven geworden, 
waarbij slechts ruimte is voor architectonische uitzonderingen in de vorm van 
iconen, die de stad niet vormgeven, maar haar wel onder de aandacht brengen.18 
Waar Frampton niet echt een duidelijke uitweg uit het door hem geconstateerde 
gevaar wijst (immers, de wereld zelf is in gevaar, als de lange duur ingewisseld 
wordt door omloopsnelheden), komt Aureli juist wel met een antwoord: een 
absolute concentratie op de vorm van het architectonisch project onthult de 
generieke en economische principes achter het ge-urbaniseerde landschap. 
In beide perspectieven is veel te vinden dat de aandacht vraagt, maar als reactie 
beargumenteer ik dat er geen onderscheid gemaakt zou moeten worden tussen 
het generieke en het afzonderlijke. Juist vanuit het idee dat architectuur blijvende 
objecten maakt (en toegegeven, ook een festivalpodium kunnen we tot het veld 
rekenen, ook al blijft deze soms niet langer dan een dag staan), en daarmee de 
wereld vormgeeft, niet alleen voor onszelf, maar ook voor hen die na ons komen, 
kunnen we niet een deel van het veld overgeven aan de ‘markt’ en ons vervolgens 
richten op de uitzonderingen. Elke opgave draagt immers bij aan de gemeen-
schappelijke wereld en heeft dus publieke betekenis. Die publieke betekenis 
wordt duidelijk als we hierbij Arendts begrip van ‘cultuur’ betrekken. Cultuur is 
in Arendts perspectief iets dat zich tussen ‘werk’ en ‘handelen’ bevindt. Arendt 
stelt dat de Grieken en de Romeinen beide een ander cultuurbegrip kenden. 
De Romeinen stelden ‘eerbied voor de getuigenis van het verleden’ centraal, 
terwijl bij de Grieken ‘de vervaardiging van kunst’ centraal stond. Het eerste 
perspectief legt de nadruk op ‘liefdevolle zorg’ enerzijds en ‘interventie’ gericht 
op de toekomst, anderzijds.19 Architectuur als cultureel verantwoorde omgang 
met de wereld, zo zouden we kunnen stellen, omvat beide perspectieven. Ze gaat 
behoedzaam om met het bestaande en tegelijkertijd maakt ze toekomstige ontwik-
kelingen mogelijk. 
Vanuit Arendts reflectie op de menselijke activiteit van het ‘werken’ en met 
name haar bespreking van het kunstwerk, als exemplarisch product dat door werk 
wordt voortgebracht, zijn vervolgens ook lessen voor de architectuur te definiëren. 
Deze lessen hebben allemaal te maken met de ervaring en verbeelding van de 
werkelijkheid. Kunst is het ultieme resultaat van werken, omdat het geen ander 
doel dient dan zichzelf en haar eigen schoonheid. Het wordt niet verbruikt, raakt 
niet versleten en heeft dus een onbegrensde lange duur. Bovendien heeft kunst 
de capaciteit van verbeelding, van verstoffelijking, van condensatie en transfor-
matie – aspecten die bijdragen aan het onthullen en bevestigen van de complexe 
werkelijkheid van de wereld. Kunst, met andere woorden, bevestigt allereerst 
de gemeenschappelijke wereld en onthult deze tegelijkertijd. Kunst bevestigt 
de gemeenschap. Maar daarvoor moet kunst wel openbaar gemaakt worden, 
ontsloten worden. Ze kan, in de meeste gevallen, niet simpelweg buiten getoond 
worden. Daarvoor is ze te kwetsbaar. Musea zijn nodig om de kunstwerken te 
ontsluiten. Arendt brengt hier de architectuur niet ter sprake. Ik beargumenteer 
echter dat ondanks dat architectuur wel verslijt en vervangen of vernieuwd moet 
worden, ook architectuur in dit perspectief hoge ogen gooit. Architectuur draagt 
immers op een alledaagse wijze bij aan de ervaring van de wereld. Ze hoeft niet 
ontsloten te worden, ze is daar gewoon, achter elke hoek in de stad, in elk land-
schappelijk perspectief. Opnieuw komen hier de drempels en wanden aan de 
orde: met name de overgangen tussen ruimtes prikkelen de zintuigen – en, zoals 
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Arendt in haar latere studie The Life of the Mind stelt, het zijn juist die zintuigen 
die ons een sensatie van de wereld geven, die ons overtuigen van de werkelijkheid 
van de wereld, met name als deze een zesde zintuig ontsluiten, de common-sense, 
die Arendt niet zomaar omschrijft als algemeen inzicht, maar als een inzicht 
gebaseerd in de menselijk gemeenschap, een 'community-sense'.20 Architectuur, 
zo concludeer ik, verbindt ons on-middellijk met de gemeenschappelijke wereld 
en de gemeenschap, zoals geen ander werk en culturele activiteit dat kan.
Deze dissertatie rondt tenslotte af met aandacht voor architectuur als activiteit. 
Tot hiertoe is het voornamelijk gegaan over architectuur als gebouwde omgeving 
(waarbij de architectuur gericht is op interventie en transformatie, het plaats 
maken voor andere programma’s, veranderende inzichten en nieuwe kansen). Het 
ontwikkelen van die ideeën, het inzetten van verbeelding, van overtuiging en van 
het vermogen iets nieuws te starten, is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 7. Ik betoog 
daarin dat architectonisch ontwerpen (om daarmee dit proces van idee-ontwik-
keling tot daadwerkelijk bouwen te benoemen) voor een groot gedeelte ‘werken’ 
is, maar dat het ook raakvlakken heeft met ‘handelen’ enerzijds, en ‘denken’ en 
‘oordelen’ anderzijds. Op zijn minst zal duidelijk zijn dat een gebouw niet slechts 
door de ontwerper geconcipieerd wordt. De opdrachtgever heeft minstens zo’n 
grote invloed, als ook de constructeur, de aannemer, de financier. De architect 
kijkt bovendien naar de voorkeuren van de gebruiker, naar de wensen (en vaak 
bezwaren) van omwonenden, de ambities van politici (en de geldende regels op 
een bepaalde plaats). Hoe hij deze input waardeert, hangt af van eigen ambities, 
van zijn architectuurbeschouwing. Met andere woorden: de architect wordt in het 
hele proces ook gevraagd positie te kiezen.  
Het ontwikkelen en uitwerken van ideeën is allereerst werk – werk van 
handen, in directe verbinding met het oog en de reflectie. Klassiek is uiteraard het 
schetsen, het maken van talloze schetsen met slechts kleine veranderingen, die 
soms toch het oog kunnen verrassen. De hand gaat zijn eigen weg, de hersenen 
reflecteren op wat er voor het oog verschijnt. Hoewel de computer veel van dit 
werk overneemt en verandert, blijft deze essentiële vorm van ontwerpen in veel 
gevallen nog overeind. In dit proces komt het lezen van heden en verleden en de 
kracht van verbeelding van mogelijke toekomsten samen, wordt het gespiegeld 
aan ervaringen, en verfijnd door het gebruik van kennis uit andere domeinen. 
Daarom is elke interventie en elk ontwerp in zekere zin een prototype. Er wordt 
getest en verder gesleuteld op basis van de ervaringen. Door die interventies (en 
door de oefening in het ontwerpen) wordt kennis opgebouwd – veel van deze 
kennis is praktische kennis, die overgedragen kan worden tussen ontwerpers 
onderling, bijvoorbeeld via de opleidingen. Een deel van die kennis is echter 
ongrijpbaar en niet overdraagbaar. Dat is de kennis die persoonlijk wordt 
opgedaan in de oefening van het ontwerpen. Tacit knowledge heeft de filosoof 
Michael Polanyi dat genoemd, persoonlijke kennis waarvan we ons nauwelijks 
bewust  zijn.21 Het is deze kennis die onze handen aanstuurt als we aan het 
schetsen zijn – die daardoor als vanzelf de juiste verhoudingen op papier zetten 
–, die essentieel is om een opgave, een kaart, een tekening, een locatie te kunnen 
lezen, om de verbeelding aan de spreken, om voorstellen te kunnen tekenen voor 
mogelijke toekomsten. Tacit knowledge is ervaringskennis die we verinnerlijkt 
hebben – het is de kennis die ontwerpers ‘in actie’ aanspreken. 
De computer wordt soms ingezet om de subjectiviteit van de ontwerper 
verder terug te dringen. Een begrijpelijke ambitie, maar ik betoog dat het geen 
goede ontwikkeling is. Integendeel: een zekere subjectiviteit is onontkoombaar, 
en verbindt de architectuur juist met de ‘wereld’. Daarmee betoog ik niet dat 
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de architect in het ontwerpproces centraal staat, maar juist dat als architectuur 
en haar bijdrage aan de wereld en haar inwoners de focus is van het architec-
tuur proces, dat dan de subjectieve interventie noodzakelijk is. De wereld is van 
plaatst tot plaats en van tijd tot tijd verschillend. De architectonische interventie 
anticipeert daarop. Het verantwoord omgaan met verschil staat op gespannen 
voet met de poging het ontwerpproces te objectiveren. De ontwerper draagt 
persoonlijk een publieke verantwoordelijkheid, heeft een culturele roeping om 
zorg te dragen voor de wereld en haar inwoners, om daarin, voor zover noodza-
kelijk, in te grijpen. Deze ethische blik stelt dus dat alle andere ambities – van 
architect, opdrachtgever, politici – tegen deze achtergrond gewogen moeten 
worden. Het generiek maken van het proces, waarbij de ambities tezamen met 
allerlei randvoorwaarden worden omgezet in parameters om zo tot een ontwerp 
te komen, is in dit kader niet de juiste weg. Het ontneemt de ontwerper verant-
woordelijkheden, terwijl deze juist vanuit de eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor 
de wereld en haar inwoners een publieke opgave heeft, waarop hij of zij ook 
aangesproken kan worden. Bovendien, stel ik vast dat de architectuur geen 
generieke wetenschap is. Waar andere vakgebieden kunnen uitgaan van algemeen 
herhaalbare processen, waarop geïntervenieerd en geanticipeerd kan worden, 
kan dat binnen de ruimtelijke interventie niet, juist vanwege die combinatie 
van wereld enerzijds en mens anderzijds. Elke locatie is anders qua geografie, 
topografie, geschiedenis, bewoning, culturele en politieke context, en elke opgave 
komt uit een andere behoefte voort, een behoefte die lang niet zeker is en juist 
door de zichtbaarheid en tastbaarheid van het ontwerp(proces) veranderen kan. 
Architectuur opereert op het snijvlak van on-mogelijkheden, het on-voorziene, het 
on-gedachte, terwijl de interventies zelf uiteindelijk voor lange tijd bepalend zijn 
voor stad, land en bewoners. Juist daarom behoort de architectonische interventie 
ook telkens opnieuw doordacht te worden. Niet dat daarbij aan ieders wensen 
recht gedaan kan worden. De ontwerper moet keuzes maken en zit daarom altijd 
in een onbevredigende en ongemakkelijke positie. Ik stel vast dat deze onge-
makkelijke positie een vruchtbare positie is: de verantwoordelijkheid die de 
architect draagt is immers niet om het even, maar bepaalt de wereld en het leven 
van haar gebruikers voor langere tijd. Het is een politieke verantwoordelijkheid, 
die allereerst gevoeld mag worden, om deze vervolgens ook publiekelijk aan te 
kaarten. 
    
Arendt heeft nooit het laatste deel van The Life of the Mind kunnen schrijven, 
het deel dat het denken verbindt met oordelen. Wel zijn na haar dood samenvat-
tingen en aantekeningen van haar lezingen over dit thema gepubliceerd, waarin 
Arendt het esthetisch oordelen zoals de Duitse filosoof Immanuel Kant dit heeft 
beschreven, neemt als haar model voor het politieke oordelen.22 Oordelen, stelt 
Arendt met Kant, is niet hetzelfde als logisch redeneren dat ons vertelt wat we 
wel en niet moeten doen. Oordelen gaat ook niet over het blootleggen van ‘de 
waarheid’, maar over het ontdekken van het aannemelijke. Dat vergt allereerst het 
vermogen om vanuit verschillende standpunten te kunnen kijken, of beter gezegd, 
zich in die standpunten te verplaatsen, om vanuit dat perspectief te kunnen kijken 
(en zo de meerdere facetten van de werkelijkheid niet alleen te beseffen, maar 
ook te begrijpen). Ik zie hier een belangrijke parallel met het ontwerpproces. De 
ontwerper moet per definitie andere standpunten, wensen, ambities nagaan om 
er een antwoord op te definiëren, om het in het ontwerp te verwerken. Arendts 
beschrijving van oordelen gaat echter verder: men moet zich letterlijk verplaatsen 
in de andere positie om dat perspectief in de vingers te krijgen. Bovendien geldt 
zeker bij ontwerpen, dat de ontwerper zelf betrokken is in het proces en de 
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opgave: daarom moet ook het vermogen het eigen handelen onder de loep te 
nemen en te analyseren aangesproken worden. Een oordeel vellen is vervolgens 
niet uitkomen op het gemiddelde, maar het aanspreken van de kennis opgedaan in 
de andere posities en dit te combineren met architectonische kennis, om op basis 
daarvan een beslissing te nemen die aannemelijk is. Oordelen (en ontwerpen) 
vertrekt dus vanuit de diversiteit, heeft de ruimte van het reflectieve nodig en stelt 
voorwaarden aan de uitkomst omdat deze in ieder geval weer aan het publiek 
uitgelegd moet kunnen worden. Ontwerpbeslissingen, met andere woorden, 
zijn publieke beslissingen: ze moeten uitgelegd kunnen worden en kunnen zich 
niet verschuilen achter persoonlijke smaak en wereldbeeld. Ontwerpen zien als 
oordelen over het beschikbare materiaal, gezien vanuit zoveel mogelijk betrokken 
perspectieven, zorgt ervoor dat het persoonlijke niet achterblijft of ontkend wordt, 
maar wel dat erover gesproken kan worden (ook door niet-architecten) en dat het 
dienstbaar gemaakt wordt aan het publieke belang.  
Architectuur – zo zou het antwoord op de fundamentele vraag, waarmee deze 
studie begon, kunnen zijn – draagt op cruciale wijze bij aan de ervaring van het 
publieke. Het is als culturele activiteit allereerst zelf een publieke aangelegenheid. 
Dit perspectief formuleert een ethisch kader voor de architect, waarin de wereld 
en haar bewoners de horizon zijn. Het doel van architectuur is dan het scheppen 
van een ‘thuis’ voor de mens in deze gemeenschappelijke wereld (die telkens aan 
verandering onderhevig is). In het kader van het ontsluiten van de gemeenschap-
pelijke wereld is de essentie van architectuur om dit gemeenschappelijke zichtbaar 
en vooral ook ervaarbaar te maken. Hoewel architectuur geen ‘verschijnings-
ruimten’ kan creëren, waarin bewoners van de wereld aan elkaar verschijnen, 
draagt ze wel bij aan de potentie van ruimte om verschijningsruimte te kunnen 
zijn en bovendien aan de ervaring van het verschijnen zelf. Die grensovergang, 
die essentieel is aan verschijning, is architectonisch potentieel –  en daarmee 
articuleert de architectuur de werkelijkheid van de gemeenschappelijke wereld. 
Ook al lijkt het enclave-landschap en de gesegregeerde stad die voeling met het 
gemeenschappelijke verloren te hebben, er is in het ontwerp van deze artefacten 
zeker ruimte om er ook deze perspectieven in te brengen.  
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Although the German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt never addressed 
architecture specifically, her writings very well can help us to rethink architecture 
as a spatial, cultural and political phenomenon and practice. Arendt’s work after 
all is remarkable spatial: behind all of her writings is a particular concern about 
the ‘world and its inhabitants’ tangible. Arendt once used this phrase to describe 
the writings of her teacher, the German philosopher Karl Jaspers. His writings 
were spatial, she stated, not because they were bound to a particular space, but 
since they always were related ‘to the world and its inhabitants’. The same thus 
counts for Arendt’s writings, I argue. It is not bound to a particular situation, but 
it stresses ‘the world and its inhabitants.’ Arendt actually distinguishes the world 
from the ‘earth’. Whereas the latter refers to the natural globe, the world refers 
to the human and cultural intervention in that earth – and intervention that is 
needed, in order to make the earth fit for human life. Important in this distinction 
is that the world always is ‘in common’. Human life after all is living together 
with and amongst others. Arendt moreover stresses this world as permanent 
and durable (in opposite to the cycle of nature) – we have it in common not only 
with our contemporaries, but also with our predecessors and our successors. This 
world (and its inhabitants) therefore, for her was the ultimate aim of all political 
life: it is the world that not only literally brings us together, it also unites us 
together and conditions human and community life. This community life, in other 
words, is sustained by the permanence of the world. 
This brief summary of one of the major premises behind Arendt’s philosophical 
reflections actually urges architecture as a practice and phenomenon that actively 
contributes to the establishment of this world-in-common. Architecture as a 
phenomenon contributes to the permanence, whereas architecture as a practice 
intervenes in that world-in-common. There cannot be one other profession 
that is so powerful present as architecture in this regard. Architecture designs 
and constructs the everyday environment of people, more extensively than any 
other intervention in the earth or addition to the world. This study, called At 
Home in the World, stresses the field and profession of architecture against this 
background by simultaneously investigating the perspective of Hannah Arendt as 
well as investigating the world, as it is designed and constructed through archi-
tectural interventions. It starts with the question of the public space, a central 
question, of course in relationship to the commonness of the world, as it also has 
been a central theme in architectural discourses for about three decades now. 
Sparks of it already are evoked more than a century ago, with the establishment 
of a ‘modern’ approach to the city, but it particularly got attention through the 
1989 English translation of a seminal book from the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas, the 1962 Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit. In this book he explains 
how in the 18th century the bourgeoisie in Europe established a third realm 
in-between the market on the one hand and the state on the other. He describes 
it as the emancipation of the public from the feudal system: this third sphere, 
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the public sphere, was neither susceptible by the sphere of the government, 
nor by the sphere of the market. Both the state and the market had to relate to 
the public sphere in this new situation – it had to deal with the public opinion. 
Ideally, of course, since in the book he also describes the fall of this sphere in the 
19th and 20th century, since it lost its independency. However, the core of the 
public sphere was, according to Habermas, people gathering together in cafés, 
coffeehouses, salons, discussing actualities, as they were made accessible by new 
media: the newspaper, that had the capacity to inform a large part of the public 
with the same information. These discussions, the reflections of the participants 
in the debates, their opinions somehow converge (on the meta-scale) to the public 
opinion, to which the other spheres had to relate. This thus is the image of the 
public sphere: a sphere of conversations, debates, exchange of opinions, that, 
taken together, have power against the market and the state. But Habermas’s 
book was not simply celebrating this third sphere of power, it recognizes its 
decline throughout modernity. The public sphere was lost (or at least in a very 
poor condition) – the market had taken over.   
The translation of Habermas’s perspective, and particularly the description of 
the diminishing power of the public sphere, in English, and the publication partic-
ularly in America, somehow evoked a fierce debate amongst political theorists, 
a discussion that also came to the table of architectural and urban theorists. 
What Habermas described somehow was visible in the American cities and the 
countryside, where new urban and suburban artefacts, like the gated community 
and the shopping mall, were characterized by exclusive rather than inclusive 
(public) spaces. The suburbanized landscape, as well as the contemporary city 
had become strongly segregated, which makes it hard to imagine a well-func-
tioning public space, where people of all different backgrounds together take part 
in public life, conversations, and exchange of ideas. This of course is not only 
the situation in America, it can be touched upon around the globe, even in much 
sharper tones. In America, however, the loss of public spaces found its theoretical 
imperative in the hypothesis of Habermas.   
The first part of this study maps the contemporary suburban landscape 
(Chapter 2) and city (Chapter 3), parallel with a reading of the discourse in 
architectural and urban theory of the last three decades. The discourse is rather 
pessimistic: the public sphere has become a ‘phantom’, public space is ‘dead’. 
The landscape and the city after all can be described as a world that falls apart 
in enclaves, worlds on its own. Even in the city, where diversity is sought and 
celebrated, processes of gentrification disturb the ideal image behind truly public 
spaces, spaces that are used by all, give room to exchange of ideas and perspec-
tives. Such spaces after all are hardly imaginable in a segregated spatial organi-
zation as the contemporary situation. It thus is clear how ‘spatial organization’ 
contributes to (or has a negative effect on) the possibility of public life that needs 
to support the public sphere. The architectural debate on public space, as well as 
the philosophical debate on the public sphere seems to be stuck in this negative 
scope. 
The second part of this study therefore investigates the other origin source of 
this debate on public space, a source that only in limited ways has entered the 
discourse on the city and architecture: Hannah Arendt (I extensively introduce 
her in by an intellectual biography in Chapter 4). Arendt, in her 1958 book The 
Human Condition introduces the idea of a public realm, a term that often is taken 
as synonymous to Habermas’s term ‘the public sphere’. Her reference, however, 
is not the early stages of modernity, but the establishing of the Greek and Roman 
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Polis, and their organization of its political life. Citizens of these city-states took 
part in public life through action and speech, Arendt states. They appeared in 
public, in public space, actively: they participated in public discussions and joint 
their words, their contributions, with actions. For Arendt this is an important 
figure. In The Human Condition, Arendt actually distinguishes between three 
human activities on earth: labor, work and action. The latter thus is bound to the 
public realm, it is the essential aspect of political life, and bound to the multitude 
and plurality of citizens of the city state. If any citizens was rendered the same, no 
action nor speech would be needed. The first two activities deal with the earth and 
the world, the notions we touched upon already previously: labor deals with the 
temporal and survival, the cycle of nature, while work creates the world that has 
a certain permanence, and therefore is able to house the human community on 
earth. The interesting perspective here is that this notion of the world is required 
before action is possible. In other words: there needs to be a permanent world that 
enables political life. Action and speech, Arendt argues, creates a web of human 
affairs that is sustained and supported by the permanence of the world. Participa-
tion in political life only makes, if this web of human affaires somehow is reified 
in the world. Yet, this political life is not simply only possible in and through 
the world, it vice-versa also has this world (and its inhabitants) as its objective. 
What unfolds here is discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, in which I discuss Arendt’s 
reflections upon action, the world, and political life and bring them to the current 
architectural discourses. 
Chapter 5 discusses Arendt’s notions of action and the public realm, particu-
larly by emphasizing an important difference with Habermas’s reading of the 
public sphere. For Habermas, the public sphere is characterized by inter-action, 
whereas Arendt’s public realm is characterized by action. Arendt’s notion of action 
certainly incorporates inter-action (speech, in Arendt’s terms), but only insofar it 
contributes to and supports action. Speech is needed in order to explain action, 
in order to gain support and response. The argument that is unfolded here states 
that inter-action easily can become virtual and intangible (as in the columns 
of newspaper, the forums on internet) without any connection to the tangible. 
Action, on the contrary, needs bodies and spaces, needs others, a public that 
sees (and hears) and responds. It, in other words, stays real, needs real spaces. 
This argument, which thus offers a perspective upon the importance of reality 
and real spaces regarding Arendt’s notion, even more is underpinned by another 
description Arendt offers of the public realm: it is the ‘space of appearance’. 
Through this notion Arendt once again introduces a spatial perspective: we appear 
in public, amongst peers, through action (and speech). I qualify this ‘appearance’ 
as moment and movement: it is situated in space and time. It is a moment of 
revelation (Arendt argues that everyone acts differently, and that only through 
action the actor is disclosed, and thus fundamental plurality of men is revealed) 
of plurality as the very condition of the public realm. This of course, confronted 
with the reality of the contemporary city and suburb, is a critical perspective. In 
the enclave world, plurality is at stake. Arendt’s notion however is hopeful here 
as well: her description of plurality is not so much differences between groups 
of people, but stresses the unique-ness of individuals. That means that even 
within the enclave, that seems to be inhabited by a homogenous group, there is a 
fundamental plurality. Therefore, even in the mall or the gated community, there 
is at least a tiny potentiality of appearance to one another. Plurality, however for 
Arendt is important, since only through plural views (from different positions) 
upon the world, the reality of the world is revealed. Without touching upon others, 
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the human being is stuck in his own perspective, which not simply is superfluous 
and virtual, but also limited and compelling. The space of appearance therefore 
also requires movement: to appear in public is to step out. It is to appear in a 
particular space from somewhere else. At this point, it is clear that Arendt has a 
strong distinction between the public and the private in mind: a life lived in public 
will lose its depth, while a life lived deprived from public appearance will never be 
fully human, she even states. It is, as previously seen, stuck in the private perspec-
tives, and loses contact with the reality of the world. For Arendt, going back and 
forth between the public and the private, the public to participate in the world, 
and to the private, to recuperate in order to participate again, is important. This 
going back and forth, I argue, is an important movement, to which architecture, as 
the very profession that creates differences in the world, contributes extensively 
(or disturbs it extensively). Architecture creates spaces to appear, but it does not 
create ‘spaces of appearance’ per se. They after all are bound to the gathering of 
people, not to a particular architectural place. The nevertheless require space. 
What architecture does through its intervention in the world, therefore, is to 
contribute to or to disturb the potentialities of a space to become a space of 
appearance. 
Chapter 6 then takes up Arendt’s notion of ‘work’, and discusses the significance 
to understand architecture as part of Arendt’s notion of work, as being distin-
guished from labor. The debate on public space takes here an ontological turn. 
Since work creates the world-in-common, it is a pre-requisite for political life. 
Work creates a durable world, that connects the now with the past and the future. 
It does not make sense to participate in public and to be engaged in a web of 
human affairs, if it is not sustained by a world that does not change overnight. 
Political life thus requires the world and its permanence as its stage. Arendt 
introduces the art-work as the human product that exemplifies this perspective, 
since the work of art is an end in itself, and therefore cannot be spoiled through 
consumptive processes (which is the case with all other objects produced, which 
together from this world). This chapter however particularly argues in what 
way ‘architecture’ contributes to the world. If permanence is reified in everyday 
structures, then it is through architecture. I take Arendt’s understanding of the 
arts in order to see how this also is applicable to architecture. Art, after all, is 
understood by Arendt as not only the most permanent of all things on earth, it 
also contributes to our understanding of the reality of the world. Art, after all, 
transforms matter in order to challenge spectators to look differently, to open 
their eyes and senses, to step aside and to take other perspectives. In other words, 
it ‘thickens’ our understanding of the reality of the world by opening up different 
perspective and offering particular experiences. These perspectives are a challenge 
to architecture too. Art, after all, often is hidden in particular art-spaces, while 
architecture is the context of our everyday life. Architecture therefore mostly 
is experienced in a distracted manner (contrary to art, to which one need to 
decide to go). It nevertheless is not neutral how this everyday environment is 
designed: unconsciously it offers views upon and experiences of the ‘world and its 
inhabitants’. 
This chapter therefore argues that no distinction should be made between 
mere building on the one hand, and architecture on the other. Here I refer to a 
well-known distinction that sometimes explicit and sometimes implicitly is made 
within architectural discourses. The world is full of (mere) building, and archi-
tecture only is understood as the surplus of these structures. Those buildings that 
make a change, are technologically innovative or aesthetically attractive. Most 
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constructions today however seem to be simply the results of economic rules 
and construction efficiency, while only the striking and remarkable buildings 
are understood through a cultural perspective. The argument in this chapter is, 
however, that since all constructions intervene in the world, and therefore create 
a world-in-between the inhabitants of the world. Mere building and architecture, 
in this perspective, fundamentally are the same. No building therefore should be 
only the outcome of simple economic maths or private profit – each construction 
is politically charged. Architecture (like mere building) intervenes in the world-in-
common, erect structures that will shape the world, not only now and tomorrow, 
but permanently. Architecture treats the world as we inherit it, it treats the past 
and transforms it in the world that will offer space for the needs of tomorrow 
and cater the space of appearance today. This therefore urges the designer to 
think beyond the actual intervention, program, ambitions, and understands 
each construction and intervention in the light of culture and community – or 
in other words, in the perspective of the establishment and maintenance of the 
world-in-common.
This brings us to the 7th Chapter, that takes up the question of design. If every 
assignment is politically charged and challenged by a public perspective, how 
can we reflect upon architecture as a profession? This perspective of course first 
is an ethical question. The work of architects does not shape a single building; it 
shapes the world that we have in common. Building never is only in the interest 
of a singular client. It after all impacts all of us. This chapter therefore introduces 
architecture as simultaneously work and action. Architecture reifies, which is 
the work-part. It however also actively creates spaces, new conditions, takes 
initiatives for change, which is the action-part. Work and action, however, needs 
to be supported by reflection, I argue. Reflection upon ‘what-he-is-doing’ distin-
guishes the craftsman from the amateur and profiteer. This notion brings us to 
another distinction Arendt offers, particularly in her latter writings: between 
thinking, willing and judging. This chapter finalizes than by offering the notion of 
judgment as model for design itself. Arendt’s notion of judgment strongly relates 
to the public. Judging, for Arendt, is to be able to think from different positions, 
not in order to come to the average, but to take knowledgeable decisions that are 
communicable to the public. It involves the public, but not to come to a singular 
public opinion, but in order to come to a judgment that is explicable to the the 
public. This perspective thus not simply urges ‘building’ as always affecting the 
world, but also stresses ‘designing’ these buildings as a public enterprise. It offers 
a perspective through which the very activity of design can be understood in the 
light of the world and its inhabitants. 
Arendt’s ideas, since she does not explicitly address architecture, cannot be 
used 1:1 within the profession of architecture. There is a significant gap between 
reflections of the philosopher and their active use in architectural design. 
This study somehow bridges that gap, by investigating Arendt’s writings and 
consciously bringing them to the profession of architecture as well as the 
discourses on architecture and the city. This of course urges an important 
methodical issue, that also Arendt once challenged. In a reflection upon the 
writings of German philosopher and literature critic Walter Benjamin, who she 
met during her flight from Germany, via Paris, to America, prior to World War 
II, she describes his work as ‘pearl-diving’, or as a fragmented historiography. 
What Benjamin did was diving into the past, in order to bring valuable findings, 
pearls, from there to here, from then to now. But in this transition, the context of 
the findings is destroyed – they are brought to a new context. The pearls are taken 
from their natural habitat towards an artificial one. It nevertheless is significant 
to do, Arendt stated. Modernity already had cut this line with tradition, she states. 
The historical context already is destroyed – unreachable for our contemporary 
perspectives. Nevertheless, this perspective does not dismiss the past. Not at all, 
Arendt argues: the past still frames our experiences today. We need these pearls 
from the past, in order to understand today. A similar perspective also counts for 
this study: taking fragments from Arendt’s writings towards the field of archi-
tecture means somehow to dive for pearls and to bring them to another context. 
By doing so, it never can fully describe and revive the original context. But by 
carefully taking them out of their place in the writings of Arendt, and placing it 
in the discourses on architecture and the city, new perspectives, new horizons, 
and new connections are established. Particularly her focus on ‘the world and its 
inhabitants’ offers a new understanding of architectural constructions and inter-
ventions, and even challenges architectural design and craftsmanship. It offers not 
simply new perspectives, but it also renews insights that were long forgotten or 
lived a hided life. It challenges the significance of all aspects of architecture as it is 
related to the public.
Chapter 8 then finalizes by bringing a few of these lessons learned to the fore. 
It urges the significance of architecture, not only as a profession taking care of 
the ‘beautification’ of buildings, but as a profession that has responsibility over 
the world-in-common. It urges architecture politically, since it forms literally the 
experience of this world, even if it is an unconscious experience. Architecture 
enables (or disturbs) the experience of the world as it also can be the stage of 
public life. It intervenes in the world in order to make differences – differences 
that can create moments and movements that contribute to the potentiality of 
a ‘space of appearance’. In other words, how these interventions are designed 
is significant. It cannot be left to the drawing boards of architects, nor to the 
maths of developers. It need to get words and images that enables the discussions 
amongst architects, their clients, but also publicly in society. Architecture needs to 
have the public interest always in its scope, it after all maintains and establishes 
the world-in-common, and thus needs to think from the perspective of the ‘world 
and its inhabitants’.  
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1.1 A CONVERSATION WITH A BUS DRIVER
‘How interesting! Interior or exterior?’ Strikingly enough, this question often is 
the immediate response when someone hears I am an architect by profession. ‘I 
do thresholds!’ I intuitively respond, an answer that often rouses furrowed brows. 
However, if the conversation continues, the next question is often, ‘Housing or 
offices?’ ‘Everything that can be designed, I will do.’ This response is easily accept-
ed, not so much as a statement on architecture, but as a business model. I can see 
them think, ‘Of course, he is willing to do everything!’ ‘Actually’, I then continue, 
‘do not think in such divisions about architecture! You can’t separate interior and 
exterior; you can’t design an exterior without also designing the interior too. And 
in addition to that, designing an office is not so much different than designing 
someone’s house.’ Admittedly, this is a statement that can be disproven by evi-
dence. I nevertheless present it as the truth. ‘No matter what program, architects 
do everything,’ I continue to teach my interlocutor. ‘Offices and houses, swimming 
pools and parking garages – to state it in terms of a famous Dutch book title, ar-
chitects are equipped with an eagerness to design Van stoel tot stad, from chair to 
city.1 ‘And some architects also write texts’, I finally add to the conversation. ‘Writ-
ing actually is what I do at the very moment, as well as teaching. I quit practice for 
a while in order to think, write and teach.’ 
This last remark prevents the interlocutor often from starting to ask practical 
questions, although some want to have my opinion on the best way to improve 
the insulation of an existing house, or on the sense of installing solar panels on 
a roof scape that is not exactly south-facing. These questions are of course very 
specific and answering them is easy. I simply can’t, since it requires another 
expertise than what I have available at this moment. Some people, however, do 
continue the conversation by asking ‘What building do you like?’ This question 
from the very beginning of my studies in architecture and urban design in Delft 
has puzzled me since it asks for a professional view on what I could say based on 
acquired architectural knowhow, different than to my underdeveloped personal 
taste. As a student, I therefore often quickly came up with one or another architec-
tural highlight that impressed me, and I’d explain why it triggered my attention: 
an unprecedented concept, stunning use of materials, great spaces, monumental 
without being static, empty spaces, a complex routing, and so forth. However, 
I started to notice that whatever I did choose, and however I tried to explain the 
intriguing details, there was either no or very little recognition – although my 
explanation was appreciated and acknowledged. Nevertheless, the inquisitor often 
also revealed their favourite buildings. Depending if they had visited Barcelona 
recently it was the Sagrada Familia designed by Antonio Gaudi, still in construc-
tion today. Or the great Cathedral of Reims. An office building designed according 
to anthroposophical guidelines, a shopping centre recently built in neo-classical 
style, an imposing skyscraper. ‘Oh yes, these are very interesting buildings’, 
I honestly could respond. ‘Very impressive, surely.’ Did you, by the way, know 
how Gaudi designed these terrific forms? And that nobody was able to continue 
his work when he suddenly died? Very interesting!’ The other examples evoked 
similar responses within me, highlighting some of the remarkable aspects or 
mechanisms beyond that indeed triggers my interest. This somehow then is the 
end of the conversation: stuck in two completely different buildings opposed to 
each other, two different appearances, two different views, without anything that 
seems to overarch these perspectives. What could we say about it? Through these 
conversations I noticed that architecture in the eyes of my interlocutors often is 
1.  
J.B. Bakema, Van stoel tot stad (Zeist: 
De Haan, 1964); in English this book 
is published as Jacob Berend Bakema, 
From Doorstep tot City (Zeist: De 
Haan, 1964). In this translation the 
broadness of the Dutch title actually 
is lost. In Dutch, it is not from the 
doorstep, but from the chair to the 
City. The English title stays within 
the ‘regular’ realm of architecture, 
since the doorstep is integral part of 
the building. A chair, however is quite 
different: it is furniture, is flexible and 
thus can easily be moved or replaced. 
In other words, where the doorstep 
obviously is part of the architectural 
project, the chair is not. As I will 
discuss later, I take architecture in an 
even more broad sense: from interior 
to landscape and from graphics to 
writing.
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urged as something impressive and remarkable, often old (and therefore even 
more impressive – to construct a cathedral 500 years ago!), or if not, then built 
in a classical style. Big and impressive is beautiful. Quite a difference with the 
buildings which were presented, discussed, investigated, and which I learnt to love 
during my studies. I also recognized within myself that I avoided the simple cate-
gorisation of ‘beauty’ – not only in these cases where I actually don’t appreciate 
the appearance of the project that is pushed forward, but also in these cases that I 
emphasized myself. The word beautiful has been replaced by a phrase like ‘highly 
interesting’; a process that is intriguing in itself. 
The questions put forward by my interlocutors obviously reveal something of 
the image of the profession in society, at least in The Netherlands, but I guess 
also more general, since I have had similar conversations in other countries too. 
Moreover, it is not only my singular experience: lots of colleagues confirm my 
experiences, recognizing these questions and how such a conversation develops. 
What these conversations reveal is at once the superficial idea of architecture, as 
well as the knowledge of architecture within the public eye. The superficiality is 
that architecture is simply imagined as the beautification of buildings – a beauti-
fication that actually seems to have no substance at all. It is linked to important 
buildings, but plays no major role in the everyday environment. This might not 
be that strange, the everyday environment after all is the everyday, and not the 
exception. It is this everyday environment that the public has a knowledge of that 
the architect does not have, since it is this environment that they experience. And 
although it is not often linked to architecture, that might not be the blind spot of 
the interlocutor. I, after all, also came up with explanations of architecture that 
stress the exceptional – these concepts, ideas, practices, approaches that attracted 
my attention (which were far away from the scope of the opponent as well).  
This limited public image of the profession of architecture thus certainly mirrors 
the reality of architecture today, which also has its impact on architectural 
practices. Architects today often get limited assignments and responsibilities. 
They are, for instance, simply asked to develop an idea for a particular building, 
which then, upon approval, is further developed into a ‘real building’ by the 
constructor. Or engineers already have developed a layout for a certain building, 
which most efficiently offers space to the required program and architects are 
asked to simply design the façade. This will define the appearance of the building 
abruptly, which can then be changed easily after a few years according to new 
standards and fashion. Or architects are asked to provide impressive buildings, 
which are seen as icons that can ‘brand’ a particular (part of the) city in order to 
create a positive image that attracts more visitors and businesses. Indeed, in all 
these cases architecture is limited to beautification. 
There are at least three limitations beyond this small image of architecture. 
The first of course is the obvious limitation of architecture to buildings. Even the 
definitions in dictionaries and encyclopaedias offer that perspective. Architec-
ture, one of the Dutch dictionaries states, is the art of construction. Architecture, 
however, as I will explain, is about space and the built environment, which ranges 
from landscape to building, and from road to toilet, and indeed from chair to city. 
A second limitation behind the question is the narrowing down of the profession 
to the activity of ‘design’, a narrowing down that fails to recognize architecture as 
a body of knowledge about the world and the built environment, about spaces and 
social practices. Architecture thus also includes the knowledge that is enclosed 
in reflections on the past and future of spaces, in drawings and writings in which 
space is evoked, challenged, appreciated, propelled, described, in conversations 
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and collaborations. Lecturing and teaching belongs to the profession, as does 
teaching and presenting. Indeed, for this limitation nobody is to blame, or it is the 
profession itself by limiting themselves to design. Design is central, definitely, but 
it stands upon the shoulders of the other activities. Thirdly, the questions reveal a 
limitation of architecture as the beautification of constructions, be it their exterior 
or their interior. This limitation probably is evoked by popular television shows 
on ‘pimping’ the interior of average houses, or by the popularity of magazines on 
interior design, by architectural projects that are mainly presented to the public 
by extravagant renderings of the exterior, or by generic warehouses with stunning 
Greek facades. However, although interiors can be pimped and exteriors can be 
polished, architecture is way more than that, and is about – I urged it already in 
the conversation – the relationship between interior and exterior, city, landscape 
and building, which is much more about structure and organization, texture and 
construction, the everyday and the exception, people’s lives and the life of the 
community – much more than only beautification. The shiny images and the 
temporality of interior design does not tell the public how the building actually 
needs to be a unity (although it can be in diversity). Behind the appearance, there 
is coherence (or contrast) from interior to exterior and back again, as well as 
from city to building and back again. And behind beauty there is structure and 
program, composition and texture, tectonic aspects and structural challenges, 
logic and surprise, plurality and coherence. 
The deficiencies of the generally limited understanding of architecture painfully 
became clear due to the 2008 financial and economic crisis. By the enormous 
decrease of assignments, most of the offices suffered fewer turnovers, let alone 
profit, and either had to fire employees or went bankrupt. The unemployment 
rate amongst architects rocketed sky-high. In The Netherlands the job rate halved 
as did the turnover, while the number of offices doubled.2 This crisis in architec-
ture often has been explained as something happening outside of architecture 
– the world is in crisis – which immediately affects the market of the building 
industries. A decrease in future perspective immediately puts all building projects 
on hold, let alone all plans that were not yet turned into a project (and the ideas 
that were not yet a plan). Architects are thus the first to suffer from the crisis. But 
as the designer and writer Rory Hyde argues in the introduction to a marvellous 
collection of interviews called Future Practices, the crisis of 2008 also revealed 
‘the crisis of relevance’ of architecture.3 Actually, a narrative of crisis has gained a 
certain pedigree within architecture after World War II. Again and again crises hit 
the world, which also and always impacted the field of architecture. Often crises 
however are experienced not entirely negatively, but also as (welcome) moments 
of change. The oil crisis, the financial crisis, the economic crisis and so on all 
urged architecture to once again reflect upon its position in the world, its focuses 
and aims, its goals and merits. Crises, in other words, urge architecture to reflect 
and to transform, sometimes to (radically) go in a different direction, to seek out 
its roots, or to acknowledge its transformative character. The crisis of modernism 
propelled architecture to withdraw from its social outlook and focus on its 
autonomy. The crisis of functionality urged architecture to look after complexity 
and ambiguity. The oil crisis of the 70s urged architecture to rethink its prolifer-
ation of resources. The disappointment with architectural autonomy urged some 
architects to celebrate architecture without architects.4 As did the 2008 financial 
and economic crisis: it urged architecture to once again rethink its specificities. To 
stay with this latter perspective, the 2008 crisis followed after a decade of archi-
tectural heights, propelled by wealth and prosper in the West. Architecture gained
2.
These Numbers are based on the 
situation in The Netherlands, via 
my former colleague in Delft Alijd 
van Doorn, who does extensive 
research to developments within the 
architectural offices as responses to 
market circumstances. The simple 
explanation is that the architects that 
had to seek for another job, as well as 
students fresh from the academies, 
had no other choice than starting 
their own practice
3.  
Rory Hyde, Future Practices, Conver-
sations from the Edge of Architecture 
(New York/London: Routledge, 
2012), 17
4. 
Architects have written in response 
to such crises, and proposed different 
directions to go forward. See for 
instance Victor Gruen, Centers for 
the Urban Environment Survival of 
the Cities (New York: Van Nostrand 
Reinhald Company, 1973); Malcolm 
MacEwan, Crisis in Architecture 
(London: Riba Publications Limited, 
1974); Bernard Rudofski, Architec-
ture without Architects. A Short 
Introduction to the Non-Pedigreed 
Architecture (Garden City/New York: 
Doubleday & Compagny, Inc., 1964). 
For an overview of the disappoint-
ment with modernism, and how that 
affected a certain ‘withdrawal’ out of 
society into ‘radical architecture’ see 
the dissertation of my former Delft 
colleague Tahl Kaminer, Architecture, 
Crisis and Resuscitation, The Repro-
duction of post-Fordism in late-twen-
tieth-century Architecture (London/
New York: Routledge, 2011), 17-69
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attention in the artistic sections of newspapers, design magazines, culture, 
business, technology, and lifestyle like Monocle, Wired, Wallpaper. Lots of 
books on architecture have been published in that period too, meant to show 
the unsurpassed possibilities of architecture today. Particularly Dutch architec-
ture was at the heart of the architectural heights, gaining worldwide attention.5 
The crisis, however, painfully made clear that architecture had become fun, and 
little more than that. Fun without fundament, a mere function of the economic 
principles beyond construction in a capitalist society. Despite architectural 
heights that I thus take ironically, is this the reason the profession has not been 
able to transcend its own significance to the public. Might it also be that because 
of this comfortable position, the single architect failed to understand ‘what he was 
doing’, his or her agency in the world? This at least seems to be confirmed by a 
public image of the architect as stubborn, arrogant, ignorant,6 characters that are 
tangible in ironic sayings that are commonly ventilated, like ‘all good architecture 
leaks,’ or ‘good architecture does not require functionality.’7 After all, little more 
than one decade of the so called ‘architectural heights’, we might argue, urged 
architecture to become something special, heroic, and artistic.8 But in that scope, 
the everyday was removed from sight, as also was its broader social, political and 
cultural scope, while it is the everyday that is the daily experience of the public, 
and it is the broader scope that lifts this environment from the meaningless. 
Under the radar, as the crisis revealed, architecture slightly but surely moved to a 
marginal position in society as well as in the building industries, and no one could 
be blamed for that. With their focus on sheer beauty, with their love for exagger-
ation, and by accepting the mechanisms of the market, architects turned the field 
down.9 Even architects who emphasized a more critical approach to the market or 
to the cultural aspects of the profession also seemed not able to reach the public 
too. Their focus on the autonomy of the profession also failed to communicate 
the substance of architecture: what it might contribute to the world, society, and 
everyday life. 
On a cold Saturday last November, I had to take a bus which replaced a train 
service due to planned construction work on the rail track. It was very early in 
the morning, and it just so happened that I was the only passenger taking that 
bus. The driver clearly liked to have a conversation, so after some this and that, 
after discussing his job and his travels around Europe, we also touched upon 
my profession. The conversation actually followed the pattern above, and also 
seemed to end with the question ‘what building I actually liked.’ This time the 
question somehow puzzled me even more. I really didn’t know what to answer – I 
was literally looking around in order to say something. I felt alienated, being an 
architect but not able to mention one building I really liked. Partly this hesitation 
came from my wish to mention something the driver would know as well – but 
that wish just paralyzed me. What about this gap between architecture and the 
public? How can I explain aspects of buildings that do matter to me, besides 
something that could be called beautiful? At that moment, I experienced the ‘crisis 
of relevance’, I thought. If it is all about beauty, what does it matter? 
‘I actually don’t know’, I told the driver, who – as far as I could see – looked at 
me not really understanding. ‘You know,’ I continued, ‘it does not matter what I 
really like in a building. For me the significance of architecture is beyond beauty. 
Aesthetics are important, surely, but for me, architecture should be more than 
that.’ 
The driver indeed looked at me in wonder. ‘What do you mean by that?’ 
‘Architecture is too often limited to sheer beauty,’ I tried to explain. ‘But if it 
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is only about beauty, then I ask myself what is the relevance of that beauty for 
society. The beauty of buildings is important, I think. Aesthetics is one of the 
aspects architects should be trained in. I even will offer it a central role in the 
process of ‘design’ – but the architecture of a building or a space, to my mind, 
cannot be limited to that. I love to think about it. I love to design myself as well, 
and to create something touching, something beautiful. I myself can be touched 
by architectural beauty, I can be moved by smart solutions to complex problems, 
I can be enthusiastic about futuristic perspectives or roused by architectural 
statements, I love to discuss these things too – but if it is only that, it does not 
satisfy me. That also is the reason why I am focused on writing today. I want to 
grasp what is beyond beauty in architecture. What is the relevance of architecture 
for society? For “the world and its inhabitants.”’ 
The driver looked at me, nodding his head. ‘And, after these years of 
practicing, teaching and writing, as you told, did you find a perspective you 
can share with me?’ he asked. I actually wanted to avoid going further, but the 
question was so inviting that I continued. 
‘This “the world and its inhabitants” that I actually urged as focus of archi-
tecture is an important phrase for me. We also can describe it as “the public”.’ I 
told him. ‘In architecture, there is an extensive discourse about the relationship 
between the built environment and the public. This discussion actually is roused 
by the American landscape and cities. Have you ever been in the States?’ 
‘Yes – good memories!’ the driver answered. ‘I once visited Florida, you know, 
spent a couple of weeks there to visit the theme parks.’ 
‘Florida, I have never been, although I use the landscape around Orlando as 
an example in my reflections. My first visit to the United States was when I was 
still a student, and a fellow student and I visited another friend in Chicago – it 
really changed some perspectives for me. That visit was terrific, what a city! Great 
buildings, a great waterfront, lovely museums and a timid ‘Indian Summer’. But 
also: what a divided city. We visited some of the great architectural projects in 
the city, and since we had no car, we needed to do that via the subway – or The 
Loop, as it is called in the inner city of Chicago – and by foot. The huge division in 
society was tangible: the black and the poor on one side of a road, the white and 
wealthy just across it, and no interaction between these two worlds. We also once 
rented a car for a day in order to visit some well-known architectural projects in 
the vicinity of the city. This drive offered me the experience of endless suburbs, 
malls, gated communities. Again, rich and poor neighbourhoods were strongly 
segregated. Particular these recently ‘new’ urban figures as gated communities 
and shopping malls, these places are regarded to be exclusive. You can’t live in 
a gated community if you can’t afford it. The shopping mall only can be reached 
by car, so in order to go shopping and spend your time in the mall, you at least 
need to have a car. These are smooth exclusive environments, where you meet 
people alike.’ I look at the driver to look if he is still following. ‘Theme parks also 
are considered part of this new exclusive environment that is developing – what 
disturbs the ideal view is polished away. Everything is smooth and shiny.’ 
‘This of course is not only an American development,’ I added. ‘It can be touched 
upon around the globe, although in The Netherlands not yet on that scale as in 
the United States. Our urban spaces, squares, parks, shopping centres are what 
we call “public”: accessible by all. However, the crucial aspect in the debate is 
that this model of exclusive (sub)urbanisation leads to a tangible segregation in 
society, and that process also can be found in The Netherlands. In America, it is, 
however, more visible, this segregation between the haves and the have-nots: the 
rich live, work and spend their spare time in environments where they don’t bump 
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into others who cannot afford it. They step out of their house in a car, immediately 
drive to their destination where they can park their car in a secured environment, 
and do their thing in a secured, shiny and smooth space. The space in-between 
the destinations is left-over space, a non-place, where the poor – those that 
cannot afford a life in such exclusive environments – are dominant. In architec-
tural theory, the emphasis is on the impact of this tangible and visible division in 
space upon the virtual realms of society. When the rich never bump into the poor, 
the white into the black, the Christian into the Muslim, society itself is at stake, 
theorists state. This, in other words, has implications for society. What should 
be a community in which the plural people work and live together now becomes 
a divided society where all sorts of groups live and work apart. This actually is a 
threat particularly for the Western democratic ideal, the theorists continue. The 
possibility to bump into someone else with a different view upon and experience 
of life and society, and to exchange perspectives and convictions, to discuss issues 
that matter, that is the very heart of democracy. Bumping into differences means 
to be questioned oneself: what do I think, and why? Where does it come from? 
How to value the perspective of the other, which previously was a stranger to me, 
but now becomes a person as well? So by bumping into others, you are challenged, 
which is, theorists state, an important aspect of democracy. It is a bit of a brief 
summary, definitely a short-cut that does not do completely right to the much 
more nuanced discourse…’ 
‘I understand’, the driver interrupts, ‘but what does it have to do with 
architecture?’ 
‘That is a very good question,’ I answer, ‘which kept me busy for years. Archi-
tecture of course is about the design of the built environment. So architects design 
the malls and walls, the neighbourhoods and other artefacts that together are 
the forms of this divided landscape. These environments shape the view of the 
inhabitants and users upon the world – it is not only that you don’t touch upon 
‘the other’, but also that the experience of the world is distorted. It offers an 
‘exclusive’ experience of the world, which is quite a distortion of reality. In other 
words: the buildings somehow are the endpoint of a process, the reification of 
a trend in society. In turn, however, these building shape the worldview of the 
inhabitants as well. Where you are born, what sorts of environments you frequent, 
what people you meet extensively shapes your world-view. This seems to be an 
impasse, a downward spiral, which cannot be easily corrected, and certainly not 
by architects. In other words, this is somehow an ideological question, which 
stresses the political aspects of architecture, of building and planning. How do we 
value the need for interaction, of inclusive space (facing the longing for exclusive 
spaces, safety and certainty)? And second, what can we expect from architecture?’
‘And?’   
‘I’m sorry for the monologue. It feels to me as lecturing…’
‘A private lecture, this early in the morning. It’s great!’ the driver joked. 
‘Ok, a private lecture in a private drive!’ I responded. ‘However, my first 
response to these questions is that we cannot expect from architecture to change 
the trends in society. But the conclusion that architecture is political is true. It 
urges the significance of architecture, not only as a profession taking care of the 
beautification of buildings, but as a profession that has a certain responsibility 
over the world in which we live. How these spaces are designed is significant, 
important to be discussed amongst architects, their clients, but also publicly in 
society. This of course is a matter of architectural ethics: is this an assignment 
you want to be involved in? Architects can be critical, but the buildings are being 
designed and constructed nevertheless. The market just asks for them. Thus, the 
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first part of this relationship between the public and architecture is quite negative, 
if you agree upon that proposition of the importance of exchange between people 
in respect to Western democratic politics.’ 
‘Do you?’ the driver asks.
‘Yes, yes, but in my research I also stress this moment of exchange, although I 
would call it “appearance”. How can we render that today, in our mass society? I 
therefore used the writings of the American-German philosopher Hannah Arendt. 
Did you ever hear of her?’
‘No, never.’
‘No worries. She actually was Jewish by birth and had to flee from Germany 
in the 1930s. Her work is somehow a continuous investigation of what actually 
happened. One of the topics is this participation in public: she experienced by 
herself what it meant to be excluded from that participation. You know: Jews 
could not enter public parks, needed to go to particular shops, they could not 
teach nor study at universities, their writings were not taken seriously or even 
forbidden. So that is both real and virtual exclusion from public space. Quite 
heavy, right?’
The bus driver nods. ‘But still,’ he says, ‘how can this address architectural 
form?’
‘What grasped me in the writings of Arendt is on the one hand her rendering 
of this public participation, which she draws in quite sombre tones. But on the 
other hand, her image of public action and speech, which are the core activities 
of public participation, and seems to offer a less idealized image than what is 
regularly offered in the debate. For her, action and speech is bound to local 
communities, which are limited in size. Such focus on the local situation is closer 
to architecture and architectural design than the democratic ideal of exchange 
on the level of society. Arendt somehow brings the perspective closer to the field 
of architecture, without losing its significance. And secondly, she offers a view 
of how this participation relates to the tangible world, which – and that is what 
I state as an architect – is for its majority shaped by architecture. Arendt argues 
that public participation, which somehow is her model of politics, always requires 
engagement with the world. Therefore, the world needs to be durable. It does not 
make sense to participate in public and to be engaged in the world if this world 
changes over night. Politics requires a certain permanence, so to speak. This 
actually is one of the major significances of architecture: it offers structures that 
are quite durable. This of course also urges architecture politically. Architecture 
treats the world as we inherit it, and transforms it in the world that will offer space 
for the needs of tomorrow. To my mind, this urges architecture and is a call to 
architects. What architects do, does matter. It makes sense and therefore cannot 
be limited to aesthetics only. Aesthetics are important, but should be embedded in 
a broader scope of the public significance of architecture. The work of architects 
does not shape a single building; it shapes the world that we have in common. It 
is not only in the interest of a singular client; it impacts all of us. One last point 
that I will make questions what architecture actually does. To my understanding 
architecture creates conditions that offer room to enable the different activities 
of life, also for the activities of society. Architecture, if it understands its public 
calling, offers room for public life too. Spaces where people can gather and bump 
into each other. That is important: public space is the stage of public participa-
tion. And to design these spaces still is the work of architects. Or to state it with 
Arendt: to appear to one another. In her work, this ‘appearance’ is important. She 
describes it quite literally: as the moment one leaves the house and enters public 
space. Entering is active, it is a moment of stepping over the threshold. This is 
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why I stressed the significance of the threshold at the very start of our conversa-
tion about architecture. If I have to mention one element that requires attention, 
it will be the threshold.’ 
At that moment, we enter the village where I was born. I stop talking, and also 
the driver does not ask for any further explanation. He has to concentrate on some 
difficult roundabouts, and I am looking outside and wondering. In my mind, I 
somehow think further about the threshold. ‘The public is not simply the public, 
it is always related to the private too. It is about interior and exterior – about 
the very relationship between the private and the public realm. But also about 
the relationship between different zones and networks. Where these overlap, 
threshold spaces exist. These are transition-zones where one can transgress the 
edges between the different groups in society. Therefore, it is threshold-spaces 
that potentially offer room for appearance.’
I am at the point of adding this perspective, but am captured by the spaces 
that are very familiar to me, although I have not seen them for about twenty years. 
I still recognize the exit of the highway, the circle at the end of this exit, the street 
where one of my best friends lived, the apartment building with the huge sign on 
top, another circle with concrete sculptures in the midst, and finally the area in 
front of the station. I am looking around in silence, noticing all these buildings I 
know so well from my youth. I realise that little changes do not so much impact 
the overall structure. Is the Italian architect Aldo Rossi right with his emphasis on 
the structure of cities as the most permanent aspects of the urban architecture? 
Surely he is – as he also is right that these urban spaces are full of (everyday) 
memories or inhabitants.10 Even though this village is not a monumental city, 
and even despite the lack of particularly good buildings and streets, also here the 
structure stays and offers recognition after about two decades.  
The driver parks his bus at the front of the station. When I move to the door, I 
shake his hand in order to tell him how grateful I am for the terrific drive. ‘Thank 
you for listening to my lecture,’ I say. ‘It actually is the briefest summery of my 
research I can give.’ ‘The pleasure is mine,’ he states. ‘Have a nice day!’
10.
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1.2 AN OPTIMISTIC GUIDE AND A PESSIMISTIC DISCOURSE
1.2.1 Anchoring in an Age of Accelerations
In his book, Thank You for Being Late, the New York Times Op-Ed columnist, 
Thomas L. Friedman, writes that, ‘We are living through one of the greatest inflec-
tion points in history.’11 Everything shifts, is adrift – particularly, he argues, since 
‘the three largest forces on the planet – technology, globalisation, and climate 
change – are all accelerating at once.’12 Accelerating indeed can be pinpointed 
as one of the common experiences of today’s times. Probably not only of today, 
acceleration somehow is a core experience of modernity, as lots of critics of mo-
dernity have urged in their writings. In the ‘20s and 30s of the last decade, the 
Dutch historian Johan Huizinga, for instance, typified modernity as a machine 
that seemed to only accelerate. It could not be stopped.13 Similar experiences are 
at the core of All That is Solid Melts into Air, written by Marshall Berman in the 
80s.14 The typical experience of modernity, which somewhere started with the 
printing revolution that preceded the Reformation in Europe about 500 years 
ago now, is this experience of change. Or better said, of continuous change. The 
late sociologist Zygmunt Bauman even speaks about ‘liquid’ times, which are pro-
pelled by ‘global liquid power.’15 Friedman states, although with some restraint, 
that the experience of today only is propelled by the experience 500 years ago, 
when everything was also adrift. Of course, we cannot be sure about this – other 
moments can be described with certainly the same experience of change. Some 
theorists distinguish different phases in modernity, as it comes to the fore in writ-
ings and art, philosophical and historical reflections.16 In the Romantic age, for 
instance, the experience of fragmentation became tangible – as well as the loss of 
a religious perspective that could offer some wholeness. Isaiah Berlin called the 
Romantic age a revolution: ‘the greatest shift in the consciousness of the West that 
has occurred.’17 The French Revolution as well as the start of the industrial age 
half way through the 19th century can be picked with equal reason: everything was 
adrift, from the cities to politics, and from the workplace to the home of millions 
of people in Europe and America. The 20th century came with unbelievable new 
machinery, culminating in unprecedented wars – World Wars. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall at the end of the 80s was welcomed as the culmination of processes in 
history, and even described as the ‘end of history’.18 Others trace a Clash of Civi-
lizations, evoked by the generalizing trends that often are described as globalisa-
tion.19 Samuel Huntington, who wrote extensively on that topic, already published 
his first article stressing the hidden fire smouldering in 1993 – it somehow became 
the common experience (and received widespread attention) after 9/11.20 All these 
perspectives seem to stress an entirely negative experience: they after all describe 
continuous change, liquid times adrift, clashes and fragmentation, and even what 
is solid melts into air. This of course is besides the actual experiences of modernity 
and globalisation, which also offered the accessibility and exchange of cultures, 
goods, knowledge, welfare and so on around the globe to an increasing amount of 
people. The experience of modernity always has two faces, the Flemish architec-
tural theoretician Hilde Heynen argues: promise and loss.21 She actually stresses 
the complexity and ambiguity of this experience. Modernity brought at once 
welfare, prosperity, and personal development as well as the experience of loss of 
tradition, identity and authenticity. It is, in other words, a positive and a negative 
experience.  
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Since 9/11 the experience of globalisation has been propelled, as not only has 
become clear in the several terrorist attacks around the world, but also in the 
impact of the crash of the housing market as the start of the financial and 
economic crisis in the United States first and around the globe thereafter.22 The 
Dutch philosopher René Boomkens defines in his book, De nieuwe wanorde, 
globalisation as the identification of the power of global capitalism as an 
unpreceded influential force on everyday life around the globe.23 Boomkens’ 
stresses the experience of globalisation in line with the previously defined 
experience of modernity. In his dissertation, which is published as, Een drem-
pelwereld,24 he defines four moments of modernity: the childhood (19th century), 
adolescence (first decades of 20th century), the rather schizophrenic adulthood, 
from the 30s to the early 60s, and finally the crisis of modernity, the latter half 
of the 20th century, also described as post-modernity.25 In De nieuwe wanorde, 
Boomkens presents Globalisation as the fifth moment of the experience of 
modernity – a rather negative experience in which all belief in the future seems 
to be diminished.26 However, Boomkens also reveals how the global picture also 
awakens the significance of local infrastructure, identity and tradition.27   
The term globalisation, however, does not refer only to the economic system, 
although the experience of global financial markets and economic systems that 
sometimes seems to be much more powerful than national governments, certainly 
is dominant within this framework. This experience certainly is propelled by the 
economic and financial crises, that started in America with the Enron-scandal, 
and soon spread to other (Western) countries (although this example also shows 
how previously the markets also were intertwined, the economic crisis of the 30s 
and the oilcrisis of the 70s after all also had their global impact). Globalisation, 
however, can better be described as a situation in which the economic, political 
and cultural (as well as academic) systems are not limited to a country or nation, 
but are influential beyond any borders and globally intertwined. Instead of a 
system of national economic, political, technological and cultural interests, a more 
loose global system has emerged, a network of elites and firms that dominate the 
world market and structures and change local and global structures. ‘Globali-
sation’, the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai writes, ‘has shrunk the distance 
between elites, shifted key relations between producers and consumers, broken 
many links between labor and family life, obscured the lines between temporary 
locales and imaginary national attachments.’28 The sociologist Saskia Sassen 
on her turn stresses the effect of this global system as particularly destructive 
in respect to the realm of politics within a system of nationalities, which lacks 
authority facing the power of the economical global market.29 Globalisation, 
in other words, could be understood as the process of a decreasing power and 
authority of (local) culture facing the increasing forces of global capitalism, 
culture and technology. The authority that previously was understood as resistant 
and critical did lose its power, specifically through deconstructing local and 
familiar ties and rootedness into a world.30 Even nations today are pulled into 
the narratives of global capitalism. They have to compete with other nations to 
be attractive to global companies, and to relocate their offices and factories by 
offering severe local (tax) conditions. In this global market, the lack of power of 
national politics is almost tangible. Sassen renders this as a threat in respect to 
social and national issues concerning citizenship, which somehow also affects the 
trust of these citizens in the power and trustworthiness of their local and national 
politics.31 Clearly Sassen’s concern described already at the end of the 90s of the 
last century has become the political landscape of the second decade of the new 
millennium, with all over Europe and America a tangible suspicious attitude 
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towards the political realm and the increasing distinction between the ‘elite’ and 
the general ‘public’. The increasing forces of the globalized economic system 
of financial markets joins forces with a diminishing belief in local and national 
politics. It actually becomes tangible, as Sassen argues, in increasing amounts 
of people adrift, in the stream of refuges around the world, in the growing gap 
between the rich and the poor, the haves and the have-nots, and in the experience 
of alienation and rootlessness.32 Although globalisation is certainly not limited to 
economics and financial markets, but also stretch to culture, politics, information 
and technology, the financial perspective seems to be in charge mainly. 
Friedman urges globalisation as one just of three forces behind today’s experience 
of the world adrift. Gobalization, besides technology and climate change, sweep 
our everyday experiences towards unknown futures. Technology, indeed, in 
the last decade has shown an amazing pace of developments. Friedman himself 
enlightens the year of 2007, when Steve Jobs of Apple presented the first iPhone 
to the public, as pivotal, not only because pf the presentation of this smartphone 
with touchscreen, but also as a year wherein internet went through another 
cycle and other technological improvements presented were about to reshape 
the world.33 Friedman describes the ways globalisation and technology affects 
everyday life, and particularly urges citizens to adapt to the increasingly speeding 
accelerating life conditions, on the risk of disorientation.34 The impact of climate 
change also requires quick adaptation. ‘While the power of men and machines 
and flows has been reshaping the workplace and politics and geopolitics and the 
economy, and even some of our ethical choices, the power of many is driving the 
acceleration in Mother Nature, which is reshaping the whole biosphere, the whole 
global ecological system.’35 The book of Friedman actually investigates how ‘we’ 
can ‘survive’ in this age of acceleration. He’s quite optimistic, as already can be 
sensed from the subtitle of his book: An Optimist’s Guide to Thriving in the Age 
of Accelerations, and offers all sorts of reflections and (possible) responses and 
innovations to the contemporary condition. The book, however, actually ends with 
a reflection on what he calls the biggest assignment for the future. He does not 
know where the accelerating forces will bring us, he admits, but then he adds: ‘I 
know where it has to start – by anchoring people in strong families and healthy 
communities.’36 Thriving in a global world requires thus local anchors, he argues. 
In order to investigate this perspective, he, in the final chapter of the book investi-
gates the possibility to ‘innovate’ in building strong and healthy communities. He 
therefore went back to the place where he grew up, a suburban neighbourhood of 
Minnesota – particularly of course since he remembers that very neighbourhood 
as a healthy community. It’s quite sparkling what he tells about the community. 
The story of the neighbourhood, he explains, ‘is the story of how an ethic of 
pluralism and a healthy community got built one relationship, one breakup, one 
makeup, one insult, one welcoming neighbour, one classroom at a time – from 
bricks and logs that were not automatically destined to fit together easily.’37 What 
actually is remarkable in this description is that image of a healthy community as 
a process in time. A community only develops if it is built by ‘bricks’ and ‘logs’ in 
the words of Friedman, two elements that contain a particular locality as well as 
temporality. A healthy community is established over time, but also is bound to a 
particular place. Another important aspect is the very diversity of the community, 
contrary to what regularly is proposed. The plurality even can be described as an 
essential aspect of the community – it is plural in people, ethics and happenings. 
The members of the community all have different experiences – but what they 
share is that particular place that they call ‘home’. In other words, the community 
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somehow is randomly gathered, but strongly united to the place, to a local area, 
a particular situation, in each other’s vicinity. This is not easy, as Friedman urges 
– it is built over time, step by step. Pluralism is one of these figures that comes 
back in his description later in the chapter. It is essential, he argues, but it will not 
happen automatically. ‘Real pluralism never comes easy,’ he writes, ‘because it has 
to be built not just on tolerance of the other but also on respect of the other, trust 
of the other.’38 This only can be build up by real encounters, he argues, by really 
touching upon the other and by risking ‘broken emotional bones.’39 Friedman, in 
the stories he tells about his youth, describes real spaces as teaching ground of 
this plurality: the school, the basketball court, a local gas station, the public bus 
that connected the neighbourhood to the city of Minneapolis, the cinema in the 
inner city, a string of lakes around the city. These can be described as more or 
less public places, enabling the community to touch upon each other in simple 
everyday encounters. His experiences of course date from about 60 years ago, 
which, as he realizes, is not easy to compare to today. ‘I realize what a relatively 
small distance we had to travel to bridge the economic and cultural gaps between 
us,’ he admits. ‘That is not true today. In this age of tightening global interdepend-
ence and intimate contact between more diverse strangers, the bridge of under-
standing that we have to build are longer, the chasms they have to span much 
deeper.’40 Having said that, he once again urges the need of communities where 
the inhabitants feel connected, respected and protected. ‘That only makes the 
need for community building and healthy communities that can anchor diverse 
populations much greater.’41 In the era of globalisation, of climate change, and 
of technology, home and community are increasingly important, Friedman thus 
argues. Anchoring, is his advice. ‘You can go back home, and you should!’42
1.2.2  The Unbearable Glance in the Eyes of the Other 
The ‘optimistic guide’ of Friedman and his trust in local communities somehow 
seems to be diametrically opposed to the rather pessimistic discourse on ‘public 
space’ as the locus of and the common ground behind such communities, which 
can be touched upon in architectural urban theory as well as in debates in political 
sciences, anthropology and social sciences. Globalisation certainly is the larger 
framework in which the discourse on public space emerges. It is the global-local 
tension that comes to the fore here, although the discussion on the city and public 
space first came to the fore rather hidden in the frame of a modern approach to 
space, and more clearly against the frame of post-modernity, as I discuss in the 
next Chapter. Most of the voices in these discourses on public space are quite 
pessimistic, addressing and stressing processes of individualization and segre-
gation, of globalisation and renewed nationalism. Most of these narratives, even 
those in architectural theory, also are mainly concerned with political, societal, 
and philosophical ideas encircling the conclusion that the ‘exchange of ideas’ in 
society are increasingly threatened due to changes in political systems and laws, 
economic developments, capitalism and bureaucracy, and finally by everyday life 
itself. That latter remark refers to the increasing cocooning of life: it is lived within 
a particular bubble, in a segregated city or one of the many enclaves that domi-
nate the suburb. The pessimism around public space is mostly concerned with the 
public sphere, the immaterialized realm of political exchange that somehow backs 
the democratic systems of Western countries. The materialised world is, despite 
some remarks, beyond the scope of most of the theorists. As an architect, I would 
render the everyday and material world as ‘a blind spot’ – of course not in the ar-
chitectural contributions to the debate, which dwells upon the new enclaves in the 
38. 
Ibid., 378-379
39.
Ibid., 379
40.
Ibid., 409
41.
Ibid., 409
42.
Ibid., 410
66
urban landscape (the mall, the gated community, the theme park) and the increas-
ing segregation in cities due to processes of gentrification. The withdrawal from 
the world, that is inherent in the first movement, and the exclusion of ‘others’ that 
is part of the second, is counter to the idea beyond public space, meaning allowing 
the accessibility of these spaces to all members of society. Behind the pessimism 
of the increase of exclusive (and excluding) spaces is the ideal of public space as 
the ‘learning space of plurality’ (which is the very characteristic of democracy), 
of ‘making one out of many’, like that which Friedman describes in his childhood 
experiences.43 The actual experiences, meetings of others, are needed behind the 
democratic system, also Friedman urges. There is no other way to evoke ‘trust’ 
amongst the participants – and it is trust that is the very heart of democracy.44 
The distinctive discourses in several scientific fields urges the importance of such 
spaces, although they use different notions to pinpoint this ideal. Besides the 
‘public realm’, the term I have used so far, also referred to as the ‘public sphere’,45 
public domain,46 and ‘the public’ in the distinct fields of philosophy, sociology and 
political sciences. From all these notions, public sphere, is the most prevailing 
one. The different terms somehow all refer to the same phenomenon: the political 
uploaded perspective of the need for discussion, commenting, debating, meeting, 
the exchange of perspectives. This ideal that is connected to that mixture and 
is this learning-aspect that we’ve touched upon previously. Exchange of plural 
perspectives, once again, is at the basis of the democratic system – not only 
by searching for consensus and majorities amongst the inhabitants, but also 
for getting to know each other, in order to construct this experience of trust 
amongst participants. Although these different terms somehow refer to the same 
phenomenon, each notion nevertheless has its own slightly different accent. 
The combination of terms therefore does clarify what this is all about: public 
life in public(ity), which unfolds not only ‘visibly’ and ‘finitely’ (realm), but also 
‘invisibly’ and ‘infinitely’ (sphere). Public space in this perspective thus is both 
tangible (as urban space, a square or a street), it however also is an ideal (the 
ideal of exchange, a debate accessible to all, of touching upon each other). The 
Dutch sociologists Maarten Hajer and Arnold Reijndorp has offered an intriguing 
definition of this ideal. In their essay, In Search of a New Public Domain, they 
describe the public domain – which is the term they use – as the place where 
society is formed. In other words, it is the space – or in their more strong terms: 
the arena – where the collective will is formed in regards to the future of society. 
In their image of the public domain, they talk about this exchange as the meeting 
of one with the ‘proverbial other’.47 In this image of the ‘proverbial other’, which 
challenges public space as a meeting space, it becomes clear that this theory 
also urges emancipation of minority groups or groups of citizens that previously 
were excluded from public participation.48 In inclusive spaces, everybody gains 
the same rights of accessibility and participation. Exclusive space, on the other 
hand, keeps certain groups (particularly strangers, those that are different) out 
of sight. This actually is very tangible in the well-known prose poem, ‘The Eyes of 
the Poor’ (1864) from the French poet, Charles Pierre Baudelaire. In this poem, 
Baudelaire tells about sitting down on a terrace ‘in front of a new cafe that formed 
the corner of a new boulevard’ in Paris, just after city architect Georges-Eugène 
Hausmann had finished his famous operation: the construction of boulevards, 
cutting through the dense city fabric of Paris. This operation, meant to make the 
city better accessible for military aims of control, opened previously enclosed 
neighbourhoods, simply by cutting through its dense urban fabric with these large 
boulevards. Could the city be seen before as a collection of close together enclaves 
(rich and poor, dirty and clean, and so on), but without being connected, the 
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boulevards brought the city towards unity: the boulevards connected the enclaves, 
opened them to each other. The boulevards quickly were occupied by the upper 
class, enjoying life in cafés and on terraces – but now also suddenly confronted 
with the citizens from other, and of course, very different neighbourhoods. In ‘The 
eyes of the poor’, Baudelaire describes the confrontation of a begging family that 
arrives in front of their terrace. It is not only the confrontation of a human being 
with the upper class and one of a lower class, it also is a confrontation between 
the dazzling atmosphere of the cafe, and the poignant situation of the beggars, 
the opportunities of the rich and the desperate future of the poor. Baudelaire not 
only describes the asking eyes of the beggars, he simultaneously describes the very 
different response of him and his accompanying lover: a response that unfolds a 
distance between them. She thinks these eyes are unbearable and asks Baudelaire 
to go and ‘tell the manager to get them away from here.’ These eyes however had 
grabbed Baudelaire as well, but differently – their glance is unbearable. He felt 
‘little ashamed of our glasses and decanters, too big for our thirst.’49 The latter 
response can be seen as the ideal of the public sphere: to be confronted with 
other lives, other positions, other perspectives, other ideas, other convictions and 
beliefs, other circumstances, and to be questioned about your own perspectives, 
ideas, convictions and beliefs. The confrontation with the ‘proverbial other’, as 
Hajer and Reijndorp calls it, or with the ‘Other’ as the Jewish-French philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas writes, is to be asked fundamental questions that cannot be 
ignored – and it is a spatial, tangible, physical occurrence.50
The quest of the public realm, I would emphasize, essentially is a spatial question. 
The public realm addresses the very reality, spatiality and physicality of the 
meeting with this ‘proverbial other.’ That at least is the very reason also to discuss 
the idea of the public realm through the eyes of architecture too: it is about real 
space – about developments in real space, in reality, not only in political systems 
or philosophical stances, neither in social processes nor in individual preferences, 
but simply in our everyday environments, around the corner or in our streets, in 
the city and in the landscape, in all these spaces that – although unperceived – 
heavily influence us. It is this perspective that is urged in architecture. Particularly 
in the past two decades architectural and urban theorists joined the discourse. 
They understood urban public spaces, like streets and squares, parks and public 
buildings as providing room for exchange amongst people. This particularly is the 
merit of urban spaces, since cities are densely populated, and have the broadest 
range of inhabitants. As seen previously, in the definition of Hajer and Reijndorp, 
the perspective of the public sphere was understood as a political ideal beyond 
urban public spaces: space accommodating the participation of, and existential 
exchange of ideas between (groups of) people in society. And to continue by doing 
so, in bringing people together, public space establishes amongst and from within 
a people a certain identity and a commonly shared experience which is a need 
for society. In this perspective diversity is accepted – moreover, it is embraced as 
a positive aspect of the nowadays society – as is the very basis of the nowadays 
economical perspective on cities as we touched upon earlier. But ‘accepting 
diversity implies sharing public space – the streets, buses, parks, and schools 
– with people who visibly, and quite possibly vehemently, live lives you do not 
approve of,’ writes the urban sociologist Sharon Zukin.51 This has actually impli-
cations on the rendering of the city, the self-awareness of citizens. She writes: 
‘Cultural institutions, such as art museums, which were assumed to enhance a 
city’s reputation for civility, have been challenged as ‘elitist’ and are in the process 
of being ‘democratized’ or redefined. At the same time, the wealth of these insti-
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tutions is praised by public officials for strengthening a city’s competitive position 
in relation to other cities. When we look at a painting by Van Gogh and see tourist 
dollars, when we think of social class differences in terms of ‘cultures,’ when we 
design a downtown shopping center as Disney World – we are walking through 
the contradiction of the cultures of cities.’52
Despite the positive embrace of diversity, which is tangible in discussions 
about the future of cities today, the spatial consequences are treated in archi-
tectural and urban discourses in a much more pessimistic perspective. Distinct 
theorists as Christine Boyer, Mike Davis, Mark Augé, Bruce Robins and the 
architect, Michael Sorkin have urged the pessimistic future perspective in 
their books and other writings. Remarkably only one of these authors has not 
originated from the USA (which is not just caused because of my selection of 
writers that I mention here): most of the books on the public realm are published 
in North America. This, of course, does not have to surprise us. The radical change 
in the form, structure, and use of public space as well as the cities itself, certainly 
can be described as an American phenomenon, although it has been spread today 
around the Globe. As I will argue, the particular American voice in the debate 
on public space was evoked by the 1989 English translation of the 1962 book, 
Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit,	written by the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas.53 The presentation to the American reader surely has evoked a stream 
of recognition. The fragmented landscape of America in the last decade of the 90s 
certainly was fertile ground for this book. The mentioned authors share a quite 
negative perspective on the future of public space as part of the public sphere 
in regard to developments in society, which of course is influenced by the also 
negative analysis of Habermas, since he stressed the ‘end of the public sphere’ 
and described its bankruptcy. The titles and subtitles of their books already 
reveal how they respond to the developments and how they render its conse-
quences for the built environment. Titles like, Cybercities (Boyer, 1996), City of 
Quartz (Davis, 1990), Ecology of Fear (Davis, 1992), Non-places (Augé, 1992), 
The Phantom Public Sphere (Robbins, 1993), and Variations on a Theme Park 
(Sorkin, 1994),54 enlighten, for instance, the consequences of emerging new forms 
of media on the concrete realm, the impact of anxiety on urban places, the effect 
of consumerism on public and urban life, the impact of efficiency and infrastruc-
ture on public space, and the political aspects of (new) architectural and urban 
typologies. The increasing emphasis on (personal) safety, properness, and fun in 
the nowadays consumerist society reduces the possibilities of public life, moreover 
the possibility of political life – and therefore the possibilities of the exchange of 
ideas between different groups of people. The New York based architect and critic, 
Michael Sorkin, for instance, understands the new urban spaces – in his intro-
duction he is referring specifically to the growing importance of shopping malls 
and theme parks in daily life and the city fabric, but in the collection of essays that 
he has included in his, Variations on a Theme Park, urban sprawl and projects 
of city redevelopment are also discussed, as well the changing importance of the 
city-centre – as a treat for the democratic system itself. The ‘new’ figures of urban 
planning: urban sprawl, suburban living environments, shopping malls and gated 
communities are excluding strangers – no accidental and unforeseen, as well as, 
organized and foreseen exchange of ideas will take place. The American urban 
theorist, Mike Davis, even describes, in a publication published three years before 
9/11, our nowadays circumstances as ‘the ecology of fear’: the concept that shapes 
our environments nowadays is anxiety. Anxiety shapes the way we live, work, 
shop, recreate, travel, even our everyday lives.55 According to Davis, this fear is 
an anxiety for the stranger, for the unknown and unpredictable. In its essence, it 
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is a fear for disasters – for obstacles – in the individual strive for the ‘pursuit of 
happiness’. Strangers – everything that is odd – are treated as a danger, generally 
in society as well as in in the daily environments of neighbourhoods. Nowadays 
political movements have a problem to set up a convincing narrative dealing with 
different cultures, religions, races positively. And on the local level residents are 
concerned about their neighbourhoods; strangers are distrusted, especially in 
respect to children. Davis’ analysis shows that in contemporary (sub)urban spaces 
Jacob’s ‘eyes on the street’ are formalized: camera surveillance, a guard, or even 
safety firms took over.
The notion of the public sphere, we can imagine at this point, is urged as one of 
the most important and central ideas in respect to the modern Western politics 
and societies. It is not only issued due to the increase of concrete spaces that are 
to be described as exclusive, but also because of the developments Friedman 
describes. Globalisation shows the power of capitalism, not only on the global 
scale, but also affect local communities and their public spaces. Climate change 
does not just affect the biosphere; it also highly impacts the everyday environment 
of citizens. Technology is not just a matter of great phones and unlimited cloud 
storage; it also immediately changes public life. The accelerating forces disorient 
people, whereas the willingness to participate in public life seems to be replaced 
by leisurely activities, isolation and private interests. ‘As the modern public 
expands,’ Marshall Berman writes, ‘it shatters into a multitude of fragments, 
speaking incommensurable private languages; the idea of modernity, conceived 
in numerous fragmentary ways, loses much of its vividness, resonance and depth, 
and loses its capacity to organize and give meaning to people’s lives.’56 It is not 
public space that organizes the public life, but commercial space seems to be 
the only form of public life that survives. The market place seems to be the only 
space left to the public in Western capitalism. But as is clear, commercial space 
is programmed and controlled, which leaves barely any room for unpredicted 
and unprecedented happenings. Even new opportunities of communication – 
webpages, weblogs, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and so on – does not 
likely seem to offer conversations, but rather offers the opportunity to ventilate 
opinions (or to curse against opposing opinions). ‘The eclipse of the problem of 
modernity in the 1970s, has meant the destruction of a vital form of public space. 
It has hastened the disintegration of our world into an aggregation of private 
material and spiritual interest groups, living in windowless nomads, far more 
isolated than we need to be.’57
1.2.3 Go Home!
The term has figured in the debate on the city and architecture for about two 
decades now and it slightly but surely has found its way to the core of this 
discourse from the moment that it emerged in the beginning of the nineties of the 
last century. Nowadays no report on cities can be written, no master plan can be 
drawn, no future perspective can be presented, no public building or space can 
be designed without reference to this term. It has turned into a marketing-slogan 
on buildings and spaces. Vivid public spaces! Projects are accompanied by shiny 
images full of people wandering around, talking to each other on a terrace, 
or sitting on stairs that slowly descend to a former dock or are curved into an 
amphitheatre. It surely can be argued that the term ‘public realm’ slightly has 
turned into an obsolete ideal. It has lost its power and perspective and politically 
spoken has become an empty figure. It has become a ubiquitous fashionable 
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term, economically preferable, a tool for the promotion of new developments. On 
the one hand, this shows that the concept of the public realm has an ideal that is 
idealized as it simultaneously is captured by the market. It has become utopian 
as well as a preferable image, which – in both cases – simply is over the top. It 
never will be reached as imagined. It neither can fulfil its politically promise, as 
being a common ground for the exchange between all inhabitants of a particular 
community, nor can it fulfil its imaginable promise, as a safe, smooth and cosy 
environment where the enjoyments of (community-)life is celebrated. We might 
agree to some degree that its widespread use nowadays is proof of the growing 
emptiness of the term itself. In most cases it just can be understood as lip service 
to the contemporary fashionable perspectives in the field. 
With equal right we however can argue how important it is to once again 
redefine the notion of the public realm. Despite the renewed interest in cities and 
plurality,58 democratic societies still seem to be on their way to harsh divisions 
and fragmentation. Today it is city against suburb, higher educated against the 
lower educated, rich against the poor, the progressive against the traditionalist, 
the cosmopolite against the nationalist. New media affects the public space, as 
well as the political arena. The accessibility of the public realm and the possibility 
of exchange belongs to the heart of Western Democracy. Particularly these aspects 
are threatened in the evaporation of public space. It therefore is part of an ongoing 
debate – a very much needed ongoing debate. Democracy never is a stable state; it 
needs to be rethought, reissued and discussed in response to actualities. The rela-
tionship between economy, politics and the public realm is in a continuous change 
too. There thus is a need to redefine these notions continuously. The public realm 
somehow withdraws itself again and again from our knowledge, understanding 
and common practices, and thus needs to be re-thought and reissued again. 
This continuous process or re-imagination has to be seen as a power of Western 
societies: it is the need of a continuous reflection on what is going on and its own 
self-understanding – not to say its own vitality. A society never can be seen as a 
perpetual mobile, a construct that can function without adding new energy. On 
the contrary, without rethinking and redefining its own values and its constituting 
parts, a society will stagnate. To state it differently, it belongs to the very essence 
of the democratic system that such fundamental questions and its premises need 
to be investigated again and again. 
In architectural and urban theory this notion of the public realm thus is 
introduced as an attempt to reach beyond the tangible, concrete public space, an 
attempt to stress the inherent but hidden meaning, significance and urgency of 
urban figures as the street, the square and the park. It nevertheless also is clear 
that architectural form and intervention cannot establish a public realm. The ideal 
of the public realm is bound to the people using a space, particularly in a certain 
openness. It thus is a matter of the people themselves and their social practices. 
Architecture can provide elements in these spaces that increase the comfort 
and the likeliness of use: benches, tables, trees, playground elements, a chess 
board. Architecture, in other words, does not create a public realm – it creates 
the possibility of it, it makes it more likely that the space can be regarded as the 
public realm. A space to meet and greet strangers, although these strangers can 
be neighbours too. That actually is tangible in the final perspective of Friedman, 
where he urges the home and the local community as the eye of the hurricane, 
the stable entity in a work adrift. The home as a point of quietness and steadiness 
in a world adrift, offering moments of pause in the ongoing bombardment 
of information and development. So are local communities – if vital they are 
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welcoming, offering a learning model of plurality and exchange of differences in 
unity, or unity in differences, of propelling moments and connectedness. A couple 
of aspects are here at stake. Friedman urges the local community as balancing 
between protection and stimulation, between connectedness and privacy, between 
respect and togetherness. As we touched upon before, such a balance is not 
established overnight, but it takes bricks and logs at a time. Although he does not 
address these ‘bricks’ so much, the tangibility of the local community certainly is 
important. The local community is graspable, it can be found somewhere – we can 
travel back home and we should! This certainly is opposed to virtual communities 
on Facebook or Instagram, but also to the way more intangible community that 
can be imagined on a meta level of society but that never will offer the same 
tangible balance between the singular and the multitude, protection and respect. 
People need to be ‘anchored’ in local situations, he somehow seems to argue. 
In his reflection, however, he does not have much eyes for the ‘bricks’ of the local 
community and the home, the physical aspects of a neighbourhood.59 As stated, he 
mentions the basketball court and the bus, the school and the gas station, but not 
so much as tangible figures. He is focused on what happened on that court, in that 
shop or that bus. Tangible things, however, are important too, as can be read in 
between the lines of his reflection on a project the bottom-up volunteering council 
of the neighbourhood started. ‘It only works if you start with a “dining room 
table”,’ one of the participants tells Friedman. ‘You get then all together around 
a dining room table, and they leave realizing, “There are other leaders in the 
community who want the same things that I do.’60 The dinner of course gathers 
the guests, but it is the table that enables them to relate to each other and to have 
a conversation. Some of the significance of tangible ‘things’ also comes to the fore 
in the very last page of the book, when he returns to the street where he most of 
his childhood had lived. It offered him the experience of a familiar environment – 
even the former house of his parents, he writes, is still the same light-blue colour 
after all these years. The people certainly had changed, but the neighbourhood 
stayed the same. Only one thing puzzled him – it was slightly darker in reality 
than in his memories. What caused this unfamiliarity, he questioned? Only after a 
while he understands: the trees had grown quite a bit, covering the street with its 
leaves.61 
Despite the recognition he experiences while visiting his former neighbourhood, it 
can be questioned whether such ‘back to home’ movement can answer the serious 
alienation that is evoked by modernity, globalization and the rapid transformation 
of our lives and environments. A ‘home’ that is filled with memories and rituals, 
shaped by our daily life and routines, certainly offers a place that can be inhabited, 
an anchor in a rapidly changing world, a connection with a local community. It 
can be argued, however, that alienation is not a modern experience at all, only 
evoked by the rapid transformation of the world. Alienation – the loss of ‘home’, 
paradise, connection with the Lord or the ‘gods’ – after all is a fundamental 
notion in religious systems and philosophical theories prior to the first traces of 
modernity in the history of the human race.
Nevertheless, this study discusses architecture precisely at the point where 
Friedman’s optimistic guide emphasises the home, the community and the 
pessimistic discourse about public spaces as well as alienation intersect. The loss 
of public space often is stressed in quite abstract ways, as a threat for the Western 
idea of democracy. Rightly so, but this is not just a matter of abstract ideas on the 
level of the political realm, it certainly also affects also the possibility of being at 
home in a local community. The loss of public space is not so much the narrative 
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of the great, central and symbolical spaces, those spaces that regularly are the 
locus of protests and demonstrations, but it is particularly tangible where archi-
tecture touches upon the soil, at the heart of local communities, in the everyday 
spaces of inhabitants, at the corners of their streets. In other words, when the eye 
of the hurricane, as Friedman calls it, is the home and the healthy community, 
this also means something for the shape of such spaces, of the architecture of 
the home as it is related to the design, structure, and lay-out of public spaces. If 
public space becomes obsolete, this will affect communities falling apart by losing 
their common ground, their obvious meeting places, their ways of life wherein 
the meeting with neighbours (and strangers) is obvious. It becomes tangible in 
the relation between the home and the situation – how houses are connected 
to streets, related to other houses. Architecture in its most basic agency gives 
form to this everyday realm: the architecture of the home, the network of streets, 
the sequence of public spaces, and the relationship between all these elements. 
To state it differently: Architecture shapes the thresholds between interior and 
exterior of the home, the edges between public space and private space, between 
the mall and the parking lot, the street and the playing field. ‘Historically,’ the 
Canadian theorist Alberto Pérez-Gomez argues, ‘it was the architect’s job to make 
you feel at home in the city, to intensify your sense of purpose and belonging in 
public, through the institutions that framed daily life. Indeed, this was the part of 
life that truly mattered, as it involved our social body, our being with others that 
reflected back a sense of purpose through our actions.’62
The title of this study, ‘At Home in the World’, certainly evokes this image 
of ‘being at home’. It evokes the material picture of the house in the world, the 
anchor that, for a while, can be experienced as solid and stable within the rapid 
transformation of the world today. However, it also, as we will see, evokes another 
picture. It challenges also the Heideggerian emphasis on alienation and home-
lessness within modernity through the much more positive reading of the ‘world’, 
as pictured by the philosopher Hannah Arendt, who is the central figure in this 
study. World, for Arendt, always means common-world, world-in-common. For 
Arendt this is a positive perspective. We’re not alone on earth, we are together 
with our fellow human beings, with which we share the world. We, we might 
argue, only can be at home in the world, if we value the commonness of the world. 
In the light of contemporary political discussions in Europe, it is important to 
emphasize this combination of 'at home' at one side and 'in the world' on the 
other. The longing for home in actual politics is often understood as a longing for 
'authentic' identity, often exclusively related to a particular tradition, landscape 
or even race. The close ties between 'home' and 'world' in redirects this view, 
not to a past, but to a present, not to a specific group, but to the plurality of all 
men sharing the world. The world, in Arendt's vocabulary, never is common to a 
specific group, it is the common ground to all. 'At home in the world' actually can 
be read as the project behind Arendt's reflections on politics, on action, on the 
human being, society, the arts, and so on, and so forth. That aim also is behind 
architecture, I actually argue. 
Understanding this from a perspective of architecture, as I will argue, means 
to value the world as a material in-between that is a common ground for the 
community both at large as well as in its very local circumstances. That material 
world is largely the matter of architecture: it requires attention, maintenance, 
intervention to continue to fulfil its role as common ground. This certainly is a 
local issue, but immediately has a larger impact on the greater community. This 
perspective, however, also enables me to argue that while the world is matter for 
architecture, vice versa architecture matters for the community.  
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1.2.4 A Journey in Circles
The conversation with the bus driver can be read as the briefest summary of 
the perspective developed in this study, which in itself is a journey through the 
field of architecture, craving for the relationship with the public and the public 
realm, with society and the political realm, or what I finally have called the ‘world 
and its inhabitants’. It literally can be read as a journey: the text goes in circles, 
investigating different viewpoints, that again and again stress the central topic 
from different ankles, in order to slowly but surely come closer to the essential 
perspectives at the very heart. The main question beyond this study is herewith 
given: against the background of modernity and globalisation, the narrative of the 
loss of the public sphere, it investigates the significance, relevance and urgency 
of architecture. It questions what architecture can do politically (or better said, 
in respect to the world and its inhabitants). It therefore also questions the role of 
the architect: designing, which is at the heart of architecture, always means the 
personal involvement of the designer. How should we value that aspect, facing 
this context of the ‘world and its inhabitants’?  
This journey starts in the next chapter with a trip through the American 
landscape of Florida, touching upon the ‘new’ urban figures that dominate this 
landscape: suburban neighbourhoods, gated communities, shopping malls, 
infrastructure, airports, theme parks, and historic districts. It offers a view upon 
the landscape and some of the forces behind it. The suburban neighbourhood 
somehow represents the image of paradise on earth, but it also – with the song 
‘Big Yellow Taxi’ of Joni Mitchell – is destroyed in the same vain; 
‘Don’t it always seem to go / 
That you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone /
They paved Paradise /
And put up a parking lot.’63
The third chapter then brings us in the city itself, which somehow seems to offer 
more optimistic perspectives. Cities are popular again and somehow increase their 
inhabitants again after years of decreases. Cities are at the heart of the new theory 
about the creative industries, which only will be successful, their promoters argue, 
when diversity is acknowledged. This perspective upon the city and its essential 
plurality also addresses the different protest-movements that have entered 
the streets in the West (the occupy movement) as well as in the Middle East, 
the Arab Spring. The essential characteristic of democratic public space, after 
all, some argue, is the possibility to gather and to protest. Protest needs public 
space – it has to become tangible, visible in public. Despite this picture, it also 
is clear that the flourishing of cities has a backside: it propels segregation. Again 
a new threat upon the plurality of public spaces. However, these two chapters 
gain insight in the discourses in different scientific fields upon public space and 
the ideals behind. It nevertheless turns out how difficult it is to also address 
architecture through this perspective. It clearly is related, but what can we say 
about this relationship. It also is clear that no fixed amount of ‘forms’ that would 
guarantee ‘success’ by intervention in public space are available – whatever can be 
defined as ‘success’ in public space. These two chapters conclude with a thorough 
examination of a particular public space: the Parc de la Villette in Paris, a design 
by the French-American architect, Bernard Tschumi, from 1986. It offers a few 
perspectives upon architectural means that propel diversity in space. However, it 
also concludes that architecture, although important, is not decisive. Particular 
public practices require particular publics, and occupy spaces that somehow 
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fit these practices. In other words, the conclusion taken from these chapters is 
that the debate on public space somehow is in an impasse, as it only offers a few 
guidelines to design. To my mind, part of this impasse is because the view upon 
public space is dominated by the perspective of the German philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas. His idea, to my mind, offers a too high ideal of public space, which 
somehow paralyzes the debate. In the fifth chapter I then compare Habermas’s 
ideas with these of Hannah Arendt – whose life and thinking I previously present 
in Chapter 4. Her view is present in the discourse, but in a rather limited sense. 
Indeed, I conclude in Chapter 5, taking her perspective certainly to enhance our 
understanding of public life and public space and how it is related to the field of 
architecture (as well as to the private realm). In my journey through her writings 
I however came to understand that her view rather would mean a shift in the 
debate. Arendt, although some argue that her perspective introduces an idealizing 
model, nevertheless keeps her model quite open and hopeful, as she also offers 
other starting points to also address architecture in this perspective. Chapter 5 
not only takes her model of ‘public space’ and investigates it in the light of the 
field of architecture, it also addresses Arendt’s concept of the public realm as what 
she calls ‘a space of appearance,’ which, as I will stress, includes an important 
role for the private realm – the home, so to speak. The next chapter then takes up 
her notion of the ‘world’, a frame through which Arendt urges the importance of 
objects and artworks. This chapter takes her reflections and introduces architec-
ture as one of the most important forms of world-building the human-being has at 
hand. It thus develops a perspective upon the political significance of architecture 
in which the tangibility of the architectural object plays a central role. Chapter 
7 finally investigates architecture as a ‘craft’ by using Arendt’s notions of ‘work’, 
‘action’, ‘thinking’ and ‘judging’. It urges the importance of design as a world-con-
structing activity, but it also questions how the public is or can be related to the 
activity of design and imagination, which after all is often understood as a limited, 
personal and subjective activity. The very final and concluding chapter brings the 
previous discussions together: addressing the relationship between architecture 
and the public (realm), between the public realm and the world, between the 
world and the work-of-our-hands, and thus urges architecture as the very agency 
of the experience ‘to be at home in the world’. 
This study, which has to be seen as a contribution to the discourse of architec-
tural theory in the first place, but also hopes to provide a different perspective 
for adjacent professional fields as philosophy and political sciences, is based on 
the conviction that this physical appearance, its materialized existence, and its 
imaginative power is of utmost importance for society. The notion of the public 
realm not only is a Western contemporary narrative of public behaviour, its 
political relevance, and its philosophical consequences, of an immaterialized 
sphere, but also is a perspective on the material structure of society – and vice 
versa. The ‘vice versa’ is important in this respect: architecture is a central aspect 
of the reality of the public realm, on its turn the public realm is a major narrative 
regarding architecture nowadays. 
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1.3 SOME REMARKS ON THIS STUDY 
1.3.1 A Reciprocal Relationship
Until this point, it might already be clear that architecture in this study is 
understood in relation to other fields of sciences, cultural, political and social 
practices. Architecture, of course, deals with space. It shapes space, as it also 
offers space to certain functions, programs. It offers space to be appropriated, 
occupied, inhabited, used, damaged, reworked. Space, for architecture, is a 
crucial term, wherein material matters and social, economic, cultural and political 
practices join forces. From the architectural point of view, space not simply is seen 
as the the spatial and material frame that offers room for a particular function 
(or). Architecture has a certain instrumental outlook: it is eager to intervene in 
space, in order to change the possibilities of use and adaptation. Although archi-
tecture thus is an agency in space, time, society, it is not a sole intervenor, nor 
is architecture independent. Architecture is part and parcel of society, and thus 
depends upon economic, social, political forces, technological and material devel-
opments. Architecture therefore does not simply represent itself, but also reflects 
the current society. This reflection upon the field and agency of architecture has 
a clear methodical implication for this study. Architecture here is addressed not 
on its own, but as part of a larger whole. Moreover, the lens particularly is taken 
from outside the field, in order to investigate the public aspects of architecture. 
This ‘outside’ perspective is needed in order to value the meaning of architecture. 
This study is not strictly architectural in that it searches for the internal rationales 
of the profession. There certainly are such rationales: over the ages of the humans 
dwelling upon earth, the art of building has developed its ‘own’ discipline. 
This study takes that into account, but will reflect upon these logics always in 
combination with views from outside the field. In this sense, this study also is 
not historical, nor practical, but instead rather theoretical. It aims to challenge 
architectural thinking, open up new reflective perspectives upon the matter of 
architecture and the question how architecture is of matter for the world. This of 
course also has methodological consequences: it studies literature and confronts 
that with literature from within the field, as it also takes literature from within 
the world and mirrors that with a reflection upon the developments in the world, 
in the everyday environment. It does not study architecture (or they everyday 
environment) through precedent-study, plan-analysis or close reading. 
The very character of architecture places this study not only in-between different 
scientific fields (from architecture to philosophy to political sciences and to 
sociology), as it also is located in-between different scientific branches. The 
material aspects of architecture after all are addressed through the natural 
sciences mainly, whereas its atmospherically qualities are part of the social 
sciences, as space and objects certainly contribute to the well being of the 
human being and functioning of the human community. Moreover, these spaces 
and object reflect that very society, and thus also are challenging the studies 
addressing the humanities. As is clear by now: it is neither pure mathematics 
nor pure philosophy, it is neither solely a technical, nor solely an organizational, 
morphological or geographical issue.   
The previous sections offer a clear premise behind this study, and somehow 
opposes the ‘school’ in architecture that urges the autonomous path of the field.64 
Within this line of thoughts architecture is urged to find its material – and 
with that its meaning – from within the discipline, from the history of archi-
tecture and the body of knowledge that has been accumulated over time (in 
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buildings, in practices, in drawings, in texts). Stating that architecture depends 
upon other fields does not mean to deny the specific architectural knowledge, 
tradition and histories. In time, through practices, expertise is gained, shared, 
propelled. It has become a body of knowledge that is embodied in buildings, 
shaped in typology, and captured in formal elements. Architecture certainly has 
its own treat, a certain resistance to other influences – and surely withstands 
the forces of time and temporalities, of changing functions and fashions, and 
the storm of actualities. The understanding of architecture as a developed field 
of its own offers the possibility to see and interpret architecture ‘as a language 
consisting of defined and comprehensible elements,’ and ‘as a craft, as a system 
of rules for the composition and ordering of elements; rules which have been 
endlessly tested throughout the history of the discipline.’65 Although I am aware 
that architecture is a practice that can build upon a history of examples that are 
characterized by a particular knowledge - each building being built contributes 
to that body of knowledge. It also is true that this body of knowledge is heavily 
influenced by adjacent fields, particularly in the everyday practice of architects. 
It is not an independent profession, nor an independent body of knowledge. 
Opposed to the conviction of autonomy, I thus urge the position of a depending 
profession, which obviously does not diminish the architect as a professional – on 
the contrary, it requires even more professionalism and inhabitation of architec-
tural knowledge to act within this dependent position, as I argue in Chapter 7. It 
agrees with the brief explanation of this viewpoint by architect and writer Jeremy 
Till: ‘architecture at every state of its existence – from design through construc-
tion to occupation – is buffeted by eternal forces. Other people, circumstances, 
and events intervene to upset the architect’s best-laid plans. These forces are, to 
greater or lesser extent, beyond the direct control of the architect. Architecture 
is thus shaped more by external conditions than by the internal processes of the 
architect. Architecture is defined by its very contingency, by its very uncertainty 
in the face of these outside forces.’66 That might seem a dramatic viewpoint 
for an architect, seemingly not in charge in the design of the building. But as 
stated above: this position requires professionality, knowledge, craftsmanship. 
It however admits that a design depends not only on the architect, but that the 
client is in charge too, as well as the contractor and even the user. That economic 
principles shape the building, besides the traditions within the architectural 
profession. Often, the construction method (partly) defines the shape of the 
building, which depends on the knowledge and possibilities of the constructor, on 
the possibilities of the particular site, and so on. Unforeseen actualities shape the 
design, as do political and economic processes. Even ‘fashion’ and stimmung are 
influential in the design process, like popular concepts and worldviews.67  
Both seemingly opposing visions on architecture, autonomy on the one hand and 
the depending position on the other hand, are clearly not addressing the same 
thing. The first addresses the knowledge that is hidden in the built environment, 
in architectural drawings and models, in architectural reflections and manifestos, 
and that all together definitely shapes the way architects think and act. The second 
view engages with the design-process itself, in which lots of other forces can also 
be recognized, influencing the outcome of the design process. We therefore might 
argue that the second view precedes as well as incorporates the first: all the forces 
shaping the built environment somehow contribute to the knowledge that is 
accumulated within the profession, educated at universities around the world, can 
be learned from publications, and that is a force in itself, shaping the architect’s 
thinking and acting (and through the architect also the built environment again). 
Architects dealing with the forces within the design process, incorporate it in the 
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design, and in professional knowledge, which – by sharing it with others, and 
through his designs – becomes part and parcel of the field and expertise of archi-
tecture. We might summarize this as architecture as a profession that is simulta-
neously dependent (as a daily practice in society) as well as autonomous (as an 
academic field, reifying and transmitting the body of knowledge). 
This summary however does not satisfy yet. It simply states something of the field 
itself, of how buildings are conceived, designed and constructed. It is focused on 
the profession only, stressing its internal and external forces. But then, it seems 
to acknowledge the built environment in a static way: as a collection of buildings, 
and the accumulation of architectural knowledge. Architecture however is not 
simply a limited moment of making plans and constructing buildings. Buildings 
have a lifetime of their own, they are used, occupied, adapted, demolished, recon-
structed. There is, in other words, a relationship with users, society, culture, 
events, happenings – should we not incorporate that as well in our view? In 
other words, after being designed and constructed, the built environment at least 
also ‘gives back’ to its context, to its clients, and to those that by chance occupy 
(parts) of the building. This relationship is nevertheless not one way, life shaping 
buildings, but also the other way around: the building shapes lives, societies, 
cultures.68 This of course rephrases the famous quote of Winston Churchill: ‘First 
we shape our buildings, thereafter they shape us.’69
We might challenge this point a bit further: there is evidently an intensive 
relationship between architecture and its users, which cannot be limited to those 
that really occupy a building, but also to those that visit it irregularly, and those 
that appear in its vicinity. This relation thus starts with the program a building 
houses. Architecture, buildings as well as other urban structures, offers room to 
programs and activities by creating proper conditions. A firm needs office spaces; 
a family, a dwelling. They need a building in order to do their businesses, to dwell. 
But this relationship is sometimes also more temporal, and less bound to the 
particular program that is housed in a building: teenagers are seeking specific 
places to race their bikes, others are looking for a table to play chess. A group of 
musicians do need a room to practice their performance. A concrete staircase in 
front of a building attracts skaters skateboarding, a playground in a park attracts 
children with their au pair. In other words, the architectural feature that makes 
this particular space attractive to use (and to gather, as a group) is its great 
acoustics (or the cheap rent), the steepness of a ramp, the toughness of a staircase. 
What happens in space cannot be detached from the architecture itself, from the 
spatial qualities of a certain place, although it also has a ‘life’ and ‘will’ of its own.70
If we would have to define the heart of the profession, we might summarize 
it at this point that architecture creates room through material interventions in 
space. Or should we state, it creates places as opposite to infinite space? This 
space, this ‘room’ that is created, which if loosely or sharply defined, makes 
things possible. Or impossible. Buildings, walls, doors, windows, streets, squares 
are offering room to particular programs. Architecture and program are inter-
related71 – and although different programs can be housed in the building 
over time, the building needs to be adapted (sometimes extensively) over time 
to make this possible. Architectural elements are making activities possible 
simultaneously connecting and separating people, spaces, environments. Built 
structures are protecting and opening space at once. By protecting, however, 
specific atmospheres and comfort can be conditioned: regulating fresh air and a 
comfortable climate, by framing perspectives, and so on. Through its intervention 
in infinite space, architecture is providing room for initiatives and activities. It has 
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to be immediately said as well: this architecture in most cases is not independent 
of these activities and initiatives, but often reifies what already is there. Archi-
tecture is not only creating place for activities of a particular ‘community’, it also 
simultaneously is the spatial and material answer to processes in that community. 
It is not an ‘either-or’ relationship, it holds a reciprocal relationship which 
somehow is divided in time. It is commissioned, but after being built, it offers 
space, also to activities that were not foreseen. And while offering space, giving 
room to activities, these activities in turn (can) reshape the building. Between 
buildings and activities, in other words, there is a reciprocal relationship. 
Architecture is not simply produced by architects; it is produced through time 
by those occupying the space and shaping it to their needs. This not only means 
that representation, experience and also production of architecture is insoluble, it 
also makes clear that the production of space is forced beyond the intention of the 
designers. The city consists of the daily experiences and the continuous reproduc-
tion of its spaces by reordering knowledge, restructuring the spatial, reconsidering 
the cultural and appropriating places.72 The importance of emphasizing this view 
is that it enlightens the – in some sense obvious – fact that actual lived space, a 
term coined by the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre,73 is not detached from its 
inhabitants. It is not only their background or everyday environment (which of 
course has influence on their lives), but moreover, it is also their product.74 
We need to understand this interdependency and the reciprocal relationship even 
on a higher level: architecture is the tangible result of developments in society. 
Architecture creates room for society, whilst society requires concrete and tangible 
spaces; architecture. Therefore, it also is true that whatever happens in society, 
sooner or later has its impact on concrete spaces, on roads and buildings, on cities 
and squares. Developments in society – the change of ideas on how we live and 
work, where to recreate and relax, how to teach in schools and treat the kids, how 
society or the government is organized, what can be expected from as well as is 
needed to offer a community, and so on – always have their impact on the built 
environment. Schools need to be redeveloped, as well as office spaces, industrial 
areas and neighbourhoods due to changing ideas and progressive insights.75 City 
centres change continuously, as does the landscape. Architecture, therefore, offers 
a tangible narrative on society and its organization, on contemporary human life 
as well as its past. It moreover also represents its dreams through the designs that 
are made and the building projects that are planned and announced. Architecture 
is the reification of everyday life of a changing society and a political organization, 
rather than the individual oeuvre of an architect or the outcome of autonomous 
processes within the field – although (and here we are back at the beginning of 
this reflection upon the very characteristics of the architectural profession) these 
new ‘experiences’ in design certainly contribute to the body of knowledge that can 
be stressed as the autonomous core of the discipline. 
It is this perspective behind this study that urges us to understand the relation-
ship between architecture and the public, particularly regarding public space, 
not as a line, a vector, but as a matrix, that simultaneously, dialectically, and 
sometimes also paradoxically, addresses the physical, the social, the perception, 
the representation, the production, and the appropriation of space. The architec-
tural project somehow bridges the complexities of this matrix. As a matter of fact, 
the notion of public space gains depth, reality, and tangibility when understood 
through such a layered approach, that I here symbolize through the figure of the 
matrix. This matrix, actually, is not limited to what regularly and intuitively is 
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understood as public space: the streets, plazas, squares and parks of cities. As we 
will see, the definition of public space is rather vague, we sometimes experience 
space to be public, that in some respects aren’t, while on the other hand, public 
spaces are experienced to be privative. Therefore, the matrix is more about 
‘spaces’ generally, although some aspects indeed address the ‘public’ aspects and 
can be found in ‘public’ spaces vigorously. 
The matrix however certainly starts with concrete spaces, whether accessible 
by the public or not, owned by the public or not, appropriated by the public or not 
– spaces that provide room (make things possible as well as impossible), have a 
surface, borders, and surroundings. These spaces are physical. Their reading gains 
depth, contrast, tangibility, and presence, through an understanding of the tactile 
qualities of the construction, and the textures of the materials. 
Secondly these spaces have a particular history that did produce the space: 
initiatives by public authorities, developers, inhabitants, owners, planners, 
politicians, they are drawn and designed by architects and urban planners, and 
built by contractors, carpenters, plumbers, and so on. But space cannot be limited 
to the designed and constructed edifice. 
Public spaces, thirdly, also are inhabited by people, and appropriated by the 
public (or not, which is meaningful too) – they play a role in the everyday life 
of inhabitants, of visitors and neighbours, of citizens and tourists. However, 
this immediately means that the spaces, as well as their meaning, changes over 
time, is (re)produced by the everyday uses. Public spaces are experienced and 
perceived differently by distinct social groups, depending on the context, the use, 
the connections, even on the specific visit, the memory, the meeting, the weather. 
Space is not fixed; let alone the interpretation of space. This not is just the case 
through the temporality of use, of what happens in public space, it also means that 
the architecture (the physical artefact) changes over time. Structure, networks, 
fabrics are temporal, as is the perception of the representation of the architectural 
project (which of course has a much shorter lifespan). 
Fourthly, public spaces also are, as theorists have unfolded in their substantial 
and significant explorations of the contemporary situation, the result of, or 
do initiate, actual social processes in space, society and neighbourhoods, like 
economic transformation, social appropriation, inhibition, colonization, and 
gentrification, and therefore are, in their form, structured and impactful - not 
neutral. Therefore, public spaces also represent something of the processes 
beyond society, the economic power and the (political) ideologies that are granted. 
The spaces thus also are symbolical or even iconographic. Meaning they inhabit 
space – although space cannot be reduced to meaning (and the meaning is 
flexible). 
Finally the spaces not only are the product of forces beyond space, they also 
are socio-cultural producers themselves. In the recent history of architecture, the 
notion of social change, for instance, was associated with architecture. Over time, 
however, it has been lost to view. Nevertheless, it still is taken for granted that 
actual spaces, specifically giving room to meetings, are significant for the human 
being. It thus is the experience of space, this temporal perception, that also is 
reproductive – it makes the distinct levels of space immediately present.
Summarized, space here is understood as a ‘stage’ that offer room for social 
processes. This stage is not simply a décor behind a certain practice or a box 
around a certain use, nor a receptor of social, economic or cultural processes 
solely, it also is understood as instrument to evoke such social processes, 
practices, uses.76 In other words, while understanding space as a stage, it is an 
agency in itself. It not only stages a certain action, it also enables this action, by 
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offering it a ‘space of appearance’. Particularly the idea that space has an agency 
on its own, an agency that was fuelled by the design of it, has played a central role 
in the history of Modern architecture. Prominent architects and urban designers 
like Bruno Taut, Ernst May, and Le Corbusier, were convinced about the positive 
affect new way of organizing the city, and the new design of dwellings would have 
on social and cultural life of the citizens and inhabitants.77 However, the history 
of architecture also has revealed how such expectations were never fulfilled. The 
intended goals never were reached.78
1.3.2 Architecture: From Nail to Trail
Next to the heteronomous character of architecture and the notion of space as 
stage, the second premise that certainly already is tangible in this text, is the use 
of the term ‘architecture’ in an expanded way. In everyday language, architecture 
is used to describe particular designs of singular buildings, or to describe the 
(academic or cultural) field (of knowledge) concerned with the design of buildings. 
In this text, however, we already discussed public space, contemporary cities 
and landscapes, streets, squares and parks – and we all have addressed this as 
‘architecture’. In other words, the notion here is used in reference to ‘the built 
environment’, and how that is experienced, used, described, evoked and imagined 
(this as summary of the specific knowledge of architecture), as well as how we 
define, design, propel interventions in this built environment (the act of design, 
that is at the heart of the profession).79 This thus means that when the word ‘archi-
tecture’ is used, it includes the related fields of urban design, and landscape archi-
tecture, building management and construction, like other fields that contribute 
to the whole process of planning, developing, constructing and maintaining the 
built environment. It ranges from the planning of cities to the cultivation of the 
landscape, from interior design to the development of buildings, from the design 
of furniture to regional planning. This close connection between architecture, 
urbanism and landscape architecture (and with them also the fields of interior 
design and construction, building technology, planning sciences, geography) can 
be understood in the light of a common concern: spatiality, although on different 
levels. In other words: those three professions are directed towards the knowledge 
of space and its materiality as well as the spatial and material intervention in the 
‘man-made world’, to state it with a term of the philosopher Hannah Arendt, who 
plays a major role in this study.80 For sure, technically seen, these professions do 
use specific knowledge of construction, structure, and planning, of mathematics 
and models, which certainly is the reason for the nowadays division in profession 
and education. I however thus argue that no division should be made between 
those professions. In other countries, the division between architecture and urban 
design seems to be less prominent. Particularly The Netherlands has a history 
of differentiation, where urban design already for about 100 years is distin-
guished from architecture. Urban design is limited to the planning and structure 
of the city and the design of urban public spaces, landscape architecture deals 
with the structure of the landscape and the design of urban and suburban green 
spaces, and architecture is limited to the design and construction of (singular) 
buildings in the city as well as in the landscape. These distinctions in contem-
porary practices are actually blurred: landscape architectural offices also design 
buildings, architectural offices also design squares and parks, offices for urban 
design strongly prescribe the architecture that needs to fit in their plans, etcetera. 
Particularly in the case of the city plan, its streets and squares, its public spaces 
and its private parts, this division is lethal. ‘To truly make good public space,’ the 
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American architect Liz Diller, one of the designers behind New York’s newest 
park, the well-known and very popular, High Line, states, ‘you have to erase the 
distinctions between architecture, urbanism, landscape, media design, and so on. 
It really goes beyond distinction.’81 Spatial design, I would stress, is particularly 
concerned with thresholds (this perspective I develop in Chapter 5 and 6), which 
connects the distinctive domains of the city, particular buildings and the urban 
fabric and so on. What thus needs to be at the core of attention actually is, if a 
strong division between professions is made, at the very edge of the assignment 
and the particular responsibility of the designer involved (and often also literally 
at the very edge of the paper, the screen, the model, the view). Spatially and 
culturally seen, however, there is no need for this division. Understanding 
interiors, buildings, cities and landscapes as a continuous chain seems to me a 
convincing perspective, at least in the light of the public realm which is central 
in this study. Or, as the French writer and theorist, member of the Situationists 
International Guy Debord wrote in 1959: ‘the problem of architecture is not to 
be seen from outside, nor to live inside. It is in the dialectical relationship interi-
or-exterior, at the scale of urbanism (house-street) and at the scale of the house 
(interior-exterior).’82 This is the underlying conviction of this study as well, it 
is concerned about the artefact in its context, the buildings in its surroundings, 
the streets in its network, the city in the landscape, the room in the house, the 
corridor in the office building, the entrance in the street, the window facing the 
street – and all this interrelated with each other, which somehow is tangible in the 
well-known quote of Alberti: ‘A building’ can be seen as ‘a small city and the city 
as a building.’83 
While architecture thus has to be seen as the concrete spatial and material 
artefacts in their environment – be it urban or rural – on the one hand, and as 
field of design, planning and building of these artefacts on the other, the indissol-
uble relationship between both sides of this description needs to be stressed more 
clearly. The expanded notion of architecture does not simply urge the knowledge 
hidden in the reality of the built environment, but also urges the activity behind 
this built environment, processes of design and construction, occupation and 
imagination. This simply means that architecture is not a regular field of sciences, 
but that within the field, at its very core, is the will to intervene (and the need 
to maintain, as I will stress in Chapter 6). Architecture is not simply the expert 
of (existing) space, it moreover is driven by imagination and besides that it 
describes the world as it is, it also stresses the world as it should (or can) be.84 
It is important to keep both sides of the profession tied together. Architecture is 
design and project, is reality and imagination, is the paper drawing and the lived 
environment. The spatiality of our ‘man-made-world’ is produced by practices 
that by itself are spatial as well. This spatiality actually is not left in the hands of 
the designer: it is transformed by appropriation of its users. It is important to 
underline this relationship since it means that the production of space, and with 
that also its representational aspects, is related to both the design and construc-
tion as well as to our daily practice and the experience of spaces. Architecture is a 
field bridging politics, environment, people and culture of a place and attempts to 
create spaces that do good, meant to contribute to the ‘world and its inhabitants.’
1.3.3 Why Arendt Matters
‘The world and its inhabitants’ as the ultimate aim of architecture is a notion
 I develop and discuss in Chapter 6. It is a phrase that comes from the German-
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American philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), when she reflects upon the 
writings of the German Philosopher Karl Jaspers,85 who had been her supervisor 
while she wrote her dissertation on the concept of love in the writings of Saint 
Augustine.86 Although this study is focused on architecture, Arendt is the central 
figure in this study. Her writings are used as a lens to discuss architecture, to 
crave through the field in order to understand its relationship with the public 
and the public realm. This choice, to use Arendt’s writings as a lens, needs some 
explanation. It might be clear that regarding the premises above, this study 
challenges the field and practices of architecture by inhabiting the ‘thresholds’ 
between distinctive realms of the built environment, society, culture, and politics, 
between the fields of architecture and philosophy, as well as sociology and the 
arts. Although Arendt never addressed the notion of the public realm as an archi-
tectural question, nor investigated the merits of architecture featuring society, the 
assumption behind this study is that her writings offer a framework that helps to 
understand architecture, indeed as a question regarding the public realm as well 
as within the broader scope of society. Arendt in that sense is different than other 
philosophers, like Jean Baudrillard, Jeremy Bentham, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques 
Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Martin Heidegger, Bruno Latour, 
Henri Lefebvre, Arthur Schopenhauer, Roger Scruton, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
that seem to be more obvious to study, since they, be it in the margins of their 
writings or (remarkably enough) even in practical exercises, have dwelled upon 
architecture (and public space). The point of entry here is indeed no stunning 
reflection on architecture, but it takes its starting point in the notion of the public 
realm (or public sphere), which as a discourse briefly is addressed above - a 
discourse that will be investigated further in Chapter 2 and 3. 
Arendt is one of the fundamental sources behind the discussion on the public 
realm within the fields of philosophy and political theory, particularly because 
of her 1958 book, The Human Condition, in which she stresses the condition 
of the public realm within the Modern Age. The book, often understood as 
her main work, is published more than half a century ago. It nevertheless is 
still relevant and actual to questions upon the public, which again and again 
are at the forefront of discussions and concerns about contemporary Western 
societies and their political structures. Moreover, after a period of less attention, 
Arendt’s oeuvre is currently the focus of study in quite different academic fields. 
Some of her books are on the list of current bestsellers (particularly after the 
election of Donald Trump to president of the United States). Her books and 
articles are being reprinted (and translated: in the Netherlands, almost all of her 
writings have become available in Dutch translation over the last five years) and 
numerous introductions to and books about her work are being published. But 
this current popularity of her work is not the reason to consider Arendt relevant 
for the field of architecture as well – my preliminary interest in her writings was 
evoked during my final thesis project at the Delft University of Technology in 
2002-2003, studying the theme of architecture, heritage and landscape, in which 
also the question of public space was at stake. A little reference to The Human 
Condition, and particularly the remark that Arendt defines a realm in-between 
the public and the private, the social, challenged me to study her work.87 That it 
is much more relevant to actual and core-topics of architectural thinking in our 
time, I discovered literally by diving into her writings, definitely propelled by the 
opportunity to write this study at the Delft University of Technology (for which my 
stay at the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College 
in 2009 was decisive). This study is the sediment of that exploration. By starting 
the journey with her reflections on the public realm, in order to connect that to 
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public space, I travelled around and found out that her larger frame is the world-
in-common, in which public space is essential. But with that larger frame, she also 
offered a much more ontological understanding of the relevance of architecture 
as intervention in this world, as she also offered a perspective upon the activities 
beyond that intervention: design, construction, conversation, and reflection. In 
other words, the question of public space brought me much more to the heart of 
the profession than I expected – although it is simultaneously in the end a much 
more theoretical reflection than it initially intended to be.  
Even though Arendt reserves a complete chapter of The Human Condition to 
address aspects of the human artifice, she does not specifically address architec-
ture (nor the built environment) as part of this human artifice. She invigorates 
on objects and things, dwells on the role of the work of art, but overlooks, I 
would state cautiously, the importance of the everyday environment, of houses 
and buildings, of schools and hospitals, of streets and squares. Part of this study 
challenges that gap, by connecting Arendt’s writings with perspectives from 
within the field of architecture. It has to be clear that the aim of this study is not 
to comment on Arendt’s work, nor to redraw her work in an architectural sense. 
What is intended is to follow her line of thoughts, especially her most thorough 
explanation on the notion of the public realm, and use that as a lens to reflect 
upon public space, the architectural project, and architecture as agency. This 
study is thus not the (re)construction of whatever Arendt’s view could be on 
the field of architecture. Her perspective will not offer the final answer to the 
problems and issues raised in this study. Her writings, in other words, are used 
as an instrument facing these questions and issues, to open up new perspectives, 
new directions to go. Philosophical ideas after all cannot be redrawn architec-
turally 1:1, but require translation and thus transformation, which certainly is a 
moment of interpretation and evocation.
We nevertheless can describe this study as a trial to construct a bridge between 
the writings of Arendt and the concrete and tangible aspects of architecture. A 
bridge, if we can use that metaphor – I depend here on the way the philosopher 
Martin Heidegger uses this metaphor in order to describe what architecture 
does by intervening in a particular place88 – allows not only one-way traffic, from 
one shore to the other. It importantly connects the shores at once, that is: it is a 
two-way relationship. It brings together two shores, which thus means that the 
two shores are influencing each other. In other words, a bridge changes both 
sides of the stream. This study aims to offer and recalibrate architecture through 
the writings of architecture, but this also means that in reverse it attempts to 
recalibrate in reverse and shine a (different) light on the writings of Arendt as 
well. It thus is the assumption behind this study that an architectural reading 
of Arendt’s concept of the public realm will provide as well insight in the field 
of architecture, the role of the architect and urban designer, and finally the role 
of the design, against the backdrop of the context of the contemporary city and 
society, as well as an addition to the philosophical perspectives and responses on 
the work of Arendt and philosophical narratives urging the public sphere.
Architecture, in its broadest sense, is an important representative of the ‘material 
structure of society’, and thus of the public realm. Although Arendt had little 
attention for the merits of architecture, her writings do reveal a great awareness 
of the significance of the materiality of the world. They therefore made it into 
architectural theory only to limited heights (particularly by the effort of Kenneth 
Frampton, George Baird, Kristiaan Borret and Pier Vittorio Aureli) – certainly 
88.
Martin Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling 
Thinking’, in: Martin Heidegger, 
Poetry, Language, Thought (New 
York: Harper & Row, 2001), 150 (see 
Chapter 6, where I quote the passage 
in which Heidegger discusses the 
metaphor of the bridge)
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
85
because of the lack of explicit thorough reflection upon the field. This never-
theless surprises me (of course only a bit), particularly since she has been a 
student in Heidelberg of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, who with 
his 1951 lecture ‘Bauen Wohnen Denken’ gained enormous response in the field 
of architecture.89 Arendt obviously builds her approach to the world partly on 
Heidegger’s philosophy, but offers a few important twists (mainly evoked through 
her intensive collaboration and conversations with the previously mentioned 
philosopher Karl Jaspers). These shifts never made it to the field of architecture 
and architectural theory. To my mind these shifts are pivotal, specifically for 
reflections upon the act of architectural design (which I discuss in Chapter 6).90 
However, a few architects and theorists – (amongst others: George Baird, Kenneth 
Frampton, and recently, Pier Vittorio Aureli) – have developed substantial 
perspectives on (aspects of) The Human Condition and other writings of Arendt, 
of which I gratefully make use.
There are at least three reasons to use the work of Arendt as our lens in this 
study. First – as mentioned, she is one of the philosophers who has extensively 
discussed the issues regarding the public realm. Moreover, she is to be seen as an 
original source in this discourse, besides her fellow German philosopher, Jürgen 
Habermas, upon which we already have touched. In moments of confusion, like 
our contemporary times, it is valuable to get back to the original sources, in order 
see what the views previously developed and still inspiring the debate actually 
have to offer. In this case, we even might state that we go back to an original 
source that not yet made it fully extensively to the debate in architecture, since 
that debate, to my mind and as I will discuss in Chapter 2 and 5 is dominated 
by the perspective that stems from Habermas’ reflections. In the meantime, the 
world has changed drastically. It thus is the challenge to read Arendt against 
the age of acceleration, the pessimism about public space, the confusion about 
contemporary politics, the new urban segregation – these contexts all requires to 
rethink ideas and draw them anew. 
The second reason to take Arendt as a lens to discuss architecture and the 
public realm is the remarkable spatiality of her writings and concepts she propels. 
Her texts are full of spatial, architectural and artistic references and metaphors – 
they even can be called ‘architectural’ in their structure and compositions.91 There 
certainly is no doubt that the idea of the public realm (also in the work of Arendt, 
but even more central in the writings of Habermas) first has to be seen as a virtual 
‘space’, urging society and politics on a meta level. It is the dialogue in society 
regarding the world, the political realm, the (im)possibility of exchange, which 
can take place anywhere and everywhere. The discourse also addresses the formal 
aspects of the issue (although slightly): the political institutions and spaces, the 
town hall meetings and the political addresses, human rights and public institu-
tions as the freedom of expression and religion, which somehow in the Western 
world are the tangible aspects and the guarantees of the plural character of 
society. The public realm also addresses virtual ‘spaces’ where people exchange 
perspectives: newspaper columns, writings on the opinion pages, magazines, 
internet forums, weblogs and vlogs, social media, and so forth. However, the 
public realm also has a concrete spatial and tangible dimension, that often is 
overlooked, but actually cannot be ignored. In the writings of Arendt this spatial 
and tangible aspect is present again and again – it even is rendered a prerequisite 
for the moment of appearance and exchange, of action and speech (in Arendt’s 
terms, as we will see). However, she never linked it to a concrete contemporary 
urban spaces – not even to the Mall in Washington, Alexander Platz in Berlin, 
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or Hyde Park in London. Nevertheless, the spatial and tangible frame in which 
Arendt addresses her concept of the public realm is her emphasis on this realm 
as a ‘space’: the space of appearance, which can hardly be imagined as a totally 
virtual or abstract space. This spatial dimension becomes more and more clear 
in her historical sketch of the public realm in which Arendt refers to archetypes 
of public space as the Agora in the Greek Polis and the Forum Roman City states. 
She stresses their functionality and accessibility and the importance of its circum-
scription by a wall (and private properties). 
The final argument to push Arendt forward once again and in my view most 
important reason to do so, is that the focus of the writings of Arendt always are 
directed towards the ‘world and its inhabitants’, the phrase I stated previously. 
It is intersecting the human being as living on earth amongst others – and how 
that living amongst others requires a world in common, and a realm in which one 
another can appear to one another. In this reflection Arendt particularly has an 
open eye to human activities, and particularly to the subjective aspects of human 
agencies. It leaves room for diversity, and even argues that diversity is the very 
characteristic of the world. This also is the very characteristic of her writings, as 
we will see later: it can be characterized as stubbornly opening up perspectives, 
craving back in history, challenging developments, trying to understand what 
had happened and what happens today, without aiming to develop a theory, a 
closed system in which all answers will be given. In other words: her writings are 
open-ended. This means something important for this study too, particularly in 
its address to architecture. This study is not meant to develop generic instruments 
to (re)design public space, nor a toolbox that can be applied to architecture in 
order to make it ‘more public’ (although that was intended but naïve idea behind 
this study at the very start). It will not develop practical and appropriate methods 
that can be applied in the (complex) design-processes of our days, nor will it 
develop a specific design-approach, let alone to suppose ‘forms’, which would have 
been properly applicable to face the investigated contemporary circumstances 
and which maybe could be the outcome of an empirical study on public space 
(although I am not sure that results of such a study still can be called architecture 
at all). Specific forms, which only can be proper answers towards concrete singular 
questions. No general method can answer the questions that are on the table, as 
we will see in Chapter 8. Much more can be expected from personal approaches, 
artistic talent and individual awareness of the public. Facing the idea of the 
public realm and its inherent diversity, there are no final answers, no methods 
and instruments that can create public space and public realm at once. Central in 
Arendt’s book The Human Condition is the question what actually ‘we are doing’ 
on earth.92 This question is urgent to architecture too, and, looking backward, 
also is the central question of this study. This research investigates ‘what we’, as 
architects and urban designers and all other involved in the construction of the 
built environment, ‘are doing’. 
1.3.4	 Diving	For	Pearls	–	Methodical	Reflections
The reason that the writings of Arendt did not fully reach the heart of the archi-
tectural discourse might also be found in the perception of her work as nostalgic 
and melancholic, an idealisation of the past, if not a conservative perspective. 
Architectural theory somehow is pre-occupied with progression and the avant-
garde, the new and the advanced – reactionary perspectives hardly get a foothold 
within its narratives. However, this classification of the work of Arendt in terms 
of nostalgia is clearly caused by an imaginable but superficial reading of her 
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work, although this will not come as a surprise. Arendt after all does not base 
her analysis on contemporary references, nor on instances of the recent past – 
although her writings address contemporary issues and are evoked by ‘recent’ 
experiences. She uses, as we have seen and moreover in tangible admiration, 
Classical sources: the functioning of Greek and Roman city-states. Classical forms 
of democracy and especially the explanation of this by Aristotle, the writings of 
Plato, the conversations of Socrates and all sorts of other Classical stories and 
writings. We nevertheless should reject this categorization of Arendt, at first 
since Arendt herself rejected any categorization. She was neither conservative nor 
liberal, left wing nor right wing, neither progressive nor reactionary, she stated: 
‘I don’t fit’. She once said of herself, ‘I suppose I never had any such position. You 
know the left think that I am conservative, and the conservatives sometimes think 
I am left or I am a maverick or God knows what. And I must say, I couldn’t care 
less. … I don’t belong to any group. You know the only group I ever belonged to 
was the Zionists. This was only because of Hitler, of course.’93 
Actually, her work can be seen as rethinking again and again this last sentence, 
her most important life-experience: being excluded from the public realm (as a 
Jew in Nazi-Germany previous to World War II). So if we indeed can conclude 
that Arendt ‘idealizes’ Classical sources, then we have to understand that this 
is not theory for her, but personal experience of having no place to stand in, let 
alone to participate in, and that she tries to understand how this has happened. 
So if there is any idealization, it is an intentional idealization, to develop an 
understanding of the meaning of the public realm and public life, and to grasp a 
place in the world for the ‘humanity of human beings.’ This actually is the second 
reason not to reject her attempt too quickly. Arendt actually uses these sources 
as a ‘mirror’ to understand what actually happened to Europe, the World and 
her own life during the 20th century. In order to grasp today, Arendt uses the past 
since it mirrors what has been lost and what is actually new today. This use of 
the past – and we can underline use here, is certainly not celebration only – one 
can actually find its source in Arendt’s view upon modernity. Modernity, Arendt 
argues, has caused a gap between the past and the present that is not anymore 
bridged by tradition or religion, philosophical systems or any other perspectives. 
In other words, the gap between the past and present is not so much new, it is 
the loss of a bridge to overcome that gap and to act today, is lost. Arendt argues 
that everybody, contrary to before the Modern Age, has to bridge the gap on 
their own.94 This however, does not mean that history is not important anymore. 
It is quite the opposite. ‘To acknowledge the “accomplished fact” of the break,’ 
the political theorist Dagmar Barnouw reflects on Arendt’s position, ‘does not 
mean to be done with the past but rather to acknowledge the challenge of giving 
it new meaning for a new cultural beginning, in order to show a way out of the 
present confusion in political thought and action.’95 For Arendt, this means that 
she is not stuck in pessimism, not about the loss due to modern developments, 
but that she actively searches in history to those aspects that still can help us act 
today. Moreover, her work actually is drenched with hope beyond pessimism: 
she stresses human life as characterized by its natality (rather than its mortality), 
which means the ever-present possibility of taking new initiatives by human 
beings.96
Arendt’s intentionality in the use of history, her intention to rethink fundamental 
examples regarding actual deficiencies somehow also is a model behind this 
study. It is important to stress this aspect, since it informs methodically how I 
approached this research. According to the American political scientist Seyla 
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Benhabib, Arendt continuously tries ‘to break the chain of narrative continuity, 
to shatter chronology as the nature structure of narrative, to stress fragmentari-
ness, historical dead ends, failures, and ruptures.’97 Arendt somehow opposes 
the German philosopher Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel, who stresses history 
as an unfolding narrative. That idea, Arendt somehow praises him, had some 
‘revolutionary’ aspects, although she completely disagrees with understanding 
this narrative as a more or less straight line from the past to the future. Such 
a perspective irrevocably leads to the idea of happenings and phenomena as 
inevitable necessities, which are plausible and even can be understandable.98 This 
perspective leads towards the idea of ‘Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht’ 
(world history is the judge of the world): today only can be judged afterwards. 
Arendt opposes that perspective strongly, since it leaves no role for the actor today 
to face current happenings. In her study On Revolution Arendt writes:
‘Politically, the fallacy of this new and typically modern philosophy is relatively 
simple. It consists in describing and understanding the whole realm of human 
action, not in terms of the actor and the agent, but from the standpoint of 
the spectator who watches a spectacle. But this fallacy is relatively difficult to 
detect because of the truth inherent in it, which is that all stories begun and 
enacted by men unfold their true meaning only when they have come to their 
end, so that it may indeed appear as though only the spectator, and not the 
agent, can hope to understand what actually happened in any given chain of 
deeds and events.’99
Arendt herself on the contrary tried to make room for action, room for human 
interventions in what can be seen as the chain of history. As we will see, this 
room for action, as well as the possibility of judgment, are crucial concepts in 
the writings of Arendt. However, in response to the linear idea of history, Arendt 
claims room for ‘new’ experiences – experiences that have no predecessors in 
the history of the world. The totalitarian political systems of Nazism in Germany 
and Fascism in the Soviet Union, were Arendt’s first topics to address after her 
experiences of being excluded from the public realm and after World War II had 
ended, and are understood by her as such kind of novelties. Both systems were 
‘new’ experiences on the stage of the world, an experience of drastic change in the 
balance between the public and politics, between the private and the collective, 
between the individual and the social, between the individual and the government, 
without predecessors. According to Arendt, this completely new experience 
was not that of dictators, but the development of bureaucracy, of unrecogniz-
able responsibility and unknown technical opportunities with their effects on 
thousands and thousands of human beings. Through her writings she tried to 
understand these new experiences. But since these were novelties, according 
to her, she obviously could not grasp back previous experiences. She had to 
construct these understandings by herself. There was no ‘history of the public 
realm’, nor a narrative on the relationship between the public and the political, 
although both were needed to understand the contemporary condition. And that 
is what Arendt wanted to construct, to enlighten the issue, in order to explore 
what was evident in the past. She investigates these issues quite punktlich in order 
to unfold a perspective on the roots of the ideas – ignoring somehow contempo-
rary ideas, since those, according to Arendt, have to be seen as polluted during 
the time passed by. That is the very reason to go back towards the sources of our 
Western civilization: not to be nostalgic, neither because of melancholic reasons, 
nor because of a conservative world-view, but simply to understand the origin of 
97.
Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant 
Modernism of Hannah Arendt 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 88
98.
Ibid,, 88
99.
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006), 42-43 
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
89
what we experience as loss today.100 Although we experience a loss of tradition, 
we are still nourished by it, she states. ‘The good things in history are usually of 
very short duration,’ Arendt writes, ‘but afterward have a decisive influence on 
what happens over long periods of time. Just consider how short the true classical 
period in Greece was, and that we are in effect still nourished by it today.’101
There is another challenge within the work of Arendt, which is connected to 
the above rendering of conservatism and idealization of the past. Arendt is not 
a historian, which craves for ‘real facts’. As she stresses herself, her method of 
approaching history is much more to be seen as a ‘forceful, purposely selective 
dealing with the past.’102 Sometimes critics have blamed her that her image of 
the past isn’t true, that she quotes sometimes carelessly. To some respect this 
criticism can be imagined, but it simultaneously is a misunderstanding of the 
characteristic of her work. She somehow even admits that the past cannot be 
described as factual. Her aim, she states, is not to investigate certain phenomena 
in an empirical matter, nor does she strive for a literally historical description of 
the development of this phenomenon during a certain amount of ages. Arendt 
actually opposed such aims. She rendered it impossible to analyse the past 
objectively. The position of the reader does influence the texts that are read. 
Facts always need interpretation. Historical text and facts are always read and 
rethought against the contemporary background of the reader, a conclusion that 
also is underlined by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer in his study 
on hermeneutics. Despite the effort the reader does in order to understand the 
‘facts’, we nevertheless always presuppose our own framework and the questions 
of our time. We read texts and facts always within our own horizon and scope.103 
Arendt clearly did not pretend to write the final answer on a clear question; 
moreover, it seems to be her goal firstly to crave for the proper questions that 
are raised by modernity and the on-going actualities of her time. In other words, 
she did not deliver a historical overview on certain developments, neither did 
she develop a logical construction of meaning of a certain issue. Arendt was not 
interested in a closed system of meaning, neither in a historiography of certain 
developments, nor in a recovery of certain ideas. This of course had to do with 
her view on modernity as a gap between past and present that has to be bridged 
without the help of tradition. Arendt actually was ambivalent about this gap: 
to get rid of tradition seems to free people. According to Arendt, it offers the 
possibility to look backwards with ‘new eyes, unburdened and unguided by any 
traditions, and thus to dispose of a tremendous wealth of raw experiences without 
being bound by any description as to how to deal with these treasures.’104 Arendt 
nevertheless also understood tradition as the ‘medium of remembrance’. We even, 
Arendt states, are not only in danger of losing traditions, but also of losing the 
past itself.105 Without the past and traditions, she continues, we have no frame 
against which we can judge new actualities. We will forget what has happened 
and what is important.106 This of course was roused by the actual experience of 
the 20th century totalitarianism, which not only made her aware of this lost frame 
through which we can judge the contemporary developments, but also that it is 
impossible to recover ideas of the past, or to restore tradition in some form and to 
think that it is resistant to the ongoing processes of modernity. However, Arendt 
also argued that we are not liberated from tradition. Concepts of the past without 
their original context actually can turn in even worse tyrannical figures. ‘While we 
are throwing them out of the window as dogmas’, she once said, ‘we have got to 
know where they came from.’107 That is why it is important to investigate the past 
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continuously, to remind society again and again what has been lost, in order to 
mirror the nowadays deficiencies.108 
In her work Arendt renders herself as simply ‘digging in history’, looking 
for interesting fragments in order to remember, rethink, reconsider, and re-ap-
propriate what apparently is lost. Through this approach and her reflection 
upon it, it is clear that she did not strive for a coherent systematic philosophy. 
She even no longer ‘thought it either desirable or even possible.’109 Therefore, 
Arendt’s work actually is strongly related to the ‘fragmentary historiography’, 
which was developed by the writer Walter Benjamin, which Arendt met during 
her stay in Paris, after she had to flee Berlin in 1933. Arendt actually has written 
a fascinating biographical introduction to Illuminations, a volume collecting in 
English translated texts of Benjamin regarding issues of literature, that she helped 
publishing in America in 1968.110 In this introduction – that also was published 
in her collection of essays on people she admired, Men in Dark Times – she, 
with obvious respect, explores his way of working. ‘Walter Benjamin’, she writes, 
‘knew that the break in tradition and the loss of authority which occurred in his 
life-time, were irreparable, and he concluded that he had to discover new ways of 
dealing with the past.’111 Benjamin found his way in a form of collectorship, states 
Arendt. On his wanderings through Paris, as a flâneur, he collected actualities: 
everything that was odd, quotes he found in magazines or books, everything that 
touched him. A collector however, Arendt writes, ‘destroys the context in which 
his object once was only part of a greater, living entity, and since only the uniquely 
genuine will do for him he must cleanse the chosen object of everything that is 
typical about it.’112 This work of destruction, Arendt adds, is not needed anymore 
today: modernity had done that part already. It destroyed the context of contem-
porary life. Modernity ‘had already relieved [the human being] of this task of 
destruction and he only needed to bend down, as it were, to select his precious 
fragments form the pile of debris.’113 So, the main writings of Benjamin, according 
to Arendt, ‘consisted in tearing fragments out of their context and arranging them 
afresh in such a way that they illustrated one another and were able to prove their 
raison d’être in a free-floating-state, as it were.’114 Arendt calls this the method of 
a pearl diver: 
‘who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring 
it to light but to pry loose the right and the strange, the pearls and the coral in 
the depth and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths 
of the past – but not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to contribute 
to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this thinking is the conviction 
that although the living is subject to the ruin of the time, the process of decay 
is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in the depth of the sea, 
into which sink and is dissolved what once was alive, some things ‘suffer a 
sea-change’ and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain 
immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who 
one day will come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living 
– as “thought fragments”, a something ‘rich and strange’ and perhaps even as 
everlasting Urphänomene.’115 
It is important to understand that through this method of fragmentary historiog-
raphy the act of ‘remembering and re-thinking’ is seen as a creative act. Although 
this re-thinking should be seen as an intentional intercourse with fragments of the 
past, it nevertheless is not enslaved by it, in particular not by ideas of ‘historical 
necessity.’116 According to Arendt, the goal of this on-going dialogue with the 
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past through fragmentary historiography is to feed the imagination and power 
to judge, without being stuck in post-modern arbitrariness and relativity. This 
approach aims to feed new, un-thought-of and unfilled perspectives on contempo-
rary issues. 
I see this study on architecture and the public in the same perspective – it has 
largely the same characteristics. I am going back to original sources of the debate 
on public space, mainly the reflections of Arendt, which I sometimes mirror 
with Habermas’ perspective. I particularly crave through the work of Arendt, 
in order to bring some fragments to the fore in order to fit them into the lively 
debate on architecture and urbanism, on the city and politics, on society and 
public space. The result – although I did attempt to make it a whole – does not 
offer a closed theory. It is fragmented in a way that it uses particular perspectives 
from Arendt in order to open up perspectives upon the built environment and 
the profession of the architect, as well as to pinpoint particular characteristics 
of architecture. It is fragmented in the sense that it dives for pearls, although in 
this study also secondary literature on Arendt is used, mainly from the field of 
philosophy and political theory, besides of course the many conversations with 
others about Arendt and her writings, particularly during and after my visit to the 
Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities at Bard College in Annan-
dale-on-Hudson (NY) and attending several conferences, in order to grasp the 
broader perspectives and the fundamental assumptions behind Arendt’s writings. 
However, this study also is understood as a creative act, by grasping thoughts 
and re-thinking them within a different context. It is an intentional reading, by 
bringing it to the discourse on public space (mainly focused on the American 
discourse) within architecture, for which I also went back to the original sources 
that mainly were published in the early 90s. During the studies, it however 
became clear that I needed to widen the scope also to other debates in architecture 
that are related to the political, social and public aspects of architecture. Arendt’s 
writings had much more to offer – it urged me to take other aspects of architec-
ture and bring it closer to the debate on public space. 
I thus will develop a dialogue between Arendt’s texts, (more contempo-
rary) secondary texts on Arendt, and (contemporary) architectural theory and 
reflections upon practices, bringing in even site-analysis (particularly of Parc de 
La Villette in Paris). The dialogue is explicitly feeded and challenged with personal 
experience - experiences that I deepen, develop, mirror with Arendt's writings 
and architecture-theoretical reflections.  In other words, I am the pearl-diver 
here. I dive for pearls in the work of Arendt, which I will bring to the surface of 
architectural theory, the city, the landscape, and architectural practices, in order 
to rethink, reconsider and re-appropriate those pearls. I will particularly review 
them within an architectural context from different perspectives and present 
them in all their facets. As stated above: this is an intentional reading, particularly 
positioned within the contemporary realm of architecture. To phrase it like this 
reveals that there is a double leap behind this project. The questions discussed 
in this study are foremost contemporary architectural and urban questions – 
although these questions are even as old as The Human Condition, if not older, 
and although I argue that they are relevant for the fields of philosophy and the 
political sciences as well. The first leap of course is to bring Arendt’s texts to 
the light of today – texts that are sometimes more than half-a-century old. The 
second leap is that I bring it to a different field, where other questions, perspec-
tives, emphasizes, are at stake. How I deal with the text is fuelled by my own 
experiences in the field, my experiences in teaching, in discussions with students 
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(and their responses through analysis and design proposals), particularly in The 
Netherlands, and other scholars from around the world. This position within the 
discussion cannot be eliminated from the writing of this study. 
The ‘danger’ behind this double leap indeed is to ask questions and draw 
conclusions that have to do more with our own questions, opinions, and perspec-
tives, than with the read and reinterpreted texts. The perspectives presented in 
this study therefore never can offer a ‘how-would-Arendt-think’ perspective, nor 
a finite frame of interpretation, although careful study helps to bring it to what 
can be called a common-understanding, which makes the proposal accessible and 
ready to discuss, challenge, critique, reject or accept. However, by taking Arendt’s 
ideas towards the field of architecture, it does not only enlighten architectural 
practices, it also shines a light backward on Arendt’s writings too. 
Certainly, this method will not lead to ‘one unavoidable answer’, let alone a single 
conclusion. Not only Arendt’s method and work provides it such framework, 
also the field of architecture does not fit with such an ambition. Architecture is 
meaningful as a subjective practice, as I argue in Chapter 7. The world differs 
from place to place, as it is shaped through time by human hands. This means that 
the care for the world as well as the intervention into the world, that I define as 
the heart of the practice in Chapter 6, requires again and again not a generic but 
an exceptional approach. Architecture, in its essential characteristic, deals with 
complexities and differences, contradictions and paradoxes, preservations and 
ambitions. In that sense, architectural thinking can open a severe perspective, 
stress awareness and emphasize consequences of spatial projects or particular 
attitudes. But it never will be able to give the one and only and unavoidable 
answer (nor solution). This study is about thinking, critical reflection, and 
raising questions in accordance with spatial projects. It does not offer in the end 
a particular and closed theory, offering a specific direction we – as a people, as 
architects, as commissioners – have to go, nor have to behave, nor – as architects 
– have to design. It also does not offer a particular toolbox, that can be applied 
to all sorts of assignments of public space. This study will conclude with a couple 
of statements, stressing the relationship between architecture, public space and 
the political realm. These statements together do not form a closed loop, but are 
open-ended reflections. They are invitations to the reader to think and reflect 
about ‘what we are doing’. In other words, there is a certain parallel with what 
Arendt states in her prologue to The Human Condition: ‘This book does not offer 
an answer,’ she writes. ‘Such answers are given every day, and they are matters of 
practical politics, subject of agreement of many, they can never lie in theoretical 
considerations or the opinion of one person, as though we dealt here with problem 
only one solution is possible.’117 
Although there might be no single answer - there certainly is a single scope. It 
is the scope that also is behind Arendt's writings: the strive to be at home in the 
world. 
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One of the most central issues of today is the question of public space, not only 
in architecture and urbanism, but also in society. Questions of the character of 
public spaces, of control with cameras; to enter public space with a burka on the 
one hand or barely clothed on the other, to walk hand-in-hand, the possibility 
to gather and to demonstrate, are debated amongst the public, by politicians, in 
newspapers, in the café continuously. Public space after all – and this is simply 
reasoned – unites differences. If we regard the street a public space, it unites 
neighbours. If we regard the square or park a public space, it brings together 
people from the surrounding streets. This certainly is plain, technically speaking. 
Ideally – or at least, ideally from a perspective of Western democracy – these 
spaces offer more: a meeting of plurals, where the individual experience the 
communal, encounter differences, and are challenged by this otherness. Some 
spaces easily fulfil that perspective: they accommodate use by different users, 
and even accommodate the possibility of getting in touch with each other. Theo-
retically we therefore might state that public space corresponds with the human 
being as a social being: it accommodates, gathers, and assembles large groups 
of inhabitants, provides the possibility to meet, to set up social contacts, to get 
to know and to be known, which results in – and this can be urged as the most 
important ideal – the experience of community, to live life amongst others. This 
ideal, however, is threatened within the contemporary city, town and village. 
Public space vanishes with the increasing amount of enclaves in a suburbanizing 
city. The common neighbourhood is detached from the city – sometimes literally 
by walls and gates, but often simply by sheer distance. Within these enclaves, 
more or less public space is being controlled, made exclusive and particular, 
leading to the decreasing possibility of gathering in public space, the exclusion 
of particular groups from these spaces, the restriction of behaviour in space, and 
the lack of possibilities to appropriate a place. This is not simply a symbol of the 
actualities of contemporary society, but, in turn, impacts the same society through 
the experience of the public, the presence of inhabitants, and the expectations of 
citizens. This chapter investigates the current (sub)urbanized landscape, strongly 
focused on the United States of America. In order to grasp the situation, this 
chapter follows the journey of one particular landscape. Only by being immersed 
in a landscape, is one able to describe the (isolated) urban and suburban artefacts 
and to understand their immanent networks. Although one of the characteristics 
of the enclave is its detachment from the soil on which it sits, it is embedded in the 
world through the networks of the users. As is discussed, the increasing amount 
of enclaves strongly affects the landscape. The in-between becomes an unknown 
area, the enclaves the destination, and the car, this private cocoon, the connector 
between. This chapter starts with a particular case-study, urged by the shooting 
of a teenage boy within one of these enclaves: the tragic death of Travyon Martin 
in a gated community in Sanford, FL in 2012. This shooting somehow shows how 
paranoid the current situation is, not only in Sanford and this particular gated 
community, but beyond life in gated communities in general. This paranoia also 
threatens public space, as we will see. 
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2.1 Google Maps image of the urban landscape 
of Sanford FL. Encircled The Retreat at Twin Lake
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2.2: Entrance to The Retreat at Twin Lake, Sanford FL.
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2.1  THE RETREAT AT TWIN LAKE (2012)
Oregon Avenue, Sanford, Florida, behind Kohl’s Department Store. It is a beauti-
ful day: the sky is nicely blue, dotted with small, soft white clouds. On the left, the 
huge parking lot of the department store, fenced to the street with hedges, grass, 
trees, a pedestrian path and a second band of grass. A bit further down the road is 
Bentley Elementary School, again surrounded by parking lots, and again, heading 
towards the street, hedges, trees, grass – only twice interrupted by the entrance 
and exit of the parking. The right side is also flanked by grass, a hedge, and trees. 
Here a pedestrian path as well: concrete slabs poured in the grass. Behind the 
hedge brick walls that every now and then steps backwards to give room for a cou-
ple of trees along the street. And behind this wall: houses. Many houses, all of the 
same design: estimated two stories high, plus a rooftop, about four or six houses 
together sharing one roof. The façades of the houses are painted yellow, the balco-
nies white, their roofs are clad in dark brown tiles. Outsets and columns articulate 
each row, providing shadows and shelter from the sun. Despite these outsets, the 
appearance of each housing block is quite superficial. The architecture itself is not 
articulated at all. The rows, although almost symmetrical, seem to lack composi-
tion or conceptual pronunciation – they even lack an articulation of each individu-
al dwelling. Possibly this is due to the design of the windows, which fail to support 
the facade’s appearance at all. The windows, especially on the upper floors, are 
small, painted white, and without texture and detailing. Some are divided hori-
zontally, others vertically, but no matter how, it is just a mere window – a hole in 
the facade. Most of these, by the way, are closed, the curtains and veils down, as 
if the houses are abandoned, empty. A closer look reveals the opposite: the closed 
windows are a sign of occupation – even the only sign of life you can see, besides 
the parked cars in the parking lot of Kohl’s: this is Florida, the morning glory of a 
hot summer day, where sunlight needs to be excluded from the interior in order to 
prevent the home from heating. 
The neighbourhood is a recent development. At the corner of the road, parcels 
can be seen not yet being built. The trees along the road and behind the wall are 
not that high, the brick-wall is still perfectly in shape; as are the yellow facades 
of the houses: perfectly yellow – no weathering has touched these surfaces, nor 
degeneration. It probably is this image of a ‘perfect’ neighbourhood that gives the 
area a certain tranquillity. The road itself is as empty and as calm as the neigh-
bourhood. No car is around, or people walking down the street. 
Somewhere in the middle of the plot, the wall rounds inwards, creating a 
symmetrical entrance to the neighbourhood. ‘The Retreat at Twin Lakes’ is written 
proudly on both corners of the entrance. It is two carriageways broad, one to be 
used for inward traffic, one for outward, divided by a small belt. A stars-and-
stripes-banner marks both sides of the entrance, proudly. Although the porch is 
open – and in its layout appears like the entrance of a park or a vacation centre: 
a green steel porch between brickwork pillars – we are not allowed to take a 
look at the other side of the wall. Strangers are prohibited to enter the area: ‘no 
trespassing’, one sign tells us. Others: ‘no loitering’, ‘no soliciting’. Although it 
cannot be seen, there is the suggestion of a camera controlling the area. Huge 
lamps suggest the illumination of the entrance during the night. Indeed, we are 
facing a gated community.
Through the porch we can see a glimpse of one building with a different 
layout, although constructed with the same architectural elements: yellow facade, 
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white balconies, brown roof, outsets and columns. It is what the residents call ‘the 
clubhouse’, a central building host to some collective facilities – such as a pool 
in the backyard of the building – discovered via the satellite view of the building 
offered by Google Maps.
The whole description in the paragraphs above, actually, is based on a look at 
Google Maps. I just strolled around The Retreat by making use of the Satelite 
and Streetview options of the program.1 Actually, this Streetview option is a 
remarkable tool. Through the maps and images, you can discover areas you will 
never experience in reality, and you get to know information you simply wouldn’t 
discover whilst walking around in reality. Of course, you can’t grasp an area in 
its full essence without also experiencing it in reality, since perception includes 
all physical evidence: a touch of the senses that consists of the feeling of the heat 
of Florida, the smell of the trees alongside the road, the touch of the asphalt and 
concrete underfoot, the sound of the cars of the highway around the corner, and 
probably the taste of coffee on your tongue. That is to grasp space: to see, smell, 
touch, taste, and hear. Nevertheless, through Google Maps we immediately 
know that in the elementary school at the left side of Oregon Avenue the Reality 
Community Church is organising their services on Sundays. And by clicking the 
link that pops up on the screen, we are taken to the website of this church and get 
to know their mission: ‘Finally a Church that I can understand and people that I 
can relate to’, reads a quote by a church-member, ‘authentic, vibrant, relevant’. 
Turning back towards the street we see a woman buying a table at the Kohl’s, 
as well as an appraisal of the method and teachers of the school, preparing kids 
for their next step in life. A bit further we see a strange stripe of asphalt in the 
greenery – what is it? A relic of a former road? A photo added to Google Maps 
shows an image of an arty billboard mentioning the name of the greenery: Derby 
Park. Above the sign a model of an old racing car: Is this a racing track? A growing 
curiousness drives me googling the name of the park – I learn I need to be more 
specific about the racing car; it is a ‘soap box racing car’, and the Derby Park is 
the home of the CFSBD, the Central Florida Soap Box Derby. Ah, that’s why it’s 
Derby Park: the park is a track for ‘gravity’ cars, youngsters between 7 and 18 
years are challenged to build their own car, a car with which they race across the 
slope of the racing track. As Google teaches me, soap box racing turns out to be 
quite a popular hobby in the USA. 
Back to Oregan Avenue. Around the corner an advertisement pops up: 
‘Goodman Air Conditioning, a brand built up since 1982’. Strange, I don’t see an 
office or warehouse. The Streetview option is most remarkable in areas like this, 
around Oregon Avenue, almost only consisting of gated communities. As users of 
Streetview know, while adding the Streetview icon to the map, the roads that you 
can drop in to light up. Here, in this specific area, you immediately see that some 
neighbourhoods and streets are not covered by the Google database. The reason 
is simple: like every other stranger, the Google-Streetview-car is not allowed to 
drive through these areas. You thus immediately get an image of the percentage 
of the built environment that is not generally accessible, those parts of the city 
that are walled and are inaccessible to even the virtual stranger. It is an amazing 
experiment and eye-opening act (to foreigners like me) to just put the icon on the 
map elsewhere, from LA to Las Vegas, and from New Orleans to Chicago, and find 
out the number of gated communities and the percentage of enclosed areas in 
these different cities, districts and neighbourhoods.2
1.
https://www.google.nl/
maps/@28.796445,-
81.3296379,1566m/data=!3m1!1e3 
[Accessed May 20th, 2012]
2.
Almost a year after my trip around 
The Retreat, I touched upon a review 
by Allard Jolles of the book of Doug 
Rickard, A New American Picture 
(New York: Aperture, 2012), in 
which this photographer explores 
urban America as well trough Google 
Streetview. He has discovered another 
remarkable trait, Jolles writes. While 
searching for the real poor area’s 
in the American cities, he finds out 
that he just has to Google for streets 
named after dr. Martin Luther King. 
Jolles writes: ‘King, as long death as 
Rickard lives, seems to be changed in 
just 50 years from a symbol of hope 
into a ‘marker’ of the most worse 
parts of the city.’ [transl. HT] http://
www.archined.nl/recensies/2013/
januari/de-echte-wereld-komt-via-
via-pas-echt-hard-binnen/ [accessed, 
January 21st, 2013]
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Via Google Maps and the Streetview icon, The Retreat at Twin Lakes appears 
to be part of a range of gated communities around a lake, which indeed is called 
Twin Lake. To get an idea of the environment, I strolled around this range of 
neighbourhoods around the lake – most of the time finding the same pattern 
on my screen: hedges, brick walls, an entrance, banners, facades, roofs, an 
empty road. The only difference is the density of housing in these communities: 
sometimes row-housing like in The Retreat, sometimes quite big villas and 
bungalows. The only neighbourhood around Twin Lake that is accessible virtually, 
as in reality, is located southeast, below The Retreat. This neighbourhood also 
consists of only one entrance road to a neighbourhood that is organized internally 
through a double road ring, the perfect layout for an area that is looking for 
control. In order to get an image of the neighbourhood I ‘strolled’ down the road 
and ‘walked’ into this neighbourhood. It consists of typical wooden bungalows 
along a curving road, one story high, amidst grassy yards, entrance paths, trees 
and mailboxes. Some residents have put pots and plants along the road, others 
have hung out the Stars and Stripes. It appears to the visitor as a quiet and 
peaceful environment. But here again: no cars on the street, no pedestrians on the 
footpaths. Suddenly, a novel experience: a rare car on the street. It disturbs the 
tranquillity of the images, and approaches quickly. Strangely enough, even if you 
sit, like me, behind your desk, you feel threatened by the car and feel the urge to 
step aside. Virtual reality.
Of this range of neighbourhoods around the lake The Retreat seems to be 
the densest. It is located at the north-eastern part of the lake, and consists of 
two strings of roads encircling a small pond. Housing blocks face the street, and 
only around the clubhouse and the pond can some open green space be found. 
The satellite map shows that these houses only have a very small backyard, and 
a slightly larger front yard, of which almost all are paved in order to park a car 
(or two). Between the houses are strips of grass, with some concrete cut-through 
paths for pedestrians. The map also shows that the area in the northeastern part 
of The Retreat, still empty in the Streetview frame, have now been built. 
I, of course, had a special reason traveling virtually to this place: the shooting 
of the Black-teenager Trayvon Martin by a 28-year-old Neighbourhood Watch 
volunteer called Robert Zimmerman on February 26th 2012. The shooting got 
worldwide attention and has – from the perspective of this chapter, aiming to 
introduce the ‘question of public space’ – a remarkable background. Martin just 
had bought some drinks and Skittles in a 7-eleven nearby, during the halftime of 
an NBA All Star game – it was also the night of the Oscars on television, actually – 
and was on his way back to his father’s girlfriend’s house in the southeastern part 
of The Retreat. Reconstructions show that he might have entered the community 
either via the main entrance or via an unfenced section that often was used by 
residents as a shortcut.3 Zimmerman, who lives in the southwestern part of the 
community, followed the 17-year-old boy in his car, informing the police that he 
had seen someone suspicious. Meanwhile Martin called a girlfriend, telling her 
he was being followed by a man. Although the police instructed Zimmerman to 
wait upon their arrival, he stepped out of his car when Martin took a cut-through 
between two rows of housing. It ended up in a fight, during which Zimmerman 
shot the unarmed Martin at 7.16 pm, just one minute before the Police arrived. 
This sad tragedy became a nation-wide scandal because Zimmerman was relieved 
only a few hours later, claiming self-defence. Eventually he was charged for the 
murder, but it took more than a month and ‘thousands of people gathering for 
vigils and demonstrations across the country.’4 The public, struck by this event, 
3.
http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2012/04/02/us/the-events-
leading-to-the-shooting-of-trayvon-
martin.html?ref=us [accessed May 
20th, 2012]
4.
Jenna Loyd, ‘The Fire Next Time: 
Rodney King, Trayvon Martin, and 
Law-and-order Urbanism’ in: City, 
Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, 
Theory, Policy, Action, 16 1-2 (Spring 
2012). I quote the excerpt on the 
website of the magazine: http://
www.city-analysis.net/2012/04/28/
the-fire-next-time-rodney-king-
trayvon-martin-and-law-and-order-
urbanism/#fn-3837-2 [accessed May 
20th, 2012] I wrote this part of the 
chapter in 2012. Afterwards we can 
state that the Martin-case was the 
first in a range of shootings around 
the US, where black people were 
victims unnessescary (they were shot, 
whithout having arms themselves), 
particularly of police violence that was 
experienced as discriminating. The 
Martin case urged the establishment 
of the ‘black-lives-matter’ movement, 
which particularly in 2015-2016 
organized lots of protests against 
racial police-violence. See http://
blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [visited 
June 11, 2017]
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understood the murder and the delay in charging the killer not as an incident, but 
as part of a series of acts of racial violence, even connected to the assassination of 
Martin Luther King Jr. and the Rodney King case in Los Angeles twenty years ago. 
I am not aiming to reconstruct the shooting here, or to discover the truth about 
what really happened the night of the killing. Some features at the background of 
the case, however, attract attention. Hearing of this shooting – almost one month 
after the accident it appeared in a short news message in the Dutch press – I was 
immediately intrigued by the fact that the shooting took place in the midst of a 
gated community. Gated communities are of course meant to keep the threat out 
there, outside the surrounding walls, in order to secure the living environment 
of the residents. This aim is quite clear in its layout, even in its typology, the 
space within its walls frames a good and pleasant life for its inhabitants. Most 
communities share a pattern inspired by neo-traditional perspectives of New 
Urbanism;5 a revival of the classical neighbourhood layout and its image of collec-
tiveness. The different houses, with their traditional architecture, face collective 
spaces which are nicely landscaped: ponds, hills, and football courts. Although 
the layout of The Retreat is a bit more dense and generic than generally found in 
gated communities, it still aims for certain collectiveness and cosiness, as we have 
already seen. Despite this peaceful image of perfectly maintained laws, paths and 
the pond, the good life depends on the surrounding wall, the fences and porches, 
and even sometimes guards at the entrance. Whoever is out should be kept out: 
we ‘now live in fortress cities,’ Los Angeles based urban theorist Mike Davis writes 
in his 1990 City of Quartz, ‘complete with encompassing walls, restricted entry 
points with guard posts, overlapping private and public police services, and even 
privatized roadways.’6 The composi6tion and aim of this neighbourhood typology 
is thus clear: securing a peaceful and pleasant life for its inhabitants, a (collective) 
cosiness and a pretty life, the tools to achieve this aim: a wall, surveillance, guards. 
Everything in its layout supports this image: its patterns, designs, landscaping, 
architecture, infrastructure, detailing, overview, walls and courses, its porches 
and fences, it’s clear distinction of ‘us’ and ‘not us’, between what belongs and 
what does not. However, it is the border, the fenced distinction between inside 
and outside, that is crucial to this image. The wall and the porch are a very visible 
intervention in space, not only literally securing access into the community, but 
also acting as a visual message, communicating what is inside and outside, who 
is welcome and who should not even try to enter. The wall thus shows a specific 
image of the good life and of collectiveness: a life without disturbances, troubles, 
within a space that is distinct from its surroundings. Paradise lost, paradise 
regained. 
‘The defense of luxury has given birth to an arsenal of security systems and an 
obsession with the policing of social boundaries through architecture’, Davis 
writes two years later in an article called ‘Fortress Los Angeles, The Militarization 
of Public Space’.7 The article is published a few months before the riots that spread 
all over Los Angeles after the violent arrest of Rodney King.8 This arrest, and the 
following riots, appeared to be a catalyst for urban planners and homeowners to 
go to even further lengths to protect their properties and neighbourhoods. Fear 
has redrawn the map of Los Angeles – the layout of the streets, the pattern of 
neighbourhoods. Not only were newly built environments designed as fortresses 
in a militarized landscape, existing neighbourhoods also redesigned their relation-
ship to the urban fabric and hired private policing services. Although generally 
the riots were seen as a clash of races,9 Davis states that it should be seen much 
5.
see Ellen Dunham-Jones, ‘Capital 
Transformations of the Post-Industri-
al Landscape’, in: Marcel Musch and 
Eireen Scheurs (eds.), Re: Generic 
City, OASE#54 (Nijmegen: Uitgeverij 
SUN, 2001), 23
6.
Mike Davis, City of Quartz Excavat-
ing the Future in Los Angeles (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1992), 244
7. 
Mike Davis, ‘Fortress Los Angeles: 
The Militarization of Urban Space’ in: 
Michael Sorkin (ed.), Variations on a 
Theme Park, The New American City 
and the End of Public Space (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 154
8.
While writing this passage, King 
was found dead at the bottom of his 
swimming pool in his garden [June 
17th, 2012]. An authobiography of his 
life was just published – a story that 
shows how much he still was in trou-
ble, althoug having peace with what 
had happened to him in the spring 
of 1991. See the somehow shocking 
interview of Kurt Streeter with King 
in the Los Angeles Times ‘The past 
still grips Rodney King’ of April 
23rd, 2012: http://articles.latimes.
com/2012/apr/23/local/la-me-riot-
rodney-king-20120423-1 [accessed 
June 19th, 2012]
9.
see for instance the necrology on Rod-
ney King of The New York Times of 
June 17th 2012: http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/18/us/rodney-king-
whose-beating-led-to-la-riots-dead-
at-47.html?pagewanted=all [accessed 
June 19th, 2012]
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more as a clash of classes. The riots concerned race, but were caused by class 
differences and economic despair. It was the rebellion of the poor. ‘The masses 
of Mid-City concentrated on the prosaic needs of life like cockroach spray and 
Pampers’, he writes.10 Fear of difference, specifically of the poor and lower classes, 
is the new driving force in city planning, he states. The response to this fear is an 
even more extreme and explicit strive for isolation, for excluding difference. ‘Is 
there any need to explain why fear eats the soul of Los Angeles? Only the middle-
class dread of progressive taxation exceeds the current obsession with personal 
safety and social insulation.’11 Neighbourhoods and private homes develop as 
secure islands in an ocean of dangerous possibilities: trespassers, burglaries, 
violence and threatening strangers that all need to be excluded. The city itself 
has become a no-go area. Almost all affluent neighbourhoods ‘contracts its own 
private policing’, writes Davis already in 1990. Residential security increasingly 
‘depends upon the voracious consumption of private security services’,12 whilst 
the police are expected to control urban spaces ‘out there’. Nevertheless, many of 
these public spaces are not only designed to exclude the poor and the weird, but 
are also privatised, fenced off from the street and only connected through secured 
connections to the city, and once again controlled by private security companies13 
– which all act to ‘further erode the already fuzzy boundary between public and 
private policing.’14 The urban realm thus gets ‘divided into “fortified cells of 
affluence” and “places of terror” where police battle the criminalized poor.’15 
But here, in Sanford, Florida, the gated community itself failed: the ‘poor’ have 
entered this community. Both the New York Times and The Miami Herald in their 
analysis of the accident at The Retreat define the financial crisis, that hit Florida 
extremely hard, as an underlying cause of the accident. ‘The Retreat was being 
built just as Florida’s housing bubble was about to burst,’ writes the New York 
Times. They spoke to David Johnson, an official property appraiser, who tells the 
newspaper that ‘they were selling in the vicinity of $250,000,- … [but] now … “are 
selling for about half.”’ The Retreat faced a significant number of foreclosures, he 
adds, which ‘have prompted investors to buy the properties at a discount and then 
rent them out.’ The Miami Herald spoke to Frank Taaffe, a former ‘block captain’, 
who admits that these ‘foreclosures forced owners to rent out to “low-lifes and 
gangsters.”’ This caused ‘“a lot of activity in and out of there,”’ Mr. Johnson told 
The New York Times. ‘“Maybe you don’t know the neighbor,” he adds, “because 
the one who was there before, maybe they got foreclosed on.”’ Strangers had 
started showing up, the gated community no longer felt safe. ‘Taaffe sounded 
chagrined when he noted that the complex is now majority-minority,’ writes The 
Miami Herald. ‘Census figures show The Retreat at Twin Lakes is 49 percent 
white, non-Hispanic, 23 percent Hispanic, 20 percent African-American and 5 
percent Asian.’ Mr. Taaffe also spoke to The New York Times, clarifying that not 
just any stranger showed up, but ‘“there were Trayvon-like dudes with their pants 
down.”’16 
It is a downward spiral. Threat entered The Retreat due to the effects of the 
financial crisis on the housing market. Instead of isolation behind the walls, the 
neighbourhood became mingled and the familiarity with neighbours decreased. 
On top of that, residents were experiencing the ‘result’ of the presence of strangers 
in the area – every now and then bikes, grills and other equipment was going 
missing. The Retreat is a quite small neighbourhood, only 260 units big, and 
so couldn’t afford a private company to guard the place. Instead, the home-
owners-association started a ‘Neighbourhood Watch’ in August 2011, of which 
10. 
Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear, Los 
Angeles and the Imagination of 
Disaster (New York: Vintage Books, 
1999), 374 
11. 
Ibid., 363
12.
Davis, City of Quartz, 244
13.
Davis, Ecology of Fear, 366
14.
Ibid., 383
15.
Davis, ‘Fortress Los Angeles’, 154
16.
http://www.miamiherald.
com/2012/03/17/v-fullsto-
ry/2700249/trayvon-martin-shoot-
er-a-habitual.html and http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/04/02/us/tray-
von-martin-shooting-prompts-a-re-
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102
Zimmerman was a coordinating volunteer. Such initiatives are fairly common 
in the United States, there is even an official program promoted by the National 
Sheriff’s Association (NSA), which started in the aftermath of the 1965-1971 cycle 
of unrest in South Central and East Los Angeles. These programs were meant to 
‘increase local solidarity and self-confidence in the face of crime’.17 A brief look on 
the website of the NSA immediately shows what is meant: a pretty but private life 
in a clean, healthy and secure environment. We see images of the happy faces of 
families standing before their front door or playing in the grass of their neighbour-
hood, the smiles of agents keeping an eye on the surroundings, cycling around 
or watching from their car. The main page also shows images of a notebook, of a 
fingerprint and of a stamp – the message is: be on the lookout, watch, register, 
prevent, protect, and be secure.18 In the States about 25,000 Neighbourhood 
Watch groups are at this moment officially active, and many more unofficially, 
like this particular one in Sanford.19 Although the Neighbourhood Watch at The 
Retreat was not part of the official program that is sponsored by the NSA, nor 
serviced by a private company, a volunteer coordinator of the local police never-
theless explained the do’s and the don’ts of the Neighbourhood Watch. Of course, 
wearing a gun is not part of the program, and neither is driving around. ‘“Watch 
groups are not even supposed to make the rounds [in Sanford]. That is the job 
of another kind of volunteer organization, Citizens on Patrol, whose members 
are selected and trained by the police and who drive the streets in a specially 
marked vehicle”,’ the volunteer coordinator of the local police told The New York 
Times.20 But Zimmerman did both. Neighbours afterwards told the journalists 
who covered the story that Zimmerman was taking his job very seriously, not 
only driving around and around in the neighbourhood, but also ringing the bell at 
every house in order to ask people to close their windows or simply to be aware. 
Some of them mention that he asked them to look specifically for black youngsters 
who appeared to be outsiders. He himself had called the police 46 times between 
2004 and 2012, reporting open windows, break-ins and other incidents, in nine of 
which he referred to seeing someone suspicious. According to a neighbour, he was 
actually responsible for preventing many crimes. Zimmerman, however, was not 
the only one reporting suspicious persons. The official police reports published 
after the shooting mention 50 calls in the past year reporting suspicious persons 
at The Retreat at Twin Lakes. The Retreat was not as safe as you would expect for 
a Gated Community: the authorities were called 402 times between January 2011 
and the shooting in February 2012. Among the reports there were eight burglaries, 
nine thefts and one other shooting. In other words, this secured community 
was not experienced as secure at all anymore. It is thus not particularly strange 
that some reports suggest vigilantism as the true cause of the shooting. When 
Zimmerman called the police in order to report his suspicions, he might have said, 
according to one newspaper article: ‘“Hey, we’ve had some break-ins in my neigh-
bourhood, and there’s a real suspicious guy at Retreat View Circle. This guy looks 
like he’s up to no good. … These a--holes always get away”’21 
17.
Davis, Ecology of Fear, 388
18.
www.usaonwatch.org [accessed May 
24th, 2012]
19.
http://www.nytimes.
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2.3 Seminole Towne Center, Sanford FL., prior to redevelopment in 2015
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2.2  THE QUEST OF PUBLIC SPACE
2.2.1  Room for Appealing Experiences
As stated by Mike Davis in his Ecology of Fear, fear has rewritten the map of the 
city.22 The Retreat, of course, is only one of the types of suburban artefacts that 
develop out of citizens’ increasing anxiety, one part of a rewritten (sub)urban 
landscape. Davis offers insight in this rewritten landscape through a description 
of recent Los Angeles, the city in which he lives. He first shows the material 
appearance of this landscape, followed by a rendering of the impact of this 
material landscape on daily urban life. Through an intriguing diagram, drawn on 
the basis of the so-called Burgess diagram, Davis shows the spatial transforma-
tion of Los Angeles. The Burgess diagram was a model developed by the Chicago 
sociologist Ernest W. Burgess in the 1920s in order to provide a general reading 
of cities. The diagram distinguishes five zones: from the inner core (the central 
business district, called by Burgess after Chicago ‘The Loop’), via an area of 
manufacturing, the single family dwellings of the residential area inhabited by the 
industrial and immigrant class, towards the Bungalow Section in the Commuter 
Zone. The Burgess diagram, in other words, is a rough interpretation of the social 
construction and composition of the city based on distance to the core, life(style) 
of inhabitants, and typology of buildings. Davis in his diagram also links the 
different zones and their distance to the core with an interpretation of inhabitants, 
not accompanied by the distinct typologies of buildings in the different zones, but 
by the possibilities, instruments and actions to secure these zones from criminal 
threats. The diagram thus takes safety and security as a method of reading the city 
and its construction. In his model, Davis distinguishes a core which is left over 
for the homeless. This core is surrounded by the Business District, the Inner City 
with its ‘Drug Free Zones’ and ‘Prostitution Abatement Zone’, surrounded in turn 
by Blue Collar Suburbs with ‘Neighbourhood Watches’ and ‘Gang-Free-Parks’, 
then the Gated Affluent suburbs with their ‘Child Molestation Exclusion Zone’ and 
‘Edge Cities’, before a Gulag Rim consisting of a number of Prisons.23 Through his 
diagram, Davis shows that the excessive contemporary focus on safety impacts 
the appearance, organization, and construction of the city extensively. This is not 
neutral, Davis states. He describes, for instance, the ‘new’ business district in the 
core of Los Angeles, Bunker Hill, as a radical privatization of public space: the 
open space is controlled, not only through camera and physical surveillance by the 
police or private security companies, but also through the very material differenti-
ation of space and surface. The open space is elevated in this area, and only rarely 
connected to the existing surrounding city fabric. These spaces, therefore, are 
only accessible via stairs or ramps, located at particular places, which obviously 
increases the possibility of controlling the area: it becomes easy to control who 
is able to enter and who should be kept out. ‘Traditional pedestrian connections 
between Bunker Hill and the old core were removed,’ Davis writes, ‘and foot traffic 
was elevated above the street on “pedways” … access to which was controlled 
by the security systems of individual skyscrapers.’24 In this example the physical 
design and layout of open space, its sectional relationship, participates strongly 
in a regime of surveillance. The particular layout and the physical construc-
tion of public space literally plays a major role in creating a ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ 
environment, claims Davis: through its design this space is easily controllable and 
can easily be turned into an exclusive outdoor space meant for the office workers 
and tourist visitors, eating their lunch outside or looking around for some inner-
city-fun. Through design interventions in physical space these users are prevented 
22.
Davis, Ecology of Fear, 363
23.
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from ‘criminal threats’ and from the strangers associated with such threats: 
the homeless, junkies, and tramps.25 Bunker Hill’s ‘public’ space thus doesn’t 
accommodate the public generally, it is only accessible for specific publics with 
a specific behaviour: consumption, entertainment, and recreation. The search 
for safety is at the expense of the very ‘publicness’ of public space: accessibility is 
restricted, and behaviour is prescribed or even scripted, decreasing the possibility 
of simultaneous use of space by distinct social groups of inhabitants. Since it is 
happening in the very centre of the city, it urges the question of public space. 
Public space in vernacular language, after all, evokes images of the heavily used 
urbanscapes of streets, squares, and parks, images of the Ramblas in Barcelona, 
Plazza del Campo in Sienna, and Hyde Park in London, spaces that host a variety 
of visitors. The urban centre historically is understood as the heart of the city, 
the core of an area.26 It is busily used, because of the concentration of (public) 
services, business, shops, and so on, on a daily basis by a variety of social groups 
of citizens, ranging from the local inhabitants to single day visitors, from the 
proverbial laborer to the landlord, all making use of the urban public fabric. But 
here, in Los Angeles, and in many other cities in the US and around the world, 
the core is transformed into an area for the white-collar-public with a specific 
program: office workers gathering during office hours, as well as tourists spending 
their savings in the theatre, the museum, the pub, and the casino. Even beyond 
specific uses, Bunker Hill in Los Angeles is a telling example of what happened to 
the centre of Detroit. Images showing emptied buildings, theatres that have been 
turned into parking lots (the grandeur of the theatre, the stage, the stairs, and the 
balconies providing an unexpected backdrop to a few parked cars), stations into 
wastelands and so on, are widely known today. The centre now is the territory 
of addicts and the homeless, and is avoided by the inhabitants of the city. But as 
Davis shows, it is a wider phenomenon, not limited to the urban centres. Also in 
the zones surrounding this very centre, in the ‘White Colar Zone’ as well as the 
‘Blue Colar Zone’, marginal groups are removed from the streets, the neighbour-
hoods and the parks. Compared to the Business District, spatial interventions 
are more on the ‘soft’-side: behaviour in public space is organized through laws 
and restrictions. Extra penalties are added to crimes committed, for instance, 
within a radius around public institutions, like public schools, where prostitutes 
and tramps are literally removed. The ‘police apparatus’ becomes visible in signs 
that announce the prohibitions and warnings. In the ‘Gated Affluent’ ring, this 
outer zone of the city, anxiety again manifests itself in the concrete, physical, and 
tangible. This is the area of The Retreat: walls, porches, cul-de-sac-lay-outs of 
neighbourhoods, guard surveillance on the roads, checkpoints at the entrances, 
signs, camera surveillance, and other interventions in space create a ‘safe’ and 
exclusive area in threatening surrounding. 
The Martin Case immediately shows what a paranoid environment this anxious 
city is, with suspicious wanderers everywhere, even in the safe-zones. Through 
his diagram, Davis shows the impact of this paranoia on the city, specifically on 
its public structures and private places. Privative trends are applied on public 
space: expanding and fencing the private, protecting the immediate surround-
ings, controlling the public. Fear erects both virtual and real walls between the 
here (and now) of the ‘lucky few’ and the there of the poor, the weird, those at the 
margins of society. The search for safety, in other words, increases the distinction 
between the public (that which is freely accessible) and the private or collective 
(that which is controlled, only accessible by a few, a specific group, upon invitation 
or else). The search for safety privatizes public space: it introduces privative 
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traits within public space, transforming public spaces into collective spaces, even 
sometimes fortresses. This affects other parts of the city, which become left-over 
spaces – often understood in this safety-preoccupied times as ‘no go areas’.27 
The concern Davis brings to the fore, alongside a range of other architec-
tural scholars and urban theorists, is a narrative that specifically originates in 
the Western society (or even more specifically, Northern American society) with 
its particular cultural and political history. It challenges the social and political 
context of public space, which is regularly understood as ‘social space’. In his 
book Life Between Buildings, that since its publication in 1971 has gained a 
status as one of the major publications on public space, the Danish architect Jan 
Gehl immediately connects these spaces with the human ‘need for contact’ and 
the ‘need for stimulation’.28 ‘Life between buildings,’ he even writes, ‘seems in 
nearly all situations to rank as more essential and more relevant than the spaces 
and buildings themselves.’29 Gehl’s book, like Davis’, stemmed from a growing 
concern with ‘recent’ developments, described by Gehl as responsible for a trans-
formation ‘from living to lifeless cities and residential areas’. This is a trend he 
associates with the Modern approach to the city, developments in technology 
and the increasing wealth of the Western world – processes of industrialization, 
segregation of city-functions, and the emergence of the car.30 Cities increasingly 
consist of area’s characterized by poor qualities, he states, where only ‘strictly 
necessary activities’ can occur. What is lost in these spaces are the modest types 
of social activities, the passive contact on the street, ‘seeing and hearing a great 
number of unknown people.’31 Even these activities can be very appealing, Gehl 
then adds, revealing his idea what public space should offer. ‘To see and hear each 
other, to meet, is in itself a form of contact, a social activity. The actual meeting, 
merely being present, is further more the seed for other, more comprehensive 
forms of social activity.’32 His book looks to define places of good quality, in order 
to propose design-possibilities and recommendations that give room to these 
comprehensive activities through the possibilities of ‘a broad spectrum of human 
activities,’ ranging from the necessary to optional activities that in turn leads 
to the ‘resultant’ activities –the social activities of greeting, conversation and 
discussions.33 Public space, in other words, corresponds with the human being as a 
social being: it accommodates, gathers, and assembles large groups of inhabitants, 
provides possibilities to meet, to set up social contacts, to get to know and to be 
known, which results in – and this can be urged as the most important ideal – the 
experience of community, to live life amongst others. Certainly, it is this social 
aspect that Davis’ renders as highly threatened through the processes of fear. 
The contemporary urban layout limits this ‘life amongst others’: in private and 
collective spaces (ranging from home to work, from leisure to education, as well as 
all forms of transportation in-between) consists of others that are similar, rather 
than different. This concern of both Davis and Gehl, despite their very distinctive 
approaches to the idea of public space, reveals how the social dimension of 
(urban) life and concrete (urban) space are intertwined. Gehl’s emphasis on 
and Davis’ concern with the actual design of public spaces and the layout of 
cities shows that public space is not simply the background of public life but the 
backbone: it creates – literally – room for social activities that fundamentally 
establish society. The transformation of public space, the decreasing possibility to 
gather in public space, the exclusion of particular groups from these spaces, the 
restriction of behaviour in space, and the lack of possibilities to appropriate place 
are not just symbol of contemporary society, but, in turn, impact the same society 
through the experience of the public, the presence of others, and the expectations 
of citizens. 
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Through Davis and Gehl, the narrative is clear. Public space, understood as social 
space, is vulnerable: the Modern approach does not offer attractive public spaces, 
and therefore does not offer lively spaces, whereas the (new) emphasis on security 
fails to offer inclusive spaces, rejecting the diversity that is part and parcel of 
public life. This narrative can can be discussed in abstract theories, shining light 
upon the processes behind such ‘threads’, but only gain sharpness and tangibility 
through an understanding of the actual spatial situation of daily life. This also 
works the other way: we cannot discuss public space as mere spaces, without 
also addressing the intertwined political questions of the so-called ‘public sphere’ 
and ‘public realm’. Whilst I will discuss the meaning of these terms later in this 
chapter, for now it is important to know that from here on these terms are used 
to infer Gehls’ description of public space as ‘social space’. This is due to the fact 
that in political theory, as well as in most architectural reflections on public space, 
the concepts of ‘public sphere’, ‘public domain’ and ‘public realm’ are used, rather 
than that of ‘socal space’.
In the following paragraphs, I will continue the reading of the American landscape 
and city, a journey that began with the investigation of the Retreat at Twin 
Lakes gated community in Sanford, FL. The aim of this journey is to understand 
the contemporary status of public space in the United States, and to explore 
urban and architectural discourse that reflects upon these concrete spaces. This 
exploration is both background, backbone and preparation for reflection on 
the field of architecture, the architectural project, and how this specific field of 
knowledge, practice and craftsmanship is related to political realm, a perspective 
that I will propel in the preceding chapters through a dialogue with the work and 
ideas of the German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). 
The choice to explore the particular landscape of Sanford FL is taken by 
chance: it is only because of the Martin Case that we landed in these surround-
ings. In other words, it is not an argued choice: it was not chosen because of its 
outstanding facts, any sort of sophisticated architecture or urban design or for the 
novelties that have been erected in these surroundings, nor for the specific charac-
teristics of inhabitants or a certain paradigmatic or symbolic image of this specific 
urban area. The random nature of this choice is important. Although an image 
will unfold of this particular place, it is also clear that it narrates a story that can 
equally be recognized elsewhere. 
But before immersing ourselves in this landscape, at least four major aspects 
must be stressed: (1) the specificities of a journey through landscape as a form of 
exploration, (2) todays cultural context as a frame beyond the discourse, leading 
to (3) a preliminary investigation of the discourse on the public, and finally (4) the 
Western, specifically Northern American locus of this discourse. 
2.2.2 Landscape as a Figure of Archaeology
This choice to investigate a landscape – our first aspect to address – is essential. 
It embraces the idea that Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit, as the title of a book by 
the German historian Karl Schlögel reads.34 Through spaces that are inhabited, 
created, and constructed, something is revealed of the convictions and cultural 
value systems of today (or yesterday). As has already become clear, contempo-
rary convictions and value systems challenge the distinction between public and 
private, as public space is replaced with collective space, exemplified in urban 
artefacts such as gated communities and shopping malls. In the investigation 
that follows, such artefacts are not mere illustrations of a certain concern, but 
34. 
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are founding element of the analysis. We will touch upon these examples not so 
much as isolated artefacts, but through the investigation of the landscape they are 
part of. In other words, the everyday landscape is understood as an underlying 
figure that connects the different artefacts. This is an important imperative: it 
positions these artefacts as the daily environments of inhabitants and users. The 
networks of these inhabitants and users, their ‘web of relationships’, somehow 
connects these artefacts. This landscape in turn is understood as the materializa-
tion of this ‘web of relationships’, all aspects of daily life coming together into a 
manifold, layered and multivalent structure. The public-private distinction that 
is challenged today is first and foremost constructed through the patterns of this 
everyday life. 
To take a ‘journey’ as the method, places us into the position of the ‘archaeolo-
gist’ who ploughs the surface to look for traces of past inhabitants and use. It takes 
‘space’ as a receptor of social, cultural, economic, and political circumstances.35 An 
important part of the work of the archaeologist is not only describing the objects 
found but also describing the site of these findings and their exact location, the 
(historical) landscape as a spatial frame for events and activities.36 This also counts 
for this exploration; in the trail through the urban landscape, we literally visit the 
local morphology of the landscape. Morphe in Greek actually does not only mean 
the outer appearance, the forms in which the landscape appear to us, not only 
it’s scheme and structure, but also means its essence – and this essence is not 
just form and location, but also the contextual relationships of actual surround-
ings and infrastructure, as well as the political, economic, historical, and cultural 
context. In other words, the artefacts that we touch upon are not just urban facts, 
not just spatial edifices, mere forms of contemporary urbanity, but are essentially 
produced within a specific context. The essential characteristic of a landscape, 
in other words, is that it is a socio-spatial figure, produced by everyday life and 
extraordinary interventions. These traces reveal patterns of public and private, 
both socially and spatially, as well as architecturally. Space and trace, in other 
words, belong together: through the traces of life, the use and meaning of public 
and private space, of urban and architectural artefacts come to the fore. Spaces are 
not independent and abstract, and neither is architecture. It is a social production: 
produced in a specific context in relation to human agency, action and interven-
tions. Space is not a meaningful term in itself, as archaeologist Christopher Tilley 
claims in his A Phenomenology of Landscape: ‘the meaning of space always 
involves a subjective dimension and cannot be understood apart from the symbol-
ically constructed lifeworlds of social actors.’37 
This social-spatial dimension is enclosed in the term ‘landscape’ itself. 
Until this point, I have used the terms ‘landscape’ and ‘urban landscape’ quite 
intuitively to circumscribe the very character of these (sub)urban surround-
ings of The Retreat. These are the ‘suburban neighbourhoods’ of the city of 
Sanford, which in turn is part of the Greater Orlando Metropolitan Area. 
Although intuitively I did not chose to call the area ‘urban environment’ or ‘city’, 
‘metropolis’ or ‘metropolitan area’, the term ‘landscape’ fits the aim quite well. 
The contemporary urban area cannot be judged on the same terms as the city in a 
classical sense of the word, at least not in the sense proposed by Louis Wirth, for 
whom the city was ‘a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially 
heterogeneous individuals’, nor by Lewis Mumford, who described the city as a 
‘point of maximum concentration for the power and culture of a community’.38 
‘It’s over’, the Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas wrote as the final sentence of his 
extensively discussed essay ‘Generic City’: ‘It’s over. That is the story of the city. 
The city is no longer.’39 The story Koolhaas urges in these two words is that of the 
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decline of the city in the European tradition, the loss of unity in the city-fabric, the 
power of the centre, the social construct of the inhabitants, and the empowerment 
of history and identity. It is ‘a fuzzy empire of blur’, Koolhaas later added to his 
observation ‘it fuses public and private, straight and bent, bloated and starved, 
high and low to offer a seamless patchwork of the permanently disjointed’.40 
Koolhaas thus recognizes a new urban environment appearing, another form 
of ‘distribution of inhabitants’, a postmodern urban area without a centre, a 
continuous sprawl of suburbanity and subcentres, a superposition of fragments, 
infrastructure, landscape, detached from the specific local geography and 
morphology, detached even from the local circumstances. This is also emphasized 
by Thomas Sieverts about fifteen years later, with his concept of the Zwischen-
stadt: neither landscape nor city.41 Sieverts doesn’t coin the word in order to warn 
against the loss of the classical European compact city as an organizing figure 
of life, but to recognize the design challenges that are to be found within this 
new urban condition whilst avoiding falling into the trap of false idealism.42 The 
Italian architect Vittorio Gregotti, about fifteen years earlier, stressed this new 
urban condition as territoire, a landscape: an ensemble of human interventions.43 
An understanding of the new urban condition as a landscape was also brought 
to the fore during the nineties in debates on the situation in Northern America, 
specifically in discussion on the future of urbanism and urban design within this 
condition. Landscape, as it is emphasized in Landscape Urbanism, a term coined 
by the Harvard Professor of Landscape Architecture Charles Waldheim, is the 
figure that delivers new common ground to cities falling apart.44   
Besides these design-objectives and perspectives,45 through which slightly also 
the idea of ‘space as an instrument’ enters the debate,46 there are other reasons 
why I prefer to use the term ‘urban landscape’. I interpret this urbanized area, 
somewhere in-between the classical European compact city and the open or 
rural landscape, as a landscape in itself. The traditional vernacular use of the 
term ‘landscape’ is bound to a certain opposition to the city, as in Sieverts’s use 
of the term. Landscape is understood as oppositional and resistant to the cultural 
primacy and transforming power of the city, even as oppositional to culture, 
to modernity, and to technology.47 Landscape emphasizes the ‘natural’ aspects 
of these areas, the countryside and forests. Yet, I would argue that this is a too 
narrow understanding of the term.48 Landscape has both a more specific and a 
broader meaning, which can be distinguished by three perspectives.
Firstly, narrowly interpreted in its vernacular use, the term, besides the afore-
mentioned oppositional aspects to the city, also refers to the physical appearance 
of a part of the globe. It is not just nature, but also ordered nature. In that sense, 
despite the opposition of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, landscape renders both – culture 
actually above nature. It emphasizes ‘earth’ as well as ‘part of the earth’, the first 
the natural aspect, the latter emphasising cultural traits. To distinguish ‘parts’ is 
an act of human and cultural intellect. The earth itself thus consists of landscapes, 
which can be distinguished along more or less clear lines of interpretation and 
reflection: unity and assembly of patterns, structures, fabrics, forms, edifices, 
functions, organization, interventions, elements, and edges. Thus, it is clear that 
a city can also be a landscape, as can a suburban environment. Landscape can 
refer to the countryside, a forest or river delta, but also a railroadtrack or the 
technological landscapes of industrial bioindustries. The term, in other words, 
emphasises the characteristics of a certain surface and its boundaries. Culture 
and nature thus merge in the term landscape, it is much more an aspect of civi-
lization than of ‘natural circumstances’.49 Moreover, since in the term landscape 
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the physical environment joins actual human observation, it is an ‘active’ concept: 
it depends upon both the traveller and the observer. It places the emphasis on 
human activity and on human capabilities: the definition of differences and the 
human capacity to differentiate. This aspect of ‘activity’ can be found in the origin 
of the term: stemming from the landscape genre in painting developed during the 
Italian Renaissance and by the Dutch painters during the 17th century,50 the word 
initially did not mean the view, but the picture, grasped by the eye at once.51 The 
painters, however, mapped the landscape through patterns and fabrics, edges and 
connections – most of these artefacts in fact comprise traces of human interven-
tion: infrastructure, dykes, canals, bridges, buildings, farms, windmills, a village 
at the horizon with the typical landmark of the church. Paintings somehow create 
an overview over the landscape by the introduction of the horizon. Landscape 
painting shows that an elevated viewpoint is essential for the observation of 
patterns, fabrics, and edges, by which mere ‘land’ or ‘surface’ is turned into 
‘landscape’. Only through the overview, can unity be discovered and differences 
identified.52 The Dutch cultural philosopher Ton Lemaire, who has written 
extensively on the idea of landscape, argues that it is therefore man who creates 
the landscape through demarcation and framing. It is the action of the observer 
that turns a section of the earth’s surface into a landscape, an action that requires 
distance as well as insight.53 
A second aspect pushes this perspective further. The term landscape inherently 
has a call for ‘action’, which is more than just the act of the observer, recognizing 
the distinct mathematic physical elements of rhythm and rhyme. The landscape 
painting is not just ‘observation’, but moreover is a form of ‘active’ reflection on 
the relationship between man and his surroundings. From the end of the Middle 
Ages, slowly but surely, the genre caused the emancipation of the ordinary and 
the everyday. Although still the everyday environment of people, of farmers and 
laborers, it also became the object of paintings, articulating in particular human 
intervention on the land. According to the well known British-American historian 
Simon Schama the essence of the Dutch School of painters in the 17th century is 
that they took the extraordinary development of techniques and human inter-
ventions to withdraw land from water in the Low Countries as their objective; the 
windmills and docks, the dikes and locks.54 The paintings somehow articulated 
man and his successes as establishing a profane space.55 The term landscape, 
which not only addresses this particular strain in painting, but affects our under-
standing of landscapes in the real world, thus immediately implies the action 
of cultivation, creation and adaptation: man actively ordering, arranging and 
structuring his environment. Every ‘landscape’ contains traces of this process of 
civilization and is therefore a cultural and historical ‘document’ of human civiliza-
tion. In other words, landscape is not just ‘what you see’, the physical appearance 
of order and unity, but also the biography, to use a term that the Dutch historian 
Jan Koolen coined in order to draw attention to the human subject vis-a-vis the 
transformation and appearance of the landscape.56 Naturally, these appearances 
are not ‘stable’: landscape is always undergoing a process of transformation, since 
cultivation and adaptation will never reach a final stage. Landscape, therefore, is 
essentially layered: it documents how people have dealt with the earth through 
time. Developments in the social, economic and political context of society leads 
to new plans, to the adaption of the landscape to the demands of new eras and 
new needs. This is how the policy maker, politician, developer and designer 
contribute to the ‘document’. Landscape is essentially an accumulation of‘ lieux 
the mémoire’,57 present, and perhaps even future (if only in those billboards 
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that announce what will be built). Thus, the actual landscape is a document in 
which the entire history of the country (including its origins) can be read.58 Put 
another way, the landscape, as a construction of distinct rhythms, artefacts and 
patterns, is a construct in time, in which layers of history can be unearthed. It 
is the product of the cultivation and adaptation of nature, the reflection of the 
experiences, knowledge and know-how of successive cultures, a historical record 
of the collective memory of a society.59 This more active definition of landscape 
becomes clear when we venture into the area of linguistics. The English word 
‘landscape’, like – and seemingly based on – the Dutch word landschap, places 
the emphasis on human observation and perception of order, unity, rhythm and 
distinctness. This word in English, therefore, can also be used in an active sense, 
as in the phrase ‘a landscaped garden’, in which landscape is literally linked to 
the activity of design, of bringing order, structure, and system in the more or less 
natural environment. This connection is also made in French. The French word 
for landscape, paysage, places heavy emphasis on human intervention in nature: 
it alludes to a designed country or area. The German Landschaft, on the contrary, 
stands for a restrictive space, a territory – originally indicating an area so sparsely 
populated that it cannot be governed. In German language the term thus has 
political and administrative connotations. The American ‘landscape’, finally, 
combines the German and English definitions.60 The distinct languages show that 
the term landscape is about the active relationship between man and his (natural) 
environment, combining intellectual observation and cultural and political inter-
vention. The human condition makes it necessary to adapt this environment to 
the needs of man (however much man also adapt to his everyday environment). 
To put it another way: the relationship between man and his environment is 
essentially one of cultivation. God created the earth, so to say, that in turn is 
cultivated by man into a world, into landscapes.61
There is one step left in this perspective, the final layer I want to stress in order 
to arrive at the actual inhabitants and their everyday experiences. With its 
emphasis on observation and cultivation, as derived from painting, the above 
exploration of the term landscape pays little attention to an idea of the world 
as the everyday setting of our activities. It is therefore important to add the 
perceived and experienced landscape as a scope of observation. Locals have access 
to the landscape in a manner quite distinctive to the observer. For locals, the 
landscape offers narratives, memories of the past, and stories of the future. The 
landscape acquires meaning not because we rise above it and can see its limits 
and order, but because we live in, enjoy and experience it. A collective memory 
comes to the inhabitants through familiar stories and local narratives, probably 
imagined through yearly events and festivals. In other words, the landscape 
acquires meaning locally, since we are biographically connected with it, argues the 
archeologist Christopher Tilley in his book A Phenomenology of Landscape. The 
inhabitants have a particular knowledge of the landscape, which is gained through 
their very familiarity with it. It is through this personal familiarity that we learn 
to read its details (and, indeed, to differentiate them). Landscapes, according to 
this perspective, are therefore not simply ‘objects for contemplation, depiction, 
representation and aestheticization’.62 With this we have abandoned the primacy 
of distance as a definition of landscape: we need both distance and inhabitation to 
fully understand the actualities of a particular landscapes. 
This perspective of the local, of the ‘accessiblity’ and ‘familiarity’ of landscape 
actually emphasizes the social practices and constructions of the inhabitants. 
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The landscape, with all its specificalities, is somehow the material outcome and 
symbolic representation of relationships, societal structure, community organi-
zations, and economic systems, as Sharon Zukin states in her book Landscapes 
of Power. ‘In a narrow sense,’ she writes, ‘landscape represents the architecture 
of social class, gender and race relations, imposed by powerful institutions. In 
a broader sense, however, it connotes the entire panorama that we see: both 
the landscape of the powerful – cathedrals, factories and skyscrapers – and the 
subordinate, resistant, or expressive vernacular of the powerless – village chapels, 
shantytowns and tenements.’63 
The landscape-term, thus, does not just depict a matter of geography, but 
merges the physical with the perception of that geography, with the narratives 
that inhabit and the powers that produce the space, stated with a reference to 
the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre.64 Landscapes merge observation from a 
distance with the experience of proximity and synchronicity, the common with the 
specific, the generic with the resistant. Landscape comes into being through the 
human capacity to differentiate and establish, to cultivate, create, and adapt, as 
well as to remember, to celebrate, to dedicate, to familiarize, and to narrate. 
The use of the term ‘urbanized landscape’ in this text implies that the journey 
through this metropolitan area is not simply a search for particular examples 
of urban artefacts, for clear examples of the loss of public space, or the physical 
appearances of paranoia. The journey-approach acknowledges that this urbanized 
landscape is a complex construction of spatial structure, built form, historical 
relics and traditions, as well as social, cultural, political, and economic circum-
stances, ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, mental imaginary, daily practices, 
appropriation, design, and particular aims. It is space understood as stage, as 
Hilde Heynen would argue.65 In other words, since both perspectives of distance 
and proximity are inherent in the term landscape, it mediates both symbolically 
and physically between what is perceived and its history, between what is beyond 
and what is inherent, what is the structuring power and everyday practices. 
That is why an exploration of landscape is more than just a mapping of what is 
touched upon, a registration of what is seen: it is a tool of cultural analysis, the 
simultaneous construction of social context and physical environment. A journey 
through the landscape, means investigating these aspects beyond the physical 
form. To quite literally take a trail through the urban landscape and investigate 
the artefacts touched upon accords with the very fluidness of everyday life of the 
inhabitants of this particular place. Via the concrete artefacts intercepted along 
this route, the trail itself adds literary insight into these differences and perspec-
tives, as driving through a landscape does: sometimes opening views, sometimes 
closing them, sometimes delivering the possibility to look back, sometimes to get 
an overview. This journey is meant to meander through the landscape and look 
after the various perspectives that are opened up, before us and behind us – and, 
if possible, beyond. As such a journey does, this delivers a sort of morphing of the 
discourse on the public and private dichotomy. 
2.2.3 (Post-) Modernity and The Threat of Fear (and Fun)
The second aspect that needs to be addressed before actually immersing ourselves 
in the Florida landscape, is the aspect of fear that, as we saw at the beginning 
of this chapter, appears to be an important mechanism behind the contempo-
rary urban condition. We have already taken the first step in our trail through 
the landscape, investigating the very question of why the landscape is what it is. 
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Something of human appropriation and attitude is tangible in that landscape, we 
concluded above. 
The urban landscape that we dwell upon here has of course undergone the 
striking growth of the city, and the simultaneous process of the city falling apart, 
the loss of every aspect that gathers the built environment and forms it into a 
‘city’.66 Indeed, intuitively spoken, the city is transformed into a fragmented 
landscape, somehow tied together by highways that cut through a vast fabric of 
neighbourhoods, articulated at points by landmarks, malls, edge-cities, and inner-
cities. That is this urbanized landscape, a fabric of loosely arranged fragments, 
that together still forms a whole, an urban region, a metropolis, but that on the 
ground is experienced as a series of coincidences, accidents, happenings. As Mike 
Davis argues, fear is shaping this landscape. The aim to secure the environment 
of the city, by the use of different instruments, is not only at the expense of the 
accessibility of public space, it also impacts the very idea of the city as a coherent 
and interdependent spatial entity, both physically and socially. In-between areas 
are being built, buffer zones left open, roads closed and paths removed. Fences are 
erected, with porches, camera-surveillance and guards. 
‘In cities like Los Angeles,’ Davis concludes in his 1992 essay ‘Fortress 
Los Angeles’, ‘on the hard edge of postmodernity, architecture and the police 
apparatus are being merged to an unprecedented degree.’67 The urban layout 
and architectural design is not neutral, he thus states. With the phrase ‘on the 
hard edge of postmodernity’, we understand Davis’observations as not just 
interesting and intriguing, a unique presentation of changing neighbourhoods 
and contemporary urban design. Here Davis looks beyond the physicality of the 
urban landscape, an important presupposition of the architectural and urban 
discourse more generally: that the physicality of cities, landscapes, and interiors, 
as well as of cars, smartphones, and other consumer goods show something of 
the ideas, convictions, and aims that produce them. As the theorist John Archer 
states in his study into the history and meaning of suburban neighbourhoods: 
the ideology of a society is closely connected to its material apparatus, to the 
very material construction and organization of daily life.68 In other words, in the 
architectural history and presence of (public) spaces, the construction of urban 
neighbourhoods and metropolitan inner cities, the layout and section of urban 
landscapes, one is able to read shifts in the spirit of a society. The urban map 
not only shows a specific plan of an area, but also unfolds a cultural map of its 
community. The artefacts, the designs of architects and urbanists, can therefore 
be seen as a materialisation of the cultural practices of society, and understood as 
tangible touchstones of a society’s convictions and (mostly blurred) self-image. 
Specifically, the different appearances of public space ‘reflect who we are as 
society, as well as the quality of life that we promise our citizens,’ since these 
spaces are the locus of civic life.69 These spaces therefore show societies’ political 
and social deficits, as well as the ‘conflictive principles’ beyond the societal 
structures, convictions and aims. We thus, as the urban theorist Sharon Zukin 
writes in Landscape of Power, ‘owe the clearest cultural map of structural change 
not to novelists or literary critics, but to architects and designers. Their products, 
their social roles as cultural producers, and the organization of consumption in 
which they intervene create shifting landscapes in the most material sense.’70 
Obviously this relationship between the physicality of a particular cultural map 
and a societies’ ideological stances is always a complex interdependent narrative: 
the city changes through distinct approaches that are fundamentally related to 
perspectives on humanity, economy, and ecology, whilst these approaches and 
the ideas that drive them may change in the face of the concrete reality of their 
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aims. Changes to the physical urban environment lead, in turn, to changes to the 
everyday life of inhabitants. This works vice-versa too: due to changing everyday 
practices, the city itself again may change. How to live, where to buy, where to 
go to school, to recreate, to work, how to travel, who to meet, how to vote. All 
this somehow is interrelated to the physical and tangible structures of life. Urban 
artefacts are produced out of a complex and reciprocal process of adaptation and 
adoption, of intervention and invention, in daily practices, mental premises, intel-
lectual ideas, spatial experiences, and societal thought.  
With his understanding of fear as the driving force behind the contemporary city, 
Davis offers a pressing example of the attitude towards the world and to society 
in the context of what distinct sociologists as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens 
call the ‘risk society’.71 Nowadays, Western society, they state, can be charac-
terized by a particular and strong focus on the future, which is perceived and 
experienced through the very insecurity that is inherent to all future perspectives. 
Future, after all, it is depicted by probability: ‘what may be gained’, but also, and 
in the last couple of decades surely more strongly, ‘what may be lost’. Uncertainty 
about these possibilities and probabilities drives the ‘risk society’ into a state of 
common anxiousness, concerns for personal and ‘metaphysical’ safety resulting in 
a cynical preoccupation with personal risk regarding individual life and property. 
This anxiousness is fuelled by concrete experiences, ranging from the personal 
to the communal, from accidents and experiences of criminality within everyday 
life to threats on the level of politics and society: such as the threat of the atomic 
bomb during the Cold War.72 Recent experiences in the West have shown that all 
utopian claims of progression, declarations of an increasing capacity to control 
nature, of the possibilities of technology, even the optimism on the very nature 
of the human being, should be regarded false. What has become clear to Western 
societies during the last decades is that technological disasters and ecological 
catastrophes are not to be seen as ‘unwanted side effects’ of modernization, 
but as its very product, Beck states.73 Life, mankind, technology only can be 
controlled to a certain extent.74 Both Beck and Giddens refer to the catastrophic 
nuclear accident of the Chernobyl disaster (1986) to emphasise this ‘risk society’ 
as intrinsically connected to the very idea of modernisation itself: the incapacity 
to control risks is bound up in the process of modernization. Beck and Giddens 
wrote their respective analysis before the recent experiences of terrorism, like the 
event of 9/11 (2001) and onwards in the West and the Middle East, the destructive 
forces of nature, like the hurricane Katrina around New Orleans (2005), the 
terrifying tsunami in Japan that caused serious problems for the nuclear plants of 
Fukushima (2011), and hurricane Sandy, that hit New York in 2012. 
The anxious risk-society, therefore, is closely related to what Davis called ‘the hard 
edges of postmodernism’. Regularly, postmodernism is described by a phrase 
taken from La condition postmoderne, the 1979 seminal book of one of the most 
prominent protagonists and interpreters of postmodernism, French philosopher 
Jean-François Lyotard: ‘the end of meta-narratives’.75 Initially this ‘end of all 
meta-narratives’ was experienced with joy and relief, especially in the fields of art 
and architecture. Soon, however, it turned into pessimism and even cynicism. As 
the term postmodernism shows, modernism was one of these ‘meta-narratives’ 
that had lost its attractiveness, along with, according to Lyotard, Christianity, 
The Enlightenment, and science. Lyotard shows how the far-fledged aims of such 
‘meta-narratives’ – the idea that the human being can know everything through 
science, the idea that history is a narrative of progression, the future possibility of 
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‘absolute freedom’, expectations that all accumulate in the modernist worldview 
– had lost their uniting power. The experience of catastrophe in relation to new 
technologies, as stressed by Beck and Giddens, challenged this utopian narrative. 
Modernism, as it is well known, originated in the rapidly developing processes 
and revolutions of modernization during the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
a period of innovation and invention in the technical, social, economic, and 
psychological spheres of society. This process impacted patterns of everyday 
life and transformed the realms of dwelling and working, as well as the public, 
private and collective spheres. Specifically, processes of ‘normalization’ and 
‘rationalization’ changed relationships, impacting on the very form of society and 
reforming existing communities into newly constructed networks. In other words, 
modernization transformed everyday life, turning it upside down.76 Urban theorist 
Marshall Berman in All That is Solid Melts into Air describes the experience 
of this turnover as ‘modernity’, a term that is used often, but with a variety of 
meanings.77 The description Berman delivers is rather useful here. Modernity, 
in his view, is described as a dialectical experience: simultaneously uncertainty 
and choice, loss and progression, melancholy and hope.78 Beyond the resulting 
changes to everyday life – a seemingly accelerating processes of transformation79 – 
modernization also influenced the ‘self-understanding’ of the western world; phil-
osophical, teleological, and theological reflection on Western society and politics 
and on the Western human being. This newly constructed self-image is called 
modernism, which can be understood as a cultural, artistic and intellectual trans-
formation of society, caused by the processes of modernization, into a project of 
progress, rationalization, emancipation, and welfare. This is highly visible in the 
field of architecture, specifically in what is regularly called the Modern Movement. 
Postmodernity therefore can be understood as the experience of the failure of 
this project of modernism.80 It is the experience of modernity, but reduced to 
its negative tones: the loss of hope, of progression and even of freedom. The 
bright and thrilling aims and their initially encouraging and inspiring results – 
the development of technology, of insights in psychology and philosophy, the 
improvement of life and the circumstances of life – were in the 70s understood as 
merely a failure. High ideals contrasted with 20th century reality: experiences of 
war and terror, of concentration camps, of political totalitarianism, the increasing 
importance of economy understood in its capitalist form, a lack of control of 
development in the fields of technics and healthcare, the loss of political influence, 
and the aforementioned on-going threat of the Cold War, criminal threats, techno-
logical and natural disasters. Far from evolving progress, increasing the possibility 
of freedom, the accessibility of knowledge and diminishing poverty, moderniza-
tion brought new relationships of power and repression, of poverty and exclusion, 
and, as emphasized by the ‘risk society’, the threat of uncontrollable catastrophes.
As is the case with modernity, there is also no agreement on the precise meaning 
of the term postmodernism, ‘except, perhaps,’ as the urban theorist David Harvey 
writes, ‘that “postmodernism” represents some kind of reaction to, or departure 
from, ‘modernism’.’81 The disagreement on postmodernism not only increases 
confusion about its essential characteristics, but shows the broad scope and 
impact of postmodernity. As a critical response to modernism and its linear idea 
of progress, absolute truths and rational approach of philosophy and social order, 
postmodernism embraces heterogeneity and differences, discontinuity, fragmen-
tation, indeterminacy, pragmatism, polymorphous correlations, chaos theory 
and fractal geometry.82 This ambiguous appearance, a rejection of modernists 
purity, first appeared in literature and architecture.83 In the case of architecture, 
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the moral aesthetic narrative of modernism can be summarized in the famous 
quotes ‘Form follows Function’ (Louis Sullivan, 1896) and ‘Less is More’ (Ludwig 
Mies van der Rohe). In its rejection of this aim of purity, postmodernism in archi-
tecture becomes anti-modernism, seen in slogans like ‘Less is a Bore’, coined by 
the American architect Robert Venturi. The American architectural critic Charles 
Jencks, in his book The Language of Post Modern Architecture, renders this as 
an ‘anti-purist’ and ‘anti-elitist’ revolution in architecture, in favour of a populist 
and eclectic approach.84 Purity, in his view, lacks the possibility to bear meaning, 
to be appropriated by and embedded in the broader public. Moreover, as Venturi 
writes in his book Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture: ‘Architects can 
no longer afford … the puritanically moral language of orthodox Modern architec-
ture’.85 Jencks proposes an eclectic approach to architecture: architectural design 
as a blending of existing elements into a playful mixture. Whilst modernism was 
understood as a universal approach to architecture, of form being directly related 
to or even originating in the function of an object, the future of technology, and 
the rejection of ornament, post-modernism rejected this universal approach 
focusing instead on the local, the traditional, the historical. Through such an 
approach, Jencks states, architecture can once more address the public, which he 
understands as its fundamental task.86 Venturi agrees on that perspective. ‘I am 
for richness of meaning rather than clarity of meaning’, he writes in the ‘Gentle 
Manifesto’ that opens his book. ‘I prefer “both-and” to “either-or”, black and 
white, and sometimes grey, to black and white. A valid architecture evokes many 
levels of meaning and combinations of focus: its space and its elements become 
readable and workable in several ways at once.’87 The book is an attempt to show 
that this approach is rather common in the history of architecture; modernism is 
the exception, not the standard, he argues. Postmodernism in architecture from 
this perspective seems to be the playful liberation of an ‘oppressive’ and ‘moral’ 
narrative in exchange for a narrative of freedom, but this – as it unfolds in a 
formal, critical and sometimes even cynical approach to architecture – is actually 
just a marginal aspect of the post-modern narrative and its materialization within 
the urban environment. 
Venturi’s contribution to the debate can be understood as stressing the 
‘problem’ of purity, in combination with the rejection of history as a projective 
device within the architectural approach. As the title already reveals, Venturi 
calls for a much more ambiguous position, where history has an operative role 
in the process of analysis (of particular problems) and design. Although in later 
post-modern approaches to architecture and the built environment, Venturi’s 
approach seems to be replaced by a rather superficial limitation to façade-de-
sign and the application of history, Venturi’s designs offer much more layered 
examples of the complexity he recognizes in reality. This also counts for his 
approach for accommodating the public, particularly in the range of ‘internal 
streets’ he designed in several of his projects.
The reality of the urbanized landscape is far more complex and anxious, as we 
have already seen. The outburst of riots and uproars in Los Angeles after the 
beating of Rodney King in 1992 is seen as a pivotal moment in the history of the 
city.88 The American sociologist Nathan Glazer and the political scientist Mark 
Lilla, in their 1987 investigation into the ‘public face’ of architecture, already 
state that ‘although there is an excitement in the actual presence of our fellow 
human beings, … there is a new concern: crime and disorder. There is always 
the fear of disorder when great crowds gather, but the decline in the power of 
common rules and in the homogeneity of the population inevitably increases 
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these fears.’89 The result is an increasing eagerness to defend public gatherings – 
sports and political events – and public spaces on the one hand, and the private 
spaces that contain the suburban dream on the other. The desire of security is 
thus beyond the contemporary urbanized landscape, causing a ‘militarization of 
the urban landscape’, as described by Davis. The increase in gated communities, 
malls, themeparks and conventions centres (in both amount and size), largely 
contributes to the postmodern experience of urbanity. Remarkably enough, as 
this list of artefacts of the urbanized landscape already shows, in this postmodern 
environment fear and fun are closely related. ‘The ecology of fantasy is used to 
master the ecology of fear,’ the Dutch philosopher René Boomkens analyzed.90 
This fantasy-landscape however can only exist at the cost of a residual, distin-
guished by ‘hard edges’. The Northern-American philosopher Frederic Jameson, 
who, like David Harvey, has written extensively on the effects and affects of 
postmodern culture, presents these fantasy-landscapes as a threat in themselves. 
He argues that they depend upon images that are to be seen as a pastiche.91 They 
replace reality. Jameson reads the post-modern approach to architecture in 
the same way: an articulation of the fantasy landscapes of the individual, which 
at first sight map appear to be an enjoyment of freedom, fuelled by prosperity 
and welfare beyond imagination and materialized in kitsch and luxury. But for 
Jameson, like Harvey, the reality is far more sombre: these images are regularly 
not just a parody, not only temporally replacing reality, but are essentially 
rejecting the social context of the individual, and therefore rejecting the (social) 
reality, real landscapes, and, in respect to the cultural field, their very societal 
possibilities.92 In other words: these are empty figures, essentially utopian.93 
But in their emptiness – and this is the point I want to emphasize – they 
accommodate and propel capitalism. Rather than being critical, postmodernity 
has become a vehicle of late capitalist consumer culture, the ‘logical extension of 
the power of the market over a whole range of cultural production.’94 Or to state it 
differently: capitalism is probably the only ‘grand explanatory narrative’ that has 
survived the critical attitude towards such narratives, even after the financial and 
economic crisis of 2008.95 Economic principles and models are (still) the driving 
forces in the organization of the human environment today. It is the economy 
that rules the city, an economical approach that drives the promotion of security, 
privacy, investment, efficiency, and entertainment in political issues, in private 
concern, and specifically in all questions concerning space.
Postmodernity as a rejection of the societal relevance of cultural artefacts and 
simultaneously a vehicle of consumer culture, has had an enormous impact on the 
city and the countryside. As Jameson, in an almost dazzling rhythm, writes: 
‘at some point following World War Two a new kind of society began to 
emerge (variously described as post-industrial, multinational capitalism, 
consumer society, media society and so forth). New types of consumption; 
planned obsolescence; an ever more rapid rhythm of fashion and styling 
changes; the penetration of advertising, television and the media generally to 
a hitherto unparalleled degree throughout society; the replacement of the old 
tension between city and country, center and province, by the suburb and by 
universal standardization; the growth of the great networks of superhighways 
and the arrival of automobile culture – these are some of the features which 
would seem to mark a radical break with that older pre-war society in which 
high modernism was still an underground force. I believe that the emergence 
of postmodernism is closely related to the emergence of this new moment of 
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late consumer or multinational capitalism. I believe that its formal features in 
many ways express the deeper logic of this particular social system.’96
The postmodern approach to the city has changed the urban environment 
drastically, in a manner remarkably comparable to the modern approach: it 
propelled both the cleaning of the landscape and the simultaneous destruction 
of ‘heterotopias’ – a term coined by the aforementioned French philosopher 
Michael Foucault to render the rare, vague, elusive, and distinct spaces of 
otherness.97 Simultaneously, it also established a wide range of enclaves in the 
urban landscape: ‘postmodern hyperspaces’ that are ‘worlds in itself, total spaces, 
comprised miniature cities.’ Both developments, in turn, threatened the unifying 
nature of the urban structure, its binding together of urban fragments into the 
urban territory of the ‘city’, in the classical meaning of the term. Postmodernity 
on the level of the urban environment thus causes the loss of spatial coherence, 
the loss of nearness, the loss of a larger social community – the loss of the very 
narrative of cities themselves.98 The initial ‘fragmentation of cultural products’, 
Jameson writes, is simply the ‘foreshadow of deeper and general tendencies in 
social life as a whole.’99 In late capitalist culture, in which economy has turned 
towards highly flexible modes of capital accumulation, society is dominated by 
capitalist approach, an ‘exchange society’ of commodities, services, and images, 
where consumption is linked with the production of highly individual and mainly 
temporal images and identities, everything is understood as commodity or image 
and there is no room outside the (financial) market. Everything is seen in terms 
of competition and rivalry – even in the built environment the accumulation of 
capital has turned into the driving force behind development, change, transforma-
tion, and decline. Neighbourhoods, shopping malls, business districts, recreation 
zones, theme parks, and university campuses need to compete, to be splendid in 
order to attract attention. Better said, in order to attract consumers and increase 
the market value of the area, the edifice, the commodities, the consumer goods. 
Every single part produces signs, images, and identities. In this process all spatial 
hierarchy and social homogeneity is lost. The city makes tangible the emerging 
social distinctions conferred by possessions and appearances. The city, consisting 
of competing parts, falls apart into distinct worlds. This is also what Mike Davis 
sees: the city falling apart, both spatially as socially. ‘The old liberal attempts’, 
writes Davis, ‘at social control, which at least tried to balance repression with 
reform, have been superseded by open warfare that pits the interests of the 
middle class against the welfare of the urban poor.’100 A warfare that can be seen 
as a limitless process of exaggerating the edges through militant interventions, 
intended to protect the individual particularity, properties, possessions, and 
surely also perception from the threat of the ‘other’ out there.101 Davis even states 
that this ‘militarization’ of the urban landscapes ‘has supplanted hopes for urban 
reform and social integration.’102 And adds, ‘We do indeed now live in “fortress 
cities” brutally divided into “fortified cells of affluence” and “places of terror” 
where police battle the criminalized poor.’103 This is literally the ‘hard edge of 
postmodernity.’ 
Back to the analysis of Beck and Giddens: at the heart of the ‘risk society’, which 
depends extensively on the experience of postmodernity, is the strive to exclude 
risks, almost at all costs and with all means, both at the level of the individual 
human being and of the collective structures.104 As the sociologists emphasize, 
this is mainly a question of who is in control: who decides what kind of risks are 
reasonable to whom, at which costs, and who is responsible in cases of actual 
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catastrophe.105 The increase of enclaves like The Retreat, the increase of Neigh-
bourhood Watches within these enclaves, the increase of private camera surveil-
lance watching over individual property, are all signs of a distrust in public, 
collective, and social structures in this respect. Large groups of citizens feel the 
need to protect themselves and their properties, even with ultimate means.106 ‘The 
old liberal attempts at social control,’ Davis also states in the quote we touched 
upon previously, ‘which at least tried to balance repression with reform, have 
been superseded by open warfare that pits the interests of the middle class against 
the welfare of the urban poor.’ Beck thus confirms Davis’ analysis through a 
comparison between contemporary society and the previous ‘industrial society’.107 
The ‘risk society’, according to Beck, is less concerned with the distribution of 
wealth, as was the case in former forms of society, in favour of the distribution of 
risks. In other words, societal concern has moved from the ‘distribution of goods’ 
towards the ‘distribution of bads’.108 Gated communities can thus be seen as a 
spatial manifestation of the contemporary battle to secure ones own environment 
through the exclusion of ‘bads’ – better said, by excluding the probable ‘bad guys’. 
The narrative of the gated community is a distrust in strangers and an eagerness 
to exclude the living environment from otherness, in order to secure both family 
life and individual property.109 One Retreat next to another, distinguished by 
their surrounding walls, create ‘safe’ worlds on their own. The experience of 
a lack of control over what the future may bring does not lead to ‘adaptation’ 
to uncertainty, but, on the contrary, evolves into a new form of ‘survival of the 
fittest’ through eagerness to control personal space and time. The Martin Case, as 
well as other spatial examples presented by Davis within the Los Angeles urban 
landscape, literally show this city of rivalry. 
As stated above, the emphasis on safety and the re-distribution of risks has conse-
quences beyond the single neighbourhood and living areas of the happy few: 
it also impacts the space that is in-between these communities, the ‘out there’. 
The emergence of enclaves changes the city itself: its appearance, the concrete 
planning of physical spaces and objects, the materialization of the city-fabric and 
neighbourhood patterns, the layout of streets and the design of public spaces, 
the mutual interdependence of the parts. That which is in between, regularly 
understood as ‘public space’, is rendered as dangerous. In order to avoid these 
threatening (public) areas, one even can download smartphone apps, Microsoft’s 
‘Avoid Ghetto App’ for instance, which gives a warning on entering a no-go area.110 
Or the ‘Offender Locater’, an app that searches through state-run websites in 
order to find sexual offenders (the app will alert the user if a offender moves 
nearby).111 In other words, public space has lost the power of the production of 
community, of creating citizenship – it has lost the quality of creating a larger 
narrative that is able to bind the distinct parts together.112 This leads to the end 
of the city as a coherent spatial and social community. What is lost is the larger 
structure that binds distinct neighbourhoods together and gathers citizens in 
public space. As Marshall Berman writes: ‘The eclipse if the problem of modernity 
in the 1970s has meant the destruction of a vital form of public space. It has 
hastened the disintegration of our world into an aggregation of private material 
and spiritual interest groups living in windowless monads, far more isolated than 
we need to be.’113 
The Martin Case, with Zimmerman as the central figure, is the sad actuality of 
this narrative of the city falling apart through radical struggles, through a process 
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of anxiousness, through new forms of the distribution of risks informing actual 
politics, through a vanishing belief in the community, increasing distrust in the 
public, and the loss of (bodily) experience of inhabiting a common world.114 This is 
what Davis shows as well: an expanded paranoia that immediately reveals the fatal 
consequences of an emphasis on safety and security, of protection and control. 
Moreover, it shows the double failure of such secured urban environments: the 
search for a safe environment turns into a dangerous quest in itself. The negative 
spiral of fear shaping the everyday living environment is characterized by even 
greater interventions in daily life, privacy and the freedom to live life personally.115 
In the case of the gated community: it starts with the wall with controllable gates. 
Soon camera control will be added. If possible, it will be expanded further with 
guards and Neighbourhood Watches. Some communities now have armed police 
guarding, 24/7 control, and are screening and balloting new residents. The race 
for safety is thus never over, and will again and again request new interventions, 
new ways of excluding the strange, distinct and threatening, since it is fuelled 
by every accident and every proposition for new facilities to secure, every new 
provisions to protect. But no matter how many barriers and layers of protection 
are being erected, riskless life is an illusion, even in a world that has lost public 
space. The aim to secure public space is utopian:116 slowly but surely it will turn 
into the dystopian figure of totalitarian control. Only ‘totalitarian’ structures – 
be it political, commercial, or technical – are able to secure the environment, 
solely by excluding the very publicness of the world.117 Moreover, the (visual) 
interventions in public space fuel the feeling and the experience of insecurity by 
the inhabitants, visitors, and users, which in turn requests new interventions. 
Therefore, in a society where fear shapes the urban environment, public space is 
both in ‘danger’ and ‘dangerous’, it is threatened as well as a critical notion.
2.2.4  On the Public
Here we arrive at the third perspective that we need to address before continuing 
our journey in the urbanised landscape around Sandford, FL. Clearly the events 
of 9/11 have had a propelling impact on the reflections upon public space, as 
the urban sociologists Neil Smith and Setha Low write in their The Politics of 
Public Space: ‘From city parks to public streets, cable and network news shows 
to Internet blog sites, the clampdown on public space, in the name of enforcing 
public safety and homeland security, has been dramatic.’118 This ‘clampdown’, due 
to anti terrorist policies, the ‘far reaching effects of the U.S. Patriot Act and related 
legislation’, became highly visible and tangible in ‘multiple closures, erasures, 
inundations, and transfigurations of public space’, initiated by both the ‘state 
and corporate strategies’.119 Although 9/11 has propelled this ‘clampdown’, this 
is not a new attitude towards public space, as seen above. Smith and Low frame 
this attitude from a neoliberal political perspective, very influential in the United 
States since the eighties, but finding its roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century works of Adam Smith and John Locke. Regarding public space, their 
stress on private property is of particular importance. This articulation of private 
property challenged the traditional figure of the commons,120 common land within 
the community to be used publicly. These commons were not always owned 
by the collective but could also be owned privately – the collective neverthe-
less were allowed access or even rights of use. At the basis of Smith and Locke, 
however, private property was understood as a ‘natural right’, which gave the 
owners arguments against the access and use of their properties by others. These 
changes greatly influenced the envisioning of the collective, even propelling a 
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new understanding of the common good: own interests and private property 
were understood as the pillar beneath the common good and the interests of 
the collective (and particularly the marketplace).121 This new, liberal perspective 
opened up the aim of security, not only as mode for securing private property, but 
for securing the marketplace itself. The ‘two preoccupations’ of Western society 
today that impact on public space, defined by the urban sociologist Sharon Zukin 
as security and shopping, promote this perspective. Through her investigation of 
shopping, it becomes immediately clear that contemporary consumption culture 
has incorporated aspects of fear. ‘Public parks,’ she writes, ‘that are now managed 
by private conservancies and shopping areas that are governed by Business 
Improvement Districts do enjoy cleaner streets and greater public safety. But 
we pay a steep price for these comforts, for they depend on forces we cannot 
control – private business associations, the police bureaucracy, and security guard 
companies – signalling that we are ready to give up on our unruly democracy.’122 
Consumption, in other words, requires governance of consumerist spaces; the 
spaces of consumption need to be controlled. Consumption will only flourish in 
spaces that are clean, smooth, comfortable, and secure. The consumer culture 
flourishes by controlling the public, both in its assembly as in its behaviour. It 
is thus shopping and security, fun and fear, those two vast aspects of contempo-
rary life, that are both shaping the city and impacting daily life, simultaneously 
understood by many theorists, as threats in respect to ‘public space’.123 
The term ‘public’, and its immediate counterpart private, differs from discourse to 
discourse. The different uses in daily language come to the fore in the discussion 
on safety in contemporary Western society. Take the debate that is roused by the 
exposing of the practices of the NSA, the American National Security Agency, by 
former employee Edward Snowden.124 The practices of this American govern-
mental organization are discussed immediately in terms of ‘public’ and ‘private’: 
a public institution investigating the actions of the inhabitants. This gathering of 
knowledge and information about inhabitants in order to control or predict their 
future actions, rouses immediate qualifications like ‘totalitarian’ or ‘dictatorial’. 
‘1984 has become true’, people refer to the famous title of George Orwell’s novel 
on state control. Big Brother is Watching You! The debate rightly questions not 
only the contemporary possibility of collecting telephone call logs, but for actual 
eavesdropping, saving and researching social-media data, hacking phones, 
collecting information about internet use, and opening the e-mails of a broad 
range of individuals. It raises the question of how legal it is for the (democratic) 
state to survey its inhabitants, and to what extent they can intervene in the 
private sphere of the individual. Should the state not respect the ‘privacy’ of its 
inhabitants, critics question? While the state – here, the then president Obama – 
defends the NSA with the argument that ‘modest encroachments on privacy’ were 
‘worth us doing’ to protect the country.125 I specifically use the term ‘defend’, since 
that is what happens. The government needs to defend itself and its practices 
vis-à-vis ‘the public’. The subsequent public is divided in this case – most people 
do not mind (I don’t have to hide something, let them see!), while a select group 
(often journalists and activists) strongly questions these practices for the sake 
of privacy. It might be not ‘the’ public, but still ‘a’ public that urges the ‘state’ to 
respond and through their writings, questioning, and voting, enforce the state to 
at least be careful in their aims and actions.  
The Snowden-case is just another example of the aim of safety affecting public 
space. The activities of the NSA are driven by their search to secure the safety of 
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the country: so that the inhabitants can live safely in their homes, feel secure on 
their work, in the playground, the mall, and so on. These are regular expectations 
of the state. However, the same gesture threatens the very ‘freedom’ of the public 
by the aim to control public space, which means not just the freedom of use and 
movement, but also of behaviour, action, and even of thought. 
Actually, even this short but exemplary case shows at least three different uses 
of the term ‘public’ in everyday language, all explicitly or implicitly connected 
to ideas upon the political realm. It shows that ‘public’ and ‘private’ are terms 
that are essentially political, and in that sense are essential ‘to a full under-
standing of the human condition,’ as the British philosopher Roger Scruton 
writes.126 The example started with the idea of a ‘public institution’ investigating 
the actions of inhabitants in their ‘private lives’. From this perspective, the term 
thus addresses the government and its services as that which the inhabitants – 
that is, private individuals – share. The state is thus seen as a ‘public authority’: 
who serve the inhabitants regardless of position, location or background. These 
‘private’ individuals, in turn, collectively form a public (not: the public, as I will 
discuss later) that are somehow able to agree, oppose or to accuse the state (and 
the market) and its behaviour. In the third, and final, part of the example, it 
is again the state versus the individual, but now the state in a ‘repressive’ and 
controlling role over what may be done ‘in public’, intervening in public life 
through scrupulous investigation of behaviour and convictions (specifically: their 
relationship). 
These three different conceptions of what ‘public’ and ‘private’ might be, 
at least show that an idea of the public is a relative term, since it cannot exist 
without its opposing term. Public and private are interdependent, a dichotomy, 
political theorist Jeff Weintraub states in an article in which he discusses four 
different conceptions of the public/private distinction.127 He even calls it the 
‘grand dichotomy’ of Western thinking, although it is better to call it a ‘relative 
dichotomy’, particularly when it comes up to physical spaces. The public and 
private indeed might be two interdependent entities, but their edge is rather 
blurred in our everyday experience. Within the urban fabric or suburban neigh-
bourhoods, it is sometimes impossible to grasp what is actually public or private 
(space). Public and private are essentially a continuum, as the Dutch sociologist 
Abram de Swaan writes: ‘this space cannot be reduced to binary oppositions… The 
spectrum of reduced public accessibility runs from the street to the department 
store (where you can wander without being accosted), from there to the waiting 
rooms at stations, institutions and bank branches, and on to the shop (where 
the question “do you need help?” forces you to explain your presence among the 
shelves), the reception area’s in offices, and then to the consultation rooms of 
doctors and lawyers, and finally the residential home, the most private space.’128 
If we indeed stick to the perspective of the city and actual spaces, what is called 
public and what is rendered private is ambiguous, and it changes from time to 
time. This fluidity also affects not only the edge between these two entities, but 
also the very meaning of the entities themselves. There is no definition that once 
and for all describes what is meant with public on the one hand and private 
space on the other. It depends on what kind of perspective is inhibited: it can be 
understood along the lines of property, along the lines of accessibility, of politics 
and issues of laws and rights, prohibitions and offerings, of possibilities to be seen 
and heard (as is the case in Arendt’s definition, as we will see), of the will to share 
or to capture. All these perspectives will change and have been changing over 
time, between (sub)cultures, and societies, between ideologies and (scientific) 
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fields. In each of these different fields, the terms inhibit distinctive values, but 
nevertheless, as Weintraub states, render again and again two fundamentally 
opposing values: the multitude versus the singular, what belongs to the collective 
versus what affects individual interests, and what is open versus what is hidden.129 
As the complexity that came to light in the Snowden-case reveals, besides the 
mutually dependent relationship of the terms public and private, there is also the 
simultaneous existence of contradictory perspectives and interpretations through 
a differentiated frame of values. Inhabitants are simultaneously public and 
private people, and the state simultaneously represents the public as well as being 
countered by the public. Weintraub has managed to draw a line through these 
different aspects by showing four different fields of attention in which the public/
private distinction is prominent, which are important to briefly introduce here.
The first public/private distinction Weintraub introduces is the liberal economic 
perspective which uses terms such as ‘public sector’ versus the ‘private sector’. 
Private sector in this case represents the market, whereas the public sector offers 
‘public goods’, goods that ‘the public’ understands as prerequisite for the good life 
of the collective: public transport, supply of gas, water and electricity, telephone 
and post services, schools and hospitals. The public/private distinction here 
means the distinction between governmental and non-governmental organization, 
as well as between the state and the individual. Individuals are understood to 
pursue their self interest freely, voluntary, and efficiently, while the state organizes 
the framework within which the good life can be lived.130 
A second perspective Weintraub distinguishes comes to light in the movement 
of feminism. Whereas in the other distinctions the public is dominant, in this 
perspective the domestic or private is the starting point. In feminism, the private 
is understood as the realm of the family, the domestic sphere. In this perspective 
obviously gender distinctions play a role: it challenges the traditional concept of 
the private realm as the sphere of women and children, as well as emphasizing 
this as unacceptable. This not only is challenged vis-à-vis the limited and inferior 
role of women, as the name suggests, but also emphasizes other homebound 
problems: child-abuse, and violence – all the things that remain hidden within 
the walls of the home.131  What therefore becomes absolutely clear in feminist 
theory, as well as in everyday language around this topic, is the connotation 
that is inherent to the term ‘private’: ‘to be deprived’ of ‘participation’ in public, 
where the public renders the realm of possibilities – the possibilities to freely 
fulfil the personal ‘pursuit of happiness’, specifically by developing a career.132 As 
Weintraub states: in this perspective ‘the market economy has migrated from the 
heart of the “private sector” to the heart of the “public realm”.’133 
These two first distinctions between public and private already show the 
ambiguity of the terms: in everyday language often the terms are unconsciously 
mixed. What is understood as the public changes from context to context – and 
even the valuation of public and private changes. In the Snowden case the public 
threatens the private, that is: the public eye threatens personal freedom, whereas 
in feminism the private is literally privative, it limits the freedom of those bound 
to the domestic sphere. This layered-ness – or ambiguity – becomes even more 
tangible and visible in the two other distinctions that Weintraub makes, and that 
are – in intertwined ways – the concern of architectural theory regarding public 
space, and, as such, have been prominent in my writings so far. Firstly, Weintraub 
distinguishes the model of citizenship as it is rooted in the Greek and Roman 
polis: active participation of ‘equals’ in public matters and collective decision 
making. Public in this perspective means ‘political’, that is ‘a world of discussion, 
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debate, deliberation, collective decision making, and action in concert’ within a 
particular community.134 Private in this perspective also means to be deprived 
from this public conversation, deprived from the presence of ‘others’. As we 
will see in Chapter 4, this is the category that Hannah Arendt has explored in 
her writings. The question that I thus will stress, particularly in Chapter Five, is 
how this relates to the final category that Weintraub distinguishes, which is the 
concrete realm of urban public spaces. 
Weintraub describes his final distinction as the sphere of sociability This 
most concretely refers to urban public spaces, and specifically to what happens 
in these spaces. Public space, in this perspective, is by definition related to urban 
environments: only the city offers space that is clearly circumscribed, that offerers 
possibilities of different uses, discovery and appropriation. Spaces that, in other 
words, give room to truly public life, in all its visibility that makes the public life 
also tangible to outsiders, spectators, strangers.135 Public life here is understood 
as contradictory to domestic life, which is hidden. Note that Weintraub does not 
address the property-question. This distinction is not so much about ownership, 
but about accessibility and visibility. 
What architectural and urban theory has addressed so far mainly stresses the 
latter two distinctions, that I have also stated as the challenge of my own reading 
of the writings of Arendt, to be investigated in Chapter 5. Political gatherings 
need public space and their capacity for social gatherings. The political will only 
have its proper meaning and achieve its full potential when embedded in the 
wide range of public life in everyday spaces. But before I address this challenge, 
let us briefly point to the regular narrative within architectural and urban theory, 
which actually does not so much grasp back to the model of citizenship as distin-
guished by Weintraub, but to the Public Sphere as it comes into being during 
the 18th century. The term Public Sphere is a term that immediately is linked 
to the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, specifically due to his 1962 book 
Der	Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit, published in English in 1989 as The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.136 In Chapter Five I will stress 
the perspective Habermas develops, and compare it to Arendt’s perspective, who 
indeed grasps back to the political gatherings in the Greek and Roman Polis. For 
no I will briefly discuss Habermas’s point, as I assume that his view in particular 
has influenced the reflection upon actual urban developments. 
Habermas understands the public sphere as ‘a forum in which private people 
come together to form a public, readied themselves to compel public authority to 
legitimate itself before public opinion.’137 Habermas originates this description 
upon ‘new’ public spaces of the 18th and 19th century cities: the salon (in France 
and German), the coffeehouse (in Britain), the café (in France), where the 
newly found class of the bourgeoisie met in order to discuss the news. These 
were somehow ‘open’ meetings, which is the very meaning of the German word 
öffentlichkeit – meetings ‘in the open’, visible and even accessible to everyone. 
This ‘everyone’ should not be taken too literally in Habermas’s original examples: 
these salons, coffeehouses and cafés were quite restricted spaces. The early 
advent of modernity in the 18th and 19th century becomes tangible in the rise a 
new social class, that of the bourgeoisie. Since the Middle Ages, communities 
were organized through a feudal system, based upon kinship, which were char-
acterized by complete absence of the public sphere. Or, better said, the ruler 
themselves were the representative of the public sphere: ‘they represent their 
power “before” the people, instead of “for” the people’.138 A long process of 
polarization, as Habermas states, broke these authorities – that is: the church, 
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princes and the nobility – apart. Through modernity, as it became tangible in 
the reformation and the Enlightenment, the relationship between the authorities 
and the ‘public’ changed drastically. The position of the church changed with the 
reformation, the economical system with the advent of the stock exchange, the 
position of princes and nobility with the revolutions, while society was charac-
terized simultaneously by an increasing awareness of and attentiveness to the 
self, as a private individual. This change is mostly described as individualization, 
fragmentation, differentiation and rationalization, the eroding of an existing and 
historically rooted community of people and instead an increasing emphasis on 
the individual self. Society, be it a social, religious, or family community, was 
characterized by a dense sociability and traditional patterns of rights and duties, 
expectations and restrictions. Due to modernity those forms of Gemeinschaft, as 
the German sociologist Fiedrich Tönnies calls them, were demolished. Individual 
human beings generally were no longer able to give ground to their fundamental 
principles, convictions, beliefs, views, stances, and behaviour via an authority 
outside themselves (be it tradition, the community, or God). In other words, 
modernity caused the disappearance of traditional forms of organization and a 
community of people and gave rise to new forms of societal organization. Or, to 
refer again to Fiedrich Tönnies, instead of traditional forms of Gemeinschaft, 
(community) life now had to be organized through forms of Gesellschaft (civil 
society). The difference, according to Tönnies, is that a Gemeinschaft is organized 
organically and is based on a fundamental connectedness. A Gesellschaft on 
the other hand is based on contracts and abstract rules.139 The process from 
Gemeinschaft towards Gesellschaft, of course, delivered a glance of individual 
freedom, liberation from tradition and other authorities and the possibility of 
self-realization. The Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, however, showed that 
this process also and indissoluble caused the loss of the known world, that is the 
security of a shared community, with tacit and shared opinions, as well as trusted 
social ties. The individual no longer was part of a larger social community by 
definition, but a sole entity. Belonging to a group or community became a matter 
of choice, of preferences and considerations – as everything in life has become a 
choice. Simultaneously, this involvement in a social group is temporal – as every 
involvement and engagement is understood to be temporal, since preferences can 
change, as well as needs and priorities. Bauman thus concludes that the condition 
of modern life has to be considered as a state of continuous ambivalence: the 
sole human being has to reinvent and reconsider their own self continuously. In 
this state of ambivalence, the individual needs to organize not only his own life, 
but also his connection with other people.140 Society thus changed drastically. 
Instead of Gemeinschaft based upon kinship, it turned into a Gesellschaft, based 
on contracts and abstract rules. Generally speaking, in modernity society needs 
to be much more actively defined. Its borders, its principles, its rules, its identity, 
its culture, its history, its monetary principle, its convention, the rights and 
duties of its inhabitants, even whoever can be seen as an inhabitant – all need to 
be discussed and defined, to be reified in laws and institutions. In other words: 
society needed to be organized strictly in the form of what has become known 
today as the nation state. Behind this organization lies the distinction between 
‘who’s in and who’s out’, who is seen as an inhabitant, and who is excluded from 
the rights that are applied in their inhabitants. In such a system, it is the ‘nation’ 
that connects the people, although this connection is organized via a ‘contract’.141 
As Bauman stresses, this contract never comforts the individual: instead, this new 
situation is a condition of social ambivalence. Although the nation state delivers 
rights to its inhabitants,142 the society that develops within this state causes the 
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ambiguity. Within modern society, the role of the individual is never clear and 
stable, not only as every human being is in a continuous process of self-definition, 
but also as the social realm itself is in an ongoing process of organization and 
regorganization. However, in spite of engaging with ambivalence, society tends 
to exterminate every ambiguity. According to Bauman this aim of exterminating 
ambivalence should be understood as a ‘typically modern practice, the substance 
of modern politics, of modern intellect, of modern life’,143 which become tangible 
in the eagerness to secure space and ensure life, the emphasis on security and 
predictability as we touched upon before. 
However – one step back in time – what Habermas traces in his investi-
gation is the advent of a new social class of the bourgeoisie in the 18th and 19th 
century. He specifically emphasises the advent of the stock exchange as a crucial 
development in this respect. This new economic system led to the development 
of trading organizations that slowly but surely gained political power. In other 
words, the emerging capital organization of society, that replaced the feudal 
system, gave room to two ‘institutions’ that were in control: the state and the 
dominant economical class. As capitalism developed, a new – bourgeois – class 
of doctors, lawyers and scholars emerged, which in the end established another 
realm of political power, in-between the state and the market, the public 
sphere – a realm of debate and rational reasoning, of developing öffentliche	
Meinung, public opinion, formally and informally affecting the organization of 
society. Increasing welfare enabled this new class to spend free time in coffee-
houses, organizing salons, and other opportunities to discuss and debate. This 
development created room for the ‘recovery’ of the notions of citizenship and 
sovereignty as they originally sprang from the Greek and Roman organization of 
the city-states and empire. Over time, these notions have become institutional-
ized in general laws and institutions. One of the terms that is developed vis-à-vis 
these terms is the idea of a Civil Society, particularly addressed in the works of 
the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who render it as ‘the social world 
of self-interested individualism, competition, impersonality, and contractual 
relationships – centered on the market’.144 It is in response to this liberal idea 
of the private market and the free individual that ‘sovereignty’ also gets its new 
meaning in the advent of the state as an administrative authority. Somehow, 
that which can be understood as ‘public life’, the meetings in the coffeehouses 
and salons, fuelled the consciousness of the public as being citizens – a public – 
that powerfully opposed the state and its administrative function, as well as the 
market and its ‘free’ trade.145 The public increasingly understood its sovereignty, 
not to be captured in the relationship between state and inhabitant or between 
market and consumer. The public sphere in this respect was understood as 
‘above all a realm of participatory self-determination, deliberation, and conscious 
cooperation among equals.’146 Or as Haberas writes: ‘the bourgeois public realm 
may be conceived above all as the realm of private people who come together as 
a public; they soon claimed the public realm regulated from above against the 
public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privatised but publicly relevant realm of 
commodity exchange and social labor.’147 
As Habermas makes clear, this both depends upon the emerging of the 
bourgeoisie, specifically by members of that class free to enter these spaces and 
spend their time in these discussions – free to participate in public, to act as a 
participating citizen. They were ‘free from the necessities of life’, so to say – freed 
from the care about their livelihood, property and family. The public sphere 
secondly depended upon the development of the press, newspapers and novels, 
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that recorded these discussions, delivering them into a shared knowledge. Only 
upon the basis of this common knowledge could the public sphere as a forum 
occur and survive. The importance of this public sphere, as emphasized by 
Habermas, is that it established a third mode of societal integration – or better 
said: a possibility of societal integration – in between the spheres of both the state 
and the market economy. 
The explanation of Habermas’ idea of the public sphere by the Canadian 
philosopher Charles Taylor helps increase an understanding of the myriad forms 
and structure of public spaces. Taylor understands Habermas’ public sphere as 
a meta-space, a space transcending all different local spaces that are turned into 
common spaces through meetings and debates, through gatherings and rituals, 
through events and happenings. These actual meetings somehow construct a 
‘common perspective’, ‘collective will’ or ‘public opinion’ that thus can be seen 
as a third perspective in-between the state and the market: not emerging from 
the perspective of the government, nor from the perspective of the economy, but 
through local encounters between citizens. This common perspective, this ‘public 
opinion’, significantly contributes to the larger debate on the common good and 
the future of society.148 Although these public debates initially were only attended 
by a narrow segment of the population – a bourgeois public that was able to read, 
to visit libraries and to gather in cafés in order to discuss political matters – over 
the years the public sphere expanded to include more and more participants. 
The emerging printed media was not only important in delivering the actualities 
that needed to be discussed and debated, it also helped to spread the opinion 
of the beourgeois class to the general public, as well as elevating local debate 
and opinion to the meta-level of the public sphere. According to Habermas, this 
public sphere was ‘without historical precedent’: it was based on ‘people’s public 
use of their reason’.149 Habermas concludes that this new ‘public sphere’ is to 
be seen as an essential aspect of both the freedom of inhabitants and the new 
democratic character of politics: status no longer determined by decisions but 
through rational debate and arguments. This public body, however, could only be 
developed through the tangible space of the coffee house, salon and table societies 
organized in one or other sitting room, through concrete meetings, as well as 
through the possibility of spreading news through newspapers. It is through actual 
meeting and discussion in public space that public ‘opinion’ developed. In this 
perspective the public sphere thus is understood as a touchstone in respect to the 
democratic system and the freedom of the people.
Habermas actually was only indirectly concerned with actual political organiza-
tion. Moreover, his emphasis on the public sphere develops the public sphere as 
a counter-active public ‘body’ in between the state and the market, in-between 
the power of the rulers and that of the economics. This image of the single body 
is criticized at length.150 Nevertheless, this emphasis on the tripartite distinction 
between the state, the market and the public emphasizes the ‘power’ aspect of 
this ‘public sphere’. Only as a collective can the public resist the powerful forces 
of the market and the state. As Habermas concludes, this new ‘public sphere’ 
is to be seen as an essential aspect of both the freedom of inhabitants and the 
new democratic character of politics. When the public body begets an important 
and powerful voice, preconceived positions or kinship can no longer completely 
inform the decisions of the state and the organization of the market. Moreover, 
this public body is not just a gathering of public, the public ‘body’ only emerges 
through discussion on what is read in the paper in public space – in these same 
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salons, coffeehouses and table societies. This position in-between market and 
state immediately raises questions regarding the very idea of the ‘public’ – what I 
call here the ‘public body’. 
The last distinction made by Weintraub, brings the discourse on the public as 
close as possible to tangible space, the social gatherings in public space. When 
this category is understood as what happens in public space, one may define 
public space as planned and – more emblematically – unplanned encounters, 
specifically between the unknown, as seen previously in the reading of Jan Gehl.151 
What happens in the public sphere then, described by Weintraub as ‘participatory 
action’, in the process of decision-making presented by Habermas as the figure 
of ‘public opinion’, is thus interrelated to this image of public life. The danger, 
however, is to understand the last category as meaningful only when it contributes 
to the previous one: to see public space only through the political perspective. To 
urge public space as only ‘public’ when, literally, political processes can take place: 
demonstrations, discussions and debates, an exchange of ideas and convictions. 
The image of public space is on the contrary linked to everyday life: an image no 
better visualised than by the well known urban activist Jane Jacobs and what she 
calls the ‘intricate ballet’ of the sidewalk. Public life, in this sense, emphasizes 
what actually happens in the public space of the street, the park and the plaza, as 
well as in the bar and café.152 
Nevertheless, as we will see, this political ideal fuels most readings within 
urban and architectural theory. This is, after all, what can easily be understood as 
the ‘democratic’ value of public space (particularly facing a multicultural society): 
offering room to and even actively gathering people regardless background, 
conviction, race, sexual orientation, and so on. This democratic space can then 
be understood as an unrestricted environment, ‘freely accessible for everyone’.153 
Through this accessibility and sheer diversity, it teaches the basics of democracy: 
living and working together with differences.154 Public space, in other words, 
gives room or even express diversity: it can generate solidarity, or at least 
make diversity ‘manageable’.155 In this picture, the possibility for ‘strangers’ to 
enter a particular space is essential: someone or something unknown or unac-
quainted.156 This is often stressed as a particularly urban perspective: strangers 
depend on urban environments as much as urbanity depends upon strangers.157 
This perspective, how urban public space and the public sphere are thus related, 
seems to be rather clear. As the urban sociologist Lyn Lofland writes in her book 
The Public Realm (instead of public sphere, she uses public realm to describe 
that democratic ideal): ‘The public realm is made up of those spaces in a city 
which tend to be inhabited by persons who are stranger to one another or who 
“know” one another only in terms of occupational or other not personal identity 
categories’, adding, ‘in the city, when one leaves private space, one moves into a 
world of many unknown or only categorically known others, … many of whom 
may not share one’s values, history, or perspective’.158 The Dutch sociologists 
Maarten Hajer and Arnold Reijndorp support this perspective by introducing the 
notion of the proverbial ‘other’. The public domain, they write (again introducing 
another term to describe the same issue), ‘is the sphere where we encounter the 
proverbial “other” and where we must relate to “other” behaviour, other ideas 
and other preferences.’159 In the very first pages of their book In Search of a New 
Public Domain, they admit that they ‘tend to think that the public space fulfils an 
important role in increasing the ‘social cohesion’ in society’,160 and thus is able to 
bring different social groups in proximity, nearness. ‘We define “public domain”’, 
they write, ‘as those places where an exchange between different social groups is 
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possible and also actually occurs’.161 
The actual meeting of the proverbial other is important in two ways. Firstly, 
it is only through such confrontation in ‘public’ that, for instance, ‘homeless 
people or other marginalized groups remain visible’, as urban sociologist Don 
Mittchel writes. ‘Only in public spaces can the homeless for example represent 
themselves as a legitimate part of “the public”’.162 Secondly, it is through exchange, 
through the confrontation with other perspectives, worldviews, approaches, 
behaviour and appearances, that our own stances and beliefs are questioned, 
they state. Exchange between people is thus essentially seen as the probability 
of (ex)changing minds and thus an awareness of the very locality of specific 
ideas, convictions, beliefs, views and opinions. The addition of the notion of the 
‘proverbial other’ by Hajer and Reijndorp to the very idea of the public sphere is 
remarkable, since it reveals that the public domain – in their terms – is always the 
opposite of a sophisticated, calm and peaceful space. Through this meeting with 
the ‘other’, the individual is questioned, even criticized, at every inch. The public 
sphere, in other words, is the possibility to be questioned and criticized. This 
means that public space gives room to the ‘battle of meanings’ that needs to be 
fought out in society.163 Public space urges the visitors (or better said: participant) 
to take a position vis-à-vis what is met in public. The city, as the sociologist 
Richard Sennett argues, has an educational aim. ‘The value of witnessing both 
difficulty and diversity’, he writes about the Classical Greek city-state, ‘was 
thought to be that through exposure to the world the individual gradually found 
his or her orientation, found how to keep a balance. … A city ought to be a school 
for leaning how to lead a centered life. Through exposure to others, we might 
learn how to weigh what is important and what is not. We need to see differences 
on the streets or in other people neither as threats nor as sentimental invitations, 
rather as necessary visions. They are necessary for us to learn how to navigate life 
with balance, both individually and collectively’.164
In other words: the public sphere is often understood as an urban perspective, 
bound to the city, its public spaces, and its diversity. It is regarded as pivotal to 
the realm of politics and decision-making, as well as offering social cohesion in 
societies that are essentially plural, as well as personal, since the individual is 
challenged through the meeting of sheer otherness, not to forget the marginalized, 
the poor, the homeless, the stranger, the refugee, the distinct. This public sphere 
therefore is not established through shared beliefs and convictions, nor through a 
single ruler (being a single man or a party), neither through kinship, but through 
the actual gathering and meeting of people and exchange in space between the 
different groups that inhibit the society.165 As we will see, and as may already be 
clear, in a city that is dispersed and scattered, this perspective on public spaces as 
part of the public sphere is highly challenged. Fear – the perspective developed 
by Mike Davis, and which opened up this debate on public spaces for us – reifies 
anxiousness for ‘public space’, since these public spaces play host to the stranger, 
to the unknown, the alien. What is rare, distinct or strange is threatening. Fear, 
therefore, as a leading principle of city planning, aims to reduce the free accessi-
bility of space and increase control on both who is able to enter and what one is 
able to do in ‘public’ space, in order to give room to a group of ‘generic’ citizens – 
whoever that might be.
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2.2.5  A North American Question
It is very important – and this is the fourth and last aspect that I need to address 
before we actually start our journey around The Retreat – to note that it is a 
Northern American perspective that dominates the contemporary debate on (the 
decay of) cities, urbanity, and public space. That of course is understandable: it 
is about gated communities, shopping malls, theme parks, as we already have 
seen, ‘new’ suburban typologies that can now be found all over the world, but 
have their origins and can be seen most commonly in the United States. This 
Northern American perspective, also hovers over the debate on the political 
perspectives. We can argue that the domination of this perspective is interrelated 
with the transformation of the actual landscape, cities, and neighbourhoods 
of Northern America. As the aforementioned urban sociologist David Harvey 
argues, the physicality of urban public space and the political realm of the public 
sphere are interrelated, even dependent on each other. ‘We do not, after all’, he 
writes, ‘experience the city blankly, and much of what we do absorb from daily 
life in the city (be it the long drag of the commute, the jostle of subway crowds, 
the blandness of the shopping mall, the elegance or grandeur of certain forms of 
urban architecture, the panhandlers on the sidewalk, or the peace and beauty of 
an urban park) surely has some kind of influence on how we are situated in the 
world and how we think and act politically within it’.166
Without doubt the changes to the Northern American urban environment, 
the decline of downtown and the vast suburbanistion of the landscape, can be 
categorized as paradigmatic. As many theorists emphasize, this transformation 
depends on the specific accessibility of the American landscape and society for 
the neo-liberal worldview, as is stressed in the perspective of Setha Low and Neil 
Smith, which moreover turned out to be fertile soil for the postmodern dynamism 
of late capitalism. The American urban environment has changed sharply, visibly, 
and tangibly – first with the shiny artefacts of economic welfare and prosperity, 
and then with the reverse due to the crisis: the shrinking neighbourhoods and 
cities with their abandoned houses and vacant lots, and urban districts that are 
acknowledged as no-go-areas. Of course, these contemporary kinds of (new) 
urban types are not limited to the United States and Canada, but can be found 
around the world, in even more radical forms, specifically in a world that earlier 
was depicted by the ‘Rise of the West’ but today is characterized by the ‘Rise 
of the Rest’.167 As Ashley Dawson, who teaches English at the City University 
of New York, but also is characterized as an urban activist, argues in his 2005 
article ‘Geography of Fear’, the rapidly growing cities of the world, the ‘global 
South’, show that ‘the model of the consumerist city’ which ‘finds its paradig-
matic expression in the zoned, gated, and sprawling cities of North America’, is 
explored abroad as well.168 Specifically, this is the case of what is rendered in the 
West as the Third World, where the incredible growth of cities settles down into 
an elusive and segregated landscape of gated communities besides slums, poverty 
near luxurious shopping malls.169 After 23 years of being the biggest shopping 
mall in the world, The West Edmonton Mall, in 2012 is now ranked number ten, 
behind malls in China, Philippines, Malaysia, Dubai and Turkey.170 However, 
although the building typology can appear to be alike, being a gated community, 
a shopping mall or an iconic landmark building, the very use and meaning can 
differ from country to country. The inhabitants of Jakarta, for instance, use a 
shopping mall in distinct ways to the ways in which roughly the same one is used 
by the Los Angeles’ inhabitants – it plays a different cultural and social role in 
daily life of distinct groups in society. Nevertheless, the sharp and radical ways 
these contemporary forms of urbanity emerge abroad sometimes show ‘the 
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underlying contents’ of the Northern American ‘society in a particularly stark 
light’.171 Specifically this is the case in the spatial development of the South African 
urban landscape, as Dawson argues. Both countries share a parallel history of 
‘foundation’, of ‘controlling the movement of its racialized populations’ and of a 
formal abolishment of apartheid during the 20th century, which nowadays seems 
to be replaced by informal practices of segregation. Securing neighbourhoods 
and public spaces from criminal threats is in both countries a leading aim in the 
development of the urban landscape.172 
Despite these comparable histories and despite the radicalized image of the 
South-African landscape compared to the Northern American landscape, another 
reason should be mentioned regarding the paradigmatic image and its domination 
of the discourse. Apart from the participation of mostly Northern American 
voices, like Dawson himself,173 it is not only the tangible changing landscape, 
but specifically the cultural, political and historical background that simultane-
ously has made the landscape accessible for the neo-liberal and the late capitalist 
approach, as well as arousing the fierce debate evoked by its very transforma-
tion. The appearance of the exterior landscape, of the world, is only accessible 
through the perspectives that are provided by culture, both literally and symbol-
ically,174 as is the case vice-versa: culture can only be understood as inhibited in 
the landscape. Landscape is formed through cultural practices – it is a product 
of a specific culture. Similarly, culture is shaped by the landscape. The particular 
context of the American landscape is first to be found in certain ‘opposition’ to the 
old continent of Europe. Symbolic to the American strive of independence, the 
historian Simon Schama writes in his book on the history of America, referring to 
the Letters from an American Farmer (1782) from French-American author Jean 
Hector st. John Crèvecoeur, is the importance of individual landownership – a 
piece of land of one own.175 The National Survey of 1785, which projected onto 
the landscape the famous American Jeffersonian grid,176 was also based on the 
ideal of the rural landowner. As the critic of the American landscape J.B. Jackson 
writes in a 1955 article on the distinction between the ‘distrust of the city’ of the 
‘Founding Father’ and the third U.S. president Thomas Jefferson and the writer 
Henry David Thoreau: ‘The National Survey of 1785 was not merely inspired 
by Jefferson, it was a clear expression of the Jeffersonian dislike of a powerful 
government, centralized in cities, and the emphasis on the small rural landowner. 
The survey permitted and even encouraged the forming of townships with the 
school section in the center, townships with their own local government; but it 
made no provision for cities.’177 This particular perspective is not at all negative 
on the political dimension of space. On the contrary, it is an almost entirely 
political imagining that is beyond the National Survey, emerging from an idea 
of freedom that was felt as opposite to the possibilities in Europe: the freedom 
of individual possession intertwined with the freedom of initiative. Although 
Jefferson changed his opposition against cities slightly during his career (he 
understood that cities were an indispensable element of American life in order 
to survive global changes), he still regarded urban environments as depriving 
citizens of human nature.178 However, this image of the ‘American Dream’ of 
the individual landowner as the origin of the process of suburbanization that 
has transformed the American landscape and today threatens public space, is 
also emphasized by Archer. ‘Already in the 1920s,’ he writes, ‘the notion of the 
American dream became melded with a very different ideal, that of the single-
family house.’179 The ‘self made man’ understood, in other words, the acquisition 
of a single-family house ‘as an instrument in respect to realize ‘the American 
dream’,180 which of course is one of the major reasons behind the rapid suburban-
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ization of the American traditional city. The American landscape is characterized 
by the individual fulfilment of the American Dream, Jackson also states.181 As the 
Crèvecoeur emphasizes, this is opposite to the possibilities of Europe, where the 
landscape is ordered and cultivated through hierarchical structures of power and 
surveillance, leaving the citizens, and even the rural landowners, with limited 
freedom. On the other hand, and this is to be seen as the other side of the coin, 
of the context that both caused this transformation and the critical approach of 
this transformation, Schama adds to the importance of individual property and 
landownership, the political implications, as highlighted by writer Crèvecoeur: 
an understanding of this small parcel of privately owned land as the smallest 
entity of democracy.182 This was also the perspective of Jefferson, according to 
Lewis Mumford ‘one of the last true figures of the Renaissance’.183 Individual 
property and private freedom, was initially understood in respect to politics, in the 
perspective of the community. To cite Jackson again: 
‘If, in terms of design, our cities are little more than extensions of a village 
grid, the village itself – except in the older parts of the country – is in turn 
little more than a fragment of the regional grid: an orderly arrangement of 
uniform lots frequently focussed about a public square with no particular 
function and unvarying dimensions. The block, whether in Chicago or New 
Paris, Iowa, remains the basic unit, and the block is nothing more than a 
specific number of independent small holdings. For all its monotony, the 
Jeffersonian design has unmistakable Utopian traits: it is in fact the blueprint 
for an agrarian equalitarian society, and it is based on the assumption that 
the landowner will be active in the democratic process. The grid system, 
as originally conceived, was thus a device for the promotion of “virtuous 
citizens.”’184 
Despite this ‘utopian’ background, the grid was also susceptible to abuse by 
speculators, which seems to be the narrative of the contemporary transforma-
tions. In other words, ‘the search of utopia [is] at the center of the American 
dream.’185
This search, however, is not so much a perspective on society, but encircles the 
private life and particularly the freedom of the individual. This also has impacts 
on the approach to (urban) planning and development of the landscape. Within 
this perspective, combined with the grid, which offers the opportunity to simply 
develop plot by plot, there is no tradition of making development plans for larger 
areas, for cities and landscapes. Every development is piecemeal, limited to the 
individual prospects and ambitions. This means that the outcome of this process 
is a pattern of seemingly unrelated developments, worlds apart. There is no 
common structure or common plan that stitches these singular developments into 
a larger whole, an entity in time, a spatial continuity.    
The changing political circumstances during the 20th century, the increase 
of land speculation causing rapid transformation of the landscape186 and the 
postmodern dynamics of capitalism, are all in increasing contrast with the ideals 
behind the (European) political and spatial realm, which was therefore fertile soil 
for the mentioned 1989 English translation of the German Philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas’ Strukturwandel	der	Öffentlichkeit. Even for those not concerned 
with the city, public space, villages, and rural areas, but rather with the political, 
economic, and social development of society, the tangible transformation of 
the – possibly their own – everyday living environment without doubt helped 
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to evoke concern about the public sphere, as recognised by Habermas. Actual 
space makes visible and tangible that which is at stake in these social realms.187 As 
Bruce Robbins, who teaches English Literature and Cultural Theory at Columbia 
University in New York, explains in the introduction to The Phantom Public 
Sphere, the translation of Habermas’ book was preceded by a number of other 
books (by intellectuals, on education) that had roughly narrated the same story: 
of ‘a quality we once had, but now have lost.’188 The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere indeed also is a story of decline. It starts, as said, with the 
emerging ‘public sphere of the bourgeoisie’ in the 18th and 19th century, due to a 
reconstitution of the private sphere as the realm of ordinary life and economic 
activity on the one hand and revolutions in the ‘world of letters’ on the others. 
This a perspective that is particularly promoted in the second part of his book, 
in which he investigates a certain ‘decay’ of the public sphere. While the public 
sphere is understood to be intrinsically interwoven with the advent of modernity 
and the rise of capitalism, it is simultaneously a notion in danger as a result of this 
modernity. The increasing number of participants – of lower social classes, with 
lower levels of education and lower cultural experiences and interests – affected 
the quality of the public debates. Civic organizations and institutions, originally 
informing and educating the public in order to ‘ready them’ before their partici-
pation in public, became interwoven with either the market or the state, and thus 
lost the independent and critical position of in-between. Later, consumerism, 
mass media, and the expansion of private space, both in reality and virtually, 
have threatened the public sphere – more or less the same forces that originated 
the public sphere are now also responsible for its decline. Undoubtedly, concern 
with the decline of public sphere was immediately linked to the changing urban 
areas. The book, therefore, was not only embraced by political theorists, but also 
investigated and incorporated by urban theorists and architectural critics who 
recognized Habermas’ concern as the narrative of contemporary public space, a 
narrative of contemporary development that threatens the very nature of public 
space. 
This also is the argument that the sociologist Richard Sennett constructs in his 
1974 book The Fall of Public Man, regarding the decline of public space. He, like 
Habermas, argues that the changing private sphere (as was the case in the 18th and 
19th century) affected the public sphere.189 He writes: 
‘The history of the words “public” and “private” is a key to understand this 
basic shift in terms of Western culture. The first recorded uses of the word 
“public” in English identify the “public” with the common good in society. … 
“Private” was used [here] to mean privileged. … By the end of the 17th century, 
the opposition of “public” and “private” was shaded more like the way the 
terms are now used. “Public meant open to the scrutiny of anyone, whereas 
“private” meant a sheltered region of life defined by one’s family and friends.’ 
… To go “out in public” … is a phrase based on society conceived in terms of 
this geography. The older senses are not entirely lost today in English, but this 
18th century usage sets up the modern terms of reference.’190 
In Sennett’s ‘history’ the coffee houses of the 18th century again play a major role. 
‘Public’, he continues, focussing on the 18th century beourgeois society, ‘came to 
mean a life passed outside the life of family and close friends; in the public region 
diverse, complex social groups were to be brought into eneluctable contact. The 
focus of this public life was the capital city’.191 In the 18th century, the capital 
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offered spaces where strangers could meet in urban parks, on streets that were 
fit for pedestrian strolling, and in coffee houses, cafes, and opera houses. The 
latter three urban spaces are even defined by Sennett as the ‘social centres’ of the 
city. Nevertheless, this also is a story of decline. The contemporary city, Sennett 
states, no longer offers such social spaces. ‘Public domain is abandoned as empty’, 
he writes, ‘On the most physical level, the environment prompts people to think 
of the public domain as meaningless.’ And: ‘the street level itself is dead space,’ 
he states in an outline analysis of the first ‘pure International School skyscraper’ 
built after world war II in New York, Gordon Bunshaft’s Lever House.192 This 
change in conception of the public domain, from a vibrant social sphere towards 
this emptiness, this abandoned realm, becomes apparent through the analysis of 
the changing city-life. The change he detects is the increasing importance of the 
private realm. In the 19th century city, the public domain became quiet, a sphere 
of ‘spectators’ in stead of ‘actors’,193 whereas in the 20th century an intimacy 
emerges in urban life, which he concludes from the strive for unity that becomes 
visible in both politics and urban planning. The search for safety in public space 
is one of the outcomes of this process: anxiety for what is distinct, odd, and 
chaotic.194 Sennett retakes this perspective in The Conscience of the Eye, in which 
he again discusses the aim of unity and wholeness regarding actual diversity, 
which is the ideal behind the Enlightenment and beyond ideals of Bildung that 
dominated the late 19th and early 20th century.195 In urbanism and architec-
ture this aim has had a major impact and has lead to more extreme forms of 
singular buildings (of which the skyscrapers of Mies van der Rohe are an sublime 
example), he writes, which further decreases the possibilities of a sympathetic 
public space, and increases the quietness of public life.196  
  
In this respect, I would argue that it is a specifically Western conception of politics 
and democracy197 and its inherent notion of the public sphere as an ethical ideal 
behind actual public space that fuels the debate, and that it is the specific history 
and situation of the changing urban environment in the United States that evokes 
this concern.198 Although both the origins of the public sphere and the theory 
of this sphere originates in the ‘old’ continent, it was absorbed and sharpened 
theoretically by the American cultural critical movement of the 1990s. Surely, 
also in the ‘old’ continent forms of ‘gated communities’, shopping malls, outlet 
centres, iconic buildings, no-go areas, have gained locations within or at the edges 
of the city. And also in a European context, the specific room for ‘otherness’ in 
public space, also understood as a defining characteristic of the public sphere, has 
diminished. Nevertheless, it is within the American discourse and context that 
the narrative of the decline of the public sphere gained its urgency.199 Generally 
speaking, the distinct ideas of ‘the good life’ between Europe and the Northern 
America’s are obvious, which brings us back to Archer and his understanding of 
suburbanization in America as the proliferation of the ‘American Dream’. Ideas 
on the ‘good life’ always depend on the valuation of the balance between private 
and public life, between private property and the political realm. Despite Jeffer-
sonian emphasis on the ‘virtuous citizens’, the contemporary image of the good 
life in Northern America is more influenced by the ideals of privacy and personal 
freedom, whereas the European perspective still – although this is increasingly 
threatened – consists of a somehow balanced approach to the private and the 
public, between the family and participation in society.200 However, due most 
probably to the echo of Jefferson, Habermas’s book gained widespread attention 
amongst political theorists in the United States, who in turn urged designers, 
theorists, architects and philosophers to rethink public space and urban 
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structures, raising issues and discussion on the loss of ideas and ideals behind 
public space in their work and explicitly connecting it to the urban environment. 
The discourse on the changing urban environment in architectural theory is 
hence a largely Western debate on the political ideas and ideals of democracy 
that lie behind public space, against a backdrop of recent changes in space. 
This discourse particularly comes to the fore in the work of Northern American 
theorists, directly related to the actual transformation of the landscape and urban 
artefacts in the United States, which, in comparison to other Western countries, 
is sharp, tangible and visible. It, finally, is characterized by a negative tone: it 
is a narrative of decline, the debate is burdened with ideology (public sphere as 
prerequisite for ‘real’ democratic politics), and the conclusion is pessimistic in 
regards to its future state. 
Thus: what about the actual urban landscape?
in the US with lesser restrictions 
than in Europe. The US, on the other 
hand, is dominated by the opposite, 
the suburban area, which more or 
less divide social groups and classes, 
instead of merging them into a public. 
However also in the contemporary 
American landscape historic sites 
become increasingly important, as 
well as the original core of cities, they 
nevertheless much more are part of a 
new ‘heritage industry’, which comes 
without the complex urbanity that 
still dominates the cities of Europe. 
Cf. Sieverts, Cities Without Cities, IX, 
XIII; and Jackson, A Sense of Place, 
a Sense of Time, 151; and Bernard 
Colenbrander, De verstrooide stad 
(Rotterdam: NAi Uitgevers, 1999), 31
200.
cf. Bauman, The Art of Life, 91
136
2.4 Historic District (Downtown) Sanford, FL.
137
2.3  IMMERSED IN THE URBAN LANDSCAPE
2.3.1  Growth – Business – Home 
The term public space and its relationship to the distinct notions of the public 
sphere, public realm, and public domain, thus has a quite specific definition, 
bringing physical space into the scope of not only urban sociologists, but also 
of political theorists. However, for a while I will suspend this definition and all 
its theoretical implications, in order to investigate the contemporary Northern 
American landscape. For now, it is enough to roughly describe public space as 
the open spaces that are regularly experienced by the public as ‘public’ – in the 
sense of not-private. This definition, of course, consists of interdependent parts, 
and is just an intuitive and loose description, in order to postpone for a moment 
the political aspects of the term. In my exploration of the landscape, I will first 
and foremost develop a view of the actual circumstances. In the next chapter, I 
will then sharpen the definition of public space with respect to the threads that 
are mentioned by Mike Davis, Sharon Zukin, Richard Sennett, Don Mitchell and 
many other theorists, before widening the definition in pursuit of an architectural 
approach as a cultural practice producing public artefacts. 
In order to do so, lets move back to the Florida landscape of Sanford. As I did 
above in the exploration of the surroundings of The Retreat, I again visit this 
landscape like a tourist, a visitor – a visitor from a distance, as I travel via Google 
Maps, Google Streetview, a reading of maps and satellite images, photographs 
that are taken by users and uploaded to Google Maps, the links to websites 
I encounter. It is an experiment to virtually walk or drive around as much as 
possible, to immerse myself in a landscape via the screen. Of course, to really 
understand the urban landscape and spatial artefacts, their function and meaning, 
one has to live in that particular place. The buildings, the neighbourhoods, the 
shopping centres, the infrastructure, are not just spaces, or program, or location, 
or images, but are closely related to everyday life, to public and private lives, 
to daily routines and specific activities, as I have already shown. That is quite a 
different experience to that of the visitor or the tourist, for whom the landscape 
is totally new, and the tour is all but routine. The view of the visitor is driven 
by curiosity, wonder, and awe. However, I will every now and then compare 
my investigation of the landscape with some of the investigations of (Northern 
American) theorists on public space, in order to deepen the understanding of what 
I have seen. 
Zooming out in Google Maps at the point we left our investigation of The Retreat, 
reveals that this gated community is part of the western suburban neighbour-
hoods of Sanford, a small town in the middle of Florida, located at the banks 
of Lake Monroe just above the city of Orlando. Without the need to draw an 
extensive and complete history of suburbanisation of Florida, it is clear that 
contemporary sub-urbanism can better be understood as an anti-urbanism. 
Suburbanism, as Mike Davis emphasized, is defined by anxiety for ‘urbanity’ 
and public space, those characteristics of urban life such as openness, publicity, 
mobility, diversity, experiment, heterogeneity, instability, uncertainty, speed, 
density, and so on.201 Suburban neighbourhoods explicitly fuel a withdrawal 
from the ‘city’ (understood as differences united in an urban structure) into 
‘worlds apart’. Indeed, suburbanism is rooted in a distrust of cities and a certain 
longing for the countryside (or nature),202 propelled by increasing welfare, the 
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development of the car, the availability of gasoline, as well as the increase of 
mass production and consumption. These developments offered broad groups of 
inhabitants the possibility to flee the city and to settle in its outskirts, even miles 
away from the city – thus changing the American landscape and city drastically. 
The ideal of countryside life has its origin long before modernity changed everyday 
life in urban environments. Lewis Mumford, in his book The City in History, 
even states that the ‘suburb becomes visible as early as the city itself, and perhaps 
explains the ability of the ancient town to survive the insanitary conditions that 
prevailed within its walls’.203 As one such example of suburban life in ancient 
times, he describes the Jewish Feast of the Tabernacle. During this feast tents are 
built outside the walls of the city for a week, in order to remember the liberation 
of the Jewish people from slavery in Egypt and their wanderings through the 
desert for about eighty years before settling down in Canaan. As Mumford argues, 
the construction of these tents perhaps aimed ‘to guard the crops overnight when 
they were ready to pick, but doubtless also to refresh the soul, weary of the baked 
bricks and the foul smells of the city itself’.204 Such perspectives on the enrichment 
of the soul, the liberation of the mind, the healthy environment of the countryside, 
have been issued throughout history, as for instance in the Romantic period. 
Exemplary are the diaries written by the philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau 
(1712-1778), in which he describes his hikes through the outskirts of Paris, the 
quality of the countryside as quiet and healthy, which he strongly contrasts to the 
bustling and chaotic city. The impression of the landscape stimulates the mind 
and opens the senses, he writes.205 The Romantic age also plays an important role 
in the history architectural historian John Archer sketches in his book Architec-
ture and Suburbia. Archer takes as his starting point the emerging culture of indi-
vidualism evoked by the Enlightenment. This culture led to forms of privatism, an 
emphasis on private property, ownership and the family. According to Archer, this 
trait of privatism is to be read ‘oppositionality’ to the city, in which a particularly 
pastoral image of the rural landscape, as echoed in the words of Rousseau, played 
a major role. Romanticism, Archer argues, demanded the spatial separation of the 
‘burden of business’ from the ‘pleasures of the home’.206 
The suggestion of the rude city versus a polite and respectable rural 
environment is also the figure beneath the earlier mentioned National Survey that 
was influenced by Thomas Jefferson’s distrust of the concentration of political 
power within the city. ‘Cities,’ Jefferson writes in his 1785 Notes on the State 
Virginia, are ‘sores on the body politic’.207 J.B. Jackson, a French-American writer 
(1909-1996) who has extensively reflected upon the American landscape, fills 
in: ‘places of useless luxury, corrupt wealth, and political exploitation’.208 This 
distrust of cities is a characteristic stance of 18th century America. Intellectuals, 
writers and poets, ranging from Ralph Waldo Emerson to David Henri Thoreau, 
and from Edgar Allan Poe to Herman Melville, wrote fierce pieces against the 
city. This distrust was certainly fuelled by the emergence of the industrial city in 
the second half of the 19th century, particularly the effects of electrical lighting 
and other features of early modernization on the conditions of everyday urban 
life and the circumstances of labor within the city. Life in the city was increas-
ingly experienced as artificial, unhygienic, polluted and poor, whilst life in the 
countryside was rendered as in balance with nature and the natural. Nature – and 
here we are again in the Romantic age – became the very ideal of life. This longing 
for the countryside, however, was surpassed by the ideal of ‘back to nature’, 
exemplified by the famous withdrawal of David Henri Thoreau into the woods 
of Walden (Mass.), described in his 1854 influential book Walden, or Life in the 
Woods. This withdrawal was more than just a rejection of the city: it involved 
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society as a whole. In what J.B. Jackson describes as Thoreau’s ‘final testament’, 
his essay ‘Walking’, Thoreau writes: ‘I wish to speak a word for nature, for 
absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and cultural merely 
civil – to regard man as an inhabitant, or a part and parcel of nature, rather than 
as a member of society’.209 
Thoreau’s perspective had extensive reverberations, not only amongst 
intellectuals, writers and poets, but also in the work of America’s most famous 
architect of the early 20th century, Frank Lloyd Wright. With the help and order 
of newly developed machines, the escape from the (old) city and the longing for 
a connection with nature got a new impulse through his work early in the 20th 
century, Lewis Mumford states in his 1956 book Sticks and Stones.210 Specifically 
in his project Broadacre City, that he studied from 1935 even until the 1950s, 
Wright ‘yearned for a system in which all men fled the evils of big capital, big 
authorities, big cities – troglodytes of every stripe – for a connection with nature, 
the earth, the ground.’211 Wright himself declared in a lecture: ‘We can go to 
any place anywhere then and happily be ourselves. But in the overgrown village 
called a metropolis, now, we have to watch our step, dodge cars, literally take our 
lives in our own hands to get from somewhere to anywhere – wasting all of our 
nervous energy and half our time merely to get there and get back again – get 
back again maybe – keeping up this senseless urban concentration.’212 The origins 
of suburbanisation thus simultaneously lie in a desire to flee from the pollution, 
poverty, unhygienic circumstances and artificiality of the city, and an attempt to 
construct a life in balance with nature, an increasing eagerness of privatism, and 
the increasing opportunities (and need) to start anew.213 Once again Mumford, in 
a wonderful quote: ‘To be your own unique self; to build your unique house, mid a 
unique landscape, to live in this Domain of Arnheim a self-centreed life, in which 
private fantasy and caprice would have license to express themselves openly, in 
short, to withdraw like a monk and live like a prince – this was the purpose of the 
original creators of the suburb.’214 
The process of suburbanization was propelled after World War II due to a 
combination of factors. Construction and extension of the cities, for instance, had 
been at a standstill during the war, and therefore a backlog had to be processed. 
The city and government specifically invested in city extensions. Welfare slightly 
increased, war technology improved processes of production (specifically mass 
production) and the technology available for society. Cars became in reach for 
the average citizen, as did gasoline, after the restrictions of the war.215 This of 
course had an enormous impact on the (possible) layout of urban extensions. 
As the American scientist Francis Bello writes in his contribution to the 1957 
volume The Exploding Metropolis: ‘The motorist is not “strangling” the city – as 
a matter of fact he drives in and out a lot faster than he thinks. But he is changing 
the fundamental character or the metropolitan area – and many planners fear, 
for the worse’.216 Nevertheless, it is not just the car that changes the environment. 
As the economist Richard Florida remarks: ‘Its rise was so inexorable because 
it was an inextricable component of the complex workings of the high Fordist 
economy, which was driven by the mass production of goods that were destined 
to be consumed by the very workers who produced them. As people … settled 
down in their suburban houses, their purchase of washers, dryers, television sets, 
living room sofas, carpets, and automobiles stimulated the manufacturing sector, 
creating still more jobs and still more homebuyers’.217 This process of subur-
banization, characterized by an incredible increase in home ownership, from 45 
percent of Americans owning single-family homes in 1940 to over 60 percent by 
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1960, was propelled by the active involvement of the government in assisting war 
veterans to build their own home, realising their ‘dream of a free-standing house 
with a garden’. The emergence of suburbs, the emergence of the social masses and 
the Fordist mass production are all intertwined: the suburbs cannot exist without 
the availability and accessibility of masses of products: cars, televisions, vacuum-
cleaners, fridges, where the development of the suburbs themselves propelled the 
emergence of mass production, and mass production in turn fuelled the masses. 
Already in 1924, Lewis Mumford criticized the suburbanization of the landscape. 
The new suburban figures can hardly be seen as ‘a city’, he argues, which has 
consequences for society itself. ‘A city, properly speaking, does not exist by the 
accretion of houses, but by the association of human beings. When the accretion 
of houses reaches such a point of congestion or expansion that human association 
becomes difficult, the places ceases to be a city.’218 Mumford’s critique upon the 
suburbs is repeated in several perspectives over the years – several of which 
have been touched upon previously. The suburbs, the sprawling of houses into 
the landscape, the new enclaves that are established, are all symbols of the 
destruction of the city and the loss of meaningful public spaces. It is of course in a 
way too simple, to blame the American Dream for the ‘destruction’ of the city and 
the loss of public space. It is actually in Europe, when the effects of the Industrial 
Revolution became tangible in cities, that other models of villages, cities, and 
urban plans began to be developed. In her preface to The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities urban writer, critic and activist Jane Jacobs, for instance, 
critically investigates one of these models, the concept of Garden City by Ebenezer 
Howard in 1898. After valuing the social perspective of this model, particularly 
facing the problems of that time, she condemns his ideas as ‘city-destroying’. 
‘Howard was not planning cities,’ she writes, ‘he was not planning dormitory 
suburbs either. His aim was the creation of self-sufficient small towns, really very 
nice towns if you were docile and had no plans of your own and did not mind 
spending your life among others with no plans of their own. As in all Utopias the 
right to have plans of any significance belonged only to the planners in charge.’219 
Some paragraphs further on, she continues: ‘he defined wholesome housing in 
terms only of suburban physical qualities and small-town social qualities. He 
conceived of commerce in terms of routine, standardized supply of goods, and as 
serving a self-limited market. … He was uninterested in the aspects of the city, 
which could not be abstracted to serve his Utopia. In particular, he simply wrote 
off the intricate, many-faceted, cultural life of the metropolis.’220 
Howard’s ideas have had a great impact on the thoughts of city-planners and 
with that on the development of cities worldwide, particularly on the Modern 
approach to architecture and urbanism, as for instance in the radical ideas of the 
well known Swiss-French architect and artist Le Corbusier. Also in his case – 
especially his radical proposal Radiant City, in which the whole city is imagined 
as huge skyscrapers in park-like open space – Jacobs blames Le Corbusier not for 
designing a physical environment but for planning a social utopia. ‘Le Corbusier’s 
Utopia was a condition of what he called maximum individual liberty by which he 
seems to have meant not liberty to do anything much, but liberty from ordinary 
responsibility.’221 Using Jane Jacobs here as a view on the history of city-devel-
opment, and with that on the public life of cities, is not to blame modernism 
in architecture. Rather, it is meant to show what specific quality she applies to 
the urban fabric and public life. In her comments on Howard, Le Corbusier and 
all other ‘modern-orthodox’ approaches to planning, we glimpse of what she 
promotes as the key importance of cities and city-life: the right and opportunity 
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to take initiatives and to invent the new, the possibility of differences and of inter-
actions. Despite a lot of nicely landscaped open green space in both Garden City 
and Radiant City, there is a lack of a lively public life, according to Jacobs, a lack 
of diversity itself as well as of the possibility to give room to diversity. She assigns 
this lack of liveliness to the aim for controlled space and emphasis on security 
in neighbourhood planning. The functional perspective is a perspective deeply 
rooted in the wish to control space. The hustle and bustle of traditional cities, 
with their mix of uses, functions and activities, withdraws from control, whereas 
areas of single-use are susceptible to control, since what is strange, or behaves 
differently, attracts attention. This of course is what many urban theorists have 
argued: in controlled space, behaviour is restricted and the stranger is seen as a 
danger to the established security. For Jane Jacobs, as well as other urban critics 
like the sociologist Richard Sennett, the stranger is the essential characteristic of 
urban space, and with that of the liveliness and vitality of the streets and squares 
of the city. Cities, Jacobs states, ‘are, by definition, full of strangers. To any one 
person, strangers are far more common in big cities than acquaintances. More 
common not just in places full of public assembly, but more common at a man’s 
own doorstep. Even residents who live near each other are strangers, and must 
be, because of the sheer number of people in small geographical compass.’222 Or 
as Richard Sennett writes in his definition of cities: ‘a city is a human settlement 
in which strangers are likely to meet.’223 In certain ways, the underlying argument 
made here is that within cities, an attractive, lively and meaningful public space 
can only exist if it is open and accessible for everyone. 
But let’s return to suburban America, and see how the actual environment has 
become what it is. About 80% of spatial development after World War II was 
bound to suburban developments. Although today more than half the population 
of the world now live in cities, in America, more than half of the city population 
lives in suburban areas.224 The model of suburbanization first was to fill the typical 
grid plan of American cities and landscape225 with the single-family house on 
its own yard. The grid, of course, could easily be extended to the surrounding 
landscape. The result of this model is the endless sea of houses that has conquered 
the American landscape. Particularly, the city of Los Angeles is symbolical in this 
respect. Los Angeles, as many other North American cities, has a relatively small 
centre with high rise buildings that mostly consists of offices and other businesses, 
a few theatres, restaurants and bars. Hardly any dwellings can be found in the 
centre. Most of the people live in single-family dwellings, a sea of houses that 
stretches far into the desert. Los Angeles always has been the ‘most private’ 
of cities: it is the city that is most extremely shaped by the American dream. 
Attracted by Southern California’s temperate climate, it was first the wealthy 
Americans that moved to the city to built their country houses, their manors, and 
their retirement homes. The city represented the good life. Due to this attractive-
ness and the specific character of city growth, Los Angeles was already suburban 
before suburbanization took place in the rest of America: in the 1920’s, developers 
built close to 3,200 subdivisions and 250,000 detached homes and in 1930 about 
94 percent of dwellings in Los Angeles were single-family homes.226 
The American dream of a ‘free-standing house with a garden’ is now spread 
endlessly over the landscape, not only in Los Angeles but all over Northern 
America, making the question of the quality of these environments an urgent 
one. At the end of the fifties, William Whyte challenged the quality of these areas. 
‘Huge patches of once green countryside have been turned into vast, smog-filled 
deserts that are neither city, suburb, nor country, and each day – at a rate of 
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some 3,000 acres a day – more countryside is being bulldozed under. You can’t 
stop the progress, they say, yet much more of this kind of progress and we shall 
have the paradox of prosperity lowering our real standard of living.’227 Only a few 
years later Lewis Mumford writes about the irony of suburban growth: ‘In the 
mass movement into suburban areas a new kind of community was produced, 
which caricatured both the historic city and the archetypal suburban refuge: 
a multitude of uniform, unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform 
distances, on uniform roads, in a treeless communal waste, inhabited by people 
of the same class, the same income, the same age group, witnessing the same 
television performances, eating the same tasteless pre-fabricated foods, from the 
same freezers, conforming in every outward and inward respect to a common 
mold, manufactured in the central metropolis. Thus the ultimate effect of the 
suburban escape in our time is, ironically, a low-grade uniform environment from 
which escape is impossible.’228 The growth of the suburbs, despite Mumfords 
remark, hasn’t stopped. On the contrary, over the years the amount of suburbs 
has grown unparalleled. ‘There are no cities, in fact, anymore. It goes on like a 
forest,’ the German-American architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe concludes 
during the fifties.229 The growth of suburbs, is however, paralleled by the growth 
of the average size of single developments, from about 800 sqft in 1950, 1500 
sqft in 1970 to 2266 sqft in 2000. Compared with ‘older’ medium density towns, 
suburban areas use two to four times as much land.230 These new neighbourhoods, 
these widely spreading housing areas, that later were combined with ‘low density 
clusters of office parks, apartment complexes, strip centres and regional malls’ 
soon were called ‘urban sprawl’, the urban theorist Ellen Dunham-Jones writes.231 
Or in the words of the architect Rem Koolhaas: ‘the residue mankind leaves on the 
planet’, Junkspace.232 This suburbanized America, this urban sprawl, immediately 
renders a specific image, an image that is formed as well as questioned through 
a wide range of cultural artworks, like novels, photographs and movies – to stick 
to the latter, amongst others (very arbitrarily chosen here) are the Truman Show 
(Peter Weir, 1998), American Beauty (Sam Mendes, 1999), The Virgin Suicides 
(Sofia Coppola, 1999) and A Serious Man (Ethan Coen, Joel Coen, 2009).233 
The image that emerges from these films is not just the endless monotony of 
single-family houses, lawns and carefully designed streets, but the ‘replacement 
of city streets and squares as social centers,’ as Sennett writes, ‘by suburban 
livingrooms.’234 Or to state it differently, emptied outdoor spaces, a lack of public 
life, an emphasis on family life and intimate spaces that characterizes the suburb 
and simultaneously heavily impacts traditional urban cores. The intimate sphere 
absorbs the public. 
Indeed, the suburbs have conquered the countryside, but is it also true that it 
‘turned the dream of every American into a nightmare’ as critics state?235 In 1971, 
the American architect Denise Scott Brown and her partner Robert Venturi, upon 
whom we touched previously, started a studio at Yale, reflecting upon the suburbs 
by propelling a close reading of Levittown, PA. Although their work remained 
unpublished (contrary to their previous studio, which dealt with Las Vegas),236 
their attempt was broadly discussed. Through their close reading, they were 
able to show how the inhabitants appropriated their spaces: how they person-
alized their front doors and changed their lawns. They compared their findings 
with popular images of the suburbs in the media – from car advertisements to 
television commercials, and from strips to home journals. The studio raised much 
critique, particularly because of this use of popular ‘literature’ as a method for 
the analysis of the built environment – the post-modern attempt to value popular 
culture.237 Venturi et all nevertheless were able to challenge the debate, and partic-
227. 
William H. Whyte jr., ‘Urban Sprawl’, 
in: William H. Whyte jr. (ed.), The 
exploding Metropolis (Garden City 
(NY): Doubleday & Company, inc., 
1958), 115
228. 
Mumford, The City in History, 
485-486
229. 
quote via Frampton, ‘Towards an 
Agonistic Architecture’, https://
www.domusweb.it/en/opin-
ion/2013/10/03/_towards_an_ag-
onistic_architecture.html [accessed 
November 22, 2013] 
230. 
Above mentioned facts are taken from 
the Canadian documentary Radiant 
City (Gary Burns and Jim Brown, 
2006). Radiant City can be watched 
online via http://topdocumentary-
films.com/radiant-city/ [accessed 
January 9, 2013] 
231.
Dunham-Jones, ‘Capital Transfor-
mations of the Post-Industrial Land-
scape’, 9
232.
‘Modernization had a rational 
program: to share the blessings of 
science, universally. Junkspace is its 
apotheosis, or meltdown … although 
its individual parts are the outcome 
of brilliant inventions, hyper tech-
nical, lucidly planned by human 
intelligence, imagination and infinite 
computation, their sum spells the end 
of Enlightenment, its resurrection as 
farce a low grade purgatory.’ Kool-
haas, ‘Junkspace’, 136
233.
A great source on cultural depiction of 
the suburbs can be found in Archer, 
Architecture and Suburbia; see for 
an extensive discussion on literature 
(novels, and finally film as well) and 
suburban life: David Hamers, Tijd 
voor suburbia. De Amerikaanse 
buitenwijk in wetenschap en litera-
tuur (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 
2003). Specifically his conclusion 
(Chapter 7) that originates from a 
reading of the film American Beauty 
is provocative.  
234.
Sennett, The Fall of Public Man, 28
235.
As for instance the American Douglas 
Morris in his It’s A Sprawl World 
After All. See http://www.itsasprawl-
world.com [accessed January 10, 
2013]
236.
Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, 
and Steven Izenour, Learning from 
Las Vegas (Cambridge (Mass.), MIT 
Press, 1972)
237.
cf. http://radical-pedagogies.com/
search-cases/a14-new-haven-de-
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 2: LANDSCAPE
143
ularly the critical approaches, in order to acknowledge these (new) suburban 
spaces as the very everyday environment of their inhabitants (although the critical 
voices remained at the forefront of the discourse on suburbs). The 2006 Canadian 
documentary Radiant City (Jim Brown, Gary Bruns), which follows the life of 
a (fictional) family in a new development on the outskirts of Toronto, somehow 
perfectly renders this image of suburbs on their poster: ‘Politicians call it growth, 
Developers call it business, The Moss family calls it home.’238 The choice not to 
follow a ‘real’ family settling down is discussed at the end of the film at length. The 
filmmakers explain that it is an attempt to mirror the numerous advertisements 
and images of perfect family and community life that are on screen today. None of 
them true, all of them artificial. The Moss family depicts the deficiencies of such 
neighbourhoods: the lack of facilities, the endless car or bus journeys to malls, 
school, piano class, gymnastics, even a 10 minutes’ drive by car to get coffee, 
the difficulty of planning, the need for two cars per household, the mundanity 
of the neighbourhood, the barrier of roads, the lack of public space, the lack of 
community. Every year, the average North American driver spend 440 hours in 
the car, the documentary tells, in suburbs traffic injuries as well as fatal accidents 
are three times more common than in the inner cities, and the average suburban 
adult is 6.3 lbs heavier than the average urban adult.   
Sanford is a small town at the borders of Lake Monroe, located about 35 miles 
above the bigger and known city of Orlando. Sanford spreads over almost 60 km3 
and has a population of about 54.000 people.239 45 % of the Sanford population 
are ‘whites – non hispanic’, American social data office Census tells. In Seminole 
County, which is the county Sanford is the main city of, 34.2% of the people are 
non-whites (exclusive Hispanics) in a population of 425.000 – which tells the 
distinction between Sanford and the smaller communities around. Homeown-
ership rates are lower than in Florida generally, 56.2% versus 69%, as also is the 
case of ownership of houses that are part of a housing complex: 29.9% versus 
34.2%. The average value of these houses is also lower than in Florida generally: 
$ 156,000 versus $ 168,000.240 The image we get through this ‘virtual’ landscape: 
Sanford is amongst the poorer areas of this region. The very topographical 
conditions in the area of Sanford have helped to create neighbourhoods not too 
large, although the identity of the distinct neighbourhoods merge through the 
architecture of the houses. The houses just offer what people want: preferably 
Mediterranean style single-family houses with verandas, gardens, garages, in a 
mono-functional development. Despite the layout of the plans – these cul-de-sacs 
that suggests a certain community in a neighbourhood - such collective spaces 
actually lack collectiveness, as the Canadian architect Marc Boutin stresses in 
Radiant City. The houses are seen as a ‘container’ in which life is lived, distinct 
from the surroundings. This container is connected to the world via media: 
television, internet, smartphone, PDA. Even in its architecture this mediated 
connection with the ‘world out there’ becomes clear: these suburban houses – not 
only here in The Retreat, but almost in every suburbanized area – seem to lack 
a connection with the surrounding collective space, let alone public space. The 
actual appearance in the world only is through the car, of which the garage that 
is prominently built in front of the house is the symbol. However, such housing 
schemes already show in their outer form that no one in the house actually 
looks at the street: these houses turn their back to the street, the garage literally 
blocking the view towards the collective domain. No inhabitant is involved in the 
collective seems to be the message, Boutin states. Even more strongly envisioned: 
the garage is the most direct connection between street and house, the car thus 
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the vehicle to appear in public.241 Actually, these kind of neighbourhoods, such 
as The Retreat and other ‘cul-de-sac’ developments, are the triumph of Thoreau 
over Jefferson. Whereas Jefferson in his distrust of cities aims to create the rural 
environment for ‘natural’ man as a social being, a political creature, inevitably 
involved in the world, Thoreau strives for solitude and closeness to unspoiled 
nature, a withdrawal from the world. These gated communities and cul-de-sac 
suburbs, despite their contemporary aim to create a collective space,242 can thus 
not only be seen as Thoreau’s rejection of the Jeffersonian grid of the National 
Survey, not only the rejection of the rural attitude in favour of the strive for a 
‘balance with wilderness’, but moreover the complete rejection of society in favour 
of ‘a total commitment to a natural, solitary way of life’, of the political in favour of 
a process of privatism.243 
2.3.2  Infrastructural Landscapes
As Davis stated: it is fear that depicts the organization of these neighbourhoods. 
Every spatial element, especially in the gated communities, has a function 
vis-à-vis securing the inhabitants: the walls and the porches, the internal street 
profiles, the perfectly mown lawns, the concrete paths between the houses, even 
the architecture of the homes, the appearance of the buildings, all create literal 
borders as well as a particular identity, a wholeness. The enclave, we might 
state, is supported by a range of interventions in space to create borders that can 
be controlled and an image that can be ‘branded’, sold to particular groups of 
inhabitants.244 Of course this ‘hardware’ needs ‘software’: signs, camera surveil-
lance, lighting during the night, burglar alarms, guards at the entrances or driving 
around the neighbourhood 24/7, attendants and gardeners during the day, and 
Neighbourhood Watches (and surely also AEDs around the corner – the threat 
is not only criminal, actually, also health is a risk nowadays). The controllable 
area needs actual control. The sight of cameras, the light of spotlights around 
entrances, the wandering around of guards, all increase the feeling of security. 
With these aspects of ‘soft and hardware’, The Retreat thus is just one example of 
the impact fear has on shaping the built environment. However, it is not only the 
neighbourhoods that change by an increasing emphasis on (personal) safety in 
society, it is the city as an urban entity that changes. It looses its social cohesion 
and morphological continuity. We therefore should travel further and see what the 
urban landscape of Sanford offers. As the map immediately shows, parkways and 
(Interstate) highways cut through the suburbia. The parkways, sometimes called 
boulevards, seem to belong to an older grid structured road system, subdividing 
the landscape in large squares, which here and there are filled with small neigh-
bourhoods and (gated) communities, those we touched upon along Twin Lake. 
Everywhere the same type of plans: small size communities consisting of curving 
roads around a collective space, similar housing typologies, all connected to 
the parkways with just one or two access roads. Thoreau over Jefferson again, 
romantic deprivation over rational community. The parkways in turn connect 
the subdivisions with a larger structure of highways, and over the highway the 
urban centre, shopping malls, industrial parks, and recreation areas.245 If Davis 
describes ‘fear’ shaping the urban environment, it starts with the very location and 
planning of a neighbourhood. Even if it is not a gated community, as is the case in 
the south eastern part of Twin Lake, the location, how it is connected to the larger 
network of the urban landscape, to (urban) functions, facilities, and services, the 
distance to other neighbourhoods, urban cores, and so on, are all crucial. Distance 
matters. As the walls of a gated community show, the search for (personal) safety 
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in neighbourhoods is driving the need for control and the exclusion of strangers 
(while at the same time, of course, emphasizing the character of ‘community’ that 
is formed through the walls and porch, as well as through the landscaping of the 
surface and the architecture of the buildings, their common shape, colour, and 
ordering). Order, today, is understood as a lack of bodily contact. Therefore much 
effort is done to minimize and even avoid conflict246 and bodily sensations. This 
fenced world, living a smooth but deprived life, is rendered as the perfect image of 
the good life. 
Of course, the exclusion of strangers in the neighbourhood starts with its very 
location: the suburban landscape is mono-functional and not easily accessible 
from other parts of the urban landscape – only the car connects the neighbour-
hood to the larger environment. The large access roads that provide drivers easy 
and immediate access to the suburbs, malls, leisure centres, and so on, seen from 
the eyes of the pedestrian or the cyclist, are barriers in the landscape. These big 
infrastructural figures are literally detached from the landscape, separated from 
the grid structure of the National Survey that, here in Sanford, is still traceable in 
different roads that now have a dead end or break near the highway. This is the 
appearance of the ‘automotive society’, as the Northern Americas can be called. 
The Interstate Highway System that covers the United States was started in 1956, 
by 1961 already 41,000 miles had been built, and in the fifty years that followed, 
a further 6,000 miles were added. Through the construction of the freeways, part 
of the governmental investment to overcome the crisis of the 1950s, inhabitants 
experienced new forms of modernity: the possibility of speed, individualism, 
technology, a balance of excitement and fear.247 The highway also brought the 
inhabitants new possibilities of living, working, and recreation. As the architec-
tural historian Iain Borden states in Drive, his exploration on cars, the landscape 
and the representation of driving in film, this governmental project helped people 
spread all over the country, also to areas without public transport, which in turn 
fuelled the demand for cars.248 
Borden explores the ‘delight’ of driving itself – an almost communal 
experience although executed in the private cell of the automobile. As is the case 
with urban sprawl, the road has become a ‘natural’ backdrop to everyday life, 
driving a daily practice, and therefore is also rendered in a wide range of movies – 
Borden has analysed over 450 films – like Kalifornia (Dominic Sena, 1993), Speed 
(Jan de Bont, 1994), Matrix Reloaded (Larry and Andy Wachowski, 2003), Taxi 
(Tim Story, 2004), Collateral (Michael Mann 2004), and Little Miss Sunshine 
(Jonathan Dayton and Valerie Faris, 2006).249 How the highway appears in film 
of course differs from picture to picture, as J.B. Jackson writes: ‘A favourite 
episode in novels and movies and television shows laid in the American heartland 
is that lonesome ride through the night landscape: an occasion for remembering 
other times.’250 The automatic handling of driving on the endless highway leaves 
the skilled driver room for thoughts and memories – suddenly seeing mistakes, 
wrongdoings, gaining new knowledges, insights, seizing new paths, chances, 
opportunities. The stops deliver new directions, a talk with the gas oil seller, a 
meeting with a hitchhiker, a chat in a burger restaurant, or by being trapped. The 
route along the road becomes the contemporary rite, the passage to the past or the 
future, the next phase in life.  
Remarkably enough, it is the very narrative of the animated (child) film Cars 
(John Lasseter and Joe Ranft, 2006) that shows the impact of the freeway system 
on the countryside, the in-between landscape. The movie starts with the pleasure 
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of driving the freeway, this endless and continuous architectural space, solely 
designed for high-speed traffic, stitching together distinct and overwhelming 
landscapes – from hills to valleys, from the wilderness to the desert – the rhythm 
of separated intersections, access-roads, signage systems, service facilities, the 
continuous movement of traffic. Cars on the move, looking forward – literally. 
But as the film unfolds, the narrative flips. Whereas roads are embedded into the 
landscape, both in the morphological and social (and economic) structure of the 
country, the freeway cuts through and is divorced from the countryside, towns 
and villages. From the highway, the landscape is decor (if it even is seen from the 
driving position), that even changes by the very speed of the movement: from the 
new economics along the road, seen by the perpetual rhythm of billboards, to the 
deterioration of the actual countryside. Radiator Springs, the rural village featured 
in Cars, has been turned in economic crisis. Vacancy and decay dominate the 
image, scaring the car couple that have taken the wrong exit and are desperately 
seeking their way out. It is as sociologist Richard Sennett states: ‘the driver wants 
to go through the space, not to be aroused by it.’251 The highway has changed in 
this picture. Although still the endless, overwhelming, yet thrilling architectural 
space, it now has turned simultaneously into an uncanny environment of on-going 
traffic, with its similar gasoline stations and motel chains, the few access traffic 
signs and shadowy parking lots, literally cutting through the hills of the fantastic 
desert around Radiator Springs. It has turned into a ‘non-place’, as the French 
anthropologist Marc Augé argues, a notion that he defines in relation to ‘tran-
sit-spaces’, the spatial realm of the traveller and driver, from the gasoline stations 
and the highway bound motels, to airport waiting lounges and underground 
stations. Although these spaces may be designed with care, despite their archi-
tectural appearance – some even may look like medieval cities – and despite that 
they may offer all the comfort you could possibly desire, they cannot be called 
‘places’, for they lack fundamental characteristics of a place: ‘identity’, ‘social 
relationships’, ‘history’ and ‘appropriation’; the authenticity and contrariness, the 
diversity and the scope for the unexpected we can find in the street, in the square 
and in the park.252 Augé warns that ‘authentic’ urban spaces are transformed 
through the emergence of non-spaces, as the terms of judgement change into 
efficiency, design, and safety, which in turn change actual space. We now look to 
urban space enslaved by ‘the powers of motion’, the sociologist Richard Sennett 
adds, and measure them ‘in terms of how easy it is to drive through them, to get 
out of them … : the driver can drive safely only with the minimum of idiosyncratic 
distractions; to drive well requires standard signs, dividers, and drain sewers, 
and also streets emptied of street life apart from other drivers. As urban space 
becomes a mere function of motion, it thus becomes less stimulating in itself; the 
driver wants to go through the space, not to be aroused by it.’253 What he therefore 
understands is that through the experience of motion, the bodily sense of tactile 
reality is weakened. However, this perspective stresses the negative aspects of 
speed and technology, and does not acknowledge what for instance the urban 
designer Kevin Lynch and other researchers brought to the fore in their book The 
View From the Road. From Lynch’s investigations, it is clear that the new mobility 
evokes a new need for particular landmarks along the road. Particularly when 
driving long and far, moments of recognition are essential.254 
The 417 heads east just at the other side of the Kohl’s department store, and 
curves southwards in the direction of Eastern Orlando through a green corridor 
of the town. Grey tarmac, two lanes south, two lanes north, a hard shoulder on 
both sides, green separation of the roads, a crash barrier at the border – that is 
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the image of this continuous space. Access to the road only is possible by passing a 
toll booth. Within Sanford some of the neighbourhoods can be seen. The freeway 
is soon surrounded by the trees of Lake Jarup, crosses over the lake, and enters 
the flatlands below: numerous suburbs under high skies. The 400, with which the 
417 has an intersection near The Retreat, differs in its appearance extremely: it 
is elevated. At both sides of this highway huge warehouses, industrial parks, and 
shopping malls are located. The highway cuts through a ‘shedland’, but since it 
is elevated, drivers overlook these warehouses and industrial zones – although 
their advertisement signs are a regular identifying marks along the road. Since the 
drivers even look over the trees, it is once again remarkable how flat this Florida 
landscape is. Despite its urbanized character, there is no sign of landmarks, no 
sign of a city centre nearby. Only the energy plant west of Lake Monroe peeks over 
the trees.  
2.3.3  A World of Shopping
The south side of the intersection 400/417, is characterized by a dozen parking 
areas around ‘sheds’: car dealers, outdoor shops, (fast food) restaurants – a range 
of so called ‘big box retailers’ of which Kohl’s department store occupies the 
very eastern edge. Above the intersection a series of malls are visible: a curved 
road, stretched parking lots, huge warehouses, and in the middle a green space 
that seems to be a fallow – here the old Jeffersonion grid structure still is visible 
(despite the roads having been removed). The structure is super imposed by the 
shopping mall structure – which a designer has tried to give a touch of cosiness 
through the meandering form of the access road. A note on Google maps tells that 
it’s the Seminole Towne Center, the adjacent mall is called the Marketplace @ 
Seminole Towne Center. Other marks give insight in the shops and facilities that 
can be found here: from the Walmart to Macy’s, Sears to Sports Authority, JC 
Penney to the H&M, Toys’R’Us to a foodcourt, and from the Seminole Cinema to 
the Spring Hill Suites Orlando – the latter praised with ‘high speed internet, hot 
breakfast, mini refrigerator and central mall.’ The Seminole Towne Centre Malls 
certainly can be categorized as so-called regional malls.
As previously discussed, the development of mass production (and mass 
consumption), and the accumulation of goods, can be seen as one of the important 
mechanisms behind suburbanisation. Suburbanisation, in this respect, could not 
take place without the establishment of malls, or better said, the development 
of a new type of shopping environment, made fit for suburban life. In her 
contribution to Michael Sorkin’s Variations on a Themepark the architectural 
theorist Margaret Crawford makes a distinction between neighbourhood centres, 
community centres, regional malls and super-regional malls. It is all about the size 
and scale of the mall, she writes: ‘the minimum number of potential customers 
living within the geographical range of a retail item to enable it to be sold at a 
profit.’255 Regional Malls are defines as housing at least two department stores 
and a hundred shops, and attract customers from as far as twenty miles away. The 
super-regional mall (five department stores and up to 300 shops) serves an area 
within a hundred-miles radius. Within these developments256 the influence of the 
Viennese architect and urban designer Victor Gruen is beyond doubt.257 Gruen’s 
contribution is widely recognized by its impact on functioning of cities. Cultural 
philosopher Frederic Jameson writes that ‘the mall was his brainchild’, clarifying 
that our contemporary experience of American spaces is the outcome, not of a 
‘weird accumulation of market-historical accidents’ but ‘that someone had the 
idea for all this.’258
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Architectural theorist Alex Wall refers to the American Heritage magazine in his 
intriguing interpretation of Gruen’s architecture, in which Gruen was presented 
as being, in hindsight, ‘one of the ten people who have changed the course of 
our daily lives’.259 Gruen’s approach of the mall was quite similar to his initial 
designs for shops and shopping facades in Vienna and New York, giving specific 
attention to the exterior appearance of the store. Gruen writes ‘As long as the 
public environment, that is, the streets with their sidewalks, public places, and 
squares, are safe and agreeable, the efforts of the individual merchant in the 
area of showmanship can be concentrated on the appearance of the exterior of 
his store, on the show windows and their display, and on the achievement of a 
pleasant shopping atmosphere and an effective display of the merchandise inside 
and outside the store.’260 In a certain reflective text on his contribution to the 
sprawling of the city (in America) Gruen writes: ‘As far as trade was concerned, 
great opportunities arose. The shortages of the war years were over, and though 
nobody in the United States had starved because of the war, the “nice things of 
life,” as symbolized by nylon stockings, had been scarce and were suddenly in 
abundant supply and demand. Yet though there was certainly a high demand 
for shopping goods, the stores, and especially the department stores, had lost 
physical contact with their customers, who had escaped to suburban and regional 
developments many miles distant.’261 It was indeed Gruen that recognized the 
‘need’ for local malls in these suburban neighbourhoods – he was the first to 
actively propose the development of these malls. In an investigation into the 
work of Gruen, the architectural critic Alex Wall writes: ‘He was not, as he said 
himself, one of the great “form givers” of his era, nor even among its most original 
thinkers. His brilliance lay, rather, in his ability to synthesize a commercial 
practice with a philosophy of urbanism; his willingness to engage compromise; 
his ability to identify what could get built; and, finally, the urgency with which he 
addressed the question, What kind of city do we want?’262 
Gruen thus was the first to recognize the need for malls even in suburbanized 
landscapes (later he also develops the concept of the regional mall). It is in the 
famous 1943 issue of Architectural Forum called ‘Architecture 194X’ that he 
comes up with the idea. The editors of Architectural Forum invited a number of 
architects to answer the question of what would happen to the city after World 
War II ended. His proposal actually showed an awareness that even the new 
suburbs need forms of centrality and public space, simultaneously acknowl-
edging the future automobile development. Gruen writes in his 1973 reflection: 
‘I contributed an article on the “Shopping Center”, illustrating it with sketches 
and drawings reflecting the concepts of separation of pedestrian and automobile 
traffic, of the creation of pedestrian areas and of the “one stop” shopping envi-
ronments.’263 Although separating car traffic and pedestrian spaces, in this 
initial proposal the neighbourhood shopping mall is still embedded within 
the (sub)urban fabric of streets and paths by just filling one of the blocks of 
the surrounding grid. Parking is largely concentrated on the backside of the 
block, whilst in front of the shops, with their large windows, Gruen introduced 
a landscaped plaza and patio, that, of course, was connected to the immediate 
streets and sidewalks. This spatial connectivity is largely lost in the development 
of the mall, which is increasingly defined by a search for a balance between the 
shopping experience, the problem of parking, and the addition of public space. 
‘Gruen,’ Alex Wall writes, ‘wanted his centres to offer not just commercial but 
community and cultural space in the emerging suburban landscape.’264 The 
commercial aim of the spaces could only be a success, he argues, if it is embedded 
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in a social structure, a pleasant atmosphere. The effort of the designer should 
‘be concentrated on the appearance of the exterior of his store,’ he wrote, ‘on the 
show windows and their display, and on the achievement of a pleasant shopping 
atmosphere and an effective display of the merchandise inside and outside the 
store.’265 This atmosphere, however, was more than just the façade of the shop. 
Also in his latter malls, from the small local malls towards the huge regional 
malls, he specifically draws attention to the ‘public’ space, still mostly offered 
as nicely landscaped collective areas, even sometimes designed as a ‘fabric of 
old-fashioned shopping streets’, a reference to old inner city streets, as is the 
case in the intriguing 1948 proposal Harvey Park, Los Angeles. In this proposal, 
Gruen’s goal was to create a central space. In the presentation of the project in the 
monthly magazine Chain Store Age, he argued that regional shopping centres also 
needed to ‘serve as social and cultural centres – the basis for community building 
in the new landscape of suburban subdivisions.’266 Gruen’s proposal consists of 
two crossing streets that were stretched from the edges to a middle-point, tenant 
store buildings with colonnades to protect the visitors from the climate, numerous 
kiosks, and at the centre a cylindrical department store that functioned as a 
landmark in the urban layout, while parking was solved between the shopping 
streets. In the centre, was also room for cultural and social functions, including 
a movie theatre and auditorium, branch offices for the municipality and medical 
offices. As Gruen wrote: ‘It is the aim of our scheme to impress the center’s 
facilities deeply into the minds of the people living in a wide surrounding area. 
The center shall become to them more than just a place where one may shop – it 
shall be related in their minds with all the activities of cultural enrichment and 
relaxation: theatre, outdoor music shell, exhibition hall.’267 As Wall concludes: 
Gruen looked to design an idea of community.  
Although Gruen developed innovative approaches of the difficulties of the 
parking lot, like in his 1947 project for Milliron, a department store with part 
of the parking area on the roof, built in the commercial area of a new district 
in Westchester, over time and through their increasing scale, the malls lost 
their spatial connection with the surrounding city fabric, specifically with the 
pedestrian routes. Once embedded in the suburban neighbourhoods, the malls 
turned into one of the loose fragments that are now characteristic of this urban 
landscape, super imposed onto the Jeffersonian grid, slowly but surely becoming 
disconnected to the local structures, and instead almost directly connected to 
the freeway-network, loosing even the possibility of reaching the mall from the 
immediate surroundings by foot. This, of course, should first be ascribed to the 
urban planning offices and departments of cities, since through their zoning plans 
the suburban area turned into segregated zones of commerce, shopping, living, 
and recreation. Gruen nevertheless had a major role in the development of the 
mall into a separate world, distinct from the city and the local neighbourhoods. In 
his mall-designs he emphasized the atmosphere of the mall, the need for enter-
tainment, attraction and charm in respect to the planning, layout and architecture 
of the mall and its economic success. Gruen was quite clear about the aim of these 
spaces: since they first and foremost were meant for shopping and entertainment, 
for consuming and producing, they should be safe and threat-less. ‘Whenever the 
public environment becomes hostile,’ Gruen writes, ‘then merchants are forced 
to band together and to create, separated from the hostile public environment, a 
more pleasant and sympathetic environment, a more pleasant and sympathetic 
environment for trade. As examples serve the open markets of antiquity, the 
agora of Athens, the Roman forums, the bazaars in the cities of the Orient, and 
in the nineteenth century the great arcades and galleries all witnesses of the 
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necessity of overcoming the disturbing characteristics of an unattractive, “hostile 
public environment.”’268 In other words, there are commercial considerations to 
creating a ‘shopping-world’, a (shopping) enclave, firstly as ‘hostile’ environments 
effect the purchases of the visitors, and secondly as this ‘world apart’ propels 
consumption through the creation of a ‘sphere of consumption and pleasure’, a 
place people enjoy and will return to. 
The Seminole Towne Centre Malls actually do show two types of malls, whereas 
the Marketcentre just consist of a row of small and huge shops facing onto 
the parking lots. The Seminole Towne Centre is the next step in the shopping 
experience: the shops are facing an interior corridor, that at specific points is 
accessible from the parking lots around the mall – a huge enclosed box amidst 
an asphalt sea of parking. The entrances, invitingly designed in a Mediterranean 
style, and demarcated by an architecturally profound figure, huge signs, nicely 
paved stoops, at the front, curved bushes and palm trees offer the shade that one 
urgently needs in this hot and stony environment. On both sides of the entrance, 
the wall is simply closed. Images of the interior of the mall, presented on its 
webpage – of the exterior of the building, the website only shows the entrances, 
of course – shows an almost mile-long corridor in the middle of mall building, 
white coloured atriums in the middle of the mall, white bridges covering the cores, 
wooden benches on the ground floor, and a ‘jump system’ and other play systems 
in one of the cores, meant for attracting visiting kids. The corridor is divided over 
two levels, the major department stores, the Macy’s and the Sears, are on both 
sides of the mall. It is a standard layout: a contrast between a blank exterior and 
an articulated interior,269 as well as the two main stores on each side, connected 
via an atrium. 
After writing Delirious New York, his well known ‘retro-manifesto’ on 
Manhattan, Rem Koolhaas moved his attention from New York to Atlanta, to the 
contemporary patterns of (sub)urbanization. One of the features he recognizes 
as important in the new (sub)urbanized landscape is the ‘atrium’. ‘Since the 
Romans,’ he writes, ‘the atrium had been a hole in a house or a building that 
injects light and air – the outside – into the center; in Portman’s [Koolhaas refers 
to the Atlanta based architect and developer John Portman, HT] hands it became 
the opposite: a container of artificiality that allows its occupants to avoid daylight 
forever – a hermetic interior, sealed against the real.’270 According to Koolhaas, 
the renewed introduction of the atrium in architecture, especially in huge building 
blocks, is part of a strive for control via self-sufficiency and independence from the 
surroundings and surrounding buildings, which is disastrous for a coherent and 
correlated landscape, and, no less important, for the ‘rootedness’ of the building 
in its environment. ‘The new atrium became a replica as inclusive as downtown 
itself, an ersatz downtown. Downtown’s buildings are no longer complementary; 
they don’t need each other; they become hostile; they compete. Downtown disin-
tegrates into multiple downtowns, a cluster of autonomies. The more ambitious 
these autonomies, the more they undermine the real downtown – its messy 
conditions, its complexities, its irregularities, its densities, its ethnicities. With 
atriums as their private mini-centers, buildings no longer depend on specific 
locations. They can be anywhere.’271
A strong resemblance to this quote can be found in the article ‘Generic City’, 
in which he describes the consequences of the loss of such physical and historical 
roots for a city. This loss is not only assumed to impact the singular building, 
but may also have effects on the city as a whole, both in geographical and in a 
historical sense. According to Koolhaas, who primarily based his ideas on recent 
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developments in African and Asian cities, the contemporary city ‘is held together, 
not by an over-demanding public realm … but by the residual.’272 Public life itself 
does not take place in this residual, according to Koolhaas, public life is confined 
to interior spaces, it is turned into a happening.273 This leads Koolhaas to state 
‘the street is dead. That discovery has coincided with frantic attempts at its resus-
citation. Public art is everywhere – as if two deaths make a life. Pedestrianization 
– intended to preserve – merely channels the flow of those doomed to destroy 
the object of their intended reverence with their feet. The Generic City is on its 
way from horizontality to verticality. The skyscraper looks as if it will be the final, 
definitive typology. It has swallowed everything else. It can exist everywhere: in a 
rice field, or downtown – it makes no difference anymore. The towers no longer 
stand together; they are spaced so that they don’t interact.’274 
The webpage of the Seminole shows a row of signs that announce that you can 
loan strollers as well as wheelchairs during shopping in the centre. There is also 
a kindergarten, a baby changing station, a bus stop, a pavilion with interactive 
television. Shopping bags are also available and there is an AED in the mall, 
as well as the possibility to exchange money. How amazing, there is even an 
explicit sign that this mall houses a Coca Cola reseller. On Monday mornings and 
Sundays, the mall is opened for Mall Walking – although the shops are closed, the 
mall is used for exercise by people that prefer to walk inside rather than outside.275 
Which is a sign, as Margareth Crawford writes, of the mall as a community and 
social centre in the suburb. The mall cannot withdraw from the community, it 
needs to settle down and find its place in the social environment (the physical one, 
as Koolhaas shows, is much harder to solve). ‘Repacking the city in a safe, clean, 
and controlled form gave the mall greater importance as a community and social 
center,’ Crawford aims. ‘The enclosed mall supplied spatial centrality, public 
focus, and human density – all the elements lacking in sprawling suburbs. The 
mall served as the hub of suburban public life, and provided a common consumer 
focus for the amorphous suburbs.’276  
2.3.4  Welcome to the Past
The Retreat, near the intersection 400/417, has excellent accessibility via these 
highways. However, looking again at the map of Sanford, it becomes clear that the 
same Highways disconnect these neighbourhoods from other parts of the town, 
specifically what seems to be the centre of Sanford, which is located north-east of 
The Retreat. It is 5.5 miles, (14 minutes drive) distance from The Retreat Google 
tells. Or a 42 minutes journey by public Transport. The bus stop is near the 
Seminole Town Center, across the 417, a 17 minutes walk – besides that it only 
has a one hour service. The centre is of course reachable by foot, or bike, although 
there are no direct connections, no direct bike lanes or specific pedestrian routes 
crossing the highway (making it difficult to cross). Google counts 1 hour and 46 
minutes’ walk, warning: ‘Use caution – This route may be missing sidewalks or 
pedestrian paths.’ By bike it would take the cyclist only 29 minutes, although 
Google warns and asks for help from the public: ‘Use caution and please report 
unmapped bike routes, streets that aren’t suited for cycling, and other problems’. 
The plan of the centre of Sanford is immediately recognizable through the 
densification of the typical Jeffersionian grid of streets and parcels, the names of 
the streets, density of the buildings, and the ‘urban facilities’: a hospital located 
at the very west edge of the fabric, near to an Amtrak ‘auto-train-station’. The 
grid fabric spans between Orlando Sanford International Airport to the south, 
272.
Koolhaas, ‘Generic City’, 1252
273.
Ibid., 1261
274.
Ibid., 1252-1253
275. 
http://www.simon.com/mall/semi-
nole-towne-center [accessed January 
3rd, 2013]; This actually is a hint that 
the mall means more for people than 
just the possibility of shopping, or at 
least that the mall management tries 
to present the mall as more meaning-
full than just a building for shopping. 
Frederic Jameson, the cultural phi-
losopher and literary critic, in a dis-
cussion on Koolhaas/Harvard Project 
on the City, cites from the second 
volume Guide to Shopping that this 
was confirmed by Supreme Court as 
well: ‘In a New Jersey Supreme Court 
case regarding the distribution oof 
political leaflets in shopping malls the 
court declsared that “shopping malls 
have replaced the parks and squares 
that were ‘traditionally the home oof 
fre speech,; siding with the proesters 
‘who had argued that a mall consti-
tutes a modern-day Main Street.’”’ 
Jameson, ‘Future City’, 255
276.
Crawford, ‘The World in a Shopping 
Mall’, 23
152
and the borders of Lake Monroe to the north. The layout of the centre of Sanford 
is as Jackson renders the average American town: ‘Aided by the state and Army 
engineers,’ he writes, ‘the city father back in the seventies [of the 19th century, 
HT] surveyed and laid out the new metropolis. As a matter of course they 
located a square or public place in the centre of the town and eventually they 
built their courthouse in the middle of the square; such having been the layout 
of every county seat these Western Americans had ever seen. Streets led from 
the centre of each side of the square, being named Main Street North and South, 
and Sheridan Street East and West. Eventually these four streets and the square 
were surrounded by a gridiron pattern of streets and avenue’s – all numbered 
or lettered, and all of them totally oblivious of the topography of the town.’277 In 
a local difference, Sanford shows at the connection of the main streets, where 
Park Street meets First Street (which is the axis along West First Street turns 
into East First Street), a cluster of pubs, bars, restaurants, shops, warehouses, 
church, revealed by zooming in to the map, as well as a crowded harbour, the 
Wayne Densch Performing Arts Center, the City Hall and the Sanford County 
Court. A dead-end rail track and disused station can be seen from the satellite 
photo. The southern part of the grid has a typical infill of small one story high 
wooden houses with a lawn, mostly accompanied by a garage. It is remarkable 
how many plots are open, as well as the character of of the houses: they look like 
sheds – they sometimes even are fenced with industrial fences. Even through the 
eyes of Google this environment narrates deprivation. The asphalt grid streets 
lack pedestrian paths, and compared to the accessible neighbourhoods around 
The Retreat, the houses lack sign of care or treatment that renders ‘the good life’. 
The south-eastern part doesn’t much differ to that of the western part – although 
there are more trees and the houses look a bit more detailed than in west. How 
different is the centre of Sanford, along Lake Monroe – although spatially so near, 
physically worlds apart, a landscape of decline and a landscape of progressive 
consumption.278 The inner centre consists of 11 blocks – as can be concluded 
from the pavement, the buildings, the terraces, the stoops, when zooming in on 
the map. Google Streetview shows that the streets in this inner centre have been 
recently repaved with bricks, laid in nice patterns. Those streets are presented as 
‘city-streets’ hosting ‘city-life’. These are streets for pedestrians. This is obviously a 
large improvement to such an environment. Even in the mid-1950s, Victor Gruen 
pleaded for the pedestrian to be prioritized in the urban centre in his masterplan 
for Fort Worth, in which he applied all the popular features of the suburban mall 
to the existing urban fabric. By keeping out the cars, the city was turned into a 
pedestrian mall. In Fort Worth he goes so far that he proposed not just six huge 
parking garages about three or four minutes walking distance from the centre, 
but even banishing all the delivery trucks underground. Slow moving electric cars 
would offer those unable to walk their connection to the shops. Noise, fumes, 
and traffic lights would not waste the valuable space of the ground floor. ‘Just 
throngs of happy people, making and spending money’ would colour the streets.279 
Stanford is of course not of this size – but the effort to re-store the inner centre 
is tangible in every detail. The stone buildings are three to five stories high. They 
house shops and bars in the basement, offices, apartments or hotel rooms above, 
with some terraces spilling out onto the street. The newly laid pavement is a sign 
of a renewed interest in ‘historic districts’ in the United States. ‘City after city’, 
urban theorist Christine Boyer states, ‘discovers that its abandoned industrial 
waterfront or outmoded city centre contains enormous tourist potential and 
refurbishes it as a leisure-time spectacles and sightseeing promenade. All of these 
sites become culinary and ornamental landscapes through which the tourists – the 
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new public of the late twentieth century – graze, celebrating the consumption of 
place and architecture, and the taste of history and food.’280 City centres are redis-
covered as environments for leisure and recreation. Beyond leisure, Boyer states, 
these historic districts are also a sign of the ‘uprootedness, this sense of nonplace’ 
that is roused by the contemporary urbanised and fragmented landscape.281 Here 
in Sanford, a Welcome Center at East First street, welcomes visitors to stroll down 
to the lake (indeed, a new walk trail has been constructed), or along ‘the hundreds 
of turn of the century homes, adorned with hundred year old oaks that whisper 
the secrets of the past (recently revitalized)’.282 Through the re-paving of the 
streets, the city-centre becomes almost pleasant: the bricks of the street, the brick 
facades of the accompanying buildings, the terraces, the nicely landscaped small 
squares between the buildings, the harbour with its yachts and palm trees – how 
nice to enjoy life in a historic district. In its layout it suggests a classical urban 
environment, although without urbanity.283 Hardly any people walk the corridors, 
only a couple of people are seen on the terrace and at the pier down the harbour. 
Behind the buildings, huge parking lots remain empty. The ‘density’ of First 
Street depends on the emptiness of Second Street – even the axis between the 
harbour and its restaurants, the boulevard at the border of Lake Monroe (which 
is the location of the City Hall and the Court), on the one hand First and Second 
Street with their many shops, pubs and bars, on the other the empty spaces of 
parking lots. These empty lots are symbolic: this town is car-traffic tailored, from 
its very centre to the shopping malls, from the living environments in the grid to 
the gated communities around Twin Lake. But it is also a sign of another aspect 
of the revitalized downtown. As the American-Dutch journalist Tracy Metz writes 
in her observations on the American landscape: it is ‘physical proof that the new 
downtown is not yet an integral part of the city, but a project. Within the property 
lines the care and maintenance are maximum, outside they are non-existent.’284
2.3.5  Fun: Next Exit
Tourism, leisure, recreation and entertainment seem to be the subject of public 
space in the built environment.285 The key to discovering the local ‘places to 
be’, is the website of the local airport, that of course offers a list of locations 
in the environment that the traveller is recommended to visit. Airports, by 
the way, are increasingly important for urban and metropolitan regions and 
their development.286 The airport increasingly offers, besides the direct airport 
facilities, a range of urban functions. The airport has turned into an airport-city, 
complete with squares, parks, hotels, museums, libraries, cinemas, events, and so 
on. The transport hub has turned into a destination.287 Return to the local airport 
of Sanford, which is officially called Orlando-Sanford-International-Airport, and 
is far too small to call an airport city. It lacks the facilities to be a ‘destination’ 
in the local or regional networks. This is the cheapest air facility in the region, 
operating alongside the huge Orlando International Airport, which is near to 
the city of Orlando itself and home to a range of national and global carriers. 
Orlando-Sanford-International-Airport is located near the to the centre of 
Sanford, between 25nd street and the Airport Boulevard, which could have equally 
been called 31st Street. Compared to the city, the size of the airport is quite big. 
It has four paved runways, two terminals, and about 12 gates. ‘Fun: Next Exit’, 
reads the slogan: the airport is mainly used by ‘holiday carriers’, charter flights 
as well as scheduled services, handling 1,577,307 travellers a year (2011). The 
main carrier that operates the scheduled services at the airport – up to 52 desti-
nations within the USA and Canada, the website states – is Allegiant, the airline 
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of an American travel agency. Small companies connect the airport with Brazil, 
while Icelandair, the national carrier of Iceland, is the only ‘regular’ airline that 
has a daily service on workdays, connecting the airport with Reykjavik and their 
European network. During the summer period more international flights are 
hosted: even Amsterdam, The Netherlands, can be reached by a direct flightw ith 
holiday carrier TUI Fly. The airport didn’t chose the name Orlando-Sanford-In-
terantional-Airport for nothing: Orlando, after all, is the US-region of fun, enter-
tainment, holidays. The popularity of the region for tourists is obvious: besides 
the temperate climate it fully depends on the nearness of Disney World and other 
themeparks around Orlando, the beaches of the Atlantic Ocean near Daytona 
in the North-East, and Cape Canaveral, the NASA spaceship base (where the 
Google Streetview-figure changes to an astronaut) in the South-East, respectively 
a 35, 20, and 40 minutes drive from Sanford’s airport, according to the website. 
This airport is the cheaper choice288 in the region: all main carriers of the USA 
are operating flights to Orlando International Airport, which is located South of 
Orlando, a 37 minutes drive from Sanford. 
A broader look on Google maps shows that the landscape between Sanford and 
Orlando is almost completely ‘suburbanized’. Sanford, although being the main 
town of Seminole county, is part of the larger region of Metro Orlando. This 
urbanized region, consisting of the counties Seminole, Orange County, Lake 
County, Osceole County and the City of Orlando, ranges about 20 miles south and 
45 miles north, about 25 miles wide, taken from the inner city of Orlando. The 
municipality itself, however, only has a population of 243,000, whilst the ‘metro-
politan region’ houses over 2 million. Due to, amongst other things, the numerous 
themeparks on its outskirts, the city is the destination of over 55 million visitors 
each year.289 The area is thus urbanized, although typical landscape conditions 
have prevented the area to turn into an endless sea of single-family houses. The 
fairly flat landscape is cut into by a river delta of the St. Johns River, and is dotted 
with numerous lakes and ponds. These lakes, some small, some big, are used in 
the contemporary situation to structure neighbourhoods (as is the case around 
Twin Lakes) or to create (city) parks, whilst the embankments of the river delta 
and some bigger lakes provide state parks - natural preservation and conserva-
tion areas and forests: floating green fragments in the urbanized landscape. A few 
highways now cross the landscape, attached to them stretching areas of industrial 
parks, office parks and shopping malls. Interstate highway 4 (400) is the main 
north-south axis, crossing through the centre of Orlando. Two parallel highways 
form the west and east edge of the area: the 429 west, the 417 east. The east-west 
axes are formed by both the State Highway 50 and 528. 
As a destination in the region, the airport operator of Orlando-Sanford-Inter-
national-Airport, alongsides the theme parks and beaches, mentions the centre 
of Orlando and a couple of malls, of which Florida Mall is the biggest. Florida 
Mall is under the same ownership as the Seminole Towne Center. Although the 
websites of both malls look alike, the photos tell a different story. Florida Mall 
has been recently extended, it’s appearance is relaxed and welcoming: small 
squares, small and exclusive shops, nicely landscaped gardens, palm trees. The 
mall houses over 250 shops at 179,778 m2, including the Apple Store and the 
Microsoft Store, Armani Exchange and Victoria Secret, a M&M’s world and 
a Saks Fifth Avenue. Google maps even shows a hotel, a pool, and, of course, 
an endless see of parking lots, almost directly connected to the 528 and 91 Toll 
Roads that intersect near the mall. Within the scheme of Margaret Crawford, 
Bart Ramakers, and Sebastian Dem-
bski (eds.), Nederland Stedenland, 
Continuïteit en vernieuwing (Rotter-
dam: nai010 Uitgevers 2012), 7 
287. 
Iris Burgers, ‘De verbeelding en 
verbouwen van een luchthavenstad, 
Schiphols airport city in architectuur 
en beeld,’ in: Ed Taverne, Len de 
Klerk, Bart Ramakers, and Sebastian 
Dembski (eds.), Nederland Steden-
land, Continuïteit en vernieuwing 
(Rotterdam: nai010 Uitgevers 2012), 
225
288.
 The airport praises itself with a quote 
taken from the New York Times, April 
6, 2011: ‘Orlando Sanford Interna-
tional Airport is among the 10 most 
competitive priced small airports’. 
http://www.orlandosanfordairport.
com/documents/banner2/NY-
Times_2011.pdf [accessed, January 
9, 2013]   
289.
http://www.orlandoedc.com/
About-Metro-Orlando/factsrankings.
shtml [accessed January 8th, 2013]. 
Another indicator is the statistics 
of Orlando International Airport: 
in 2012 they operated 3.7 million 
international passengers, and over 
31.6 million domestic passengers. 
http://www.orlandoairports.net/
press/2012/20121107.htm [accessed 
January 8th, 2013]
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 2: LANDSCAPE
155
referred to above, this mall is amongst the Super-Regional Malls. In attractive-
ness Florida Mall, however, is surpassed by another shopping experience in the 
surroundings: the Mall at Millenia, located South-West of Orlando city centre 
with a direct connection with the 4. The Mall is praised by the authorities of the 
Orlando Metropolitan Region as ‘Orlando’s newest and most luxurious mall that 
transforms shopping into a multi-sensory experience. Fashion is taken to the 
highest level in a dramatic, eight-story Grand Court … Ambiance aside, the mall 
deliver the goods – and exquisite goods at that. It offers a dazzling selection of 
over 150 stores.’290 Images of the mall indeed shows a ‘dramatic’ space, a glazed 
corridor, reflective floors, shiny walls, comfortable benches, a glazed tower at the 
entrance with art and fashion images whirling down, many palm trees in front 
of the entrance which are spectacularly lit up at night – and at the background 
the shops, all attractively designed as well. A clean, perfect, bright environment. 
‘Great Fashion Needs a Beautiful Form’, the website reads.291 From Marketplace 
@ Seminole Towne Center, via Florida Mall, to this Mall at Millenia, we can 
observe the development of the mall. From neighbourhood services, to just 
shopping, to a ‘shopping experience’, from efficient organization to a shiny and 
new environment that people want to visit, revisit, and spend time in, from 
citizens with needs, via consumers that want to be satisfied, to tourists that need 
to be entertained.292 The mall has grown into an artificial world, specifically 
designed to attract people and to conquer other tourist destinations. Actually, the 
regional mall is not only conquering other malls, but also other leisure destina-
tions: the theme park, the historic district, even the museum and the preservation 
parks – destinations of a totally different order to the shopping mall, but equally 
dependent on claiming a position in the economic ‘market’ of leisure and free 
time. This position on conquering the ‘market’, fuels the development of the mall 
and an increasing emphasis on the actual experience of the visitors. New features 
are introduced, more luxury, glamour, comfort, a kindergarten, entertainment 
facilities, beauty arrangements, events, services, where the visit can be extended 
over days through the addition of spas and hotels, bars and restaurants. Malls 
increasingly need to be distinguished from other parts of the city, rendered as a 
world apart, both geographically and architecturally, as well as in terms of surveil-
lance and safety. This controlled, governed, and ‘overdesigned’ interior world 
apart, perfectly illustrated by the images of the Millennia, is the perfect tool of 
consumer-sciences. It is a known effect that in attractive environments even the 
most regular commodities get stimulation. Regular products sold in an exclusive 
environment or presented besides dissimilar objects are more attractive, since in 
this decontextualized environment they gain an unexpected aura.293 A Coke Light 
at the Malls at Millennia can be sold for twice the price than in the Marketplace 
@ Seminole, a plain white bowl sold here is much more glamorous than the 
same sold at the Wallmart. This insight, of course, is at the heart of every mall, 
not only these regional ones, but also the small strips and smaller local malls of 
the very urbanized and plural areas, for instance around Los Angeles. ‘Korean 
malls’, the already mentioned architectural historian Margaret Crawford writes 
in ‘The world in a Shopping Mall’, ‘have blue tile temple roofs, Japanese malls 
combine Zen gardens with slick modernism to attract both local residents and 
touring Japanese. Minimal developers in Los Angeles style their malls according 
to location: postmodern in the affluent Westside, high-tech in dense urban 
areas, and Spanish in the rest of the City.’294 Although the Malls at Millennia 
may not appear as ‘architecturally’ outstanding295 – whatever that may be – the 
very mall-design is used to create distinctness, which of course is used both as 
a marketing-tool in the presentation of the mall to consumers, and in order to 
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create particular spheres, to create a visitor experience distinct from other envi-
ronments, to make them feel ‘special’, by the addition of bright and shiny luxury 
and comfort.296 
One of the most experienced offices in this ‘market of mall design’ is The Jerde 
Partnership Inc., established by Jon Jerde in 1977.297 The office that has built 
striking malls, hotels, casino’s, leisure centres across America, from Los Angeles 
(as for instance the mentioned Universal City Walk, 1993) to Las Vegas (Treasure 
Island, 1993) and from Atlanta (New World of Coca-Cola, 2007) to New York 
(East Harlem City of Dreams, 2006), as well as around the globe, from Dubai 
(Dubai Festival Waterfront Center, 2007) to Osaka (Namba Parks, 2003), 
and from Rotterdam (Beursplein, 1996) to Istanbul (Kanyon, 2006), present 
themselves with a design-philosophy that they summarize as ‘place making’. 
Every project aims to create ‘communal places with heightened experience.’ In 
a 1998 monograph on the office, Jerde presents this aim as a strategy against 
a ‘contemporary desperate need’ of ‘authentic urban experiences’. ‘We design’, 
he explains, ‘the appropriate vessels for a renaissance of the human communal 
scene – communal settings that renew a public life of richness and complexity. 
We create vast meeting places for a humankind that has been split apart 
into fractured, yet kindred souls who are beginning to participate in a global 
movement towards unity. … Today market forces require that … evolutionary 
processes acting on space are completed in a decade. Participants in the global 
economy no longer have time for slow growth. Our landscape and environments 
are now designed as instant worlds. The creation of authentic community is 
not an automatic result of the globalization process. … Fortunately’, he adds, 
‘communal experience is a designable event. The challenge is to inspire – to 
trigger – unity out of the dismembered, disassembled parts of the once-cohesive 
city, within the abbreviated time frames of our fast-paced world.’ Having said 
this on the possibilities and power of design, he adds some notes about strategy, 
explaining the offices’ tendency to create spaces with a ‘wow-factor’: ‘We have 
designed a deliberate urban script, a conscious creation of communal urbanism. 
… We design our projects ads nodes of intensity within the larger city fabric. We 
work on large sites, … areas with enough urban substance to activate a full set of 
complex experiences. We make them places, which are more identifiable in their 
signature characteristics than an anonymous cityscape or typically alienating 
suburban environment. They have a consistency of intention, but at the same 
time contain an infinite set of possibilities.’298 Design, thus, as a method to create 
identity through the recognition of tension in program and possibilities. The 
strategy here is the addition of lots of program, from shopping and entertain-
ment to apartments and hotels. These distinct functions are super imposed, 
confronting each other, and bringing tension in the spaces of the project, whereas 
the designerly approach of the office united this tension through the dynamic form 
of the public routing. What Jerde aims for with this approach, of the actual areas 
and spaces, is an experiential architecture that reintroduces the experience of 
place and communality. Shopping, he adds later in the article, is the last place left 
in American society that somehow renders the idea of community, as retail, after 
all, is meant for everybody. Jerde writes this without irony, adding that shopping 
centres today are too functional, too rational.299 They lack perspective on the 
commonly shared need for shopping. ‘Our projects use the shopping center as a 
catalyst – drawing a crowd of people, who, once there, experience a stimulating 
environment to connect to and share with those around them.’300 It is not difficult 
to see that this aim plays a role in the works of the Jerde Partnership. Looking 
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through the works of the office, this aim of a ‘heightened experience’ can be seen 
in the sculptural forms of their interior mall-spaces, which all aim to create archi-
tectural tension: variation of daylight, artificial light, and even darkness, fluid 
spaces of small paths and ‘squares’, water and fountains, hanging plants, crossing 
bridges, stairs, tribunes, moving escalators and elevators, curling balconies and 
overhangs creating surprising perspectives, opening up and closing the views at 
eye level. The dynamics of the space can even be felt just looking at photographs. 
The office, in other words, is extremely capable and experienced in creating spaces 
to amaze. Amazement, where the ordinary becomes extraordinary, creates a sense 
of identity in the vast sprawl of the suburbanized landscape, even ‘citizens, not 
just consumers’, by its capacity to ‘engage the human spirit.’301 For huge masses 
of visitors, the mall has become their public space, an environment not only in 
which to shop and to be entertained, but also to meet and greet – although still 
in the mall the primacy of consumption defines the space.302 But despite Jerde’s 
emphasis on the specific context of each projects – he writes that every project 
starts with gaining information from the environment – and despite the projects’ 
aim to be catalysts for urban renewal within the city – bringing people back to 
the very centre of cities in order to create new communities – he overlooks the 
bigness of the projects, their aim to attract not just a local public, but a regional 
one.303 Contrary to his statements, the actual projects show a different language: 
even the projects in urban environments highly depend on the creation of an 
‘interior world’, be it internal or external. The buildings face this space that is 
created within the project, rather than interacting with the surroundings, to the 
adjacent streets. Sometimes the buildings literally stand with their backs – large 
blind walls, sometimes the zone for transporting and undocking goods – to the 
surrounding city-fabric.304 Urban access immediately runs into a parking garage 
or is in other ways distinguished from the surroundings. Even the addition of 
a square in front of the mall, as is the case in the Kanyon in Istanbul, does not 
disguise the sharp boundary between the mall itself and the large blind walls that 
face the adjacent neighbourhood, as well as the fact that it surely aims to draw 
the people out of the plaza and into the interior of the mall.305 The curves of the 
interior space, visible from the outside apartments and office buildings that sit top 
of the mall in the same curve, articulate the mall as ‘world apart’. And this interior 
world, although experiential for the visitor, again and again is rendered by images 
of ‘shiny happy people’, photographs of a public of leisure – shopping, shopping, 
enjoying life, and shopping again.  
What is distinct, however, is that the imagery of malls has another effect. As 
Crawford writes on the development of the mall: ‘The enclosed mall compressed 
and intensified space. Glass-enclosed elevators, and zigzagging escalators added 
dynamic vertical and diagonal movement to the basic horizontal plan of the 
mall.’306 This interior world307 is obviously controlled, perfectly planned and 
governed. And this control starts with selection: who is allowed in and who must 
stay out, even probably thrown out. Such control starts with the walls, doors and 
entrances, the visible thresholds at the edges of the area – at Millenia, the nicely 
lit palm trees, the bright yellow cladding of the walls in natural stone, the perfectly 
maintained stoops, the glazed tower with its twinkling interior. The message 
is clear, inside and outside are different worlds. Inside: richness, expense, and 
exclusiveness. Outside, what is left over. But even before the walls can express 
their message, the very location of the mall has selected its public – as also is the 
case at The Retreat. Simohole Towne Center, Florida Mall, Mall at Millenium all 
have immediate access to the main highways via direct intersections, enormous 
parking lots and access roads. Bike paths, let alone pedestrian paths, are rare. 
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The buildings are detached, despite their nicely landscaped surroundings.308 
‘Such imagery treads a thin line between invitation and exclusion’ Crawford 
observes.309 Whilst the intentions of the developer and designer may be honest, 
the malls draw lines, distinctions, images, appearances that all affect the accessi-
bility, both literally and mentally, tangibly and virtually. The architecture of the 
mall – and here we’re back to the observation of Davis’ as well, that architecture 
plays a role in the policing of cities – besides their distance, disconnection and 
visible warnings, one of the tools that are used to create ‘worlds apart’, to control 
and predict what is happening inside versus what is kept outside the borders 
of the enclave. Nevertheless, to cite Crawford again: ‘The assurance of safety 
implied by the mall’s sealed space is no longer adequate.’310 The aim of security 
increasingly gains visibility: behind glazed screens security guards monitor the 
mall, while colleagues wander through the streets and squares. At airports, and 
also elsewhere, militarized police officers even have a gun in their hands, ready 
to shoot. The guards will intervene, at all costs, the message: ‘Think twice!’ 
Simultaneously this is a warning not to disturb the smooth sphere of the mall 
or the inviting image of the theme park: stick to the rules and do not behave 
differently. This space is meant for fun, shopping, entertainment, and happiness. 
The governance, in other words, within these postmodern enclaves, not only 
aims to create a safe environment for its visitors and inhabitants, it also aims to 
create a smooth environment, reified by shiny tiles on the floor, expensive natural 
stone on the interior façade, mirrored glass railings on the upper floors – be it 
for shopping or traveling, for recreation or entertainment, for sports or leisure. 
Behaviour is restricted to consumer behaviour. When entering a mall you can 
find lots of warnings: ‘no groupings allowed!’ ‘No loitering.’ Or even: ‘Private 
space’. Crawford, in her essay, quotes a mall manager from a Pennsylvania mall: 
‘We simply don’t want anything to interfere with the shopper’s freedom to not be 
bothered and have fun.’311 This is not only restricted to these commercial areas, as 
can be understood from a quote that Mike Davis notes. An employee of Universal 
Studio tells him in an explanation as to why their City Walk is so popular in Los 
Angeles: ‘The city is not fun anymore’.312 
Recent investigations in Los Angeles, however, urged Margeret Crawford 
to reject the pessimism about public space behind the book Variations on a 
Theme Park, edited by the New York architect Michael Sorkins, to which she 
contributed her article ‘The World in a Shopping Mall.’ In another essay ‘Blurring 
the Boundary’, she states that a close reading of neighbourhoods in Los Angeles 
showed her the creativity of inhabitants, even using their garages as (new) 
sales-locations. Particularly within such processes of appropriation of space and 
the reclaiming of public space, there is no reason to be negative about the potenti-
alities of these spaces with regard to the issue of the public sphere.313 
Although landed on by chance – by The Retreat shooting – in the Orlando region, 
the city is famous of one thing: its theme parks that attract large groups of tourists 
not only from the Americas, but from all over the world. Specifically Disney World 
attracts its millions – we need to explore the specifics of this theme park, as the 
cultural philosopher Frederic Jameson marks in ‘Future City’: ‘For no study of 
any innovations in this area [Jameson means the development of the shopping 
mall and its impact on the city, HT] can be complete without a comprehensive 
recognition of everything – all the various things, from a new urbanism to a kind 
of shopping, a new kind of globalization, a new kind of entertainment industry, 
even a new kind of Utopia itself – that Walt [Disney, HT] invented.’314 It actually 
turns out to be an immense area of different entertainment spots, ranging from 
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the famous theme park with its Castle, Main Street with its train station,315 
Fantasyland, Space Mountain Experience, Lagoon, another theme park, with 
a Lakeside walk, Ferry Trips, Experience Center, and again, another theme 
park, the ESPN World Sports Centrum, spas, golf courses, Hollywood studios, a 
Convention Center, a Fairy Tale Wedding spot, ship rental, a driving experience, 
a heliport, and all this surrounded by an enormous range of resorts, with hotels 
and vacation villas on all sorts of themes, connected through a monorail track 
and surrounded by a see of parking lots – besides the huge ‘backstage’ spaces for 
maintenance, training, offices, organization far greater than one can ever imagine. 
It dazzles me, looking at it via my laptop. 30 million people a year visits Disney 
World – a 40 square mile area. 40 square miles, about 104 square km, nearly half 
of the surface of Amsterdam!316 From Google Streetview it is hard to get an image 
of this immense area. Surely, the Streetviewcar was not allowed to drive through 
the theme park, and only a few roads that cut through the area, in between the 
distinct ‘landscapes’, are public. These roads, however, are fenced with trees and 
bushes, or endless parking lots. Glimpses of the park can be seen behind these 
trees and parkings – but it is nothing more than some flags at the entrances, a 
pond, the elevated track of the monorail. Only the Future World attraction at 
the EPCOT theme park, the famous bowl, is highly visible from the road, as are 
fragments of the famous hotels with their post-modern architectural language, 
designed by Michael Graves, the Dolphin and the Swan. The castle, used by the 
company as the very logo of Disney World, can’t be seen, although every now and 
than the passersby sees the world-famous fireworks above the castle, I suppose. 
Nevertheless, even being near Disney World virtually, seeing the parking lots and 
reading the possibilities that are offered, already evokes the desire to enter into 
this Fantasyworld and let ‘dreams come true.’ Is this ‘the warmth that the whole 
Disney experience gives’, as Graves refers to in respect to his designs?317 Or does 
it evoke a deeper longing, a longing for utopia, which is at the very origin of the 
Disney’s theme parks – the strength of the engineer (in Disney’s world actually 
called ‘imagineers’)318 to indeed fulfil the promises of images spread all over the 
world. Or better said, to create these ‘perfect worlds’. Sharon Zukin cites one of 
Disney’s engineers: ‘What we create is ‘Disney realism,’ sort of Utopian in nature, 
where we carefully program out all the negative, unwanted elements and program 
in the positive elements.’319 Whereas Disneyland, Disney’s first themepark in 
Orange County, California, is based on the historical image of Main Street USA, 
the Orlando branch Disney World – which in size dwarfs the already large 
Disneyland320 – is dominated by an image of the future (although not lacking 
Main Street USA, of course). EPCOT actually means the Experimental Prototype 
Community of Tomorrow, somehow intending to scale down futuristic visions 
to domestic consumption. Although the initial idea was to establish a utopian 
residential community, an image of how the city of tomorrow should be according 
to Walt Disney, where entertainment values and motifs of social control would 
merge, the very futuristic and utopian image still remains in the resort colony that 
it has become.321 Zukin describes the imaginary landscape of Disney as a ‘utopia’ 
of consumption, based on three motifs: mobility, populism, and social control – 
meaning with this term utopia as an illusionary ideal. The ‘warmth’ of this utopia 
is the populist and recognizable narrative that combines selected fragments of 
the past, with future elements that are known through the Hollywood stories. 
The desire of the tourist for recognising both the nostalgia of Main Street and 
progress of Futureland (and thus remarkably avoiding the now) – even sometimes 
playing the card of the myth of domination – merges with the desire for security 
into a ‘perfect’ vernacular landscape, which is highly planned, prescribed, and 
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lished his own theme park. As Sharon 
Zukin writes on Disney World: ‘He 
wanted to project the vernacular 
image of the American small town 
as an image of social harmony. … 
Disney’s peculiar vision was based on 
a highly selective consumption of the 
American landscape. Anchored by a 
castle and a railroad station, Disney-
land evoked the fantasies of demos-
ticity and illicit mobilitiy that were 
found in the vernacular architecture 
of southern California. The castle and 
the station were joined on an axis 
by “Main Street USA,” an ensemble 
of archaic commercial facades. This 
mock-up in fact idealized the vernac-
ular architecture Disney remembered 
from his childhood in Marceline, Mis-
souri, before World War I. But Disney 
had not had a happy childhood. The 
son of a disappointed utopian who 
drifted between factory jobs and 
small business ventures that always 
failed, Disney designed Disneyland by 
abstracting a promise of security from 
the vernacular.’ Zukin, Landscapes of 
Power, 222 
316. 
Suddenly I understand why people, 
even from Europe, travel to Orlando, 
stay in one of these resorts for a week, 
and only enter Disneyland day by 
day, not exploring the city of Orlando, 
neither the nature reserves around, 
nor the coast of Cape Canaveral (as 
I overheard in a conversation in the 
train last year). Holiday in a cocon, 
prescripted by Walt Disney.  
317.
Zukin, Landscapes of Power, 228
318. 
Ghirardo, Architecture after Mod-
ernism, 53
319. 
Zukin, Landscapes of Power, 222
320.
Ghirardo writes: ‘Although Disney-
land is large (76 acres/31 hectares), 
the epic scale of Walt Disney World 
in Orlando, Florida dwars it. There 
the Magic Kingdom alone covers 100 
acres (40 hectares).’ Ghirardo, Archi-
tecture after Modernism, 49
321.
Zukin, Landscapes of Power, 224, 
227; actually the Disney Company 
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controlled. ‘Disney World is nearer to what people really want,’ the architect 
Robert Venturi stated once, ‘than what architects have ever given them’.322 But, as 
Christine Boyer writes: ‘Symbolically, whatever path the traveller may take, the 
voyage begins and ends at Main Street USA, where the tourist shops lie. Hence 
Main Street becomes the centre of Disneyland’s story, a shrewd commercial tale 
that tells of consumption American style.’323 It is both nostalgia and a longing 
for progression, both remembrances and futuristic experience – essentially 
designed to encourage consumption.324 This image in reverse, warns Zukin, also 
effects the world outside the themepark: it fuels the expectations of society for 
a perfect, secure, entertaining ‘real world’, that are increasingly developed and 
shaped by the power of capitalism, by large global corporations, in a simultaneous 
gesture of withdrawal from local responsibility, the loss of political power and the 
involvement of the public.325   
Surprisingly enough, the Google Streetview car was able to enter the nearby 
themepark of Universal Studios, which is located a bit closer to the centre of 
Orlando, and to cover the themepark itself. It drives over the pedestrian routes 
in the park and shows all attractions: the roller coasters, the movie-scenes, the 
theatres, the landscaped ponds with their terraces, and, to my surprise, a ‘fantasy 
version’ of the Universal City Walk, a Los Angeles Mall that is modelled after an 
original Los Angeles famous shopping street by the Jerde Partnership, rebuilt on 
top of a parking garage. The Universal City Walk – at least in Los Angeles – is 
publicly accessible (after parking the car in the car park) without having to enter 
the theme park, but despite its appearance as urban shopping street, with its 
plural  and specific architectural forms, distinct shops (actually just filled with 
lots of fast-food restaurants and other chain stores like McDonalds, Starbucks, 
Gap, Hard Rock Café, Quicksilver, Harley Davidson), casinos, entertainment 
halls and an ‘indoor flying attraction’, lots of neon and advertisements,326 it is an 
example of shopping as a tourist attraction, with the emphasis on food, drinks, 
terraces. The postmodern architectural forms suggest an urban environment, 
but it is without urbanity. Firstly, because the ‘public space’ is only a loop, not 
interwoven into the urban fabric, in the adjacent neighbourhoods. It is a décor 
on top of a parking garage, a balloon that is immediately pierced at the edges 
and at the public toilets, where the thinness of the façade is revealed. One step 
through the décor is entering a regular shed efficiently designed for its purpose, 
or entering the driveway where taxis are waiting to bring you to the other events 
you want to visit. Secondly, the lack of urbanity is felt through the public itself. It 
is a street without inhabitants, there is no neighbourhood, no people living close 
by, no homeless on the streets, no strangers around the corner. Nothing should 
disturb this image of the perfect urban street.327 This is an environment of fun 
(and beer). And indeed: while looking around, only tourists wander around, in 
their typical outfits and their positive state of mind. But this definitely is not the 
perfect image of an urban street, this clearly is not the utopia that is shown in 
the corporation’s flyers and folders. Nicely dressed slender women, charming 
kids and sympathetic dads populate these images under blue skies and in a joyful 
soul. Sorry to say, but what a contrast with reality. However, The Universal City 
Walk is, as Crawford writes, the next step in Mall design: ‘Architects manipulated 
space and light to achieve the density and bustle of a city downtown – to create 
essentially a fantasy urbanism devoid of the cities negative aspects: weather, 
traffic, and poor people.’328 Some people, the Dutch philosopher René Boomkens 
adds, only dare to enter public space in such environments: covered, controlled, 
temperate, homogenised spaces, directly accessible through parking garages. It is 
as Gruen had written: ‘But when the public environment becomes, for one reason 
introducing and demonstrating new 
materials and systems, a “showcase to 
the world for the ingenuity and imag-
ination of American free enterprise.” 
This patriotic impulse was to be 
expressed in a new town with 20,000 
inhabitants in which new technologies 
would be used for everything from the 
watstedisposal to swer and telephone 
systems. Although destined to be 
outfitted with schools and cultural 
facilities, it would differ from typical 
American communities in certain key 
respects. Residents would not own 
land and therefore would be unable 
to exercise control by voting: there 
would be no slums; and only working 
people would be eligible – therefor no 
elderly, either.’ The death of Disney in 
1966 actually stopped the planning of 
the community, changing the resi-
dential community into a resort with 
temporary residents – ‘a resort with a 
futuristic themepark connected to it,’ 
as Ghirardo circumscribes.  
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or another, plagued by conflicts and disturbances and therefore hostile, then the 
merchant is forced to call on the help of planners, urbanists, and architects to 
create environmental conditions which, separated from the hostile overall public 
environment, will give him a chance to survive.’329 The Universal City Walk is 
the merge of shopping and theme park, the very outcome of a movement that 
creates perfectly predictable environments, only aiming to fuel consumption.330 
‘Public life’, as Ghirardo writes on Disneyland, ‘is conceived as passive, guided 
movement through controlled spaces, where the only arenas of active choice are 
the selecytion of foods and shopping.’331  
The Walt Disney Corporation plans to bring this aim of ‘consumption’ to 
new levels: they experiment with visitors wearing bracelets enhanced with 
RFID chip radio frequency identification, a system they called MyMagic+. For 
consumers it will become easier and more pleasant. The bracelet, which is called 
the MagicBand, combines room key (of a hotel or resort), park ticket, ‘FastPass’ 
and credit card, so that the visitor no longer needs cash, or to swipe their cards, 
any moment they want to buy something or to enter in to another level of the 
park: money is immediately transferred on entering the park, buying food, 
souvenirs, whatever. The bracelet will even contain personal details so that the 
park employees can easily deliver a more ‘personal’ service: ‘Now – if parents opt 
in – hidden sensors will read MagicBand data, providing information needed for 
a personalized greeting: “Hi Angie,” the character might say without prompting. 
“I understand it’s your birthday.”’332 At the same time, the Disney Corp is also 
able to get more information on the park’s use and visitors, their behaviour and 
experiences, what they like or dislike what they do and what they don’t. A happier 
guest will spend more money, they suppose. 
However, beyond Disney’s aim to capture the behaviour of people in the park 
in order to specify the bids they can offer to customers, it is also an additional 
layer of surveillance, of controlling of the park, that already lies at the very basis 
of the park’s design.333 Through the bracelet, the corporation can trace perfectly 
who’s in and who’s out, where one hangs around, behaviour can be traced, and 
in case of ‘emergency’ can directly be intercepted by the park managers. One can 
be redirected to another parts of the park, entrance for some parts can be refused 
for a while, and so on. The bracelet is an example of control ‘no longer [is] terro-
rialized or historicized’, as the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard stated. ‘It is 
computerized.’334 Surveillance today is a layered process in which the obtaining of 
information on the specific behaviour of large groups in society, as well as of an 
individual, is a crucial figure.335 Internet-use, use of smartphones, social media, 
camera-registration, and so on, is a rich source of information – acquired without 
request, or by making use of facilities and services impossible without accepting 
the ‘small letters’, the terms and conditions; there is no such thing as a free lunch 
– and lots of large companies and governmental organizations spend lots of effort 
and pay lots of money to gain this (private) information (from Google, Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram), on your web-behaviour in their online-shop, your online 
habit on forums and other websites, data of wifi-connections, and so on – firstly 
because of commercial reasons, secondly for reasons of security.336 The line 
between what is public and what remains private is extremely thin, at this point,337 
specifically threatened through the ‘war on terror’. As Smith and Low write in a 
quote already cited above: since 9/11 ‘the clampdown on public space, in the name 
of enforcing public safety and homeland security, has been dramatic.’338   
In his extensively discussed essay ‘Generic city’, Rem Koolhaas states that the city 
of today is ‘liberated from the captivity of center, from the straitjacket of identity. 
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The Generic City,’ he writes, breaks with this destructive cycle of dependency: 
it is nothing but a reflection of present need and present ability.’339 This Greater 
Orlando Metropolitan Area seems to be moulded according to this template 
(although Koolhaas apparently never wrote ‘Generic City’ as a template, more 
as a survey of contemporaneity, a sharp observation on unfolding and inevitable 
powers and appearances). There is no single centre nor history left that has 
the power to perform, to ‘captivate’, to determine the identity of this urbanized 
region. Globally seen, the region is known because of its theme parks, but besides 
the weather of the Florida region, these parks actually do not depend on the local 
geography or morphology in any way. 
There is, however, an ‘inner-city’ left, obviously recognizable through a couple 
of high rise buildings (mainly hotels and offices), but without the specificity that 
brings any form of identity to the region. For a metropolitan area, the inner-city 
is quite small: as part of the continuous grid, only about five blocks wide, eight 
blocks high. Immediately around this, rectangular low rises start – fragments of 
expensive villa-neighbourhoods, as well as some poorer areas, according to the 
image that Streetview delivers: the regular wooden two story high city-houses in 
their own yard. It is remarkable how many leftover spaces the city, immediately 
outside the centre, contains. A view from the road shows that the urban fabric 
consists of broad streets of two times four lanes, an exclusive bus lane, as well 
as smaller, secondary ones. At the south-west corner, the City Hall is located, 
in the south-east corner a new Center of Performing Arts is being built this 
very moment. The images show that this Center will also offer a huge publicly 
accessible outside space at the front of the entrance, something in-between a park 
and a square. At the edges of the Center two large church complexes, a couple of 
schools, and a fairly large car park is located. 
The inner-city of Orlando is located in the ‘armpit’ of the intersection between 
Highway 4 and the 408 – which here highly rises above the urban fabric on its 
viaducts. Beneath the highway an old railway station is located, including a steam 
engine, that with the help of volunteers every now and than can be booked for a 
trip. This is probably the oldest part of the city, Orlando’s own historic district – 
with nicely renovated buildings, streets without traffic, two storeys high brickwork 
with nice details, the station with decorated steel columns and bridges. History 
located right down under the highway viaduct – Gods Own Junkyard.340 
At the other side of the highway, the Amway Center is located, ‘a sports 
and entertainment venue in the DownTown Area’ that in volume conquers the 
viaducts of the highway. It is home to both Orlando’s NBA Basketball Team 
Orlando Magic and the local ice hockey team, Orlando Solar Bears. The Amway 
Center also organizes other sports events, like a kickboxing competition, besides 
pop concerts, circus performances, and other entertainment shows. 
Although the inner city – this Central Business District of Orlando – does offer 
a range of offices and luxurious hotels with spas, ballrooms, outdoor rooftop bars 
and pools, executive lounges, and presidential suites, as well as the City-Hall, 
some schools, lots of cafés, pubs, bars and parking lots, it remarkably doesn’t offer 
shops: neither a chain department store or a local fashion shop, nor any housing. 
It is like the historic district of the small town of Sanford, where again hardly any 
store can be found. Inner cities are indeed meant for either business and offices or 
tourism and leisure. Dwelling is programmed out to the suburbs, and shopping is 
concentrated in malls that are located near highways exits, on the outskirts of the 
city, or at the heart of the theme parks. The more people that live in the suburbs, 
however, the more the city centre has become a ‘leisure playground’: the inner city 
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is a destination of global travellers, and for locals that are going out to dine, for 
festivals that attracts a crowd and for daily visitors that are seeking fun.341
California of course is not Florida, and Los Angeles not Orlando, Malibu not 
Sanford. Elevated public space, as described by Davis, is rare in Orlando, or it 
should be the highway. Nevertheless, the very image of the centre shows the same 
strive that Davis revealed in the centre of Los Angeles: ways to control public 
space in order to exclude the tramps, the addicts and the homeless. Indeed, not 
in the extreme manner of Bunker Hill, but still through the layout of spaces and 
– although not seen through the eye of the Streetview car – through surveil-
lance as well. Lets have a closer look at the public space. Generally speaking, the 
spatiality of the streets is important: sidewalks, the facades, shops, and entrances 
of the buildings. From Streetview, one is able to get an image of the square in 
front of the Regional History Center (the larger square), the stairs in front of 
the City Hall (the formal public space), and of the park around Lake Eola – an 
empty recreational area in the north-eastern part of the center. Although the 
streets in Orlando are busy with cars, taxis, buses, the sidewalks are empty. Even 
the pedestrian environments in central Orlando, around the historic district, feel 
deserted. Remarkably, only a few people are wandering around: a businessman 
waiting for the traffic lights at the crossings, some people enjoying lunch 
underneath the trees on the square. In front of the City Hall some tourists wander 
around: prepared with a backpack on their back and mountaineering boots on 
their feet, sunglasses for their eyes, looking to the camera-car (as everyone does 
when the car drives along). Around the historic district, no people are seen on 
the streets. Is it due to the time of the Streetview car took its images – it could be 
too early, too warm, or the wrong season to attract people outside? Or is it due to 
the badly designed ‘plinth’ of these high rises - a base without public functions, 
besides a couple of (hotel) bars and restaurants? Or is it because of the perfection, 
the lack of damage and danger. All public spaces are nicely shaped and paved, 
and perfectly maintained, well planted with (palm) trees, and adorned with 
benches, fountains, lampposts and pergolas, moulded by differences in height, 
short stairs and ramps, and divided by flower boxes and banks. They are clean, 
undamaged, and safe – as public spaces are appreciated today. But where are 
the people that really inhabit the streets and that are expected to wander around 
the very centre of a city? The youth, the shoppers, the strollers, and even the 
homeless, who together construct the hustle and bustle connected to the inner 
city experience? Are there actually homeless people in Orlando? This is a crucial 
question in respect to public space, as I will investigate later in this chapter. Of 
course, there are. Google maps shows that there are actually homeless shelters at 
the other side of the Highway, and in the northern part of the city. Nevertheless, 
the Streetview car spotted no-one, as far as I could discover. Is it prohibited to beg 
in this area, as it is the case in other city centres around the world?342 Is it possibly 
even forbidden to wander around? Central urban space, clearly the message of 
this information, is meant for business, leisure, entertainment, and tourism: this 
is the urban landscape of today, an image of consumerist culture, of late capitalist 
society, which can’t be disturbed by addicts, homelessness, and poverty. Some 
critics state that this is the effect of the ‘perfect’ image of shopping malls and 
theme parks: ‘Disneyland and Disney World have shaped the perspective from 
which the real landscape is viewed,’ Sharon Zukin writes. ‘For many consumers, 
the self-conscious production of the imaginary landscape is what they perceive 
as real.’343 Decay is disturbing this perfect image, literally material decay: 
unoccupied shiny buildings, vacanct lots, offices, shops, damaged commodities, 
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empty space, all are counter productive to the consumer culture, do not encourage 
consumption, and offer consumers a feeling of physical and metaphysical 
discomfort and anxiousness, as architectural historian Antoine Picon writes.344 
344.
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2.4  AN ENCLAVE WORLD
‘To travel through American cities,’ Christine Boyer writes in her contribution 
to Variations on a Themepark, ‘is to sense that these gigantic urban regions 
are disintegrating into unrelated groupings of shopping centres, special zoning 
districts, and housing tracts, all caved up by highways and multilevel traffic 
interchanges.’345 The Greater Orlando Metropolitan Area is such a disintegrated 
landscape, consisting of a range of enclaves: gated communities (as well as other 
suburban cul-de-sac developments), shopping malls, newly built commercial 
areas, theme parks, and state parks. Even the newly redeveloped city centres, 
business districts and heritage areas and in some of the older neighbourhoods that 
were previously part of the continuous spatial fabric, have turned into enclaves,346 
although these are mainly less clearly physically demarcated than the contem-
porary suburban enclaves.347 Suburbanisation, as the American writer James 
Howard Kunstler writes in his book Geography of Nowhere has been ‘a process 
that, instead of blowing up the world, has nearly wrecked the human habitat in 
America’:348 it meant the disintegration of the ‘city’ into a landscape of urban 
artefacts, a world of enclaves. 
Despite being different, distinct worlds of living, shopping, working, transpor-
tation, traveling, education, entertainment, leisure, and tourism, every enclave in 
itself is essentially based on the same suburban figure: a solid distinction between 
outside and inside. This distinction is often both reified in the edge, as well as 
articulated in the overall appearance. This strong inward emphasis immediately 
excludes the world outside. Every enclave has the same pattern: an inward 
oriented world: space de-localized, re-framed and re-formed. Enclaves thus 
create interior worlds by (design) effort – by defining the edge (the wall) and by 
articulating the interior (identity). The interiors are precisely planned, attentively 
designed, well governed, highly controlled, and extensively safeguarded. 
The enclave is a template for the creation of an ideal world, and thus creates 
an imaginary environment. The walls and fences of the enclave exclude the 
outside world in order to create, secure and maintain a fantastic interior world, 
theme park like, perfectly fit for sole use. A nicely landscape surrounding, evoking 
the sphere of the Mediterranean, made fit for living the good life. Shiny materials 
that create the experience of luxury, of exclusivity. The perfectly mown lawns of a 
university campus communicate the quietness of intelligence and meditation. The 
blatant architecture of the theme park promises enjoyment. Worlds an sich, stand 
alones, without a visible and tangible relationship to other parts of the urban 
landscape, let alone with the very geography itself. 
Although from the very beginning of the processes of suburbanisation, critical 
voices have questioned these new environments, a pivotal publication was 
certainly the collection of essays Variations on a Theme Park, edited by the 
New York architect and critic Michael Sorkin and published in 1992.349 The 
essays, three of them used in the reflections above – the reflection on the mall 
by Margaret Crawford, the reading of the Historic Tableau by Christine Boyer, 
and Michel Davis stressing the militarization of the urban landscape - discuss the 
new urban and suburban spaces against a background that Sorkin in his intro-
duction sketches in sombre colours: the demolition of public space as caused 
by these (new) artefacts, or better said, the loss of a democratic ideal related to 
public space. I regard this publication pivotal; although it does not discuss with 
many words the ideals that the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas promoted 
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in his book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, which became 
available in English about 3 years prior to this publication (1989), it certainly can 
be understood as the translation of Habermas’ philosophical perspective in the 
field of urban reflections and architectural theory. The book, after all, was the 
first important book in a range of publications, books and articles, that somehow 
addressed concerns about public space in relation to the public sphere. 
Sorkin, in his introduction to the 1992 collection of essays Variations on 
a Theme Park, distinguishes between three characteristics of contemporary 
American cities, and the ‘destruction’ of the city itself in favour of detached 
enclaves. Let us use these three characteristics here, to reflect upon our journey 
through the American landscape, by way of a conclusion on our findings. The first 
characteristic Sorkin puts forward is an alienation from the very local and cultural 
geography of the urban artefacts, as discussed in the paragraphs above. Malls, as 
well as suburban communities, entertainment parks and even historic districts 
have become detached from local circumstances, history and culture. He even 
calls it dissipation: today, urban artefacts celebrate the final loss of the connection 
to time and place in the human environment.350 Enclaves are detached by choice. 
Secondly Sorkin emphasizes the obsession with security that we have covered 
extensively. What is important in respect to the enclave landscape is what Ulrich 
Beck and Anthony Giddens showed above: this obsession leads to new forms of 
segregation. Sorkin adds: ‘throughout America, city planning has largely ceased 
its historic role as the integrator of communities in favour of managing selective 
development and enforcing distinction’351 between the different enclaves as well 
as from the surroundings. However, although these recent urban typologies are 
independent urban figures (if not isolated), they are complementary to other 
enclaves simultaneously. Inhabitants of this landscape of enclaves are continu-
ously traveling between enclaves, in their very individual capsule, the car, from 
home in the gated community, to work in the business district, via the drive-
through of the Starbucks, after work to the shop in the shopping mall, via the 
drive-through ATM, and from the mall to the historic district in order to attend 
a bar or restaurant, before finally driving home, through the safe walls of the 
gated community secured from the outside world, finally letting the blinds go 
down and putting the television on to look back to the world, the smartphone to 
share some opinions. Each of these spaces that are frequented – even those in 
between the actual destinations: in the car, on the highway, at the filling station 
and the parking lot – are controlled by different regimes of surveillance: by 
guards, cameras, porters, gates, fences, barbed wire, police posts, urban layouts, 
even the architectural appearance. The contemporary citizen is able to choose 
from a range of destinations, neighbourhoods to live in, shopping malls to shop, 
theme parks to be entertained – and will choose the locations that correspond 
to their expectations, not so much on accessibility of nearness, but certainly on 
what is offered by the shops, and a perception of safety of the area, a recognizable 
public (to which one wants to belong), and outstanding service.352 In other words, 
the contemporary American city is re-written through individual composition 
and construction: an assembly of well considered destinations that are chosen 
because of their function and program, their distinguished image, the perception 
of safety, the offerings of enjoyment and leisure, as well as visited by peers of the 
same social class and racial background.353 Christine Boyer even calls this, in her 
contribution to Variations on a Theme Park, the individually constructed ‘city’, ‘a 
map of tourist attractions’, a map of sites with a specific aim, exclusivity, public, 
and appearance.354 This of course not only affects the landscape, it also impacts 
the very experience of the inhabitants, passing from enclave to enclave, without 
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touching the in-between zones. The emphasis on the interior of the enclave 
leaves the surrounding landscape ‘left-over-space’, or: space that is inhabited by 
leftovers, strangers, which should be avoided at any time. The enclave world is 
a narrative of an outside that consists of strangers and other dangerous species, 
which should not only be kept out, but also avoided whilst going elsewhere. This 
is not only a matter of the wall and the gate, distance and disconnection are 
means within the strategy to exclude strangers and other threatening aspects of 
the surroundings outside. But although the enclave frees the inhabitant of the 
obvious dangers of urban-life, ‘the end product is an encapsulated life, spent more 
and more either in a motor car or within the cabin of darkness before a television 
set: soon, with a little more automation of traffic, mostly in a motor car, travelling 
even greater distances, under remote control, so that the one-time driver may 
occupy himself with a television set, having lost even the freedom of steering 
wheel,’ as Lewis Mumford writes in his 1961 The City in History on suburban 
life.355 Mumford obviously could not foresee how much this has become true in the 
contemporary suburbs, and only recently with the experiments with of driverless 
cars. What is remarkable is that he connects this encapsulated life with a lack of 
freedom356 – the freedom not to follow what is prescribed, predicted, determined, 
and dictated,357 which is both characteristic of the television screen as well as the 
enclave. The public space is walled, as well as the private space: living in a gated 
community, working in a business district, shopping at a mall, entertained in a 
theme park – and traveling in between those enclaves by their car, without once 
meeting another person by chance. Life today is lived in a capsule: a private life in 
a capsular society, as Belgian philosopher Lieven De Cauter calls it.358 But as part 
of the citizens freely withdraw from the world, this immediately means that all the 
other citizens are excluded – they live in a ghetto too, unwanted.
This, perspective brings us to the third remark of Sorkin: simulation as a char-
acteristic of the contemporary city, which of course is prominent in the adaptation 
of Main Street as a central figure in the theme parks of Disneyland, amongst 
other examples. Simulation, in this respect, is essentially a tool in a capitalist 
redrawing of everyday life. As I previously argued, the only grand narrative left in 
post-modernity, is the all-encompassing and promising narrative of Capitalism. 
Whilst we might discuss whether we today still live in a post-modern era, or if 
we live in ‘globalisation’ (as the Dutch philosopher René Boomkens argues), or 
in a period of ‘super-modernity’ (as is argued by the aforementioned anthropol-
ogist Marc Augé and the Dutch architectural critic Hans Ibelings), we are still 
witness of the power of Capitalism (as the crisis of 2008 has shown). It might not 
surprise us therefore that most of the critics that we have used above in order to 
sketch the peculiar character of the urbanized landscape have a background in 
Marxist thinking. However, this perspective of simulation, which relates to a very 
Capitalist approach, as we will see, starts clearly: a shopping mall is designed 
in a way that consumption increases, as is the theme park. The living enclave is 
nicely landscaped, its layout is carefully planned, and the houses perfectly fit in 
– together forming a narrative of nostalgia or progression, of the Mediterranean 
or of the high plains, of Texas or Norway, in order to deliver the perfect image 
to attract homebuyers, who, in turn, present themselves as property-owners of 
the ‘good life’ with taste and wealth. Even the living enclave is over-designed and 
determined as well – as Zukin remarks above, highly influenced by images of the 
fantasy worlds of theme parks and their inherent rejection of ‘reality.’359 Although 
enclaves are worlds apart, distinct and complementary. But as distinctive 
elements in the landscape, they aklso highly influence each other. Newly built 
housing neighbourhoods, despite their suburban or urban location, are today 
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branded like shopping malls.360 The architecture of the house is designed to fit in 
this peculiar narrative, as is the ground plan, the landscape, and even the bricks of 
the surrounding walls and the fonts at the gate on the name of the development. 
The reconstruction of historic districts is approached as being a theme park, 
the (old) mall is (re)developed like an old city, the neighbourhood is drawn like 
a holiday park.361 Enclaves, in other words, are perfectly fit for branding. Their 
image and identity can be controlled and sold. Which somehow relates back 
to Sorkins first characteristic, as Boyer argues: ‘That peculiar American place, 
the historic tableau, proliferating in the centres of … deconstructed cities, is an 
attempt to arrest this uprootedness, this sense of nonplace, this decomposition 
into bits and pieces.’362 
This perspective of simulation, as it is intertwined with economic perspec-
tives, actually urges a final point: this simulation also affects the experience of 
the citizen of the world. Physically the range of enclaves constructs a fragmented 
experiences of interior worlds floating amidst the spaghetti of connecting roads 
and leftover landscape. The contemporary city evokes an experience of disintegra-
tion. It has lost its ‘common’ character, both physically and socially. The physical 
appearance influences extensively social perception in three ways. It starts with an 
increasing emphasis on the interior as a perfect world. In the satisfying image that 
these worlds offer, there is no room for the dark side of perfection. ‘The awareness 
of highways in disrepair,’ Boyer states, ‘charred and abandoned tenements, the 
scourge of drugs, the wandering homeless, subway breakdowns and deteriorating 
buses, visual litter and auditory bombardment – all are erased and ignored in 
the idealized city tableaux set up before the spectator’s eyes and presented as an 
entertaining show.’363 There is no room for decay in the enclave world, no room 
for development over time, for the inscription of life, as Lyotard states. 
Secondly the range of enclaves that are the personal composition of these 
interiors as the everyday environment are spaces that attract the same kind of 
people, sharing a recognizable background, social classes, education, convictions, 
and political perspective. From the Business District to the Grand Café, and from 
the Shoppingmall to the Gated Community people live amongst others that do 
not differ too much from themselves. The image of perfection, again, cannot 
be spoiled by other social classes, specifically the poor, the misfits of the earth. 
There is no room for the strange, nor for the stranger, no room for poverty, or 
for the poor, no room for decay or decline – the image of perfection must not be 
spoiled.364 
This actually fuels a contrast between the inside and outside world, which 
is the third aspect in the way in which social perception is influenced. The 
composition of a city as a range of precisely governed, highly controlled, and 
perfectly safeguarded interiors, increasingly contrasts with the world ‘outside’: 
leftover spaces that, of course, lack this level of perfection, safety, control, and 
governance and therefore are subject of anxiety and avoidance. This world is 
designed as a ‘stronghold against heterogenous experience’,365 moreover, it 
‘suppresses the continuous order of reality, the connecting in-between places, 
and imposes instead an imaginary order of things’ as Boyer argues.366 As I will 
discuss later, this is one of the major points Arendt also stresses: only participa-
tion in a plural public reveals the reality of the world. At this point, regarding the 
experience of the world, we can conclude with Boyer that the spectator, hopping 
from enclave to enclave, loses touch with reality, lacks an image of the urbanized 
whole, ‘in all its uneven development; attention is directed to those sites that are 
perceived as productive or useful, or are engineered to satisfy desires.’367 
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This loss of touch with the whole, the larger picture, is the object of much 
discussion in Western society today, of course evoked by increasing differences in 
political preferences, cultural backgrounds and world-views. Sociologists, political 
theorists, cultural critics, philosophers, and theologians, in their reflection 
on society, express concern about a culture of ‘expressive individualism’ that 
suffers the vanishing image of a cohesive social structure and is absorbed by the 
self.368 American sociologist Robert N. Bellah, from whom I took the notion of 
‘expressive individualism’ in this respect, also urges the everyday environment, 
the objects surrounding us. In a short address delivered in 1996 at a conference 
on the developments of religious life in the United States he comes up with a 
very interesting analysis of the individual versus the collective. There are still two 
referential frames, he argues, that are intrinsically present in each citizen’s life: 
the state and the market. Both affect the citizens beyond their cultural, racial, 
religious, or any other background, through their ‘agencies of socialization’: 
the state with its influence on education, and the market through the powerful 
mediums of television and Internet, yet the market more influential than the state. 
Their presence is so strong, that Bellah suggest that it bind the citizens together 
through the shared experience of a common cultural understanding of the world. 
‘Our cultural understanding of the world,’ he writes, ‘is shaped every time we 
enter a supermarket or a mall.’369 Of course he here consciously evokes an image 
of consumerism and capitalism that impacts everyday life and perspectives in 
the Western world extensively: huge shopping areas filled with everything you 
could ever want, to experience, to explore, actually want to be (for those who 
can afford). We in fact need to stretch this image a bit further than Bellah surely 
means: from the commodities to the actual space. Space is pre-existent: it is 
‘a-priori’, a fundamental condition of our human life on earth. But this space is 
not neutral, even when we are not aware of the spaces we are using (which is most 
of the time). Space consciously and unconsciously affect our understanding of the 
world. Our view is not just shaped by the moment of entering the mall, through its 
commodities, already the road to the mall influences us: it unfolds the world and 
how it is ordered. The moment we enter a mall, supermarket, a gated community, 
theme park, business district, historic site, or travel on the highway, wait for our 
plane at the airport (I take these here, but I also could choose other spaces, that in 
discussions on the city and its future have a less negative imaginary), our under-
standing of the world is shaped. Our senses are urged and stimulated immediately 
– that is: directly and without any mediation – by the smells and views, the 
sounds and touches.370 Most of it of course is visual: the luxury of commodities, 
signs of advertisements and other mechanisms of temptation. But also the public 
– their clothes, their faces, their backgrounds – tell an immediate story, as do the 
instruments of of control and security, the fences and cameras, the guards and 
hosts. But it also is mental: why you are there, how you came to be there, is it the 
mall of your choice, if you live there or are just a guest, if you paid for it or not. 
It might be ridiculous to expect the urban fabric to form the social fabric, as 
seems to be the assumption behind many claims on and complaints about public 
space. Social practices certainly are spatial practices, but that does not mean that 
space itself evokes the practice. Physical space only offers the possibility of social 
practices, but surely the form of the space has an influence on these possibilities, 
and the appearance of the space on the invitation of these practices. The skate 
ramp is distinct from the alley in its possibilities, as is the park compared to the 
parking lot. 
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The narrative behind this chapter, we can state here in hindsight, suggests that 
the urban fabric once offered forms of space that quite naturally provided space 
for social practices amongst a plural public, while the emergence of new (sub)
urban types of neighbourhoods and buildings do not offer the type of spaces that 
offer the same possibilities. The question of course is if this can be ascribed to the 
particular design of these spaces, or if society itself has changed. Bellah of course 
urges the economic worldview that determines society, which seems reasonable. 
We have long lost the modernist expectation of a one on one relationship between 
architecture and social practices. However, to admit this changing cultural and 
societal context does not dismiss the importance of space in this respect. 
This certainly is an ethical statement: the urban fabric should not be taken 
as merely the necessary physical and tangible spaces or connectors between 
buildings and urban blocks, urban districts and boroughs, and between cities 
and the surrounding landscape, neither solely as the concrete space that offers 
room to social structures (it’s possibilities, problems, and limitations simul-
taneously), but as the very expression of the social fabric of a certain culture, 
whose expression in turn influences society. The urban fabric, the sequence of 
spaces are both tangible infrastructure, public sphere (social structure), and 
cultural expression (material culture): this threefold perspective is the horizon of 
architecture. Architecture here is at stake as the profession that plans, designs, 
organizes, and constructs – and often even deconstructs – concrete urban space, 
the everyday environment of the citizen that, although often unconsciously but 
so importantly, affects its experience of the world. This architectural perspective, 
however, is not limited to the desk of the architect, but is publicly relevant. When 
culture today is determined by consumerism and capitalism, this affects actual 
spaces (their appearances, their forms, their materials, the possibilities they offer 
to be appropriated by users, and so on), which in turn affects people’s experiences. 
That is what the social geographer David Harvey also suggests when he writes: 
‘We do not, after all, experience the city blankly, and much of what we do absorb 
from daily life in the city (be it the long drag of the commute, the jostle of subway 
crowds, the blandness of the shopping mall, the elegance or grandeur of certain 
forms of urban architecture, the panhandlers on the sidewalk, or the peace and 
beauty of an urban park) surely has some kind of influence on how we are situated 
in the world and how we think and act politically within it.’371 These aspects, 
public space as public sphere as well as the immediate and tangible experience of 
a common world, are challenged by actual changes in the urban fabric (that surely 
narrates the changing society itself). It, as might be clear, is a pressing ethical 
question not only for designers, but also for planners, developers, politicians and 
others responsible for the development, design and maintenance of cities, neigh-
bourhood, landscapes, buildings. 
The question at this point is whether this narrative on the urbanized landscape 
in Northern America is the only perspective upon society and its actual spaces to 
be told. Certainly not: when we extend our journey in Florida, as we will do in the 
next chapter, for instance to the inner city of Orlando, another narrative develops. 
Where fear rewrote the suburbanized landscape (of the recent past), now renewed 
enjoyment of plurality seems to shape the future of the (inner) city. Some inner 
cities develop – after large periods of vacancy and neglect, into lively neighbour-
hoods again, where new apartments, offices, theatres, museums, and restaurants 
are being built, where terraces are attractive again, people are sunbathing in a 
park, or working in a coffee shop. 
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One day prior to the birth of our eldest son, we moved from the city centre of 
Amsterdam to a neighbourhood in the eastside of the city. We until that moment 
lived in an apartment less than 30 m2, perfect for the two of us, but too small for 
the prospect of becoming a family. The apartment was located in the beautiful 
medieval area, in sight of a canal and the oldest church in town, in Amsterdam’s 
famous red-light district. The area attracts lots of visitors and thus was always 
crowded, especially at the weekend (although it was surely busier in the tourist-
season, from Easter until mid-October). Apart from the inhabitants of this 
particular area, it is not a destination for locals. Some would call it a theme park, 
containing the most beautiful environment with the worst of Dutch culture. 
However, from our new location in the city, the centre still was easily accessible. 
Almost every destination could be reached within a twenty minute’s bike-ride 
or a quarter by tram. From our perspective in the east, we have experienced the 
fuss in Amsterdam city-centre growing extraordinary. The increase of visitors is 
not limited to downtown. It slowly but surely also entered our new neighbour-
hood. Around the corner a hostel was opened, a former hospital was turned in 
a four-star hotel, and, with AirBnB becoming increasingly present, the tourists 
also entered our street. But the increasing fuss obviously is not limited to foreign 
visitors, nor to any season: it also includes expats and the increasing student 
population in the city, recently graduated job hunters, young couples, and 
families that stay, which are attracted by the buzz of new cafés, coffee bars, pizza 
restaurants, bakeries, and even more coffee bars. We were part of the new urban 
revival – the city was attractive again. 
This revival certainly was almost diametrically opposed to the stories we heard 
while living in the city-centre. We lived at that moment in a community, which 
was started in the fifties, when huge parts of the historic city were in decay, and 
lots of the properties were vacant. The community survived during even more 
vacancy and decay in the neighbourhood around, until the eighties, from when the 
inner city slowly but surely attracted new citizens. The revival was also opposed 
to the stories we heard while doing, alongside our regular jobs, volunteering 
work with homeless people, the prostitute-neighbours, and illegal citizens. Their 
broken lives, their stories somehow revealed a different reality, then others who 
we touched upon as well, being part of these groups of people that certainly can be 
called ‘new urbanites’. In our daily life, we experience the segregation of realities, 
that seemed to increase day by day. Even during the economic and financial crisis, 
that brought The Netherlands in a downward spiral from 2008 onwards, the 
appeal of living in this city remained. It fuelled housing costs and increased the 
cost of living in the city, and thus propelled the segregation between the ‘new’ and 
highly educated inhabitants, and the original inhabitants and other newcomers, 
that cannot compete with them. 
Whereas the concluding remarks in the previous chapter offered a sombre 
perspective – the urban fabric has lost its connecting power (if there actually is 
such a thing that we can expect in physical form) – this chapter deals with the 
recent turn in stories on the city, in which plurality, proximity, and even risk, 
play an important role. Some inner cities develop in lively neighbourhoods again, 
where new apartments are being built, terraces are full, people are sunbathing in 
a park and work on their laptops in a coffee bar. Although this seems to develop a 
promising and positive perspective upon physical space as a space of meeting and 
exchange, behind this appreciation of diversity a process of further segregation 
comes to the fore. Whereas the enclaves, as described in the previous chapter, 
are concrete spaces of withdrawal, what happens in the city seems to be the other 
way around: while the knowledge workers turn to the world, others seem to be 
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excluded within the same moment and movement. This chapter discusses the 
new valuation of urban life, and how it is related to public space. Via the riots 
in London and Paris, in 2005, that some theorists understand as related to the 
increasing segregation within cities, we also touch upon the revolutionary protests 
of the Arab Spring as well as the Occupy Movement in 2011. These events in 
public space stress the political dimension beyond these spaces. If the possibility 
to demonstrate is the very ideal beyond public space, what does that mean for 
actual spaces? Or better said, how can we, that is, architects, ‘form’ them in such 
a way that the diverse events of public and political life can take place, can occupy 
the place for a while. This perspective thus challenges the design of public spaces 
- a perspective that, finally, is addressed through a close reading of Parc de la 
Villette in Paris, a very much debated design of the French-American architect 
Bernard Tschumi from 1986. 
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3.1 Press photo’s of the opening of the exhibition 
Children of New York at Park 51, September 21, 2011
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3.2 ‘Edge City’ Cumberland (foreground) of Atlanta, GA 
(downtown visible in the background)
178
3.3 Jasmine Street, Water Street, Celebration Boulevard, 
and Market Street, Celebration, FL.
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3.4 New Investmetns in Los Angeles (Downtown)
1. Cathedral of the Lady of Our Angels  (Rafael Moneo, 2002)
2. Walt Disney Concerthall (Frank Gehry, 2003)
3. The Broad Museum (Diller Scofidio + Renfro, 2016)
4. Los Angeles County Museum of Art (Peter Zumthor, forthcoming)
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3. 4.
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3.5 The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao 
(Frank Gehry, Bilbao, Spain, 1997) 
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3.6 Rotterdam, November 1st, 2017, 10.00 am
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3.1 THE REDISCOVERY OF URBAN PLEASURES
3.1.1 Park51
The space is white. Very white: even the floor is coloured light, a bit greyish. 
On the walls are images: a series of photographs placed in a varied pattern. A 
group of musicians are sitting in front, playing their violins, flutes and cellos. 
All musicians, men and women, are wearing black: a suit, a dress or another 
sophisticated outfit. People are all over the space, easily recognizable as modern 
citizens: young, rich, and successful, sipping their glass of wine or water. A few of 
the people are listening to the music; others investigate the photographs on the 
walls. Most of them just gather together, enjoy a conversation, looking around 
for other interesting opportunities, nice people to meet. It is like the first scene of 
By Nightfall, the novel of the New York based author Michael Cunningham, the 
opening of a gallery, and exhibition.1 
There might be a difference, even in the lively New York cultural scene. Behind 
the people with the trendy suits, sophisticated dresses, naked shoulders, high 
heels and fashionable shoes, turbans and scarfs can also be seen. Some men even 
have beards (and these pictures are taken before the beard made its comeback 
on the faces of urban hipsters). It is clearly what is termed a multicultural 
public. Amongst the public, television cameras and photographers are also seen, 
recording the event. That many cameras is quite rare for one or another opening 
of an exhibition in a gallery somewhere in New York. There are simply too many 
openings; only a few will attract the journalists and reporters. And even more 
rare: this series of photographs capturing the event have reached the newspapers 
and internet sites around the globe.[IMAGE 3.1] 
Indeed, an opening it is: the varnishing of the exhibition of the New York 
Children Project, an attempt of the photographer Danny Goldfield to photograph 
one child of every nationality that lives in New York. His photos are sharp and 
touching – these little kids in a big city.2 The photos deliver a clear insight into the 
current population of the city, the enormous diversity not only in backgrounds but 
also in circumstances. A nice project, but certainly not the reason the images of 
the opening were being published worldwide. And moreover, not the reason that 
a police officer is posting in the street, keeping an eye on the front door, which is 
shown in one of the last images of the series as well. A hint is given through one 
of the turbans in the images: it is decorated with the American stars and stripes. 
The turban and the American sensibilities: this New York Children Project is the 
first exhibition in the gallery of Park51, the opening is the very first public event in 
what has become known as the ‘Ground Zero Mosque’. 
About a year before this opening, this very first public event, the initiative to 
establish Park51 was the object of a huge controversy – with demonstrations, 
advertisements in newspapers, on television and even on New-York-City-buses, 
public speeches, websites for and against, articles in newspapers as well as 
columns, and so on. A public debate, so to say: hot, emotional, and vigorous. 
Even the then mayor of New York, Michael Bloomberg had to react, as well as 
then president Barack Obama.3 The controversy encircled the question of whether 
Muslims should be able to establish a Community Centre, including a prayer room 
for 1,500 visitors, on a two-minute walk from Ground Zero. It was of course the 
nearness of this latter place of the former Twin Towers and the 9/11 happenings 
that fuelled the debate. Park51 after all was not the very first Muslim community 
established in Lower Manhattan. Two other groups have their prayer space in 
1. 
Michael Cunningham, Bij het 
vallen van de avond (Amsterdam: 
Prometheus, 2010), 13-15
2.
http://www.nytimes.com/
slideshow/2011/08/02/nyre-
gion/20110802-park51-ss.
html?ref=park51 [accessed January 
2nd, 2012]
3.
The speech of mayor Bloomberg 
on tolerance has widely been 
published on the internet. See for 
instance: http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/michael-bloomberg/mayor-
bloomberg-on-the-ne_b_669338.
html [accessed January 4th, 2012]; 
see for a video on Obama’s support: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/
POLITICS/08/13/obama.islamic.
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bid=qlMj9FlaYim&wom=false 
[accessed January 4th, 2012]
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Lower Manhattan as well, FactCheck wrote during the arousal. The website aimed 
to clarify facts in the controversy, since it obviously was dominated by emotions, 
rumours, and even twisted or misrepresented facts, today called alternative facts 
(as for instance the rumour that the Centre would open its doors on September 
11th, 2011, exactly a decade after the attacks on the Twin Towers).4 
The Park51 community established their gathering space (in Park Place 
45, two blocks from Ground Zero) in May 2009 and from this very start their 
ambitions were clear: to start a Community Centre modelled after the Christian 
YMCAs in the city and the Jewish Community Centre on the Upper West Side. 
Park51’s ambition was to be ‘a vibrant and inclusive community’, ‘inspired by 
Islamic values and Muslim heritage’, ‘serving New York City with programmes in 
education, arts, culture, and recreation’ as their website reads.5 By doing so, the 
organization states, they ‘foster cooperation and understanding between people 
of all faiths and backgrounds.’6 It is their ambition to be one of the spots in the 
city where people, with different origins and convictions, meet, discuss, learn 
and exchange. In order to achieve their goal, they create room for this meeting, 
through their programme as well as through the spaces they add: the gallery and 
the auditorium, the café and the education rooms. 
In May 2010 concrete plans were presented at the Local Community Board by 
the board of Park51 and a developer. The existing buildings at Park Place 45-51 
were bound to be replaced by a fifteen storey high building, which would house 
the exhibition space and the prayer room on ground level. On the upper floors 
other facilities would be added: at least a swimming pool, childcare, a library, an 
auditorium and a restaurant. As is also the case with the YMCA and the Jewish 
Community Centre, all facilities are meant to be open to the public – believers 
or not. A few months later the New York architectural firm SOMA presented 
two preliminary sketches of the new façade – architecturally speaking indeed 
preliminary, a rather superficial trial to transform middle east figures and patterns 
in a contemporary image, a façade structure that would allow wider openings as 
well as more closed sections where needed. The images actually didn’t say much 
about the building and the ambitions of the mosque, but the Local Community 
Board nevertheless approved the plans almost unanimously later that month, as 
did the Landmark commission in August 2010 (and with that latter approval, they 
were allowed to demolish the existing buildings).7 It is around this final formal 
announcement that controversy arose – at the looming of US Midterm elections 
on November 2nd, 2010. Despite the public criticism, the community elaborated 
on their initiative: they started fundraising in the fall of 2010, and opened a 
preliminary exhibition space on September 21th, 2011 with the varnishing of the 
mentioned exhibition of the New York Children Project.
The Park51 controversy was obviously only one of multiple public conversations 
in New York during the fall of 2010, yet it attracted lots of global attention. Not 
only since it was the hottest debate, with lots of participants, it was also the 
most precarious and most far reaching, since it dealt with a grievous past of the 
city in which lots of people felt involved, as well as with the very fundamentals 
of the open Western society and political democracy: the freedom of conviction 
and religion, the freedom of gathering and the freedom to establish businesses, 
communities, and associations. 
What had happened was beyond imagination and ‘real life’ seen on television 
worldwide. The planes hitting the towers, the suicide of desperate people on the 
upper floors of the towers, the collapse of these towers – nobody could believe 
what happened, and almost everybody felt perplexed. It changed not only 
4.
http://www.factcheck.org/2010/08/
questions-about-the-ground-zero-
mosque [accessed January 2nd, 2012]
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http://park51.org/vision [accessed 
January 2nd, 2012]
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the world generally, but also how the world is perceived. The architect Daniel 
Libeskind, who won the architectural competition for the World Trade Centre site 
that was organized after 9/11, states in an interview with Architectural Record: 
‘This is now a site that has memory in it. This is a site where people perished. This 
is a site which forever has altered how we view New York and the world.’8 The 
site, in other words, had turned into a symbolic space.9 Libeskind had won the 
competition with a design that was completely rooted in this symbolism, simulta-
neously picturing the grievous history, as well as challenging national pride for the 
country, showing the world that the city was able to recover from the strike and 
to develop into an even stronger city. The Park51 controversy however showed 
other layers that apparently were alive and vivid in the city and around the world 
as well. It pressed the question how the city needed to deal with its painful history, 
with the tangible injuries and scars in concrete space. Could the city proceed here, 
in this area, as it would do elsewhere? Each move the city would make, could be 
explained as a victory for the terrorists, actually. 
Most of the opponents of Park51 were not against Muslims establishing 
community buildings in New York generally, but establishing a mosque in this 
area, they emphasised, could be understood as ‘a slam in the face of everybody 
involved’. An advertisement on the New York buses in the autumn of 2010 asks: 
‘Why there?’ Other opponents go even further: as if the project right here is finally 
a sign of Islamic triumph. This actually was the very message of the speech that 
Dutch controversial politician Geert Wilders delivered at a demonstration against 
the project on 9/11, 2010. Ground Zero, he said literally, was ‘holy ground’ of 
which Islamists should be kept away. ‘No Mosques here!’ he yelled in his speech, 
and the crowd repeated.10 The speech of course is a rhetorical tour de force, but it 
elicits an emotional response to developments around this specific site.
The proponents on the other hand emphasised that forbidding the mosque to be 
built here would be a victory for the terrorists as well. The city and the Western 
world after all were built upon tolerance and freedom: the freedom of gathering, 
of initiative, of conviction and religion, of protest, and of participation. Forbidding 
the community to erect a building here, forbidding the community to gather here, 
would violate the essence of the Western world. In his speech Bloomberg explicitly 
referred to this essence of Western democracy. ‘Should government,’ he stated, 
‘attempt to deny private citizens the right to build a house of worship on private 
property based on their particular religion? That may happen in other countries, 
but we should never allow it to happen here. This nation was founded on the 
principle that the government must never choose between religions, or favor one 
over another.’11 According to Bloomberg such freedom is not only rooted in its 
very foundations of American society and particularly the city of New York, it also 
was and is its strength: ‘This is the freest City in the world,’ he stated literally. 
‘That’s what makes New York special and different and strong.’12 New York is 
an attractive city – an attractiveness that is reciprocal. The city is attractive for 
people from all over the world, not only to visit, but also to inhabit. It is attractive, 
since it attracts lots of people, different people, which gives the city its form and 
substance. In other words, the attractiveness is strongly related to its diversity, 
a diversity that is at the very foundations of the city: ‘New York City,’ the mayor 
said, ‘was built by immigrants, and it is sustained by immigrants - by people 
from more than a hundred different countries speaking more than two hundred 
different languages and professing every faith.’13 
With this speech Bloomberg not only emphasizes the foundation of this 
particular city, as well as the United States of America and Western society 
generally, but also addresses the attractiveness of the city by stressing the power 
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of diversity. With this emphasis on diversity he is in line with what has become the 
dominant narrative on cities in about the last one-and-a-half decade: the diversity 
of the public is the strength of cities. I can’t describe the value of this diversity and 
the tone of the debate on cities more beautifully than Thomas L. Friedman did in 
his column in the New York Times during the Park51 controversy:  
‘…the sheer creative energy that comes when you mix all our diverse people 
and cultures together. We live in an age when the most valuable asset any 
economy can have is the ability to be creative – to spark and new imagine new 
ideas, be they Broadway tunes, great books, iPads or new cancer drugs. And 
where does creativity come from? … It comes from being exposed to divergent 
ideas and cultures and people and intellectual disciplines … The resistance to 
diversity, though, is not something we want to emulate … Countries that choke 
themselves off from exposure to different cultures, faiths and ideas will never 
invent the next Google or a cancer cure, let alone export a musical or body of 
literature that would bring enjoyment to children everywhere.”14 
Friedman here thus supports the ambition of the community as an initiative that 
enriches public life of the city and society. And Park51 literally can be seen as a 
facility gathering together a diverse public through setting up programmes and 
organizing events. 
It is the size of New York City that enables its diversity: it has enough ‘critical 
mass’ to support and join a diverse range of businesses, possibilities, initiatives 
and happenings. In one evening a theatre has a premiere, a film is launched, 
a museum organizes a lecture, a restaurant is serving a new menu, a famous 
musician performs at a concert hall, a company presents a new service, a 
Community Centre organizes a varnishing day for their very first public exhibition 
– and there is a public that is interested and able to attend these events. And 
around the corner of course the coffee shops are open, as well as bars, restaurants, 
swimming pools, fitness clubs, supermarkets, laundries. A school is organizing 
evening lessons in painting, dancing, writing; a church organizes voluntary work 
in one of the homeless shelters. There is yoga in the elevated park, music at the 
metro station, IKEA is still open, ice skating on the rink. This on-going amalgam 
of activities is an important image of the city and the metropolis: collections of 
multiple happenings, events, actualities, taking place on the streets, squares, 
parks and in its buildings, in the galleries as well as in the theatres, on the river 
as well as in the drainage canals, in the city hall as well as in private clubs. It is 
the range of possible activities that makes the city attractive to inhabitants and 
visitors, tourists and expats, yuppies and artists. This seems to be a virtuous 
circle: the sheer size and diversity of the public enhance the possibilities to 
organize diverse initiatives, and vice versa. Park51 itself thus adds diversity to the 
city, because of what it is and what it offers in particular spaces and programmes 
(as it also might be able to attract a plural public itself to attend their activities). 
City and Community Centre thus have a reciprocal relationship as well.
3.1.2 Time is Changing Again
This emphasis on the reciprocal relationship between plurality and the city 
embodies a positive narrative on the future of cities that has attracted attention 
in the past one-and-a-half decades. It mainly is fueled by the research and books 
of Richard Florida, specifically his The Rise of the Creative Class from 2002.15 
14.
Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Broadway and 
the Mosque’, in: The New York Times, 
August 3, 2010
15.
Richard Florida, The Rise of the 
Creative Class, And How it’s Trans-
forming Work, Leisure, Community, 
& Everyday Life (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002)
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Florida in turn admits to be influenced by Jane Jacobs, the famous critic of the 
modernist city and urban activist from the 60s onwards, upon which we already 
touched. Jacobs rendered this plurality of the city as visible in street life as 
attractive instead of ‘noisy’ and ‘dangerous’. ‘Great cities,’ she writes in her famous 
book Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), ‘are not like towns, only 
larger. They are not like suburbs, only denser. They differ from towns and suburbs 
in basic ways, and one of these is that cities are, by definition, full of strangers. To 
any one person, strangers are far more common in big cities than acquaintances.’16 
Strangers not only are present in the city, they dominate the space. Even up to ‘a 
man’s own doorstep’, as she adds.17 Jacobs thus emphasizes strangers and public 
life as essential aspects of the city. She urges this against the background of the 
urban renewal in her days, which roused her attention and opposition. Urban 
renewal at that time was mainly imagined as demolishing existing buildings, to 
be replaced by new building-configurations that were based on suburban models, 
introducing air and light as well as simultaneously removing the clutter and 
the fine grained street life (together with the streets itself).18 Jacobs described 
everyday public life on the streets – people collecting their post, walking their dog, 
strolling to the bakery, wandering with their child, and even overlooking the street 
through their (kitchen) window – as important for the livability and attractiveness 
of urban space. It was through these different ‘eyes on the street’, or the possibility 
that someone overlooks the street from the house, that safety is secured. For 
Jacobs however it is not the safety that counts first, it is the community that 
is formed through street life. In an early address at the Architectural School 
of Harvard University (1956) she stated that ‘planners and architects are apt 
to think, in an orderly way, of stores as a straightforward matter of supplies 
and services … but stores in city neighbourhoods are much more complicated 
creatures, which have evolved a much more complicated function. Although they 
are mere holes in the wall, they help make an urban neighbourhood a community 
instead of a mere dormitory.’19 Jacobs here describes the city in what we can call 
‘parochial’ perspectives, to use a term coined by the sociologist Lyn Lofland.20 
By the very use of services in the neighbourhoud, by kids playing on the streets, 
by sitting on a bench in front of the house, neighbors learn to know themselves, 
as they somehow appropriate the streets, make it their own. These streets in the 
city, although occupied, differ from the streets in the village or town, since it 
is still a space where strangers, as we have seen above, belong to that everyday 
environment, rather than outsiders in a particular scene. However, in her latter 
book Cities and the Wealth of Nations Jacobs investigates the importance of 
cities and their very diversity for a country economically – and with that study she 
indeed is a pioneer of the current debate on cities.21 The very plurality that Jacobs 
emphasizes as the essence of city life is now seen as the sheer economic strength 
of cities, and much urban policies are encircling this topic, searching for ways to 
be attractive to new inhabitants, and economically vital for the future.22 
Traces of the renewed interest in cities and diversity could of course already be 
found in the suburbanized landscape before Richard Florida and others brought 
them to economic formula, for instance in what is called by the journalist Joel 
Garreau ‘Edge Cities’ and the initiatives of the New Urbanism movement to 
break through the monotony of the suburbs.[IMAGE 3.2] Garreau, in his book simply 
called Edge City, presents his topic as a third wave after first the post-World 
War II movement of the homes to the countryside, secondly the movement of 
marketplaces out of downtown to where the people actually live, and thirdly – or 
‘today’, as he writes, – ‘we have moved our means of creating wealth, the essence 
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of urbanism – our jobs – out to where most of us have lived and shopped for two 
generations. That has led to the rise of Edge City.’23 Garreau describes these ‘Edge 
Cities’ as ‘real cities’, but without the frightening things of the ‘old’ cities. Garreau 
cites the cultural historian Leo Marx, who argued that these areas represented 
‘an escape from the negative aspects of civilization,’24 but not as a withdrawal 
from the city, but by catching the best of both worlds. A city, but without all its 
restraints. Garreau suggests that the ‘Edge City’ combines the joy of the landscape 
with aspects of the urban figure of downtown – a mixture of functions: offices and 
shops intertwined with apartment buildings and restaurants, bars, cinemas, and 
theatres. This downtown image is stretched in order to embed the automobile 
as the agent of movement. Garreau actually understands this third move as 
another trial to establish the American Dream in a particular balance between 
landscape, nature, neighbourhood, homeownership, freedom, and community. 
The strict mono-functional suburbs and malls didn’t fulfil the expectations, 
whereas ‘Edge City may be the result of American striving once again for new, 
restorative synthesis,’ he argues. ‘Perhaps Edge City represents Americans taking 
the functions of the city (the machine) and bringing them out to the physical edge 
of the landscape (the frontier). There, we try once again to merge the two in a 
newfound union of nature and art (the garden), albeit one in which the treeline is 
punctuated incongruously by office towers.’25 This new form of ‘city’, despite the 
concentration of services near the residential areas is however still preoccupied by 
the prevention of ‘congestion’.26 Edge Cities are organized by the strive for safety, 
car-accessibility, and cleanness, whereas the tool again is segregation of functions 
(and inhabitants as well), with its ‘landmark structure’ of the ‘celebrated single 
family detached dwelling, the suburban home with grass all around.’27 Garreau’s 
Edge City is not simply a new model in which the suburban spirit merges with 
the merits of urbanity. It articulates first the replacement of investments from the 
inner city towards other locations, particularly located in the periphery, as well as 
secondly the new form of the megalopolis, which is not organized along a single 
core (as the classical city), but is an urban landscape or territory with multiple 
cores.  
The second example of dissatisfaction with the monotony of the urbanized 
landscape, the New Urbanism movement on the contrary does not go back to 
the inner-city-model (with skyscrapers, offices, shopping, leisure) but comes up 
with proposals to apply lessons learned from Jacobs within the suburban model 
of the neighbourhoud. The New Urbanism approach was developed during the 
eighties of the last age, when architects and urban designers joined forces in their 
dissatisfaction with the results of the processes of suburbanisation. They critiqued 
the suburban typologies that spread over the country without hierarchy, without 
collective entity, even without identity, highly depending on car-infrastructure. 
In other words, they put forward the loss of clearly recognizable neighbour-
hoods and the strict mono-functionality of suburban developments. In 1993, 
a group of architects and urban designers founded the Congress for the New 
Urbanism, organizing annual conferences in different American cities. During 
the 1996 conference a ‘charter’ was ratified, in which the group put forward their 
‘design philosophy’, which is rendered by ‘return to a more traditional, compact, 
town-planning strategies intended to slow down people (and cars), connect to 
existing conditions and emphasize enduring building types and place-based char-
acteristics,’ as the architect Ellen Dunham Jones, vice-president of the Congress, 
writes.28 The charter starts with a short statement on the contemporary urbanised 
landscape, that is described as ‘disinvestment in central cities, the spread of 
placeless sprawl, increasing separation by race and income, environmental deteri-
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oration, loss of agricultural land and wilderness, and the erosion of society’s built 
heritage’, which is rendered as a challenge of community-building.29 Immediately 
after this statement the charter reveals the goals of their approach, focussing on 
the creation of ‘real neighbourhoods’ that are ‘diverse in use and population’, 
‘designed for the pedestrian’, structured by ‘physically defined and universally 
accessible public spaces and community institutions’ which are ‘framed by 
architecture and landscape design that celebrate local history, climate, ecology, 
and building practice’, offering therewith a ‘supportive physical framework’ for 
‘economic vitality, community stability, and environmental health’.30 This intro-
duction is followed by recommendations for distinct levels of the urban design, 
the region, the neighbourhood, and the block, which addresses the planning, 
the layout and the architecture of the community, emphasizing the aspect of 
‘community’ and ‘identity’ through urban and architectural design. 
The manifesto seems to offer a gentle agenda as a response to the deficiencies of 
suburban developments. The outcome of it, however, has led to even more divided 
landscapes, an increase of enclaves, wherein these principles were implemented, 
but still failing to be part of a larger urban, suburban, or landscape fabric. 
The New Urbanism initiative did not emerge out of nothing: in the preceding 
examples, movements of ‘idealists’ that built their own ‘utopias’, this threat of 
the enclave, to describe it in negative terms, is already visible. Most well-known 
is the ‘planned city of Irvine’ in Los Angeles that was designed early in the sixties 
by William Pereira in collaboration with the Irvine Development Company. 
Pereira divided Irvine in townships that were separated by access roads. Every 
township was proposed to consist of houses in a similar design, commercial 
centres, schools, church-buildings, and quite a lot of greenery. Specific to this 
development also is a certain emphasizes on safety: citizens were even screened 
before they were allowed to live in these villages. Parts of Irvine are actually still 
functioning as proposed. However, such ‘idealized’ and planned cities are the 
first signs of both the critique on the endless urbanization of the landscape, as 
well as simultaneously the first appearances of gated communities in the urban 
landscape – as fear shaping the urban landscape. The influence of New Urbanism 
on the development of new suburban neighbourhoods is beyond doubt. Most of 
the newer developments are structured along crescents and cul-de-sacs, curling 
streets and collective spaces, however most of them without the addition of 
facilities for shopping, eating, recreating, as well as without the differences in 
‘building typologies’ as the ‘New Urbanists’ plead for.
It’s worth a Google detour, to once again travel back to the Florida landscape 
that I explored in the previous chapter in order to travel through on of the most 
well-known examples of this New Urbanism movement, to the community 
of Celebration, just southwest under the shadow of Disney World.[IMAGE 3.3] 
Celebration is actually well known since it was the first ‘real world’ neighbourhoud 
developed by the Disney concern that took the initiative in the early nineties. 
The Disney Development Company asked well known architects to contribute to 
the development of this 20 km2 plot. The architect Robert A.M. Stern supervised 
the urban plan together with Jacquelin Robertson. He modelled the town after 
an early 19th century American town separating two mainly residential areas and 
a central neighbourhood, where businesses? and dwellings are mingled. These 
three neighbourhoods are separated by fragments of the original landscape. Stern 
also delivered the design of the hospital. Michael Graves was asked to design the 
tiny Post Office, while Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown were busy with the 
Suntrust Bank, Philip Johnson delivered the design for the Town hall (a pyramid 
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roof on a dazzling number of columns), adjacent to the Post Office, and Cesar Pelli 
was asked to design a cinema. 
The afore mentioned aspects of New Urbanism – emphasis on the neighbour-
hood, diversity in use, pedestrian oriented, accessible public spaces, and attention 
to architecture – are well recognizable in Celebration. Today the community is 
inhabited by almost 7,500 people (amongst them 447 veterans) with a median 
age of about 39. About 1,200 of these inhabitants are ‘foreign’ born, 4.1% of 
the inhabitants live under the poverty line (median income in the area above 
$92.500,-, whereas the high school rate is at the height of 97.5%. To compare 
with Orlando city, with a population of 238.000, the high school rate is at 86.7%, 
people living under the poverty line 17.3% (median income is $42.755,-).31 
The statistics thus show a prosperous neighbourhood, as does the image from 
Google Streetview. Surprisingly, Celebration is well covered by the Google 
Streetview Car, and shows immediately its distinctness in comparison to other 
neighbourhoods in the surroundings. The mixed use neighbourhood is located 
in the middle – one can find there a Celebration school, and the Celebration 
‘centre’, complete with shops, terraces, a pub, a tavern (but where’s the church?),32 
apartment buildings, all facing the Celebration pond, and built in ‘traditional’ 
architecture. Quite characteristic of this central neighbourhood, as well as the two 
adjacent ones, is the ‘perfection’ of every street, the architecture of the houses, 
the well maintained gardens, the attention to the public spaces, the landscape 
in-between. There are lots of differences – within the residential area not only can 
family-houses be found, but the edges of some plots also offer room for apartment 
buildings, some office-buildings and the local hospital. In between the neighbour-
hoods, which seem to be cut out of the original wetlands, golf courses are created, 
as well as other recreational areas. The two residential neighbourhoods consist 
of white painted wooden houses (in different sizes) with verandas and stairs, in 
front of perfectly mown lawns, black tiled roofs, white painted fences. The centre 
has slightly green painted townhouses, with black painted fences. Nice trees 
accompany the streets, which are well maintained. Broad sidewalks indeed offer 
room for pedestrians, while pools with fountains make the stroll nice. A grass strip 
is emptied in the middle of the plan of one of the neighbourhoods – collective 
spaces all over the place. 
I have to admit that I expected Celebration to be a gated community. And I 
thus was surprised to find out there were no walls around it, nor guards at the 
entrance, or even a porch that could be closed. Surely, the very location and the 
limited entrances to the neighbourhood(s) are signs of control and limited access; 
it is still a community on its own, only slightly embedded in a larger infrastruc-
tural network. Despite the lack of a ‘gate’, through its location, accessibility and 
image it still has characteristics of a gated community – specifically the image 
of perfection, that is set by well painted buildings and fences, as well as the well 
maintained public space, displays identity and control. It is the suburban enclave 
with a façade (in the middle part) of urbanity, although again – like in the Edge 
Cities – without everything that can disturb the image of perfection.33 
Both the New Urbanism movement as well as the emergence of Edge Cities 
somehow can be seen as a sign of a more or less recent change of perspective 
towards the suburban developments around American Cities, specifically of the 
mono-functionalism and the experience of a certain loss of ‘community’. Both 
attempt to establish new spatial and organizational forms of urban environments, 
but without the negative aspects that are associated with cities: the danger, the 
dirtiness, sloppiness, and depravation. Their charter directs the designers to 
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re-introduce pre-modern urban forms, like the street and the square, sidewalks 
and parks, as we have seen. This pre-modern approach, according the archi-
tectural historian Vincent Scully, treats the organization of the city, the neigh-
bourhood, as a sequence of enclosed spaces (enclosed by buildings), whether the 
modern approach is concentrated on the buildings as objects in space – where the 
buildings can even become sculptural by themselves.34 The British philosopher 
Roger Scruton supports the emphasis on the street as the principal figure of urban 
design: ‘People can live without parks,’ he states, ‘but not without streets, they can 
live without greenery, but not without accessible windows and doors. The street 
is the most important of open public spaces, and the task of constructing a street 
is the most important that any planner may face.’35 The urban sociologist critic 
David Harvey however judges the trials of New Urbanism as empty gestures: ‘No 
amount of “new urbanism” understood as urban design, can promote a greater 
sense of civic responsibility and participation if the intensity of private property 
arrangements and the organization of commodity as spectacle (of which Disneyfi-
cation is the prime example) remains untouched. Empty gestures of this sort with 
respect or the organization of public space abound.’36 
However, these trials to overcome the deficits of the suburbanised city are 
surpassed now by the contemporary embracement of plurality, as I touched 
upon above, in which even the negative aspects of the city are accepted if not 
engaged. It specifically is the dependency of the inhabitants on the car that 
wrecks the development of the suburban landscape, one might state, and the 
renewed interests in city and city-living might be evoked by bottom-up initiatives 
to overcome this dependency. Traffic jam and travel time have been increased 
enormously in the past decades, which now rouses a movement back into the city 
again.37 The building of a new performing arts centre in the inner city of Orlando, 
which we touched upon in the previous chapter, is a tiny hint of these ‘times they 
are a-changing’ again, a fourth wave that needs to be added to Garreau’s distinc-
tions within suburban movement after World War II, a sign that ‘Edge City’ is not 
the final phase in the process of civilization of the landscape. There is a renewed 
interest in downtown developments, new (public) downtown investments, and 
a new narrative on cities that gets rooted today. In his 1973 book Centers for the 
Urban Environment, Victor Gruen is amongst the first to recognize the old inner 
cities as spaces that need to be re-conquered and re-designed in respect to both 
the economic vitality of urban areas, as well as concerning environmental and 
contemporary social problems. ‘By interweaving’, he proposes, ‘all expressions of 
human life within the urban tissue, we can restore the lost sense of commitment 
and belonging; we can counteract the phenomena of disorientation, isolation, and 
lonesomeness and awaken a sense of identification and participation.’38 Gruen 
again was ahead of his time – only at the end of the last century, downtown 
has made it to the drawing boards of architects, urban planners, and urban 
developers. Even in Los Angeles – this city of fear, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter – this idea now fuels urban planning and downtown developments. In 
2002, the Cathedral of our Lady of the Angels, designed by the Spanish architect 
Rafael Moneo, opened its doors. One year later, two blocks away the Walt Disney 
Concert Hall, designed by the American architect Frank Gehry, opened. In 
2016 a new art museum, The Broad, housing the Broad Art Foundation and its 
collection, opened, the building designed by Diller Scofido + Renfro, that also are 
the designers of the New York High Line, and to be completed at the end of 2013. 
A proposal for the extension of the LACMA, the Los Angeles County Museum of 
Art, by the Swiss architect Peter Zumthor bridging Wilhsire Boulevard roused a 
34.
Vincent Scully jr., Modern Architec-
ture, The Architecture of Democracy 
(New York: Georg Braziller, 1989), 11
35.
Roger Scruton, ‘Public Space and 
the Classical Vernacular’, in: Nathan 
Glazer and Mark Lilla (eds.), The 
Public Face of Architecture, Civic 
Culture and Public Space (New York: 
The Free Press, 1987), 18
36.
David Harvey, ‘The Political Economy 
of Public Space’, in: Setha Low and 
Neil Smith (eds.), The Politics of 
Public Space (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 33
37.
This not only is the case in the United 
States, but also in the European 
landscape this increasingly is tangible. 
Even in the Flemish region, with its 
dispersed cities and culture of single 
family-houses people move back to 
the inner cities. [see Tom Avermaete 
and Karina van Herck (eds.). 
Wonen in Welvaart, Woningbouw 
en wooncultuur in Vlaanderen, 
1948-1973 (Rotterdam: Uitgeverij 
010, 2006]
38.
Victor Gruen, Centers for the Urban 
Environment, Survival of the Cities 
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhald 
Company, 1973), 11
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 3: CITY
191
fierce public debate during the last five years. [IMAGE 3.4] In the meantime, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers – in the USA responsible for protection against flooding 
– approved a plan to revitalize parts of the LA River: it will be widened, wetlands 
will be added, as well as access points and bike trails between Griffith Park and 
Downtown Los Angeles.39 That is remarkable news: a range of urban and cultural 
interventions that can be very well understood as investments ‘beyond’ the Bunker 
Hill development that we touched upon in the previous chapter, besides the 
initiatives by other parties to invest downtown again.40 
Critics have warned about horrible scenarios regarding downtown areas facing 
the initial phases of urban sprawl after World War II, later suburban trends 
and recently also the increasing digitalization of daily life. Downtown would be 
immersed in a downward spiral that would lead to an emptied core over time. This 
has indeed been the case in lots of cities, of which Detroit is the most well-known, 
particularly illustrated by a beautiful theatre building used as a parking garage, 
surrounded by huge empty apartment buildings and a vacant train station. In 
the previous chapter we touched upon the ‘left-over’ space, in-between enclaves, 
depicted by decay, vacant lots, and deterioration, unsafe environments, inhabited 
by the homeless, addicts and other ‘drop outs’ – downtown was such a left-over 
space.41 This narrative on the future of downtown, coloured by loss and despair, 
has changed nowadays due to two different developments. First is the afore-
mentioned trend that citizens increasingly are moving to locations closer to 
their work, in order to be less dependent upon their car(s). Traffic jams are an 
issue, as well as the time spent in the car, while also the worrying scenarios 
about climate change and other environmental issues get rooted in the minds 
of particular groups of people. The local situation is increasingly important: the 
idea to arrange life (including the production of food) as much as possible around 
the own domicile started in a limited sense, but increasingly got attention and 
succession now by new groups of urban inhabitants. This change in preferences 
of the own residential environment and daily life is accompanied by the second 
change: an emerging different economic theory that has gained attention over 
the last decade, and that has offered new perspectives to cities and their planners 
and politicians. This theory emphasizes the ‘knowledge workers’ and ‘knowledge 
economy’ as the key to economic growth in the ‘first world’. This theory binds 
‘knowledge economy’ (and that is the distinctive change), close to the urban 
milieu. ‘Creative people’, the previously mentioned Richard Florida writes, ‘don’t 
just cluster where the jobs are. They cluster in centres of creativity and also where 
they like to live.’42 The city, Florida then refers to Jane Jacobs, can be a place 
of creative ‘gravity’, as it not only caters for a single industry but is a place of 
diversity. In other words, the city and its possible plurality is the very locus of this 
new economic perspective – possible, since cities of course had to change their 
mind, redirect their focus from the monotony of the suburbs to the diversity of 
central places. Florida’s point is not just a nice theory – his book is the articulation 
of a development he saw happening in places like Seattle, Austin, Toronto and 
Dublin, while cities like Buffalo, Grand Rapids, Memphis and Louisville remained 
behind.43 This also counts for the other aspect of our contemporary times that was 
feared previously: the age of the digital media that accompanies, or better said, 
is intertwined with this new economy. Digitalization has not led to less need for 
physical contacts, but, despite the expectations, has further fuelled the eagerness 
to meet and greet physically, to actually see and tangibly experience what is 
projected on a screen. It ‘raises the importance of central functions’, as urban 
sociologist Saskia Sassen analyses,44 specifically to a few global cities that span the 
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world and that are understood as strategic sites, providing resources, creativity, 
and innovation. 
Los Angeles’s new and remarkable (public) buildings need to be understood 
from this perspective. It is the unthought-of turn in previous processes, wherein 
downtown areas either became office-parks, leisure areas or had to suffer decay 
and vacancy. In Los Angeles the downtown area was mostly rendered as office-
park, whereas the new additions somehow stretch to the realm of culture (and 
leisure). These cultural venues are part of the new economic narrative on cities, 
as is the outspoken character of the architecture of the church, the concert hall, 
the museum, and the theatre. Particularly architecture has become a means to 
present the city to the world outside. Not simply as a tourist destination, but also 
to attract attention of firms, businesses and new inhabitants. Architecture, in 
other words, is used in the process of city-branding, by establishing an image of 
renewal, prosperity, diversity. Frank Gehry’s famous design for the Guggenheim 
museum in Bilbao (Spain) can be seen as the predecessor of this development. 
[IMAGE 3.5] As is the case in his design for the Los Angeles’s Walt Disney Concert 
Hall, the Bilbao design is attractive and sculptural, and consists of an astonishing 
skin of titanium-cladded forms that seem to be frozen in the midst of a dance. 
The Bilbao Guggenheim museum attracted a lot of visitors to what was before a 
dump and almost bankrupt Spanish harbour town. Only by huge investments in 
public transport (a new subway) and public space (particularly in the downtown 
area) the economic downward spiral could be stopped. The Guggenheim was the 
almost final investment in that range of structural enhancements of the inner city, 
but depicted from its very initiative until today as the image of the city. It is not 
exaggerating to emphasise architecture here as the means to attract attention. 
Gehry’s design offered something special, astonishing views and sharp contrasts, 
which attracted attention from around the world, as well as thousands of visitors 
to the city. The Bilbao story soon turned into a model that other towns, villages, 
and even cities and metropolises copied in order to change their image and attract 
people. New downtown developments require architecture as a tool in order to 
‘brand’ the city. It needed to be attractive, spectacular, an icon, an eye catcher in 
the tourists’s gaze.45 
During the last fifteen years the debate on downtown areas and cities has thus 
significantly changed. Recent insights in the current economic circumstances of 
the Western World vis-à-vis the emerging economies in the South and the East 
re-appropriated the perspective that was developed by Jane Jacobs during the 
sixties in her well known publications as Death and Life of Great American Cities 
and Cities the Wealth of Nations. Once again, central in this new theoretical 
frame is the assumption that urban plurality is a powerful source of creativity, and 
that it is particularly this creativity that is needed to compete with the emerging 
economies elsewhere around the globe.46 The perspective behind is of course that 
in the Western society the economy has transformed from largely production to 
services, development and innovation, from labor-oriented to creativity-driven. 
This process of course is propelled by the emergance of the global network society 
and ‘information-based’ economics, which in turn, according to Saskia Sassen has 
led to a new type of city. She starts her book The Global City by emphasising the 
four aspects that show the increasing importance of major cities around the world 
– she dwells upon New York, London, and Tokyo, but also mentions Frankfurt 
and Paris as examples, whereas she probably today also would have mentioned 
an additional Chinese example, like Hong Kong.47 First these cities function as 
concentrated spaces of organization of the world-wide economy. Secondly these 
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using our capacities for open-ended 
creation and development.’ Jane 
Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of 
Nations, 224-225
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cities house the financial institutions that are accommodated, as well as, in their 
slipstream, specialized service firms. Thirdly they are ‘sites of production’, specif-
ically the production of ‘innovation’ in leading industries. And lastly, these cities 
are markets as well, markets for the innovation that are produced within the city 
itself.48 This somehow thus is an upward cycle: an accumulating concentration 
of institutions and businesses that are dependent on the availability of highly 
educated and skilled employers, as well as on other institutions and businesses, 
while these employers in turn require a rich cultural, creative environment, 
interesting institutions and businesses to work for, and vice-versa. It is the city 
and its physical and virtual networks that offer both sufficient employers, as well 
as – from the perspective of the employers – the challenging jobs and opportu-
nities.49 To attract knowledge workers as new inhabitants therefore seem to be 
pivotal – Florida at least argues that today, firms follow employers, rather than 
the other way around.50
Richard Florida in his perspective on the city concentrates on the aspect of 
innovation. The city, he states, is the stage of innovation and creativity, since 
in cities diversity is a main characteristic.51 Florida thus pleads to redirect 
investments from the suburbs to the city itself, and emphasises a cultural and 
mental shift in respect to daily city life. Florida emphasizes the importance of 
plural urbanity, and public structures (of public spaces, buildings, services) and 
cultural venues that can accommodate and attract a distinct groups of inhabitants, 
specifically the offerings of a broad range of restaurants, coffee shops, bars 
accompanied by cultural hotspots as libraries, concert halls, and museums, as well 
as sports playgrounds, football courts, runway paths, and fitness rooms, as well 
as a meaningful range of events, concerts, discussions, in public spaces or within 
these public buildings. Whereas in the enclave city ‘public’ space mainly is limited 
to leisure (and shopping), in Florida’s plea public space is seen as a productive 
space. Although offering room for leisure, it is immediately productive in its 
attraction of a plural public. Cities offer public spaces where people meet and 
organize happenings where people are brought together, known and unknown, 
strangers and alike. Cities need to create places, Florida formulates as the future-
agenda for cities, where people can be ‘on their own’, as well as ‘amidst others’.52 
That is fertile soil for creativity, the meeting, planned or by surprise, of others 
that are distinct – a sphere of possibilities, hustle and bustle of urban neigh-
bourhoods. In such society, the laborer does not follows firms, but firms follow 
the sources of creativity, and therefore settle in cities with a highly populated 
‘creative class’, as Florida calls it.53 After years of a lack of political will to invest 
in public spaces (and leave that to the market), Florida called upon politicians 
to take responsibility again. And indeed, cities (and their governing structures) 
increasingly understood the need to be attractive to plural groups of inhabitants, 
and started to invest in the downtown areas, public amenities and cultural venues. 
‘We have taken a step toward the urban diversity and tolerance that prevailed in 
Paris a hundred years ago,’ the journalist Alan Ehrenhalt states in his book The 
Great Inversion, in which he analyses this new urban turn.54 ‘People with widely 
different backgrounds and modes of living come together on the sidewalks of 
Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and a growing number of other cities in ways 
that would have been unthinkable in 1980. American cities are also returning 
to diversity of use: The idea of zoning for segregation of uses is slowly dying in 
America; virtually every city planning official is now looking for ways to promote 
mixed-use zoning, perhaps not the chaotic jumble of the old Paris, but a mixture 
of uses nevertheless.’55 In order to be attractive for inhabitants and visitors cities 
have started to reinvest public money in the liveability of the inner cities, investing 
47.
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Florida distinguishes three aspects 
that the ‘creative’ city should 
inhibit: Technology, Talent, and 
Tolerance. Ibid., Chapter 14; Since 
Florida is educated as an economist, 
his account of course is driven by 
economic perspectives, not political. 
It is – again – economic processes 
that impacts the city, first its fall 
and now its rise as well. That makes 
suspicious to this view. Does this 
economic process need the public, or 
is the public only treated as reservoir 
of creativity? It is as the sociologists 
Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla write 
in their 1987 introductory notes to 
The Public Face of Architecture: ‘If 
the occasions of our public gatherings 
have changed, so have our purposes. 
They have, over the centuries, become 
less political, more commercial – to 
buy, to sell, to display, to bargain. 
We are a commercial republic, and 
it is not surprising that we allow the 
creation of our public space to be 
dominated by commercial interests.’ 
Nathan Glazer and Mark Lilla (eds), 
The Public Face of Architecture, Civic 
Culture and Public Space (New York: 
The Free Press, 1987), xiii
53.
Florida’s definition of the ‘creative 
class’ actually is quite broad: he 
counts all the inhabitants with higher 
education to the creative class, 
which seems to hollow actively the 
very idea of distinguished creativity 
and innovation. Also his emphasize 
on ‘class’ do immediately suggest a 
highly segregated urban landscape, 
whereas the creatives, ranging 
from componers to architects and 
from artists to scientists, even from 
PHD-students till researchers (in 
his case) of course are spread over 
different social classes (and urban 
environments). Some therefor argue 
that the perspective Charles Landry 
develops in his book The Creative 
City, A Toolkit for Urban Developers 
(London: Taylor and Francis, 2012) 
might be more meaningful, since it 
is less broad, more concrete, and is 
immersed in the cultural aspects of 
creativity and the city as well. See 
for this point: Klaske Havik, Urban 
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in public infrastructure, from tangible urban spaces of parks and squares to public 
buildings, like museums, centres for performative art, concert halls, pop stages, 
football stadiums. With these investments the city is focussing on being attractive 
for the ‘knowledge workers’, the creative class, as was suggested by Florida. 
Historically, culture, in a strict sense of the word, comes after times of economic 
surplus, when there is sufficient prosperity, as the sociologist Sharon Zukin writes, 
‘to fund sacrifices for the temple, Michellangelo’s for the chapel, and bequests to 
art museums in the wills of robber barons,’56 nowadays this process seems to be 
inverted. The investment in the cultural sector foregoes the attractiveness of the 
place to the ‘creative class’ as a living environment. The investment in culture, 
accompanied by attractive commissions to world-wide known architects, therefore 
has a function in marketing processes of image-building and city-branding, in 
order to show the world, and specifically the creative class and the global firms 
that something is going on in the city, that the city offers plenty of possibilities of 
things that can be done, be experienced, enjoyed, even during a regular weekday 
evening.57 
 
3.1.3	 Coffee	Will	Save	Downtown
Recent Census data indeed initially show a change in the process of (sub)urban-
isation. Besides that, cities are investing in their urban neighbourhoods, their 
cores, first by building those cultural amenities as a performing arts centre, also 
the downtown areas are increasingly inhibited again. The vibrant city and the 
hustle and bustle of urbanity is ‘rediscovered’ as a thrilling living environment, 
even for families with kids. Increasingly people inhabit the downtown area, even 
statistics show that a movement can be recognized from the suburbs back into 
town. The data gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau, the state office that monitors 
the social circumstances of the American landscape, show that downtown areas 
grew faster than suburbs in 27 of America’s 51 largest metropolitan areas between 
July 2010 and July 2011, which was the case in only five metropolitan areas 
before. Although this development slowly but slightly emerged in the last decade, 
it is propelled by the financial crisis that hit the Western economy in 2008. 
Recently the American journalist Alan Ehrenhalt in his book The Great Inversion 
presented this ‘fourth wave’ of (sub)urbanisation after World War II as a major 
demographic shift.58 Inhabitants now don’t move away from the city, but move 
back to inner cities. One of the minor reasons of the movement back to town, 
he writes, is the concern about environmental issues. It fits in a green and clean 
lifestyle. The major reason is the dissatisfaction with suburban life, Ehrenhalt 
states. City-inhabitants do use their cars less, they live in smaller apartments.59 
Also healthcare issues do play a role, not only amongst citizens, but also in the 
policy of the government and city councils. Former boss of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development of the United States, Ron Sims, states: ‘We 
realized that we could predict life outcomes of children, health outcomes of adults, 
by the zip code they live in. If you have a park a quarter a mile from your home, 
your children are not going to be obese. If it’s half a mile away, you begin to see 
the early signs. But if a park is a mile or more away from a residence, obesity will 
be a problem. How a neighbourhood is designed determines health outcomes.’60 
Sims thus urges a relationship between the availability of public spaces and health 
issues, in which proximity is the key word in this new perspective upon the urban 
environment.61 A renewed interest in living in cities with their well-developed 
physical and virtual infrastructure thus is tangible, as well as simultaneously a 
new policy of investing and improving this physical and virtual infrastructure of 
Literacy, Reading and Writing 
Architecture (Rotterdam: nai010 
Publishers, 2014), 221; We also 
can argue that the broad definition 
Florida uses indeed directs us to 
the wrong direction, and that we 
better can call his ‘create class’ 
the ‘knowlegde workers’, as I used 
previously.   
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Richard Florida, in later writings, 
connect the slightly growing inner city 
with the 2008 financial and economic 
crisis. One of the turns in society due 
to the crisis, he writes, ‘is the resur-
rection of our cities. In the 1960s and 
1970s, our urban cores had been all 
but left for dead. … But what a change 
there has been. For the first time in 
decades, American cities are growing 
faster than the suburbs. … Dispropor-
tionate numbers of the new urbanites 
are 20- to 34-year-olds—who are 
delaying marriage much longer than 
their parents did—and since 2008, 
they have been dealing with the 
effects of the economic contraction. 
Urban living provides them with 
thicker job and dating markets, 
opportunities to share rent with 
roommates, and plenty of things to do 
in their off hours, from bar-hopping 
to attending graduate school.’ Richard 
Florida, ‘The Fading Differentiation 
between City and Suburb’, http://
urbanland.uli.org/Articles/2013/Jan/
FloridaSuburbs [accessed February 
14, 2013]
58.
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Which of course also is because of 
the increasing amount of singles 
or un-coupled within the urban 
environment, but even families with 
children are seeking a more compact, 
less sprawling, less car-dependent 
way of life. 
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(London: Reaktion Books, 2009), 18
61.
Also the New York Times architec-
tural critic Michael Kimmelman 
emphasises the relationship between 
the ‘healthy city’ and public space. ‘A 
healthy city,’ he writes, ‘has a robust 
diversity of public spaces: it needs 
destination places like Central Park, 
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cities. New York houses are specifically some of the success stories in this respect, 
besides the embankments of the Hudson River, also the High Line, Fresh Skills 
Park at Staten Island and the opening of Governors Island as a park.62 In an 
article in the Sunday Review of The New York Times the journalist Frank Bruni 
writes ‘Whenever you doubt that the future can improve upon the past or that 
government can play a pivotal role in that, consider and revel in the extraordi-
nary greening of New York. This city looks nothing – nothing – like it did just 
a decade and a half ago. It’s a place of newly gorgeous waterfront promenades, 
of trees, tall grasses and blooming flowers on patches of land and peninsulas 
of concrete and even stretches of rail tracks that were blighted or blank before. 
It’s a lush retort to the pessimism of this era, verdant proof that growth remains 
possible, at least with the requisite will and the right strategies.’63 This indeed is a 
narrative that is quite well understood amongst policy makers in other cities. As 
Bruni continues: ‘The New York story is a national one. In the centre of Oklahoma 
City a revitalized park complex, Myriad Botanical Gardens, recently took root. In 
downtown Houston, there’s Discovery Green. Dallas is building a park on a deck 
over a downtown freeway, and Los Angeles is looking at how to gussy and green 
up an old concrete river bed.’64 The contemporary development, wherein the city 
increasingly is popular as a residential and working area,65 thus can also be seen 
as re-appreciation of public space. Although the new inhabitants will ‘feature 
elaborate security systems,’ in their houses, they ‘will not be walled off from the 
street. They will want to be in contact with the street.’ Ehrenhalt states.66 ‘People 
do not move to the center of cities,’ he writes as a conclusion, ‘merely to be able to 
get to and from work a quarter of an hour faster. They are settling in cities – those 
who have a choice – in large part to experience the things that citizens of Paris and 
Vienna experienced a century ago. Round-the-clock street life; café sociability; 
casual acquaintances they meet on the sidewalk every day.’67 This renewed interest 
in cities indeed becomes very visible in the increasing amount of coffee houses, 
both the chain stores of Starbucks as well as the increasing amount of local 
speciality bars that pop up in the slipstream of the chain stores in the neighbour-
hoods around downtown.68 The coffee house, somehow again,69 is the stage in 
which the urban economy and the urban area as living environment mingle.70 The 
urban creativity that Florida emphasizes as the essential to the future of cities is 
depicted by the space of such environments. The distinction between personal and 
professional life fades in the post industrial city, and the coffee bar is the perfect 
environment in which work-life and private life come together, specifically for 
smaller businesses and the increasing amount of free lancers, who are ‘footloose’, 
of course due to the rise of portable electronic devices and telecommuting. Profes-
sional meetings on the spot alternate with staying around, reading newspapers, 
tasting fabulous coffees, bumping into others by chance. The quality of the coffee, 
as well as the innovation of new sorts of coffee (beans, roasting, grind, brewing, 
and preparing), of sweets and sandwiches, of amenities (WiFi, newspapers, 
bulletin boards, power outlets), of seating, light, tables, arrangements, the ‘sphere’ 
(organic, vintage, hipster, crafts, bikes), as well as extra organized activities 
are increasingly important for the new urbanites – not just as an environment 
of socializing, but increasingly as a spot for working, reading, writing, in other 
words, for productivity.71 
In this new future-perspective for cities, public space and urban design is 
understood as a prerequisite for (economic) development. Besides investments in 
social factors as public health and education, this also means large investments 
in the demolishing of cheap social housing and restructuring public spaces, in the 
but these don’t’ touch the daily life 
of most people the way neighbour-
hood square do. … To the extent that 
the city has become more liveable 
and humane in recent years, the 
improvement is attributable to the 
improved quality of the parks and 
the spread of public space along the 
waterfront and elsewhere. Public 
health and public space go hand in 
hand.’ Kimmelman, ‘Foreword’, in: 
Ron Shiffman, Rick Bell, Lance Lay 
Brown, and Lynne Elizabeth (eds.), 
Beyond Zucotti Park, Freedom of 
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Ehrenhalt writes: ‘One can meake 
fun of the ubiquitous presence and 
the uniformity of Starbucks, but 
the fact remains that just twenty 
years ago, the idea of coffeehouses 
in urban centers seemed a quaiont 
vision of the vanished past. Now 
one can walk into a Starbucks in the 
center of any large American city at 
ten in the morning or eight in the 
evening and find clusters of coffee 
drinkers deep in converstation, many 
of them lingering as much to talk as 
to consume. It is not going too far to 
say that Starbucks resurrected the 
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repaving of streets and redesign of parks and squares, those places to meet. Cities 
of course do help the regeneration of urban neighbourhoods actively also through 
the subsidizing of the settlement of new business, offering cheap ateliers for 
artists and even by stimulating private developers to invest, a process that today is 
generally called gentrification.72
Whereas the global coffee-chains establish in already settled neighbour-
hoods, privately owned coffee houses emerge in the neighbourhoods around 
the centre, of course in need of cheap retail prices, but also near their ‘market’, 
since the ‘creative class’ initially also can’t afford the affluent housing prizes in 
the very centre. Setting up a coffee bar therefore contributes to the liveability of 
the urban environment. It attracts people and businesses, changes the image of 
the surrounding, and, by doing that actually creates slowly but surely room for 
a process of gentrification – the process of changing demographics in a neigh-
bourhood (although it can be discussed what’s first, the initial phase of gentri-
fication, or the coffee bar and other amenities servicing the new population).73 
Retail prices increase, social housing decreases, housing prices increase, schools 
improve, new urbanites come in and the ‘original’ population is forced out to 
neighbourhoods with worse public spaces and amenities, job opportunities, 
education, and meaningful societal networks74 – this is the backside of the above 
mentioned success story of the renewed investments in the city and public 
spaces.75 Cities themselves of course also contribute to processes of gentrifica-
tion by actively taking initiatives, participating and investing in projects of urban 
renewal, or even sometimes by designating certain areas as extraordinary, as 
‘historic districts’ (upon which we touched in the previous chapter), a ‘label’ that, 
in most cases, will raise the prices of the properties.76 Despite all good intentions 
of investments in public health and education, urban policies are mostly focused 
on economic circumstances and economic growth, which is helpful for the 
economic and financial strength and vitality of urban neighbourhoods, as well as 
for the safety within these neighbourhoods,77 these investments however simul-
taneously propel the process of gentrification.78 This process, however, not only 
disperses the original inhabitants, in the long run, it also makes living in that 
place impossible for the new urbanites. Rents for houses, ateliers, shop-spaces 
will increase – and since the environment is established, another group of 
inhabitants will be attracted, with even more money to spend. The question 
though is how to value this process of gentrification. Lance Freeman, professor 
of urban planning at Columbia University in New York, simply states that it is 
an ‘inevitable consequence of capitalism.’ As long as real estate properties are 
regarded as market commodities, gentrification is part of the – by definition 
continuous – process of urban transformation.79 Others, like the former Columbia 
professor of Urban Planning Peter Marcuse, however, urge the development of 
different policies regarding this process. The displacement caused by gentrifica-
tion, actually by abandonment and decline as well, should be halted, he states. 
‘Neighborhoods in danger of either abandonment or gentrification,’ he writes, 
‘must be given control of their own destinies. Resources must be made available 
to them adequate for that purpose. Public policies dealing with housing (including 
the control of private actions, particularly speculative ones) must have as their 
clear objective the elimination of all displacement in all its forms, whether by 
abandonment or by gentrification.’80 
Although the renewed attractiveness of the inner cities and public spaces regularly 
is celebrated positively, it thus has a backside that is increasingly tangible in 
cities like New York, London, Amsterdam. These cities increasingly become 
coffeehouse experience in present-day 
America: small independent cafés 
have returned to the street along with 
it.’ Ibid., 38 
69.
Ehrenhalt also sees this parallel 
with what the German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas describes in his 
book The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere (Cambridge 
(Mass.): MIT Press, 1989), upon 
which we touched in the previous 
chapter.  The ‘public’ discussion as 
the core of Habermas recognition 
of the coffeehouse as an essential 
space of the public sphere surely has 
changed. But what Habermas doesn’t 
dwell upon in his discussion on the 
coffeehouse, was the than ‘belief 
[in Vienna] in culture and enter-
tainment as the core of life in their 
community’, as Ehrenhalt writes. 
He cites the memoirs of the novelist 
Stefan Zweig, who writes: ‘The first 
glance of the average Viennese into 
his morning paper was not at the 
events in parliament, or world affairs, 
but at the repertoire of the theater, 
which assumed so important a role in 
public life as hardly was possible in 
any other city.’ Ehrenhalt than adds: 
‘Taking the family to a play early in 
the evening and then out for a late 
supper on the Roingstrasse was not 
a special treat; it was a routine part 
of urban living. The Ringstrasse had 
a wide slection of formal restaurants 
for after-theater dining, but for causel 
dining and sociability at all hours 
there was the café, an institution that 
turn-of-the-century Vienna developed 
to a level of suphistication unmatched 
anywhere, before or since. The café 
was a place to drink strong coffee and 
choose from an enormous variety of 
pastries … but for many, it was also 
a place to spend much of one’s day, 
conversing on subjects that ranged 
from the upcoming whether to the 
state of Western civilization. Every 
café had its regulars, who spent three 
or four hours a day there, but also a 
steady supply of smart and talkative 
strangers.’ And then Zweig again: ‘It 
is a sort of democratic club … to which 
admission costs the small price of a 
cup of coffee. Upon payment of this 
mite every guest can sit for hours on 
end, discuss, write, play cards, receive 
mail, and above all go through an 
unlimited number of newspapers and 
magazines.’ Ibid, 31-32
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unaffordable, not only for the ‘original’ inhabitants or the new urbanites, but 
also for the middle class. Prices of properties and rents rise, as do other costs of 
living. It has been argued widely that Florida’s theory on the future of cities and 
the creative class thus has a huge backside: although it celebrates diversity, in 
the long run it propels processes of gentrification and of segregation. In his last 
publication, he admits this perspective – he even calls it (with the title of his book) 
The New Urban Crisis.81 This crisis somehow is inherent in the individual and 
sole economic perspective that supports his view. The city and its public spaces, 
in Florida’s image, is a means towards the development of the individual, to 
challenge creativity, to propel ideas. Compared to the view of for instance Lewis 
Mumford, about four decades previously, this is a limited scope of public space. 
Mumford understood urban encounters as propelling ‘man’s conscious partic-
ipation in the cosmic and the historic process. Through its own complex and 
enduring structure,’ he argues, ‘the city vastly augments man’s ability to interpret 
these processes and take an active, formative part in them.’82 For Mumford 
the essence of the city thus is the ability to participate in public, in something 
beyond the individual, which has a longer pedigree and a particular permanence. 
Although in Florida’s perspective the city and its economic prospects is the frame, 
it is nevertheless all understood through the individual, his needs, his possibili-
ties, his wishes. This focus on individual prosperity requires again smooth areas, 
hipster bars with cocktails, and expensive coffees. 
Since Florida is so clearly focussed upon ‘knowledge workers’ and their assumed 
need for a plural cultural climate, he overlooks the actual – very stubborn 
and even more awkward – forms of plurality, that always have been part of 
the urban culture, and that have been (and still are) important to attract the 
urban ‘pioneers’. Even in the city of Los Angeles this form of plurality has never 
disappeared. Berkeley professor of Architecture Margaret Crawford, analyses this 
plurality, and poses it versus the negative stories on cities and their future. Based 
in research in Los Angeles, she states that the city is continuously redefining 
the very terms ‘public’ and ‘space’ through lived experience.83 This is a process 
that does not specifically happen in the designated area, on streets and squares, 
but can pop-up everywhere and unexpectedly. The ‘continuous re-definition’ of 
spaces is part of the everyday space – that is ‘the connective tissue that binds daily 
lives together, amorphous and so persuasive that it is difficult even to perceive.’84 
That it is so difficult to read is also the reason that only the main narrative of 
loss, deeply bound to the ideal images of public space of the street and square, is 
emphasized over time, she states. ‘In spite of its ubiquity, everyday space is nearly 
invisible in the professional discourses on the city.’85 But by looking closer – that 
is not only better, but also closer to the circumstances in the neighbourhoods 
itself, the continuous process of appropriation and re-appropriation of space 
becomes slightly visible in the street vendors and garage sales, in the often illegal 
demarcation of specific uses, in temporal events, and so on. These spaces contin-
uously change meaning, it is continuously reorganized and reinterpreted by users 
(obviously even the seasons do affect this).86 ‘Individual garage sales’ Crawford 
states, ‘might not in themselves generate new urban politics, but the juxtaposi-
tions, combinations, and collisions of people, places, and activities … create a new 
condition of social fluidity that begins to break down the separate, specialized, and 
hierarchical structures of everyday life in Los Angeles.’87
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Seattle, WA, USA, May 2nd, 2017
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3.2 THE STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC SPACE
3.2.1  Some Notes on the Situation in Europe
This ability of people to occupy and appropriate public spaces with their own 
businesses (in a broad sense of the word) might also offer a lens to investigate 
the suburbs. Ehrenhalt, in his discussion of the renewed interest in cities, after 
all urges that the future of the suburbs and their monotonous developments is 
an urgent urban problem.88 Ehrenhalt holds the new demographic movement 
actually as a process beyond gentrification. It is not about the change of a neigh-
bourhood, but about the complete change of the city itself. The whole urban 
model is turned upside down. And ‘gentrification is a too small word for it’, he 
writes.89 What he means is that the recent development in the American city is 
not just a process of the white residents returning to city centres, the biotope 
of the blacks. It is not the affluent displacing the poor in the downtown area. It 
literally is demographic inversion of the whole city, he states. It is the transfor-
mation of downtown and the suburbs simultaneously. The appearance of the 
city rearranged, where inner cities do increasingly attract the affluent people, 
and those who can’t afford living within the city have no choice but to live in the 
suburb, far away from the inner city. This model, that he somehow also recognizes 
in the European cities with their banlieus is common in the developing world too. 
‘Perhaps more dramatically,’ he states. ‘Mumbai, Cairo, and Rio de Janeiro all 
consist of central districts where tourists and rich locals congregate, surrounded 
by shantytowns populated by newly arrived urbanites who have left zones of rural 
poverty to try to make a fresh start amid the chaos of a mushrooming metropol-
itan population.’90
The contemporary urban situation in Europe – to move a bit away from the 
American perspective that is very dominant in the discourse on public space and 
my writing until now – can be described in distinct ways, depending on what is 
the focus of the aim. The already mentioned German architect Thomas Sieverts 
calls the urban condition as ‘Zwischendsstadt’, neither city nor landscape, the 
result of the aim to both address an urban and a rural ideal.91 In OASE #89, that 
aims to cover the Contemporary European Urban Condition, this form of urban 
development is described as the domination of the mid-size city (besides of course 
the only true Metropolises of London, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Moscow, Istanbul), 
which they describe as being slightly invisible in the discourse on urbanity and 
cities because of its self-evidency. The mid-size city is a place, the editors write, 
‘where the desire for a ‘temperate’ urban experience is the object of urbanism and 
architecture.’ But ‘once the centre of its own surrounding territory, the mid-size 
city is more than even part of an urban network in which the opportunities 
and problems of contemporary urban society are concentrated.’92 This network 
condition in turn is described by the Dutch sociologists Maarten Hajer and Arnold 
Reijndorp as ‘a field’ – their word for what I call ‘a landscape’ in the previous 
chapter. They state that this field consists of ‘an undifferentiated ‘urban sprawl’: 
a random collection of a few old urban cores, villages, in the midst of suburban 
residential areas, shopping centres, airports, brainparks, educational institutions, 
motorways, hotels, railway and metrolines, nature areas, motorway services, 
discos, museums, amusement parks, recreation areas, country estates, stadiums, 
golf courses, distribution centres, ‘leisure’ facilities, multiplex cinemas and so 
on.’93 Although this field is less ‘cocconed’, less separated in distinct enclaves, as is 
the case in America, yet it is heavily segregated as well. It even can be called ‘ghet-
88.
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toisation’, as the French sociologist Eric Maurin concludes in a 2004 study on 
French cities. His research shows that segregation along the lines of class and race 
increasingly took place in the past twenty years. He even talks about the simulta-
neous establishment of ghettos of the upper class and ghettos of the lower class. 
The elite settles down in the urban core, the middle class moves to the suburban 
neighbourhoods, attracted by family housing, while the lower class is stuck to the 
high rise environments of the banlieu.94 
As the sociologist Manuel Castells states in his extensive study to the impact of 
the rise of networks in society, in Europe (central) cities indeed are still shaped 
by their history. Particularly in the last decades, the elite has settled down in the 
well preserved historic area’s in the city-centre, ‘truly exclusive residential areas 
[that] tend to appropriate urban culture and history,’95 which actually today 
also are appropriated by the global economy of tourism.96 These urban cores are 
used today to attract visitors actively, by the organizing of festivals, exhibitions, 
and other events, which of course immediately rouses tension between the city’s 
ambitions and the inhabitants of these areas.97 Such investments in downtown, as 
the Hajer and Reijndorp state in their study In Search of a New Public Domain, 
the attempt to save the city centre controversially treats the very urban charac-
teristics of the core and its public spaces itself. Urban planners use strategies 
of the periphery, specifically homogenization and theming, in order to organize 
the inner city and make it ‘fit to the requirements of wealthy house-hunters and 
consumers who want a safe, controlled and segregated environment.’98 However, 
despite the dissolution of old social class structures in favour of variable lifestyles, 
as some sociologists claim,99 the European city and periphery is thus still strongly 
segregated along the lines of social classes. The European suburbs are, in contrast 
with the American situation, much more the stage of ‘socially diversified space; 
that is, segmented in different peripheries around the central city,’ as Castells 
suggests.100 As one of these segments he also mentions the ghetto, ‘where new 
immigrant populations and poor working families experience exclusion from 
their “right to the city”.’101 There are also the traditional working-class neighbour-
hoods, that nowadays – in times of gentrification – ‘becomes the battleground 
between the redevelopment efforts of business and the upper middle class, and 
the invasion attempts of countercultures.’102 Specifically this latter aspect of trans-
formation seems important. These neighbourhoods, Castell writes, ‘often become 
defensive spaces for workers who only have their home to fight for, being at the 
same time meaningful popular neighbourhoods and likely bastions of xenophobia 
and localism.’103 These demographics somehow tell a story of renewed or 
increasing segregation, a divide between the haves and the have-nots, the rich and 
the poor, those with and without opportunities, the white-collar workers (Florida’s 
creative class) and the blue-collar workers. As the Dutch sociologist Paul Scheffer 
writes in his 2007 extensive study on migration, Het land van aankomst, these 
sharp lines of segregation in cities even can get to a ‘culture of poverty’, a growing 
isolation, and the increasing threat of the outburst of frustration in daily trouble 
or even sudden revolts.104 This remark on riots of course evokes the urban riots 
of the sixties in Los Angeles, Detroit and Newark, as well as the Los Angeles 
riots of 1992, but also to the more recent situation in Europe, the 2005 French 
revolt in the banlieus of major cities as Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, and 
Bordeaux,105 as well as the civil unrest in the boroughs of London that from there 
on spread throughout Great Britain in 2011. Both these civil unrests in Europe 
are understood as fuelled by the poor and desperate social circumstances of the 
protesters – although interviews with protesters in the London revolt show that 
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even ‘affluent people’ with affordable jobs joined the protesters, even in their 
lootings of shops and setting them on fire. The situation in London was slightly 
different from the Paris situation, depending on the very location of the banlieus 
in Paris and other French cities quite a distance from the centre, that function 
much more like a ghetto – ‘a permanent crisis,’ Dutch architectural historian 
Wouter Vanstiphout writes, ‘lived by millions but neglected by tens of millions.’106 
In London the eruptions were much closer to the urban core in even (very) rich 
urban neighbourhoods as amongst others protests occurred in Tottenham, 
Hackney, and Brixton.107 In response the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman connected 
the riots with the consumerist society and the culture of consumption. ‘This are no 
hunger or bread riots,’ he writes, pointing to the pillaging of luxury shops.108 These 
are riots of defective and disqualified consumers.’ In other words, in the culture of 
consumerism has become a means not to fulfil our practical and physical needs, 
but also has a mental dimension: ‘The fullness of consumer enjoyment means 
fullness of life.’109 Due to the increasing segregation in society, the gap between 
knowledge workers and blue-collar workers, between the centre and some 
suburbs, the haves and the have-nots, the last ones literally feel like ‘defective 
consumers’. The riots are the outburst of dissatisfaction about being disclosed 
from contemporary ‘normality’, he states. In other words, Bauman sees in the 
plundering of shops the have-nots taking what they wanted, not simply since they 
cannot afford these luxury goods, but they feel excluded from these goods. Others, 
like the sociologist Richard Sennett, approve the view of Bauman that the riots 
have to be seen as outburst of have-nots.110 Processes of gentrification, fuelled by 
often ambitious intervention in local structures, have dispersed to deliver a feeling 
of exclusion. But this is not just a tension between haves and have-nots, a classic 
tension between classes, the rich and the poor, it is also a tension between the 
global and the local. According to Manuel Castells this precisely was the critical 
factor in urban processes. He writes on the European city, although it is also 
the case elsewhere, ‘urban space is increasingly differentiated in social terms, 
while being functionally interrelated beyond physical contiguity.’111 The biggest 
challenge of the European city is the balancing of the global economic functions 
of cities with the local and cultural roots of urban society.112 But that is what 
actually happens today: the accumulation of capital in the urban centres, which 
fuels the gap between surrounding neighbourhoods. It is symbolized by huge 
investments in the urban cores, in new office towers and apartment buildings 
(today even from foreign countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia, China) and a 
seemingly lack of investments in poorer areas – despite good endeavours behind 
regeneration processes in the latter neighbourhoods (and thus of investments), 
they sometimes even fuel the dissatisfaction amongst the inhabitants.113 Seen from 
this perspective, the European city is not so much distinct from the American 
or the Asian examples, where huge investments in the city centre and far less 
investments in other areas fuel the increasing gap between the upper class and the 
lower class. Here again symbolized by the exorbitant-expensive apartment towers 
and penthouses that are being built, often acquired by ‘foreign’ capital. This 
process, however, also means that the middle class thrives out of the urban areas: 
the lower classes don’t have any other options, the upper class only can afford the 
urban cores, for the middle class it is hard to find a place in the city, and thus they 
are expelled to other places.114 
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3.2.2  The Power of Visibility and Tangibility
Riots are threatening, of course: the images of yelling youth, burnings cars, looted 
shops, and so on, rouse fear. An imminent sphere enters the streets and squares, 
as well as the newspapers, the journals, and the social media during riots. In turn 
public authorities do aim to intervene, in order to safeguards space, properties, 
and citizens – often by taking far-reaching decrees, like rough policing of the area, 
prohibition of gatherings, a curfew, and preventative arrests. Sometimes even 
architectural design anticipates the possibility of riots, by turning buildings into 
bunkers and public spaces in a ‘vandal-proof’ environment.115 The possibility of 
riots in public space is therefore also a threatened image itself: this possibility 
should be excluded, or at least anticipated. Not only at the very moment and in the 
very place of the event, but moreover also on the forehand (and afterwards) and 
elsewhere, by regulations, planning, and specific designs.116 As Mike Davis shows 
in his book The Ecology of Fear, the increase of segregation and demarcation 
in the contemporary urbanised landscape was highly propelled by the Los 
Angeles riots of 1992.117 It is not simply the added laws that treat public space, it 
is moreover threatened by forms of design, by patterns of mobility and neglect. 
Although threatening, some theorists see riots as an inherent and emblematic 
possibility of all truly public spaces.118 Public space than is presented as the very 
room of revolt, revolution, and change. 
Riots of course are excessive in the range of distinct protests. The New York 
based architect Michael Sorkin in his introduction to Variations on a Theme Park 
takes the slightly less violent but even more political term ‘demonstrations’ as the 
ultimate characteristic of ‘truly public spaces’. Main street in Disney World, he 
states, can’t be seen as a public space, since demonstrations are prohibited. ‘The 
theme park presents [a] happy regulated vision of pleasure – all those artfully 
hoodwinking forms – as a substitute for the democratic public realm. … In the 
“public” spaces of the theme park or the shopping mall, speech itself is restricted: 
there are no demonstrations in Disneyland.’119 
Such a ‘criterion’ for ‘real’ public space obviously cannot be the sole 
perspective to judge public space, as similarly also the political perspective of 
democracy – or more generally stated: the political perspective – cannot be 
reduced to the right to gather, assemble and protest. The democratic right to 
protest is a limited part of a broader political structure – but it is a crucial part, 
surely. Two remarks have to be made here at least. It is during ‘urban distur-
bances’ that the ideas and image of public and private are challenged, as we have 
seen in the paragraphs above. From this perspective a reflection of Margaret 
Crawford on the 1992 riots in Los Angeles is intriguing: ‘During the riots spaces 
formerly devoted to the automobile – streets, parking lots, flea markets, and strip 
malls – were temporarily transformed into sites of protest and rage, into new 
zones of public expression. The riots underlined the potent ability of everyday 
spaces to become, however briefly, places where lived experience and political 
expression come together.’120 In other words, spaces are never by definition or 
forever public or private, nor do they guarantee the ‘experience of public domain’, 
in the words of Hajer and Reijndorp, the experience of exchange and challenge.121  
Public and private spaces are continuously questioned and challenged, are turned 
into other spaces, appropriated and occupied. As Crawford continues to reflect: 
‘This realm of public life lies outside the domain of electoral politics or profes-
sional design, representing a bottom-up rather than top-down restructuring of 
urban space. Unlike the normative public spaces, which produce the existing 
ideology, these spaces help to overturn the status quo. In different areas of the 
115. 
An intriguing example is the 
Library building of the University 
of California in San Diego, of which 
is said that it is designed and 
constructed to prevent riots. See Tom 
Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures 
among the Ruins of Atomic America 
(New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2002), 107)
116.
As the sociologist David Harvey 
wrote in 1989, such riots – he 
actually reflects upon the French 
revolt in Paris after the loss of the 
Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1871 
– are part of ‘an all too familiar and 
dismal story of the ghettoization and 
segregation of a city, in this instance 
almost entirely according to class 
interests and sentiments.’ These Paris’ 
uprisings actually created room for 
a range of political decrees that were 
incorporated in the ‘complex politics 
of the Paris Commune of 1871’, but 
that moreover challenged the distinct 
classes in society. ‘As the dance halls 
and cabarets became the loci of 
public meetings on political topics 
after the liberalization of empire 
in 1868, and as political meetings 
proliferated throughout working 
class Paris, so bourgeois hegemony 
over the right to the rest of the city 
was challenged. Seeping outward 
from their own symbiotic fashioning 
of public, commercial, and private 
spaces, popular forces more and 
more asserted a public and collective 
presence on the boulevards of 
bourgeois Paris. The image of hordes 
of workers descending from the 
working class district of Belleville and 
pouring out onto the public spaces 
of the city, even, on one occasion in 
1869 getting as far as the new Opera 
House, struck political fear into the 
bourgeoisie. The boulevards became 
spaces of political expression, albeit 
ephemerally, for those whom they 
were supposed to exclude or control’; 
Harvey, ‘The Political Economy of 
Public Space’, 23
117.
Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear, Los 
Angeles and the Imagination of 
Disaster (New York: Vintage Books, 
1999), 363
118.
The American Urban theorist Allan 
Jacobs visiting Rotterdam participate 
on a seminar about the design and 
use of public space, asked on a 
certain moment: ‘Are you allowed 
to demonstrate here? No? Than it is 
not public!’ Quote via Matthijs De 
Boer, Binnen in de stad, Ontwerp 
en gebruik van publieke interieurs 
(Amsterdam: Trancity*Valiz, 2012), 
25
119  
Michael Sorkin, ‘Introduction: 
Variations on a Theme Park’, in: 
Michael Sorkin (ed.), Variations on 
a Theme Park, The New American 
City and the End of Public Space 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), XV; 
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 3: CITY
205
city, many generic spaces have become specific and serve as public arenas where 
debates and struggles over economic participation, democracy, and the public 
assertion of identity take place. Without claiming to represent the totality of 
public space, these multiple, temporary, and simultaneous activities construct and 
reveal an alternative logic of public space.’122 
It is, in other words, and that is the second aspect we need to address, important 
to note that the challenge of the public is not only limited to the formal spaces, 
but even stronger (but less visible, and often overlooked) is connected to everyday 
spaces as well, although protests are more evident in ‘symbolic’ spaces like 
Washington Mall or Times Square. Speaking of symbolic spaces, the spatial 
structure of democracy is essentially widely ramified. There is a diverse inventory 
of public spaces, spaces that can be distinguished by character, size, purpose, 
appearance, location, history, and so on. Some of these spaces play a crucial role 
in the local setting of people’s life and are, somehow, much more influential for 
their everyday lives and the life of the community than the big and famous public 
spaces that, indeed, are the locus of demonstrations and riots. Therefore, before 
judging the very ‘publicness’ of public space generally along the lines of the right 
to protest, one needs to ask what kind of demonstration would one organize at 
a certain spot – say (to follow Sorkin) on Main Street Disneyland?123 One can 
imagine a protest of employees on the firm’s wages, structures, services, and so 
on – and of course, Disney would immediately try to stop these protest: they 
after all disturb the image of perfection that carefully is constructed within the 
park. Probably also a single figure will put up a sign at Main Street, in order to 
complain about the firm’s vision and approach of business, sustainability, or to 
protests against consumerism, or to get attention for other social questions. For 
such questions, Main Street Disneyland is symbolically attractive, although we 
might expect such protests take place in front of the main entrance, rather than 
behind the entrance of the theme park. But for larger demonstrations, demon-
strations that addresses issues beyond Disneyland, Main Street indeed is not 
the place where it will get room, as it also certainly is not the obvious location 
of assembly. Local questions will be fought out in front of town halls. Spaces in 
front of embassies will be used in order to show dismissal of the foreign country’s 
politics. At the doorstep of an office tower, often the headquarters of a company, 
one will gather in order to put specific businesses in question. The streets near 
the UN Headquarters, specifically during a general assembly, will give room to 
protests that aims to gain attention to Human Rights generally, to poverty, or 
crimes against humanity. Ground Zero still is the locus for protestors that call for 
‘truth’ about 9/11. 
Clearly the right to protest, to criticize, even somehow to revolt, belongs at 
the heart of the democratic political system, as most political theorists would 
state. Although the right to protest first is a matter of voting, participating in a 
discussion at the town hall, writing letters to governors, or publishing an opinion 
forming an article in a newspaper, it is also of upmost importance that these 
democratic rights need room in physical space as well, not just in the periphery 
but in the very centre of a community. Only by becoming tangible in public space, 
protest movements get attention and gain power.124 It is therefore that these 
rights to protest and demonstrate are actively allowed in spaces in the heart of 
the political arenas or other spaces that play a symbolical role in (the history 
of) a community: Washington Mall, Paris’ Place de la Bastille, and London’s 
Hydepark.125 
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Ghirardo’s description of Main Street 
USA in Disney’s theme parks, which 
actually can be seen as a template for 
other artefacts of consumerist spaces: 
‘Main Street lacks industry, poverty, 
and, most of all, political life. It does 
have private police and laws, however 
unobtrusively they are inserted. 
As private terrain, the Disney 
Corporation can and does formbid 
political activity, just as it enforces a 
dress and comportment code on its 
employees, for whom disobedience 
means dismissal.’ Diane Ghirardo, 
Architecture after Modernism 
(London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 
2006), 48
120.
Crawford, ‘Everyday Urbanism’, 151
121.
Hajer and Reijndorp, In Search of a 
New Public Domain, 11
122.
Crawford, ‘Everyday Urbanism’, 151
123.
To start with, there of course is a thin 
line between the riots and demonstra-
tions. Later in this Chapter I briefly 
will discuss the occupy movement, the 
protests of the Arab Spring, and all 
the protests that have been shown to 
the world after that, from the Ukraine 
to Hong Kong. Hannah Arendt has 
written quite a lot on protests, specif-
ically in her book On Revolution. 
According to her, a revolution ‘spells 
the end of an old political order and 
brings about the birth of an entirely 
new one’. Therefore Arendt values 
the American Revolution above the 
French one – that latter did change 
the figures on the stage, but not 
the stage itself. It is not my goal to 
investigate the contemporary revolu-
tionary movements. Let me only add 
this distinction that Arendt makes 
an stages of revolution. It starts with 
a first transitory phase driven by 
people’s desire for liberation from 
oppression, the second stage aims for 
the formation of a new body politic. 
See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 
26, 29-33, 35-36, 141-150
124.
Hannah Arendt offers this definition 
on power: power is what people 
gain together and only can possess 
together with others. Arendt 
distinguishes power from strength, 
force and violence, which are 
in the hands of the single man. 
Power is held together in a web of 
human interaction and is based 
upon a shared world. Power only 
is sustained through interaction 
with other people. (Hannah Arendt, 
The Human Condition (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1998), 
200-203) Power is therefore superior 
to strength and force. The conse-
quences of power cannot be undone. 
‘Popular revolt against materially 
strong leaders … may engender an 
almost irrestistible power even if it 
206
The year 2011 made very clear that even if not allowed – in societies that are not 
democratic at all – inhabitants understand the importance of physical tangibility 
by intuition, as do the authorities. Even by risking their life by appearing in 
public, they take over and occupy symbolic spaces in order to protest: from Tahrir 
Square in Cairo to Pearl Square in Bahrain, to mention two of the recent places 
that has become known worldwide because of the ‘Arab Spring’ demonstrations 
– stages for recent political revolutions. The governments often did everything 
needed to diminish these demonstrations, and empty the spaces. However, these 
squares or parks of course indeed are the stage for demonstrations not by chance, 
but because of their symbolical character in a community, largely because of 
their role in the political realm or because of the facing symbols of the nation and 
authority.126 Although Tahrir Square is much more an infrastructural artefact than 
a square or plaza, it nevertheless has already been the stage for political protests 
numerous times: 1919, against the British rule as well as in 1946 and 1951; 1977 
against rising food prices; 2001 in sympathy with the Palestinian Intifada; in 
the same year against the U.S. invasion in Iraq; 2006 as a response to the Israel 
attack of Lebanon.127 In 2011 no less than three hundred thousand demonstrators 
appropriated the square, that thus regularly is a huge traffic circle and a transit 
hub for metros, busses and cars in the heart of the city – ‘the traffic helps define 
these squares as the hub around which the nation revolves’128 –, surrounded by 
both vacant lots or construction sites, as well as some of the most significant 
buildings of the city: the headquarters of the Arab League, Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party, The Hilton Hotel, the Omar Makram Mosque, and the Egyptian 
Museum around the corner.129 Somehow opposed to the French and British riots, 
the Arab spring protests had clear political aim: regime-change. The protesters 
actually had to protect themselves from the pro-Mubarak forces. The public 
authorities intervened hard in the protests, even sending the army to knock down 
the protesters. In order to participate in the protest, courage was needed, since it 
actually meant taking significant risk of injury, of being arrested and brought to 
jail, even risking death. In Bahrein the public authorities allowed the protests after 
first a bloody knock down for almost a month. However, after being bulldozed by 
the Defence forces and military forces, the authorities immediately redesigned 
and reconstructed the huge roundabout that was the stage of the protests, even 
flooring the iconic Pearl monument that was a remembrance to the first meeting 
of the Gulf Corporations Council in Bahrein. In the new design of the area, any 
space that was free of cars was eliminated; even the square’s name was replaced 
by Al Farooq Junction.130 The authorities, in other words, were eager to wipe out 
the recent narratives that tell the story of a square celebrating an authoritarian 
symbol into the very locus of a people’s movement. 
In other words, demonstrations have a locus: they need ‘symbolic’ spaces 
that are related to the aim of the protests, as well as bound to temporalities: 
happenings, meetings, assemblies, events – occurrences against which is 
protested or whose attention it would attract and support it would gain. These 
spaces are physical spaces, without exceptions. Protests, demonstrations, and 
other gatherings need physical space. It can be organized from the kitchen table 
through social media, the protesters themselves nevertheless need to go outside, 
gather in a central point – most often near the actual buildings of a government 
– to get visibility and tangibility, to get attention and gain power.131 [IMAGE 3.7, 3.8, 
3.9] In that sense public space that allows protests and demonstrations indeed 
are vital to democratic societies, we need to admit to Sorkin et all. But, added 
to that perspective, we should also acknowledge that political action is so much 
more than protests and demonstrations alone. Protests and demonstrations as 
foregoes the use of violence in the face 
of materially vastly superior forces. 
To call this “passive resistance” is 
certainly an ironic idea; it is one of 
the most active and efficient ways 
of action ever devised, because it 
cannot be encountered by fighting, 
where there may be defeat or victory, 
but only by mass slaughter in which 
even the victor is deveated, cheated 
of his prize, since nobody can roll 
over dead men.’ (Arendt, Human 
Condition, 201) The continuation of 
power depends upon those spaces 
of interaction. Political relevance 
of public space as the ‘space of 
appearance’, where people appear to 
each other and interact. 
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the ultimate aim (of public space) is limiting the scope to the very monumental 
and rhetorical appearances of action. Although those in power can intervene in 
demonstrations, everyday actions (or action in everyday situations, between a 
couple of people) are less susceptible to control.132 
Less explicitly this locus of a nation or community also reflects national tradition 
and/or aspiration, at least recognition by the people, since they embody local or 
national heritage and today’s pride. The buildings of parliaments evidently share 
highly symbolic meaning. As the British architectural critic Deyan Sudjic tells in 
his book Architecture and Democracy, the storming of the Reichstag on May 2nd 
1945 was deemed so important it was re-enacted for Soviet cameras days later.133 
This symbolic aspect of architecture refers to another architectural and physical 
expression of political systems, democracy not excluded: the formal monuments 
of the past besides the concrete buildings of the government. Particular construc-
tions and statues are erected in order to celebrate existing (political) structures or 
remember a (shared) history, event, situation that are important in the history of a 
community. Often these spaces – specifically squares that have played a role in the 
history of a country, like the Tahir Square in Cairo, the Taksim square in Istanbul, 
or the Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kiev, to mention a few that in very recent history 
have provided space for long protests against the government, are the locus of 
demonstrations as well as, as said, parliament buildings. Again, these edifices 
and spaces often use monumental or otherwise outspoken architecture in order 
to deliver this experience of the common history and future. Take for instance 
this description of the architectural critic of Vanity Fair Paul Goldberger on the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Mall in Washington DC, designed by Maya 
Lin: ‘At the Vietnam Veterans Memorial,’ Goldberger writes, ‘monumentality 
creates a true public realm, public not only in the sense of ownership but also in 
that of intellectual and emotional connection. The memorial is public, people feel, 
because it is about them, and its physical form touches their souls. This memorial 
has the power to move people of startlingly different backgrounds and political 
views, and it performs this difficult task of making common experience when 
society seems infinitely fragmented. This work of architecture provides common 
ground.’134 The capacity of this architectural figure surely depends upon its form 
and materiality, upon the inscriptions of names in the wall that can be touched by 
fingers, as well as by the slow descending path along the wall – spatial and bodily 
experiences bound together in a monumental though modest form. Nevertheless, 
what helps to set this feeling of ‘common ground’ of course is the specific history 
that is remembered through the monument. Even non-native Americans feel the 
sacredness of such a monument, such a place of remembrance – the amount of 
names shown makes impressively visible the loss of the country and is even able 
to rouse feelings of sadness. However, this ‘common experience’ of course is not 
limited to these tragic events of the past. Political regimes now and then have used 
and do use architecture and edifices to deliver a kind of commonness amongst 
their inhabitants (often probably better stated as: impress the citizens). Lots of 
these buildings and constructions today are destinations of world travelers and 
tourists surely because of their particular grandeur, which earlier was a privilege 
of the elite – Vedi Napoli e poi muori! To see Naples and die! It is like the German 
writer and poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe writes in his Italian Journey, his 
diary of his journey along the Italian highlights of art and architecture, on the 
amphitheater of Verona: ‘Well, the amphitheater is the first important monument 
from antiquity that I examine, and so well preserved! … But only in the earliest 
time the amphitheater fulfilled its full effect, since the nation was a people, more 
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than today. Such amphitheater after all aims to impose the people by themselves, 
as well as to entertain them.’135 This example of course emphasizes the role of 
architecture in order to embed, celebrate and encourage structures of power. 
However, to a certain point this example also shows the architectural capacity 
to act upon or against existing structures and to affect not only the daily users 
but also the public in general (and as an entity in itself).136 This capacity to affect 
the public, in this example specifically trough imposing people by monumental 
structures, always has been understood as an important feature of architecture by 
very different structures of power in society. Palaces represent the royal power, 
churches the clerical power, parliaments the political power, arches the military 
power, and so on. Architecture has been used regularly to represent power 
relations, moreover, to communicate the power structures as well as affect, not 
to say impose, a people. Close reading of these buildings and monuments that 
represent the power in their immediate surroundings does show that of course 
it is not only the construction solely that has the ability to provide in majesty, 
monumental or grandeur, it depends upon specific ensembles of building or 
groups of buildings and the surrounding public space: parks, squares, boulevards, 
promenades, axes, and streets ‘act’ together, only revolving in certain climaxes 
of buildings and monuments. Intricate relationships between the building and 
the public space support the tale of power: the balcony on which those in power 
can emerge hovering above the heads of the people, the space of the square 
where military parades can be at display to the rulers, spectators, and the world. 
Often these public spaces and surrounding buildings are directed to the single 
construction, or to put it differently in the words of the German-born architect 
Paul Zucker, are dominated by the specific public building or monument.137 These 
constructions thus are not only representations of (political) power; they are 
power structures themselves as well. They ‘direct’ and ‘dominate’ space, attract 
attention and diminish the surroundings to its background or supplier – and the 
viewer to a subject. Within democracies one of course can question the role of 
such spatial ensembles. Are these structures-of-power and power-structures solely 
suppliers of suppressing (political) structures (in contemporary capitalist society 
they might represent the actual power of the economy), or do they contribute 
to the experience of the public sphere? In this respect we might understand 
such ‘societal’ edifices of celebration and remembering as pivotal construc-
tions between the necessary formal buildings and spaces of a democracy – the 
parliament, governmental buildings, and so on – and the physical public spaces 
like the square and the street. 
3.2.3 The Democratic Ideal and Public Space
Although every society thus has ‘fixed’ symbolic spaces that are rooted in the heart 
of its political history, we also can state that every space potentially can turn into 
a symbolic space, once, depending on the occurrences in space. Nevertheless, in 
the range of public spaces, these symbolic spaces are only the top of the pyramid 
– and moreover, rare and distinct. This spectrum of formal public spaces on the 
one hand and everyday public spaces on the other is to be seen as a continuum. 
The importance of such a continuum is evident: in a democracy the ramification 
of public and political space is essential. They need to be intertwined. Opposite 
to autocratic and surely totalitarian regimes, where cohesion is delivered by the 
single ruler, through a party, through shared convictions or by kinship, in the 
democratic organization of society the different groups need to work together and 
establish together a community that not only is workable or livable, but is also of a 
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shared value and experience. As Aristotle writes in his Politics: ‘A city is composed 
of different kinds of men; similar people cannot bring a city into existence.’138 
More important thus is what happens at the bottom: the everyday spaces of 
streets, squares, parks, that gives room to a local public realm – everyday 
unexpected and unplanned meetings. The debates in the formal spaces – between 
formal representatives, formally organized as well – are senseless when not 
fed through actual and coincidental meetings and discussions amongst citizens 
in everyday public space, both virtual and real. As the sociologists Hajer and 
Reijndorp in their In Search of a New Public Domain understand urban space 
as symbolic space as well, ‘as a space where a battle of meanings is fought out.’139 
This surely also counts vice-versa: the debates amongst citizens, the formation 
of ‘public opinion’, finally need to be stretched towards the formal spaces and 
debates in order to get ‘decision-making-impact.’ Better said: the informal 
discussions that are hosted in public space are counterforce to the two dominating 
powers in today’s society: the market and the government. This of course urges 
the importance of the informal debates to become tangible, visible in public space, 
in order to affect opinion. 
Although the formal political space of the parliament in democracies somehow 
formalizes the differences, it is in the everyday spaces that the diversity is 
experienced (or, as I will argue in Chapter 5 based upon a reading of Hannah 
Arendt’s reflection upon public space, should be experienced). We thus might 
conclude that if architecture has the capacity to affect people, as we touched 
upon before, it does not have to be the power in charge. It very well can evoke the 
experience of common-ness and other-ness at once, the experience, of a shared 
world, hopefully at least evoking awareness of one another, of other bodies in 
space. 
This might be described as the democratic ideal beyond public space. This 
ideal, however, is not only continuously challenged in reality, it also needs to be 
approached carefully. I will discuss this ideal extensively in Chapter 5, at this point 
it is good to once again look more closely at some examples of protests in public 
spaces, as they are the ultimate democratic challenge. Again 2011 is a remarkable 
example, in this respect. That very year seemed to be a revolutionary year, with 
not only the Arab Spring movements in, amongst other countries, Egypt, Bahrein, 
Libia, and Tunisia, but the happenings on Tahir Square also evoked the assembly 
of people in the Western world, specifically in New York, as well as in Brazil, 
what became known as the Occupy-movement, and that from New York onwards 
spread all over the world to distinct cities and villages, a protest against existing 
economic and political structures.140 ‘We are the 99%’, the protesters put forward, 
accusing the leaders of the banking and financial sector, as well as their financiers, 
the participants in the stock markets, of greed – at the cost of the regular proper-
ty-owner, the employee, the average citizen and specifically the poor. It is at the 
heart of the financial crisis, September 17th, 2011, that a group of protesters occupy 
Zuccotti Park in Lower Manhattan, erecting a camp in order to demonstrate and 
launch marches to, amongst other destinations, Wall Street, City Hall Park, and 
Times Square. The square is a privately owned space, the result of ‘a specific 
permission from the New York City Planning Department to add additional floors 
to the building beyond the existing height restriction’ by also constructing a public 
accessible space in front, bordered by Broadway, Trinity Place, Liberty Street, and 
Cedar Street, on a stone’s throw distance from Wall Street.141 The space was not 
specifically symbolic, probably chosen because of the nearness of all these desti-
nations, although the awareness of these kind of privately owned public spaces 
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has raised attention in the years before the occupy movement. In San Francisco, 
for instance, SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research Association, 
an institution already originated from 1912 onwards, first aiming to improve the 
housing quality, later the ‘urban quality’, drew a map of these privately owned 
spaces, accompanied by an app that can be downloaded on smartphones that 
offers routes, descriptions and public rights to these POPOS, as they called it: 
Privately Owned Public Open Spaces.142 Also in New York such a map is offered 
by the ‘Advocates for Privately Owned Public Spaces’ (APOPS) – in New York 
‘slang’ these spaces are called POPS.143 In an article in the New York Times in the 
heydays of the occupy-movement the Harvard professor of Urban Design Jerold 
S. Kalden, the founding president of the mentioned ‘advocates’, writes that over 
the years since 1961 more than 500 of these POPS have been established (offering 
the developers to construct about 20 million square feet extra residential and 
office floor space). Generally speaking, the quality of these spaces, he states, 
are however abominable, over 40% is ‘actually useless, with austere designs, no 
amenities and little or no direct sunlight. Roughly half of the buildings surveyed 
[in a survey he had executed in 2000, HT] had spaces that were illegally closed or 
otherwise privatized.’144 The New York Times critic Michael Kimmelman adds that 
most of these POPS are ‘token gestures by developers in turn for erecting bigger, 
taller buildings. Think of the atrium of the I.B.M. tower on Madison Avenue and 
countless other places like it: “public” spaces that are not really public at all but 
quasi-public, policed by their landlords, who find a million excuses to limit their 
accessibility.’145 Zuccottini Park actually is amongst the better examples of POPS, 
he states. The owner installed trees, lightening, benches, and even art in the 
past decade – as well as renamed the place (from Liberty place) after one of its 
co-chairman. According to Kalden the occupy movement showed the inadequacy 
of rules regarding these spaces. ‘Other than the requirement that this space 
remains open 24 hours a day,’ he writes, ‘the owners were left to promulgate 
their own rules; the only limit is that they be “reasonable.”’146 Already during 
the protests the Real Estate Board of New York asked the city to endorse rules 
in order to prevent the privately owned spaces in the future for such protest 
encampments again. Kimmelman in turn: ‘Zuccotti as an exception, revealed just 
how far we have allowed the ancient civic ideal of public space to drift from an 
arena of public expression and public assembly (Speakers’ Corner in Hyde Park, 
say) to a commercial sop (the foyer of Time Warner Centre). City officials are 
forever closing streets and parks for celebratory events – parades and street fairs 
– but try getting a park or street closed for a political protest.’147  
What makes public space public, the architect and Associate Professor 
of Architecture at Columbia University Reinhold Martin writes in an article 
reflecting on the occupy-movement after police officers had removed the occupiers 
on November 15th, is not that it is ‘universally available and accessible’ to all, 
but ‘is the very fact that’ these features are ‘contested’ continuously, not only in 
these POPS, but also in legal public spaces. Martin suggests in his article that one 
thing is left to activists, that is: ‘continue to reclaim spaces and artefacts, such 
as foreclosed houses, on behalf of the common interest harbored in the term 
public.’148 Although economical and governmental structures, public and private 
partnerships seem to construct ‘closed circles of capital accumulation’, he suggests 
that ‘these circles are never complete, and the spaces they enclose are full of 
holes.’ These ‘holes’ enable occupation ‘by bodies and practices at odds with the 
hegemonic world system.’149 
Through the success of the ‘occupy Wall Street movement’, that got a response 
in cities all over the world, occupying squares and parks, it becomes utmost clear 
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how important the visibility is of such demonstrations and occupations. The 
occupation of a physical site increases the tangibility of the protests, as well as 
simultaneously creates room for the crucial exchange of ideas beyond the attempts 
and discussions on the future and the past of the movement, and other attempts 
that help to understand, declare, and disseminate the message, amongst partici-
pants.150 Only what appears in public gets tangibility, visibility, gains presence and 
ultimately exists.151 Specifically in a global world, the very visible struggles, revolts, 
demonstrations are inherent, not to say a necessary. ‘Street struggles and demon-
strations are part of our global modernity. The uprisings in the Arab world, the 
daily neighbourhood protests in China’s major cities, Latin America’s piqueteros, 
and poor people demonstrating with pots and pans – all are vehicles for making 
social and political claims.’152 Again: only what becomes visible and tangible – in 
the real world, in public space – gains recognition and response, and by that 
increases in power, requires responses. 
Somehow that is also pertinent in the quote of Michael Sorkin I cited above: ‘The 
theme park presents [a] happy regulated vision of pleasure – all those artfully 
hoodwinking forms – as a substitute for the democratic public realm. … In the 
“public” spaces of the theme park or the shopping mall, speech itself is restricted: 
there are no demonstrations in Disneyland.’153 Sorkin links here public space, 
public realm, and the possibility of demonstrations – and there is reason to, as 
we have seen. He actually adds as a conclusion to a sentence that rouses interest 
at this very moment: ‘The effort to reclaim the city is the struggle of democracy 
itself.’154 Public spaces, public realm, demonstrations, the city and the political 
democracy somehow are intertwined, according to Sorkin – and by losing the city 
(into a landscape of enclaves, or through segregation), means losing a solid basis 
for democracy. Democracy somehow is characterized by a continuous effort to 
‘reclaim’ the city. 
That very idea also comes to the fore in the 2011 revolutionary spirit that 
occurred in public space as well. In another article on the occupy movement 
the Associate Professor of Landscape Design of the University of Washington 
Jeffrey Hou goes one step further than the idea that physical public spaces helps 
to creates a ‘space of appearance’ (a term often frequented by Hannah Arendt, 
as we will see) by adding that the actual occupation of the space not only was 
taken or reclaimed but was also immediately transformed into ‘sites of action, 
meaning and possibility’.155 That means that the occupation not only suggests 
the capacity to act, but also the agency to transform and modify structures of 
the city and society, specifically the capacity to ‘mobilize … the very notion of the 
“public” in public space,’156 which enables a different story on the future of public 
space. Despite the pessimistic aim in the past decades about the loss of public 
space, the different movements around the world in 2011 and thereafter seem 
to suggest a new narrative – a narrative of local involvement and participation, 
a grass-root struggle on the reclaim of both space and public.157 That does not 
mean, according to Hou, that it is simultaneously also a movement of increase of 
privatization of public space that can be seen in North American cities, as is the 
response mentioned above by the Real Estate Bond of New York making clear, 
which is evidence, Hou writes, of ‘a political and institutional crisis – the privat-
ization of our democracy through unequal taxation, institutional loopholes and 
the overpowering influence of multinational corporations.’ This however cannot 
be addressed or even corrected by simply adding ‘more public spaces’ or even by 
turning the existing ones into ‘more inclusive and accessible’ spaces. It moreover 
needs ‘the attention and intervention of a much more active and engaged public, a 
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public willing and capable of speaking up and mobilizing politically to change the 
system.’158 This revolutionary spirit sometimes is roused by an event, festival or 
happening. 
Recently in the city of Detroit this ability to involve a crowd in a grass-root 
movement has shown its extraordinary power of change. The active involvement 
of residents, architects, artists and activists in the shrinking city show the local 
possibilities of each neighbourhood, with respect to the environment, and even 
awareness of the societal problems.159 Once a city that was known because of the 
‘emptied centre’, suffered even the failure of the American automobile industry, 
as well as the financial and economic crisis from 2008, but now has switched the 
narrative of decline into that of a successful grass root (standardize) movement, 
specifically of urban farming on the increased numbers of vacant lots – although 
this could not prevent the cities bankruptcy in 2013. Facing these enormous 
problems that the city deals with, this actually is a remarkable development. 
The ‘success’ of local residents was first formalized by non-profit organizations 
that aimed to ‘green the city’, mobilize the public, even had educational goals.160 
Today this even attracted businesses that now have bought and exploit vacant 
lots professionally – in the midst of the urbanized landscape of the city.161 Richard 
Florida recently wrote on the development Detroit that the city now even has the 
chance to attract ‘general businesses’ again. ‘With its fraying social fabric and the 
imposition … to cope with its collapsing finances, it would be argued that a city 
that was a global centre of carmaking and musical innovation 50 years ago has 
passed the point of no return. Easy, yes; but wrong. Detroit’s days as a manufac-
turing powerhouse – like those of many industrial cities in America, Europe and 
elsewhere – are irrevocable. But its downtown is rebounding, thanks to the kind 
of central location, affordable property, improved efficiency and productivity also 
bringing people and businesses back to struggling former industrial hubs such as 
Cleveland and Pittsburgh.’162 
What actually is remarkable about Sorkins conclusion, however, is his emphasis 
on ‘reclaiming the city’ and democracy. Slightly before his conclusion he had 
circumscribed this reclaim as ‘a return to a more authentic urbanity, a city based 
on physical proximity and free movement and a sense that the city is our best 
expression of a desire for collectivity,’163 an aim that seems to be very formal. 
Although most political theorists will follow Sorkin in his emphasis on the rela-
tionship between public space, public realm, the right to demonstrate, and the 
ideal of democracy, the statement that a ‘more authentic urbanity’ and ‘physical 
proximity’ should be seen as essential would rouse discussion. Sorkin in the quote 
above presented the opposite of this ‘more authentic city’, the theme park and 
its image of pleasure, as a ‘substitute for democratic public realm’, specifically 
because of – and I left this part of the quote out above – ‘it does so appealingly 
by stripping troubled urbanity of its sting, of the presence of the poor, of crime, 
of dirt, of work.’164 In other words, Sorkin suggests that there are two images 
of public space: first renders the open spaces in the theme parks and shopping 
malls, that are used by huge crowds, but that essentially are exclusive and bound 
to the aim of consumption. The other image of public space – and that is what 
he describes as more authentic urban – is open to all, and therefore even aims to 
include the threatening aspects of the world: poverty, homelessness, strangers, 
even crime, dirt and risk. It is clear that Sorkin opts for the second image. 
Despite the imagary of the Malls, Parks and Communities, that in their very form 
and appearance emphasize ‘community’, only the spaces that give room to the 
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poor, crime, and other threats is the ‘best expression of a desire for collectivity.’ 
Geography professor Don Mitchell also distinguishes between two images of 
public space in respect to the political ideal of democracy, somehow parallel to 
Sorkin’s aim.165 First can be described as the political space, an ‘unconstrained 
space within which political movements can organize and expand into wider 
arenas,’ the second is roughly stated the ‘open space for recreation and enter-
tainment, subject to usages by an appropriate public that is allowed in.’166 The 
crux, in this perspective, thus is the accessibility and use of space, and Mitchell 
therefore also, as Sorkin does with the poor and everything else that can disturb 
the quiet – and safe – image of public space, emphasises the homeless as the ‘icon’ 
of the differences, the key to understand public space. The second conception of 
public space doesn’t allow the homeless to enter, while in the first perspective the 
fundamental idea is that those groups that live in the margins of a community 
only through participation in space, only through visibility and tangibility, can 
gain room in society – both politically and socially.167 The first perspective thus 
understands public spaces as places where the rights of citizenship needs ‘to be 
expanded to the most disenfranchised segments’ of society, whereas the latter 
stresses the need of the users of public space to feel safe and comfortable, in 
order ‘not be driven away by unsightly homeless people or unsolicited political 
activity.’168 The public realm – this connection with democracy – as emphasized 
by Sorkin therefore is part of this first perspective on public space: public space 
as essentially space of confrontation with diversity, plurality, and otherness, as 
well as inherent risks, crime, and other scary threats. Every endeavour to exclude 
this confrontation does impact the very ‘publicness’ of public space, deepening 
with the same gesture the gap between both spaces, and by doing that pushing the 
first space in an even worse and deplorable state, since it leaves the regular ‘open 
space’ as left-over-space that in the end is only inhabited by the marginal groups 
in society.169  
Public space as public realm is a space of possible riots, revolts, revolutions, 
risks and threats, of unexpected meetings and life-changing events – actually 
of society-changing-events.170 As David Harvey writes on the uprisings in Paris 
1830, in mind of course the well-known poem of Baudelaire on The Eyes of the 
Poor: ‘The public spaces of Paris were transformed toward the end of empire 
into sites of geopolitical struggles between warring factions in ways that were 
intensely symbolic of clashing ideologies in the public sphere of politics. The eyes 
of the poor would not be averted. Nor could they be sent away. The anxiety of the 
bourgeoisie was justified. The spectacle of the commodity may mask, but it can 
never erase, the raw facts of class relations.’171 As became clear in the previous 
chapter, it is this risky environment that scares people and institutions, both 
public authorities and private owners, who regularly aim to provide ‘safe and 
clean’ spaces.172 Their regular argument should be valued: the aim to remove 
‘criminal elements’ and ‘inappropriate activities’ – ‘small-time drugs dealers, 
street people, and the homeless’ – in order to make room for others, for students, 
for the middle class, for families with kids, that otherwise would have been 
excluded.173 ‘Safe havens’ and modest spaces meant to accommodate the affluent 
people. However, the aim to exclude threats and risks, as came to the fore in this 
chapter, specifically by commodification of the space and by taking control over 
space, is a risk in itself, for instance for the very publicness of public space. Clean 
and safe often means ‘dead public space’ – a term coined by Richard Sennett, 
regarding the empty plazas often surrounding the modern office towers.174 Or it 
means a space that actually encourages consumption, the ‘downtown development 
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areas, the malls, and the festival marketplaces’, where control, order, and surveil-
lance perfectly collaborate with the expected increase of consumption.175 
It surely can be discussed whenever ‘publicness’ is a perspective that should be 
strived for,176 although the debate, both in the field of architecture as well as in 
the adjacent fields, is coloured by the wish to create truly public and democratic 
spaces. Therefore, also a vice-versa process can be acknowledged. In spaces where 
people are urged to participate, are welcomed to be involved, spaces that can be 
appropriated, and where everyday people can take responsibility, these spaces 
increasingly turn public, even those privately owned or thoroughly designed and 
publicly maintained. The ‘safe and clean’ spaces can be enjoyable: the sphere 
can be cosy and quiet, or lively and vital. It can be a perfect destination on hot 
summer evenings – nice spaces to celebrate life and let the kids play. But it 
won’t serve the proximity of plurality and differences, neither the confrontation 
between classes, the clashes that are at the bottom of democracy. The first are 
spaces of segregation, whereas the public spaces somehow contribute to urban 
life as a continuous training in democratic values.177 The earlier mentioned Jeffrey 
Hou follows the urban sociologist Don Mitchell and the French philosopher 
Henri Lefebvre in his distinction between two different approaches to public 
space, but he slightly moves the attention from ownership and accessibility to 
involvement and participation. He writes that he distinguishes between two kinds 
of public space: ‘institutional public space and insurgent public space. Insti-
tutional public spaces include typical parks, plazas, squares, streets, and some 
civic buildings, as well as privately owned public spaces that are defined and 
produced by governments and corporations.’178 On the other hand ‘in contrast, 
insurgent public spaces are those created or initiated by citizens and communities, 
often outside or at the border of regulatory and legal domain. Insurgent public 
spaces are frequently brought into being by those who appropriate, reclaim or 
occupy a particular space to gather, express opinions and engage in various 
cultural practices. They include guerrilla gardens, flash mobs, “third places,” 
street vending, street theatre and protests.’179 Hou thus suggests that it is not 
only a matter of allowance by the owner, a range of inclusion to exclusion, but 
that it is about the participation of a public, even in the very establishing of the 
spaces. The institutional spaces ‘are by nature codified, regulated and institu-
tionally maintained; usually they presuppose a fairly generic public that may be 
served by these spaces, but for the most part is not engaged in their making,’180 
whereas ‘the very idea of insurgent public spaces argues that the making of public 
spaces is not the exclusive domain of institutions; it can involve a broader range 
of actors – and thus reinforce the fact that “public” is not just an adjective but 
more broadly an active body of citizens.’181 In other words, only when the public 
is involved and participates in specific spaces and places, these spaces can be 
turned into ‘truly’ public spaces. New York Times critic Michael Kimmelman 
writes; ‘Public spaces … must be “enacted” – occupied, used – for it to be truly 
public. It is this act of using it that makes it public, that makes it a real place.’182 
He adds to this perspective a suggestion. ‘One answer is that we need ambiguous 
spaces, multiuse spaces. Access to space breeds a feeling of ownership; ownership 
of empowerment, as Paul Broches has put it. But more than access, openness 
– or what Broches and others lately have taken to calling “sloppiness” – is the 
key to useful public space. From a design perspective, this means intentionally 
incomplete, and at least partly unplanned spaces that are completed in different 
ways by different users. But how do we create them?’183
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3.2.4 A Pressing Question to Designers
‘But how do we create them?’ This question on the production of space indeed 
seems to be the remaining question after this journey through the contemporary 
landscapes of America and Europe and snapshots of places elsewhere vis-à-vis the 
quest of public space that I discussed in this and the previous chapter. Slightly, 
of course, also the ‘production’ of these spaces has been touched upon, to start 
with the statement that this urban landscape, the relative dichotomy of public and 
private spaces, has to be seen as the outcome of a cultural, economic, and political 
cultural condition – that it is a social-political construction. Nevertheless, these 
spaces of course don’t come into being automatically, but are planned, designed, 
and constructed as well. Moreover, most of these contemporary spaces as we have 
seen, like the shopping mall, the theme park, the gated community, and even the 
historic district, are carefully designed, constructed, planned, imagined, and – 
finally – marketed as vivid and meaningful spaces. But still, what is lacks from 
the journey above is a specific take on this design – moreover, it lacks a thorough 
vision on what architecture actually means in respect to this urban landscape. 
The path after all delivered perspectives from different fields touching upon this 
quest – perspectives emerging from anthropology, political sciences, philosophy, 
geography, economy, history, and social sciences. It also delivered reflections 
upon everyday practices, the contemporary urban and landscape condition, the 
political realm, as well as views upon concrete (public) spaces, from the highway 
to the POPS. This question of concrete space, of design, and of imagination often 
is overlooked in the adjacent scientific fields. That sounds remarkable, although 
it is even more is remarkable that even architects and architectural theorists 
themselves also fail to come up with perspectives that draw specific architectural 
narratives. It shows that it is not easy to construct an architectural perspective 
regarding public space and the public sphere, a perspective that emerges from 
within architectural practices and that unfolds the specificities of projects, 
buildings, constructions, planes, sections, designs, materials, texture, and so 
on vis-à-vis the public sphere, leaving a gap in our physical understanding of 
the architectural project and public space. This somehow also depends on the 
recent history, specifically due to the influences of a critical-theoretical approach, 
the field of architecture has been positioned in the midst of the perspectives of 
adjacent fields, like philosophy, sociology, history, and so on, aiming that architec-
tural projects cannot be understood without reflections from these fields. 
Additionally, architectural theory then should be understood as occupying and 
appropriating the insights of these adjacent fields, applying them into an architec-
tural narrative. This has actually caused an overlooking of perspectives from the 
inside, even failing to come up with perspectives from within the field of architec-
ture.184 Nevertheless, specific architectural insight, knowledge and understanding 
will deepen and enhance the perspectives upon this question of the public realm. 
In the same run, the question of creation and design indeed belongs to the heart 
of the field of architecture, it is nevertheless simultaneously only a small aspect 
of what a specific architectural perspective can add to the quest of public space. 
Architecture after all is not only about creation – the choice of the right forms, 
the nicest materials, the most spectacular or unspectacular routes, stunning 
dynamics, or silent façades. Despite the lively debate on the public sphere, the 
term thus is actually badly rooted within the spatial practices itself: for a concept 
that is at the core of the architectural and urban discourse it is striking that the 
ideal doesn’t address the form, structure, organization and materiality of the space 
and objects. On the contrary, it mainly focuses on the ‘fourth’ dimension of space, 
on the social practices of people. In other words, it is an immaterialized narrative, 
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not only in philosophy and political sciences, but also in architectural theory.
Certainly one of the reasons (I will briefly offer 4 reasons) for the lack of actual 
architectural perspectives upon public space is the lack of an answer to the criti-
cal-theoretical narratives that are adopted within the field of architecture. There 
simply is no single architectural answer, no particular form, neither a specific 
material, nor any other way to treat public space that solves the questions posed 
by theorists and activists. Or do we have to say, there is no answer that actually 
works period. As we have seen, the New Urbanism movement has formulated 
concrete answers to surpass the monotony of the suburbs, and stresses the 
importance of the community and its collective spaces, offering particular 
suggestions and directions to design these spaces, but as we needed to conclude, 
the examples that follow these rules simply are the next enclaves, only more nicely 
designed. There is no singular answer, that once and for all can be repeated. 
Luckily, we might add. It belongs to the very essence of architecture that each case 
needs a particular answer, as we will see. 
A second reason for the lack of pure architectural answers to the pressing question 
of public space might be the unclear role of architecture and urban planning in 
contemporary landscapes. It can be argued that social practices have more impact 
on spaces than architects, planners and designers would admit:185 changes in the 
everyday practices of a society and developments in its political structure, which is 
the context of the discourse in philosophy, sociology and political sciences, always 
have concrete consequences and become tangible in the built environment, as for 
instance in the gated community and the shopping mall. These types only could 
become popular, not because of their specific designs, but because they fulfil a 
need of people, they form an answer to changing social and spatial practices of 
citizens. Planning and designing in this respect are understood as just creating 
room and providing the design in answer to societal or economic processes. If 
formulated like this, architecture simply follows society, rather than challenging 
it, which is not strange, particularly in a situation of developers as commissioners 
of architectural design. This of course is too negative – I will come back to the role 
of architecture and the architect in Chapter 7. 
For now, in the frame of what has been written previously, starting from the 
double failure of the strive to exclude risks towards the conclusions that risks are 
deeply inherent in public space, as come to the fore in the riots and revolutions 
as potentially inherent in public space, it is right to understand that most of the 
concerns and perspectives that are addressed facing public space indeed deal with 
the everyday practices of people, or ‘dream’ about what their practices should 
look like ideally, compared to the ideal of the democratic society and the public 
realm. Public realm is actually a narrative dealing with the use of these spaces, 
not with the architecture of these spaces. This is the third reason explaining why 
it is difficult to answer the quest of public space architecturally. It is clear that 
the spatial practices do need physical spaces. The changing practices urged the 
development of new urban types, sometimes they became successful, commer-
cially, sometimes badly surviving. But all of these urban types urge the question: 
how is the field of architecture involved in all this? Is this only a manner of 
planning, of urban layout, of location? Does ‘design’ have an impact on what 
actually happens? Certainly it does: the figure of the enclave differs from the 
figure of the grid, as does the cul-de-sac development from the organically grown 
European downtown, all impacting the daily practices within these environ-
ments. And surely, it matters if a mall is constructed from concrete stones or is 
cladded with shiny polished natural stone. But again, although we can investigate 
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public spaces and the behaviour of the crowds, the involvement of architecture 
vis-à-vis these anthropologic, philosophical, sociological, and political processes, 
meanings, and developments, is hard to make. It is easier to make this connection 
the other way around. Within each architectural project, as I will argue in Chapter 
6, political aspects are at stake. What about the specific materiality, the spatial 
quality, the imaginative elements, the projective qualities – does that impact the 
uses of space, the everyday practices of people, the stability and coherence of 
society? What is the specific role of the architect in this respect, and what kind 
of architectural knowledge needs to be embodied in these architectural projects? 
That doesn’t seem to be clear at all. Or as Thomas Sieverts writes: ‘Sometimes 
I get the impression that our guild has forgotten how to think politically and to 
draw distinctions between social changes, movements and forces – which we, 
whether we like it or not, have to recognise as preconditions for planning because 
we can change hardly anything about them – and such developments as we can 
influence and structure. However, only if we can do that, will we be able to get 
involved with any prospect of having an effect.’186
The fourth aspect addresses the difficulty of developing a specific architec-
tural narrative in the virtual character of the public sphere. Rather than a spatial 
question, it surpasses the question of space. The ideal of the public sphere is the 
Western idea of a ‘participating’ democracy. This of course is a provocative ideal: 
it values and simultaneously calls for participation, for action, for taking risks, 
and initiatives. This of course is first a matter of ‘pre-political’ rules that needs to 
be formulated in order to erect and sustain the public realm: freedom of speech, 
freedom of thought, freedom of religion, freedom to establish political parties, the 
distinction between state and church, as well as between state and market, and 
so on. It only secondary also provokes architectural questions. The architectural 
narrative that is regularly constructed on this matter is the suggestion that such 
a participatory democracy also needs room, not only virtual (being the societal 
debate) but also physical space, where citizens gather and appear amongst peers, 
where their voices can be heard and acts can get proper responses, where people 
are involved in public interests, where the exchange of ideas is possible, and 
finally where decisions are taken and agreements are constructed. Even in the age 
of social media, this is still a matter of concrete space – although this public realm 
is not limited to concrete public spaces, as well as vice versa: not every public 
space, square, street, park, belongs to the public realm. As Hajer and Reijndorp 
state in their In Search of New Public Domain it is about ‘…places of shared 
experience by people from different backgrounds or with dissimilar interests. 
In principle, such places can also be found beyond the traditional urban space 
of streets, parks and squares. They can even be spaces that are not public in the 
strict sense, for example privately managed collective spaces that still function as 
public domain.’187 In other words, these places of shared experience are not fixed 
spaces, even are not limited to the symbolic spaces in society – those public spaces 
in front of city halls, governmental buildings, that are understood as the heart of 
society or an urban environment, but that most often are dominated by commerce 
and tourism, which often disperse the differences in the use of space, and with 
that the opportunity of exchange between different groups of users. Public 
sphere is only a temporal condition, actually limited to the meeting of people 
itself, and only a few times turn into a stable and symbolic place of recognizable, 
distinct, and shared use and exchange. The crucial insight therefore is that public 
realm is not a matter of architecture: it is a matter of use, of accessibility, of 
programme, of locations and connections, of the environment and functions, of 
the organization of events – in other words, it is a matter of inhabitants and users 
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themselves, their willingness to participate, to sit down and look, to be involved 
in local opportunities – which sometimes is a matter of unforeseen accidents, 
happenings. Admitted, architecture and urban design create the very possibilities, 
it can accommodate these opportunities, or – in a negative perspective – is able 
to prevent these possibilities. This architecture is important: it can help to propel 
the experience, or it can disturb the potentials of such experience. Essentially, 
however, the public sphere emerges everywhere where people bump into each 
other, open up new perspectives, form new opinions, exchange perspectives. 
But since most ‘pre-cooked’ meetings don’t happen to be really meaningful 
– except from the political meetings of the parliament and government, that 
take place in the specifically designed and very symbolic spaces of government 
buildings and city-halls – a well-functioning public realm doesn’t depend on 
specific architectural design of the space. It is first and foremost a matter of social 
practices. An architect therefore is not even required, even in the worst designed 
spaces meaningful meetings can take place – moreover these meetings can’t be 
planned, let alone be designed. It therefore indeed can be questioned whether 
the public realm should be a topic of architectural discourses. Architecture, in 
this perspective indeed yet provides a framework in which the public realm can 
emerge – opportunities that need be occupied and appropriated by the citizens 
themselves. Architecture in this sense operates on the same level as human rights, 
institutions, the newspaper, and Facebook: it creates a somehow accessible 
and stable platform for exchange.188 However, the distinctive aspect is the very 
tangibility of architecture. Public spaces, like streets, squares, parks, of course 
potentially are in the public realm, specifically within the urban cores, since the 
city consists of a large and somehow homogeneous population living closely 
together – it is the city that is dense and durable enough to create a political 
realm: dense enough to bump into each other, dense enough also to urge the 
need to communicate, to join forces, to construct this political realm, which is, of 
course, why the urban sociologist Lyn Lofland called the ‘the quintessential social 
territory’ of the city, as the subtitle of her 1998 book The Public Realm reads. 
The importance of concrete and tangible public spaces is simultaneously unques-
tioned. Rules, rights and restrictions are needed, of course – they establish a 
stable space for the public debates and create room to speak freely, to understand 
each other, to set up a meaningful exchange of ideas and convictions. Newspapers, 
internet and other media are important as well – they actively create the debate 
itself, through articles and their responses. They also obviously became more 
and more important as a counter sphere to the political realm, as came to light in 
the revolts and demonstrations in the Arab countries in the 2009 till 2012, after 
the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2010, and so on. As the philosopher Arjun 
Appadurai writes: ‘the diasporic public spheres that such encounters create are 
no longer small, marginal, or exceptional. They are part of the cultural dynamic 
of urban life in most countries and continents, in which migration and mass 
mediation constitute a new sense of the global as modern and the modern as 
global.”189 The difference, however, is rules and rights are the preconditions of 
the public realm, the media and institutions are the platform for the debate, both 
however are immaterialized realms. They actually are in need of concrete space as 
well. The virtual meeting needs the concrete appearance as well. Concrete (urban) 
spaces on the contrary – here seen as part of the pre-conditions as well as the 
platform – are concrete, tangible, touchable, visible, a physical appearance of the 
public realm. A political community, however, needs room, not design, one would 
summarize. 
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This firm summary however does not satisfy; it immediately needs to be nuanced 
and urges despite the difficulties the development of a specific architectural 
narrative. At least also four perspectives can be mentioned along which lines an 
architectural contribution can be developed. The first perspective of course is the 
very obvious need of design in a political community, which immediately comes 
to the fore in respect to the symbolicl spaces that have gained their place in every 
society. The distinction in appearance, aim, design, and planning between the 
Palace of the Parliament in Bucharest, the Capitol in Washington, the Reichstag in 
Berlin (specifically after the renovation and extension by Norman Foster in 1999), 
the Congresso Nacional in Brasilia, and the House of Assembly in Chandigarh, is 
obvious – as well as the distinction between the Tianman Square, the Washington 
Mall, and the Dutch Dam Square. 
Secondly, although the less symbolic public and collective spaces, even if 
they are understood as the product of the changing public, spatial, political, 
and economical practices, still are designed, planned, constructed by architects, 
planners and designers. The design, planning, and constructing of new public 
spaces, public buildings, squares and plazas, landscapes and monuments, are the 
daily practices of architectural offices, urban planners, landscape designers. Their 
drawings have impact – as of course evidently is seen in the work of Gruen and 
his envisioning of the future of shopping. In this respect the plea for attention to 
liminal spaces, border zones, the connection between public and private spaces, 
the roles of fences and other hard edges, the need of ambiguity, of openness, 
of accessibility, of inclusion, of the possibility to be involved and participate, 
the need of benches, of sunlight, of comfort, of sports fields and playgrounds, 
of artworks, of intermediate and logical connections, of embedded structures, 
of urban context, of acceptable dangerousness, a bit of anarchy, and even of 
programme, of festivals and events are valuable, although none of them guarantee 
the establishment of a public realm.190  Architectural products, in other words, 
literally form the public spaces.  
Thirdly, the emerging virtual public realm – as comes to the fore in social 
media – ever more presses the need for concrete space and tangible public 
appearance. One can easily argue that the appearance on the public stage, 
which is, as is seen in the protests in the Arab world as well as in the occupy 
movement, still in the stable and central urban spaces, is ever more valued today. 
The discourse on the public realm therefore calls attention to the questions of 
materiality, thingness, centrality, spatiality and stability, which are inherent in the 
field of architecture. 
This actually also brings us back to the urgent question of production and creation 
of the common world, which is the fourth perspective that need to be addressed. 
‘For social existence to enable self-production and self-determination,’ the 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre writes, ‘– so that people make lives for themselves, 
not simply surviving and adapting to the natural circumstance to which they are 
born or projecting life from idealized sources – consciousness and experience 
must form concrete elements.”191 This actually becomes more important when 
we emphasize the role of architecture in its vice-versa relationship with society. 
As stated before it can be understood as the pre-condition as well as the result 
of processes in society. This doesn’t downplay the role of architecture, when we 
understand architecture both as a field of imagination (on the future needs and 
objective of society) as well as the production of collective tangible and touchable 
elements and spaces in respect to current developments in society. Architecture 
from this perspective thus inherently has the capacity to evoke the future and 
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make the present apprehensible – through imagination it shows what the future 
might be, and through confrontation, even in the everyday environment, it makes 
clear the ‘vast and remote forces that produce our world today’, as the architec-
tural theorist Sanford Kwinter writes,192 which of course again urges the political 
relevance of architecture today. This capacity of the field of architecture is even 
more important nowadays, since society and culture ‘no longer stores its history 
primarily in words and texts, but in images.’193 Architectural theory and design 
are not only able and used to communicate in images, but moreover, are also able 
to address the ‘non-linear, non-dimensional and even qualitative aspects’ of our 
contemporary culture, as Kwinter adds. According to him, architectural thinking 
and design thus ‘assumes a newly privileged role’: it has to be seen as a critical 
practice addressing contemporary questions in society and culture.194 I would 
add that this specifically is what is needed in the debate on the public realm. This 
world apart, the renewed interest in urban public spaces, the anxiety that we 
touched upon – it all also needs to be addressed from the perspective of the very 
material and imaginative structure. That is what needs to be investigated, facing 
the ideas and ideals of the public realm, therefore is the field of architecture as a 
public act, as a public art, and as a public project – architecture as a field of local 
involvement and initiatives and global connections, a field of imagination and 
creativity, of sensory perceptions and physical tangibility. 
In respect to these perspectives the question of ‘how to create?’ should be 
expanded: how to create, build, construct, discuss, inhabit, design, imagine, 
and appropriate public spaces architecturally? And – less actively, since archi-
tectural theory also needs to construct a frame in which this assignment can 
be understood – how to understand these spaces, the thresholds, the ‘relative 
dichotomy’ of public and private architecturally? And finally also vice-versa: 
what is actually the meaning of architecture of the urban-landscape-artefacts, of 
the urban environment, the city, the suburb, the shopping mall, the theme park, 
and public and private space? What is the field of architecture, the profession of 
architects, the practice of architectural offices, specific architectural knowledge 
able to contribute to the discourse on public space and the process beyond its 
production? Moreover, how can it contribute to enhance public space, create 
common space – not to say common ground? What is actually the role of architec-
ture, of the process of design and construction, of architectural objects, vis-à-vis 
public spaces and the ideal of public sphere? 
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3.10 Canal de l’ Ourcq, Parc La Villette (Bernard Tschumi, Paris, France, 1998)
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3.11 Points, Lines, Surfaces; Exploded view. 
Parc La Villette (Bernard Tschumi, Paris, France, 1998)
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3.3  PARC DE LA VILLETTE
3.3.1 Giving Room for Things to Happen 
A few years ago my wife attended a conference that was hosted by the Cité des 
Sciences et de l’Industrie in Paris, France, located in the Parc de La Villette. 
I immediately decided to join her for a few days. The possibility to stay near 
this park, to see it a few days on a row, I definitely felt was an opportunity. The 
park is located on the edge of Paris’s inner city, right up against the Boulevard 
Périphérique, on the site of a former abatoire, slaughterhouse. Parc de La Villette 
is one of these remarkable stepping-stones in the recent history of architecture 
and urban design – one of these crucial moments in architectural history that, 
once spoken, appears to shift paradigms. From the very start of the initiative to 
transform a site into a park, the park has attracted attention amongst architects, 
urban designers and planners, not least because of the sophisticated visions 
developed by the initiators that were translated in a competition brief.195 This 
competition aroused attention worldwide: about 400 submissions were urged 
by the call to rethink the concept of a park within the contemporary urban 
context. ‘The French cultural authorities wanted a new type of urban park,’ the 
French-American architect Bernard Tschumi, winner of the competition, reflects 
about twenty years later in his talks with Enrique Walker, ‘and had asked the 
advisers and various committees to prepare a brief. It was a very complex brief 
since it aimed to address everyone: the old and the young, the active and the 
passive, the working class and the young elite, the rich and the poor, a reflection of 
the young socialist government then in power.’196 
The park is an intriguing departure in order to answer the question proposed 
in the previous paragraphs: ‘but how to create?’ In his presentation of the park, 
Bernard Tschumi emphasises the design with the abstract term ‘superimposition’ 
– a term that is fuelled specifically by a particular drawing of the different layers 
of the design, points, lines, planes, in an exploded view.[IMAGE 3.11] To a wider public, 
the park is surely known because of the 26 red folies, as Tschumi calls the little red 
buildings ‘without program.’197 Together these little buildings – a few actually got 
a stable programme in the end: restaurant, information point, or cafeteria – form 
a grid of squares, measuring 70 by 70 metres, the points-layer (as Tschumi calls 
it) of the park. Indeed, it is these folies that strongly influences its appearance. 
My wife and I booked a hotel at the northern edge of the park, near the Cité des 
Sciences. Our room didn’t have a direct view on the park itself, but was facing the 
street on the other side. A lively street, very much Parisian: a small supermarket, 
some cafés, restaurants, pizza-bars, lots of terraces on the pavement, where the 
public gathered in the evening to watch television and see their soccer team 
perform in the Italian Soccer World Cup Finals. From the staircases of the hotel, 
however, I had a finite overview: a stony plaza in front of the huge building of 
the science institute, stairs descending to the metro station, at the right four 
of the folies were visible (a small one on the square, a composition with an old 
tower bell, one with a fast-food restaurant, another with a temporary annex that 
housed an exhibition). The view further offered a gallery that leads into the park, 
covered with an undulating pergola and accompanied by a long bench, trees 
as a background, and above these trees apartment blocks with their rhythm of 
windows, balconies, and chimneys. During the day, lots of people were out on the 
plaza: sitting and walking around, some by bike, others pulling luggage, looking at 
a map or reading a guide to Paris. Lots of tourists wander around here, entering 
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the Cité des Sciences and the temporary exhibition, or leaving the area to take the 
metro, some musicians on the stairs.
Even the only four folies that I could see from the hotel stairs – indeed 
because of their colour they were very prominent – suggest repetition and 
continuity, which of course is emphasized through the fixed distance between 
the buildings and three of these positioned in a row that more or less follow the 
gallery, as well as through the design: not the same buildings, but immediately 
recognizable as part of a family, a series of possibilities. The folies and the gallery 
therefore suggest a world that I could not yet see from the staircases, but that 
surely was hidden around the corner, or better said from this perspective, behind 
the trees and the huge building of the Cité. Although the map of Paris colours 
the park (even this plaza in front of the Cité), it immediately at first sight seems 
like another type of park. It appears from this view as quite stony, full of built 
structures, with different pavements and distinct routes, and only a few trees at 
the back. It already suggests complexity and diversity. This becomes even clearer 
when entering the park itself: the row of folies turns into a grid, a curling path 
starts, a bridge crosses the Canal de l’Ourcq towards the old Grand Halle, and 
along the gallery a sequence of different views, planes, fields unfold before the 
eye. This gallery and the canopy runs straight from the Northern entrance to 
the Southern entrance, from the Avenue Corentin Cariou to Avenu Jean Jaurès, 
only interrupted in the middle by the stairs and bridge that crosses the canal. [] 
In some senses, the Canal that cuts through the park is less visible, but it never-
theless creates openness in the middle of the park, as well as rootedness to the 
site, specifically since it links the site, especially via Canal Saint-Martin and the 
characteristic Basin de La Villette (that runs into the very centre of Paris through 
an impressive tunnel, even underneath the Place de la Bastille), with the Seine, 
and in the other direction with the suburbs of Paris, and further on with the 
wider landscape. Every now and then a barge appears from the lock, and turns 
through the park in the direction of Pantin, whereas a tourist vessel regularly 
heads over the Canal Saint-Martin to the Seine. The canal itself is accompanied 
by open fields, pedestrian and cycle lanes that connect the neighbourhood of 
Pantin, across the Péripherique, with the city centre, again accompanied by a 
wavy canopy. In addition to these straight walk-and cycle-routes through the 
park, other paths, allées, connect the different corners with other spots within the 
park. The planes in between in turn consist of various gardens and lawns, each 
with its own atmosphere: large lawns, alternating with tree-dotted playgrounds, a 
bamboo garden, a climbing facility, and so on. Some of the planes feature a clear 
programme: there is a playground, a conference centre, grand museums – the 
aforementioned Cité des Sciences, but also in the Southern part, the Cité de La 
Musique – and the conservatoire along the edges of the park, lots of pavilions 
and theatres, an IMAX cinema (La Géode), a concert arena (Zénith), the phil-
harmonic, and many other functions, which of course attract many visitors from 
all over the city as well as tourists to this site. All of these places somehow are 
tied together through the meandering internal route that takes the visitor to the 
furthest reaches of the park. It starts at the lock that navigates the difference in 
height between the Canal Saint Denis, which is the Western edge of the park, and 
the Canal de L’ Ourcq, which runs through the park east-west. The path curves 
around the folies, disappears behind the trees that are at the left, and emerges 
again a bit further along the gallery, to turn again to the left to run all the way 
to the submarine, that is behind the Cité, to the bamboo garden, stepping over 
the canal at the East side, curling along the gardens and the playground to the 
Southern entrance of the Park. Its path is random, as Tschumi emphasises – it is 
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 3: CITY
225
the only element that has an inherent randomness, and therefore is distinguished 
from all the other elements that are ‘super-positioned’ into this site. ‘Randomness, 
by definition,’ Tschumi explains to the architect Enrique Walker, who conducted 
a couple of reflecting interviews with Tschumi, ‘is vulnerable to change; it’s very 
difficult to maintain in architecture since it can’t be justified and goes against any 
sort of logic in terms of construction or cost. At a conceptual level, randomness 
can be better applied to events, actions, and programmes than to physical form 
itself. So at La Villette the system of physical forms is there to allow the random – 
the event – to take place.’198 
This emphasis on the event is frequent in Tschumi’s writings. It somehow is 
a simultaneous rejection of the revival of historicism and formalism, as he writes 
in his article ‘Spaces and Events’,199 as well as giving account of the increasing 
instability of programmes and functions today, as he for instance emphasizes 
in his lecture ‘De-, Dis-, Ex-’. To start with the latter, in this lecture Tschumi 
challenges what he calls the crisis of representation and meaning of architecture. 
‘In no way’, he writes, ‘can architecture today claim permanence of meaning. 
Churches are turned into movie houses, banks into yuppie restaurants, hat 
factories into artists’ studios, subway tunnels into nightclubs, and sometimes 
nightclubs into churches. The supposed cause-and-effect relationship between 
function and form (“form follows function”) is forever condemned the day 
function becomes almost as transient as those magazines and mass media 
images in which architecture now appears as such a fashionable object.’200 The 
programme, Tschumi thus argues, has become too fluid to deliver meaning 
permanently as well as form generative rules for the design of buildings, which 
would be the physical representation of the programme. The British architectural 
historian Adrian Forty has, in his excellent book Words and Buildings, shown 
that the idea of ‘Form Follows Function’ has been only established by looking 
back critically, by questioning and criticizing the dictum during the seventies 
and eighties. The dictum was always understood in multiple ways and trajec-
tories, never as a simple design-law or receipt. Nevertheless, the recognition 
of the instability of today’s programme has been at the core of the debates in 
post-modernism. But whereas architects like the Italian Aldo Rossi and the 
American Peter Eisenman plead for an autonomous understanding of architec-
ture201 – form and meaning emerge from within the profession, its histories and 
practices – Tschumi’s research, writings and designs can be understood as a trial 
to redefine the relationship between ‘what happens within a space’ and the space 
itself through the notion of ‘event’. ‘Our work argues’, he writes in the aforemen-
tioned article ‘Spaces and Events’, ‘that architecture – its social relevance and 
formal invention – cannot be dissociated from the events that “happen” in it.’202 
Inherent in the notion of event is its temporal and fluid character. Spaces are 
not formed through static programmes, but are as it were produced by events, 
by the movement of bodies in space. In an earlier article, ‘Violence of Architec-
ture’, Tschumi emphasizes this relationship between body and space affecting 
one another even more extensively.203 Violence here is used as a metaphor, 
emphasizing the strong and intense relationship between the body and space,204 
and vice versa. ‘Any relationship between a building and its users is one of 
violence,’ Tschumi states, ‘for any use means the intrusion of a human body into 
a given space, the intrusion of one order into another.’205 The body disturbs the 
order of the architectural space, as well as the other way around: the architec-
ture influences the body. Tschumi suggests narrow corridors and large crowds, 
strange desires for vistas, steep and dangerous staircases, as intruding on the 
human body. The physical presence of architecture forces itself upon the body, so 
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to say, according to Tschumi cannot be denied nor always brought to pleasure or 
comfort. The text actually pleads for openness to such violence, not since ‘the love 
of violence, after all, is an ancient pleasure,’206 but moreover since the architecture 
violating existing orders, like any violence, contains the possibility of change and 
renewal.207 Tschumi therefore pleads for subtle relationships between event and 
architecture. When rituals become paths, when architects dream of purifying the 
transgressions of body and space, everything immediately turns into frozen forms, 
institutes of order,208 and loses its quality of the possibility of change, giving room 
to something new.209 The philosopher Edward Casey takes that as the very essence 
of Tschumi’s argument. ‘In the case of architecture and event’, he writes in his 
The Fate of Place, an event ‘is not only something that takes place; it also gives 
place (donne lieu), gives room for things to happen … Architecture, then, does not 
occupy a place but provides places … and in so doing occurs as an event that ‘there 
is’.’210
During the few days I was in the park I was able to attend, besides the regular 
programme of the park, several temporarily organised events, ranging from 
the open-air cinema in the evening that is still organized by the park during the 
summer months, to a music festival, specifically giving the floor to groups of 
foreigners. I could participate in a small walking event, visit an exhibition, enjoy 
the music (sounds?) of lots of musicians that try to conquer the loud music of the 
festival. I could drink coffee from a pop-up coffee-car or eat ice cream a few steps 
ahead. I saw how locals occupied spots to celebrate a birthday, enjoy the fresh 
air with a cake or a picnic, take a nap on a lawn or meet with friends, a bottle of 
wine always to hand. The park was also filled with non-locals, which you could 
see from the guides they were holding and their language. They came to wander 
over the paths, walk along the canal, visit specific sites, and have a short break and 
eat their lunch after visiting a museum. I thus could see how the lawns and the 
folies are used, moreover are occupied by locals and Parisiennes, by tourists and 
congress-attenders, and turn it for a few moments into their own place in space. 
The folies actually appeared to be multi-purpose, and thus approved Tschumi’s 
aim of physical form that allow events to take place. They were actively occupied, 
sometimes just for a while to enjoy the view from above, then by a group of 
youngsters to do some skating practice, while others go and sit there for a picnic 
– a romantic spot with a view, just for two. The music festival has turned one 
into the stage. The open-air cinema uses one as the position for the projector (the 
really huge screen is held up in the air by a hoisting crane). Through the design, 
‘La Villette promotes programmatic instability,’ Tschumi writes. ‘The Park’s three 
autonomous and superimposed systems and the endless combinatory possibili-
ties of the Folies give way to a multiplicity of impressions. … La Villette is a term 
in constant production, in continuous change; its meaning is never fixed but is 
always deferred, differed, rendered irresolute by the multiplicity of meanings it 
inscribes.’211 
3.3.2.		 Density,	Heterogeneity,	Conflict,	and	Contradiction
It surely can be argued that Parc de La Villette is the ‘frozen understanding of 
urbanity’ by Bernard Tschumi (and certainly also by his commissioners). That is 
the fate of architecture, it always offers form, which is fixed. Even those architec-
tural practices that try to establish formlessness, or mobile architecture and even 
moveable architecture, in the end need to come up with construction, structure, 
material, form, which somehow fix its material possibilities. Nonetheless, the 
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forms that are offered, the spaces that are demarcated, can create openness. 
Even more, they can provoke action, happenings, events, occupation as Tschumi 
states in the quote I already cited, ‘Randomness can be better applied to events, 
actions, and programmes than to physical form itself. So at La Villette the system 
of physical forms is there to allow the random – the event – to take place.’212 
Tschumi even claims that this specific superimposition (of structured layers) has 
created spaces formed by accident, which are better equipped to offer unpredicted 
possibilities of use. These residual spaces thus are loosely defined, not by (design) 
form, neither by programme, which makes them open, according to him, for 
occupation, appropriation, and unexpected use. These are the places that embody 
the possibility of change, giving room for something new.213 This openness is 
therefore opposite to the atriums of malls and the open spaces of theme parks, 
which are so well organized in order to predict movement and behaviour, and 
which have been a template for a range of (re-)design plans of urban areas – from 
historic districts to (thematised) suburbs.214 
Although Tschumi would reject the folies, due to their colour, repetition, 
and appearance, simultaneously binds together these diverse layers, paths and 
possibilities, the density and the emptiness, the dynamics and the diversity, as 
well as providing the park’s identity. The latter Tschumi of course cannot reject, 
the first however is presented differently, as it is suggested that the folies are 
only one of the three layers that autonomously and independently are superim-
posed. Nevertheless, the grid surely is the invention of his park-design. Besides 
its power of bringing together the very diversity of sites, locations, appearances, 
spheres, events, activities, programmes, functions and so on, strongly uniting the 
complexity that is the outcome of the superimposition of the different layers. It 
also suggests a certain limitless character of the park.215 The grid however also, 
as he recognises, mediates between the existing and the new. ‘I already knew 
[since he had taken part in the earlier 1976 competition on the site as well, HT] 
that any attempt to be contextual, either with the visible elements (the canal, the 
highway, the neighbourhood) or the invisible ones (the hidden nineteenth-cen-
tury composition of the Masonic star or the old city walls) was the wrong starting 
point. The grid was a way to get rid of “context,” but at the same time it provided 
mediation between the old and the new. … the strength of the project and of the 
park comes from the relationship between some of the existing nineteenth-cen-
tury buildings and the repetition of the folies themselves.’216 The contextual aim, 
‘to get rid of context’ as well as ‘mediation between the old and the new’ therefore 
can be better understood as the reverse process of ‘contextual’ design: instead 
of adjusting the new additions to the context, the context is adjusted to the new 
layers that were superimposed on it.217 In his drawings he consistently extends 
the folies to the existing urban fabric, specifically along the canal and Basin de 
La Villette. In hindsight, in the interview with Enrique Walker, Tschumi is more 
specific about what actually this strength is. ‘The galleries,’ Walker questions, 
‘adjust to existing conditions; that is, they follow the canal and join together 
the two entrances.’ Tschumi reacts: ‘Both are lines of coordinates, but adjusted 
slightly according to the site. This was a very self-conscious strategy. For example, 
the Grande Halle is not a rectangular building; it’s slightly trapezoidal. Since the 
grid was absolutely rigorous, accepting the two-degree deviation meant that the 
line of movement was breaking away from the point grid. In fact, this resulted 
in occasional collisions between the lines of movement and several folies. These 
collisions created a specific architectural condition. So at the time, our argument 
was that the architecture of the park was the result of the conflict of collision of 
its different autonomous systems.’218 That firstly, I would argue, means that the 
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existing situation,219 the canals, the lock, the Grand Halle, and even the edges 
of the site have been treated as another layer in addition to the formal layers of 
the design, the layers of the points, lines and surfaces.220 The situation thus, in 
other words, is not treated as a tabula rasa in which the design simply could be 
drawn, which is suggested by the idea of the ‘anti-contextual’, nor is accepted as 
limiting conditions of the site that even compel the intervention, the addition, 
and the appearance of the new. It is moreover part of the design itself, not of the 
pre-conditions: it is the very material of the project, besides the given programme, 
requirements, and the aims that were offered in the competition brief. 
Conflict and collision are the very outcome of the superimposition of the 
different layers. In his 1987 article ‘Abstract Mediation and Strategy’ Tschumi 
explains the strategy of superimposition: ‘Each [layer],’ he writes, ‘represents a 
different and autonomous system (a text), whose superimposition on another 
makes impossible any “composition,” maintaining differences and refusing 
ascendency of any privileged system or organizing element.’221 And a few pages 
later he adds: ‘The Parc de La Villette project had a specific aim: to prove that it 
was possible to construct a complex architectural organization without resorting 
to traditional rules of composition, hierarchy, and order. The principle of superim-
position of three autonomous systems of points, lines, and surfaces was developed 
by rejecting the totalizing synthesis of objective constraints evident in the majority 
of large-scale projects. … One of the goals at La Villette was to pursue this investi-
gation of the concept of structure, as expressed in the respective forms of the point 
grid, the coordinate axes (covered galleries) and the “random curve” (cinematic 
promenade). Superimposing these autonomous and completely logical structures 
meant questioning their conceptual status as ordering machines: the superimpo-
sition of three coherent structures can never result in a supercoherent megastruc-
ture, but in something undecidable, something that is the opposite of a totality. 
… the independence of the three superposed structures thus avoided all attempts 
to homogenize the Park into a totality.’222  Tschumi again and again emphasizes 
this rejection of the park as a totality, a coherent or even a homogeneous place or 
structure. In his talks with Enrique Walker he positioned this rejection against 
the homogenizing approach of cities and urban places by architects like the 
Luxemburg architect and critic Léon Krier, who has become well-known because 
of his rejection of a modern approach in favour of a Classical approach to archi-
tecture and the city, which we will discuss in Chapter 6. Krier also had joined the 
‘pre-competition’ in 1982 on La Villette. In his reflection Tschumi states ‘At the 
time, the ideology of a futuristic utopia had been discredited and [Krier’s] project 
was the beginning of the now well-known discourse on memory and historical 
constants.’223 In his proposal he wanted ‘to break that pattern’, Tschumi admits.’224 
His refusal of Krier’s approach goes further than a critical response to the 
‘nostalgic return to the past’, as Tschumi qualifies these plans,225 but rather funda-
mentally questions the understanding of the urban environment, public space 
and (landscape) architecture. ‘What exactly did you mean,’ Walker asks him, ‘in 
using the term urban to qualify the park?’ And Tschumi answers: ‘I meant density, 
heterogeneity, conflict, contradicting. … Thus, the only particularity of La Villette 
was deep density, since it was introducing the heterogeneous. That notion was 
key to a different type of city – a city of activities rather than a city of forms.’226 
This actually is not only a fundamentally different perspective in regards to the 
Krier proposal, it is also quite distinct from the traditional approach of landscape 
architecture. Although exaggerated, it can be argued that Tschumi has applied the 
very notion of the public square – in the words of the sociologist Richard Sennett: 
‘to intermix persons and diverse activities’227 – to the park’s design. These notions 
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are somehow contradictory to the obvious notions that are often associated with 
parks in high-density urban areas: bringing nature, quietness, and retreat to the 
very heart of cities. Parks have been treated so far as spaces of rest, reserves of 
nature, even of wilderness in the urban context – a counter space, opposite to its 
surroundings. But here, in La Villette, the urban heterogeneity has been taken as 
its very starting point, and the cities hustle and bustle is the very characteristic of 
the appearance of the park. 
Therefore, being a clear example of post-modern architecture, Parc de La 
Villette can be very well described as a public space that strongly opposes the 
‘public’ spaces that are the outcome of the enclave-like landscape I traced in the 
previous chapter. But whereas the ‘public spaces’ of the Mall, the theme park, 
the historic district, the airport, all these post-modern ‘new’ spaces, can be 
characterized as smooth, efficient, safe, and unambiguous, Parc de La Villette 
on the contrary celebrates struggle, conflict, tension, and provocation – it is 
therewith closer to the other post-modern perspective, as it comes to the fore 
in Robert Venturi’s plea for ambiguity – complexity and contraction – in archi-
tectural design.228 Through its very construction, with a mixed – ‘super posited’ 
– programme, spaces that don’t have a clear single aim and thus are ambiguous 
and can be occupied temporarily, the connecting routes that cut through the 
middle of the park, the park-space almost literally represents urbanity, specifi-
cally understood as the possibility of encounters with others; that is, strangers 
by chance. Whereas postmodernity has led to the smooth spaces of controlled 
areas, which is a commercial extrapolation of the aim of hygiene, air, security, and 
control that was inherent in the project of modernity, it has also led to a counter 
approach, the critical emphasis on collision, conflict, contradiction, which might 
be seen as a hyperbolic embracing of urbanity beyond the anti-urban modernist 
treatment of urban environments. 
3.3.3 Preliminary Lessons for Designers
Public space, as we have seen, is essentially an urban term. The city, as the 
urban sociologist Louis Wirth has stated, is a permanent and dense concentra-
tion of a large population that socially is heterogenic.229 Cities therefore, Jane 
Jacobs for instance emphasized, ‘are, by definition, full of strangers. To any one 
person, strangers are far more common in big cities than acquaintances. More 
common not just in places full of public assembly, but more common at a man’s 
own doorstep. Even residents who live near each other are strangers, and must 
be, because of the sheer number of people in small geographical compass.’230 
And Richard Sennett in his definition of cities: ‘a city is a human settlement in 
which strangers are likely to meet.’231 These statements somehow suggest that the 
previous reflections upon the political (or democratic) perspective beyond public 
space is bound to the city. Such urban public space will only be attractive, lively, 
vital, and meaningful if it is accessible for everyone, especially for strangers. It 
is in the city that the space of streets, squares, parks, supermarkets, post-offices, 
potentially houses the political exchange that is beyond the political perspective 
– space where people bump into each other, can touch upon strangers. However, 
when we ask ‘how to create’ such public space, Parc de La Villette can teach us 
important lessons. It is not too difficult to analyse the features of design, planning, 
and architecture that contribute to this quality – although, as we will see, that 
will only show a specific appearance of what we understand today as being public 
space. Although Tschumi suggests that the design is nothing more and nothing 
less than imposing layers, it is somehow bound together by the folies as I argued. 
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It is made a whole, despite the different fragments that it is constructed of. There 
is design-effort beyond it, yet Tschumi emphasizes the character of uncertainty, 
unpredictability and chance of the final result.232 Obviously the strategy of super-
imposition strengthens the appearance of ‘heterogeneity, density, conflict, and 
contradiction’, these notions Tschumi calls ‘urban’. Common sense reasoning and 
analysis afterwards – since Tschumi himself never has presented his design as 
such – shows at least five aspects that evoke these notions of the urban, specif-
ically attracting a diverse public to the park, bringing diversity and density into 
the same spatial environment. However, before presenting these five features, 
it should be said that the park of course can never be a template that heedlessly 
can be used somewhere else. In architecture essentially no receipts are available, 
specifically no receipt for what a ‘good public spaces’ might be. The same design 
that fits here will be a misfit if applied somewhere else. In this case, one needs to 
admit that the park is of course heavily backed by the surroundings, the enormous 
density of the Paris city fabric, the small (and dark) apartments without outdoor 
space: surely no gardens, but not even balconies. The citizens thus need to go out 
for a bit of fresh air. Having said that, it is also fair to recognize the contribution of 
this design that clearly shows some features that enhance the wide range of possi-
bilities of use and therefore the heterogeneity of visitors and users. 
The first obvious important feature is the routing, which includes the galleries that 
are part of the greater structure of Paris urban fabric, and link the surroundings 
of the park through the midst of the park (and not along the edges) to the inner 
core of the city. Cyclists frequently use these galleries, especially the one along the 
canal. The internal routes, like the scenic route and the allées, cross these galleries 
several times. As a result, the park is part of the urban fabric, part of a meaningful 
whole (which is the city), as well as contribute to it with a unique setting. Route 
and structure, in other words ensure unity across the site and connection with 
the surroundings. A balance is always needed between internal routes, which 
turn an area into a (perceptible) whole, on the one hand, and are intersected by 
going-through-routes on the other. This ensures a mixed public with different 
destinations and objectives (the cyclist heading home, the neighbour wandering 
with a dog, a family on their way to kindergarten) within the same complex spatial 
system, it brings the passer-by in contact with the ‘ordinary user’. 
The second element that helps extensively increase the diversity of public 
in the park is the heterogeneity of the programme in scale level, definition and 
temporality. Programming is everything, even if there is no programme, we can 
argue. Part of the success of La Villette is a number of large-scale functions on the 
one hand, like the Cité des Sciences and the Cité de Musica, and a busy festival 
schedule on the other. There is always something to do and something new to 
see – each programme, furthermore, brings its own public to the park. The park, 
within the same spatial system, houses functions for the local area and for the 
entire city. Apart from these long-term and temporary functions, the un-pro-
grammed and un-defined space can very well be even more important. This is the 
space that can be appropriated, and where ‘action’ is possible. It only becomes 
interesting, however, once there are people in it. The importance of this, again, is 
that it brings together those for whom the park is an everyday setting and those 
for whom it is a special space. 
The third element is the superimposition itself, which makes the space open 
to multiple interpretations. Various sections of the population and individuals 
can feel at home there and occupy the space, identify with the park, and even 
transform the space by adding personal elements: vanes, a table and a chair, a 
tent, a barbecue set, candlesticks, and so on. The park thus offers ‘something for 
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everyone’: panoramic vistas, or an intimate setting instead, secluded or with other 
people in sight, an individual spot or open and exposed, next to a playground or 
close to a stage, along the canal or in the romantic atmosphere of the bamboo 
garden. 
The fourth feature is the re-use of a few of the old elements that remained from 
the former slaughterhouse, most prominent, of course, is the Grand Halle, which 
is quite important in the appearance of the park (more than for instance the 
really huge building of the Cité des Sciences, I would argue, which appears much 
more as being at the edge of the park). Historical imbedding and respect for the 
past is not the same as a nostalgic or historicizing outlook, this park shows. But 
nevertheless, the few historical buildings as well as the canal and the barges that 
sail through the park on this canal, together with the red follies, lend the park an 
authentic atmosphere, a historical rootedness that is attractive to visitors. It is 
moreover precisely that confrontation between old and new, the unyielding grid of 
follies versus the imperturbable old building structures that has become the park’s 
identity.
The final aspect is actually the combination of the preceding and making 
them a ‘unified’ whole: the structure of the folies. For it is by bringing together 
the different routes, programmes and atmospheres in a structure (although one is 
open to multiple interpretations) that scope is created for meaningful encounters 
among the diverse public. These encounters need not be taken literally. Watching 
and being watched is already something, can in fact be provocative, planting 
the seed for enhanced social interaction.233 Cohesion is imperative, but this does 
not mean everything has to be uniform. Let alone themed. Tschumi’s design, 
at first glance, seems a banal collection of different fragments of park, in which 
die-straight routes frustrate the meandering paths. Yet this layered-ness is 
essential. The park as a whole, in its multiplicity and especially its ambiguity, has 
nonetheless been given clear cohesion, first of all by the grid of red follies and 
then, actually, by the routes that cross it.
3.3.4 Competing Public Spaces
But now we have learned these lessons, it is also time to deconstruct them again. 
Ever since I was a little boy I have been interested in inland shipping – the 
intriguing sight of barges slowly navigating along the rivers, lakes, canals, and 
harbours. This interest, as I see now, is a combination of an interest in this figure 
of the water-landscape of the Delta of where I grew up, as well as the business 
that these ships represent – a business that is about movement, but not about 
speed. The whole industry of shipping of course is dominated by the landscape, 
but nevertheless also vice-versa can dominate it. The whole network of rivers 
and lakes connects landscapes: strings that meander from the very mountains 
upwards down to the sea, in the meantime forming the very landscape by the 
very processes of streaming, grating, polishing, flooding, inundation and sedi-
mentation – processes that have no end. At that point, men came in with their 
handcraft, horsepower, wind-power, steam-craft, diesel-engines, nuclear-power, 
sun-power in order to construct canals, cutting in straight lines through the 
landscape, constructing artworks like viaducts, tunnels, harbours, docks and 
locks, barrages, even ship-lifts, and by doing so again transforming the landscape, 
connecting places and constructing networks. And then the barges come in, slowly 
sailing upriver, or a bit quicker down the river, bringing with them goods that are 
transported around the world to their definitive destination, of just to a first stop 
in their journey around the world. Finally the slowness of sailing, often seen as 
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its weak point in respect to other possibility of transportation, embeds even the 
single ship to the landscape.  
However, the actual use of the canal within the Parc de La Villette by the small 
barges right through the midst of this public and urban area every now and then 
thus attracted my attention. I decided to walk along the canals out of the park in 
order to see where the ships came from or where they go, to see if there are still 
plants so near the city centre that are still in use. I started my journey along the 
Canal Saint-Denis, starting at the lock, from where you can walk under a few 
bridges into a more open environment of the industrial zones on the other side of 
the Boulevard Périphérique. On the left side a row of trees accompanies the canal, 
the parcel of land beyond it seems to be fallow. A person sits between the cane 
fishing, I see. I walk on the right bank, which is in appearance a different story: 
enclosed boxes of businesses – plumbing firms, building firms, a depot of sand, 
gravel and grit, a few offices. All around here there is the sound of heavy trucks 
driving up and down the road. At a distance I indeed see some cranes that still are 
loading or unloading barges. 
A man approaches me, but since I don’t understand the French language 
fluently, I don’t understand his question. A few moments later, another man 
walks up to me, and also asks me something. I can’t hear him well, but it evokes 
curiosity. Only after a period of time, and having seen more men wandering 
around slowly and looking after me, I realise that this canal zone is not just an 
industrial area but also what is called a ‘cruising’ area – an informal meeting area 
of gays, looking for contacts. This use doesn’t have to surprise me: the site is near 
the business of the city-centre, very accessible, but still peripheral and not visited 
enough to give room to this very practice. By touching upon this practice, I finally 
understand clearly that however openly accessible and unrestricted the park is, 
it doesn’t give room to all particular practices. At least this practice requires a 
different context than that of the public park. Some human and ‘public’ activities 
need less business, less openness, less accessibility, less control than the park 
offers. For this practice, the park can also be too accessible, too successful. 
This example easily shows that ‘public spaces’ despite its initial meaning of freely 
accessible space, does not mean that the space attracts all group of people and 
give room to everything that might be possible. Here in Parc de La Villette surely 
the public management has its rules, but particular practices in particular places 
also develop quite ‘spontaneously’: the specific position in the neighbourhood 
and the extensively used area by a variety of groups, automatically excludes 
certain activities and therefore also select groups of city inhabitants. A playground 
attracts families, but keeps away couples without kids. A dance festival will attract 
youngsters, but will be neglected by the elderly. Burger King attracts locals, but 
it is not worth a detour for other citizens of Paris. Sure, all these groups can enter 
these specific places, but they are of no interest for them. So also for the men 
seeking contact and sexual pleasure, for them it makes no sense to wander around 
subtly inviting other man for a liaison. This place is too crowded in many senses: 
it is not clear who enters the space for the same reason, it is too busy to recognize 
like-minded visitors, who can be approached and who can’t. This specific practice 
needs such distinctive places like the canal-zone, needs the periphery and 
isolation, not to be disturbed by others – it therefore cannot take place in the 
midst of such crowded places as the park. In other words, I thus suddenly realised 
that both spots had distinctive ‘publics’, actually both avoid one another. 
This experience in the periphery actually reveals a specific characteristic of 
‘public space’. The peripheral experience in actual urban politics is usually not 
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acknowledged as a regular part of public space. Discourses on urban development 
amongst local politicians, developers, citizens, but also architects, are surely 
dominated by images of ‘established’ social behaviour. ‘When asked about their 
desires’, Tschumi states, they ‘generally repeat the established codes of spatial use 
and design – the doxa of social use.’234 Or as Ghirardo writes: ‘Almost completely 
ignored … is the wide range of temporary or provisional claims on urban areas 
for such things as teenage cruising (in automobiles in American cities and small 
towns, on Vespas or on foot in many European cities); garage sales and other 
temporary street vendors; demonstrations, marches and parades; block parties 
and other urban and suburban festivals. None of these depend upon massive 
mechanisms of control, and none of their success depends upon well designed 
public spaces. On the contrary, often the less hospitable and more bleak a setting, 
the more successful the ephemeral event. Because of this, these activities are 
typically ignored by architects and urban designers.’235 Not neglected by Tschumi, 
one could argue, with his emphasis of the importance of the temporal event 
and ambiguity of space, and his reading of the urban in terms of heterogeneity, 
density, conflict, and contradiction. One nevertheless simultaneously needs to 
conclude that after about twenty years, Parc de La Villette has become part of 
the accepted doxa of social use and public spaces, it is appropriated and occupied 
by the inhabitants of Paris (the festivals, of course, attract them), specifically 
of those living in the immediate neighbourhood (for which it is an everyday 
environment). Although its appearance is completely different to the historical 
examples around, such as the nearby Parc des Buttes Chaumont, it is turned into 
an ordinary environment – probably only architects and urban planners (or those 
slavishly following the Lonely Planet from highlight to highlight) will come along 
in order to investigate the difference	and extraordinary design. It has become an 
established area, giving room to appropriation and occupation to a certain extent. 
It is therefore in the fringes of the park that other users? that are excluded from 
the established praxis can be found. 
That the canal-zone and its blunt uses are on the other side of the Route 
Peripherique surely is not just symbolical – cruising belongs to the practices that 
not only need peripheral space, but also that are pushed into the periphery of 
society. It is a practice most people want to avoid. The ‘proper’ location of certain 
human activities in public of course is highly dependent upon urban planning 
and all political and public processes beyond. The difficulties of human life that 
in cities much more are exposed to the public than in villages are nevertheless 
often threatened, pushed away out of sight. Sometimes clearly by regulations like 
prohibition of begging in shopping streets, or a ban on youngsters gathering near 
playgrounds, or skate-boarding on the stairs in front of a town-hall, sometimes 
invisible, through the specific design of streets and squares, the addition of speed 
bumps, cameras, street lights, benches one cannot lay down on, shiny paving and 
expensive coffee-corners in order to attract a specific public, and so on. Often 
urban design indeed is used to smooth public space, thereby wiping out decay 
and deterioration, images of places that are experienced as threatening by the 
crowd. On a higher level the urban planning itself of course also redraws the map 
of the city. By developing expensive apartments in socially poor neighbourhoods, 
the planning of public transport connections, leisure facilities, and so on, specific 
places in the city fabric are gentrified, change from inhabitants, the public and 
use. ‘What is characteristic of our city-building’, as the sociologist Richard Sennett 
writes about contemporary urban planning, ‘is to wall off the differences between 
people, assuming that these differences are more likely to be mutually threatening 
than mutually stimulating. What we make in the urban realm are therefore bland, 
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neutralizing spaces, spaces which remove the threat of social contact: street walls 
faced in sheets of plate glass, highways that cut off poor neighbourhoods from the 
rest of the city, dormitory housing developments.’236 That of course is not to blame 
Tschumi, this is simply how urban environments develop (although this can also 
be the other way around, from established design into peripheral atmosphere). 
Some of the practices need peripheral location, sphere, and environment, anyway. 
Design proposals and urban planning often, not to state always, violates this 
sphere and turn it, although unwanted, into an environment that in subtle ways is 
excluding, pushing the peripheral praxes out – which therefore always are on the 
run, searching for the new fringes of the urban fabric. 
These two faces of ‘public’ space, the park versus the canal-zone, the established 
spaces versus the sharp edges, show at least two things. Firstly that, as the archi-
tectural critic Diane Ghirardo states: ‘there is not “a” public, but competing 
publics, often in conflict with one another and with their own venues for action, 
indeed, their own definitions of action,’237 and secondly that the role of actual 
design is questionable. Does a public gather due to or despite of its physical 
environment? That latter question is central in all the following chapters. I 
however am convinced that an answer is enclosed in this notion of ‘action’ that 
Ghirardo brings to the fore. Public space as the locus of ‘action’ will bring us to the 
work of Hannah Arendt, who indeed has put forward ‘action’ as the very activity 
of the human being in public space. Her concept of action, that indeed is bound 
to public spaces, however, is related to other forms of human activity: labor and 
work. This larger framework will help us to connect architecture even more closely 
to public space, not just as means to form, design, control public spaces, but also 
in a more fundamental way, by delivering it meaning, permanence and common-
ness. Arendt’s writings thus will offer another framework regarding public space, 
in which the very character of architecture, amongst them these aspects of inter-
vention, transformation, and (re)construction, play a significant role. 
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How architecture can be related to the political ideal that in one way or the other 
is tangible behind the question of public space within the contemporary urban 
condition is a question that is not easily answered. The previous chapters revealed 
this condition: on the one hand a scattered landscape of suburbs and city-cen-
tres, malls and business districts, defined by a longing for security and comfort, 
while on the other hand a particular strive for plurality in order to create an 
environment of creativity, but which in turn also seems to evoke gentrification 
and similarity. This condition thus prevents public spaces from playing a central 
role in the life of all inhabitants of society, preventing it from turning into a public 
sphere. The somehow liberal ideal of the public sphere, to briefly summarize, 
is the meeting of different people, the exchange of ideas, to be provoked and 
challenged not to grant the own perspective and to dismiss other perspectives 
too easily. It is the space of the meeting of all members of society, no matter their 
race, class, gender, and worldview. As became clear in the previous chapters, 
this view largely depends upon the 1962 book The Structural Transformation of 
the Public Sphere by the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, which only in 
1989 was translated into English. Behind the debate, another origin-source are 
the writings of the German/American philosopher Hannah Arendt, although her 
thoughts garnered a sparse scholarly response. Arendt’s notion of the public realm 
is slightly different than Habermas’s concept of the public sphere. To my mind, 
these differences offer another – and more clear – view upon the relationship 
between this political term of the public realm (or public sphere) and concrete 
public spaces, which are the object and subject of the architectural project. In 
this chapter I therefore introduce the life and work of Arendt, so that, in the next 
chapters, I can go in-depth in this relationship between the political and the archi-
tectural, the public realm and public space. 
I start this chapter with challenging the need to re-read Arendt. It after all 
might be questionable why architects need philosophers to gain insight in ‘what 
they are doing’, in the meaning of architecture. There certainly is a huge gap 
between the theory and practice of architecture, and the reflections and writings 
of philosophers. The (recent) history of architecture has shown how difficult 
it is to bridge that gap, without being struck in superfluous actions, proposals, 
manifestoes. Nevertheless, thinking about the public, and how that might be 
related to architecture, to the political and how that is related to public space, is 
not simply a question that can be covered only within architectural reflections. 
It needs a conversation with other scientific fields, other experiences – but in 
that conversation, an important perspective can be unfolded, in order to build 
an understanding of the meaning of architecture, also in the relationship to the 
contemporary culture and urban condition. After these reflections, this chapter 
offers the reader an intellectual biography of Arendt’s life and work. It starts with 
stressing the particularity of Arendt as a thinker, who is, somehow stubborn and 
not easily captured in a single perspective. Arendt herself after all distances her 
from the method and position of the philosopher, as she also does not regard 
herself as a political theorist. She is devoted to actualities, puzzled by what 
actually happened in the modern age in the Western world – with a marvelous 
knowledge of the past, the Classical tradition, and cultural references, she sets 
out to understand these developments, without falling into existing patterns 
and following existing analysis. She wanted to understand by herself. This stub-
bornness, this eagerness not to be placed in a particular stream or perspective, 
is an important figure. What Arendt offers as reflections never is brought to a 
formula. Arendt keeps away from defining a theory, but instead opens up new 
questions, and even is not anxious to leave paradoxes and contradictions in her 
237
work. These preliminary remarks on Arendt’s attitude opens up the narrative 
of her life and a brief reflection upon her ideas, which are, as will become 
clear, are interrelated. Arendt is personally involved in that question of public 
space – although she does not extensively dwell upon her own experiences, 
these experiences nevertheless urged the questions that she investigates. The 
chapter finalizes by enlightening two major theoretical concepts, that are 
fundamental to her thinking, and which are important to continuously keep in 
mind during the reflections thereafter. 
238
239
4.1 Covers of various versions of Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition
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4.1 THE NEED TO BRIDGE
The whole trajectory of the last two chapters through the urbanized landscape, 
the suburbs, the strive to secure spaces and places, the exclusive environments, 
the re-appropriation of the city and the re-valuing of diversity, simply reveals the 
elusive complexity of physical spaces. It becomes even more elusive when these 
spaces are stressed through ideas about the public sphere, and thus are mirrored 
against political ideals of a Western Democratic worldview. How does concrete 
(public) spaces relate to these ideas and ideals that largely are rendered on a 
meta-spatial level, if not addressing a virtual realm beyond public space. The 
question of how architecture contributes to that relationship, which somehow is 
at the heart of the debate on public space within architectural theory, therefore 
is not easy to answer. There is no formula on architecture, no toolbox that can 
be applied to assignments on public space, in order to enhance public space 
and turn it into a public sphere. Surely, architecture (in)forms literally (public) 
space, and (public) space (might) offer(s) room to meet others, offer(s) room for 
strangers to come close, for the exchange of ideas and debate about the future. 
Public space also offers room for protest and demonstrations, which often are 
presented as the touchstone of the relationship between public space and the 
realm of politics. However, there is no law beyond such possibilities of space, 
no recipe for a successful architectural intervention which unlocks these poten-
tialities. This journey therefore finally came down to the pressing question the 
New York Times architectural critic Michael Kimmelman, urged in his reflection 
on the Zuccotti Park protests: ‘But how do we create them?’1 How can we today 
create spaces that are able to bear political meaning? Kimmelman urged this 
question on the design of spaces specifically by his conclusion: these demonstra-
tions, these political activities, took place in ‘intentionally incomplete, and at least 
partly unplanned spaces that are completed in different ways by different users.’2 
Political happenings, like protests and demonstrations, arise largely in unplanned 
ways, and take over space regardless of its architecture. The proper question 
therefore even might be if architecture has any relationship with the public sphere 
whatsoever. Does architecture matter? Occupy occupied Zuccotti park, a well-de-
fined and well-designed ‘public’ space, not because of its design, but because of its 
very location (near Wall Street) and, secondly, because of its status as privately 
owned public space. This of course, first and foremost, urges the suggestion that 
the public sphere is bound to unplanned events, rather than to specific spaces. 
Indeed: is architecture at stake? Does architecture have something to offer? Is 
there even a need for architecture? 
These questions actually do not only stress the relationship between actual 
space and a certain ideal of a political realm that is related to these spaces, 
which is developed through actual meetings and happenings that take place in 
that space. Kimmelman’s question also suggests two other aspects of architec-
ture as bound to the realm of politics – these two aspects are related to the two 
sides of architecture itself. Architecture first is an artefact in the world. It shapes 
the world, and through that, it also shapes our everyday life. The form of this 
artefact is political, as I will stress in Chapter 6. However, these artefacts are 
also tools to intervene in the world. Design is a tool of intervention – and since 
it is related to the world, this always means political intervention. Beyond every 
space is a moment of ‘design’, a moment of making decisions and judging upon 
the world, as I investigate in Chapter 7. Architecture, as we will see, thus always 
is political. However, despite this dimension of architecture, to shape the political 
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and offer room for politics to happen, is not evident, as can be concluded from 
Kimmelman’s question. 
As a start of an answer to the question of Kimmelman I investigated the design 
of Parc de La Vilette in Paris, designed by the French-American architect Bernard 
Tschumi. The park, as I stated, is an exemplary project, in which the relationship 
between the planned and the unplanned is at the core of the design. Tschumi 
often emphasized his design as an attempt to accomplish ambiguity, to leave room 
for the unplanned appropriation of the actual spaces. His main instrument in Parc 
de La Vilette for this ambiguity is the layered-ness of the design. Of course, such 
a statement cannot be taken for granted, and therefore I investigated the park 
itself: not only how it is designed (which is the agency of the architect) but also 
how it is appropriated (the agency of the public). Through this investigation I thus 
expanded already the focus of the question from specifically ‘architectural design’ 
to a broader understanding of the project of architecture. Architecture is not only 
about architectural agency through the design of spaces and objects, but also 
about the artefacts itself and how these evoke imagination, stress representation, 
and allow appropriation. However, although the park offered insight in most of 
these categories – and in the daily use indeed is able to offer room for broad and 
unplanned practices, is open for occupation and appropriation – it nevertheless 
also showed (again) the often limited agency of architecture (and the architect). In 
the case of the park, it’s public character mainly depended upon its sheer location 
within the dense urban fabric of the Paris city centre and the need for open 
and accessible spaces in the immediate environment of the park, the different 
programs that were added to the park, the infrastructure (that already previously 
was there), and so on. The architectural project here, as I stated, was a smart way 
of recognizing the possibilities of the site, and to connect the different elements 
of the existing location and the requirements of the program brief. The design 
actually can be described as the articulation of the possible connection between 
the elements, although the strategy of juxtaposition does not seem to define all 
aspects into detail.3 The case also showed that the ideal of gathering all groups of 
people within the same space, this ideal of the public sphere, in the end seems to 
be beyond reach. As all also will acknowledge: the grid, the follies, the red colour, 
the paths and routes are important, but they never can be a recipe to be used 
anywhere else, besides that this design sometimes feels worn out already. It is of 
another era, out of fashion and outdated. 
So what? Are we stuck here, at this very point? The ‘how’ question of 
Kimmelman in itself seems unanswerable, period, which might be the reason that 
most of the writings on architecture and the public sphere, from Michael Sorkin 
to Sharon Zukin, really remain centred on the level of descriptions of urban and 
social practices, the lament of loss of these practices by the emergence of new 
(sub)urban spaces, but fail to address architecture as artefact and agency that 
somehow relates to these urban and social practices. In these writings architecture 
often is depicted as the décor of things to happen (which is, admitted, a relation-
ship too), but it does not define any other agency than being the décor of these 
things happening (or not-happening). But architecture is not simply the counter 
form of these practices, as is also not the case the other way around: architecture 
does not predict what happens. But that does not mean that the relationship 
between these two sides cannot be addressed. Architecture offers room for things 
to happen: it excludes as well as connects, it offers spaces for events, activities, 
uprisings, debates, as well as that it deprives, disturbs, violate them within the 
same gesture.4 It has agency and power, although it also is steered by powerful 
forces beyond its agency, as we’ve seen previously. It is the manifestation of 
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society as well as the representation of it. It is the reification of a collective, as well 
as the private intervention within that collective. It is the outcome of market-driv-
en-processes, as it also defines the market and its processes. The discussion on the 
relationship between architecture (and its agency) and the public sphere, I would 
argue, stays too much on the level of social sciences, of political, anthropological, 
and sociological reflections, and too little addresses architecture itself. What to 
conclude about architecture then, if in the end the matter of concern is actually 
a social question – a matter of social practices, and thus of areas architecture 
can’t control, challenge, nor form. This debate thus places architecture indeed in 
an impasse. If it fails to recognize the relationship between architecture and the 
social and political practices, there indeed is no way out for the designer. What 
can he do? There is no way out for the philosopher or sociologist too: since where 
they will touch upon, specifically in the flow of Habermas’s argument on the 
formation of ‘public opinion’, is the decay of the public sphere, as it is dominated 
today by polarizing forces, fake news and alternative facts. The power of public 
space to gather a plural public seems to be vanished – this does not only count 
for concrete public spaces, but also for the (new) media, the opinion pages in the 
newspaper, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages. 
The question of Kimmelman thus cannot be answered once and for all by a 
particular approach to the design of public spaces, nor by a toolbox of archi-
tectural forms that can be applied to the city, which will offer public space in a 
way that it can be appropriated by the users, or stop the decay of public space 
politically spoken. There is no univocal architectural answer that can cover all 
aspects of the pressing question by Kimmelman, period, let alone a particular 
form, a set of forms, a specific design-strategy, or what else to answer it, period. 
This does not mean that the question does not make sense. On the contrary, it 
makes reflection upon the question more urgent. How to understand public space 
as a matter of plural people, ambiguity, unplanned coincidence but simultane-
ously also as a matter of architectural design? The question therefore is how we 
can develop another view upon public space and the field of architecture, which 
acknowledges today’s fundamental changes in public space and how we can 
understand these as related to the realm of politics, but also acknowledges the 
fundamental proposition of architecture as an answer-less field (since it is rooted 
in the fluid conditions of space and time and deal with the human capacity of 
imagination). Responding to this question means to balance between the realm 
of social (and political) practices and the realm of architecture, it means to reason 
from within the practices and to apply to these practices the specific worldliness 
of the profession. When we are able to clarify the relationship between the public 
and its public practices on the one hand, and the realm of architecture from 
artefact to agency, and from project to occupation, this not only will help the field 
of architecture reinvestigate itself, it will also conversely offer new insights to 
those fields investigating the public sphere: the humanities, philosophy, sociology, 
political sciences, anthropology and so on. 
It is at this point that I want to introduce a chain of thoughts that can be derived 
from the writings of Hannah Arendt in the debate. Well, to introduce – I have 
to be precise here, since I am certainly not the first to introduce this political 
thinker into discourses on architecture – the public and public space. Particularly 
in the philosophical debate on the public sphere, Arendt’s perspective has been 
discussed extensively. However, this discussion only in a limited sense arrived 
at the discourse on architecture and the public sphere. Only a few architectural 
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scholars, historians, critics and designers have reflected upon theme’s Arendt have 
stressed. Most important to be named are both the British-American architect 
and historian Kenneth Frampton and the Canadian architect and theorist George 
Baird. Frampton specifically discussed ideas of Arendt in his ‘The Status of Man 
and the Status of his Objects’, an article that has first been published in 1969, and 
has been republished several times afterwards – particularly as the opening of his 
collected writings which were published in 2006.5 The article therefore certainly 
can be understood as foundational for his view on architecture (and the world). 
In recent interviews, articles and lectures, he continues to put Arendt forward as 
one of his peers.6 Although Frampton quite early thus understood the relevance 
of Arendt’s writings for the field of architecture, he never stressed it in respect 
to the theme of the public sphere, probably since the debate on public space 
within architecture stems from at least one decade later than the first version of 
the article. It is actually George Baird that introduces Arendt into the architec-
tural debate on public space, specifically in his book The Space of Appearance 
(1995) and two decades later again in Public Space (2012).7 Recently also the 
former Antwerp city-architect Kristian Borret as well as the Italian architect and 
theorist Pierre Vittorio Aureli has offered provoking attempts to rethink the work 
of Arendt within distinctive architectural debates – Borret trying to conceptu-
alize public space, Aureli emphasizing political aspects behind the autonomy of 
architectural form.8 Although I will come back to their views, and will discuss 
them in the following chapters, my aim is that we could gain more in this debate 
on architecture and the public from Arendt’s writings than is discovered and 
presented until now. I therefore regard this reading of Arendt, that I will offer in 
the following chapters, as being a relatively new introduction of Arendt’s thoughts 
and ideas in the debate on architecture and the public. 
To introduce here once again a philosopher in the debate on physical and concrete 
(urban) space(s), while we are particularly interested in the relationship with 
architectural artefacts and architectural agency, needs explanation, particularly 
since the previous chapters lead to the experience of an impasse: to be struck in a 
complex relationship between theory and practice, or better said, between actual 
spaces and ideals beyond these spaces. Should we expect another theorist, with 
a focus on philosophy, to help us out of this trapped situation? The questions 
are urgent, we already concluded, although they remained on a theoretical and 
ideological level. They are not yet answered architecturally, if we ever can find 
an architectural answer at all. It therefore does not seem so obvious to introduce 
another political thinker in order to answer the quest of public space architectur-
ally, specifically not a theorist that wrote her main books addressing the public 
realm more than five decades ago (without, admittedly, even being concerned 
about actual urban places). 
Arendt published The Human Condition, the book in which she most clearly 
has addressed her ideas about the public realm, in 1958, three years before 
Habermass published his book on Öffentlichkeit, which we touched upon in the 
previous chapters.9 In The Human Conditon the public realm is one of the major 
concepts, a term she parallels with ‘public space’. As I will argue later, this use 
of the term ‘space’ often should be understood in a metaphorical sense, quite 
detached from actual (urban) public spaces like streets and squares, parks and 
malls. At first sight, the term ‘public space’ for Arendt seems to be synonym for 
‘public realm’, which thus seems to have a metaphorical character. Again at first 
sight, this term ‘public realm’ seems to be aligned with the term public sphere, 
as defined by Jürgen Habermas. Like Habermass, also Arendt’s concept is based 
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upon an historic example in which the actual space of the public realm is indisput-
able: Arendt grounds her concept in the Greek and Roman polis, which are urged 
as the root of the democratic system of politics. As I will investigate in Chapter 5, 
although both Arendt’s and Habermass’s concepts seem to be comparable, there 
are major and important distinctions. However, Arendt’s reading of the public 
realm often is questioned and fiercely criticized when it comes to actual public 
space. She is blamed to offer just another ideal into the debate: an ideal based on 
the past and drawn in binary terms, urged by a lament of its vanishing.10 Would 
that not again obscure our sight on the specificities of architecture? Does this help 
us to overcome the ideal of the public sphere in which we are struck? In other 
words, why again take a view from abroad, why again a detour via a field adjacent 
to the profession of architecture or urbanism, through seemingly in-tangible 
theoretical reflections, which certainly are difficult to translate to the field of 
architecture (a journey which is, as history shows with all sorts of philosoph-
ical inquiries, quite risky, very difficult and in much cases results in superfluous 
and incomprehensible architectural theories)? I of course disagree with this 
comment: Arendt’s thoughts are stubborn, sometimes rebellious, often surpris-
ingly different and open ended. They are only at first sight binary and nostalgic. 
It indeed seems obvious to read her writings as indeed offering another ideal 
of a binary distinction between public and private spaces, but this, I will argue 
later in this chapter, is based on a misreading of her writings. Arendt has a very 
particular way of dealing with history. Whilst she acknowledges the loss of the 
past due to the modern times, she nevertheless also argues that we are still living 
in the past. Arendt therefore uses history, not in order to restore it, neither to go 
back to a certain ideal, but as a mirror to our contemporary experiences. What 
she comes up with certainly is not a theory, neither a solution – it’s a direction, 
a path, based upon the recognition of important themes regarding the contem-
porary situation. Her engagement with the past is not antithetical, which seems 
to be in the minds of scholars that have argued that we, within the debate on the 
public sphere, simply need to get rid of all the images of the past in order to value 
our daily spaces more justly. Arendt strongly opposes that perspective. On the 
contrary, she argues through her writings, we actually are in need of these images. 
They are still ‘alive’ behind our very own and contemporary experiences, Arendt 
argues. ‘The past is never dead, it’s not even past’, Arendt quotes the writer and 
Nobel Prize winner William Faulkner.11 This perspective, although it stresses the 
past as part of the contemporary condition, also does not argue for a linear under-
standing of history. As if today is the only possible outcome of a progressive past. 
Again on the contrary – history is not linear at all. It is disruptive, characterized 
by outbursts of actualities and distinctions, by simultaneous progress and decay. 
Arendt’s urge to ‘understand’ the contemporary situation, which is behind her 
writings, therefore is always grasping back and rethinking previous outbursts 
against a background of more or less hidden historic experiences. Therefore, to 
bring it back to the discussion on public space: by rethinking historic images, by 
looking to them from different perspectives, and by relating them to our contem-
porary experiences, the narratives touched upon not only will reveal dimensions 
that have been lost over time, what is at stake as well as what differ from previous 
experiences. These images therefore challenge people involved in the planning 
and construction of actual public spaces, but also will challenge those involved 
in the theory and practice of everyday politics – not to go back, nor to restore, 
but to understand the actualities of today. Public space, politics, everyday life 
is in need of this continuous challenge, as is the profession of architecture and 
the whole mechanism of planning and constructing the contemporary everyday 
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landscapes and symbolic places. The writings of Arendt, the concepts she collected 
from the past and presented in her books and articles, essays and letters, help to 
re-invent this debate, not by introducing just another ideal, but by investigating this 
ideal from other perspectives. The answer therefore, of why the writings of Arendt 
would be helpful for architects, should arise from the next three chapters, in which 
I will discuss some of her writings against the background of the field of architec-
ture, concrete physical environments, the architectural project and the agency of the 
architect. 
246 4.2 Selection of books and essays by Hannah Arendt
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12.
Hans Morgenthau, professor of 
Political Sciences at The New School 
in New York (where Arendt also did 
teach regularly), questions Hannah 
Arendt during a conference at the 
Toronto University in 1972 on her 
position vis-à-vis the political circum-
stances and actualities. Quote taken 
from Hannah Arendt, ‘On Hannah 
Arendt’, in: Melvyn A. Hill (ed.), 
Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the 
Public World (New York: St. Martins 
Press inc., 1979), 333
4.2  I WOULD NOT INSTRUCT YOU
4.2.1 Toronto 1972 – An Introduction
‘What are you? Are you a conservative? Are you a liberal? Where is your position 
within the contemporary possibilities?’12 
Imagine the early seventies. America is at war in Vietnam. Still at war, better 
said. The anti-war movement grows in strength and visibility. Numerous articles 
are published in newspapers and magazines, and anti-war demonstrations are 
organized. Throughout the country society is mourning about the loss of troops. 
President Nixon seems to respond to these voices and negotiates about the 
withdrawal of the troops. At the same time, however, the troops still bomb cities 
in Northern Vietnam and Cambodia. The president counts the ‘silent majority’ 
as supporting the war. Awful images showing the effects of these bombardments 
– suffering Vietnamese children as well as elderly – are being published in the 
newspapers nationwide, driving more and more people in the anti-war camp. 
It is not only this war that dictates the sphere in America in the early seventies. 
Also the presidential election attracts attention. Or probably better said, the 
controversies around this election fill the newspaper columns and the discussions 
on television. President Nixon, a Republican, runs for his second term, while 
the Democrats still need to choose their candidate (in the end senator George 
McGovern wins the nomination). Pre-elections are held throughout the States, 
debates are organized, and the campaign teams are fighting each other. Literally 
fighting, they actually say: the campaign is unprecedentedly hard. Even more, 
strange developments are its characteristic. What nowadays is known as ‘The 
Watergate scandal’ happens: a burglary in the headquarters of the Democratic 
National Committee in Washington, probably in order to place electronic listening 
devices meant to overhear the campaign strategies of the Democratic candidate. 
The burglars were caught, and all evidence pointed towards the camp of president 
Nixon. He himself rejected responsibility, and even also denied knowledge of the 
plan to eavesdrop the employees of his opponent. He eventually is re-elected as 
president in November 1972 – but has to resign a year later when the Washington 
Post journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein make clear that the president 
himself nonetheless was involved in the scandal, despite his firm denial. 
So, imagine this political landscape of Northern America in the early seventies as 
the context of a conference in Toronto on actual politics. Numerous Canadian and 
American scholars attended the conference, which was intended to investigate the 
then actual situation through the lenses of the work of the philosopher Hannah 
Arendt. Political theorists have gathered, as well as philosophers, sociologists and 
others involved in political issues – amongst them two scholars from the field 
of architecture whom we already touched upon: Kenneth Frampton, who offers 
the audience a lecture based on the mentioned article ‘The Status of Man and the 
Status of his Objects’, and the architect and then associate professor at the School 
of Architecture of Toronto University George Baird, who, three decades later, 
through his The Space of Appearance (1995) and Public Space: Cultural/Political 
Theory; Streetphotography (2011) would most extensively introduce and discuss 
the work of Arendt within the architectural discourse. Teachers, amongst them as 
well as students, theorists as well as activists (probably roughly the same groups, 
same generations) – all discussing the concepts Arendt came up with, ranging 
from action to thinking and beyond – against a background of anti-war protests 
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and revulsion on the political reality of strategy, method, campaign, and even 
scandals. Whoever reads the report on the conference does feel the eagerness of 
the audience to act – not only to think and theorize and reflect, as mostly is done 
within the field of academics, scholars and conferences, but actively respond on 
actualities.13 First, of course through their speeches and essays, in their articles in 
newspapers and magazines, but surely also through participating in the protests 
on the streets, in the marches against the war and the president. In this eagerness 
the audience evidently expected Arendt to support their willingness to act. She, 
during the conference presented as a political philosopher, was known at least 
because of two publications: the already mentioned The Human Condition (1958) 
and her report on the Eichmann trial Eichmann in Jerusalem (1961).14 The 
Human Condition nowadays is regarded as her magnum opus. The book actually 
reads as a plea for action, the very activity of political life, which was, according 
to Arendt, the distinctive characteristic of the human being. Her emphasis on and 
surely also celebration of political action moreover was fueled in a book that can 
be read as an extension of The Human Condition, meant to investigate, present 
and understand concrete forms of political action: On Revolution (1961).15 The 
public at large however did know Arendt because of a totally different topic: from 
her report of the Eichmann trial of 1963, which she had followed for the magazine 
The New Yorker. This book has gained attention in the newspapers and caused 
agitated responses, surely caused by its subtitle: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil. I will come back on this nationwide controversy later in this chapter, which 
is meant as a biographical sketch of Arendt’s life as well as an exploration of her 
works. For now it is important to know that Arendt blamed Eichmann of ‘thought-
lessness’. The Human Condition thus investigated the capacity to act, the book 
on Eichmann the ability to think – action and thinking, the two main topics of 
Arendt’s writings, one can argue. 
Thus, it is November 1972, on a conference in Toronto. The audience: eager to 
stand up and act. The topic: the work of Arendt. Arendt herself was invited as 
well, as a ‘guest of honor. She had replied that she would prefer to be invited to 
participate.’16 And present she was, with a quite different response than expected 
by the audience: no support for their eagerness to act. She actually perplexed the 
audience with her replies on questions during the conference: she never gave the 
answer expected. Instead of emphasizing the urge of action, that very moment in 
time and political situation, she was eager to emphasize the sole and distinctive 
position of thinking. And it is precisely this emphasis that roused a quite agitated 
conversation during the conference. Arendt immediately starts to provoke the 
audience: 
‘I think I understood something of action, precisely because I looked at it from 
the outside,’ 
she states. This slight distinction between participation and reflection, between 
involvement and distance was well understood by the Toronto professor emeritus 
of political economy C.B. Macpherson. He replied in disbelief: 
‘Is Miss Arendt really saying that to be a political theorist and to be engaged 
are incompatible?’ 
Arendt again: 
‘No, but one is correct in saying that thinking and acting are not the same. … 
To the extent that I wish to think I have to withdraw from the world.’ 
Macpherson replies on his turn: 
‘But to a political theorist and a teacher and a writer of political theory, 
teaching, or theorizing is acting.’ 
13.
See: Arendt ‘On Hannah Arendt’ and 
Elizabeth Young Bruehl, Hannah 
Arendt,	Een	Biografie	(Amsterdam/
Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Atlas, 2005), 
269-270
14.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality 
of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 
1992)
15.
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006)
16.
Arendt, ‘On Hannah Arendt’, 301
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Arendt agrees on teaching and theorizing, but is quick to emphasize thinking as 
distinct from theory. 
‘Thinking in its purity is different,’ she states. ‘I have to keep back to a large 
extent from participating, from commitment. … What is the subject of our 
thought? Experience! Nothing else. And if we lose the ground of experience 
then we get into all kinds of theories. When the political theorist begins to 
build his systems he is also usually dealing with abstraction. … I think that 
commitment easily carry you to a point where you do no longer think. …
I do believe that thinking has some influence on action. But on acting man. 
Because it is the same ego that thinks and the same ego that acts. … I really 
believe that you can only act in concert and I really believe that you can only 
think by yourself. These are two entirely different – if you want to call it – 
‘existential’ positions.’ 
This perspective astonishes the audience. Why did she now emphasize thinking at 
this very moment? Had Arendt herself not praised action as the ‘highest’ human 
capacity in The Human Condition? And were the actual political circumstances, 
the war, the political intrigues, the perversion of power, not clearly enough driving 
towards action? And should this not be seen as the task of academics in the field 
of political sciences as well as the task of political theorists to inform the public, 
to influence the opinion of the public, and even to encourage them to protest and 
resist? Christian Bay, professor of Political Economy at Toronto University asks: 
‘I want political theorists of my kind to be men and women of politics first, 
committed to try to educate ourselves and each other about how to resolve the 
urgent existential problems that we are up against. … Hannah Arendt, what 
can we as political theorists do to see to it that the existential issues – which 
sometimes have true and false answers – are brought home to more of our 
fellow citizens, so that they become citizens in the ancient sense?’
But Arendt refuses to underline such urge for the profession of political theorists 
(although she a couple of months earlier had supported financially some of the 
anti-war movements in Northern America):
‘These other things – that you saw in the development in the last years – 
are more or less things of the public mood. And the public mood may be 
something which I like, and the public mood may be something which I 
dislike, but I would not see it my particular task to inspire this mood when 
I like it, or to go on the barricades when I dislike it. The unwillingness of 
people who actually are thinking and are theorists to own up to this, and to 
believe that this [thinking] is worthwhile, and who believe instead that only 
commitment and engagement is worthwhile, is perhaps one of the reasons 
why this whole discipline is not always in such a very good shape. People 
apparently don’t believe in what they are doing.’  
Arendt’s answers thus confuse the audience. What is her point, how does she 
address actualities, and what do you have to do as a political theorist, as a student 
in politics, or just as citizen? The Toronto based ‘consultant of social services’, 
Michael Gerstein, then asks: 
‘I wonder, as someone who is or feels himself to be a political actor, how would 
you instruct me?’   
And Arendt replies: 
‘No I wouldn’t instruct you. … I think that you should be instructed when you 
sit together with your peers around a table and exchange opinions. And then, 
somehow, out of this should come an instruction: not for you personally, but 
how the group should act. And I think that every other road of the theoretician 
who tells his students what to think and how to act is … my God! These are 
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adults! We are not in the nursery! Real political action comes out as a group 
act. And you join that group or you don’t.’
The answer actually didn’t help that much. The audience still was confused. It is 
at this very moment that the professor of political science at The New School in 
New York, Hans Morgenthau, who Arendt actually knew quite well since she also 
lectured at The New School on a regular base, asks the question I quoted above 
already:
‘What are you? Are you a conservative? Are you a liberal? Where is your 
position within the contemporary possibilities?’17
Arendt, the advocate of action, is not advocating action at all! The audience 
couldn’t believe what they heard, which can be read through their responses, their 
comments and their questions. And it also is the experience of reading the tran-
scription of this discussion today. This Arendt, still seen today as the philosopher 
dealing with concrete political action and revolution, the philosopher who not only 
thought about action generally but also never resigned investigating extensively 
political actualities, here refuses to act, refuses to make up her mind facing the 
actual political situation! Arendt indeed had written in admiration about the 
revolution in Hungary in 1956 and the student protests in America in the sixties. 
She even, quite soon after the outburst of these last protests, visited the students 
of Columbia University in New York – she actually lived around the corner of 
the campus – to talk and support them.18 During her lifetime she did publish lots 
of essays on political issues, on culture and education, on the Jewish question, 
on ‘Europe and the Atom Bomb’, on Religion, on Communism, on history, on 
racism – just to mention some of the actual topics she addressed – in magazines 
and newspapers distributed widely throughout the world like Aufbau, Partesian 
Review, The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Frankfurter Zeitung, 
Der Monat, The Nation or more narrowly distributed amongst philosophers, 
historians, theologians, and political theorists like Jewish Social Studies, The 
Review of Politics, and so on. And of course, although she kept distance to actual 
politics, through these articles she was involved in debates about actual situations, 
engaged towards certain perspectives and stances. Her articles however gained 
praise as well as fierce objection, but she never ran away from criticism on her 
work, and always was eager to discuss the concepts she had introduced and loved 
to defend the reflections on actualities she disseminated. 
However, at this very moment, she continuously refuses publicly to join 
the protests and the protesters outside the conference hall and moreover even 
is rejecting a public role for political theorists and educators gathered at this 
conference inside the conference hall.19 She emphasizes the audience not to follow 
a theory, but, on the contrary, to think for themselves. As if the eagerness to 
protest was roused by ‘a theory’, an abstract idea. As if these people did not think 
at all.20 For Arendt, however, this last remark is crucial: to think for oneself is a 
central motive behind her writings. 
Although the transcription of this discussion surely is not Arendt’s most striking 
text, neither does it investigate her work in astonishing ways or is it seen amongst 
‘Arendt-scholars’ as – finally – declaring her oeuvre, and moreover, it might 
sometimes even evoke confusion about her ideas, I nevertheless want to use 
this transcript in this chapter as a trail through her life and works. I will use the 
transcript as an introduction to a couple of concepts and insights that she dwelled 
upon and explored in her work, topics that I afterwards, in the following chapters, 
will investigate again and will expand within an architectural context. Every now 
17.
The conversation I explore here 
has been published as Arendt, ‘On 
Hannah Arendt’, 301-339. This tran-
scription of the conversation is not an 
exhaustive report of the discussion 
literally, but is revised and reposi-
tioned by Melvyn A. Hill, who was 
the organizer of the conference. Hill 
selected fragments of the conversa-
tion and grouped it along the themes 
addressed through it. The transcript 
thus is an interpretation of what 
happened at this very conference. 
I therefore felt free to write here 
my own version of the discussion, 
in which I actually follow Elisabeth 
Young-Bruehl’s explanation of the 
debate in her outstanding biography 
of Hannah Arendt, Hannah Arendt, 
For the Love of the World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 
I used the Dutch translation, Young-
Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 596-570 
18.
The political philosopher Seyla 
Benhabib mentions the student 
protests even as one of the moments 
of joy and excitement (as well as 
concern) in her life. She writes: 
‘For Arendt, the student movement 
was proof that every generation 
could bring something new into 
the public-political world, that the 
capacity for “natality”, for initiating 
something new and unprecedented 
and the capacity for “plurality”, for 
discovery and enjoying the world 
through action-in-concert, were not 
exhausted.’ Seyla Benhabib, ‘Hannah 
Arendt’s Political Engagements’, in: 
Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz, and 
Thomas Keenan (eds.), Thinking in 
Dark Times (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010), 59-60. 
Arendt herself answered that question 
during an interview with the German 
writer Adelbert Reif in 1970: ‘I 
welcome some of the goals of the 
movement, especially in America, 
where I am better acquainted with 
them than elsewhere; towards others 
I take a neutral attitude, and some 
I consider dangerous nonsense – 
as, for example – politicising and 
“refunctioning” (what the German call 
umfunctionieren) the universities, 
that is, perverting their function, and 
other things of that sort. But not the 
right of participation. Within certain 
limits I thoroughly approve of that.’ 
And her enjoyment: ‘the first thing 
that strikes me is its determination to 
act, its joy in action, the assurance of 
being able to change things by one’s 
own efforts.’ Hannah Arendt (and 
Adelbert Reif), ‘Thoughts on Politics 
and Revolution, A Commentary’ in: 
Hannah Arendt, The Crisis of the 
Republic (San Diego/New York: 
Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969), 
201-202 
19.
Which of course was even more 
perplexing since Arendt herself had 
also written about politics in the 
perspective of the Vietnam War, as 
for instance in her essay ‘Lying in 
Politics’, which was published in 
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and then I will quote the text, sometimes extensively as above, sometimes just 
in a short note – a trail of steppingstones throughout this chapter. Although it 
probably is not obvious to grant this transcript critique like I will do, nevertheless 
there also are reasons to do so. The first reason obviously just is a personal love 
for transcripts like this: the liveliness of those texts, the meandering, the boldness, 
the spoken and unspoken words, all due to the critical questions and smart 
objections, and of course the answers, reflections and attempts to explain a point 
already taken differently by the subject that is questioned. The second reason is 
that, being a transcription of a dialogue and despite the confusion at first sight, 
it gives an unmistakable insight in the thinking of Arendt – particularly in the 
way she thinks, her modus operandi. In the discussion Arendt somehow is very 
reflective upon her work, which of course partly was due to questions the audience 
came up with. They asked for explanation of earlier stances, for explorative 
examples, they came up with quotes, taken from her own works and writings – 
she had to be reflective, due to which this transcript somehow thus reads as a 
reflection upon a working life. I guess this is even more enhanced because of the 
very personal circumstances Arendt had to deal with during the first years of the 
seventies: the recent loss of her most important relatives: the German philoso-
phers Heinrich Blücher and Karl Jaspers. Blücher was her husband, Jaspers was 
the (famous) professor with whom she had written her dissertation back the in 
Germany in the thirties. With both of them she had a continuous conversation 
about actual developments in the world. With Blücher, on a daily base, at their 
dining table, and with Jaspers through an extensive Briefwechseln and regularly 
visits.21 The loss of both Gesprächspartners drove her to reflection as well, 
rethinking her path through life, reconsidering her aim, approach and stances 
throughout work.  
A third reason to use this text is the openness of a conversation like this: 
it is more ‘open’, multi interpretable than an essay, article or book, creating 
an overview and cross sections through her life and work. It comes forwards 
as a trail of trials, nicely, indeed, meandering between abstract addresses and 
concrete examples, bold statements and nuanced responses, references to her own 
biography and reflections on the actual situation, combining diverse elements, 
early thoughts and very dense and well considered concepts. Especially through 
the questions, the concrete examples and the trials, it explains earlier concepts 
differently, helps to reflect on her work, on the aim of her writings, the reason she 
addresses certain topics and handling actualities. 
The very last reason is actually even more odd: it is this very ungraspable 
character of the text itself, this stubborn quality that makes it a perfect trail 
for this chapter. The text actually shows that Arendt was non-dogmatic in her 
thinking. She would not prescribe a certain path to go, nor did she want to instruct 
others how to act. Arendt herself continuously was on the move, she rejected a 
static position. 
So: why was Arendt at this very moment rejecting something she had celebrated 
in her magnum opus? I guess the answer is threefold. First of course is the 
audience she addressed. Although we only know of (assistant) professors asking 
questions, the audience surely was filled with a large amount of students as well. 
As history shows, it is mostly students that are willing to act – to go out and to 
demonstrate. But Arendt, although earlier appreciating this eagerness (see her 
attitude in 1968), she now blamed it to be based on theory, rather than on an 
enhanced personal response. She moreover reacts fiercely to professor Bay, who 
directly states his expectation for his students to stand up, and on the consultant 
November 1971 in The New York 
Review of Books, and a year earlier 
did publish an essay called ‘Civil 
Disobedience’ in The New Yorker. 
Both essays are republished in a 
1969 collection of essays: Hannah 
Arendt, Crisis of the Republic (San 
Diego/New York: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1969)
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Gerstein who asks her how she would instruct him that very moment: ‘These are 
adults!’ she states. ‘We are not in the nursery!’ Instruction is a wrong approach 
of education and action. Education only makes sense if it urges the students to 
think for themselves. And action is something that starts ‘bottom-up’, it cannot be 
the outcome of a theory, it cannot be nailed, nor can it be organized ‘top-down’. 
It cannot be instructed, but should arise through the thinking and reflection of 
the people themselves. The outcome of the thinking process will only eventually 
become action, through appearing in public and through convincing others to 
act as well. Action, in other words, only emerges as outcome of this exchange of 
perspectives. Or as Arendt call it: action only rises and gains power if it becomes 
action ‘in concert’. You think by yourself, but you have to act in concert. This also 
counts the other way around, Arendt argues: you cannot act without this previous 
moment of thinking. Her rejection of action that very moment somehow has to 
be read as urging of the students to think for themselves, and challenging the 
scholars to also urge their students to think for themselves. 
The importance of thinking for her, at that very moment, of course has a 
reason. The very moment of the conference, she was dealing with this topic of 
thinking by herself. Of course it was roused by her concern on the thoughtless-
ness of modernity, a concern she developed during a reflection on the answers 
of Eichmann during his trial. Apart from her publication of her reflection on the 
trial, she also had taken up a project that was in her mind already years earlier: 
writing a consistent investigation in the very topic of thinking. She literally was 
writing the first chapters of what we now know as The Life of the Mind, the 
threefold study she had planned to publish on the topic of thinking.22 This, I would 
argue, is the second reason she was focusing on thinking that very moment, rather 
than on action; although she told the audience not to be ready to tell the public 
much about it, she even admits not to be sure of success in writing about it.23 
Lastly, this ‘thinking on thinking’ surely also roused an autobiographical 
reflection on her own path through life. Of course, this can be understood as 
a devotion to thinking – but Arendt understood it differently. She was not the 
philosopher, just thinking on topics, striving to unfold ‘truths’. She expressed 
every now and then that she only was out to understand – understand not general 
perspectives, nor theories and worldviews, but – indeed – actualities. Her work 
should not be understood as celebration of action solely. Arendt cannot be seen as 
an activist philosopher, not a philosopher and activist. Her work is not activism, 
nor does it challenge people to act on certain topics. Her reflection upon action 
is much more ontological and phenomenological than to stir up, to activate, 
or to move her audience politically. The reason Arendt investigated action was 
not to present a concept here that should be applied, but differently, it only fits 
in an investigation of understanding the ‘things’ happening – and that ‘thing’ 
happening here was the decline of the public realm and the withdrawal from the 
world of modern life and (bureaucratic) political institutions. That eagerness to 
understand actually makes her work strongly personal: thinking, according to 
her, indeed was to ‘think for oneself’, beyond systems, theories, the Zeitgeist. If 
the outstanding characteristic of thinking is the thinking against theories and 
systems, no pre-cooked stances can be embraced, no leaders that can be followed, 
no models can be adopted, no theories can be joined. 
This, it is this view she increasingly developed, adapted and adopted that 
drove her to respond in a reflective position ‘outside action’ during the conference. 
This surely was not only a recent thought of Arendt that very moment, but, as I 
would argue, is the underlying characteristic of her work throughout her life. It 
cannot be caught on a certain position, nor circumscribed by a clear theory, nor 
22.
Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind 
(New York: Harcourt Inc., 1978)
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Arendt, ‘On Hannah Arendt’, 305
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written down in a dogma. That also counts for her answers in Toronto: they could 
not be grasped immediately and thus astonished the audience. That of course is 
the reason the discussion in Toronto on a certain moment came together in this 
single question of Hans Morgenthau: 
‘What are you?’ 
The answer Arendt gave Morgenthau is characteristic: it is a refusal to be 
positioned.24 Not in her own work, neither in the categories she has introduced in 
her work, nor in known political positions or in any other categories: 
‘I don’t know. I really don’t know and I’ve never known. And I suppose I never 
had any such position. You know, the left think that I am conservative, and the 
conservative sometimes think I am left or I am a maverick or God knows what. 
And I must say, I couldn’t care less. I don’t think that the real questions of this 
century will get any illumination by this kind of thing.
I don’t belong to any group. You know the only group I ever belonged to were 
the Zionists. This was only because of Hitler, of course. And this was from ’33 
to ’43. And after that I broke. The only possibility to fight back as a Jew and 
not as a human being – which I thought was a great mistake, because if you 
are attacked as a Jew you have to fight back as a Jew.’25 
The aim of this chapter nevertheless is to deliver the reader an introduction 
into the work and life of Arendt – my reading of her work, so to say. Not to 
position Arendt in a certain position, but to lay-out a framework against which 
three of the famous distinctions she had dwelled upon throughout her working 
life – labor, work, and action; the public, the private, and the social; thinking, 
willing, and judging – can be introduced into the field of architecture (and the 
public sphere) and interpret them vis-à-vis architectural practices, architectural 
thinking, building, and design. This chapter thus has to be seen as an introduction 
into the thinking of Arendt: it can be read as both an explanation of her works 
and concepts as well as a ‘leading into’ her approach, effort, aims, concepts and 
objectives as well.26 The chapter did start with the somehow ungraspable character 
of (the work of) Arendt: how she puzzled the audience in Toronto. In the following 
paragraphs Arendt somehow herself responds to the question of Morgenthau: 
‘What are you?’ This question of course was frequently asked, and through a 
couple of interviews, letters, and introductory texts, I construct a certain ‘self-re-
flection’ of Arendt. The third part of this chapter presents a biography, of course 
accompanied by short investigation into her works as well. The chapter closes 
with an exploration of two notions that are fundamental to Arendt’s thinking, 
notions that she did explore throughout her broad writings.
 
4.2.2 In order to Understand
Arendt regularly is introduced, as I did above, as a political philosopher. Although 
this is a quite accepted understanding of the characteristics of her work, and of 
her position vis-à-vis the profession of political sciences as well as philosophy, 
Arendt however would have opposed it. The work of Arendt indeed explores all 
kinds of issues encircling politics philosophically. She nevertheless emphasized 
the essence of politics and philosophy to be two opposite trajectories. Although 
being educated as a philosopher, she did not qualify her own work as being 
philosophy. She had felt the urge to disengage from this field over the years. In 
the introduction to the The Life of the Mind – a book that nota bene easily can 
be seen as her most philosophical work: it explores the character of the human 
capacity of thinking, and willing (and would also have included a part on judging, 
24.
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if Arendt could have finished it) – she literally warns the reader not to regard her 
as a ‘Denker von Gewerbe’, a term the German philosopher Immanuel Kant once 
coined to describe the philosopher: a professional thinker.27 That actually is an 
important note, concerning the aim of the book. Whereas philosophy, according to 
Arendt, is dealing essentially with eternal truths, the big questions beyond life, her 
object is different. And whereas philosophy is ‘extremely burdened by tradition,’ 
from which the philosopher cannot withdraw, she on the contrary aimed to 
rethink actualities and actual phenomenon with eyes ‘unclouded by philosophy,’ 
as she told the journalist Günther Gaus in an interview in 1964.28 This objective, 
which can be understood as her interest in political issues, I would stress, is the 
essence of her work: understanding actualities anew – although without losing 
the historical roots of actual developments and phenomenon out of sight.29 Arendt 
questions philosophy potentiality to be of any help in this aim – which is precisely 
the opposition she draws between politics on the one hand and philosophy on the 
other, the outbreak of actualities on one hand, and an extremely precise tradition 
on the other. Arendt of course is quick to admit that the tension between the 
fields of politics and philosophy can be vital, and even probably does need each 
other (I would stress that her work is an intriguing example of this tension: it 
indeed should not be seen as a trial to frame the world in philosophical construc-
tions and eternal truths, but as a particular response to and a trial to reflect on 
the actualities of the world, of her everyday environment, of its current political 
circumstances and even their extraordinary incidents). 
Political philosophy in Arendt’s view thus is a contradictio interminis, and she 
urges this statement with four aspects. The first is the above-mentioned ‘burden of 
tradition’. Contemporary history, actualities, and nowadays particular questions, 
according to Arendt, do ask for reflection that is not bounded by tradition. The 
second aspect is the particular aim of each professional field. The field of politics 
investigates the now and its eruptions, the rumours of the street and the hustle 
and bustle of everyday life. Philosophers, on the other hand, aim to dwell upon 
the big questions of life. The fluidness of the now, which is the aim of the political 
perspective, only seems to disturb and distort the philosophers aim to discover 
and unfold eternal truths – these after all are to be found beyond the world, 
beyond the concerns and events of everyday life. Philosophers thus feel the urge 
to withdraw from all the eruptions of the now, which is the third consideration: 
the philosopher’s need to withdraw from the world, literally as well metaphori-
cally, like Plato hid himself in his famous cave to be able to imagine the good and 
construct his image of the ideal and the state, and also Heidegger, whom Arendt 
knew personally very well, preferred his workshop in the German countryside. But 
whereas the philosopher has to withdraw from the world, the field of politics asks 
for a turn towards the world and all its distorting and disturbing voices. Arendt, 
somehow in line with the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, urges an engagement 
with the world and its actualities: contrary to withdrawal engagement. Arendt 
stresses this oppositional account one step further. Whereas the philosopher is 
dwelling upon eternal truths and ‘speaks in the name of all mankind’, politics 
doesn’t aim for such objectivity or neutrality whatsoever.30 It ‘is based on the fact 
of human plurality’, Arendt writes in an essay titled ‘Introduction into Politics’.31 
Philosophy is concerned about man, politics about men. Philosophy is ‘metaphys-
ical’, politics ‘social’, one can argue. ‘From the very start’, Arendt writes, ‘politics 
organizes those who are absolutely different with a view to their relative equality 
and in contradistinction to their relative differences.’32 
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This rejection of the field philosophy in favour of the field of politics is character-
istic of the work of Arendt. Almost all of her writings encircle the question of the 
now. How to regard the now, the actual situations, contemporary phenomena 
and the actualities by itself. In order to understand actual tides, modernity, its 
accidents and events, its actualities and novelty, a perspective is needed which is 
located in the world, amidst and in conversation with the contemporary society 
and with its history. Her work thus can be read as a response and reflection 
of current political issues or incidents – of which she always searches for its 
historical roots. Her magnificent knowledge of the philosophical tradition and 
Western politics and her knowledge of history, especially Greek, Latin and Roman 
history is tangible at every page she wrote. She nevertheless also never took a sole 
historical perspective; she was not solely concerned about the understanding of 
the root of a phenomenon solely. History as well as the tradition of philosophy 
are both always used by Arendt as a conversation with her contemporaries and 
preliminaries, the reader and the critic, discussing a topic from several viewpoints, 
not to construct final answers or a theory like philosophers do, but in order to 
open up new perspectives. Arendt thus relates freely to the history and tradition 
of philosophy, in order to keep the freedom to engage with actualities, and even 
describes novelties to what happened due to modernity, she does not reject 
history in her aim to understand these actualities and novelties. On the contrary: 
her political view uses history to which today is related, although not as a linear 
process, but rather as points of references. 
While she thus rejected to be seen as a political philosopher, she sometimes 
presented herself as a political theorist – whereas this ‘theorist’ should be seen 
as oppositional to the practicing politicians. Arendt never applied her work to a 
certain party, nor felt the urge to be involved in politics herself. The description 
of ‘theorist’ nevertheless also can be misinterpreted in a different direction. 
Despite being a ‘theorist’, she never felt the need to construct a new theory. She 
always rendered her work as strive to understand what was going on, especially 
on the political domain. This notion of ‘understanding’ again and again comes 
to the fore: In interviews, in introductions to her writings, in letters and also in 
discussions like in Toronto.33 
‘Now I will admit one thing.’ Arendt stated, ‘I will admit that I am, of course, 
primarily interested in understanding.’ 34 
It is the very eagerness to ‘understand’ what had happened in the West, politically. 
Arendt has given a closer description of her own professional approach. In a 
letter to the German philosopher Karl Jaspers she renders herself as someone 
between a ‘historian and a publicist,’ disengaging from philosophy and theory, 
as well as disengaging from the actual practice and pragmatism of politics. This 
strive actually shows a deep understanding of the contemporary circumstances of 
everyday life by Arendt, as it is deeply influenced by the condition of modernity, 
by actualities and novelties. Everyday life cannot be captured in dogma’s and 
ideologies, which are to fixed to leave room for the otherness caused by unpre-
dictable and unprecedented outbursts of history. The actualities of contempo-
rary politics and recent transformations and mutations of society, the impact of 
the sciences, of statistics, of economic developments on human life, cannot be 
understood from a perspective outside the world, nor should they be summarized 
and abstracted in a theory. The impact of these actualities, the world-changing 
events in politics that she had experienced herself, and the ever-changing char-
acteristic of contemporary everyday life cannot be recognized from the transcen-
dental perspective, nor from a theoretical position, but only can be re-thought 
and understood in a continuous conversation. Neither contemporary theories 
33.
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nor eternal truths will help. Arendt’s writings are exemplary in this respect: she 
never easily follows a path already known. She deconstructs existing and popular 
concepts and theories, constructs arguments, unfolds historical perspectives, asks 
questions and develops insights which are startling and provocative, but never 
turns them into a new theory, a dogma, a closed system of thinking. This charac-
teristic makes her writings nice reads but simultaneously also hard to grasp. 
Arendt’s turn towards the world and its actualities – which is for the perspective 
I develop on architecture the essential move of Arendt – and the simultaneous 
rejection of those fields of professional thinking and reasoning does not mean that 
she pleas for novelty as the outcome of this thinking. On the contrary! An idea, 
according to Arendt, never is without predecessors. ‘Her own philosophizing’, 
writes the psychotherapist and Arendt’s biographer Elizabeth Young-Bruehl in 
her recent essay Why Arendt Matters, ‘always began from particular, concrete 
experience, which set her wondering, exploring’ in order to ‘discover basic 
experiences, which she conceptualized and described in carefully chosen, illumi-
nating detail.’35 That ultimately was her goal, which we, as present-day readers 
of her work, should have in mind continuously: to think and rethink freely, to 
understand, never to prescribe but to discuss and investigate the actualities, 
turning this thinking from contemplation into reflection on actualities and from 
withdrawal from the world towards the very heart of the public debate. She 
therefore preferred to write essays (or lectures), since they can ‘arise out of the 
actuality of political incidents,’36 while they don’t have the pretention to deliver a 
final analysis nor answers, and moreover since through a range of essays different 
viewpoints can be explored, examined, and emphasized simultaneously. She did, 
for instance, give the book Between Past and Future the meaningful subtitle Eight 
Exercises in Political Thought,37 which shows that she depicts the essay essentially 
as an exercise, a trial to look from a specific viewpoint in order to unfold new 
insights in the contemporary circumstances or new views on its history. But 
it essentially is and remains an exercise. In the introduction to the mentioned 
collection of essays, Arendt writes:
‘My assumption is that thought itself arises out of incidents of living 
experience … Since these exercises move between past and future, they contain 
criticism as well as experiment, but the experiments do not attempt to design 
some sort of utopian future, critique of the past, of traditional concepts, does 
not intent to ‘debunk.’’38 
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4.3 A BIOGRAPHY
4.3.1  Eine Verraten Jugend
Arendt’s biography actually is proof of this perspective: ‘Thought itself arise out 
of incidents of living experience’.39 If something became clear to Arendt, then it is 
this ‘realism of reality’ and its impact on our thinking. ‘What is the subject of our 
thought?’ she asks the audience at the Toronto conference I started this chapter 
with. ‘Experience! Nothing else,’ she answers. Or like she had written in a letter to 
the writer and her friend Mary McCarthy: ‘Thinking starts after an experience of 
truth has struck home.’40 Those three remarks on the very origin of our thinking 
and our eagerness to understand for Arendt neither was a theoretical construct, 
nor a philosophical reflection, but indeed a living experience. All her works 
encircle the eagerness to understand almost one single event: being excluded from 
the public realm as a Jew in Germany in the years previous to World War II – an 
experience we can summarize as ‘the shock of reality’ that had struck home. 
Hannah Arendt was born on October 14th, 1906, in a nonreligious and assimilated 
German Jewish family in Linden, one of the suburbs of Hannover.41 Already at 
the age of three, her father got ill and had to resign from his job at an electro-en-
gineering office. Because of his resignation, the family moved to Königsberg in 
the very East of Germany, where both her father, Paul Arendt, and her mother, 
Martha Arendt-Cohn, were born. Their family still lived there. This city, nowadays 
known as Kalingrad, Russia – it was annexed by the Soviet Union according to the 
Potsdam agreement after World War II –, once was also the home of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1802).42 Arendt already studied the work of her former 
fellow citizen at the age of 16 and somehow was struck by it: at the time of her 
sudden death in 1975, she was lecturing at The New School in New York on his 
Critique of Judgement.43 
In an autobiographical sketch, that she had written in 1925, Arendt reflected 
on her youth in sombre terms: ‘hilflosen, verraten’, helpless, betrayed.44 That of 
course had to do with the illness of her father, who died in 1913 at the age of 40. 
She thus had to be raised by her mother solely. Due to her family, however, she 
learned to think socially and politically independently. Her grandparents from 
both sides were middle-class religious Jews, continuously searching for a certain 
reconciliation between their Jewishness on the one hand and being an inhabitant 
of the country of Germany on the other. Arendt’s parents both left behind this 
question of race and religion; they on the contrary were concerned with German 
politics and joined the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Arendt’s mother especially 
admired the more revolutionary strains of the SPD, particularly of the group lead 
by Rosa Luxemburg. The question of Jewishness, although not prominent in their 
family life, nonetheless was always present in Arendt’s youth. In an interview 
Arendt remembered: ‘When my teachers made anti-Semitic remarks – usually 
they were not directed at me, but at my classmates, particularly at the eastern 
Jewesses – I was instructed to stand up immediately, to leave the class and to go 
home.’45 
Soon after Arendt’s father died from Syphilis, and with the outbreak of the 
First World War, she and her mother flew to Berlin, since her mother feared the 
capturing of Königsberg by the Russians. The Cohns were actually Russians by 
birth: they were refugees of Russian anti-Semitism. Although the war still was 
raging, the region was peaceful again after ten weeks. Arendt and her mother 
therefore decided to return to Königsberg. After a few years of involvement in the 
local political scene, Arendt’s mother married Martin Beerwald, who provided 
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financial security to the family till the mid-1920s, when his manufacturing firm 
went bankrupt. Arendt in the meantime, caused by a mix of stubbornness and 
recalcitrance, dropped out of school, followed some personal chosen courses at 
the university in Berlin, and passed her exams successfully through private study. 
In Berlin she joined the colleges of Romano Guardini, a Christian existentialist 
who lectured on the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, colleges that made 
her decide to study theology, although not being Christian herself.46 After her 
exams – her Abitur that gave her the right to enter the universities officially – 
from 1924 onwards, she indeed studied theology and philosophy at the university 
of Marburg, after the bankruptcy of her stepfather, with financial help of an uncle. 
The years of her studies, between the two World Wars, were relatively peaceful. 
The most eminent thinkers of Germany in that period taught her: she followed 
the colleges of philosophers like Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger47 and 
theologians like Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich. Quite soon, however, she 
completely focussed on the field of philosophy, which she later described as her 
‘first love’. After finalizing her studies in 1926, she wrote a dissertation at the 
University of Heidelberg on the notion of ‘love’ in the work of Augustine under the 
guidance of the philosopher Karl Jaspers, which was finalized in 1929.48 
Indeed, the turn towards politics – or the partial disengagement with philosophy, 
as I above put forward as the very characteristic of her work – actually took 
place quite a while after her studies, and only after ‘the shock of reality has 
struck home’. In a reflection she called herself naïve during her studies. Whereas 
Jaspers, who guided her through her dissertation, already did plea for the 
freedom of speech in the political realm as well in the academic spheres, Arendt 
was not interested. She was interested in philosophy an sich, she was involved 
in theology, and in classical Greek literature, but not in such actual questions. It 
had been Heidegger that introduced her to the classical sources of philosophy, 
and it was Jaspers that helped her cultivate her interest in theology, especially 
in the worldview of Augustine. Even her dissertation doesn’t address ‘political’ 
issues, despite the dramatic change of the political sphere during these three 
years she was working on till 1929. She wrote the dissertation, nonetheless the 
subject, with a strict philosophical attitude. While not politically engaged, the 
dissertation nevertheless already bears the seed of what I understand to be the 
main topic of her work afterwards, the turn towards the world. In her disserta-
tion she confronts and discusses two different and seemingly opposite Christian 
notions: first to live in the world and to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ as the 
commandment urges,49 while, second, at the same time being in the world, but not 
‘from this world’, as Jesus states.50 The first urges the Christian to turn toward and 
engage in the world, while the latter is stressed in an unworldly or extra-worldly 
Christian Theology. The lack of ‘worldliness’ that can emerge out of the latter 
perspective bothered her completely – a concern I will emphasize in the final parts 
of this chapter.51
With Karl Jaspers Arendt maintained a warm relationship till the death of Jaspers 
in 1969. Jaspers, born in 1883, actually studied medicine, and started his career 
as a practicing psychiatrist at a hospital in Heidelberg. He also was interested 
in psychological and philosophical topics, and was, besides his daily work at 
the hospital, able to publish thorough studies in these fields. After a while, he 
took a position as a teacher in psychology at the University of Heidelberg, and 
again after a while turned to a position as a professor of philosophy at the same 
university in 1923. Unfortunately he had to retire from this position in 1937, 
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since his wife, Gertrud Mayer, was Jewish from birth. In 1938, just after his 
forced retirement, he published three lectures under the title Existenzphiloso-
phie, which became an important contribution to the field of philosophy after 
the war.52 Despite his retirement, and despite the continuous threat to him and 
his wife of being arrested and sent to a concentration camp, and despite living 
in isolation in Heidelberg, Jaspers was able to continue his studies during the 
war. It lead to a couple of publications afterwards: amongst others, important 
works like Die Schuldfrage (1946), Von der Wahrheit (1947), and Vom Ursprung 
und Ziel der Geschichte (1949). In 1949 he took a position at the University of 
Basel in Switserland, where he lived till his death at the age of 86. Shortly after 
the war, Arendt was able to re-establish her contact with him. She then raised 
money amongst her friends and affiliates in order to help Jaspers set up a home 
and a life, first in Heidelberg and later for his movement to Basel. After the war, 
from the fifties onwards, Arendt tried to visit Jaspers regularly. She enjoyed these 
meetings; Jaspers somehow was like a father for Arendt. During those visits they 
extensively discussed their works and ideas, their lives and sorrows, face to face. 
This conversation, spread over days, was continued throughout an extensive 
correspondence, which are published as Briefwechsel.53 Both Arendt and Jaspers 
were critical to each other, but always with respect to their subsequent works, 
their thinking, their judgement and their position. Arendt introduced the work of 
Jaspers in America through lectures and articles, connecting him with publishers 
and correcting the translations of his work. 
Arendt’s relationship with Heidegger was a lot more complicated. Almost every 
commentary on her work spells it. Not because of the influence of his works on 
her thinking, which is evident, but also since it is known that they have had a 
love affair during the time Arendt was one of his students (while Heidegger was 
a young but already married professor).54 This relationship is actually questioned 
with even more disbelief since Arendt, being Jewish, never publicly accused 
Heidegger for his involvement in the National Socialist Party in the early thirties 
before World War II and for his deeds as a dean of the University of Freiburg 
during these years.55 But in disguise, as is clear in the correspondence with Karl 
Jaspers, she blamed him of excluding of Jewish professors from the academic 
campus on the orders of the Nazi government, as for instance the famous 
philosopher Edmund Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological approach in 
philosophy, of whom Heidegger actually was the successor in Freiburg.56 Jaspers, 
however, corrected her afterwards: it was not Heidegger that had fired Husserl.57 
Later on, in a reflection on what had happened, Arendt stated: ‘The problem, 
the personal problem, was not what our enemies might be doing, but what our 
friends were doing.’58 Heidegger and Arendt nevertheless kept in contact – they 
met each other again after the war in 1950, and from the end of the sixties (1967) 
onwards till the death of Arendt in 1975, on a yearly base. In the meantime they 
corresponded, although hardly on their works.59 Heidegger did not even read the 
books of Arendt, ‘or only very cursorily, and what he does read will offend him.’60 
Arendt on her term did acknowledge Heidegger in America: introducing his books 
by publishers, taking effort to get them translated and being published. 
Heidegger did hold his position as a professor after the war, but simultane-
ously was prohibited to teach till his retirement in 1951. The French authorities, 
that controlled this Southern part of Germany after the war, treated him as a 
mediocre figure. He nevertheless was able to gain a position as a public figure in 
Germany: he lectured throughout the country on quite a broad range of themes 
like language, technique, art, poetry, and even architecture – his lecture on 
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‘building’ and ‘dwelling’ from 1951, which I will discuss in Chapter 6, shifted 
the field of architectural theory and got decades later numerous responses from 
practicing architects as well as from architectural theorists and critics.61 Over the 
years however he retreated from this image of a ‘public’ philosopher: he preferred 
the quietness of his workshop at the German countryside near Freiburg.62 It is 
this withdrawal from the public realm, of course supported by the perspective he 
already developed in his famous studies Sein und Zeit, that was published already 
in 1927 and is to be seen as an investigation in the complex philosophical question 
of the character of the human existence, that became the final image of Heidegger. 
As said above, this also can be seen as the regular image of the philosopher: 
withdrawn in solitude in order to be saved of the ‘hustle and bustle’ of the world, 
thinking about complex philosophical questions, reaching for eternal truths. This 
image of Heidegger withdrawn in his workshop was strengthened in his latter 
works, while he took his workshop and the German country scape as a major 
metaphor in his works and an illustration of his thoughts. He literally emphasises 
again and again the serenity of the woods, the path cut into the woods that leads 
to a lightening – a metaphor, of course, of the difficulty and somehow unforeseen 
gift unfolding ‘truths’. Despite their renewed contacts, it never became an easy 
relationship after the war between Heidegger and Arendt, possibly also since 
Arendt opposed precisely this position of the philosopher thinking in solitude and 
withdrawn from the world, walking the difficult path of thinking and reaching for 
the gift of unfolding truths. Arendt offers a perspective of human life as life-in-ac-
tion and dwells upon the importance of being in the world, amongst people.63 
4.3.2  The Shock of Reality
Soon after finalizing her dissertation, Arendt started to write an intellectual 
biography on one of the main figures of Berlin Salon life in the late eighteenth 
century, the Jewish Rahel Varnhagen (1777-1833). Again, like in her studies on St. 
Augustine, Arendt wanted to address a question regarding the possibility to live 
in the world against a background that threatens engagement to the world, this 
time in respect to experiences of race and racism in daily life. How is it possible 
‘to live in the world and to love one’s neighbours, if one’s neighbours – and even 
you yourself – will not accept who you are.’64 This study, certainly somehow 
driven by her own situation facing the developments in the German society prior 
to the war, would have been her habilitation, which in German academic life 
is key to get a position in the academic world. The rise of the National Socialist 
movement actually disturbed her work on the finalizing of the manuscript. She 
never finished it before 1938 and only published it almost twenty years later as 
Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, adding two chapters that actually are 
quite a difference than she had in mind before.65 During these years, the question 
‘how to live in the world’ did evolve from a philosophical and social question into a 
political and personal question. 
It indeed was the rise of the National Socialist movement that changed her life 
radically, as well as the topics she wanted to address in her writings. This ‘shock 
of reality’ directed her interest and attention towards politics, and towards her 
main concern: the very character of freedom within society. Arendt personally was 
involved in these political developments by just being a Jew by birth. Since being 
a Jew she was threatened, a ‘persona non grata’. Almost all her work afterwards 
can be seen as an attempt to understand this experience: ideology justifying terror 
against sole groups of inhabitants, excluding them from public participation, and 
the position of Karl Jaspers at the 
University.
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vice-versa, terror being justified by the goal to realize an ideology. This situation 
thus first of all made her aware of her own background as a Jew.66 Her work on 
the biography of Varnhagen actually changed because of these actualities. While 
she in the first chapters deals with the will of Varnhagen to assimilate into a 
gentile member of society, unless she, and others, accepted her as what she was (a 
Jew), in the final chapters, those that are written after the war, Arendt emphasizes 
the development of Varnhagen into what she calls a ‘self conscious pariah’. Arendt 
refers here to two opportunities for a ‘stranger’ in society, being either a ‘parvenu’ 
or being a ‘pariah’, a distinction she appropriated from the French-Jewish literary 
critic and journalist Bernard Lazare, who had played a major role in the reconcil-
iation of Alfred Dreyfus after the Dreyfus Affaire in France at the end of the 19th 
century. The parvenu, according to Lazare, is aware of his origin, but tries to deny 
it, tries to settle down.67 The parvenu thus tries to wipe all differences in order to 
be a ‘good’ inhabitant. The pariah, on the other hand, especially in the formulation 
of Arendt – the ‘self-conscious pariah’ – is also aware of the differences, but is 
capable to live with this ‘sole’ position.68 The pariah needed ‘to be alert to the 
unexpected,’ Arendt writes, ‘to look at how things and events appear without 
preconceptions about history’s course or pattern, to avoid sacrificing the 
outsider’s perspective for the parvenu’s comfort.’69 Although this only remained 
social question for Varnhagen, Arendt urged it as a political question. The 
biography on Varnhagen therefore is regularly also understood as the autobi-
ographical narrative of Arendt’s own development into a political ‘pariah’. The 
writing turned out to be an attempt in self-understanding and an attempt to 
take position within changing political and social circumstances. Moreover, the 
alertness that is characteristic to the pariah-position can be seen as the metaphor 
of the writings of Arendt after the war: being aware to the ‘outbreaks of history’ as 
well as ‘rethinking’ them, trying to understand what was happening, in respect to 
their impact on the plurality of daily human life.
This development into a self-conscious pariah, to inhabit a solipsistic position, 
not only was a form of increasing self-understanding, it also concretely influenced 
her everyday life. Arendt moved to Berlin in 1929, after finishing her dissertation. 
While being there she rekindled her relationship with Günther Stern, a Jewish 
philosopher and writer who she had met during the colleges of Heidegger in 
Marburg.70 They married the same year, while he was trying to get a position at 
the University of Frankfurt through a proposal that constructed a philosophy 
of music. Although Stern and Arendt shared the same background and interest, 
and intensively worked together on the publication of Arendt’s dissertation and 
several other texts, their marriage only lasted till 1936. In Berlin as well, Arendt 
in the meantime also reacquainted with Kurt Blumenfeld, the foreman of the 
German Zionist movement, which she already knew as a child, since he was a 
friend of her grandfather, and whom she had met afterwards in Heidelberg again. 
She discussed with Blumenfeld extensively about the impact of the actualities 
on the life of the Jewish in Germany. Blumenfeld, and with him the Zionists, 
tried to reconcile their own Jewishness. They foresaw that this was impossible 
in Germany. They therefore strived for the constitution of a Jewish nation in 
Palestine. In 1933, Arendt for the first time was involved in an act of politics: 
instructed by Blumenfeld she made excerpts from official anti-Semitic tracts in 
the Prussian State Library, where she worked on her biography on Varnhagen. 
He wanted to use these excerpts at the 18th Zionist Congress in August 1933, to 
show the audience how real the German anti-Semitism was. Although Arendt was 
slightly involved in and joined the Zionist movement (see her remark in Toronto 
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that I quoted above: ‘I don’t belong to any group. You know the only group I ever 
belonged to were the Zionists. This was only because of Hitler, of course’)71 she 
never became a Zionist by herself. Her biographer Young-Bruehl writes: ‘she 
was a pariah even among pariahs.’72 In the same period Arendt and her husband 
Stern also harboured German communists in their apartment in Berlin, who 
prepared their flight from Germany. For both acts, Arendt was arrested and 
imprisoned by the Gestapo, but released after eight days. Soon after this incident, 
she left Germany via Prague and Geneva to Paris. In 1939 she actually was also 
able to move her mother to Paris as well. Despite the situation, Arendt somehow 
enjoyed Paris. ‘If I were ever to feel homesick,’ she wrote to Jaspers in 1946, ‘it 
would be for Paris.’73 In France, the German refugees were an isolated group, of 
which Arendt became an active member. In order to make a living, she did some 
practical jobs at several Jewish and Zionist organizations. Through her work she 
touched upon and became friends with other German-Jewish refugees like the 
writer and critic Walter Benjamin and the philosopher Eric Weil. She also met 
Heinrich Blücher, a Communist philosopher – although he never had followed an 
official study of philosophy, he did educate himself and followed some colleges at 
different Berlin institutes on very different topics, ranging from military history 
towards political theory towards art history –, a Spartakist activist, a proletarian 
from Berlin, a non-Jew that nevertheless in his youth joined a Zionist youth 
committee. He became her second husband early 1940. Blücher forced her to 
read beyond her regular philosophical scope and investigate the writings of Marx, 
Lenin and Trotski. Although Arendt remained involved in the Jewish question 
after the war, his influence on her writings in this period is evident as well. Arendt, 
on her term, influenced him on his final rejection of communism and his critical 
approach of Marxism later on. In the spring of 1940 they again had to move, since 
Hitler’s army approached Paris and the Vichy-government was installed. The 
German refugees were transported to internment camps in the south of France. 
Arendt, her mother, and Blücher were able to escape from these camps during the 
first administrative confusions and after that they were also able to secure visas 
for themselves in order to immigrate to America. Compared to others, they had 
luck: much of their friends and acquaintances didn’t flee and were transported to 
Auschwitz after three years, or had back luck during their escape, like her friend 
Walter Benjamin. Later, in an impressive essay on his work and life, she wrote – 
and I quote extensively since it is so touching:
‘On September 26, 1940, Walter Benjamin, who was about to emigrate to 
America, took his life at the Franco-Spanish border. There were various 
reasons for this. The Gestapo had confiscated his Paris apartment, which 
contained his library (he had been able to get “the more important half” 
out of Germany) and many of his manuscripts, and he had reason to be 
concerned also about the other which, through the good offices of George 
Bataille had been placed in the Bibliotheque Nationale prior to his flight 
from Paris to Lourdes in unoccupied France. How was he to live without 
a library, how could he earn a living without the extensive collection of 
quotations and excerpts among his manuscripts? Besides nothing drew him 
to America, where, as he used to say, people would probably find no other 
use for him than to cart him up and down the country to exhibit him as the 
“last European.” But the immediate occasion for Benjamin’s suicide was an 
uncommon stroke of bad luck. … Thanks to the efforts of the Institute in New 
York, Benjamin was among the first [German refugees in France] to receive … 
a visa in Marseilles [bound for America]. Also he quickly obtained a Spanish 
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transit visa to enable him to get to Lisbon and board a ship there. However, 
he did not have a French exit visa, which at that time was still required and 
which the French government, eager to please the Gestapo, invariably denied 
to German refugees. In general this presented no great difficulty, since a 
relatively short and none too arduous road to be covered by foot over the 
mountains to Port Bou was well known and was not guarded by the French 
border police. … The small group of refugees that he had joined reached the 
Spanish border town only to learn that Spain had closed the border that same 
day and that the border officials did not honor visas made out in Marseilles. 
The refugees were supposed to return to France by the same route the next 
day. During the night Benjamin took his life, whereupon the border officials, 
upon whom this suicide had made an impression, allowed his companions to 
proceed to Portugal. A few weeks later the embargo on visas was lifted again. 
One day earlier Benjamin would have got through without any trouble; one 
day later the people in Marseilles would have known that for the time being 
it was impossible to pass through Spain. Only on that particular day was the 
catastrophe possible.’74 
4.3.3  The Novelties of our Times
It is indeed this ‘shock of reality’, this experience of ‘truth that struck home’, this 
‘living experience’ that changed her attention, rejecting philosophy in favour 
of politics and actualities: being excluded from the public realm and the loss 
of a couple of other civil rights (as a Jew), the need to flee and the flight itself, 
this confrontation with the fragility of human affairs. In New York, Arendt and 
Blücher found accommodation in two furnished rooms on West 95th street on 
Manhattan. Arendt learned English as soon as possible; a German accent however 
accompanied her till her death, as is mentioned by several of her students 
afterwards. She did learn English not in order to assimilate like a parvenu – she 
got the American nationality in 1951, actually – but only since she was eager to 
participate in the on-going public debates. Especially those discussing the Jewish 
situation: during the war and shortly after, she particularly was focussed on other 
European immigrant Jews and spoke with them about topics as ‘Jewish identity’, 
‘the creation of a Jewish army to fight against Hitler’s army’, ‘the constitution of 
a bi-national Arab-Jewish state in Palestine’, and ‘the need to resist the call for 
assimilation.’ In the meantime, she earned a living through a range of projects 
she worked on: as an editor at Schocken Books, the publisher that also published 
a number of her early works, as a journalist, mostly focussed on Jewish topics, 
and by writing articles and essays for the German Language Jewish Magazine Der 
Aufbau, and other magazines like the Jewish Frontier, the organization journal of 
the Labor Zionist Alliance. Despite her preliminary focus on the Jewish question, 
she also immediately investigated the bigger picture: the emergence of Fascism in 
Germany, the limits and possibilities of Western democracies, and – later – the 
Soviet Union and the transformation of the Marxist worldview into communism 
as a repressive ideology. 
On that latter matter she collected her essays into a book, called The Origins 
of Totalitarianism, which was published in English in 1951 for the first time, 
appeared in German language in 1955, and again was published in America (in 
an expanded version) in 1958.75 In the book, Arendt investigates the sources of 
anti-Semitism in the years prior to the war, as well as the emergence of National 
Socialism as a totalitarian system, and added later – when the similarities became 
clear to her – also the totalitarianism of Stalinism and Imperialism in the Soviet 
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Union. The preface to the first edition actually starts with a thrilling description of 
the time: 
‘Two world wars in one generation, separated by an uninterrupted chain of 
local wars and revolutions, followed by no peace treaty for the vanquished 
and no respite for the victor, have ended in the anticipation of a third World 
War between the two remaining world powers. This moment of anticipation 
is like the calm that settles after all hopes have died. We no longer hope for 
an eventual restoration of the old world order with all its traditions, or for 
the reintegration of the masses of five continents who have been thrown into 
a chaos produced by the violence of wars and revolutions and the growing 
decay of all that has still been spared. Under the most diverse conditions and 
disparate circumstances, we watch the development of the same phenomena 
– homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented 
depth.’76
This description reveals her, and certainly also more genuinely the experience of 
the decade after the Second World War – the experience of scattered hopes, of 
homelessness and rootlessness. Even more important seems to be her addition 
to the experience: the scale of it is unprecedented. It is a novel experience, there 
is no precedent in history for this experience. Arendt actually argues that this 
unprecedentedness is exactly also the case regarding the political systems of 
National Socialism and Stalinism. She therefore emphasized that such ‘new’ 
occurrences cannot be re-thought or analysed by the use of already known, 
traditional concepts, which actually have become meaningless and empty in the 
face of modernity. Arendt thus claimed that new concepts had to be developed, 
although she warns not to put the old concepts aside as being ‘past’ or ‘out of 
date’. There is, on the contrary, a need to explore and re-think those concepts. 
Historical knowledge, Arendt states, is not like worn-out fashion, but is essentially 
part of our thinking today. It still affects our view on the world: our thinking is 
rooted in it – and we use them even if we are not aware of it or even if we reject 
them.77 Arendt’s aim with The Origins of Totalitarianism thus never was to 
write just a particular history, ‘a study of a kind of political domination that once 
threatened the world, which the world rose up against and overcame.’78 Therefore 
the book not only was a reflection on recent developments in the Europe, neither 
a historical analysis of and reflection on the downfall of nation states nor an inves-
tigation in the rise of totalitarian regimes, but also an emphasis in structures of 
the contemporary world that could be understood as having a parallel with the 
historical structures that have led to the forms of repression and totalitarianism. 
Such investigation thus does not aim for the importance of ‘remembrance’, is not 
concerned about the conservation of certain historical facts as well, but tries to 
understand the (final) happenings, the events Europe and the world had suffered, 
in order to recognize the parallels in our contemporary society, the weaknesses 
of modern democracies, and the threat of possible developments. And she 
indeed touched upon ‘new threats’ that are an enduring concern for the human 
community in modernity – threats that she understood via two characteristics 
that both Nationalism and Stalinism did share. The Origins of Totalitarianism 
actually did have had two different working titles: The Burden of our Times 
(which actually became the official title of the publication in Great Britain),79 and 
The Three Pillars of Hell. In respect to this latter title, Arendt had in mind that the 
book would address respectively anti-Semitism, imperialism and totalitarianism. 
During the writing of these chapters, however, it became clear to Arendt that both 
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first two topics served the latter and thus that she had to show her readers how 
totalitarian regimes and political structures used the first two, indeed, as pillars 
in order to gain its power. For Arendt this became clear through two discoveries 
that somehow shocked her. The first was the difference between ‘old’ religious 
anti-Semitism in pre-war Europe, as for instance in the writings of Luther, and 
recent forms of anti-Semitism, that actively were fuelled in the political reality 
and by the political authorities in order to gain power. The latter was, according 
to Arendt, a dangerous and more far-reaching modification of the already known 
religious’ form. The second discovery was the ‘reality’ of concentration camps. 
She became aware of the awful existence of concentration camps in Germany 
during the war in 1943, but only understood the extraordinary phenomenon of 
these camps – ‘administrative murder and the industrial nature of the extermina-
tion system’80 – as a crucial element of the totalitarian political system since she 
became aware that in the Soviet-Union those camps also existed. Concentration 
camps were the appearance of ‘hell on earth’, as Arendt stated, where people were 
‘concentrated, massed together, neither distinct nor related, in preparation for 
extinction.’81 She then immediately understood those camps as not just ‘a black 
page in Modern Western history’, of which we easily can state ‘never again’.82 
For Arendt, these camps were a proof that the very human condition itself was 
under attack, since, ‘for no political purpose, people were dominated, terrorized, 
deprived of their rights and their ‘rights to have rights’, of their capacity to act, 
and finally of their now completely devaluated lives.’83 I took this circumscription 
from Young-Bruehl, who renders here the political problem of two of the concepts 
Arendt dwelled upon in her latter work: the ‘right to have rights’, and ‘the capacity 
to act’. Both ‘discoveries’, the new political forms of anti-Semitism and the reality 
of concentration camps, lead her to the provocative analysis that the events that 
did happen in Europe, especially on the political level, didn’t have a precedent 
in history. Arendt called this new political phenomenon the ‘totalitarian state’ – 
which became a famous notion within political theory. As Young-Bruehl, states: 
“… the concentration camps were the defining institution of an unprecedented 
form of government that was neither a deformation of tyranny nor an extreme 
of authoritarian dictatorship. In a totalitarian state, nor a single leader but 
a party that has abolished all other parties establishes absolute power in 
the wake of a political movement that has broken down all social and class 
formations and created a ‘mass society.’ This new form of government, without 
political opposition or traditional forms of community to check it, reaches into 
every facet of life with institutions of total terror, among them secret police, 
and, especially, concentration camps.84 
It is important to understand that Arendt recognized these camps not to be just 
a mere novelty of two political systems of the past. They moreover belonged to 
the essence of new forms of political domination, a domination that was distinct 
from all previous tyrannies. Arendt frames the camps indeed as an inalienable 
part of totalitarian, repressive regimes, but she also shows that the context of the 
existence of concentration camps is a certain lack of ‘morality’ in combination 
with growing technical possibilities. In such society everything is permitted, and 
everything also is possible. The importance of Concentration camps, of course, 
were the places where this not only was possible but also a shocking reality. 
However, this is not a threat of the past and of specific political systems and 
ideologies; the lack of ‘morality’ and the growing technical possibilities are also 
at the very heart of Western capitalism and modernity. This urges Arendt to 
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emphasise the importance to ‘think without banisters’ – not to think from a firm 
set of principles, but to think for oneself, an urgency she later takes up again in 
her report on the trial of Eichmann as we will see. Arendt’s call here is shaped by 
Jaspers’ idea of a ‘boundary situation’, in situations of life and death, where one 
is thrown back on oneself. ‘The point was’, Richard King argues, ‘to maintain the 
flexibility to think in reference to the situation at hand.’85 
Through this statement, the book gained attention and did set the name of 
Arendt as a political thinker as well in America as abroad. From that moment 
on, she got invitations to lecture and teach on universities in, amongst others, 
Chicago, New York, Princeton and Berkeley, and to participate in intellectual 
discourses in America and Europe. She sometimes was asked to teach at univer-
sities and colleges throughout America, from the University of Chicago to Bard 
College, from Columbia University till Berkeley, and from Princeton to The New 
School, but never extended a stay at these campuses with a formal contract and 
appointment as professor. Since she never strived for an academic career, she 
didn’t apply for official jobs at universities too. She nevertheless enjoyed teaching 
one or two semesters at a university on a specific topic: she enjoyed talking with 
students, the possibility to experiment with thoughts, to set up an argument, to 
reflect on actualities together with the students. Through such lecture-series, 
Arendt was able to develop her ideas and work them out into books. Neverthe-
less her career somehow shows the pattern of switching between small jobs, 
academic obligations, writing, teaching, discussing, and traveling. Her life, 
better said, was not encircling the university campuses, but moreover encircling 
debates, topics, and controversies, traveling between New York and the rest 
of America, and between America and Europe, simultaneously writing essays, 
lecturing, corresponding, and editing books and articles that were published in 
well-known magazines as The New Yorker. Her success as a writer – and also 
Blücher’s appointment as a professor in philosophy at Bard College in Annan-
dale-on-Hudson (NY), about 90 miles above the city of New York –, also meant 
that they could move to a somewhat bigger apartment at the edge of Harlem at 
the Morningside Drive containing at least two working rooms. Later, when the 
crime rates in their neighbourhood increased and threatened them, they rented an 
apartment at the Riverside Drive, around the corner of the campus of Columbia 
University, where they lived till their death. 
 
4.3.4  ‘This Comes Right Out of Aristotle!’
Blücher, although even not having finished his high school, was offered to set 
up a course in philosophy for first year students at Bard College. His proposal 
was to introduce the students in the sources of human creativity, through an 
exploration of thinkers that somehow explored this human capacity, ranging 
from Abraham to Jesus, from Buddha to Lao-tse, from Homerus to Socrates. The 
course of Blücher was very successful; therefore he got an appointment to teach 
philosophy at Bard in 1952, an appointment that was extended till his death in 
1970.86 Arendt followed the course as well – at home – and absorbed it in her 
own work – only the Asian philosophers that Blücher introduced in his course 
did not get a foothold in her reflection. Blücher’s interest in the human creativity 
had influenced her next big study after the publication of The Origins of Totali-
tarianism that became her second big book, The Human Condition. In this book, 
regularly presented as her magnum opus, she takes the notion of politics that she 
had developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism in order to define the essence 
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of political action. Arendt possibly became aware of the remarkable characteris-
tics of action, even in the suppressing totalitarian political systems that actually 
were supposed by herself as implacable facing resistance, by the uprising protests 
against the Soviet oppression in East Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956. 
Whereas the undertone in The Origins of Totalitarinism surely is pessimistic, The 
Human Condition, despite descriptions of loss and neglect and other negative 
readings of the contemporary situation, has a remarkable optimistic message. 
It is characterized by hope, stressing the unpredictability of action. Opposite to 
her earlier book, she now doesn’t develop her perspective from within certain 
macro-political structures, but from outside these structures, from a micro-po-
litical level. She explores the perspective of political action as a capacity of the 
human being itself – not as a part of political institutions, but as a possibility, even 
in ‘boundary situations’. Whereas she had discussed the regimes of Nazi-Germany 
and the Soviet-Union as similar totalitarian political structures in The Origins 
of Totalitarianism, she also understood that the racism of the Third Reich was 
of a different order than that of the Soviet ideology. The Soviet ideology was, in 
contrast to Nazism, part of the ‘Great Tradition’ of European thought, since it 
after all was based on Marxism, which of course cannot be rendered without this 
philosophical tradition. Arendt therefore, in order to deepen her understanding of 
the Soviet ideology, planned to investigate the thinking of Karl Marx extensively. 
She spent a year in Europe working on this study, but changed her mind since 
she became aware of the lack of awareness in the ‘Great Tradition of European 
thought’ for the realm of politics – a lack that also had its impact on the ideas 
of Marx, she argued.87 This lack of attention for politics mainly came down to 
overlook the capacity of the human being to ‘act and speak’ in public, amongst 
peers. This lack of rewarding public appearance, as she defined it in The Human 
Conditon, somehow is inherent in the tradition of philosophy, which after all, as 
I already touched upon above, is rooted in a withdrawal from the world. Politics, 
on the contrary, only can grow and flourish through an interest in the world 
and by a commitment to sustain this world.88 Arendt is particularly interested 
in this ‘worldliness’ of politics, as she calls it, and through this perspective also 
in the fundamental ‘worldliness’ of the human being. In her introduction to 
The Human Condition she stresses Western modernity as continuous trial to 
escape the conditions of the earth-bound character of human life, an escapism 
that somehow is driven by recent developments in techniques, sciences, and 
philosophy. Even the totalitarian slogan ‘everything is possible’ has to be seen 
as a manifestation of this ‘escapism’ as well. In The Human Condition, Arendt 
investigates this worldliness of the human being: the conditions of life on earth. 
Arendt distinguishes these conditions in three spheres: to be part of the life cycle 
of nature, being restrained to place and time, and – the most essential and simul-
taneously the most threatened condition according to Arendt – within a condition 
of plurality. Those three conditions are interconnected with three activities of the 
human being: labor, work and action. 
Before we go into the argument Arendt develops in The Human Condition in more 
detail, it is important to acknowledge ‘making distinctions’ as her method of inves-
tigating topics and constructing arguments, which is applicated in the majority 
of her writings. Quite regularly she stresses her views and constructs arguments 
through the investigating of a number of (irregular) distinctions – some of 
them remarkable themselves since the distinctions Arendt explores in everyday 
language are usually understood as synonyms. Besides the mentioned ‘labor, work 
and action’, and the ‘parvenue’ and the ‘pariah’, Arendt also distinguishes the 
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‘earth’ versus the ‘world’, ‘power’ and ‘violence’, ‘the public, the private, and the 
social realm’ and finally ‘thinking, willing and judging’. Through such distinctions, 
which she often derives from a particular historical investigation, Arendt tries to 
differentiate aspects of life, the world, our being, that regularly are understood as 
a spectrum or even are experienced as a whole. She however is keen to stress the 
differences (and even sometimes makes them more explicit than arguably have 
been in everyday language), since awareness of differences enlighten important 
phenomena and perspectives that might have been once evident, but has been lost 
over time. This once again emphasises her particular use of history as a point of 
reference. By investigating historical circumstances – or notions, as in the case of 
distinctions – she investigates the Western tradition of thought in order to stress 
the contemporary situation. Arendt’s method can be understood as enhancing, 
rethinking and stressing the differences consciously, and therewith offering a new 
richness of definitions. Although she is aware that the emphasis on differences 
does not always correspond to the blurred experiences and language of the 
human being, she nevertheless delivers an argument on the importance of the 
new awareness of aspects often overlooked. She even speaks of ‘the human ability 
to make distinctions’, which, according to her, is closely related to the human 
capacity of judgement, a capacity that is central in the fields of politics, aesthetics 
and taste.89 Here method clearly also rouses questions. At the Toronto conference 
her friend, the writer Mary McCarthy, at a certain point remarks: 
‘This space that Hannah Arendt creates in her work and which one can walk 
into with the great sense of walking through an arch into a liberated area and 
a great part of it is occupied by definitions. Very close to the roots of Hannah 
Arendt’s thinking is the distinguo: ‘I distinguish this from that, I distinguish 
labor from work, I distinguish fame from reputation.’ And so on. This is 
actually a medieval habit of thought.’
Arendt interrupts: 
‘It is Aristotelian!’
McCarthy again: 
‘This habit of distinguishing is not popular in the modern world, where there 
is a kind of verbal blur surrounding most discourse. And if Hannah Arendt 
arouses hostility, one reason is because the possibility of making distinctions is 
not available to the ordinary reader. …  Each of her works is an unfoldening of 
definition, which of course touch on the subject, and more and more enlighten 
it as one distinction unfolds (after another).’ 
Arendt indeed admits: 
‘It is perfectly true what you say about distinctions. I always start anything – I 
don’t like to know too well what I am doing – I always start anything by saying, 
‘A and B are not the same’. And this, of course, comes right out of Aristotle.’90 
But C.B. Macpherson comments: 
‘She defines a lot of key words in ways unique to herself: you know social 
versus political (a rather special meaning to the word “social”), force versus 
violence (a quite special meaning to the word “force”)…’
Arendt again interrupts to correct the speaker: 
‘No, power versus violence. I am sorry.’  
Macpherson finalizes his comment: 
‘Power and violence, sorry. Action (a unique definition of “action”) …’
Arendt reacts: 
‘I would not agree with this. What you consider my idiosyncratic use of words 
– I think there is a little more to it, of course. We all grow up and inherit a 
certain vocabulary. We then have got to examine this vocabulary. And this not 
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just by finding out how this word is usually used, which then gives as a result a 
certain number of uses. These uses are then legitimate. In my opinion a word 
had much stronger relation to what it denotes or what it is, than just the way it 
is being used between you and me. That is, you look only to the communicative 
value of the word. I look to the disclosing quality. And this disclosing quality 
has, of course, always an historical background.’91 
The reason Arendt thus distinguishes distinctive notions is the urge to reveal 
quite different aspects that play a role in daily life unconsciously, which can be 
unfolded through the different words that are used in everyday language, while at 
first sight most of these notions are not distinct in daily conversations at all. It has 
to be clear that by making these distinctions, Arendt does not particularly aim for 
the construction of a theory or a coherent system, a system in which the distinct 
phenomenon or concept will get its place, according to a certain hierarchy and 
meaning. Such a systematic philosophy she no longer understood ‘either desirable 
or even possible.’92 On the contrary, Arendt moreover operates consciously to 
unfold, enhance and explore tensions and contradictions that are at the very root 
of the notions used through which we have had ordered our daily lives as well 
as our political life. According to the political philosopher Sheyla Benhabib this 
is the very reason to make such distinctions: ‘Certainly,’ she writes, ‘for Arendt 
a thinking process that does not exhibit tensions and contradictions would be 
superficial as well as inadequate to grapple with the tasks at hand.’93 It is through 
this specific method of stressing distinctions and unfolding their (historical) use, 
aspects, and background that Arendt is able to remember, rethink, reconsider, 
and re-appropriate phenomenon that apparently are lost, but which will help 
to understand the contemporary situation. In other words, by investigation the 
particular notions and their historical connotations, she discloses certain values 
that have vanished over time, but by stressing them once again will enhance the 
understanding of certain phenomena and developments. 
4.3.5  Labor, Work, Action
Such tensions and contradictions also are at the very root of The Human 
Condition. The goal of this book, Arendt writes in the prologue, is as simply ‘to 
think what we are doing.’94 It is important to keep that sentence in mind as a 
reminder that Arendt does not aim to develop a theory on the human condition, 
on human active life, or whatsoever. On the contrary, she simply intends to 
explore and understand the human activities on earth. Arendt, to put it with the 
Greek term that she did choose as title of the German translation of The Human 
Condition which appeared in 1960, wanted to rethink the vita activa.95 This 
notion, Arendt immediately admits, ‘is loaded and overloaded with tradition’.96 
The vita activa initially was one of the three ways emphasized by Aristotle as the 
good life (bioi) that could be chosen by men that were freed from the necessities 
of life and the body. This life devoted to ‘the matters of the polis’ (politics) was 
accompanied by the life ‘enjoying bodily pleasures’ (art), and by ‘the inquiry into 
things eternal’ (philosophy).97 During medieval times the term Vita Activa gained 
a different meaning through the decline of the ancient city-state. Whereas the 
Greek thinking limited the vita activa to the bios politikos, life devoted to public 
matters, the medieval philosophy broadened its meaning by including ‘all kinds 
of active engagement in the things of this world.’98 All activities ‘to stay alive’ now 
became part of the vita activity too: from the production of food and livestock 
towards the crafts of things and artworks. By including them in the vita activa, 
alongside the bios politicos, this also meant that the life devoted to the public 
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affairs was understood in the same vein: being enslaved by the necessities of 
life (to state it negatively). What Aristotle had excluded from the vita active, the 
working life of the labourer, the craftsman and the merchant, now was understood 
in the same manner. The Aristotle emphasis on the freedom of ‘movements and 
dispositions’, that he related to the life devoted to public affairs, had been lost. 
For the Medieval philosophers (and theologians), like Thomas van Aquino, only 
the life of the philosopher was understood as the ultimate good life, a perspective 
they gained from the writings of Plato and Augustine.99 Since the vita activa was 
regarded to be to restless, and with that opposed to the absolute required tran-
quillity of the vita contemplative, which was devoted to the ‘inquiry of the things 
eternal’, Arendt is quick to admit that also in Greek thinking the same hierarchy 
slightly is tangible: in Aristotle’s threefold distinction of the good life, the ultimate 
preference of the ‘life of the philosopher’ can be traced. However, Arendt’s aim 
in The Human Condition, although not explicitly said, is to bring bios politicos 
back to attention and undo it from all the dust that has fallen down on it after the 
decline of the polis. She does so by focussing on all the human activities on earth, 
[should there be a ‘not’ in this clause?] but by excluding the life of the philosopher, 
which had been central as the highest good in life already since the Medieval 
times. The Medieval philosophers after all had influenced the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment and modernity, even until Hegel and Heidegger, in whose philos-
ophies Arendt was well at home. Quite revealing in that respect is the title of the 
famous series of books written by Descartes, in which he tries to find out what can 
be said to be absolutely sure: Meditations. The active life, in other words, never 
had lost its ‘negative connotation of the “un-quiet”’.100 Augustine in his De civitate 
Dei, Arendt adds in a note, even ‘speaks of the “burden” of active life …, which 
would be unbearable without the “sweetness” and the “delight of truth” given in 
contemplation.’101 The general idea was, in other words, that the eternal things 
only could be approached through the possession of meditative prayer and only 
would be revealed in contemplation through a cessation of all worldly activity. 
Arendt is quite opposed to that perspective, as we already have seen above in 
her response to Heidegger. This neglect of the active life and the emphasis on 
contemplation, Arendt stresses, is to be seen as a process of extracting, idealizing 
and universalizing ‘eternal truths’. And besides that, it also should be seen as a 
misunderstanding of the highest form of the bios	theōrētikos: the human faculty 
of thinking. Arendt in turn emphasizes the human capacity to think as a constant 
dialogue with the self as well as with the world. This perspective also does mean 
that truth doesn’t appear necessarily in silence, but more likely in direct access 
of the world, roused by the hustle and bustle of everyday life, by unforeseen 
happenings and astonishing events. 
In this aim Arendt somehow is inspired by the works of Marx and Nietzsche, who 
already in their respective writings tried to break with this tradition of over-em-
phasizing the vita contemplativa. But even in their works, Arendt concludes, the 
essence of the vita activa still remained blurred. Their works did not even try to 
reveal the value of the bios politikos, this direct interaction and engagement with 
the world. Although The Human Condition initially had been imagined by Arendt 
as a serious critique upon Marx, she soon became aware that she had another 
mission to follow: to re-asses the vita activa by freeing it from the ‘burden’ (to 
reverse the Augustine complaint) of the vita contemplativa as well as to re-value 
the distinctiveness of the different activities the human employ on earth. 
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‘If, therefore, the use of the term vita activa, as I propose it here, is in 
manifest contradiction to the tradition, it is because I doubt not the validity 
of the experience underlying the distinction but rather the hierarchical order 
inherent in it from its inception. This does not mean that I wish to contest 
or even discuss, for that matter, the traditional concept of truth as revelation 
and therefore something essentially given to man, or that I prefer the modern 
age’s pragmatic assertion that man can know only what he makes himself. 
My contention is simply that the enormous weight of contemplation in the 
traditional hierarchy has blurred the distinctions and articulations within the 
vita activa itself and that, appearances notwithstanding, this condition has 
not been changed essentially by the modern break with the tradition and the 
eventual reversal of its hierarchical order in Marx and Nietzsche.’102
As stated before, the goal of The Human Condition is actually not to theorize 
the vita activa, nor to construct a ‘philosophy of the human activities’. The 
book in that sense doesn’t deliver a systematic investigation, neither a balanced 
and firm construction of the working life of human beings on earth. It does 
render human activities, distinguished by her in three categories: labor, work, 
and action, but only and insofar as to ‘understand’ the distinction between our 
activities through differentiation and through definition of these differences 
(vice-versa). Therefore Arendt uses classical sources, investigates the political 
and philosophical tradition, as well as confronts her findings with actualities. 
In the prologue she mentions three recent ‘threatening events’ that somehow 
sketches the context in which the book should be rendered. Arendt respectively 
comes up with Yuri Gagarin, the growing complexity of the sciences, and finally 
the increasing emphasis on labor in modern society. Gagarin, of course the first 
man in space, figured in her prologue as the rejection of the earth as the ‘quintes-
sence of the human condition.’ Her second example emphasized as ‘our inability 
to understand, that is, to think and speak about the things which nevertheless we 
are able to do’. Only a few scientists are able to give words to their findings, and 
they only can communicate with each other. Nevertheless, the impact of their 
finding is unsurpassed. How would that be made public, how can society prepare, 
deal and judge these developments? Her final example discusses the advent of 
automation, which she interprets as ‘the prospect of a society of laborers without 
labor, that is, without the only activity left to them’.103 She actually pushes forward 
that the increase in spare time did not lead to a larger involvement in society, nor 
to engagement in public affairs (which was the very characteristic of the citizens 
of the polis that were set free, as we will see), but to the increase of leisure and 
entertainment. Spare time was to be filled with entertainment, that is, filled with 
personal joys and experiences, self-interest distinct from the world. In other 
words, the background to which she poses her book is a few concerns about actual 
developments. First, according to Arendt is the lack of the possibility of a dialogue 
between on the one hand (economical) sciences and technological developments 
and on the other hand the political realm itself. Without such a dialogue, sciences 
and the technical wonders have the tendency to set up a distinct realm in which 
they develop in their own respect, risking the loss of the touch of humanity.104 On 
the other hand, secondly, the sciences as well as technological developments can 
be understood as means in the process of freeing oneself from the necessities of 
life – a perspective that is of course emphasized by Marx also. However, in his 
perspective of the society of laborers, the emergence of ‘empty time’ is symbolic, 
according to Arendt. This newly gained freedom, caused by scientific and tech-
nological developments, as well as the growing economic prosperity of society 
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generally, doesn’t lead to an increasing participation into the affairs of the world. 
This participation, however, Arendt renders as ultimate freedom: to be freed from 
the necessities of life in order to be able to be dedicated to the world. Instead 
people nowadays understand this newly gained freedom also as a freedom from 
politics (which somehow is outsourced to parties and professional politicians). 
The empty space, once again, is not filled with a turn towards the world but with 
entertainment and amusement. Arendt understands this as another turning away 
from the world, a turn towards the ‘private life’. Modern developments, in other 
words, risks the loss of the world that is not just a single possession but is, as 
Arendt defines, the commonly owned structure, a shared entity, that makes life 
as men amongst men, as men in plural, of society possible. According to Arendt, 
the world is what the human being produces in order to make life possible: from 
concrete objects to institutes, from tools to artworks. All these things we share 
with others. It is through these interventions in the earth that human life on 
earth is possible. Moreover, the human artifice also makes the human community 
possible. I will investigate this idea of the world later in this chapter, for now it is 
important to know that this definition of the world, which she actually acquires 
from the writings of Heidegger, is one of the major assumptions beyond the works 
of Arendt. The prologue of The Human Condition, to summarize, shows Arendt’s 
concern about world-alienation that is part of modernity, while the common 
world, according to her, is the very condition humaine. In other words, while 
Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism was concerned with the source of actual 
developments in politics solely, in The Human Condition she also addresses 
the broader ‘condition’ of human life, our material world and the influence of 
the ‘sciences’ of both physics and economics on our treatment of this shared 
condition. 
Arendt thus in The Human Condition examines explicitly the worldliness of the 
human being. She immediately emphasizes this condition as plural. There is no 
such thing as the human condition. It always is men in the plural. This emphasis 
of course is rooted in her own experiences. In her emphasis it immediately 
becomes clear how concerned she was on this condition of plurality. The main 
sources for Arendt’s aim are the Greek and Roman city-states, the polis. The 
establishment of the Greek polis has been a crucial moment in the development 
of human life on earth. Before the existence of the city-state, people were 
organized along the lines of kinship and family bonds. The polis was preceded 
by the demolition of these ‘natural’ structures. The organization of the city-state 
is in opposition to these ‘natural’ forms of kinship and family bonds: citizens – 
the inhabitants of the city-state – belonged to two orders, on the one hand to 
their own property (idion), and on the other to that of the city-state (koinon). 
To rephrase this important change: citizens correspondingly had a private 
life, organized through a household, the oikia, as well as a public life, the bios 
politikos, which was bound to the polis and unfolded in the public realm of the 
city. Crucial in this perspective is thus the emergence of the public realm that 
offers the opportunity of a public life. The demarcation of a public space thus 
is the second important aspect of the polis, which differentiates the city from 
all other (and former) settlements. Of course, this erection of public space is 
immediately linked to the different organization of the people. Without public 
space this new organization along the lines of citizenship was not possible, 
likewise also without this new organization a public space was not needed. 
Community-life in all other settlements, one surely can argue, was bound to the 
private sphere: the community was understood as one big family, sharing the 
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same needs and interests, organized along the lines of hierarchy with a pater 
familias (which was the Roman title of the head of a household) as the ruler 
over the community. In the city-state, where the inhabitants thus did not share 
common interests (at least, one cannot presume so), the community needed to 
be organized differently. Quite remarkable is that no citizen was appointed as 
ruler. All citizens were challenged to participate in the public realm, to gather 
in the agora in order to discuss the things at hand in the community and to 
decide upon the future of the city. It is obvious that this only is at stake when all 
citizens were regarded to be equals. To appear in public space (in order to discuss 
the things at hand) means to appear amongst equals. To be political, to live in 
a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and 
not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, ‘to force people by 
violence, to command rather than persuade, were pre-political ways to deal with 
life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head ruled 
with uncontested, despotic powers.’105 Amongst equals only words (and deeds) 
are the proper instruments to go forward, while the necessities of life only can be 
mastered by sheer violence. ‘Violence,’ Arendt writes, ‘is the pre-political act of 
liberating oneself from the necessity of life for the freedom of the world.’106 
It is in this perspective that Arendt emphasises that only two activities 
necessary for human community were understood as part of the bios politikos: 
action and speech, praxis and lexis. All other forms of human activity somehow 
contain force and violence, which essentially means that the one rules over the 
other. This also means, Arendt argues, that the aim of public life was limited to 
these two human capacities as well: to do great deeds and to speak great words.107 
Both terms need to be kept closely together: speech without action easily turns 
into empty speech, chatter, while action without words is not possible either, 
since it means that the actor had been vanished, as well as the action senseless. 
‘Speechless action,’ Arendt writes, ‘would no longer be action because there would 
no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at 
the same time the speaker of words.’108 Without actions being seen, and speeches 
being heard, no inter-action is possible.109 It thus is not only the actor that 
vanishes without speech, also the action itself remains unnoticed, or at its highest, 
badly understood. It lacks power to evoke response. This of course inherently 
suggests the need of a public that is regarded to be equals too. Action only make 
sense when seen and heard by a public that understands the deeds and words 
in order to re-act. In other words, Arendt celebrates a political space in which 
citizens gather together for speech and action. This is the core of Arendt’s under-
standing of politics and political space, which is, as we compare it to contempo-
rary ideas on democracy, quite narrow. For Arendt the essence of politics is the 
possibility to act amongst peers, and to re-act as a response to the actions and 
speeches of others. Arendt’s gatherings never are just about speech and exchange 
of opinions. It always is about the opportunity to do great deeds and to speak 
great words. In other words: for Arendt the public realm is not about the aim of a 
public opinion (through discussion), it’s aim is action itself. Action is not a means 
but an end, according to Arendt. 
But here we are a bit ahead of our exploration of the three notions Arendt actually 
stresses as the human activities bound to the earth: labor, work and action. Arendt 
circumscribes these three activities as follows: 
‘Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human 
body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound 
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to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The 
human condition of labor is life itself.
Work is the activity that corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, 
which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, 
the species’ ever-recurring life cycle. Work provides an ‘artificial’ world of 
things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders 
each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and 
transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness.
Action, the only activity that goes directly between men without the interme-
diary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, 
to the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the world. While all 
aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality 
is specifically the condition – not only the conditio sine qua non, but the 
conditio per quam – of all political life.’110 
Particularly the terms ‘labor’ and ‘work’ today are used in everyday language 
as synonyms. The distinction Arendt pushes forward between those two forms 
of human activities therefore seems odd, specifically by mirroring it with the 
very activity of ‘action’. The root of these distinctions however is based upon 
Classical sources, specifically upon the organization of the Greek and Roman city-
states, and above all on Aristotle and his perspective on the human being, and 
finally on Machiavelli and his remarkable observations about politics. We might 
understand the terms probably better as ‘faculties’ every human being share. 
Through her focus on the distinction between the activities, Arendt nevertheless 
however seems to suggest that it’s a quite blunt black and white distinction, as if 
no one whose daily activities are to be understood as part of ‘work’ not also can 
‘act’. The three activities however are surely simultaneously interdependent and 
intertwined, although Arendt again and again emphasizes the very distinctness 
of the terms. Since she is not eager to offer theories that try to cover everything, 
she’s quite comfortable by leaving it at that. The Human Condition has, therefore, 
lots of open endings. The interplay between these forms of activities surely can 
be understood as one of the major perspectives still to be elaborated. It might 
be, however, important to sustain these distinctions for a while, since this not 
only reveals aspects of political life, of the human activities on earth, but also 
enlighten potentialities and qualities of the field of architecture that in the debate 
sometimes are undervalued.  
Arendt’s main focus obviously is the activity of action, which she once again 
wants to withdraw from the dust that the emphasis on the vita contemplativa 
has drawn upon it. She even goes so far that she argues that without the activity 
of ‘action’ a human being cannot be regarded fully human. Action always has 
the world as objective. It is, we might exaggerate, characterized by world-en-
gagement. Without action, one can state, the human being is bound to his own 
perspective and limited by his own sorrows. Without action the human being fails 
to embrace the world and its plural perspectives. Or to state it differently: action 
lifts one from his limited position and redirects his views towards the world and 
its inhabitants. This of course is Arendt’s major critique upon modernity and 
its temptation of world alienation: it fails to withdraw from the very personal 
concerns and perspectives. Even the political realm today, as we will see, is limited 
to these personal concerns and interests. However, although Arendt’s main focus 
in The Human Conditon obviously is upon ‘action’, she nevertheless regards the 
three activities together as the foundation of every creation of and intervention in 
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the ‘world’. Labor, work and action are at the very fundamentals of every civiliza-
tion – without labor, work and action no culture, no world, that is, no commonly 
owned and shared world amongst the people will stand and be sustained. Labor 
actually corresponds to biological life, the human body, growth and decay. It is 
linked to the effort ‘to stay alive’. Work, on the other hand, is connected to the 
human artifice. Work creates an artificial, sustainable ‘world of things’ within 
which human life can develop. Action, finally, depends upon human plurality: 
since human beings are plural, action (and speech) is needed. Action is the basis 
of political life. This also does mean that action is part of public life. Action itself 
is intangible and fluid. Action only makes sense if seen (and heard) by others: it 
therefore needs to be seen and heard immediately, only then it can have effect, 
rouses responses, reactions and support. In other words, action in solitude does 
not affect the world. It needs the visibility of the public realm in order to gain 
responses and indeed offer new beginnings. Other human beings should see 
and hear what is done and said in order to respond. Arendt therefore always 
emphasizes ‘action’ as ‘action and speech’. They need to be joined together – they 
can’t survive solely. Action without speech is superfluous and does not leave 
traces. It needs to be joined with speech that declares and clarifies the action. 
This also counts vice-versa: speech without action is nothing more than babbling, 
offering empty words. 
Although Arendt’s main objective certainly is to reveal once and for all the 
importance of (political) action, Arendt nevertheless also develops way more 
multiple and ambiguous perspectives in which labor and work plays a significant 
role. Particularly for the field of architecture, as we will see in Chapter 6, the 
notion of work is decisive. Action, we briefly might emphasise already, not only 
needs to be seen and to be heard to get real, it also needs to be reified in order 
to leave actual traces behind. This immediately introduces the efforts of work in 
relation to action and speech. Action takes place directly among humans, without 
the intercession of things or matter. It needs to be heard and seen by others and 
therefore is bound to the public realm; it doesn’t produce tangible results itself 
unless it is recorded in stories, reports, novels, films, and so forth. Action, in other 
words, depends upon human artifice, which actually is the product of ‘work’, in 
order to be reified as permanent. Action thus needs the work of the artists, writer, 
and certainly also the architect to be remembered at all. Arendt nevertheless 
follows Aristotle in his statement that participation in this political realm only 
is possible by a freedom from the necessities of life. Labor and work, for Arendt, 
somehow are related to these necessities. The main objective of labor, after all, 
is to survive the species. Labor is closely related to the biological cycle of life, it 
is part of ‘nature’, one might argue. Labor, according to Arendt, indeed is related 
to the earth and its temporalities. Work in contrast does create artifice that lasts, 
and thus is related to the durable world. What actually is distinctive in Arendt’s 
categorization is the durability of that which is produced. The produce of labour 
is a consumer good that has a very short lifespan. Bread, for instance, needs to be 
consumed quickly otherwise it will spoil. Action has no permanence of its own, 
although re-action and inter-action can have enormous impact. The distinctive 
characteristic of the products produced by ‘work’ is their inherent durability: they 
outlive the producer.111 The durability of the human artifice, for instance, Arendt 
understands as prerequisite for political action. It is the human artifice that 
delivers the world its durability, which makes it worth to be engaged in the world. 
Action itself is intangible and fluid – it therefore needs the stability of the world. It 
is, Arendt states, the stage of political action. 
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Although Arendt argues that this world is a prerequisite for all political action, 
as it is commonly owned and a durable stage, the craftsman itself is depicted by 
the need to produce, as well as by an attitude towards the world in categories of 
means and ends. He therefore isn’t free to enter the public realm and participate 
in the affairs of the world itself, Arendt argues. The need of the artist, however, 
in regard to political action to not immediately vanish, shows the complexity and 
somehow artificiality of this distinction. It nevertheless is important to understand 
that Arendt rendered the ‘necessities of life’ as continuously frustrating the possi-
bilities of ‘action’. 
It is important to emphasize ‘action’ once more. It might seem that action is 
rendered by Arendt as a means within the bios politicos, that it gains its value 
against the background of its possibility to change situations, enhance public life, 
and so on. Action, however, for Arendt is an end in itself – and it is, as we will 
see in the following chapter, important to emphasize particularly that aspect. 
According to Arendt, action unfolds the plurality of mankind. For Arendt this 
plurality is paradoxical. Individual man, after all, is similar to others as human 
being. Words and deeds, action and speech, somehow contain the difference in 
content and character, in wisdom and eagerness, in response and reaction that 
exists between people. Words and deeds are specific: no one speaks or acts the 
same way, because everyone’s life story is different.112 The response of the human 
being to the world is not only influenced by genes, but also through origin and 
life story, through experiences and chances, through education and daily context. 
These differences influence the way the human being participates, how he 
responds on what happens, and defines his perspectives in certain discourses. It 
is thus nature and nurture – as nowadays is said – that influences the individual 
and his appearance amongst peers. These differences, Arendt emphasizes, only 
will appear to each other through words and deeds. However, the human being 
demonstrates his uniqueness by speaking and acting publicly. ‘Men in the plural,’ 
Arendt writes, ‘that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world.’113 
It is only against a background of peers, that differences come to the fore. 
The importance for Arendt of action and speech beyond their possibility 
of change thus is that through action and speech plurality is confined. Insofar 
people appear in public through action and speech, the plurality of society is both 
revealed and constituted. Society, in other words, by definition is plural, although 
this plurality is simultaneously and obviously depending on the possibility to act 
and to speak publicly. The plurality of mankind is thus related to and depending 
on men as acting beings amidst other human beings. By emphasizing plurality 
in this direction the importance of politics immediately is clear as well, be it 
formalized in institutions, laws, rights, and borders, or be it informal as the inter-
actions between human beings, as a key condition of human life. It is important 
to note, however, that for Arendt the aim of politics is not the human community 
as a single entity, as the aim of action. If that would be the aim, according to her, 
plurality itself is at stake. It is therefore that action is an end in itself: only through 
action the human plurality is revealed as well as secured. 
Arendt of course also is very critical about the activities of work and labor (less 
about action, although she again and again stresses the difficulty action delivers 
with it: the lack of control, its fluidity, its endlessness, and its unpredictability. 
If all activities on earth are solely understood as labor, she argues, all plurality 
of mankind soon will be vanished. The Human Condition at this point can be 
understood as a major rejection of the Marxist tendency to read society, power, 
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and relationships solely through the lenses of the activity of labor and the laborer. 
Labor, somehow, is the rejection of differences, since it is rooted in the biological 
sphere and the cycle of life. Of course, before the human being is able to act, 
before the philosopher is able to think, before the artist is able to create, before 
even the laborer is able to labor, there is a need to be freed from the sorrows of 
daily bread and livestock – a need that is fulfilled through the laboring activity 
itself as well as to gain some properties. Nevertheless, to solely understand the 
human activities through the lenses of labor, as a way to understand the human 
presence in the world, is very limited and actually threatening the plurality of 
men. With its close relationship to the cyclic character of biological life, labor 
itself is a threat for the durability and the plurality of the world. Biologically, 
every human being not only is bound to the same life-cycle, they also are part of 
species that needs to adapt to that life-cycle in order to survive. All human beings, 
therefore, are bound to the same necessities. Secondly, the activity of work is 
bound to a process of means towards another end. There always are tools needed 
in order to cut the tree, slices it into boards, and bring it back together differently, 
as a table. The table, in turn, although the end product of this production process 
and probably the proud object of its craftsman, is a tool in itself too: it simply 
is meant to collect the family for dinner. The two main concerns Arendt shares 
are linked to these activities, specifically when their objective is used as lens to 
understand the world. Through labour, Arendt argues, the human plurality is at 
stake. Through work violence enters the public realm: the means towards another 
end-approach will destroy the very opportunity to act freely. Violence destroys 
the equality that is at the basis of the public realm. Violence divides the public 
in rulers and ruled and makes it impossible to appear in public through action 
and speech freely. This emphasis on equality of the public realm, as we will see, 
is not so much a critique upon diversity and discrimination, let alone a critique 
upon personal property. On the contrary, actually, as I will argue in Chapter 5, 
when I will discuss the importance of the private space. Arendt nevertheless 
was very critical about the contemporary primacy of economy as a model to 
understand the world. Economy, according to Arendt, leaves us with the inability 
of speech (and action). Political life is brought back to models of profit and failure, 
welfare, the accumulation of capital and the importance of money (even over 
property). This model changes our approach to the artifice of the world, and turn 
them from goods (that can be an end in themselves) into merchandise. That is: 
means towards the end to earn money, if possible within short term. The human 
artifice is simply turned into a collection of consumer goods, soon to be sold or 
replaced. This approach shortens the lifespan of the artifice drastically (it tends 
towards the category of labor, one might stay). Even the individual home on 
earth, family properties or whatsoever are approached differently, and thereby 
in itself extensively changed. It is not difficult to understand, but the economical 
perspective has had a major impact on the fundamental structure of society as 
well as on the political realm. 
Despite the omnipresence of bureaucracy in the contemporary western societies, 
and despite the primacy of economic models and arguments – about which 
Arendt speaks negatively – she nevertheless unfolds a surprisingly hopeful view 
on the possibility of political action of human beings. Action actually should be 
understood as the faculty to start anew, to take initiatives, which in its essence 
is the source of hope for the world. This source of hope is the very character-
istic of ‘action’: the human capacity to start things anew, to take initiatives, to 
communicate and to collectively be engaged in public affairs. Action, therefore, is 
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closely related to the natality of life, Arendt states. This once again is in opposition 
with Heidegger, who approached the world and life through what he called the 
human Sein zum Tode, his mortality. Everything, even the human life, comes to 
an end, is bound to its finality. Arendt turns this perspective upside down: what 
affects life even more drastically is not it’s perishing but its very beginning. We’re 
not only bound to temporal existence, we’re also able to initiate new things, new 
directions, new beginnings. That is the very characteristic of the human being, 
according to Arendt: his ability to take initiatives. 
Arendt somehow felt the urge to extend The Human Condition with some ‘recent’ 
and concrete examples of political action, and therefore wrote additionally On 
Revolution in which she investigated the French and American Revolution.114 
We might argue that this 1963 book is to be seen as an extension to The Human 
Condition, trying to construct a more concrete and historical understanding of 
the concept of action and how that could be related to actual political regimes. 
In On Revolution Arendt particularly admires the American Revolution, which 
she understood as the only revolution that culminated in a change of the political 
system – establishing a constituted republican form of government. The French 
Revolution could not be seen as a political revolution, Arendt argued on the other 
hand: it remained a social one. The French changed the social circumstances, but 
did not change the political system an sich. Whereas the American revolution 
provided in new and sustainable political structures, the French actually forgot 
to do so, and therefore only changed the panels and could materialize into new 
oppressive structures in the end. On the basis of these differences, Arendt distin-
guishes two stages within revolutions: they start with a transitory phase in which 
people gather together in recognition of a common ‘desire for liberation from 
oppression’, while in the second stage a new body politic is formed. The French 
Revolution never entered the second stage and thus was bound to fail, Arendt 
argues. It ended in in a terrible bloodshed. The American Revolution, after having 
liberated the inhabitants from the British rulership, formed new political order 
based on human interaction, from the famous town hall meetings in the small 
villages to the governmental institutions on the level of the state and the (united) 
nation. Arendt here uses words as ‘cosociation’, ‘cohabiting’ and ‘cojoined’ in 
order to express what actually is the meaning of this human interaction and its 
importance in order to organize the new secular order through ‘covenant and 
combination’.115 What is important to note here is that Arendt, although she 
celebrates ‘action’ as an end in itself, and although she celebrates the unpre-
dictability of it, there is a need to institutionalize the public realm and public 
structures, in order to secure the possibility of action in the end. 
Arendt once again gained critical response upon her reading of the American and 
French revolution, which was understood as a particular conservative or elitists 
view, overlooking the social needs beyond and the French revolution and the 
changes it actually forced. Arendt, however, was charmed by the directness of 
the early forms of political and democratic organization in the States, as well as 
the way it was constituted in the General Constitution. In Toronto the Canadian 
professor C.B. Macpherson asks Arendt: 
‘I was interested in Miss Arendt’s position in relation to the traditions. I take 
it the idea is that she has rejected the tradition of Hobbes and Rousseau, 
and she has accepted the tradition of Montesquieu and the Federalists. I can 
understand this, but it raises a puzzle because there is one very important 
thing that it seems to me the Hobbes tradition and the Federalist tradition 
114.
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006)
115.
Ibid., 170-176
280
have in common. That is their model of man as a calculating individual 
seeking to maximize his own interest. Bourgeois man is the model. And the 
model of society that follows when you put it in the addition assumption is 
that everyman’s interest naturally conflicts with everybody else’s.’
Arendt replies: 
‘I do not believe that the model of man is the same for the two traditions. I 
agree that the model of man which you described is the bourgeois and I agree 
that this bourgeois, God knows, is a reality. But if I may, I want to talk now 
about the model of man in this other tradition. The tradition of Montesquieu 
that you mentioned could really go back to Machiavelli and Montaigne, 
and so on. … And this kind of man is not the bourgeois, but the citizen. 
This distinction between le citoyen and le bourgeois remained, of course, 
throughout the eighteenth century because it became such a central way of 
talking and thinking about these things during the French Revolution, and 
lasted up to 1848. … And they [Machiavelli and so on] read all these books 
[that is: the books from antiquity] … in order to find a model for this new 
political realm which they wanted to bring about, and which they called a 
republic. The model of man of this republic was to a certain extent the citizen 
of the Athenian polis.116 
In between the lines it actually is very clear that Arendt felt the need the retell the 
Americans their history, since, what she acclaimed, ‘fear of revolution has been 
the hidden leitmotif of post-war American foreign policy.’117
4.3.6  Public, Private, Social
The turn towards the private or – even worse – the social, a turn I dropped in 
the paragraphs above, was understood by Arendt as a threat for the world and 
humanity. Without the appearance in public space, life evaporates, she argues. A 
human being, she even goes further, can’t be completely regarded to be ‘human’ 
without participation in public. A life lived in private, devoted to private matters, 
might be a happy life, but it nevertheless doesn’t reach full flourishing heights, we 
might bluntly summarize Arendt’s viewpoint. Or to state it differently, Arendt’s 
distinction between the public and the private somehow is ontological. The public 
is a prerequisite for human life. This emphasis of public participation obviously 
fuelled by her own experience of being disclosed from the participation in public, 
but moreover is deeply rooted in her understanding of the distinction between the 
public and private realm. 
Public and private, according the Arendt, correspond to the distinction between 
the household and the political realm in the polis – she once again grasps back 
to Greek and Roman thought.118 The bios politikos has its proper place in the 
public realm, while private life is limited to the oikia. A clear line separates both 
distinctive entities, although both entities also cannot be understood separately. 
The public and the private are interrelated and even interdependent concepts. She 
actually starts her description of the public realm by emphasizing the very charac-
teristic of appearance in public: 
‘It means … that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by 
everybody and has the widest possible publicity.119 
Arendt mirrors this perspective of gaining publicity immediately with the intimacy 
of the private realm which – in her terms – cannot get publicity. The private 
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realm is the realm that offers space concealed from public viewing. The private 
is a space where one is on its own, not being seen neither being heard by ‘others’, 
invisible for peers. Surely, this might not mean that one is ‘alone’: in the private 
realm one often is surrounded by relatives or friends. Arendt thus strictly distin-
guishes ‘relatives’ from ‘peers’: to function amongst relatives is quite different 
that appearing in public amongst peers. The very distinctiveness of both realms is 
important – they are in need of each other. The public realm cannot exist without 
a private realm: the public depends upon the private, the private upon the public. 
The private realm nurtures biological life and thus is characterized by necessities. 
It is concerned with everything we need to do in order to the biology of the body: 
eating, drinking, earning money, making love, giving birth, and finally dying. 
The household, in other words, is the very realm of necessities. It is the realm 
where necessities are captured and mastered. ‘Necessity ruled over all activities 
performed in [the household]’, Arendt writes.120 The public realm, on the other 
hand, is the realm of the bios politikos. Arendt follows Aristotle at this point, 
since he excludes everything that is necessary or useful from the bios politikos. 
Arendt draws the public realm as the realm of freedom, of not being enslaved by 
the necessities of life, the self, the body, relatives. In the public realm one even 
is free from the necessities of the community (although the very characteristic of 
this realm is devotion to the world). This realm is characterized by the promises 
and uncertainties of action and speech. This emphasis also makes clear how the 
private and the public are bound together. The public realm cannot exist without 
a private realm: in order to live a public life, somewhere else the necessities of 
life – since all human begins are biologically bound to these necessities – need to 
be captured elsewhere. What thus is important at this point is Arendt’s distinction 
between the realm of necessities (the private) and that of freedom (the public). 
The very distinction between both realms thus is to be understood through her 
emphasis on freedom: both the freedom from the necessities of life, but also 
immediately a freedom to be devoted to the world.121  
Both realms were organized accordingly, Arendt argues. Whereas the public 
realm was regarded to be a space where equals could appear to one another, 
the household was organized through hierarchy with slaves, women, and 
children being ruled by the head of the household. This also meant that violence 
was inherent to the private realm, which in turn was unthinkable within the 
public realm. The household mastered the necessities of life, so that the head 
of the household could devote himself to the public realm. Again an important 
perspective needs to be stressed here. With leaving the household in order to 
enter the public realm, the head of the household also had to leave personal and 
private concerns and interests behind, so that he – and the others present in the 
public realm – could think and act from the perspective of the polis. By partici-
pating in public one had to leave its role as head of the household behind in order 
to participate as a citizen within the public realm.
Throughout her writings, and especially in The Human Condition, Arendt renders 
the public realm as a space of words and deeds, of ‘action’ om favour to the 
world. It is a space in which people are seen as equal, despite their fundamental 
differences. This perspective, again, harks back to Classical references: the Greek 
and Roman city-states, their public spaces of the agora, the forum, and the 
market-square. This crowded public space was surrounded by buildings that we 
today call ‘public’ too: libraries, shops, courts, cafes, markets, temples and offices. 
For Arendt nevertheless only the bios politikos counts – that is, according to 
her, the only activity that is truly public.122 This of course causes trouble for the 
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contemporary viewer. Although these classical public spaces after all were full of 
people – merchants selling goods, craftsman creating objects, philosophers delib-
erately discussing ideas, visitors conscious to look after new perspectives – not 
all of these present were allowed to participate in what was understood the public 
realm: the more or less debates on the future of the city state.123 Only citizens were 
allowed to participate in the public life of the polis, which offered room to appear 
in public through action and speech amongst peers. To be a citizen, as stressed 
above, actually meant that one needed to own a household – which thus comes 
down to the male head of the household. Having a household, in other words, 
was seen as a prerequisite for entering the public realm, since the women, the 
children, and the slaves within this household captured the necessities, the head 
of the household was free to admit him selves to the public life. The household 
frees the head of the household, offering him the possibility to participate in the 
public realm. Arendt emphasises this equality in the public realm is realised only 
through a limited accessibility. Not only the polis was of limited size,124 also not 
every inhabitant of the city-state was allowed to participate in these discussions in 
the agora. 
Once again, only two of the human activities are needed to erect and sustain 
human communities, according to the Greek, and thus should be seen as 
belonging to the political realm: action and speech. All other human activities, 
also those we today regard political (even legislation!) were understood as of 
public relevance, but not as political in itself. Between brackets, Arendt also 
mentions architecture in this respect: the actual construction of the polis, more 
specifically, the construction of its outer wall, was needed in order to create room 
for the political realm – a statement I will discuss in Chapter 6 and 7.125 Arendt 
thus emphasizes at this point the very fact of the construction of the defensive 
walls as an architectural act in order to secure a place where people can gather, 
appear to one another, in order to act politically. Legislation in a way fulfilled the 
same function: also the law created room for action – it set out the limits of the 
public realm. The law and the wall – which are two words that mirror each other 
quite nicely, by the way – are thus prerequisites for the space of appearance. The 
wall offering the proper safety of the place, both physically as well as mentally,126 
the law offering the proper rules for the organization of the political realm and 
human community. The law and the wall, once again, thus created space for 
action and speech. They are those two activities that are bound to the space of 
appearance, as well as are the source of the human affairs. It is important to 
understand that for the Greek, the community was not the goal of the action and 
speech – it was the other way around. The polis, the community, is the stage for 
action and speech. Only this political realm makes the doing of great deeds and 
the speech of remarkable words possible. Everybody that didn’t belong to the 
polis was deprived of this possibility, of course not of speech itself, but of the 
life dedicated towards the public realm, a life engaged in the world.127 Arendt 
acknowledges that only citizens were able to participate in the bios politikos in 
these city-states. Clearly, the situation in the polis was quite elitist: only male 
household owners were recognized as citizens. Those were freed from the need 
to search for food, to produce products or every other necessity to earn money in 
order to survive: all these other activities in life, labor and work, were executed by 
the other members of the household, the women, children and slaves, or by the 
craftsman in the city, the merchant, businessman, lawyer, the architect, and so on. 
Beyond her argument on the specificities of both realms, Arendt is concerned 
about something else: the contemporary (in)ability to use the (recently) gained 
freedom to withdraw from the self and the private towards the world. As Seyla 
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Benhabib argues, for Arendt ‘there is not an elite of class, an elite of income, 
an elite of talent that has the privilege to engage in politics; rather, political life 
brings forth a self-appointed elite.’ This self-chosen elite consist of those ‘people 
that are able to care for “the public thing,” for the res publica,’ and are capable to 
look beyond their own interests. ‘In every generation’, Benhabib continues, ‘there 
will be people who care for the res publica, and it is the legacy of revolutions that, 
like a Fata Morgana, they appear and disappear, bearing witness to the human 
capacity for natality – for letting the new shine forth in politics.’128 Arendt thus 
does not emphasise the limited group (gender, status) that was able to participate, 
but moreover stresses the capacity of the citizen to choose to be involved in the 
public realm. Before entering the public realm and participating in the debate, one 
surely needs to be free, Arendt argues, free from every necessity of life, but also 
from other necessities that could capture the opinions about the future of the city 
in self-interest. This latter aspect requires a personal choice of dedication to the 
city and the world, rather than to the self and self-interest. As she continues: this 
perspective actually urges an important perspective in this regard. Before entering 
the public realm, one needs the courage to give up one’s own interests in order to 
dedicate oneself to the affairs of the world.
‘To leave the household, originally in order to embark upon some adventure 
and glorious enterprise and later simply to devote one’s life to the affairs 
of the city, demanded courage because only in the household was one 
primarily concerned with one’s own life and survival. Whoever entered the 
political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for 
life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness. Courage therefore 
became the political virtue par excellence, and only those men who possessed 
it could be admitted to a fellowship that was political in content and purpose 
and thereby transcended the mere togetherness imposed on all – slaves, 
barbarians, and Greeks alike – through the urgencies of life. The ‘good life,’ 
as Aristotle called the life of the citizen, therefore was not merely better, more 
carefree or nobler than ordinary life, but of an altogether different quality. It 
was ‘good’ to the extent that by having mastered the necessities of sheer life, 
by being freed from labor and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all 
living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological 
life process. … Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, 
neither life nor the ‘good life’ is possible, but politics is never for the sake of 
life. As far as the members of the polis are concerned, household life exists for 
the sake of the ‘good life’ in the polis.’129 
It is in this perspective that Arendt stresses the more or less ontological character 
of the public realm. Without participating in public, the human being has lost his 
very humanity, she even states. In order to underline this bold statement, Arendt 
offers two definitions of the public, which are strongly related. First Arendt argues 
that only the public appearance guarantees ‘reality’, simply through the fact that 
only what appears in public can be seen and heard by others. This starts with the 
quote that I already offered above. Public, Arendt writes,  
‘means, first, that everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by 
everybody and has the widest possible publicity.’
She then continues: 
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‘For us, appearance – something that is being seen and being heard by others 
as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality. … The presence of others who see 
what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and of 
ourselves.’130
What stays in the private realm, stays hidden, or is left to the personal and highly 
individual perspectives, emotions and experiences of the single human being. 
Arendt even stresses therefore that a life lived completely in the private realm 
cannot be regarded fully human. ‘In ancient feeling,’ Arendt writes, ‘the privative 
trait of privacy, indicated in the word itself, was all-important; it meant literally 
a state of being deprived of something, and even of the highest and most human 
of man’s capacities. A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was 
not permitted to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to 
establish such a realm, was not fully human.’131 One of course is not deprived from 
the ability to talk or employ activities, or to live a happy life. Arendt much more 
stresses the aspects that can uplift the single life out of its own circle. Therefore a 
public is needed. ‘Every activity performed in public can attain an excellence never 
matched in privacy; for excellence, by definition, the presence of other is always 
required, and this presence needs the formality of the public, constituted by one’s 
peers, it cannot be the casual familiar presence of one’s equals or inferiors. … No 
activity can become excellent if the world does not provide a proper space for its 
exercise. Neither education nor ingenuity nor talent can replace the constituent 
elements of the public realm, which make it the proper place for human 
excellence.’132 
With a reference to Machiavelli, Arendt states that in this political realm, 
goodness can not be the norm of action, but glory. At the Toronto conference the 
architect George Baird asks to clarify this statement. And Arendt responses: 
‘It has something to do with the distinction between the public and the private. 
But I can put it differently. I would say that in the notion of wanting to be 
good, I actually am concerned with my own self. The moment I act politically, 
I’m not concerned with me, but with the world. And that is the main 
distinction. … Whether the criterion is glory – the shining out in the space of 
appearances – or whether the criterion is justice, that is not the decisive thing. 
The decisive thing is whether your own motivation is clear – for the world – 
or, for yourself, by which I mean for your soul.’
Important to underline in Arendt’s first definition, however, is the importance 
of the public in order to assure the ‘reality’ of the world. Human life that is 
enclosed solely in the private realm actually is de-prived from the reality of the 
world, which only is established through the appearance in public, through the 
shared experiences – being seen and being heard, as well as to see and hear what 
others also see and hear. This emphasis on the reality of the world also is the 
most important aspect of the second definition, although emphasized in a slightly 
different direction. Public, Arendt put forward as her second definition, is the 
world itself. The world is what human beings have in common. Therefore, to be 
deprived from the public realm, Arendt argues, not only means to be struck in 
personal and private concerns and interests, it also means that one is de-prived 
from that what actually is able to gather human beings, deprived from a life 
dedicated to the concern for the world.133
‘The term “public” signifies the world itself, insofar as it is common to all of us 
and distinguished from our privately owned space in it.’134
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It is in this perspective that Arendt also emphasises a third realm that she saw 
emerging in the Modern age, the social realm. This social realm she actually 
understands as a threat for both the public and the private realm. This realm 
actually is characterized by an ‘upscale’ perspective of ‘labor’ as the shared char-
acteristic of the human being. This lens of ‘labor’ actually affects extensively the 
understanding of the human community. Whereas through the perspective of 
action the human being is understood in all its differences, the labor perspective 
stresses its sameness: sharing the same needs and interests, as well as offering the 
same capacities to society (labor). 
Arendt traces this change back to early Romantic period at the end of the 
18th and beginning of the 19th century – a change she for instance traces in the 
fall of architecture as truly public art, which I will discuss in Chapter 7, and the 
rise of the novel as the ‘only entirely social art form.’ With this image, Arendt 
means that it investigates the ‘modern individual and his endless conflicts’, 
making public ‘the intimacy of the heart.’135 For Arendt this is an entirely negative 
judgment. With the term ‘social’, and in correspondence with that also ‘society’, 
she refers to something she understands as a threat for both the public and the 
private realm. The rise of society, she writes, has not only blurred the border 
between public and private, but also changed the meaning of both terms ‘beyond 
recognition’.136 The human community in this perspective is ‘a body of people’ 
that share the same needs and interest, and that together need to contribute 
to the prosperity of society at large. Thus, this means that the aim of society is 
the prosperity of every member of society. This perspective obviously is derived 
from Marx’s emphasis on the structure of society through which this prosperity 
is distributed amongst its people. Arendt however faults him for a lack of under-
standing of the differences amongst people at all, as well as his inability to 
retrieve the economical perspective from the human body. Whereas for Arendt 
the possibility of outstanding work and glorious deeds are beyond doubt, through 
the labor perspective there is no room for each of these. Economic principles 
after all deal with generalities and therefore do only deliver room for minor 
differences. They render only the shared need to survive, the shared interest in 
prosperity, the shared requisite of peace and welfare. This perspective, Arendt 
argues, does lead towards an understanding of the human being as being part of 
a mankind, being part of the body of man, part of a larger construct that simply 
share the same interests and needs. In economic perspectives man is seldom 
approached as ‘merely’ a consumer, as a being that can be regulated through 
economic principles. The public realm, according to Arendt, on the other hand 
is about ‘glorious deeds’, remarkable words and great works, appearing in 
public, and through this appearance, adding his perspectives, words and deeds 
towards culture and the history of the world. In a community that is dominated 
by economic principles everything is in the end understood through its monetary 
value. Arendt however withstands this urge. Words, and deeds, and also ‘works’ 
(sic), cannot be judged through a single measurement, she states, without simul-
taneously being consumed, that is, being destructed at the same time. Money 
turns everything into a sort of objective mode. This however runs counter with 
not only our own experiences of reality in which all sorts of remembrances and 
objects resist such a limitation towards countable objective, as well as with the 
very character of the public realm. 
What finally is important here is to understand the threat Arendt describes when 
she investigates the social realm. ‘The emergence of the social realm, which is 
neither private nor public, strictly speaking, is a relatively new phenomenon 
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whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern age and which found 
its political form in the nation-state.’137 In modern times, Arendt writes, property 
becomes prosperity, something that can be used and consumed. Prosperity can 
offer the state certain stability, but this never is a stable structure. Since capitalism 
is a process, also the stability of prosperity is the stability of a process. Arendt is 
quite concerned about this loss of durability. First she, however, sketches another 
warning. The social sciences as the theory of the social realm actually emphasize 
the ‘normal’ behavior, not their excellent, neither their eccentric acts. It is the 
theory of behavior – which is mapped and with statistics carefully employed. 
Human behavior, in this perspective, can be predicted, and even be manipulated. 
These perspectives actually dwell upon the huge number and the long term, upon 
what is the norm and what can be predicted. What is left behind in this model, 
Arendt argues, is the very human capacity to act. Action is regarded ‘not natural’, 
since it withdraws itself from the normal behavior. It starts something new, 
something of which the outcome cannot be predicted. Arendt understands this 
as the biggest challenge of the social realm. History changes, she states, not due 
to everyday behavior, but through that what is beyond the normal, through what 
is odd, different and stunning (these might be small differences, but differences 
they are). In society, it is not about these single actions and speeches that would 
gain reaction and responses, endorsement or objections, but cannot be predicted. 
The emphasis upon the ‘normal’ requires from its inhabitants to act as if they 
are part of one enormous family, as if everyone has the same interests, opinions, 
and objectives. The public realm has become an extension of the private, Arendt 
states: the government needs to take care of the private interests and is forced to 
strive for prosperity for all its citizens.
However, it is this ruling economic principle that Arendt mainly understands as 
the core of the social realm. This social realm, she states, swallows both the private 
interests and experiences, as well as the private properties on the one hand, as 
well as the possibility to act in public on the other hand. Both the public realm 
and the private realm turn into hollow realms, when the economical approach is 
influential both in public affairs and in private matters. For Arendt, in a society 
that is characterized by such a limitation of the instruments to value and judge its 
happenings, events, objectives, outbursts, structures, artefacts, and so on, people 
have become solitary individuals, prisoners of their own subjective experience – 
even if others can have the exact same experience. ‘Being seen and being heard by 
others’, Arendt writes, ‘derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees 
and hears from a different position.’ 138 The end of the commonly shared world, 
in other words, has arrived when it is reduced to a single perspective and a single 
aspect. Arendt argues that a real public realm on the contrary is characterized 
by the simultaneity of countless perspectives. ‘Only where things can be seen by 
many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who 
are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly 
reality truly and reliably appear.’139
With this analysis, Arendt emphasizes the importance of the public realm as a 
space of human plurality. The public realm and plurality are interdependent. 
While plurality is confined, there is no public realm. And if there is no public 
realm, also plurality is endangered: people are stripped of the freedom to develop 
their own unique biography in relation to others and with it to take part in the 
organized world.140 In this regard, Arendt, in The Human Condition, does not 
so much identify political threats (totalitarian regimes), but mainly other devel-
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opments: the mass society (which was becoming more and more evident in her 
time), the bureaucratic forms of organization attendant upon this and in addition 
the increasing primacy of economic principles over everyday life, as I already 
discussed. 
This idea of the emergence of a 'social realm' quite often is misunderstood 
in the work of Arendt; it leaves the reader with a lot of questions, actually. In 
Toronto a nice conversation emerged about this topic, starting with a question by 
Arendt’s close friend and writer Mary McCarthy: 
‘What is somebody supposed to do on the public stage, in the public space, if 
he does not concern himself with the social? That is, what’s left? It seems to 
me that if you once have a constitution, and you’ve had the foundation, and 
you have had a framework of laws, the scene is there for political action. And 
the only thing that is left for the political man to do is what the Greeks did: 
make war! Now this cannot be right! On the other hand, if all questions of 
economics, human welfare, busing, anything that touches the social sphere, 
are to be excluded from the political scene, then I am mystified. I am left with 
war and speeches. But the speeches can’t just be speeches. They have to be 
speeches about something’
And Arendt replies: 
‘Life changes constantly, and things are constantly there that want to be talked 
about. At all times people living together will have affairs that belong in the 
realm of the public – “are worthy to be talked about in public.” What these 
matter are at any historical moment is probably utterly different. For instance, 
the great cathedrals were the public spaces of the Middle Ages. The town halls 
came later. And there perhaps they had to talk about a matter which is not 
without any interest either: the question of God.’
She then, after a while, adds: 
‘There are things where the right measures can be figured out. These things 
can really be administered and are not then subject to public debate. Public 
debate can only deal with things, which – if we want to put it negatively – 
we cannot figure out with certainty. Otherwise, if we can figure it out with 
certainty, why do we all need to get together? Take a town-hall meeting. There 
is a question, for instance, of where to put the bridge. This can be decided from 
above, or it can be done by debate. In case there really is an open question 
where it is better to put the bridge, it can be decided better by debate than 
from above. I once assisted such a town-hall meeting in New Hampshire, and 
I was very impressed by the level of sense in that town. On the other hand, it 
seems to me also quite clear that no amount of speeches and discussions and 
debates – or what is unfortunately taking their place: research committees, 
which are an excuse for doing nothing – that none of these things will be able 
to solve the very grave social problems which the big cities pose to us.’ 
‘Lets take the housing problem. The social problem is certainly adequate 
housing. But the question of whether this adequate housing means integration 
or not is certainly a political question. With every one of these questions there 
is a double face. And one of these faces should not be subject to debate. There 
shouldn’t be any debate about the question that everybody should have decent 
housing.’
George Baird comes in: 
‘From an administrative point of view, the British government described as 
inadequate a huge percentage of the housing stock of Britain in a way that 
makes no sense to a large proportion of the inhabitants who actually live 
there.’
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Arendt admits: 
‘I think this example is helpful in showing this double face of which I have 
talked in a very concrete way. The political issue is that these people love 
their neighbourhood and don’t want to move, even if you give them one more 
bathroom. This is indeed entirely a debatable question, and a public issue, and 
should be decided publicly and not from above. But if it’s a question of how 
many square feet every human being needs in order to be able to breathe and 
to live a decent life, this is something which we really can figure out.’141
4.3.7  Thinking, Willing, Judging
Although Arendt’s turn towards the vita activa, and her opposition towards the 
vita contemplativa, as well as her favoring of the public realm above the private 
realm, indeed can be understood as this rejection of the withdrawal from the 
world in favor of the ‘love for the world’, it nevertheless is remarkable that she 
doesn’t address the activity of ‘thinking’ as a human faculty in her study. Arendt 
herself in the prologue explains this lack of attention. Thinking, after all, is the 
highest activity of the human being, Arendt admits. Nevertheless, she’s not sure 
every human being is able to think. It follows, she argues, that she had to exclude 
thinking from the human capacities that are shared by everybody. This seems to 
be a weak argument, specifically since Arendt also is quite concerned about action 
as a shared capacity of the human being. However, thinking is not completely 
written out of her investigation. Again and again this activity is touched upon, 
indeed often in a quite pessimistic view upon the human capacity to think after 
all. This concern somehow is the embarrassing thesis of which she found proof in 
her analysis of the Eichmann process a couple of years later. Thinking, therefore, 
turned to be her central concern in the latter part of her life, especially extensively 
discussed in her last – not completed – book The Life of the Mind.142 Yet now, 
still in The Human Condition, she states: ‘Thoughtlessness’ – the heedless reck-
lessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of ‘truths’, which have 
become trivial and empty – seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of 
our time.’143 
This thoughtlessness is precisely what Arendt renders as the very characteristic 
of Adolf Eichmann. Quite a lot of her books and essays roused attention, which 
already started amidst the Jews and Zionist at the moment she – early in her 
career – critically investigates the Zionist ambitions to establish a Jewish state in 
Palestine, when she herself is still an active member of some Zionist groups. She 
also rouses attention of the conservative and liberal political theorists, philoso-
phers, historians, writers, activists in Europe and America with her uncommon 
approach of politics, political action, thinking and philosophy, in her latter work. 
Most attention, however, she had gained with her critical approach of the Jewish 
culture in her review of the 1961 process against Adolf Eichmann, the former 
SS-officer during World War II responsible for the logistics of the transports of 
Jews, Roma and Sinti to the concentration camps. Certainly Arendt was happy 
to be involved in those debates, and answered questions, letters, and remarks 
extensively. Despite this eagerness to rethink all issues and actualities towards 
their essence, and reconstruct arguments, and her love to dispute, the commotion 
caused by her book on the trial Eichmann in Jerusalem touched her strongly. 
The critical response and the implicit and explicit blame of betraying the Jewish 
case moved her emotionally, specifically since it also did cost more than she had 
expected: the loss of some friendships too. Quite soon after the publication of 
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The Human Condition, Arendt was asked by the magazine The New Yorker to 
follow and comment the trial of Eichmann. Arendt accepted the invitation and 
followed the process, of course, with personal interest. She certainly also dealt 
with the question that the whole world was asking: how could this man do such 
evil deeds? Already in 1951 Arendt had written to Jaspers that the evil of modern 
times ‘has proved to be more radical than expected. In objective terms, modern 
crimes are not provided for in the Ten Commandments. Or: The Western tradition 
is suffering from the preconception that the most evil things human beings can do 
arise from the vice of selfishness. Yet we know that the greatest evils or radical evil 
has nothing to do anymore with such humanly understandable sinful motives.’144 
She adds to this remark that she didn’t know how such radical evil should be 
understood really – at that moment in 1951 she suggested that human beings were 
made superfluous. As an example Arendt refers to the Soviet Union, where during 
the World War II people not only were used ‘as a means to an end, which leaves 
their essence as humans untouched and impinges only on their human dignity’,145 
but moreover the very humanity of people was threatened: they were deprived 
from their capacity to act. About a decennium later, at the moment Arendt writes 
Jaspers that she will follow the trial of Eichmann (‘I want to go to Israel for the 
Eichmann trial, and The New Yorker, a very well-known magazine here, has said 
it will send me’),146 Jaspers advises her not to go: ‘The Eichmann trial will be no 
pleasure for you. I’m afraid it cannot go well.’147 But Arendt went, and indeed tried 
to find the answer how a man like Eichmann was able to do such evil deeds. Her 
answer actually was surprising – the very root of the evil was thoughtlessness, 
she stated. Eichmann was not able to think for himself. At a certain point in her 
book she writes: ‘The longer one listened to him, the more obvious it became that 
his inability to think, namely, to think from the standpoint of somebody else.’148 
In Arendt’s terms: he did not think, neither did he act - the reason he didn’t act 
probably was he lacked the faculty of thinking. He just did what he was told to 
do. He behaved. According to Arendt the evil done by this man only source was 
‘thoughtlessness’, which is not the evil-doing itself, but the very first step which 
can cause this evil-doing on a vast scale.149 Thoughtlessness for Arendt is both just 
following ‘truths’, be it the truth declared by one man, the ‘truth’ acquired from an 
ideology, or the ‘truth’ which is the undoubted zeitgeist, the celebrated narrative 
of current society as a whole. Such thoughtlessness is a withdrawal from the world 
as well, a withdrawal from its reality. This idea is precisely what Arendt declares 
as the banality of evil, the phrase that Arendt added as the subtitle of her book 
on the Eichmann trial, Eichmann in Jerusalem. She writes on Eichmann: ‘He did 
not need to “close his ears to the voice of conscience,” as the judgment had it, not 
because he had none, but because his conscience spoke with a “respectable voice,” 
with the voice of respectable society around him.’150 He, in other words, was not 
able to ‘think for himself’, nor ask himself: ‘can I live with the deeds I did?’ – a 
phrase that is of major important for Arendt. 
In her report, however, Arendt doesn’t address this as a question limited to 
Eichmann only. She drew this lacking capacity to think for oneself as a widespread 
problem of modernity. The commentators and critics immediately stumbled 
over the subtitle since they wrongly understood the phrase ‘the Banality of Evil’: 
it roused the fiercest responses Arendt got on her work during her lifetime. It 
even did cost her the loss of some friendships.151 In retrospect, for a large part the 
discussion was not based on her statement in the book, but only on the sound bite 
of the word ‘banal’ on the cover. At first sight the word banal could after all mean 
that such evil, of which Eichmann than is a symbol, could be done by ‘everyone’, 
that ‘Eichmann is in each of us’, and that ‘we’ therefore should see the evil itself 
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as banal. This misunderstanding Arendt had yet to correct during the Toronto 
conference.152 With ‘banal’, she stated during the conference, she never did mean 
such a statement. She simply was astonished by the ordinariness of Eichmann. 
He was not strange nor resentful, ideological nor evil: his evil neither sprang 
from psychopathic depths, nor from a frustrated life or abused childhood. He was 
just an ordinary man. And the problem was, Arendt stresses, he just did what he 
had to do without asking questions. He even during the trial still backed himself 
behind the system he had to operate in. That attitude did not make the evil itself 
banal, but the other way around, Arendt suggests. It turned banality itself into 
evil. Jaspers – indeed like a father – later wrote Arendt that she better could have 
written that it was ‘this evil, not evil per se’ that was banal.153 The ‘banality’ she 
added to the subtitle however shows that Arendt did not limit this ‘unthought-
fullness’ to this one person, but understood it as a broader problem, linked to 
modernity and a characteristic of contemporary ‘masses’.
Although strains of this argument already were part of her writings before, from 
this moment on she began to give more explicit attention to the human faculty 
of thinking, although she still also worked on her ideas on the importance of the 
human ability to act, of which she felt the urge to make her concept less abstract 
and way more actual. I already mentioned her 1963 book On Revolution, in 
which she investigated political and social revolutions, especially the American 
Revolution and the French Revolution. The two lines of attention, action and 
thinking, for the first time, actually, merge in a collection of essays that she 
published in 1961, called Between Past and Future.154 In these essays, Arendt 
elucidates fundamental terms like history, freedom, culture, and education – 
and through those topics investigates again action and thinking, but adding 
terms as beauty and judgment. In 1968 Arendt publishes Men in Dark Times, a 
collection of essays on her ‘hero’s’, as for instance Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Jaspers, 
Berthold Brecht and Walter Benjamin, who in quite different ways but clearly 
have been able to recognize and resist actual and dangerous trends in society.155 
Through those essays Arendt not only presented these figures as ‘men able to 
act’, but also as ‘human beings able to think’, which obviously counter with 
the figure of Eichmann. The five years after the death of her husband Blücher, 
Arendt worked on what had to be a counterpart of The Human Condition. In 
The Human Condition Arendt had deliberately not addressed the human activity 
of thinking. Thinking is an activity itself, an activity that, according to Arendt, 
the human being distinguishes from the animal. While describing thinking as a 
human activity, it is clear that Arendt understood this emphasizing the very idea 
of thinking not as a new project. Moreover, this project can be considered as the 
investigation of those activities that she had excluded from her earlier reflection 
on the human activities. By emphasizing thinking as an act, Arendt distin-
guishes it from mere reasoning, which can be seen as applying a certain theory. 
She rephrases thinking already in earlier writings as ‘a talk with oneself’. This 
‘dialogue’ or even ‘arguing’, as she renders it, needs to be without restrictions. In 
a three-volume book called The Life of the Mind, Arendt therefore intended to 
investigate not only ‘thinking’, but also the notions ‘willing’ and judging’. Unfor-
tunately, Arendt only could finish the first two volumes roughly, since she died 
suddenly because of a heart attack the very morning of December 4th in 1975. In 
her typewriter the first page of the third part was found, containing two epigraphs. 
Her friend the writer Mary McCarty published the first two volumes as The Life 
of the Mind posthumously in 1978. In these two volumes she asks herself if our 
thinking, as being seen as a dialogue with the self, can lead to the development of 
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a conscience. The third volume would have been a reconsideration of the ideas of 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant on judgment – this ambition was already clearly 
mentioned by Arendt, and she actually just had given a range of colleges on this 
topic at The New School in New York. The propelling posthumously published 
transcriptions of these lectures on this topic in Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, can be seen as an outline for this volume.156 The idea to reconsider 
‘thinking’, ‘willing’ and ‘judging’ as three different faculties of the human mind 
already shows a bit of her view. Within these topics, the philosophical distinction 
between thinking and willing, the tension between willing and acting is tangible, 
as well as the important role of ‘judging’ in her view. Judgment makes thinking 
manifest in the world.157 
The idea that ‘thinking’ and ‘action’ are intertwined, as for instances was rendered 
through the portraits of her ‘heroes’ in Men in Dark Times, of course also was at 
the very basis of Arendt’s critical response towards the audience at the Toronto 
conference and their eagerness to act. 
‘Reason itself,’ Arendt explained to the public in Toronto, ‘the thinking ability 
which we have, has a need to actualize itself. The philosophers and the meta-
physicians have monopolized this capability. This has led to very great things. 
It also has let to rather unpleasant things.’158
Already in her very first statement159 during the Toronto conference Arendt roused 
the public, not only by her rejection to be positioned or to be involved in concrete 
political action at that very moment, but also by the very provocative rejection 
of philosophy and political theory as such. That is a bold statement to start with, 
especially amongst an audience of political theorists and philosophers: a disasso-
ciation from both philosophy and political sciences – and theology, I guess, but 
that is less relevant in this case. In Toronto Arendt nevertheless also stressed that 
both activities, thinking and acting not are two capacities of different persons, 
as the capacities of the philosopher on the one hand, and of the politician on the 
other hand. Not at all – thinking and acting essentially should be seen as two 
different capacities of a single person. But although united in the same person, 
Arendt here even harder stresses the distinct character of both capacities. 
‘I do believe that thinking has some influence on action.’ Arendt nevertheless 
admits. ‘But on acting man. Because it is the same ego that thinks and the 
same ego that acts.’ 
Arendt actually adds to this statement:
‘But not theory!’
Which is a particular insight in the critic Arendt actually has. Arendt blames the 
practitioners of these fields of thinking of a monopoly that has brought good, 
surely, but evil as well: 
‘We have forgotten,’ Arendt states, ‘that every human being has a need to 
think, not to think abstractly, not to answer the ultimate questions of God, 
immortality, and freedom, nothing but to think while he is living.’
Theory, however, mostly is dealing with generalities – that is what Arendt blames 
the professional thinkers. 
‘If you think about it in these … terms, you think about mankind – that is, 
about some noun which actually doesn’t exist, which is a concept. And this 
noun – be it Marx’s species-being, or mankind, or the world spirit, or what 
have you – is constantly construed in the image of a single man. [But] if 
we really believe – and I think we share this belief – that plurality rules the 
earth, then I think one has got to modify this notion of the unity of theory 
and practice to such an extent that it will be unrecognizable for those who 
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tried their hand at it before. I really believe that you can only act in concert 
and I really believe that you can only think by yourself. These are two entirely 
different – if you want to call it – “existential” positions. And to believe that 
there is any direct influence of theory on action insofar as theory is just a 
thought thing, that is something thought out – I think that this is really not so 
and really will never be so.’160
Arendt thus opposes again thinking or philosophy seen as a construct, a system, 
a theory – thought out and ready to be accepted as a framework by the single 
human being, ready to be applied in the everyday world. Arendt on her terms 
pleas for thinking that is not detached from the world, even not detached from 
everyday life. She takes it from the sole and lone position of the professional 
thinkers, and brings it to the human being itself, into the world. 
‘Everybody who tells a story of what happened to him half an hour ago on the 
street has got to put this story into shape. And this putting the story into shape 
is a form of thought.’161
The explanation and the understanding of that what happened – or possibly what 
actually now is happening or what will happen in the future – only can exist in a 
continuous interaction with the world and its actualities – which is what Arendt 
pleas for. 
‘What is the subject of our thought? Experience! Nothing else! And if we lose 
the ground of experience then we get into all kinds of theories. When the 
political theorist begins to build his systems he is also usually dealing with 
abstraction.’162
Arendt thus rejects philosophy not only because of its existing philosophical 
constructions and insights, but also because of its very objective, as well as 
because of its ‘exclusivity’. Philosophy, Arendt states, essentially deals with eternal 
truths, the big but mostly abstract questions beyond life. But Arendt here brings 
it back to the single person and life itself. The eternal truth, that the professional 
thinker tries to explore, only will unfold to the human being in contemplation and 
solitude. The philosopher has to withdraw himself from the world, literally as well 
metaphorically, to not be disturbed by the rumours of the street and the hustle 
and bustle of everyday life. Without contemplation and solitude the philosopher 
probably is even not able to think. The common view is that the philosopher 
needed contemplation and solitude to touch upon the eternal. In other words, 
such an emphasis on the withdrawal from the world renders the conviction that 
truth is transcendental and only can be found beyond this world, beyond the 
concerns and events of our everyday life. But Arendt thus blames the profession 
of thinking, as indeed being disconnected from the world and actualities. This 
remark actually is an important insight in what Arendt understood as ‘thinking’. 
It is not the ability to construct abstract worldviews or views beyond the world, 
but the interaction between everyday live and personal reflection on what one is 
doing. In other words, to ‘think for oneself’, so to say, and not hide behind the 
shoulders of certain predecessors, schools, programs, theories. In her book The 
Human Condition Arendt states that thinking is like the daimon on one’s shoulder 
who continuously asks ‘can you live with what you are doing?’163 
Thinking, according to Arendt, is not the sole activity as regularly seen in the 
tradition of philosophy, in which the thinker is turned away from ‘reality’ in order 
to conceptualize the ‘truth’, as in Plato’s idea of the eternal ideas. Nor is it rational 
and logical reasoning which leads to a cognitive truth, as scientists mostly see it 
and as it is seen in contemporary society as well. Thinking moreover is to be seen 
as getting rid of these constructions. On the contrary, thinking should address 
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the reality itself and its only source is the experience of reality – as Arendt had 
understood by her own biography.164 Thinking is concerned about the world itself, 
its daily experience as well as the ‘interruptions or outbreaks of history’, and 
especially focused on what man (or men) can do, how they (should) act, interact, 
and react, and what the world may become because of that action. Or as Arendt 
write to Mary McCarthy: ‘thinking starts after an experience of truth has struck 
home, so to speak.’165 So thinking is not ‘just having some thoughts in mind,’ nor 
‘developing an opinion on a certain topics’, even not constructing a certain theory 
and finally also adopting and adapting certain dogma. It is also not mere contem-
plation (as opposed to the vita activa), nor a goal-bounded theorization.166 The 
essence of thinking, states Arendt following Plato, is a dialogue between ‘me and 
myself’,167 distinct from voices around, but caused by ‘real experiences’. 
It is the dialogue between me and myself that is the essence of thinking. This 
on-going dialogue is fuelled by the ever changing context: all new information, 
newly emerging circumstances, new actions and speeches, are needed to be 
rethought and re-approached. The goal of this ongoing dialogue is a holistic life, 
living in agreement with oneself. Or as said by Socrates: ‘Since I am one, it is 
better for me to disagree with the whole world than to be in disagreement with 
myself.’168 In other words, thinking is clearing the mind of general collective 
thoughts, common premises, the presuppositions, opinions, and prejudices. 
Thinking, thus, should be seen as a form of personal resistance to the environment 
surrounding us. Thinking should be free, she said – it even should be freed from 
the ‘right way of thinking politically.’ Through this conversation also, her own 
refusal to be pinpointed on one position is felt. Arendt’s oeuvre, of course, is an 
example par excellence of such thinking.
‘If you take away the bannisters from people,’ Arendt stated in Toronto, ‘– 
their safe guiding lines (and then they talk about the breakdown of tradition 
but they have never realized what it means! That it means you really are out 
in the cold!) then, of course the reaction is – and this has been my case quite 
often – that you are simply ignored. And I don’t mind that. Sometimes you are 
attacked. But you usually are ignored…’169
Nevertheless, if all ‘common ground’ has to be questioned, if theory is suspicious, 
how is the human being able to judge? Is common ground not needed in order 
to take decisions that are not purely personal, but also can be understood and 
followed and accepted by the public at large? For Arendt that was a serious 
question: how to judge actualities within politics? Arendt found a perspective in 
the work of Immanuel Kant that helped her to define a perspective of judgment in 
politics, although she derives it from the thinking of Kant on aesthetics and taste. 
Kant supposed, in his third critique, that there was a certain common ground for 
beauty – that the human beings could collectively agree on what they understand 
as beautiful. Therefore he emphasized this capacity of the human being through 
the definition of taste. Arendt on her term takes this third critique towards the 
political level. Politics, according to Arendt, deals first and foremost with the 
human plurality. The plurality of men unfolds through action and speech, which 
is actually the domain of politics. The goal of politics somehow is the continuity 
of the world – the world that is around us and the world that connects us – we, 
now, together; but also with the generations before and those after us. For Arendt 
this world only gets its reality through the plural approaches of the human beings. 
It only gets tangibility through the process of being seen and being heard from 
different perspectives – only through these different perspectives can a certain 
reality be understood in all its different aspects and complexities. In order to 
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judge, Arendt thus explores the idea of taste in the work of Kant, and she follows 
him in his emphasizing the need of ‘enlarged mentality’. In order to judge – 
Kant means aesthetical judgment, Arendt means political judgment – a human 
being should be able to look from different perspective, not only from his own 
standpoint, but also from each other’s position around him or her. Judgment thus 
is not reasoning: its arguments are not linear but holistic. Again, like thinking, it 
is not about ‘truth’, but about ‘reality’, and this reality only appears (or gets real) 
from different viewpoints. Judgment is the ability to look from different perspec-
tives, ‘to think from the standpoint of everyone else’ as well as the ability to ‘reflect 
upon one’s own judgment from a universal standpoint’. Or as an inscription in 
some tiles in Mazara del Vallo on Sicily, Italy reads, 
‘Nell’ accessione della filosofia Hannah Arendt
la tolleranza è la capacità di pensare
anche per un solo instante, che
l’interlocutore possa avere ragione’
‘In Hannah Arendt’s conception, 
tolerance is the ability to think, 
even for a moment, 
that your interlocutor might be right’
These exercises, according to Arendt, however requires different capacities 
from the human being: courage (to think for oneself and to judge their own 
perspective), imagination and creativity (in order to explore different viewpoints), 
experience, ‘culture’ or community (on the basis of which a judgment gets 
validity) and finally communication (the community should be able to discuss 
the judgment, the judge should be able to explain its decisions). It is important to 
come back to this notion of the ‘enlarged mentality’ of Kant and Arendt’s interpre-
tation – or, in other words, the capacity to think from different standpoints. The 
goal of this ‘enlarged mentality’ of course is not to be empathic. On the contrary. 
It is meant to set up a political agreement. Judgment derives its validity, writes 
Arendt, only through such agreement – it only through such agreement ‘can 
liberate itself from the subjective private conditions’. Judgment thus ‘needs the 
presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose perspectives it must take 
into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at 
all.’170 This idea of the enlarged mentality and the goal of thinking from different 
positions presupposes the existence of a ‘sensus communis’. Kant and Arendt both 
used this Latin term and not the more general and everyday used common sense 
– which meant that they emphasize that this is not a certain extra mental capacity 
but that this sense is rooted in a human community. It thus has to be seen as 
‘community sense’. And since it is community-sense, it is open for communica-
tion.171 Judgment, thus only is possible within a community. Beyond thinking, 
beyond this idea of ‘to think for oneself’, common ground is needed in order to 
judge. Again, thus: in order to judge one needs courage, imagination, creativity, 
experience – and a judgement only gets its validity within the context of a certain 
culture and community, and only through communication. 
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4.4  TWO BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
4.4.1  The World 
Regarding the life and works of Arendt it is obvious to argue – as I do above – 
that her oeuvre closely is related to her biography: particularly her unwanted 
involvement in the political developments in Germany before the war and her 
escape to the United States in the early 40s and, later in her biography, the 
controversy around her Eichmann report. Somehow these events indeed caused a 
change from philosophical to political oriented works, as well a renewed attention 
to the very capacity of thinking of human beings in the latter decades of her life. 
Although she did regard her position as a student facing the emerging National 
Socialism as rather naïve afterwards, these experiences nevertheless did not lead 
to a complete turn in her work. These experiences worked like an accelerator, 
which pushed some perspectives already existent into new depth and attention 
by making these lines of thoughts urgent to investigate, elaborate, and enhance. 
Major concerns and objectives of her latter works, for instance, are already 
between the lines of her dissertation, on Augustine, as well as in her biography of 
Rahel Varnhagen, whilst the topic of thinking itself was already important before 
her report on the Eichmann trial. I would argue that at least two main concepts 
do form the foundation of her work: ideas about the ‘world’ on the one hand, 
and about ‘politics’ at the other. Both concepts I will address in the following 
subsections of this chapter. 
Obviously one of the major notions in the work is that of ‘the world’. It at least 
is a perspective that already in her very first writings are pronounced, but surely 
gained way more attention in her latter works. Arendt’s dissertation on Augustine, 
for instance, dealt with the very worldliness of the human being, which has, in the 
works of Augustine as well as in the very heart of Christianity, a certain tension. 
I already noted above the tension between the command ‘to love thy neighbor as 
thyself’ versus the remark of Jesus that whoever follows Him lives ‘in the world’ 
but not is ‘from the world’. This tension actually is very characteristic within the 
writings of the apostle John, who starts his gospel with the famous words ‘For 
God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son …’172, while he in his 
letters assures the readers to ‘not love the world or anything in the world.’173 
Arendt coined this emphasis of John later as otherworldliness.174 Somehow the 
same dilemma played a role in the biography on Rahel Varnhagen: the position 
of the stranger in the world as being a pariah or a parvenu. It is reasonable that 
the same tension also drove her to emphasize the human activities in The Human 
Condition, which are somehow forced against a certain bias of philosophy in 
the actual world. This urge still is at the very heart of her The Life of the Mind in 
which her dwelling upon thinking is not a celebration of a withdrawal from the 
world. It thus is not without reason that Elisabeth Young-Bruehl did choose to 
subtitle her biography on Arendt with: For the Love of the World. In the tension 
between withdrawal from the world and involvement in the world, Arendt chooses 
the latter. The notion of the world she gained from the work of Heidegger, 
although their respectable reflections on the notion are utterly different. 
Heidegger actually defined the notion of the world as ‘an encompassing network of 
instrumental’ relationships of entities that surrounds us and are a ‘given’ because 
they fulfil ‘certain functions within the nexus of our pragmatic concerns.’175 This 
notion of the ‘world’ is opposed to that of the ‘earth,’ which he saw as the natural 
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circumstances of the globe and outer space. The distinction thus is the ‘natural’ 
versus the ‘artificial’, the ‘given’ versus those things that request a certain effort 
of the human being, the ‘circumstances’ and the ‘relationships’. Essentially the 
latter category disturbs the first category: all human effort somehow intervenes 
in natural circumstances as well its processes – even the existence of the human 
being itself is difficult to understand without also disturbing the ‘natural’ circum-
stances. To be clear, ‘natural’ circumstances does not per se mean ‘nature’, 
although this nature is an important part of the earth. The distinction between 
earth and world lies precisely in the active role of the human being. Arendt does 
follow Heidegger in this distinction: she on her term calls the earth the ‘very 
quintessence of the human condition.’ Earthly nature provides ‘human beings … a 
habitat in which they can move and breathe without effort and without artifice.’176 
The distinctness of the ‘world’ from the ‘earth’ lies precisely in this artifice. Both 
Heidegger and Arendt do emphasize that artifice is a human need. Without inter-
vention in the earth in order to create a world – creating a shelter, fabricating 
tools, equipment, instruments, aiming for a place, resources and even comfort 
– human life on earth is not possible; the human species does need artifice in 
order to survive. The earth thus has to be converted into a world that’s fit for the 
human being – it is through intervention in the natural circumstances of life that 
the world is created; intervention turns the earth into a world that is inhabitable. 
According to Arendt, it is also through the production of the human artifice that 
human life is distinct from animal life (although of course also animals do need 
to create spaces for their survival as well: they create holes, nests and shelters as 
well. Compared to animals, however, the intervention of the human being onto 
the world has way more effect and impact).177 Whoever is familiar with both the 
work of Heidegger and Arendt, this distinction between the earth and the world 
for both is not a permit to intervene in nature rucksichtlos. They both render the 
earth as a ‘given’ – indeed, a ‘gift’ – while intervention is seen as a necessity. Even 
in Arendt’s embracement of the vita activa, intervention in order to create a world 
is a necessity rather than a given. What is very important to stress once again: 
beyond the intervention in the earth there is a moment of creation and invention 
that finally turns into intervention. It is specifically in the writings of Arendt that 
this aspect gains attention, however, Heidegger also renders this moment as part 
of the specific ‘worldliness’ of the human being. 
It might be confusing, but besides the earth as a ‘given’, the world itself is a 
‘given’ too. It after all consists of the interventions made by our predecessors. 
These humanly made circumstances, these ‘new’ relationships, and this artifice is 
the pre-existing context for the life of human beings. In that sense, both earth and 
world are a ‘given’, circumstances that already exist when we enter the world, as 
well as which will be out there when we leave the world, which highly affect our 
being on earth in the world. 
The difference however is how both value and assess this (man-made) world. 
Heidegger describes the ‘world’ as a necessity, a functional entity needed for the 
human life to survive and develop. His focus in respect to the world is on the 
relationships between entities and beings, how the human being is surrounded, 
related, and affected with other beings and objects. It is this perspective that he 
seems to understand the world entirely negatively. Quite central in his writings 
is the question of the self, the authentic being of the human being. The ‘authentic 
self’ somehow is the aim, the ultimate goal in life. According to Heidegger, the self 
only can know nothing but the self. This perspective urges him to emphasise the 
importance of the vita contemplativa: withdrawn from the world, in solitude with 
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the self. The world, in this perspective, is a threat for this contemplating life: the 
world after all is depicted by the hustle and bustle of events and actualities that 
again and again darkens the sight, disturbs the search and distracts the human 
being. In other words: the hustle and bustle of the world disturbs the self to 
develop authentically. Heidegger therefore stresses the need to find a space that is 
detached from the world in order to offer room for this vita contemplativa, room 
for the self in which it can ripen to authenticity, undisturbed and undistracted. 
Only in solitude, withdrawn from the world, the self would reveal, he states. The 
very image, this contemplative life, of course, has been represented by his own hut 
in the woods, his philosophical atelier in the Black Woods in Germany, far away 
from the city that is understood as the ultimate appearance of the continuous 
tumble of human affairs, the ultimate detachment of the earth, nature, and 
authenticity. This active being detached from the world only is achievable by the 
philosopher – all other human beings need to operate within the world, amongst, 
with and against others, Heidegger admits. Essentially, Heidegger therefore 
understands the world in a quite instrumental way.178
The existence of the human being, according to Heidegger, thus is that he’s 
dropped into a world he can’t know. The human being thus is in helpless 
dependence, Verfallenheit. The world therefore is important, but only as 
necessity: consisting of relationships with other human beings or things, which 
help the helpless individual to settle and survive within this world. His 1951 
lecture on ‘building, dwelling, thinking’, that became famous within the field of 
architecture and which I will discuss in Chapter 6, seems to celebrate the rela-
tionship between the world and the human being, since it links the very root of 
the German word being and thinking to the root of dwelling.179 The human being 
is a being that dwells upon earth. This perspective does not celebrate the world: 
Heidegger even speaks in this lecture as the real problem of housing (he delivered 
this lecture at a conference on housing shortage after the war in Germany) is that 
the modern (architectural) artifice detached the human being from real dwelling, 
that is, from inhabiting in the landscape. This perspective not only does not 
value the commonness of the world, it also stresses the dwelling human being 
in a as solipsist perspective facing the earth and the heaven, the mortals and the 
immortals.180 Heidegger emphasizes this world not only as an entity the human 
is dropped in, in which he has to carve out his path in order to find his very own 
place, this world moreover is disturbing the individual carving out this path to his 
authentic self. In other words, Heidegger’s approach of the human being dropped 
in the world is rather negative: the world is a necessity, unknowable, disturbing. 
The German philosopher Rüdiger Safranski in his biography of Martin Heidegger 
emphasises the work of Arendt as a complement to the work of Heidegger. He 
writes: ‘To his “running ahead into death” she will reply with a philosophy of 
being born; to his existential solipsism of Jemeinigkeit (each-one-ness) she will 
reply with a philosophy of plurality; to his critique of Verfallenheit (helpless 
addiction) to the world of Man (One/They) she will reply with amor mundi. To 
Heidegger’s Lichtung (clearing) she will respond by philosophically enabling 
the “public.”’181 Opposed to Heidegger, Arendt emphasizes that only through 
participating in the world, does the reality of the world get revealed (which was 
the first point Arendt stresses as the importance of the public realm). The public, 
however, also is needed to reveal the self (which is her ‘philosophy plurality’, as 
Safranski calls it). Arendt, in other words, rejects the vita contemplativa as the 
instrument to get to know oneself, and on the contrary argues that the self only 
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is revealed by appearing in the world through speech and action. Human beings 
appear to each other in the world, by ‘which we reveal who we are and what we are 
capable of.’182 As Seyla Benhabib writes: ‘To be alive as a human being, as opposed 
to being a mere body, is to act and speak with others in space and time. Being 
is being present, it is to appear; it is to manifest itself.’183 In this perspective the 
very activities of the public realm, ‘action and speech’, are at stake. It is through 
action and speech that one manifests oneself. ‘In acting and speaking, men show 
who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their 
appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any 
activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This 
disclosure of the “who” in contradistinction to “what” somebody is – his qualities, 
gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide – is implicit in 
everything somebody says and does.’184 
Revelation is not only unconscious, or a gift that accompanies our being in and 
acting upon the world, it also often is a conscious step into the world, a conscious 
appearance to others. This appearance, in other words, rests on initiative, the 
initiative to appear amongst others. Nevertheless, this ‘who’ that is revealed is 
hidden for the agent himself as well. ‘The unchangeable identity of the person, 
though disclosing itself intangibility in action and speech, becomes tangible only 
in the story of the actor’s and speaker’s life.’185 This revealing of the person to the 
public thus might be a conscious action – who is revealed is under the control of 
the agent himself. ‘Nobody know whom he reveals when he discloses himself in 
deed or word, he must be willing to risk the disclosure.’186 In close relationship 
to this revealing of the ‘who’ through words and deeds, Arendt emphasizes thus 
that only in the same movement one gets to know oneself.187 For Arendt the only 
thing that counts in public space is the revealing of the plurality of mankind. As 
I discussed earlier, Arendt’s reference was the agora in the Greek Polis and the 
Roman City States, where the citizens gathered in order to act and speak. This 
reference shows that the revealing of the plurality of the public only is possible in 
a sphere of equals. Only on the basis of equality, one can participate in a way that 
the single ‘who’ is revealed.
Returning to the concern of Heidegger, Arendt thus pleas for a contradictory 
perspective: her ultimate aim is the participation of the human in the world rather 
than withdrawal. To be fully human, the human being needs to be dedicated to 
the world. To get to know oneself, one need to participate in the world. Only by 
appearing amongst peers and by participating in this disturbing world through 
action and speech, by being engaged in the hustle and bustle that accompanies 
human life on earth, the self will be revealed and established. Arendt of course 
writes here also with her experience of being deprived from the public realm: it 
is this detachment from the world that darkens the sight upon the commonality 
of the world. It is the world gathering human beings, as well as reveals their 
plurality. 
This change of perspectives upon the world is of major importance for archi-
tecture as well, as I will emphasize in the upcoming chapters. For now it is 
important that Arendt, on the shoulders of Heidegger, redirects his ideas in 
favour of the world. The world, for Arendt, not only is a necessity for human life, 
the sole human being, it also is a necessity for the life of the human community 
at large – the world and the public are two interrelated phenomena. It even is 
so, Arendt argues, that without the world, which somehow is the testifying of 
the presence of other human beings, human life is not possible.188 But whereas 
Heidegger focuses on the disturbance of the surrounding world and the presence 
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of other human beings on the individual – a disturbance of the very character of 
the human existence –, Arendt on the contrary celebrates the public. Where for 
Heidegger the plurality of the public is a condition of facticity, in which the human 
being is thrown and easily loses itself, for Arendt plurality is the condition of the 
human being, that needs to be valued. Only through the appearance in the world, 
amongst peers, the human can get to know the self, an utterly different statement 
than Heidegger’s response. As Benhabib writes, the difference between Heidegger 
and Arendt is ‘Being-unto-death is displaced by natality; the isolated Dasein is 
replaced by a condition of plurality; and instead of instrumental action, a new 
category of human activity, action, understood as speech and doing emerges. 
Everyday being-in-the-world, rather than being the condition of inauthenticity 
into which Dasein is thrown, now becomes that “space of appearance” into which 
we are inserted as acting and speaking beings and within which we reveal who we 
are and what we are capable of.’189   
For our perspective it is important that Arendt emphasizes and values the 
man-made character of the world. Besides the ‘psychological or intellectual 
realms, [which] have become permanent’ realities, Arendt underlines that an 
important part of this world surrounding us is a world of things:190 concrete, 
durable, and tangible objects and artefacts, which are produced by our predeces-
sors and by ourselves. The human being is indeed dropped into a world that was 
created before him: predecessors have created this world by continuous inter-
ventions and inventions, adding their produce to this world, as we will do as well. 
Every generation is dealing with this world, that is a given: produce products, 
intervening in situations, inventing new approaches, modifying circumstances, 
accommodating places, making the world inhabitable according to contemporary 
insights. Through this continuous involvement in the world, this world is the 
object of continuous change as well – slightly but slowly the world adapts to these 
changes, and it is changed through new adaptations. Every generation thus forms 
the context of the life of other generations by their additions and interventions. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that the production of things not only 
add to the world, it also destroys the world of the past. Better said, production 
destroys the world as well as the earth. For a wooden chair, for instance, a tree 
is cut down and sliced into boards, power is needed to produce the chair, and 
natural processes are forced down. It is important to have this in mind while 
touching upon the notion of the world: at the very heart of the notion of the world 
is a process of creation and intervention as well as destruction and demolition. 
Summarized, the world thus refers to the way the human being is making a living 
on earth, how he conditions the earth to his sojourn on it, how he carves out a 
place to live in, furnishes it, makes it more comfortable, and – because he is not 
alone in the world – forms communities. The world serves our daily lives, and 
simultaneously is the context of it. It influences our lives, and we on our turn 
intervene in the world. It comforts our lives, and, very importantly, it connects us 
with other human beings, it is in-between human beings – as a famous quote of 
Arendt reads: 
‘This world, however, is not identical with the earth or with nature, as the 
limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of organic 
life. It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of human hands, 
as well as to affairs, which go on among those who inhabit the man-made 
world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of 
things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between 
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those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates 
men at the same time.’191
For Arendt it thus is clear: it is the world that makes the human ‘community’ 
possible – the world arises between men, simultaneously connecting and 
separating – which actually also is a short but sharp description of the human 
community itself. The world thus is, so to say, the common ground for the 
community, but this common ground is not a fixed entity. Not at all! It is, as inves-
tigated above, continuously influenced by the activities of human beings. Although 
the slightly but continuously changing character of the world, due to our inter-
ventions, additions, destructions, it also is to be seen as the shared ‘experience’ 
of the human community, as well as the shared concern of this community. 
For Arendt, the act of constituting and, very important, maintaining a world 
is essentially not an act of an individual human being, but is an act of society 
itself. For Arendt the notion of the world thus always refers to a ‘common world’. 
It is not just the surrounding in which human beings are dropped in ‘helpless 
addiction’. Human beings, here and now share these given circumstances – this 
world it is. The human being has this world in common with his contemporaries 
as well as with his predecessors and the generations to come. That is why Arendt 
renders and emphasizes this commonly owned ‘world’ as essentially being an 
in-between: gathering and simultaneously separating human beings, generations, 
the past and the future. For Arendt, this thus is a positive notion: it is the world 
that places us between and binds us with our contemporaries and connects us to 
our predecessors and the generations to come. Actually this common world, the 
world of things, is the first meaning of the notion of the public in Arendt’s works. 
The world of things is the stage for action and speech: it delivers the stability, 
permanence and transcendence that is needed in respect to the inherent unpre-
dictability and frailty of action and speech. Therefore the continuity of the world 
is crucial for Arendt. Only through the permanence of the world, this world is 
understood as common world, that is the stage and the concern of politics. This 
world is the public realm itself.
‘Without this transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, 
strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm, is possible. It 
transcends our life-span into past and future alike; it was there before we came 
and will outlast our brief sojourn in it. It is what we have in common not only 
with those who live with us, but also with those who were here before and 
with those who will come after us. But such a common world can only survive 
the coming and going of the generations only to the extent that it appears in 
public. It is the publicity of the public realm which can absorb and make shine 
through the centuries whatever men may want to save from the ruin of time.’192 
A threat for the world she investigates in The Human Condition is the increasing 
abilities and opportunities to intervene on a vast and enormous scale. Although 
destruction and creation anew always has been the very essence of the world 
itself, through modern equipment and technics, scientific insights and mechanical 
power and even nuclear power, this world can be destroyed completely.193 
Of course, this rendering of the world in the end is a political issue. Without 
recognition of the importance of this common world, without understanding 
the responsibility, and without effort to establish and edifice the world, it will 
be destroyed. The continuity of the world thus is a political question, a shared 
effort, common concern of the human society. And on its turn, without world, no 
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endurable society is possible. World and society, according to Arendt, thus are 
interrelated: no society without a world, as well as no world without the human 
community.194 This world actually is in continuous change, but since it is strongly 
related with the human being and the human society, Arendt in her work stresses 
the durability and tangibility of this world as a prerequisite for the human society. 
A lasting community only develops within an endurable world – the effort the 
human being will invest, the political interference in this community, only has 
sense within an endurable context. Therefore Arendt emphasises that politics 
only will develop in respect to a shared love for the world. In the end this is a very 
crucial insight within the work of Arendt, that she has emphasized throughout 
her work, and which she practiced through her refusal of philosophy – the vita 
contemplativa – an sich. 
‘In order to think, I have to withdraw from the world.’ Arendt states in 
Toronto. ‘But the moment you begin to act, you deal with the world,’ she 
adds.195
4.4.2  Politics
The Toronto conference, which I addressed in the very first paragraphs of this 
introduction into the work of Arendt extensively, was of course just one of several 
occasions Arendt was questioned about her position vis-à-vis the actualities of 
politics. Quite a lot of these occasions – be it a discussion in real life, certain ‘brief-
wechseln’, an interview, or whatever – end up in questioning the very position of 
Arendt in the field. In his interview with Arendt, the German writer Adelbert Reif 
for instance asked her to render the possibility of an alternative besides capitalism 
or socialism. The conversations starts with a reflection on the relationship and 
responsibilities of the Western world for the ‘third world’. Arendt stubbornly 
however rejects the notion of the ‘third world’, which surprises Reif a lot. The 
rejection comes down as blaming the ‘New Left’ movement of ‘empty talk’: ‘This 
imperialist levelling out of all differences … is always the same old story: being 
taken in by every catchword, the inability to think or else the unwillingness to 
see phenomena as they really are, without applying categories to them in the 
belief that they can thereby be classified. It is just this that constitutes theoretical 
helplessness.’196 Arendt does not shut her eyes for the deplorable circumstances 
people had to live in the ‘developing’ countries, but on the contrary rejects them 
to be seen solely from the perspective of the Western World, and through the 
categories of Western philosophy and political theory. She blames this approach 
for levelling out differences, and only comparing local situations towards a 
presumed standard, which is the ‘developed world’. Such approach doesn’t help, 
Arendt states. That very moment, Reif urges the question of capitalism either 
socialism: can there be another future than these two alternatives? The answer 
of Arendt again is very characteristic: ‘I see no such alternatives in history; nor 
do I know what is in store here. Let’s not talk about such grand matters as “the 
historical development of mankind” – in all likelihood it will take a turn that 
corresponds neither to the one nor to the other, and let us hope it will come as a 
surprise to us.’197 Arendt on her term would propose another distinction: between 
countries that respect the rights of human beings and those that don’t: Sweden 
versus Franco’s Spain, the United States versus the Soviet Union.198 The concern 
is beyond the ‘economical model’: the difference is that ‘in one country people 
can say and, within limits, also do what they like and in the others they can not. 
Believe me, that makes an enormous difference to everyone,’ Arendt states.199 
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It is through such discussions of actual situations and her responses on contem-
porary approaches that some of her assumptions regarding her ideas on politics 
stay rather ambiguous. Take this idea of the ‘rights’ that Arendt put forward 
here. Arendt starts to address this idea of the human rights soon after the war. In 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, for instance, Arendt emphasizes the problem of 
post-war politics through the symbol of the ‘state-less person’. After the war this 
‘state-less’ person was a common ‘figure’ all over Europe and in the USA: refugees 
of the holocaust, survivors of the camps, persons not welcome in their country 
of origin or not able to travel back to their original country anymore. Arendt 
understood this as a general problem of contemporary nation states, of which 
even today countries in the West do house stateless persons, like refugees, asylum 
seekers, and illegal immigrants. The very problem of these state-less persons is 
that they are deprived from their rights. Moreover they even are deprived from 
‘their rights to have rights’, as a famous circumscription of Arendt goes. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) after all is based on the presuppo-
sition that the nation state defends the rights of its inhabitants. Arendt was very 
critical about this idea of the nation-state, which, according to her, not was begun 
on behalf of the people, ‘but rather on behalf of the national economic interest,’ 
in order to extend European imperialism at the turn of the century.200 For Arendt 
this situation, to be deprived from the rights to have rights, comes in its essence 
down to the worldlessness of the state-less person. There not only isn’t any agency 
that will defends his rights, he moreover is deprived from the world: no room in 
the world that he can inhabit, which thus not only is literally no place to go, but 
essentially to be deprived from the participation amongst and with others. 
According to Arendt, this ‘problem’ has to be seen as a sting in modern societies, 
a misfit in how the world is rendered through the eyes of modern Western 
principles. Arendt herself however didn’t come up with a solution, which of 
course not only is caused by its complexity, but moreover by the aim of her 
work.201 This case of the stateless however is an illustration of the important 
essence of the political realm: the freedom to appear amongst peers in order 
to participate in a commonly owned world. The stateless person shows in his 
status of being deprived from the ‘rights to have rights’, this participation in 
the world, this speaking and acting in public, only will be ‘allowed by different 
forms of government and secured by … laws.’202 Nevertheless, politics for Arendt 
never converge in these forms of government and institutions solely. She does 
understand them as ‘pre-politics’, the rules and rights that give room to the partic-
ipation in public. Politics thus for her is this participation itself, as also would 
become clear in a revised part of the second edition of The Origins of Totalitari-
anism, that was published in 1958, the same year also The Human Condition was 
finished. In this revised edition, she added a chapter on the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956 addressing the ‘council system’ that was developed during this revolution. 
Arendt celebrates in this chapter those councils as a form of bottom-up self-organ-
isation, open for participation in the actual (political) developments and moreover 
– which can be understood as a response to the problem of the stateless person 
– not bound to certain (abstract) boundaries. The future direction Arendt thus 
sketches is that of ‘more political life’ as the enhancing of everyday life. A council 
structure, according to Arendt, has to be understood as a chance for ordinary 
people to act politically: those councils were opportunities for the public at large 
to constitute an accessible ‘political space’ in which the human being was able to 
act and speak in public in close extension of the daily environment and life of the 
people and with actual relevance and influence on the wider political develop-
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ments. The importance of such platforms, of this increase in political realm within 
such critical moments and movements of revolution, is not only participation and 
influence by the public at large, but also an assurance of the continuation and 
exploration of plurality. In the words of Young-Bruehl: ‘The more you are bound 
closely to other people, the more you are unable to exclude.’203 However, as Arendt 
stated at the Toronto conference, such a council system has a certain inherent 
contradiction in regard to the continuity of the common world. Its success also 
will be its failure: 
‘You know I have this romantic sympathy with the council system, which never 
was tried out – that is something which builds itself up from the grass roots, 
so that you really can say potestas in populo, that is, that power comes from 
below and not from above – if that all is said, then we have the following: after 
all, the world in which we live has to be kept. We cannot permit it to go to 
pieces. And this means that ‘administration of things’, which Engels thought 
such a marvelous idea, and which actually is an awful idea, but which still is a 
necessity. And this can be done only in a more or less central manner. And on 
the other hand this centralization is an awful danger, because these structures 
are so vulnerable. How can you keep these up without centralization? And if 
you have it, the vulnerability is immense.’204
Arendt thus here emphasises the fragile balance of the rules and rights that are 
needed in order to create room for politics, and the political participation itself. 
Without the first, no participation in the world is possible, but the danger of these 
pre-political instruments is that they also can turn into a restriction of political 
participation. We definitely touch upon the very essence of the idea of politics 
here within the work of Arendt: freedom against tyranny.205 Tyranny, according 
to Arendt, is any form of political and economic organization that defeats the 
‘human condition of plurality’. Not Man, but men inhabit the world, she states in 
her ‘Introduction into Politics’, which at least renders two significant principles. 
Firstly of course the very essence of worldly life: to be amongst men. The Roman 
– the most political people the world has known, according to Arendt – even used 
the words ‘to live’ and ‘to be among men’ as synonyms, as also ‘to die’ and ‘to cease 
to be among men’.206 Second this of course also is a critique on the approach, aims 
and methods of most sciences, as well as philosophy and theology (and religion). 
‘All their pronouncements’, Arendt writes, ‘would be correct if there were only one 
or two men or only identical men.’207 She actually understands these approaches 
of reality as a threat: essentially, Arendt stated at the Toronto Conference, 
‘you then think about mankind – that is, about some noun which actually 
doesn’t exist, which is a concept. And this noun – be it Marx’s species-being, 
or mankind, or the world spirit, or what have you – is constantly construed in 
the image of a single man.208  
It is either or, according to Arendt. That is why she is provoking the audience and 
their eagerness to unite their theory with the practice of political action. 
‘Or we really believe – and I think we share this belief – that plurality rules the 
earth, then I think one has got to modify this notion of the unity of theory and 
practice to such an extent that it will be unrecognizable for those who tried 
their hand at it before.’209   
The reason Arendt of course emphasizes plurality again and again is of course 
her own experience of being excluded from the public realm, the participation 
in politics, public life, and surely important for her, academic life, just by being 
a Jew by birth. ‘Politics deals with the coexistence and association of different 
men,’ she writes. ‘Men organize themselves politically according to certain 
essential commonalities found within or abstracted from an absolute chaos of 
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differences.’210 It nevertheless is important and remarkable that Arendt never 
had addressed this pluralism of the human condition as the existence of different 
‘groups’ in society, as is nowadays widely admitted and accounted in Western 
democracies, differences that are distinguished through differences in birth, 
race, belief, conviction, sexual orientation. These differences on the one hand are 
celebrated as a need for innovation in respect to the economical development of 
the West, as well as on the other hand simultaneously being a threat through an 
increasing discomfort in Western societies of multiculturalism. However, Arendt 
is not so much dealing with distinctions as such. The fundamental condition 
of plurality that Arendt emphasizes does not regard groups but individuals – it 
has a different grain, which is challenging and complex. Arendt rejected ideas of 
democracy as being understood as a representative system, being the representa-
tion of distinguished groups of people at the level of the government.211 ‘We are all 
the same’, Arendt writes in The Human Condition, ‘that is, human, in such a way 
that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.’212 It 
is from this perspective of plurality that Arendt renders it important to emphasize 
politics not only not as a system of representation of the people, but also not as a 
self-evident system, as if it would be a ‘natural’ process or project of worldly life 
in order to ‘safeguard’ life: communal life rendered as a need since man is not 
self-sufficient.213 The assumption in this perspective is that something political 
is inherent in man essentially. But Arendt on the contrary regards this idea as a 
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s definition of the zōon politikon, especially caused 
by the interpretation of the term by Seneca, but spread throughout the world 
through the more influential interpretation of Thomas Aquinas of the term, who 
understood the human being as a ‘social being’ by ‘nature’. Arendt rejects this 
view. ‘Man is apolitical,’ she writes. ‘Politics arises between men, and so quite 
outside of man. There is therefore no real political substance. Politics arises in 
what lies between men and is established as relationships.’214 
Aristotle’s definition of the zōon	politikon however is very important for Arendt. 
She therefore went back to the very roots of the idea of politics in order to 
understand its essence: Greek thinking. Important in Greek thinking is indeed 
this difference between political organization and natural association.215 Political 
organization was bound to the city-state, the polis (which actually in the European 
languages is the very root for the word politics itself).216 Politics thus can be 
understood as the project of organizing the city; that is organizing the human 
community beyond family bonds and kinship relationships. Even preceding the 
establishment of those city-states there was a destruction of existing organiza-
tional units based on kinship.217 Within the polis however a sharp distinction was 
made between the public realm of the city and the private realm of the household, 
the first understood as being the realm of private life bound to families, the second 
as the scope of public life and politics. Arendt renders political life, life in the 
polis, as a ‘second life’: it only can exist besides private life. In the polis, it is only 
the owner of a home, the head of a household, that is rendered as a citizen, and 
therefor allowed to participate in the public realm, the public affairs of the city-
states. This restriction of participation in the public life of the polis concentrates 
on the distinction between the very essence of private realm and the public realm 
as being a distinction between a realm of necessity and a realm of freedom. The 
household, according to Arendt, is the sphere of the necessities of life, related to 
the maintenance of life of all members of the family. ‘The distinctive trait of the 
household sphere,’ Arendt writes, ‘was that in it men lived together because they 
were driven by their wants and needs.’218 The political realm on the other hand 
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is the realm of freedom. In order to enter this political realm that is concerned 
about communal life, all necessities should be fulfilled, in order to commit oneself 
to the community, to the polis solely, without being restricted by questions of 
survival, wants and needs. The freedom that is characteristic to the public realm 
thus is understood as a freedom from necessities of daily life as well as a freedom 
towards a dedication to the public affairs. Only the home-owners, the rulers over 
household who reigns over the members of the family as well as their slaves, 
could afford this freedom, and therefor were able to enter the public realm.219 
This freedom towards politics is opposite to a regular view on freedom in society 
nowadays as well as in the past, which moreover can be understood as a freedom 
from politics. Arendt however renders the participation in public affairs as the 
highest capacity of the human being – only by appearing amongst peers on the 
public realm does life get fully human. And on the contrary whoever stays in the 
private realm is literally deprived – deprived from public recognition, deprived 
from ‘the highest human capacity’.220 Arendt nevertheless emphasises the entering 
of the public realm as an act of courage: since this participation in public affairs 
comes down to the renunciation of the personal and private interests in order to 
strive for the interests of the city-state.221 However, the citizen – where here is 
this male home-owner – thus has ‘two orders of existence’, Arendt writes. ‘There 
is a sharp distinction in his life between what is his own (idion) and what is 
communal (koinon).’222  
According to Arendt this distinction still is of major importance: the downfall of 
politics she recognizes throughout her work, she again and again understood as 
caused by a confusion of political organization on the one hand, and what she calls 
‘social’ association on the other, organization of the human body based on kinship 
and shared interests. It thus is a confusion of what is of public and communal 
concern, and what should be understood as private interest, resulting in a 
convergence of public and private interests. The problem, according to Arendt, 
actually is that in those political systems the human community is conceived 
as a family at large. This of course is a powerful structure, Arendt admits, since 
it is able to ‘unite extreme individual differences’, as well as simultaneously 
isolating and contrasting groups of individuals.223 This however simultaneously 
is a threat as well: its outcome is the eradication of ‘any original differentia-
tion’ amongst human beings. ‘Families’, she writes, ‘are founded as shelters and 
mighty fortresses in an inhospitable, alien world, into which we want to introduce 
kinship. This desire leads to the fundamental perversion of politics, because it 
abolishes the basic quality of plurality, or rather forfeits it by introducing the 
concept of kinship.’224 The problem for Arendt is that, as it is compared to a 
family, the people are understood as sharing the same interests, needs, wishes, 
experiences, hopes, convictions, and so on, all of them related to the ‘family’ 
and its prospects. Within such an idea of ordering of the human community, 
deviations from ‘normal’ behaviour run counter to the common interest of the 
group, which therefore cannot be tolerated. In this perspective moreover, politics 
is seen as the instrument to defend these interests against the chaos of reality, as 
well as a tool to fulfil the individual needs or even wishes. The threat, of course, 
is that everything that differs, which probably will oppose the shared interests or 
threaten the fulfilment of the needs at large, should be excluded or suppressed.
Through such merging of the public and the private interest, according to Arendt, 
the political realm is rendered as a ‘gigantic, nation-wide administration of house-
keeping’ in which the sciences of economics and the practice of politics somehow 
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coincide as well.225 It is the economics that rules this gigantic household. Since 
all of our contemporary forms of democracy are based on the latter, Arendt is 
very critical about contemporary systems of governmental and political organi-
zation. Although she of course acclaims the rejection of organization of society 
through racial kinship – as is secured in basic laws and constitutions of Western 
countries –, the essence of the contemporary system is however an organization 
based on kinship of nationality and economic interests, an ordering of society 
that can be as suppressing as the totalitarian regimes Arendt had investigated 
in her first publication after the war. Surely, the communist political system of 
the Soviet-Union can be seen as an extreme outcome of such conception of the 
community, a system that in the end even was repressive towards individual 
properties: agricultural land was expropriated and the farmers disowned, and 
even the ‘elite’ of the country could be ‘made a beggar overnight – without even 
the right to employment – in case of any conflict with the ruling powers.’226 
Arendt of course, while exploring her ideas of politics, had this in mind, as well as 
her own experiences with totalitarian regimes. She nevertheless does not locate 
these threats in a past or in a system that once was there but now had showed 
its reality and is overcome, according to her it is also accompanied in modernity 
itself. Also, current democratic societies indeed are regularly understood as large 
‘households’; people are bound together by kinship of economical interests and 
national boundaries, political order in which the government is seen to serve 
and secure in the individual needs of its inhabitants: their individual security, as 
well as securing the freedom the individual inhabitants as well as their economic 
means and settlement.227 Again and again Arendt thus emphasises the threats 
of such a perspective on political order: the very room for plurality in society. 
Arendt questions this even more since in mass society the political systems has 
turned into a bureaucracy, which is not the system of one ruler, but the system 
of the ‘nobody’ and the rule of the anonymous.228 At the Toronto conference, 
Hans Morgenthau asked Arendt about her opposition against the ever growing 
importantce of central organized political systems. Morgenthau:  
‘The question has been raised about centralization, which runs directly counter 
to democracy if it is pushed far enough.’
And Arendt confirms this: 
‘I think this question is very complicated. I would say on the first level there 
is indeed all over the world a certain rebellion, almost against bigness. And I 
think this is a healthy reaction. And I myself share it. Especially because this 
bigness and centralization demands these bureaucracies. And the bureaucra-
cies are really the rule by nobody. And this nobody is not a benevolent nobody. 
We cannot hold anybody responsible for what happens, because there is no 
author of deeds and events.’229
It of course is way too far for our purpose here to investigate the contempo-
rary Western democracies, be it the process of elections and representation of 
the people in the USA, the scattered political landscapes of The Netherlands, 
Germany and Belgium, the divided situation in the UK or France, and so on, 
facing Arendt’s warning of the inherent problem of bureaucracies – contempo-
rary Western democracies are of course to some extent bureaucratic. The major 
importance of this emphasis on this warning here however is that Arendt not only 
was addressing political systems from the past and from elsewhere, but also the 
(liberal) democratic systems of the contemporary West, which till quite recent 
were rendered as the ‘outcome of history’,230 that even should be forced to the 
rest of the world. Even in democracies, which are seen as a system celebrating 
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the freedom of participation and the freedom of opinion, the very plurality of the 
inhabitants is not guaranteed. For Arendt, however, plurality is the essence of the 
human community. Through this analysis of political systems, we nevertheless 
thus can at least determine two basic important aspects of the idea of politics in 
the work of Arendt. First is pluralism as the condition of politics, and second is the 
meaning of politics: freedom. Both of course are interrelated: there is no freedom 
without room for plurality, and without freedom there is no room for plurality. 
As stated earlier above, Arendt aims in her work for ‘more political life’, which 
somehow has to be seen again as the celebration of pluralism of human mankind. 
The council system, which she investigates through the Hungarian Revolution, 
for Arendt symbolized the opportunity to ‘appear amongst peers’, amongst fellow 
citizens, and participate in the worldly affairs as a citizen itself, not through repre-
sentation of a group, but as an individual. In The Human Condition, as well as 
in lots of other writings, Arendt emphasizes that only through such ‘appearance 
amongst peers’ in ‘action and speech’ the plurality of mankind unfolds and gets 
substance.231 The freedom, therefore, for Arendt always tends towards the freedom 
of speech. ‘Freedom,’ Arendt states, ‘is freedom whether guaranteed by the laws 
of a … state. … The point is simply and singly whether I can say and print what I 
wish, or whether I cannot; whether my neighbors spy on me or don’t. Freedom 
always implies freedom of dissent. No ruler before Stalin and Hitler contested the 
freedom to say yes – Hitler excluding Jews and gypsies from the right to consent 
and Stalin having been the only dictator who chopped off the heads of his most 
enthusiastic supporters, perhaps because he figured that whoever says yes can 
also say no.’232   
For Arendt however the freedom, which is the meaning of politics, is not limited 
to the freedom of speech. Moreover, Arendt renders again and again this freedom 
as a freedom to take initiatives, which is the very essence of political action. 
Moreover, action and speech in her view are the instruments to start something 
new. This somehow is the only reason to have ‘hope’ for the future. I guess Arendt 
at this point is opposing Heidegger again. Heidegger after all is emphasising 
the finality of life. Arendt admits this finality, but suggests that this is not the 
only perspective that counts. Life also is characterized by its natality: every 
birth is the start of something new, the chance of change, of a different future. 
‘The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal 
“natural” ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is 
ontologically rooted,’ Arendt writes The Human Condition. And she adds: ‘It is 
this faith in hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and most 
succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels announced their 
“glad tidings”: “A child has born unto us.”’233 Arendt emphasizes action and speech 
in the same manner. Every action and every speech in public has the inherent 
possibility to start something new. I need to emphasise here the addition ‘in 
public’: only when actions are seen and thus requests response, and only when 
speeches are heard and understood and drive towards action and again reaction 
and again speech, and again response and recognition, opposition and approval, 
contribution and resistance, and so on, will it grow and slowly but surely will lead 
to something new. Real political action is recognized and joined, gain response, 
and thus grow in power. 
‘You can only act in concert,’234   
Arendt stated in Toronto. Action and speech in public are powerful instruments 
of the possibility to take initiatives, to develop, to criticize, to interact, to change 
the world – in other words, to act politically. Action nevertheless, Arendt warns, is 
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unpredictable and frail. Action cannot be controlled, nor directed. It is over before 
one knows, or it grows in power and recognition. This, somehow, is the reason 
in totalitarian regimes, but also in other political systems or human societies, for 
diminishing the possibilities for action in public. It is a threat for the established 
political systems and regimes, organization and differences. The political 
therefore can be seen as ‘the creation of power through action-in-concert of the 
many, united-in-diversity, through the plurality of their views.’235 
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PUBLIC SPACE. LOCAL 
ENCOUNTERS AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF ACTION
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At the very same moment Hannah Arendt develops her ideas on the public realm 
and Jürgen Habermas his ideal of the public sphere, the question of public space 
also entered the discourses on architecture and the future of the city. Although 
not aware of the parallels in the field of philosophy, a new generation of modern 
architects stressed the issue of public space as part of their critical stance towards 
previous Modernist approaches to the city. The Canadian architect George Baird 
explores the moving back-and-forth of this debate in architecture, particularly in 
the post-war period, in his 1995 book The Space of Appearance, freely comparing 
the newly developed architectural views with ideas Arendt investigated. This is 
limited not only to issues of space, but also to reflections on art, craftsmanship, 
and other architectural aspects. Baird however mainly addresses the theme of 
public space through the emphasis on plurality, history, and mobility, which 
are central aspects of public space as addressed throughout the ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ debates on architecture. Whereas his first book mainly has a 
historical outlook, his second book on public space, simply called Public Space, 
is much more philosophical. Baird in this book focuses on the specificities of the 
notion of action, and what that might mean for our understanding of architecture 
and the project of the city. He therefore contrasts this notion with the everyday 
experience of (urban) spaces in a rather distracted way, an observation that comes 
right from the writings of Arendt’s friend and literature critic Walter Benjamin. 
This second book therefore is not so much in discussion with the history of 
modern architecture, but much more with the modern recent debate on cities 
and their public spaces, facing the increasing amount of exclusive spaces in the 
contemporary (sub)urban landscapes, upon which we touched in Chapters 1 and 
2. With the help of the notions of action and distraction, Baird shows how these 
notions help to develop a certainly more optimistic and architectural look upon 
public space as outcomes from this debate. 
In this Chapter, I first take Baird’s explorations in architectural history, urban 
theory and the work of Arendt from The Space of Appearance in order to address 
the notion of public space, as it is related to the idea of plurality, encounter, and 
action. I will start with his reading of architectural history, which reveals how 
the notion of the public is a recurrent theme in modern architecture. On the 
basis of his encounters, I will develop a brief history of architecture of the public 
space, as it has been part of debate amongst architects. This history somehow 
reveals a range of aspects of public life that are addressed, sometimes explicitly, 
sometimes implicitly, within the architectural intervention and project, and 
how this has fuelled debates reflecting on architecture. This also means that the 
landscape, as we touched upon in the previous chapters, not only is discussed 
in urban theory, anthropology and urban sociology, but also urges architects to 
come up with ‘new’ models and typologies, to reflect upon their contribution to 
the city and public life, and to their effect upon issues that are not architectural 
at all. The current debate, which Baird discusses in his second book, and which I 
traced previously, however is particularly fuelled by ideals beyond public space, 
which are evoked by concrete urban and architectural artefacts. Therefore, before 
turning to Baird’s second book in the third part of this chapter, I mirror the 
Arendtian understanding of public realm with the notion of the public sphere, as 
it has been developed by Jürgen Habermas. As has become clear in the previous 
chapters, it is particularly Habermas’s view which shapes the mentioned debate. It 
is his ideal of the public sphere that offers a negative horizon to actual public life. 
By stressing the differences between his view and Arendt’s notion, it will become 
clear how the latter, and particularly her emphasis on the activity of action, offers 
an alternative that will help to overcome certain impasses in the recent debate 
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on public space. Nevertheless, also the notion of Arendt cannot be applied 1:1 
on the urban experiences of the masses in cities today, nor to architectural form 
of public space. In the third part, I therefore investigate Arendt’s notions of the 
‘space of appearance’, ‘the public realm’, and ‘public space’, in order to reveal how 
this relates to actual space and eventually also to architectural intervention. These 
remarks therefore open up the stage for Baird’s Public Space, which needs our 
attention particularly because of his attempt to relate Arendt’s notion of action 
as well as Benjamin’s notion of distraction to actual experiences of public space, 
an attempt that offers a few directions to enhance the design of urban public 
spaces. This chapter ends with an aspect of public space that largely is overlooked, 
not only in debates in the field of architecture and urban design, but also in 
philosophy: the interrelatedness of public space and private space. By taking 
Arendt as a scope to understand public life and public space, this interrelatedness 
needs more attention.
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5.1 THE PIVOTAL FIFTIES 
5.1.1 A Space set Apart for Public Functions
It does not need many words to argue that landscapes, cities, houses, public 
buildings, squares, streets and other elements of the spaces we live in somehow 
represent ideas about ‘being at home in the world’. Parking lots, for instance, 
embody the obvious importance of the car today. The same parking lot can reveal 
something completely different in two decades from now, when mobility and 
infrastructure have changed drastically. Monumental buildings on a university 
campus reveal something of a view on the university as institution, although that 
view has been surpassed today: in their new buildings universities emphasize their 
outstanding character through technology and innovation, which is expressed 
in a dynamic and transparent architecture. This sometimes hidden, sometimes 
obvious representation of ideas belonging to certain cultural convictions is 
also behind the journey through the Florida landscape and cities: their very 
appearance ‘before our eyes’ revealed something of the cultural and social 
processes in society of the past decades – or even from ages ago.1 The artefacts 
touched upon along the route revealed aspects of public life, security, history, 
and plurality. Since architects and urban designers are dealing with the world in 
their daily practices, such ideas are behind their works, debates and reflections 
– sometimes very explicit and intentional, often in very hidden ways, in inatten-
tional blindness. Nevertheless, by reviewing these works, debates and reflections, 
one can reveal hidden aspects that are present in their views, approaches, and 
designs and that are certainly roused by (new) insights, (new) ambitions, and 
(new) intentions dealing with the world that is in common. Seeing in back sight, 
we can state that the theme of public space is at the heart of Modern Architecture, 
although it is often described and discussed in completely different directions. 
In his book The Space of Appearance (1995) George Baird develops such a back 
sight reading of the development of Modern Architecture, easily flipping back and 
forth between the architectural debate on the public and aspects that Hannah 
Arendt urges as important aspects of the public realm.2 Baird, whom we touched 
upon already in the previous chapter since he attended the Toronto conference 
in 1972, throughout his career as an architect and educator has been one of the 
few introducing Arendt in architectural debate. In the mentioned book, he in very 
explorative ways connects aspects of what Arendt wrote in The Human Condition 
to particular moments and figures in recent architectural history, particularly in 
the views of Modern and Post-Modern architects. By taking his explorative views 
as a starting point, I will develop a brief overview of the theme of public space in 
the recent history of architecture. 
In The Space of Appearance Baird follows the development of architecture 
from the cultural context in Vienna during the turn of the century around 1900 
towards the end of the eighties and the early nineties of the twentieth century. 
Baird easily switches between debates amongst architects and artist and quotes 
from Arendt and other scholars from outside the field of architecture. His reading 
actually connects important developments, ideas and concepts from within archi-
tecture, with a broader cultural reflection, particularly offered by Arendt. Baird’s 
reading of the history of modern architecture offers important reflections upon 
the relationship between art and architecture, architecture as a craft, architecture 
and history, architecture and politics, and finally, in his last chapter, architecture 
and public space. As the start of our own reflection upon that latter theme, let us 
take his reading of the history of architecture and the relationship he acknowl-
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edges with the writings of Arendt as our starting point. We stand here, as it were, 
on the shoulders of Baird – we make use of his capacity to go back and forth 
between architecture and philosophy in a quite flexible way. Baird, in this final 
chapter, mainly addresses public space through an emphasis on three aspects 
that belong to public space and which have some resonance with the reflections 
of Arendt: ‘plurality’, ‘mobility’ and ‘history’.3 Particularly in the earliest stages of 
modern architecture these three aspects were somehow neglected. Or, should we 
say, a new idea of these aspects was at the heart of the plans of modern architects 
regarding cities and urban extensions. Baird rightly argues that these aspects 
were put back on the table by a younger generation of architects after World War 
II – he even calls these notions the ‘hallmarks of debate about architecture and 
urbanism in Europe and North America since the end of the World War II.’4 In 
other words, at the very same moment Arendt develops her first ideas on the 
public realm – in which she also stresses aspects of plurality, history and even 
mobility, as we will see – in architecture a debate on public space is roused. Baird 
rightly shows that the early fifties can be understood as pivotal in architectural 
debates about the city and public spaces. A new generation of architects started 
to develop their ideas about the city. Although critical to the previous modern 
approaches, they could present these ideas within the context of the Congrès 
Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne (CIAM), the organization of Modern 
architects in the West. Their ideas particularly were at the table during the 
seventh and eighth congress of the CIAM, respectively in 1949 and 1951. The first 
addresses the question of how the Modern should deal with history, the latter 
reintroducing the theme of the center in the modern assessment of urban fabrics. 
The ideas of the new generation on the one hand are to be seen as ‘corrections’ on 
the programmatic and pastoral modernity of the Modern Movement – they, much 
more than in the Modern Movement itself, have an eye for the experiences of 
transition and loss of tradition that has accompanied the transformations of cities 
and landscapes.5 Baird shows that this ‘correction’ also includes new or renewed 
ideas about public space. One of the clearest statements of such new attention 
to public space, Baird argues, can be found in the introduction to the book that 
accompanied the 8th CIAM congress, The Heart of the City.6 During this congress 
the architects discussed the theme ‘the core of the city,’ revaluing the notion of 
centrality within the urban fabric. In his introduction to the mentioned book, the 
Catalan architect Joseph Lluis Sert, who at that time chaired the CIAM, quotes the 
Spanish philosopher Ortega Y Gasset, investigating the ‘birth of the city’. Gasset, 
in this quote, argues that with this new form of settlement, the city, also a new 
space emerges. 
‘The “urbs” or the “polis” starts by being an empty space, the “forum,” the 
“agora,” and all the rest are just means of fixing that empty space, of limiting 
its outlines. The “polis” is not primarily a collection of habitable dwellings, but 
a meeting place for citizens, a space set apart for public functions.’7  
This statement is actually taken from the first paragraphs of his 1930 book The 
Revolt of the Masses, in which he in rather pessimistic tones investigates the 
emergence of the masses and what this might mean for the cultural situation 
of the modern world. It is revealing to see in what context Gasset comes to the 
fore with this reflection. He starts his book with the remark that every investi-
gation into the human community has to start with the city, whose origin – he 
emphasizes – is mysterious. 
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‘Excavation and archaeology allow us to see something of what existed on the soil 
of Athens and Rome before Athens and Rome were there. But the transition from 
that pre-history, purely rural and without specific character, to the rising-up of 
the city, a fruit of a new kind produced on the soil of both peninsulas, this remains 
a secret. We are not even clear about the ethnic link between those prehistoric 
peoples and these strange communities which introduce into the repertoire of 
humanity a great innovation: that of building a public square and around it a city, 
shut in from the fields. For in truth the most accurate definition of the urbs and 
the polis is very like the comic definition of a cannon. You take a hole, wrap some 
steel wire tightly round it, and that’s your cannon.’8 
Immediately after this quote, the phrase follows that Sert had quoted, in which 
Gasset thus emphasizes the importance of this empty core in the middle. A city 
can’t exist without these empty spaces ‘set apart for public functions’. The city, 
once again, is not about a certain collection of buildings, nor about a certain 
dimension, nor about the amount of people, but about the possibility of an empty 
space. After pushing the centrality of public space, Gasset than continues by 
emphasizing the extraordinary character of this space. 
‘The city is not built, as is the cottage or the domus, to shelter from the 
weather and to propagate the species – these are personal family concerns – 
but in order to discuss public affairs. Observe that this signifies nothing less 
than the invention of a new kind of space, much more new than the space of 
Einstein. Till then only one space existed, that of the open country, with all the 
consequences that this involves for the existence of man.’9
Gasset thus, about 25 years prior to Arendt, urges a perspective upon public 
space as part of the new order that cities brought to the world. This might not 
be remarkable today, but in the context of the development of Modern Archi-
tecture and the CIAM-debates, this is part of a pivotal moment in the reflections 
upon cities, existing structures, and urban fabrics. Sert thus quotes Gasset in 
the introduction to the CIAM meeting of 1951, in which the theme of ‘The Core’ 
was at the table. As George Baird emphasizes, this theme was urged by a debate 
between the initial group of architects that formed the CIAM movement in 1928 
and particularly Le Corbusier on the one hand, and younger architects that during 
and after World War II joined the group on the other hand. Whereas the pre-war 
principles of the CIAM approach, known as the Athenian Principles,10 emphasized 
the segregation of (urban) functions (work, living, recreation and circulation), 
after the war new challenges were ahead. The war itself, with its destructive 
forces, opened the field for the architects of the CIAM to implement their ideas in 
the existing urban fabric, even in the very heart of many cities in Europe, as well 
as urged by the growth of the population and welfare during the decades after 
the war. While the CIAM principles were applied in post-war urban plans, new 
questions were raised, which caused modifications of the straight forward modern 
principles. The new questions, nevertheless, revealed their ‘new’ interest in history 
and existing form. It first came to the fore in the 1949 meeting in Bergamo, where 
the participants discussed how to deal with history, having the historic centers of 
existing cities in mind. This theme was reassessed in a broader sense in the 8th 
CIAM meeting at Hoddesdon (England) two years later – and it is at this moment 
that Sert urges the quote of Gasset. The discussion on the core somehow acknowl-
edged that the center of the city was in need of a more distinctive approach, 
different from the clear-cut segregation of the CIAM principle on urban devel-
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opments. As Baird states: ‘By 1951, the views of the CIAM group had moderated 
to the point that they were even prepared to qualify the imperatives of the old 
functional grid, conceding that a mixture of functional activities was appropriate 
to this particular part of the urban territory.’11 However, as he continues, ‘the 
CIAM did not then come seriously to grips with the issues of the historic fabric 
of existing urban cores, or with new issues arising out of the ever-growing 
phenomenon of mobility. Less still did it manage to come to grips with the more 
elusive social conception of plurality – this, of course, being one that had played 
no role at all in the original formulations of CIAM.’12 
5.1.2 A Mute-Theme of Modern Architecture
Although Baird thus rightly argues that the early fifties thus can be seen as pivotal, 
it also has to be said that some sort of attention to public space was never absent 
in the works of the Modern Movement. As the Spanish architectural theorist 
Ignasi De Solá-Morales has stated, new ideas about public space and public life 
were at the heart of the Modern Movement, but it remained ‘mute’ as a theme in 
the modern discourse.13 In their ‘new models of urbanisation’ and their attempt 
to transform existing urban fabrics, the question of public space certainly was at 
stake. It only took the form of ‘landscape’, dedicated to leisure and/or infrastruc-
ture. Let us briefly look to some of the works of Le Corbusier to show how public 
space was present in his ideas. The presentation of the Ville Contemporaine 
(1922) might be exemplary for the understanding of public space as infrastruc-
ture.[IMAGE 5.1] The plan consists of two types of urban buildings: central one finds 
a cluster of typical skyscrapers in a park-like setting, around which a vast see of 
twelve storey urban blocks is drawn, all strictly aligned along an orthogonal grid. 
The lay-out of the buildings is important: all the apartments in the urban blocks 
have huge terraces, rendered as outside gardens. Different from traditional urban 
plans, where streets organize everything, roads here are purely infrastructural. 
The green inner courts of the block after all organize communal life, offering 
services to the inhabitant ranging from tennis-courts to schools. Although not 
rejecting the model of the (closed) urban block, this proposal nevertheless is not 
about the street that is formed by the blocks, but about the blocks as objects in an 
open landscape, about living in a green environment. In this model both the green 
and communal inner courts, as well as the apartments, which are oriented around 
the private balcony (huge two storey high loggias that are rendered as inner 
gardens) are the crucial elements. The center of the plan, however, consisting of 
twenty-four office blocks, are located in an open green structure. The very middle 
of the plan is divided by a ‘megastructure’ that, on its roof, offers a landing strip, 
and beneath gives room to a subway and rail-system. The park on the edges of this 
business-district detaches it from the living environment. The typical cross-form 
of the skyscrapers show that they are designed in order to offer the office-workers 
places near the windows, offering them ‘space and air’, as the well-known ‘drive’ 
behind the modernist approach can be summarized. 
This description of Ville Contemporaine shows the vast sea of open spaces – it 
even reveals a distinction between core and surrounding, where the core offers 
certain functions of transportation. In Le Corbusier’s schemes for urban growth 
the street and its public life is certainly not completely forgotten, although it 
seems to be completely devoted to the ‘function’ of leisure. The center of Ville 
Contemporaine is not only presented through bird’s-eye perspective drawings 
and a model, but also – and this is particularly important – by drawings that 
shows perspectives at eyelevel. The most famous of these is the one that shows the 
11.
Baird, The Space of Appearance, 310
12.
Ibid., 311
13.
Ignasi De Solà-Morales, ‘Nouveaux 
Espaces dans La Ville Moderne’, in: 
Jacques Lacan (eds.), Le Corbusier. 
Une Encyclopedie (Paris: Centre 
Georges Pompidou, 1987), 136
14.
Ernst May, ‘Stedebouw en volkshuis-
vesting’, in: Henk Engel, and Endry 
Van Velzen (eds.), Architectuur 
van de stadsrand, Frankfurt am 
Main, 1925-1930 (Delft: TU Delft, 
Faculteit der Bouwkunde, 1987), 
58 [translation from Dutch, HT; 
Original: Ernst May, ‘Städtbau und 
Wohnungsfürsorge’, in: Süddeutsche 
Monatshefte, volume 24, 1927 no.6]
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC SPACE
325
towers in the background of a terrace of a café.[IMAGE 5.2] The drawing actually shows 
a sidewalk, a road and a park. No human beings are present in either the park, 
the sidewalk, or the terrace, while no cars are drawn on the road, although they 
may be represented by little dots far away (but it is not clear if these are meant as 
cars or pedestrians). However, since the tables are set with teapots and cups, the 
suggestion at least is evoked that it is used after all. This city is not just the private 
domain of the apartment and its inner garden, nor that of little communities and 
their inner-courts, there still is the public life of the café and its terrace on the 
side walk, which offer potentialities of encounter. The drawing also shows that an 
in-between level between the individual and the superstructures is missing: the 
table, teapots and cups rightly in the shoulder of a highway. 
The figure of the ‘open landscape’ as public space seems to be the most important 
figure, not only in the works of Le Corbusier, but also in that of his contempo-
raries. In the plans for the extensions of Frankfurt am Main by Ernst May and 
Leberecht Migge the landscape gains an even more pronounced position. Where 
in the work of Le Corbusier landscape seems to figure as the plain background of 
building blocks, in the plans of May and Migge the landscape has a vital function 
as back bone of the new city extensions. Particularly their plan for the Nidda 
Valley, that separates the new extensions from the existing city, does reveal this 
important function. In his 1927 article ‘Städtbau und Wohnungsfürsorge’ May 
explains his view by urging the explosive growth of both the population of the 
city, as well as the traffic involved. The city’s responsibility is not offering nice 
monumental streetscapes and squares, but is to offer the citizen healthy envi-
ronments. ‘Within these circumstances’, he writes, ‘it is the task of the urban 
designer to offer the citizen, wherever they settle together, living conditions that 
guarantees bearable and healthy life.’14 The destruction of the unhealthy situation 
of the industrial city has his primary attention. By taking the garden-city plans 
of Ebanezer Howard and Raymon Unwin as prime examples, May proposes the 
introduction of ‘green zones’ in-between the different urban extensions and the 
old city. This idea he had developed already in a competition for Berlin, where he 
developed a ring of satellite cities around a core city that housed most services like 
schools and shops. The open land, he then writes, ‘is about strollers-distance, easy 
accessible from every dwelling.’15 In other words, the green structure is not just 
opening up the city, and delivering air and light to the new urban extensions – 
siedlungen, as they were called in Germany –, it is also meant to be ‘public space’. 
It is near the houses, and offers additional communal services to the inhabitants: 
playgrounds, swimming pools, and collective vegetable gardens. In the Berlin 
example the green structure also needed to give room for an intensive agricultural 
infrastructure that would feed the increasing urban population. That latter aspect 
plays also part in the Frankfurt am Main proposal, which meaningfully articulates 
the existing landscape of the Nidda Valley. The multiple use of the landscape 
is important. Whereas in the modern designs of the post war neighbourhood 
designs landscape is drawn only as leisure, in the proposals of May and Migge, the 
landscape offers much more meaning to the inhabitants as a ‘working-landscape’ 
of collective and productive gardens, which even sometimes had the character 
of anarchistic communities (originating in a history as squatted land).16 Besides 
that, the gently rising slopes of the valley offered the opportunity to position 
the surrounding neighborhoods on terraces, which offers the inhabitants a 
view over the green belt.17 [IMAGE 5.3] Lots of the houses that are at the edge of the 
Nidda Valley had been given roof terraces, which offered the inhabitants, as May 
writes, an ‘Ausblick auf die freie Landschaft der Flußniederung in vollen Zügen 
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zu genießen.’18 What is important to stress here as well, is that this model of 
green zones in-between the urban extensions clearly not only separates the built 
areas, providing them with healthy air, views, and space, but also connects them: 
it is meant to be used by the inhabitants of the different neighborhoods. The 
landscape, which thus is not simply green and open, but ‘programmed’, gathers 
them.
Whereas May in Frankfurt develops his low-rise urban extensions, in which 
the (private) garden was essential,19 Le Corbusier continues to emphasise his 
initial idea of high rises in the park-like landscape. However, also his ideas were 
developing, increasingly adopting experiences of collective and communal life. 
This particularly can be touched upon in the project Ville Radieuse (1934). This 
enormous urban setting again emphasizes the continuous landscape, which by 
then had become known as one of the five points advocated by Le Corbusier as 
the characteristics of a ‘new architecture’. The continuity of the landscape would 
be guaranteed by lifting buildings from the ground, by the use of pilotis, columns. 
This idea suggests that durable structures should intervene in the landscape as 
little as possible in order to offer this landscape for leisurely use (and I formulate 
it as wide as possible here). When it comes down to the soil, there would be only 
‘public space’, since no part of this continuous landscape needed to be claimed as 
private property anymore. In the drawings of Le Corbusier of the Ville Radieuse 
this landscape indeed is imagined as heavily used by the people. Trees and plants 
hide the buildings, while the park floats underneath. People settle down for a 
picnic, or stroll along the paths.[IMAGE 5.4] One of the sections Le Corbusier drew to 
present the project, however, reveals that he made an important differentiation: 
the landscape itself indeed is ‘public’ ground, accessible to all, but elsewhere also 
collective spaces are defined. In the buildings, ‘collective’ courtyards, ‘collective’ 
roof terraces and even new (interior) streets run up, this all accompanied by an 
emphasis on the ‘private’ green balcony which again is part of the apartment 
lay-out. This suggests at least that Le Corbusier urged the need for a gradation or 
even a hierarchy of more or less public spaces, and that the very continuous and 
scale-less public space of the landscape needs to be accompanied by other more 
limited spaces. 
This section obviously is the very basic idea that in the end is developed into 
the well-known series of Unité d’Habitation, the apartment complex as built in 
Marseille (1952) [IMAGE 5.5, 5.6], Nantes-Rezé (1955), Berlin (1957), Briey (1963) and 
Firminy (1965). With these project we are of course back to the fifties. These 
buildings actually show how Le Corbusier’s previous thoughts already were rein-
vestigating his ideas about public and communal space, and how he was able 
to connect these to the ideas of the younger generation of architects joining the 
CIAM. In the concept of the Unité, additionally to the prevailing landscape-like 
ground level, Le Corbusier again introduced three other spaces that particularly 
were intended to be shared by the inhabitants of the building. Le Corbusier’s 
own reflection on the Marseille project of the Unité d’Habitation, which actually 
is a short explaining note in his Oeuvre Complet, is revealing. The surrounding 
landscape, above which the building ‘floats’ on pilotis, is left ‘unencumbered, and 
given over to the pedestrian’, while the building itself is served by five ‘internal 
streets’, so-called rues intérieures, and ‘halfway up (levels 7 and 8) is the shopping 
street for provisions (communal services).’ Finally he describes the offerings of 
the roof terrace with an emphasize on (communal) active life: ‘a hanging garden 
and a belvedere’, which ‘provides a gymnasium, an open-air space for training 
and gymnastics, a solarium, a 300 metre running tract, a buffet-bar, etc.’20 The 
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building thus offers thus a distinction in ‘collectiveness’: the landscape as totally 
public space, not simply as a nice green environment, but actually ‘given over’ 
to the pedestrian. Within the building three different types of collective spaces 
are offered: the roof terrace, that is a collective space for active, bodily life, the 
internal streets that were not only meant for circulation but also as a ‘social 
condenser’, and the shopping street ‘in the air’. Baird, who briefly touches upon 
Le Corbusier’s concept of the Unité d’Habitation, rightly points to the signifi-
cance of the rue intérieure in these plans, which particularly is the return of the 
term ‘street’ within the ideas of Le Corbusier. Le Corbusier after all had declared 
the ‘death of the street’ in his book The Radiant City, a remark that has become 
‘a basic tenet of CIAM orthodoxy,’ Baird argues.21 It thus is remarkable that Le 
Corbusier himself re-introduces the term, and re-appropriates the idea of the 
street as social condenser. The street is not just a transportation zone, but is also 
a place of encounter, which is clearly emphasized by the benches along the façade 
in the shopping street, which are articulated by a series of light armatures in the 
internal streets.[IMAGE 5.5]
One rightly can question whether indeed the roads, the parks, the terraces, the 
collective rooftops in these plans are about public life as we would understand 
it today. Today public life is associated with street life, which is far more 
complicated than the public life dedicated to leisure as comes to the fore in the 
images that are discussed above. Public life was conceptualized along the lines 
of health, space, sight, airiness, and movement, avoiding notions of plurality, 
differences, tension, and conflict. As Baird argues, like Jane Jacobs as we touched 
upon previously in Chapter 2, beyond the movement of modern architecture is the 
influence of the ‘organicist conceptions of community, which ‘have attempted to 
maximize the social homogeneity of community, either by excluding or escaping 
from those who do not conform, or by deliberately instituting programs of homog-
enization.’22 Although these organicists heavily opposed the anonymity of modern 
architecture (specifically because of the enormous scale of the new urban devel-
opments), beyond the modern approach the same aversion to heterogeneity and 
ambiguity can be found. 
However, despite the initial images of a heavily used landscaped urban park 
as the immediate surroundings of the new (sub)urban extensions as the twentieth 
century unfolded, the specific aspects of proximity and heterogeneity turned 
increasingly into despair, delivering extended fields of homogeneous habitation 
and use and thereby decreasing the possibility of encounters almost to zero. One 
might argue that the figure of the landscape specifically lacks the clear-cut edges 
that are emphasized by Gasset in the quote above. The modern movement (re-)
introduced the figure of the landscape, which only was possible by the increasing 
independence of the modern human being from the land itself. As Gasset notes, 
in ancient times the city was needed to distinguish the human being from what 
he calls the ‘community with the plants and animals’, and what Arendt would 
surely call human life captured by labor and everyday necessities. Gasset clearly 
emphasises the importance of the city as the opportunity to withdraw from the 
fields, nature and the cosmos.23 
‘Where will he go, since the earth is one huge, unbounded field? Quite simple; 
he will mark of a portion of this field by means of walls, which set up an 
enclosed, finite space over against amorphous, limitless space. Here you have 
the public square. It is not, like the house, an “interior” shot in from above, as 
are the caves which exist in the fields, it is purely and simply the negation of 
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the fields. The square, thanks to the walls which enclose it, is a portion of the 
countryside which turns its back on the rest, eliminates the rest and sets up in 
opposition to it. This lesser, rebellious field, which secedes from the limitless 
one, and keeps to itself, is a space sui generis, of the most novel kind, in which 
man frees himself from the community of the plant and the animal, leaves 
them outside, and creates an enclosure apart which is purely human, a civil 
space. Hence Socrates, the great townsman, quintessence of the spirit of the 
polis, can say: “I have nothing to do with the trees of the field, I have to do only 
with the man of the city”.’24  
Regarding this origin of the polis, one might argue that the modern approach 
to the city was somehow strongly based in a ‘programmatic’ understanding 
of modernity.25 The increase in power and force of modern instruments, the 
refinement of social behaviour, the increase in spare time (freedom from labor) 
offered the opportunity for the city to open its public space to the landscape. The 
urban dweller, we might argue, is brought back into the field, although not so 
much in a modus of survival, as in a sense of enjoyment – even enjoyment of the 
little vegetable gardens. Landscape as landscape, that is landscape as enjoyable 
and peaceful image, as space of leisure and accommodation, as space of ‘other 
practices’, has become increasingly important for uprooted human beings.26 
In this movement, however, as we would argue today, public space as political 
space, which was the main aim of Gasset’s narrative on the birth of the city, has 
been lost. It has become an image of ‘communal life’, united by different forms 
of leisure – even in these parts programmed as vegetable gardens. Although this 
idea of leisure (and the need for leisure) is rooted in the modern experience of 
freedom, it is the opposite freedom Arendt understands as the heart of public 
space. Leisure is to be free from labor, to be set free, withdrawn from anything. 
Arendt’s understanding of freedom is indeed also ‘to be freed from labor’, but this 
freedom is not filled with entertainment, nor does it lead to withdrawal, but leads 
to engagement with the world. It is: to be freed in order to participate (in public 
and political life).27 
5.1.3 Team 10 and the Revision of Public Space
Although I called public space a ‘mute theme’ in the early modern approach to 
architecture and the city, it nevertheless is a very central issue. It was as we have 
seen implicitly intertwined in the social aims of Modern Architecture, hidden in 
its belief of social-political efficacy.28 With the vanishing of this belief amongst 
the younger generations of modern architects – or at least the increasing critical 
attitude towards the rather technical approach to social issues in the modern 
project – the question of public space became explicit in the discourse on architec-
ture and the city. It is, indeed, a central issue in the discussions at the 1951 CIAM 
meeting discussing the Core. Baird thus argues that the renewed attention to the 
historic center and the idea of the existence of a core within the urban fabric is 
the sign of a slowly folding understandiddng of the importance of public space. It 
is only four years later, when a new generation of participants raised their voices 
more clearly and stubbornly, that the principles of the initial 1933 Athens Charter 
were questioned and adapted.29 The younger group of architects, later known 
as the Team 10 group,30 questioned specifically the diagrammatic character of 
these principles: the reality is so much more complex and mysterious than the 
principle of the separation of functions as an approach to all questions of city-
building suggests. Opposed to the smoothness that was the aim of the modernist 
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approach to the city by focusing on separation of functions, they emphasized the 
inherent contradictions and controversies that are part of reality, specifically 
within the urban fabric, even within those mono-functional areas, as they are 
raised by everyday life. From several other sources, we can understand how public 
space actually was understood in the decades after the war. Tom Avermaete, for 
instance, argues, reflecting upon the contribution of George Candilis, Alexis Josic 
and Shadrach Woods, the French members of Team 10, that, in their own terms, 
one can already touch upon a changing orientation. ‘Terms such as architecture 
urbaine, architecturbanism and environment were much used designations in 
Team 10 discussions … They indicated that architecture was not conceived as a 
matter of single building projects, but rather that each architectural project should 
be concerned with delivering a contribution to the collective urban realm.’31 
According to George Baird ‘these tentative observations are … the early indicators 
of a new appropriation of the possible impact of such phenomena on the design 
of the contemporary city.’32 The 8th CIAM meeting, addressing ‘the Core’, was 
actually not yet prepared by the younger generation. Moreover, according to my 
Delft colleague, the Italian researcher Leonardo Zuccaro Marchi who wrote his 
dissertation on this theme, the younger generation even almost all abhorred this 
meeting.33 The 8th CIAM conference was actually organized by the English partic-
ipants in CIAM, who were known as the MARS group. They presented the theme 
as an additional 5th element to the Athens Charter, the ‘element which makes the 
community a community and not merely an aggregate of individuals. … This is 
the physical heart of the community, the nucleus, THE CORE.’34 In other words: 
the theme acknowledges the importance of a certain centrality as well as the 
importance of ‘public life’, which somehow is rendered in this core. This does not 
mean a single centrality on the level of the city – it actually urges centrality and 
public life also on the level of the district and the neighborhoods, in clusters of 
apartment buildings, and so on. Although Zuccaro Marchi doesn’t spend many 
words on the background of the theme, he points to several movements in the 
then contemporary discourse on the city that somehow delivered the arguments 
to change the focus towards the central core. The general idea is, as Zuccaro 
Marchi makes clear, that this 8th conference addressed mainly the question of how 
historic centers, that suffered from bombings during World War II, should be 
addressed. Zuccaro Marchi however rejects this view, not only since brand-new 
cores were also presented during the conference (amongst which the well-known 
plan of Le Corbusier for Chandigarh), but also because already before the war 
city-cores had been emphasized in several reflections upon the city and had been 
put forward into the debate, some of them clearly meant as critical responses 
towards the Athens Charter approach to the city. One of the main sources of 
this different approach to the city seems to be the writings Scottish biologist/
urbanist Patrick Geddes, who understood cities as organisms – of course with 
a reference to his knowledge of the biological sciences. The core, or better said, 
the heart, in his perspective is a prerequisite for a vital urban configuration. 
Although he offers this perspective already in 1915, and thus as a reflection upon 
the industrial city, when Jacqueline Thyrwirtt, the MARS-member who took 
part in the organization of the 8th CIAM congress, (re)edits his book Cities in 
Evolution in 1949, just a few years before this conference, this argument is clearly 
readdressed against the background of the modern approach to the city. The 
lack of a core with its ‘supreme organs of the city’s life – its acropolis and forum, 
its cloister and cathedral,’ according to Geddes, means that ‘our cities reek with 
evils.’35 Another critical response, Zuccary Marchi states, came from the American 
historian Lewis Mumford a decade before CIAM 8. In a letter to Joseph Lluis Sert, 
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who later became the chairman of the conference on ‘the core’, he wrote that ‘the 
four functions of the city do not seem to … adequately cover the ground of city 
planning.’ What is lacking, he continues, are ‘the organs of political and cultural 
association [which] are … the distinguishing marks of the city: without them, 
there is only an urban mass.’36 
During the conference meeting ‘the core’ is adopted as a self-evident need 
within the urban fabric, although simultaneously a proper definition of the theme 
fails to appear. The several participants, however, present and express quite 
different and sometimes opposing features of the core. The core itself therefore 
remained rather vaguely defined, as the urban theorist and historian Eric 
Mumford argues.37 Nevertheless, the meeting was a reference point of ‘new forms 
of public space, including shopping malls, renewed downtowns, and theme parks’, 
he states, as well as the first expression of the ‘major preoccupations with archi-
tect-designed public gathering places in the work of Victor Gruen, Kevin Lynch, 
and many others in the following decades.’38 One might conclude that due to the 
focus on ‘the core’, the heart of the city, the human being and its social life was 
re-introduced in the perspective of the architect. What somehow was lacking in 
the Athenian Principles was this understanding of public space as a space where 
people meet. This perspective of public space, that had to be reclaimed from other 
(infrastructural and leisure) functions, was underlined in a couple of points that 
were included by the architectural historian Siegfried Giedion, who was one of 
the participants in CIAM from the beginning, in his concluding ‘Summary of the 
needs at the core’, which was included in the conference readings. The third point 
he proposes reads that ‘the Core should be a place secure from traffic – where the 
pedestrian can move freely’.39 Giedion himself a couple of years later affirms this 
perspective upon the core strongly in his book Architecture You and Me. ‘Even the 
most beautiful housing project’, he writes, ‘remains but a segment when it stands 
in isolation, when it has no “heart,” no place that serves as a bridge between 
private life and community life, no place where human contacts between man and 
man can again be built up. The destruction of human contacts and the present 
lack of structure of the metropolis are mutually urgent problems.’40 He makes this 
perspective very explicit towards this importance of spaces for the ‘pedestrian’: 
‘The right of the pedestrian in the center of community life – in the core,’ he 
writes, ‘was carefully respected, and indeed self-evident, in all former civiliza-
tions. Today this right of the pedestrian – this human right – has been overridden 
by the automobile, and so the gathering places of the people – the places where 
people can meet together without hindrance – have been destroyed. Today one of 
our hardest tasks is the reestablishment of this human right, which is not merely 
imperiled but has been destroyed altogether.’41 According to Giedion amongst the 
participants in the CIAM meeting on the Core a special interest could be sensed 
in the sociologist’s reflection upon the ‘spontaneous activities of people of all 
ages,’ as well as – and this might be a surprise, given the explicit rejections of 
tradition within the modern approach – in the question of history: ‘We are vitally 
concerned to know how those who came before us handled certain like problems. 
For instance, how did they develop social intercourse and community life?’42 
Although not explicitly emphasized in this perspective, this somehow reveals 
that the participants in the 8th CIAM conference had a sense of the political 
importance of public space – which had already been mentioned by both Geddes 
and Mumford as respectively the emphasis on the acropolis and forum as the 
‘supreme organs of city life’, and the ‘organs of political and cultural association.’
As George Baird argues, the younger generation that took part in the CIAM 
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meetings from the early 1950s onwards had a particular interest in these themes 
of ‘history’ and ‘the core’ and their reliance on ‘reality’. This group of youngsters, 
like Alison and Peter Smithson from England, Giancarlo de Carlo and Nathan 
Ernesto Rogers from Italy, Georges Candilis, Alexis Josic and Shadrach Woods 
from France (although two of the three partners of this office were not born in 
France), and Aldo van Eyck and Jaap Bakema from The Netherlands, did gather 
together as a group after the 9th meeting in order to prepare the following 
conference, which would be held in Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia), 1956.43 They 
therefore became known as Team 10. Although the emergence of Team 10 is often 
presented as a clash of generations, their ‘new’ views certainly reveal signs of a 
continuous thinking process, rather than specific and radical distinction from 
the ‘elderly’. There is, one can surely argue, a vice-versa influence between the 
generations, where the young ones stood on top of the shoulders of the elderly, 
while immediately also influencing the elder generation of architects.44 In order 
to organize the 10th CIAM meeting, the Team 10 members previously held a 
series of preliminary meetings in which they developed the theme for this CIAM 
conference.45 According to Tom Avermaete, the group argued that new analytical 
and conceptual tools needed to and could be formulated. The shift in their 
attention was slightly influenced by developments in the social sciences, where 
such concepts as identity, association and neighbourliness gained attention.46 
Their ‘new’ perspectives were actually supported by Le Corbusier. The CIAM had 
to renew itself, he argued. This renewal could only be expected from a younger 
generation, he added. It is the younger ones who should be regarded to be the 
‘only ones capable of feeling actual problems personally, profoundly, the goals 
to follow, the means to reach them, the pathetic urgency of the present situation. 
They are in the know.’47     
As stated above, this newer generation of architects developed perspectives 
that somehow embrace the urban ‘reality’ of contradictions.48 Baird quotes a 
telling statement, as brought to the fore by Peter and Allison Smithson in 1956, 
which on the one hand places them within the modern approach to architecture – 
‘we are still functionalists and we still accept the responsibility for the community 
as a whole’ – but immediately distinguishes themselves from their forerunners 
– ‘but today the word functional does not merely mean mechanical as it did thirty 
years ago. Our functionalism means accepting the realities of the situation, with 
all their contradictions and confusions and trying to do something with them.’49 
An exemplary example of this simultaneously walking the path of their prede-
cessors as well as distancing themselves is the reintroduction of the urban figure 
of ‘the street’. ‘Not the street of historic European form, to be sure,’ Baird writes. 
‘Revisionists as they were, the members of Team 10 still held fast to the critique 
of the historic form of the street that had so forcefully been made by Le Corbusier, 
some two decades before.’50 It actually is Le Corbusier himself who re-accesses 
his 1933 thesis of the ‘death of the street’ by, as we have already discussed above, 
introducing the rue interieure in his Unite d’Habitation in Marseille. 
The growing interest in the figure of the street surely can be understood 
as part of the rediscovery by the members of Team 10 of the human scale as 
‘primordial elements in the continuity of human institutions’, as George Candillis 
reflects upon the 10th CIAM congress in Dubrovnik.51 As Avermaete argues, the 
idea to find an alternative for the traditional street, not by rejecting it completely, 
but by reassessing it, has been central to lots of attempts among the Team 10 
participants.52 The English participants in Team 10, Allison and Peter Smithson, 
offered an alternative with their ‘streets in the air’ or ‘street decks’,53 which are a 
very prominent part of their Golden Lane competition project, as well as later in 
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their actually built project Robin Hood Gardens.[IMAGE 5.7] In their turn, the French 
members Candillis, Josic and Woods introduced their concepts of the ‘stem’ and 
the ‘web’. According to Avermaete, Candillis, Josic and Woods tried to address 
two perspectives on the street in their approach: a physical and a phenomenolog-
ical approach. The physical emphasizes the street as a road that is to be seen as ‘an 
element that defines a framework for architectural development’, which regulates 
the ‘development of the settlement and the landscape.’54 This phenomenological 
aspect resonates with the perspectives of Kevin Lynch and Gordon Cullen, who 
emphasized the human experiences of roads, streets, streetscapes and cityscapes. 
Again the street here is understood as a method of structuring the landscape: it is 
the road and the practice of moving along the road that structures the experience 
of the perceiver. However, according to Avermaete, Candillis, Josic and Woods 
merge both perspectives upon the structural role of the road in their concept of 
the stem. The concept reaches beyond the moving eye and its experience of the 
physical form of the street towards the daily practices of the users as their starting 
point for design. The main function, however, is to be the thread that holds the 
basic characteristics of the urban fabric together,’55 relating the spatial practices 
and physical elements. According to Candillis the role of the street, which ‘is 
formed by its composing parts: dwelling complexes, shops, markets, performance 
spaces, places of worship, social service offices, garden and parks, … is to link 
the dwellings to the various activities of the city.’56 The office of Candillis, Josic 
and Woods emphasized their interest in the street and their concept of the stem 
within a broader interest in the urban fabric, also by addressing the open spaces 
and the grid or the frame as aspects of this urban fabric. This threefold approach 
actually led them to a new concept for the urban fabric, which they called the 
web. The city, they argued, is not about the geometry of form, but the physical 
form that allows the specific daily practices of the users. The web-concept that 
they developed therefore should be a system that should permit development of 
an area, ‘organizing it by a network of circulation and support systems that would 
unify diverse activities.’57 This idea of the network somehow tries to overcome 
the limited, static and discriminating aspects of the stem, which of course by 
definition is linear, a connection between two points. The web, by reaching back to 
the image of the grid, somehow tried to offer unification and flexibility within the 
vast growth of the city fabric.58 Despite their emphasis on everyday practices, and 
despite the very interesting architectural investigation in projects like their urban 
scheme for Toulouse Le Mirail, in which they used their concept of the stem,[IMAGE 
5.8] as well as their proposal for Frankfurt am Main, based upon their concept of 
the web, one might argue that their projects indeed still show the modern belief 
in architecture as a social project, a belief in the power of architecture to structure 
society. 
Whereas both the English and the French participants in Team 10 investigated 
these ‘mega structures’, ultra-large projects, the Dutch participant Aldo van 
Eyck introduced a completely different emphasis on the heterogeneity of the 
daily urban fabric. Whereas, one might argue, the French office has their starting 
point in the structure of the project, it is remarkable that Van Ecyk’s projects 
seem to start from the (small) single cell, and somehow construct the whole 
as an ensemble of these single cells, sometimes articulating the structure as a 
whole, sometimes the single cells. The source of his proposal nevertheless is 
not so distinctive, compared to Candillis, Josic and Woods. Whereas the work 
of the French office was influenced by their projects in the cities of the French 
colonies, where they were confronted in their actual works with the (urban) 
48.
According to Avermaete this shift 
towards ‘reality’ already is tangible 
in introduction of the Grid as a form 
of analysis and presentation during 
the 1947 meeting – as a result of 
an understanding of architecture 
as a discipline that is embedded in 
a wider cultural and social reality: 
‘The development of CIAM between 
1928 and 1947 can be understood as 
the installation of an epistemolog-
ical transition from absolute values 
towards the analysis of empirical 
facts. … Within CIAM, architecture 
was not regarded as an autonomous 
discipline based on ideal principles, 
but rather as a matter of building 
that touches upon the different 
realms of human existence. From 
its inception, CIAM elaborated a 
definition of architecture as a heter-
onomous matter; anchored in a 
broader matrix of social, economical 
and geographical parameters. The 
introductions of questionnaires 
concerning the economic, social and 
cultural specifics of architectural 
projects at the occasion of CIAM II 
(Frankfurt, 1929) can be considered 
as a first attempt to broaden de 
definition of architecture. However, 
it is only with the presentation of the 
1947 CIAM Grid that a heteronomous 
approach to architecture is completely 
embedded within CIAN methodolog-
ically. The twelve columns of the Grid 
exemplify the broadened approach 
to architecture in categories such as: 
“the environment” (natural condition, 
geographic and demographic 
parameters); “occupation of the 
terrain” (two dimensional zoning 
and drawing); “facilities”; “ethics and 
aesthetics” (with possibly a study 
on the link between the Ancient 
and the Modern), “economic and 
social impact”; and “legislation”. The 
categories of the CIAM Grid reveal an 
approach to architecture as a matter 
that is ingrained in the analysis of 
concrete facts with a geographical, 
ethical, social and legal character. The 
form and concept of the Grid suggest 
that only through careful reading 
and consideration of these various 
aspects of the “real” can a work of 
architecture be analyzed, conceived 
and understood.’ Avermaete, Another 
Modern, 63
49.  
Quote via Baird, The Space of 
Appearance, 313
50.
Ibid., 317
51.
Avermaete, Another Modern, 219
52. 
Ibid., 235
53. 
Architectural historian Alan Powers 
offers this following reading in his 
reflection upon the Robin Hood 
Gardens project: ‘While Robin Hood 
Gardens was the first and only public 
housing built by Alison and Peter 
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC SPACE
333
practices of non-Western societies, Van Eyck was inspired by the ‘primitive’ 
cultures of constructing and building. He presents his Burgerweeshuis design 
at the 11th meeting of CIAM in Otterlo, The Netherlands, in 1959. His design 
was accompanied with an analysis to the Kasbah structures in Northern African 
societies.59 Seemingly challenged by Candillis, Josic and Woods and their colonial 
experiences, Van Eyck also introduces his experience with the Dogon culture as 
a source of inspiration, first in the magazine Forum, of which he was one of the 
editors.60 The introduction of these references can be read as a strong comment 
on the more or less deterministic approach to reality that somehow is at the heart 
of modernist thinking. This is one of the important details beyond the Team 
10 movement, which broadens the scope of their inspiration from the Western 
world to the non-Western continents, particularly to Africa. Van Eyck in Otterlo 
pleads for another approach to thinking, which is much more based upon a 
non-Euclidian form,61 and which strongly introduces through his famous ‘Otterlo 
circles’ an image made up of two circles.[IMAGE 5.9] The left circle – I introduce you 
here to the updated version, not the one he presented at the conference, the idea 
beyond is however still the same – bears the title ‘by us’, the right ‘for us’.62 In 
the middle of the left one, two plan-drawings and an axonometric drawing are 
visible, the right shows a circle of people. The plans and axonometric drawing 
seem to offer different architectural positions and approaches, as understood 
through the few words that are added to the plans: next to the plan of the Temple 
of Nike in the Acropolis of Athens – a clearly defined object, harmonious in its 
basic form – he added ‘Immutablilty and Rest’; besides the group of houses 
from the village of Alouef in the Sahara in Algeria – a truly organically grown 
ground plan – he added ‘Vernacular of the Heart’; and finally the axonometric 
drawing, one of Van Doesburg’s ‘contra-constructions form the 1923 Maison 
Particuliere’ – a drawings that reveals the continuity of space – to which he adds 
‘Change and Movements’. These are the physical realities that somehow cover 
the architectural field – they represent the different approaches to the field of 
architecture. According to Van Ecyk, these approaches cannot be separated. They 
are complementary, they belong together. However, the tension is with the other 
circle, of course, which seems to be a different realm – or is it a different reality? 
A reality of the people that are the object of these architectural figures – that have 
to inhabit the spaces offered. ‘For each man and all men’, Van Eyck has written 
in this particular circle. The one circle thus represents the spatial realm, the 
right one the social realm. A third layer added is another series of sentences that 
somehow are written below and encircle the circles and through which tension 
between the two realms is emphasized. ‘Gettting closer to the center, the shifting 
center – and build’, Van Eyck wrote down under the right circle. Close to the left 
one he questions: ‘When is architecture going to bring together opposite qualities 
and solutions?’ Two sentences bridge the two poles: ‘to discover anew implies 
discovering something new’, and: ‘We can discover ourselves everywhere – in 
all places and ages – doing the same things in a different way, feeling the same 
differently, reacting differently to the same.’ The circles through their images and 
depictions question the distinction of the realm of architecture towards the reality 
of the people. The last sentence somehow reveals Van Ecyk’s emphasis: there is 
not really a difference between the people in the 20th century compared to those of 
the ages before. It is of course within this frame that we can read the introduction 
of photos of the Dogon culture in the Forum magazine: they reveal ‘a culture of 
living that still existed as the embodiment of an original harmony of contrasts’.63 
The people are the objective of architecture – and moreover, the architect should 
not distinguish himself from these people: they’re part of the people too. It is ‘by 
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us’, not ‘for them’, but ‘for us’. It is nevertheless quite revealing too that Van Eyck 
doesn’t merge the drawings into a single one: there are polarities between archi-
tecture and the people that are separate in themselves. Architecture is somehow 
always about these dualities, about balancing between dual-phenomena – as is the 
human existence.64 
Van Eyck’s emphasis on the dual-phenomenon of both architecture and 
the human existence was particularly influenced by the writings of the Jewish 
philosopher Martin Buber, who strongly emphasized the ‘in-between’ as an 
embodied sphere – das Gestalt gewordene Zwischen.65 As the Otterlo circles also 
show, the architectural project cannot be limited to the object itself. It merely 
should be defined in terms of its relationships. It always addresses the spatial 
and the social, the part and the whole, the physical and the – as one might state 
– mythical.66 This moreover also counts for the physical urban form, as Van Eyck 
argues. Its identity is not included in terms of its functions (as might be the case 
in a functionalist approach), but ‘only can be approached in terms of relations.’67 
In his writings Buber develops the dialogue as the main figure through which the 
human community can be approached. This dialogue can only be based upon the 
acceptance of the plurality of men, ‘the acceptance of each other’s “opposition and 
complementarity”.’68 This dialogue actually requires and evokes a space between 
men, which, as Buber writes, ‘is rooted in the fact that a being considers another 
as an other, as a clearly distinct being, so as to be able to communicate with him 
in a realm which is common to both and which transcends the individual realm 
of both.’69 This realm of the in-between has become a fundamental figure in the 
work of Van Eyck, as is tangible in his approach to architectural assignments. His 
seems to construct freely a bridge between the anthropological ideas of Buber 
and particular forms of architecture. The well-known design for the Burger-
weeshuis in Amsterdam might be exemplary. The building offers a collection of 
individual and collective cells, arranged around a series of patios. These cells, 
however, are structured by an in-between space, that connects the single cells of 
the different parts of the building. This in-between space is not programmed: it 
offers particular forms that can be appropriated by the children who lived in the 
building. The space challenges these children to occupy the spaces, to make them 
part of their play, to find places for themselves, to appear amongst their peers 
in order to meet and play. The same importance of the figure of the in-between 
is also tangible in Van Eyck ‘s approach to the city, which specifically is exposed 
within the more than 700 playgrounds he designed for the municipality of 
Amsterdam. Most of these playgrounds were located on vacant lots or in leftover 
spaces in the streets. Van Eyck added simple forms to these spaces: climbing 
frames, sandpits, little walls.[IMAGE 5.10] Through the lay-out of these spaces, it is 
clear that Van Eyck mainly was interested in the in-between, connecting different 
worlds. Sometimes the playgrounds indeed connected different worlds: through 
a vacant lot two streets were connected. In other places, the playground offered 
intriguing in-between spaces between the children and their peers, between the 
children and their parents, and between the public itself. The historian Siegfried 
Giedion actually offers a nice reading of these playgrounds: 
‘I had another experience recently in Amsterdam. I saw a number of children’s 
playgrounds which have been created under the guidance of Van Eesteren and 
designed by a young Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck. These have been made 
from very simple elements – a circular sand pit, some upright steel hoops, a 
parallel pair of three trunks lying horizontally. But these simple elements are 
grouped so subtly – with a background of the Stijl movement and modern art 
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which injects some kind of vitamin into the whole performance – that they act 
as fantastic starting points for the child’s imagination. These playgrounds also, 
simultaneously, fulfill another function. The careful design of their layout has 
transformed useless pieces of waste ground into active urban elements. One 
needs only to provide the opportunity and we, the public, who are also maybe 
children of a kind, will know how to make use of it.’70 
Van Eyck, within these mentioned designs, thus offered lots of leftover places that 
could be occupied (and transformed) by the inhabitants and users – room for the 
daily practices of the people themselves. 
5.1.4 History Reloaded
Despite this focus upon everyday life and its messiness, the re-appraisal of streets 
and squares, primitive cultures as a source of inspiration, and the eagerness to 
deal with a ‘reality’ beyond a deterministic approach, the Team 10 approaches 
nevertheless do not acknowledge a ‘full-fledged recognition of the phenomena 
of pluralism or of heterogeneity,’ George Baird states.71 Neither the huge urban 
interventions that were the study of the Smithsons and Candillis, Josic and Woods 
and that turned urban neighborhoods into huge built structures connecting an 
agglomeration of buildings, nor the emphasis on the reciprocal relationships as 
embraced by Van Eyck, who turned buildings into small agglomerations of parts 
– the building as the city – does grasp the complexity of the human condition 
of plurality. One might argue that these projects were still bound – despite their 
emphasis on controversy, contradiction, and human interaction – to the project 
of social engineering, which is so typical of the Modernist approach to the city. 
It nevertheless the question is also whether the post-modern architects of the 
seventies and eighties, who left this belief in architecture as social engineering 
behind and particularly embraced everyday culture, were capable to grasp the 
plurality of the public in a more convincing way. Baird himself refers to about 
four directions that were taken after or alongside the Team 10 movement. 
First Baird briefly refers to Victor Gruen, who introduced the concept of the 
suburban shopping center in the American suburban landscape (as I described 
in Chapter 2). As Baird argues, this center is the outcome of segregation as the 
underlying figure of the modern approach to the city. The important step Gruen 
took in respect to public life is of course the connection he provides between 
the commercial realm of shopping and public space. Although this figure has 
also been implemented in the Team 10 concepts, specifically that of clustering 
as developed by the Smithsons, due to the vast growth of the shopping center 
towards the shopping malls, this development has been criticized a lot from the 
European perspective.72 The second direction we can recognize within the archi-
tectural field before the nineties is surely the approach of what can be called ‘The 
Rationalists’, but often is referred to as La Tendenza. This somehow started with 
the pleas to acknowledge the ‘context’ of architecture by the Italian architect 
Ernesto Rogers during the 1959 Otterlo Conference. He, during that conference, 
was specifically critical of projects that somehow tried to redesign the city, but 
by doing so completely destroyed the history of specific sites.73 The importance 
of history as the context of new additions to the city has been a central figure in 
the works of Aldo Rossi, Giorgio Grassi, and – a to a lesser extent – the formal 
approaches to the city by U.M. Ungers. Their works were quite opposed to the 
Team 10 approach, which somehow tried to come up with an architecture that 
is characterized by an ‘open aesthetic’, while, as Baird argues on the works of 
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Ungers, they ‘promote a strong current of formality, and a sharp urban definition.’ 
Specifically in the (theoretical) works of the Italian architects, this formality and 
the stress on typology, the street is re-introduced ‘in its literal form as the primary 
organizational principle of urbanism.’74 As Rossi explains in his book The Archi-
tecture of the City, typology can be explained as the study of types, that is, the 
essential characteristics of certain urban and architectural elements. It is the core 
essence of a building, like the essential characteristics of a theatre. Important in 
this perspective is that Rossi argues that architectural form and type regularly do 
not coincide. ‘No type can be identified with only one form, even if all architec-
tural forms are reducible to types.’75 What Rossi stresses with the emphasis on 
typology is that there is much more continuity in architecture than modernism 
would admit. The type of the theatre, as it is foundational for the newest theatre-
building is still the same as an examples of 500 years back. ‘Typology is an 
element that plays its own role in constituting form; it is a constant.’76 Rossi’s 
urge to discuss typology is actually a response to the paradigm of functionalism in 
Modern Architecture, which is often stressed by the slogan ‘form follows function’. 
This paradigm was often understood as machine-like – as if a certain function 
could be analyzed and deconstructed into certain diagrams, which in turn offered 
the right architectural form to the designer, as if it were a mathematical formula. 
What Rossi actually shows is that knowledge of architecture is already present 
in the actual city and architecture.[IMAGE 5.11] It is present in the building stock, it is 
inherent in architectural constructions. Rossi’s point here might be summarized 
as ‘form follows knowledge’. This at least might count for most assignments, 
but the modern city and modern life also has urged new programs, particularly 
those based on the car, mass production and welfare. A typological approach 
does not offer any guidance in designing a supermarket or shopping mall.77 The 
second half of the Rossi’s book, however, stresses the experience of the existing 
city, underlining the permanence of actual urban form, and particularly the 
monumental building within the urban structure. He shows how the existing city 
fabric was able to offer room for changing programs and practices over time.78 In 
this part he therefore brings together the typological approach and his critique 
on functionalism in order to stress the future of city-planning. This of course 
is a response to the form of the modern city, as urged in the Athens Chapter of 
CIAM, and has become tangible in the post-war extensions to cities. New urban 
additions, Rossi urges, should take account of existing forms, give accountability 
of the knowledge that is existent in existing structures. The old city functions as 
the model for new urban extensions. 
At first sight, the approach of the Luxembourg born Krier brothers seems to be 
alike. By looking back to the formal analysis of, for instance, Camillo Sitte (Rob 
Krier) or the principles of classical architecture and urban morphologies (Léon 
Krier), they explicitly reject the achievements of the modern approach. Léon 
Krier in particular has become well known because of his hilarious drawings 
and comics, in which he jokes about modern architecture, and compares it with 
the merits of the classical language. For them, architectural form is a certain 
language, and the classical idiom is closest to the human condition. I return to 
this point in the next Chapter. At this point it is important to know that the very 
difference with Rossi and Grassi, however, is that for Léon Krier and Rob Krier 
the continuity is in the architectural form itself, while for the Italian architects 
it is in the principle beyond architectural form. Whereas Léon Krier developed 
his ideas further in a mostly academic career, Rob Krier has built a flourishing 
practice, that, remarkablly enough, got a foothold in The Netherlands.79 Their 
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ideas about a pre-modern approach to the city fits in the post-modern critical 
approach of modern architecture, although the earliest critics, like the American 
architects Robert Venturi in the mid-sixities, and Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter 
in the mid-seventies urged a more ambiguous urbanity than the Krier-brothers 
urge. As we have already seen previously, Venturi urges ‘complexity and contra-
dition’,80 which also seems to be behind the ideas of the latter two. In their 
‘manifest’ developing alternative approach to city planning, published as Collage 
City,81 they oppose the modernist treatment of the city, first by convincingly 
tracing the ambiguity and incoherence in the approaches of modernism itself, and 
secondly by proposing such incoherence as the very starting point of urbanity. 
The ambiguity in the modern approach they emphasize is manifested in the 
prescribed ‘natural’ or ‘landscape’ setting of the apartment blocks. They cite Le 
Corbusier: ‘Sun, space, verdure: essential joys, through the four seasons stand the 
trees, friends of man. Great blocks of dwellings run through the town. What does 
it matter? They are behind the screen of trees. Nature is entered into the lease.’82 
Rowe and Koetter regard the last sentences as ironic. How about this relation-
ship between the building blocks and the landscape, why design those objects 
when they are to be hidden behind the lines of trees? they question. Should the 
city be evaporated?83 In their research they actually use the map-technique of 
the famous Nolli-map of Rome (1748) to compare the classical city pattern to the 
modern approach of urban design. Gianbattista Nolli graphically emphasized in 
his map the public space, by drawing the buildings that were not accessible in 
grey, but leaving the publicly accessible ones, civic buildings and churches, blank, 
like the streets and squares (only showing in black their structure). Through this 
technique of presentation, these accessible interiors were shown as extensions 
of the public space. What is revealed through such mappings is a pre-domi-
nant urban pattern of masses and voids, the urban blocks and the streets, that 
is punctuated by major buildings and spaces, landmarks and open spaces that 
provide ‘locus’ within this ‘vast’ urban fabric. Through the map, since in the centre 
of Rome the coverage of buildings of ‘ground’ is dense, the streets and squares 
appear to be carved out from the building mass.84 As cities have grown explosively 
in the twentieth century – all intrinsically related to the development of mass 
production, the emergence of cars, the rise of speed, the increase of prosperity, 
and so on – this had a major influence on this relationship between figure and 
ground, solid mass and voids.
Well known are these pages of Collage City that simultaneously shows a 
fragment of the urban center of the Italian city of Parma and a fragment of Le 
Corbusier’s project for Saint-Dié (1948).85 The differences between both situations 
immediately become clear. Whereas in the Parma example the buildings define 
the open spaces, in Le Corbusier’s proposal the objects are placed in what can be 
called generic space. Space generates the setting for the objects, while the objects 
barely differentiate the sea of space(s) that surrounds them. They link this back 
to Classical examples, referring to the difference between the Roman forum and 
the Greek Acropolis.86 Through the drawings and in their texts they show the loss 
of ‘defined’ urban spaces and such types as the street, the square and the park. 
Everything has been turned into ‘landscape’, in a quite narrow sense of the word – 
a green park-like structure, occasionally sliced by (elevated) roads. In the modern 
approach, the pre-dominant figure is the single building. A connecting pattern 
of blocks or well-defined spaces is missing. What is lost is the ability to shape a 
coherent urban space through built form. In an object oriented approach, spatial 
structure of the environment cannot be constructed through the built figure.87 
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The approach of Rowe and Koetter can be described as a ‘figure-ground’ 
approach: it investigates the relative land coverage of masses to voids. Voids here 
are positively understood, and indeed, as specifically in the Rowe and Koetter 
approach, opposed to urban approaches characterized by objects in infinite 
space, or in the case of Sitte, opposed to ‘technical spaces’. In other words, in 
this approach to urban space, public space is understood as ‘enclosed’ space, 
or even sometimes as ‘interior’ space: specifically designed, distinctive in form, 
composition, articulation, and spatiality. One might conclude that this ‘figure-
ground-theory’ can only be applied to quite classical forms of urbanization and 
design. The urban designer and former Harvard Professor of Urban Design Roger 
Trancik, when he discusses this ‘figure-ground’ theory, only refers to classical 
examples – and when he refers to more contemporary examples – including the 
design of H.P. Berlage for Amsterdam Zuid –, it is shortly to Alvar Aalto, who had 
stated that ‘the problem of spatial design as connecting the form of the building 
to the structure of the site, or of twisting and turning the building’s facade to 
create positive exterior space.’88 The open spaces of streets and squares within 
this classical urban fabric, beside their function of transport and connectivity, give 
room to the active public life of the city – as do the parks, although they specifi-
cally offer the opposition of the hard urban fabric: room for nature, rural settings, 
and leisure. ‘Historically,’ Trancik writes, ‘the streets and squares were the 
unifying structures of the city.’ However, as almost overstated: ‘in modern times 
… they have lost much of their social function and physical quality.’89 It however 
might be questioned if it can be brought back through a very formal approach, 
as in the case in the figure-ground-theory. How can this address the social and 
communicative aspects of streetscapes? And how does it value its mercantile and 
pragmatic root? And is the unspoken but clear preference for the pre-industrial 
city vital enough to also structure today’s urban lifecycle? The emphasis is on 
the shape of (open) space, moreover on the dialogue between void and mass, 
embedded within a comprehensible and coherent urban structure, which can be 
perceived by the human body. 
Here we are of course back to the ideas of the Luxembourg brothers Léon and 
Rob Krier – their aim that the city and public life can only be revived by a return 
to the pre-modern types and organization of urban space.90 As Léon Krier writes: 
‘Today, one truth is evident: without traditional landscapes, cities and values our 
environment would be a nightmare on a global scale. Modernism represents the 
negation of all that makes architecture useful: no roofs, no load-bearing walls, no 
columns, no arches, no vertical windows, no streets, no squares, no privacy, no 
grandeur, no decoration, no craftsman, no history, no tradition. … There is no true 
substitute for the traditional fabric of streets and squares.’91 Krier, as well as his 
younger brother Rob, therefore aims to reconstruct the city along ‘romantic-reac-
tionary lines’, as Joan Ockman has characterized their work: a return to the prein-
dustrial world.92 
Specifically the early examples of Léon Krier’s own work, as for instance 
his contribution to ‘Roma Interrotta’, his Project d’un centre social place Saint 
Pierre, (1978) [IMAGE 5.12, 5.13] places emphasis on public space and monumental 
structures: axes and colonnades cutting through a fine mazed urban fabric, 
public buildings, quite monumentally designed by abstracting and reconsidering 
classical examples, strategically placed amidst the vast mass of urban housing. 
The Roma Intterrota plan even comes up with a new type of public building that 
is a building and square at once. ‘It provides’, Krier writes, ‘engines for urban 
centrality and marks both the plan and skyline of the city.’93 His 1976 proposal for 
Parc de La Villette (his submission to the pre-competition) is also a very clarifying 
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example of his approach. The plan is characterized by a limitation of the large 
open space of La Villette to two open public spaces, which form two distinctive 
parks, interrupted by ‘urban’ axis containing a few larger buildings and squares, 
running north-south. The rest of the site is completely filled with ‘generic’ urban 
building blocks. His strategy, in other words, is to limit open space, while in the 
same gesture carefully designing the perimeter of these spaces. Simultaneously, 
the urban axis and the parks divide the area into four quarters, easily understood 
as distinctive neighborhoods. The design for La Villette exemplifies Krier’s 
understanding of the urban fabric: hierarchy of public spaces of streets and local 
squares, distinctive neighborhoods, a vast sea of urban buildings (Res Economica 
Privata) knitted together by monumental public buildings and carefully designed 
central public spaces (Res Publica – Churches, Theatres, Schools, Markets, 
Memorials, Parliaments, Galleries, and so on).94 To him this division in hierarchy 
and distinction of public spaces, as well as between generic and specific buildings, 
is based upon a clear lesson learnt from tradition. ‘All traditional architecture 
clearly distinguishes between public and/or sacred buildings on the one hand,’ 
Krier states, ‘and utilitarian and/or private buildings, on the other. The former 
express the qualities of institutions – dignity, solemnity, grandeur for the res 
publica and the res sacra; the latter, the more modest private activities of 
housing, commerce and industry in the res private and the res economica.’95 In 
a provoking discussion with the American architect Peter Eisenman he adds: 
‘It is, obviously, not enough to have fine houses; a city also needs temples and 
monuments. Architecture is not concerned with the private realm. It shapes 
the public domain, the common world.’96 This of course is much more than just 
the shape of space. The context of public space should be rightly approached as 
well. Urban environments should accommodate the pedestrian, he states. Its 
size should not be bigger than about 10 minutes walk, within this distance the 
primary services should be located, and that the city should be constructed out 
of such autonomous fragments (that share the secondary services on the level of 
a borough, and some urban functions, like the airport, the administration, and 
cultural facilities, on the level of the city).97  
The projects for Roma Interrotta or La Villette site indeed show well-de-
fined public spaces, clearly being part of the urban fabric (although immediately 
admitted, not at all divided in 10 minutes’ walk divisions). In La Villette surely 
the canal helps to embed the structure in the existing environment, since the 
urban axis, the distinguished parks, and the structure of the generic building 
blocks, are orthogonally positioned along the canal. Both plans also show the 
relationship between architecture and public space: architecture indeed is used 
to ‘shape’ space. The squares are dominated by colonnades and arcades, obelisks 
and sometimes even by covered structures. In other plans too attention is paid to 
‘natural’ environments of lakes and rivers, specifically since they always have a 
relationship with built structures: thorough designs of bridges and embankments, 
walls and boulevards.98 
5.1.5 The Architecture of Social Condensors
The pivotal discourses on public space during the fifties also made room for an 
emphasis on ‘social’ aspects of space by the former student of Van Eyck, Herman 
Hertzberger, who is introduced by Baird in a description of his Centraal Beheer 
office in Apeldoorn: [IMAGE 5.14] 
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‘Basically, it is an office building to house the administration of a governmental 
insurance organization. Given his strong social orientation to architecture, 
Hertzberger was very interested in the potential programmatic symbolism of 
the building, but for him this symbolism of the building, but form him this 
symbolism was necessarily far more poetic and elliptical than institutional 
and monumental. Indeed, Hertzberger’s almost psychoanalytic orientation 
to the creation of built form was so individualistic, in its anti-institutional, 
and to establish its intended systems of social meaning exclusively from the 
individual outward, as it were.’99
This connection of the individual towards the collective has strongly influenced 
the early design-schemes of Hertzberger. One might argue that he has pushed 
the scheme of the Orphanage of Van Eyck, upon which we already touched, 
towards its more extreme position, by taking the building as a strong collective 
structure that not only offers guidance in a situation of chaos but immediately also 
generates freedom for the individual.100 Baird actually argues that
‘for Hertzberger, the constitution of the public realm can only proceed from 
the individual act cumulatively outward to the resultant collectivity. According 
to his politics, any preconstituted collective image would necessarily be 
authoritarian.’101 
This is an important remark, when architecture is also understood in its repre-
sentative character. The early works of Hertzberger are characterized by what 
we might call a structural approach. As he himself describes backwards, this 
approach was roused by the attention to the Kasbah-structures within the Team 
10 meetings, as well as the then contemporary studies on urban neighborhoods. 
Hertzberger joined the discussion as a member of the board of the architectural 
journal Forum by using matchboxes to show how simply squared elements 
can be brought together in different configurations, and how this could lead to 
more pleasant outdoor spaces, substantial urban settlements, and provocative 
differentiations than the standard suburban developments, which were based 
upon repetition.102 Hertzberger has always offered the metaphor of the city as a 
perspective to judge his attempts. In his early experiments with individual cells 
and collective structures, he emphasises these structures which are simulta-
neously building and city, while in later projects he presents (and designs) the 
collective spaces as streets and squares. The building functioning as city (in a 
city), and vice versa, the city understood as interior.103 Hertzberger argues that 
with the introduction of ‘structuralism’ in architecture – a term that nowadays 
often just refers to an architecture that pronounces mainly its structure, but that 
for him foremost is stressed by offering collective structures, through which the 
individual gets freedom of choice, occupation, and adaptation – ‘urban-design-
thinking’ has been introduced in architecture, introducing the consciousness of 
the collective as distinguished from the private domain in architecture too.104 
According to Hertzberger, this understanding of structuralism in architecture 
offers a more ‘humane’ perspective for the designer, a far more social under-
standing of architecture. 
Baird however, stresses particularly the expression of the individual in the 
architecture of Hertzberger: 
 ‘Growing out of the Team 10 tradition, the Centraal Beheer manifests instead 
a commitment to the constitution of a human plurality that is radically indi-
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vidualist and decentralist, and that cannot tolerate any predetermined repre-
sentation of collectivity.’105 
Despite this interpretation of Hertzberger’s withdrawal from a prescribed repre-
sentation, it is quite remarkable that at the very moment George Baird wrote these 
reflections, Hertzberger himself changed his architecture quite radically. The 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken building in The Hague, which can be understood as 
the last building in the former approach to the task, already shows traces of the 
new characteristics of Hertzberger’s architecture. It somehow merges the themes 
that Hertzberger had addressed in the past with those that he would address in 
the future.106 The outward appearance of the building still somehow emphasizes 
the parts, the different elements, over the whole: it is a structure of different 
wings that are bound together through a corridor. This corridor here however 
draws far more attention than in the Centraal	Beheer	offices. Whereas the wings, 
which offers spaces to the several departments of this government building, are 
less articulated (and less separated along the lines of units or clusters of office 
spaces, the central hall has been treated with much more attention. This collective 
space consists of the central atrium, broadened hallways or corridors, broadened 
stairs, added heights and stages, and so on. Particularly in his famous school-de-
signs, these elements were already investigated and articulated. However, in his 
other projects too these architectural elements gained a central role and have 
been turned into the very characteristics of Hertzberger’s architecture over the 
years. The infrastructure of the building turns here into architecture. Stairs and 
corridors, entrance halls and atriums are designed as the heart of the building 
– it is these spaces, this spatial infrastructure as we can call them, that have the 
potential to offer space for the collective, where the users of the building in more 
or less spontaneous ways touch upon others. These are the ‘social condensers’ of 
the project, as Baird argues.107 Simultaneously with the concentration upon the 
central collective spaces, Hertzberger’s designs of the buildings themselves began 
to change, particularly the way his more recent designs appear in the city, through 
their ultimate form and façade, changed drastically. Instead of the articulation of 
differentiation along the lines of the individual (element), his buildings more and 
more emphasized the collective itself: the building understood as single object, 
embedded in the structure of the city. Despite these changes, understanding the 
building as an object rather than a collection of individual elements, Hertzberger 
still kept his previous ideals: the interior of his buildings always gave space 
for central collective spaces, connecting different parts of the building. These 
are often infrastructural spaces of stairs and corridors that are broadened and 
combined in such a way that they turn into a diverse and dynamic space, where 
people can bump into each other, can relax and sit, or performances can be given. 
The stair as tribune, the corridor as balcony, the ground floor as stage. The inte-
rior-space thus is characterized, we can argue, by a certain ‘predetermined repre-
sentation of collectivity’ that nevertheless has to be appropriated by the users. ‘I 
regard a building only a success,’ Hertzberger once stated, ‘when I come back after 
a few years and find it appropriated by the users.’108  
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5.2  PRELIMINARY NOTES ON ARCHITECTURE 
 AND THE PUBLIC REALM
5.2.1 The End of the Commonly Shared World
Almost at the end of his book, immediately after his review of the early works 
of the Luxemburg architect Léon Krier, Baird vents his hope for ‘a more fruitful 
theoretical exploration of our predicament that this acrimonious bifurcation, 
one that would look again to the related concepts of “plurality” and of “action” 
as they were propounded by Arendt in the late 1950s.’109 He thus seems not to be 
satisfied by the proposals he previously discussed. His reflection nevertheless is 
open ended: he also does not urge one particular approach as a (final) architec-
tural solution for the design of public space. The future of public space, he seems 
to argue, lies somewhere in-between the proposals he discussed. Based upon a 
brief review of the activity of action as the core of the public realm,110 he finalizes 
his book by returning to the important analysis that he offered in the very first 
chapter. Beyond the question of actual physical spaces that can be regarded to be 
public, another question emerges: how architecture is able to affect the possibility 
of – to say it with Arendt – the human activity of ‘action’. In other words, how 
architectural design can offer room for appearance of the human being amongst 
peers, through the activity of action. Behind this question a critical stance can 
be detected, which is the other side of the coin: architecture often limits the 
possibility of appearance amongst peers, narrows the opportunities to act. The 
opportunities ‘to act in public’, Baird suggests, will be found far more in the 
succession and sequence of different spaces than in a profound design of public 
space: the network is more important than the singular space. At this point Baird 
does not choose a particular architectural position within the debate he just laid 
out, but underlines the lessons that can be learned from all previous approaches: 
public space has to have representational elements, has to have learnt from 
historical models, has to offer space(s) for meetings (in a very pragmatic sense), 
has to consist of a network of spaces, has to contribute to the urban fabric, and so 
on. 
At the core of these statements is the conviction that the architecture of public 
space needs to give room, which urges architecture not so much by taking control 
of all of the different aspects in a – you could say – totalitarian way, but rather in 
an unconscious intertwining of the different aspects. In other words, Baird urges a 
rather ambiguous approach to public space: 
‘It seems to me almost certain’, he writes, ‘that [the future public realm, HT] 
will be fabricated, in part, of known historical models, but that those models 
will have been fragmented and reconstituted in newly affirmative ways. It will 
also be rhetorical in its explicit taking up of public positions, but the concate-
nation of those positions will itself be heterogeneous – not to say pluralistic.’111  
Baird’s The Space of Appearance indeed has an open end – he simply expresses 
his hope that Arendt’s concept of ‘action’ might offer new insights in order to 
understand the notion of the public realm architecturally, beyond irony and 
bifurcation. He thus closes his exploration of public space with the recommen-
dation to explore the related concepts of ‘plurality’ and ‘action’.112 He faced this 
challenge himself about two decades later, in his second book on public space, 
simply called Public Space. We will come back to that book later, but at this point 
will take up the challenge as well: to explore the related concepts of plurality and 
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action as the very essential characteristics of the public realm, particularly urging 
how this realm is related to actual space. After all, there was an intensive debate 
on public space in architectural and urban theory during these two decades that 
have passed between Baird’s books on public space – a debate that we traced in 
Chapters 2 and 3. Our exploration of the debate led to the conclusion that the 
relationship between the public realm (as a political idea, or even ideal) and 
actual public space (as it is the object of architectural intervention) cannot be 
defined in clear lines, a toolbox of interventions, a matrix of architectural figures. 
The question thus is what Arendt’s concepts of plurality and action offer in this 
respect. How can we think about – if not understand – the relationship between 
architecture and the public realm, or how to imagine the relationship between 
architecture and the political? 
Arendt most clearly has introduced the concepts of plurality and action in The 
Human Condition, where, as Baird states, they appear to be interrelated. Plurality 
amongst human beings is revealed through action. To state it briefly, Arendt is 
very concerned about the possibilities of action within modern concepts of society 
and bureaucracy. In the background of this concern of course is her previous 
study to totalitarianism, a completely new form of organizing society according to 
her. Within totalitarian political systems there is no room for action, nor plurality, 
as we will see. The book in which she presented her reflections upon this new 
form of political organization, The Origins of Totalitarianism, can obviously 
be seen as a reflection upon her own experiences as a Jew in Germany, prior 
to World War II.113 It came to her somehow as a shock, but she not only had to 
reflect upon Nazism, but also upon Stalinism, the political system of the Soviet 
Union, in which she also recognized parallels of totalitarianism. As a following 
up upon that recognition, Arendt started to thoroughly investigate Karl Marx’ 
theory of labor and capitalism, upon which, as is well known, Stalinism was built. 
During her close reading of Marx, Arendt however recognized two other modes 
of human activity on earth besides labor, work and action, that were overlooked 
largely, not only in Marx’s perspective, but within the whole tradition of Western 
philosophy since medieval times. Philosophy moreover overlooked all these three 
forms of activity, celebrating contemplation as the ultimate form of ‘the good life’, 
to state it with Aristotle. In The Human Condition Arendt therefore articulates 
these ‘other’ activities and their essential characteristics, as she also investigates 
the labor-perspective. The differences between the three forms of activity are 
decisive, Arendt insists. Labor, she states, is the very earth-bound image of the 
human activities. Its aim is to fulfill the needs and necessities that burden the 
human existence upon earth. Labor is driven by the biological needs of the human 
being, the need to survive. Work distinguishes itself from labor: it is the creation 
of a durable place on earth for the human being. It is not simply ‘surviving’, 
but it establishes the permanence of the world, furnishing it with things and 
produce that last. Finally, action is bound to all political life – it is the capacity to 
be engaged in a common world through words and deeds.114 These activities are 
bound to different realms of human life: labor to the cycle of nature and survival, 
work to the durability of culture, and action to the establishment of a political 
community. As we will see in the next chapter, there is an important connection 
between work and action, between culture and the political community. At this 
point, however, we need to trace the differences between labor and action, partic-
ularly since it is the labor-perspective that threatens the very character of plurality 
that is bound to the public realm. The critique Arendt develops by emphasising 
these distinguished praxes of the human being is that perspectives limited to one 
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of these fail to understand these praxes within the right realm, and therefore also 
fail to understand essential characteristics of the human condition. 
That also is what Arendt developed as a critique of Marx. As is well known 
of Marx, with his emphasis on corruption, he is challenging the very structure 
of society. The prosperity gained through the effort of all in the capitalist system 
certainly is not the prosperity of all. The capitalist system is corrupt: the labor 
offered of the laborer benefits the elite of owners rather than helping the laborer. 
Structures in society thus needs to be revolutionized – power to the laborer. In 
other words, this perspective positions the laborer against the owner, everyday 
man against the elite. In her investigation, however, Arendt blames Marx first for 
a lack of understanding of the differences amongst all people, not only between 
classes, but between all individuals, and secondly of an inability to step back 
from the economical perspective. Arendt, in her attempt tries to go beyond these 
limiting perspectives. Her main critique is that in a solely labor-perspective 
everything is similar. The activity of labor is bound to the biological sphere, to 
the earth and its circular economy. It is urged by everyday needs. Although it 
produces products, these are products understood within this cycle of needs: they 
are meant for consumption. Through the labor-perspective human beings are 
understood as species sharing the same needs and interests, as well as offering 
the same capacities to society (namely: labor). The singular human being is 
brought back to a person that is alike others. There is no plurality amongst men: 
there only is the animal laborans, who needs to labor in order to live and to fulfil 
the necessities of life. According to Arendt this perspective leads towards an 
understanding of the human being as being part of mankind, the body of man, 
a part in a larger construct, one big family. The human community is brought 
back to a society based on kinship, in which the individual members are seen 
as the members of a family at large. The members of that family share the same 
interests, opinions, prospects, which together are expected to contribute to the 
prosperity of the family as a whole. In other words, the prosperity of society 
thus strongly emphasized as the very prosperity of every member of that society. 
Arendt regards this view as a misfit between the particular activity on the one 
hand and the realm in which it is employed on the other. Labor is bound to 
the private: it is bound to the body. Labor urges the public as the body of man, 
whereas action stresses the image of men in plural. It is the replacement of the 
public realm by the realm of the social, plurality replaced by similarity. 
This emphasis on society and its members, which are depicted in their 
similarity, threatens the possibility to be distinct within the public realm. This 
certainly is one of the difficulties in totalitarian systems. To differ in view, in 
outlook, in ambition, in aim, in interest simply is impossible within the totali-
tarian view, as it is within the view of the public as a family at large. Differences 
cannot be allowed to appear. Arendt discovered in her investigation into total-
itarian systems that this prompts questions about public space. In the last 
chapters, Arendt proposes this perspective, which she takes up again in The 
Human Condition. ‘Totalitarianism has no spatial topology’, the Turkish-Amer-
ican political philosopher Seyla Benhabib summarizes. ‘It is like an iron band, 
compressing people increasingly together until they are formed into one.’115 The 
single labor-view, in other words, threatens the possibility of a public space, where 
one can appear in words and deed – those two together are at the heart of Arendt’s 
concept of action – amongst others. Words and deeds reveal differences between 
the actors and speakers. These differences are not simply caused by different 
genes that offers variation to the human species, but are grounded in the very 
experiences of the human individual, in his narrative of life. Although science has 
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proven that genes are important too in respect to the differences between human 
beings, it is the nurtured condition of the human being that is really distinctive, 
Arendt argues. Despite differences in DNA, biologically the human being is funda-
mentally the same as we have seen previously. The differences that prescribe how 
we act and speak are evoked by the narrative of our lives. Each human inhabits a 
particular view, based on previous experiences, education, convictions and so on. 
Words and deeds thus are crucial in establishing plurality, as vice-versa, action 
always reveals differences rather than similarity. Plurality, once again, is the 
very condition of the public realm. For Arendt this plural outlook that is revealed 
through action is crucial. The end of the ‘commonly shared world’, she warns, has 
arrived when it is reduced to a single perspective and a single aspect.116 As we will 
see in a few moments, the reality of the world, that is in common for all, can only 
be established through plural perspectives on that world. 
Arendt does not only present this limiting of perspectives as a threat to the 
political systems of the past, she also emphasizes it as the very problem of 
modern social sciences, particularly the economic sciences. As is clearly the case, 
these sciences impact today’s political (democratic and bureaucratic) systems 
extensively, as well as on our everyday environment as we have seen previously. 
Economic, social, psychological studies are used as tools to define the government 
and its assets, the lay-out of the social realm, the ‘design’ of public amenities. All 
human beings are alike: consumers in need of consumer goods. Or voting masses. 
Or the mass. Or yuppies, hipsters, youngsters, or take all the categories that are 
used in statistics, planning, urban sociology, psychology, or other scientific fields 
and politics to predict what will happen in society and forecast the behavior of 
people. This reduction of multiple human beings – or groups of human beings 
– into the human body not only is preferable to those in power, but also enables 
the scientist to quantify needs and predict behavior, the politician to develop 
policies, the entrepreneur marketing, and the brand to pitch consumer goods.117 
Such reductions of the single human being into ‘a human body’ however can turn 
quite repressive. What is different must be excluded. It disturbs the profitability 
of the shared outlook. Labor leads to behaviorism, Arendt therefore states, to 
predictability and stability. This is specifically why it is so tempting for all political 
systems, and particularly to the totalitarian approaches. But this is also why it, as 
a model, is rejected by Arendt. If behavior is the norm, action is impossible.
Within economic principles, which are a particular case addressed by Arendt, a 
generic viewpoint covers society, in which deviations and differences are problems 
too. Economic principles after all are only concerned with the shared need to 
survive, the shared need of prosperity, the shared need of peace and welfare. In 
economic perspectives man is not seldom approached as ‘merely’ a consumer, 
a being that can be regulated through economic principles. People are expected 
to behave, and in their spare time to be entertained, absorbed in the bubble of 
economic goods, while losing sight of engagement in the world. In the end, when 
the public is understood as consumers, this public has lost its specific plurality. 
The differences between people vanish in this economic perspective, as long 
as the people go shopping, and enjoy it, as long as they follow the pattern of 
consumption, and continuously buy new stuff (that is expected to comfort them). 
Within the consumer-society, she argues, people have become solitary individuals, 
prisoners of their own subjective experience – even if others can have the exact 
same experience.118 
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Arendt thus understood the increasing importance of economic principles in the 
Western societies as a curtailment of ‘man in the plural’, and this becomes visible 
in space – indeed, specifically in those spaces that appear in the book of Michael 
Sorkin, Variations on a Theme Park. Understood from this perspective, the 
shopping mall might be one of these everyday places that at first sight is stripped 
of its possibility to offer a space of appearance by the very use of architecture. In 
their planning and organization, their design and construction, one thing prevails: 
the treatment of the visitor as consumer. As Robert Bellah emphasized – and 
we touched upon this perspective previously – the moment you enter a shop-
ping-mall, your (world)view is shaped – and this is what our common cultural 
experience in the end seems to be. Bellah in his article is quite pessimistic on 
the possibility to adjoin this extensive cultural influence with counter narratives, 
which in turn can critique the prevailing and determining worldview.119 In the 
Mall, the Theme Park, the Historic District, and so on, despite the effort of the 
designer and planner to offer outspoken, thrilling, tempting experiences, in all of 
these instances one perspective prevails: the economic. ‘Once the city is imaged 
by capital solely as spectacle, it can then only be consumed passively, rather than 
actively created by the populace at large through political participation.’120
Regarding the relationship between the public realm and architecture, we might 
argue that this emphasis on plurality and action also has something to offer 
regarding concrete public spaces. As Arendt argued, the public realm has lost its 
power to enlighten the ‘commonly shared world’ the very moment it is reduced to 
a single viewpoint. Based on that viewpoint, we might conclude that within spaces 
that are structured along the lines of such a ‘single viewpoint’, to appear amongst 
others in words and deeds is rather difficult – more difficult than in spaces where 
multiple viewpoints are possible. Such spaces dominated by a single outlook are 
increasingly important in today’s life – we touched upon them extensively already: 
the mall, with its emphasis on consumerism, the theme park, with its emphasis 
on entertainment, and the gated community, with its emphasis on the secured 
private paradise, and so on. In other words, the very lay-out of space, how it is 
ordered, structured, connected in a network, designed, certainly contributes to the 
possibilities of action: it increases the possibilities or, on the contrary, it can limit 
these possibilities.   
5.2.2 The Condition of All Political Life
Action, according to Arendt, is the activity that distinguishes between people. It 
changes the perspectives upon the human being from being an animal laborans 
towards being a zoōn	politikon.121 Arendt introduces ‘action’ in The Human 
Condition as follows:
‘Action, the only activity that goes directly between men without the interme-
diary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, 
to the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the world. While all 
aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality 
is specifically the condition – not only the conditio sine qua non, but the 
conditio per quam – of all political life.”122 
At least four aspects mentioned in this introduction of the notion are important 
in our aim to reflect upon the architecture of public space. First is of course the 
fundamental condition of plurality as the basis of political life. It is important to 
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have this perspective continuously in mind. For Arendt politics is always linked 
to the plurality of mankind. As touched upon above, mankind is understood as 
a single body, as Man, like Arendt calls it in this quote. Arendt fiercely rejects 
that perspective as a false conception of common life. According to Arendt only 
men live on earth – plural in pluralism, as well as plural in unpredictability.123 
The image of mankind as a single body has been tempting, since it is imagined 
as predictable and accountable. Arendt, however, urges the unpredictability of 
political life and the plurality of men. It is this plural condition that requires 
political life. 
The very character of this pluralism is the second aspect we need to address. 
As already touched upon above, this plurality is not diversity per se. It is not 
bound to the biology of the human being, to nature, but to nurture. Nevertheless, 
Arendt insists that, although the condition of public life is pluralism, this public 
life can only take place between ‘equals’. ‘If men were not equal,’ Arendt writes, 
‘they could neither understand each other and those who come before them nor 
plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them.’124 
We need to be sufficiently alike in order to be able communicate. Arendt actually 
strongly emphasizes both the aspect of equality as well as of pluralism in regard 
to the public realm. Only in a space that offers room for pluralism amongst equals 
can politics rise. In such a space there is room for words and deeds, for critique 
and arguments, for questions and debates. This is the ultimate view of the space 
of appearance according to Arendt: the appearance amongst peers in order to 
convince, to exchange, and to persuade through action and speech. The words 
and deeds reveal the differences. In such a space, the only thing that cannot be 
permitted is violence. Violence after all immediately destroys the public sphere 
by introducing inequality: it means the performance of a power relationship, 
in which people are not equals.125 Therefore it is only through words and deeds, 
through action and speech that we appear amongst peers equally yet simultane-
ously distinctive. On the other hand, the political realm would make no sense if 
there were no differences. Action would be unnecessary if we were all the same, 
‘endlessly reproducible repetition of the same model, who’s nature or essence was 
the same for all and as predictable as the nature or essence of any other thing.’126 
In such a condition of sameness, behavior would be sufficient, Arendt argues. 
‘Speech would not be needed, nor action, ‘to make themselves understood.’127 For 
Arendt, moreover, this action and speech is not simply the heart of political life, 
it also is its aim. This is an important perspective: politics after all often is valued 
because of its political aims. It is understood as an instrument to reach another 
goal. Arendt, however, the end of action and speech is to disclose the human being 
itself – and with that establishing again and again the plurality of men. 
This brings us to our third aspect: the ‘un-mediated’ aspect of pluralism. 
Today, pluralism is often understood to mean diversity: visual distinctiveness 
which is articulated, enhanced, upheld and confirmed by personal decision. How 
we dress, what we buy, where we eat, where we go underline our personal choices 
– and for some these aspects even underline their individual distinctiveness. In 
other words, how we appear in public visually reveals something of who we are, 
or better said: how we would like to be seen by others. At a closer look, these 
differences are mediated by representation, but the things that on the one hand 
underline our own ‘personality’ also stress not so much individual differences 
as group sameness. Certain groups attend particular coffee bars, others go to a 
skate ramp, some wear headscarves, others wear caps. These visible ‘differences’ 
can often be brought back to individual choices,128 particular lifestyles, or are 
roused by religious beliefs, national pride, a love of sport, sexual preferences, 
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and so on – often they are even commercially boosted. This however does not 
match with Arendt’s understanding of plurality. These differences after all are not 
be a matter of human beings appearing among equals in words and deeds, but 
hiding oneself behind the mask of a prescribed identity. Arendt would call these 
differences, as they appear to be the distinction between recognizable groups, the 
‘social realm’. The articulation of differences through ‘styles’, one can argue, hide 
both the fundamental equality of human beings and plurality of men out of sight. 
Arendt therefore urges a different understanding of plurality. What really makes a 
difference, Arendt urges, is communicated without means and medium: plurality 
unfolds while the human being appears in public through action and speech. It 
is beyond our control, she states. ‘In addition to the urge toward self-display by 
which living things fit themselves into a world of appearances, men also present 
themselves in deed and word and thus indicate how they wish to appear, what in 
their opinion is fit to be seen and what is not. This element of deliberate choice 
in what to show and what to hide seems specifically human. Up to a point we can 
choose how to appear to others and this appearance is by no means the outward 
manifestation of an inner dispositions; if it were, we probably would all act and 
speak alike. …. Distinction and individuation occur through speech, the use of 
verbs and nouns, and these are not products or “symbols” of the soul but of the 
mind.’129 In other words, the distinctiveness of human beings is not just a matter 
of mere otherness. Words and deeds themselves are not grounded in and highly 
affected by one’s biology, but in one’s biography. Where we are born, how we are 
raised, what we have experienced – all of this affects the way we act and speak, 
which initiatives we take, how we react and respond to what happens around us.130 
The final aspect we need to stress at this point is that Arendt immediately 
situates action and speech in the world. Biologically the human being lives on 
earth, but as far as we make a living on the globe, occupy a place for ourselves, and 
create societies in which we can live together – as men – we turn this globe into 
a shared world. In other words, the activity of labor is bound to the earth and its 
inherent cycle. Work, in turn, transforms the earth into a world – and particular 
to this world is that it is shared with others, as it is both the location and the 
object of action. As far as he lives in the world, the human being is fundamentally 
a being living together with others, able to communicate, and to set up political 
life. In turn, this political life particularly means being engaged in a shared, 
common world.131 If the aim of political life is action and speech itself, which 
reveals the actor itself, than it is to disclose this unique identity in close relation to 
the world-in-common.132 
These aspects thus offer a fourfold reflection upon the condition of political life: 
it is evoked through the (1) plural appearance of human beings amongst (2) 
peers through action and speech, that is (3) un-mediated. It is the (4) world that 
offers the space of appearance, the stage as well as the object of action and space. 
Although in the next chapter we will focus on the activity of work, at this point we 
can already state that architecture essentially can be seen as interventions that 
turn the earth into a world – moreover, into a world-in-common. This world-
in-common in Arendt’s view is essential to the public realm. Action and speech 
are bound to the world: it is a form of being engaged with the world. To appear 
through words and deeds means not only to live on earth, but also to inhabit the 
world. Action and speech, in other words, are not simple abstract terms, regarding 
a meta-level of political life, but are bound to the immediate environment, the 
very world, of the actor (and spectator).  
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5.2.3  Startling Unexpectedness
Although this image stresses a public and meaningful conversation, in which all 
perspectives are being heard and positions being seen, and in which the capacity 
to persuade is central, it might be that this perspective evokes less the toughness 
of the public realm. In Arendt’s perspective, action and speech are not ‘toothless’ 
– the public realm offers room for conflict and danger. The condition of plurality, 
which is the very condition of all political life, essentially is one of conflicting 
perspectives, of unpredictability and challenge. To appear in public, therefore, is 
never an easy activity. It might be a painful, rather than a calm, heart-warming 
or confirming experience. Action always reveals differences, as it also disturbs 
the quiet, calm and comfort that are bound to the private and social. Action by 
definition is different and dangerous with its characteristics of unpredictability, 
instability, and unexpectedness. In her writings Arendt strongly emphasizes these 
aspects of unpredictability and unexpectedness of action. Every act is fundamen-
tally open, is a risky business, the outcomes of which can never be predicted or 
forecast. 
This perspective is tangible for instance in Arendt’s rejection of goodness as the 
aim of action and speech. The public realm offers room for ‘heroic deeds’ and 
remarkable words, which is not simply just meeting each other, presenting a 
particular perspective, or publicly doing something good (for the world). Arendt 
even goes so far as to join Machiavelli by rejecting the aim of goodness as the goal 
of public life. ‘Goodness,’ she concludes from a stunning passage on the famous 
quote of Jesus that goodness should always be hidden in order to be protected 
from corruption,133 ‘is not only impossible within the confines of the public 
realm, it is even destructive of it.’134 Arendt then refers to Machiavelli. ‘Nobody 
perhaps has been more sharply aware of this ruinous quality of doing good than 
Machiavelli, who in a famous passage, dared to teach men “how not to be good.” 
Needless to add, he did not say and did not mean that men must be taught how to 
be bad; the criminal act, though for other reasons, must also flee beings seen and 
heard by others. Machiavelli’s criterion for political action was glory, the same 
as in classical antiquity, and badness can no more shine in glory than goodness. 
Therefore all methods by which “one may indeed gain power, but not glory” are 
bad.’135 The public space thus is not a space where people can do good, it’s a place 
where people can do heroic deeds and speak remarkable words amongst others. 
In other words, action and speech does create public realm in which to appear 
in close relation with prior appearances – in close relation to the ‘highest human 
qualities and principles’.136
Machiavelli’s daring perspective on politics is very important in Arendt’s 
image, as the American Political theorist Bonnie Honig has argued.137 Honig 
stresses ‘speech’ as the opposite of ‘war’ in the spectrum of human action. 
Since ‘war’ cannot be part of the public realm, as we have seen above, (violence 
introduces inequality in public space), speech has to deal with the inherent 
controversies of the distinctive perspectives, aims and claims. But as the actor 
is involved in his action, is revealed through the way he acts and speaks, this is 
not to be seen as an easy conversation. For Arendt, conversation – the activity 
of speech – is related to action. Speech reveals action. Action and speech, even if 
they cannot include violence in public space, then is always on the cutting edge, 
since the actor himself is involved in the action. Honig therefore proposes the 
public realm as an agonistic space. Appearance in public space, Arendt stresses, 
requires courage.138 For Bonig this is a critical perspective upon all political 
approaches that immediately diminish the dimensions of conflict within the 
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public realm. ‘For the sake of the “who” they might become,’ she writes, ‘Arendt’s 
actors risk the dangers of the radically contingent public realm where anything 
can happen, where the consequences of action are “boundless”, uncontrollable, 
irreversible and unpredictable.’139   
Arendt thus presents action as a risky business: one can start something, but not 
predict what the outcome might be. One does not know how action is received, 
acknowledged and eventually accepted, and how others will react. Totalitarian 
regimes as well as bureaucratic organizations have difficulties with this aspect 
of action, as we will see. With these perspectives in background, Arendt highly 
values this aspect of unpredictability. Action is not mere reaction to what 
happens. On the contrary: it has the potential of something unpredictable and 
‘new’ in it, of something that cannot be singled out beforehand. Human beings, 
Arendt emphasises, have the capacity to start something anew. As Arendt argues, 
the capacity to take initiatives, that is to start things unknown and uncertain, 
is a particular and important human capacity. It is this capacity that offers the 
possibility of change, of renewal and improvement. This capacity thus also 
provides the ‘hope’ for a different, not to say ‘better’ future. Life, not only that of 
the individual, but also of the community, is not predicted and pre-scripted, but 
open for change and chance. According to Arendt, this capacity is rooted in the 
fundamental natality of human beings, the fact of being born. This emphasis, 
which evokes a hopeful perspective, turns Heidegger’s perspective upside down, 
since he builds his perspective narrative upon what he called the fundamental 
Existenz zum Tode of the human being, Being unto Death. Arendt’s change of 
perspective and emphasis on natality, brings the aspect of hope back into her view 
of the world.140 When everything boils down to this Being unto Death, everything 
is burdened by finality. Arendt’s perspective, on the other hand, is drenched in 
the possibility of the new. For Arendt every birth is the possibility of change, an 
opportunity of differences, a potential ‘newness’ for the world.141 
We therefore can qualify action and speech as ‘open’ activities, a term that 
rightly resonates with some of the reflections on the arts and writings from the 
sixties and seventies – particularly to the theory of the ‘open work’ by Umberto 
Eco.142 As he has argued in written texts, they are to be seen as open: they can be 
read in infinite ways, which depend upon the reader and what he or she brings 
to the table. The writer cannot grasp all these layers hidden in the text, nor can 
the reader. Something also happens with action and speech. To start with, action 
cannot stand ‘alone’, in the wide open. It does not make sense if nobody can see 
and listen. Arendt even argues that what does not appear in public simply does 
not exist. In the case of ‘action’, this particularly means that action which does 
not gain responses does not have any effect. It simply whispers away without 
causing any chain of action and reaction. However, this chain of responses can be 
neither controlled nor pre-scripted. It is an open process, which depends upon the 
responses of other peers. It evolves through the particular actions of actors and 
peers, it thus stands or falls with their interpretation and experiences of previous 
actions. 
Action can only impact the world if there is room for re-action and inter-ac-
tion. That, for Arendt, is the problem of world-alienation. It not only does reject 
the value of the world that is common, as I will discuss in the next Chapter, it 
also reduces the opportunities to act, to initiate, and to inter-act. However, to 
stand up, to appear to the world, to act and speak, is also losing control: it is 
not clear beforehand in which direction the actions and responses will evolve. 
‘This character of startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and all 
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origins.’143 The future is open, at that point. In this openness acting and speaking 
also take initiative. Action is active, we might argue – it is not a passive following 
of the regular directions. We have to distance ourselves from ‘behavior’, in order 
to seek new ventures, new paths to follow. Action is starting, starting anew, 
moving, not alone, but in a way that others can apply, add their perspectives. 
Action essentially is never finished: responses are needed and can’t be controlled. 
Arendt stresses that as the very hopeful aspect of action: ‘The fact that man is 
capable of actions means that the unexpected cab be expected.’144 So is every act 
also the opportunity of a new and distinct future that cannot yet be foreseen. 
Every voice can change a mind. 
‘Fired up? Ready to go!’145
Arendt is quite aware that this aspect of action also immediately leads to an 
inherent instability in the public realm. For Arendt action therefore is always a 
venture that needs protection. The history of mankind again and again shows the 
anxiety towards the ability of human action, towards this instability and unpre-
dictability. Action always has the potential of gaining collective acknowledge-
ment, which is the very basis of a revolution against those in power. Action and 
its responses also stress the very diversity of the public realm, which is a difficult 
aspect of society in respect to a bureaucratic government. Political power often 
combined with military power is used to diminish this aspect of unpredictability – 
today we can argue that not only political power is at stake, but commercial power 
is used to diminish the aspect of unpredictability in the public space. In other 
words, public space is always a threatened space, since most ‘power systems’, be 
it political or commercial, can’t deal with the indissoluble characteristic of unpre-
dictability and instability. 
We can allow at least two brief and preliminary thoughts at this point regarding 
architecture. The image of the public realm as a quiet conversation about 
all-things-that-matter is simply a wrong impression. The public realm is harsh, 
exhausting – it is a realm of struggle between conflicting interests. The world, 
however, in which this struggle is engaged, is a world-in-common. Action and 
speech, although revealing the plural interests and conflicts, are always bound to 
this world-in-common, as we have seen before. The awareness of inhabiting-a-
world-in-common offers room for action as contributing to this world. The public 
realm, despite its inherent conflicts, is fundamentally an open-work. It is open to 
intervention, as long as it is the outcome of action (and re-action). This once again 
urges the plural image of public space: not being defined by a single narrative. 
The single narrative after all does not offer room for the unpredictability of action 
(since it disturbs the very aim of these spaces, as we have seen previously), but 
also since these single narratives are closed systems. There is no room for the 
users – the public– to appropriate, inhabit and contribute to the space. This 
once again requires a certain ambiguity or openness of public space, as we have 
touched upon already. The public can only occupy, appropriate and contribute 
to that public space if these spaces allow them to inhabit their own positions, 
preferences, perspective in space. This of course is a lesson for architects, as 
the architect Herman Hertzberger posits when he states that architects have to 
‘detox’ from the idea that ‘what he makes only is his exclusive creation.’146 The 
design (and the construction) of a building only is the start of the new, the largely 
unexpected future of appropriation and change.  
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5.2.4 The Virtual Sphere of Inter-Action
We now have described the first outlines of Arendt’s image of action and how it 
is related to the public realm. It is at this point that we need to compare Arendt’s 
perspective with the image of the public sphere as described by Jürgen Habermas. 
Through this comparison a few other aspects of Arendt’s image of the public 
realm will be enlightened. In architectural and urban theory their views are often 
taken as one.147 Close reading of both concepts, however, will reveal differences 
on essential aspects. And since particularly Habermas’s view has triggered the 
debate on public space in architectural and urban theory (although this is not 
always clearly stated), it is valuable to stress these differences at this point. It will 
offer some other points of departure to rethink public space in the contemporary 
circumstances. 
Not only are Arendt’s and Habermas’s sources different, but also the images 
and aims they propose put forward distinctive aspects. A brief remark is needed 
at this point: by comparing both concepts, it is clear that we push the limits of 
the distinctive aspects of both concepts, rather than stressing their similarities. 
Although pushing the limits and focusing on Arendt’s perspective, this is not 
meant to dismiss the image Habermas’ provides. His perspective is valuable, as it 
has been in the past. However, Arendt’s perspective, we will see, offers a different 
way to understand the relationship between public space as the object of architec-
ture and the public realm as the political perspective bound to public space. The 
aim of this comparison, in other words, is to clarify the debate and to discuss the 
possible expectations of public space. The similarities of Arendt’s and Habermas’s 
thinking nevertheless are evident: their views are both rooted in Western-Eu-
ropean cultural thinking. Or to be more precise, they are evoked through their 
German perspective, easily accessing and discussing the philosophical writings, 
concepts and reflections of a variety of German philosophers. The differences in 
their view are evoked in a different reading of this German context. Habermas 
positions himself as member of the Frankfurter Schule in the Marxist tradition, 
while Arendt, as we have seen, distances herself from Marx. Arendt is much more 
in conversation with the Classical strain of philosophy and in its wake also the 
German ‘Grand Masters of philosophy’ Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger and 
Karl Jaspers, with a twist of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
According to the political philosopher Seyla Benhabib, upon who we touched 
previously, Habermas’ Strukturwandel is indebted to Arendt’s Human Condition 
and her emphasis on public space. The Strukturwandel was published four 
years later than the publication of The Human Condition, which was not yet 
translated into the German language at that very moment. It nevertheless did 
reach Habermas: there is one brief reference to the book in the first chapter. 
Habermas and Arendt dwell upon the changing private sphere as a thriving force 
beyond the rise of the public sphere (Habermas) or as, quite on the contrary, a 
threat to the public realm (Arendt) in the modern age. Benhabib emphasises that 
the first pages of Habermas’s The Transformation of the Public Sphere are to be 
understood as a (hidden) dialogue with Arendt. Within these pages Habermas (re)
discovers public space and the public sphere as a central question of modernity, 
which he first brings into the German discourse. Secondly he connects this idea of 
the public sphere to different aspects of the activities of the human being on earth. 
This indeed seems to acknowledge the similarities in their approach to the theme. 
Arendt after all also develops her view accordingly: the public realm as crucial 
phenomenon in the modern era, as well as how the public realm is indebted to the 
human activities on earth. 
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There are nevertheless two important differences between their notions, which are 
related to their sources, certainly, but particularly to their definition of the human 
activities. Arendt distinguishes, as we have seen, between three activities: labor, 
work and action. Habermas, in turn, only distinguishes between two: labor and 
interaction. Habermas thus leaves the activity of work behind, and this is a crucial 
difference. In the next chapter, we will see how the concept of work offers an 
important perspective upon the relationship between architecture and the public 
realm. In this paragraph, since we are focussed on ‘action’ now as the activity 
bound to the public realm, we will investigate this second difference: Habermas’s 
concept of inter-action. The differences between these two notions, ‘action’ 
versus ‘inter-action’, are remarkable, and influences the understanding of public 
space and its purpose. Obviously, Arendt’s concept of action is much broader 
than Habermas’s inter-action. Action after all requires and includes inter-action 
– as we have already seen above: action requires inter-action in order to evoke 
re-action. Action always needs speech that explains the action, it needs a public, 
and it needs responses in order to gain tangibility and to be effective. Effective 
action requires inter-action. Action, if it is to be meaningful, cannot be left unseen, 
unknown; it needs company. Action in Arendt’s writings thus always pre-sup-
poses the context of ‘action in concert’. However, when we push the limits of these 
notions in order to grasp the differences, we will understand that Habermas’s idea 
of the public sphere is much more impersonal and virtual than Arendt’s concept. 
In our comparison, it is first important to see that Habermas’s term is only loosely 
related to the actual space of the salon and coffeehouse, as it is only loosely related 
to the actual persons that gather in the salon and the coffeehouse in order to 
have a chat.[IMAGE 5.15] As we have seen previously, this is the very image Habermas 
evokes, the bourgeois in the 18th and 19th century, gathering in particular spaces 
discussing actualities or literature. This ‘looseness’ of the relationship between 
what Habermas calls the public sphere and these meetings – the very space 
and the people gathering – is that this public sphere is not simply the singular 
meeting, but that it contains all meetings, debates, discussions on actualities in 
cafés, coffeehouses, salons and Tischgesellschaften together. The public sphere, 
in other words, consists of the accumulation of all meetings on the micro-level, 
but is mainly drawn and meaningful on the macro-level. This is an important 
perspective, since what Habermas celebrates in this public sphere is the inherent 
power of the public sphere on that macro-level, vis-à-vis the market and the 
state. The public sphere, in other words, plays its role in-between the spheres 
of the state and the market: neither coloured by government intervention nor 
susceptible to market forces.148 The local meetings are important in so far as they 
contribute to and are absorbed by this meta-sphere. This distinction between the 
local and micro level on the one hand, and the macro level of the public sphere 
clarifies the relationship with the other two spheres that dominate society, the 
state and the market. These two of course are also to be seen as meta-spheres, 
which exists as localized practices, but together merge into a single societal 
sphere. This is an important perspective, which loads the public sphere with 
political importance. The twin spheres of government and market had to learn 
to relate to this new public sphere.149 To my mind, this is the point where the 
struggle around the Western idea of democracy and reflections upon its vitality 
today comes in: the modern state only derives its legitimacy from this public 
sphere, namely from the extent to which the political project serves the collective 
pursuit that is made known through the public sphere. The public, after all, is 
only powerful if it can be brought back to a ‘consensus on the common good’, 
the ‘public opinion’. The modern state, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor 
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summarizes Habermas’s point, only derives its legitimacy from this public sphere, 
namely from the extent to which the political project serves the collective pursuit, 
which is made known through the public sphere.150
‘Inter-action’ as compared to ‘action’ thus emphasizes conversation, 
dialogue, discussion. This term is to be seen as the root of Habermas’s concept 
of ‘communicative action’ that he coined later in his massive 1981 book Theorie 
des Kommunikativen Handelns.151 Society consists of a network of interactions, 
the aim of which is to gain ‘understanding’ between the inhabitants. In this book 
Habermas distinguishes between several forms of inter-action, both on the level 
of the individual as well as on the level of society and politics. In the Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere, prior to his 1981 investigation into commu-
nication, he already argues that the public sphere is devoted to communication, 
which in turn is shaped by the media.152 This perspective reveals how the media 
(the printed press) is fundamental to the public sphere. In order to gain the power 
that challenges both the government and the market, all public gatherings need 
to be informed about actualities. The ‘right’ information, shared with anybody 
else present, is essential to fuel the discussion. Only shared information leads 
to meaningful conversations, a shared level of entry, and a shared outlook on 
the world. Fundamental to the conversations in the 18th and 19th century salon 
and coffeehouses indeed was the then new printed media: the newspaper for the 
coffeehouse and the wider distribution and accessibility of books for the salon.153 
Habermas’s public sphere, in other words, is particularly evoked by the rise of 
the printed press and other changes in the media. Note here that this ‘public’ is 
a particular group of citizens. As already stated, and Habermas admits that by 
calling this the ‘bourgeois’ public sphere, those attending the cafes, salons and 
coffeehouses were a wealthy group of citizens, rich enough to afford a newspaper 
and having spare time to visit the coffeehouse in order to meet with others. These 
‘bourgeois’ were literate, well-educated citizens, eager to share their opinion to 
other literate and educated citizens.154 In respect to their eagerness to deliver their 
opinion about actualities, the new media played a major role by informing them 
on the same level, offering subjects of conversation. The public gathers, whereas 
the media offers them a basis of conversation and interaction. The public sphere 
of Habermas, in other words, is based on reason – what joins the ‘public’ is their 
use of reason in order to form their opinion about actualities, and thus the ability 
to discuss, argue, and gain approval.155 But since the public sphere is about the 
accumulation of all particular meetings, the new media evokes what we can call a 
‘virtual community of like minds’, which in turn offers a ‘public opinion’.156 When 
defining the public sphere, it is immediately clear that this concept is virtual 
and intangible rather than spatial and tangible. It might be therefore questioned 
whether this model indeed helps us to define the relationship with architecture, 
challenged by the question of concrete public spaces and their inherent spatiality 
and tangibility. The image of the public sphere at least is quite far away from 
Arendt’s concept of action, which, as became clear, is always bound to the world 
and thus cannot fade away into realms of virtual reality.  
5.2.5 The Public Sphere and the Realm of the Social 
The intertwining of media as the source of the conversations on the micro-level 
that serves the aims of the public sphere on the macro-level also demands a 
second important distinction from Arendt’s concept of action. Unlike in Arendt’s, 
in Habermas’s concept it is not the meetings and appearances that are central, 
nor the action and reaction, but the outcome of these meetings, the result of 
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interaction. Habermas’s public sphere urges a purpose: to withstand the state 
and the market. With that aim, the conversations in these coffeehouses are 
immediately burdened with that aim: their aim was consensus and agreement 
which – accumulated – could be described as the ‘public opinion’. It is this burden 
that shifts the focus from the very personal nature of appearance, which is central 
to Arendt’s concept of action, to the very impersonality of the result that is the 
aim of Habermas’s interaction. ‘For Habermas,’ as Benhabib writes, ‘the public 
sphere is not just, or even principally, an arena of action but an impersonal media 
of communication, information, and opinion formation.’157 Although Habermas 
himself evokes this image of a ‘public opinion’ as the ‘fiction of the one public’,158 
this aim of the public sphere nevertheless reveals how this idea does match with 
the characteristic of plurality, which Arendt argues as essential to the public 
realm. The public sphere that has the capacity to meaningfully challenge other 
societal spheres is after all necessarily to be seen as a unity. 
As Arendt never responded directly to this thesis of Habermas, it is no surprise 
that Arendt’s reading of the developments in the 18th century would be different. 
Arendt did not write about the cafes and coffeeshops, but discussed the Berlin 
salon in delightful tones. ‘The charm of the early Berlin salons,’ she writes in The 
Origin of Totalitarianism, ‘was that nothing really mattered but personality and 
the uniqueness of character, talent, and expression.’159 In this book the salon is 
just a minor point, but in her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, the Jewish organizer 
of a famous Berlin Salon at the end of the 18th century, it has a more significant 
role. Varnhagen, Arendt argues, suffered from her Jewishness. Only at the end 
of her life doesshe engage with it. ‘The thing which all my life seemed to me the 
greatest shame, which was the misery and misfortune of my life – having been 
born a Jewess – this I should on no account now wish to have missed.’160 Behind 
this quote is a longing for a full participation in society. However, Varnhagen 
was able to participate neither as a Jew, nor as a women. She was left ‘without 
weapons’, Arendt states.161 As we touched upon previously, Arendt frames 
Varnhagen’s turn at the end of her life – from the struggle to assimilate towards 
the engagement of her Jewishness – as the turn from a parvenue towards a pariah. 
To bear differences with pride. To assimilate, Arendt argues, was only possible at 
the cost of lying. Honesty and being-a-parvenu is a paradox.162 However, the salon 
Varnhagen organized, and which became significant in Berlin Culture, was one of 
her attempts to assimilate and participate in the world. Although this notion of the 
world, as we have already seen and we will discuss extensively later, in Arendt’s 
terms is always the world-in-common, here she uses it differently. For Varnhagen, 
she writes, world means society, ‘the world of those who were socially acknowl-
edged.’163 This of course already shows how much the eagerness to assimilate 
is not meant to be engaged in the world, but is about ‘being-acknowledged-by’ 
society or ‘being-acknowledged-as’ part of society. Furthermore, about this salon 
itself, Arendt argues that it was immediately affected by the Romantic spirit of the 
18th century: it offered space ‘in which the private things were given objectivity 
by being communicated, and in which public matters counted only insofar as they 
had private significance.’164 Although Arendt does not use that specific term here, 
we might conclude from these remarks that Arendt rendered the salon to be a 
social realm. Although the attendees discussed all sorts of actualities and public 
affairs, she only understands it as private conversations. It is inter-action without 
action, it is a matter of private interests rather than engagement in the world. 
Even the ‘charm’ of the salon, as we touched upon above, is a matter of private 
profiling: the revealed personality and unique characteristics, which are longing 
for recognition, ‘being-acknowledged-by’ others. To be acknowledged by ‘the 
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people of rank and name who represented something lasting and legitimate.’165 
Although Arendt has written most of the book in 1933, she finished and published 
it only in 1956, two years prior to The Human Condition. It is in the final two 
chapters, which she wrote after the war, in which she argues this position of the 
pariah, certainly in recognition of her own position during the terrible period of 
Nazism in Germany and her flight to America. The war had not only disturbed 
her writing activities, but also redirected her points of attention and interest. 
However, since she was extensively reflecting upon Varnhagen, it is telling that 
the salon-meetings (and the meetings in cafes and coffeehouses) are absent in The 
Human Condition, the book in which Arendt sharpens her notion of public space. 
That Arendt does not write about the salon or coffeehouse as one of the public 
spaces in the modern ageis not a matter of ‘overlooking’, since she is too focussed 
on the Classical examples of the agora and the forum, nor is it to be seen as an 
omission in her writings. Again this is to be seen as stressing the social character 
of the salon and coffeehouse. For Arendt the social realm is a realm of ‘society’, 
which stresses sameness and similarity rather than plurality. The coffeehouse and 
salon are such places stressing similarity: it gathers a particular literate public and 
it unites them through the reading of a single newspaper; people with about the 
same background, reading by the same newspaper. The salons and coffeehouses, 
in other words, were places where similar people could discuss their shared 
opinions, could propel and share their private interests. 
This ‘reading public’ of the public sphere therefore is utterly different than the 
zoon politikon that Arendt put forward as the figure appearing in public. Arendt 
emphasizes the agora and the forum – admittedly, these were spaces for the elite 
too, however, Arendt renders public space as offering the opportunity for every 
citizen (in the modern meaning of the word) to participate in the ‘government of 
affairs’166 – again and again as ‘spaces of appearance’ and action, where pluralism 
becomes tangible and people are engaged in the world. Habermas’ public sphere, 
once again, can be read as a sophisticated form of the social realm, organizing 
the counter forces for state and market, which in the end needs to cover ‘the 
public opinion’ – a single version of what ‘we’ might think of the things at hand. 
Habermas would agree with that perspective. He himself argues the public 
sphere, as we have seen, not as the realm of politics in itself, but as something 
in-between the public and the private. It challenges the realm of politics, as it also 
challenges the sphere of the market. ‘The political task of the bourgeois public 
sphere,’ he writes, ‘was the regulation of civil society (in contradistinction to the 
res publica).’167 
Arendt on the other hand celebrates the public realm as the political sphere, 
although she does not stretch that perspective to a macro (and virtual) level. 
Arendt’s concern is limited to the micro-scale of politics, to councils and town 
hall meetings, in which citizens appear to one another as equals, but nevertheless 
reveal through their acts and words their utter distinctness. Within this space of 
appearance, human beings appear in public, inter-act with one another, discuss 
the future, take note of one another, and (finally) re-act. According to Arendt, 
this is not in order to construct common opinions from the multitude of private 
interests and convictions. Quite on the contrary: the public realm – and all its 
inter-actions – reveals the utter plurality of mankind. Nothing more, nothing less. 
For Arendt, and that is the significance of the statement that the salon is a 
social space rather than a public space, the social is about sameness rather than 
differences. This clarifies why in Habermas’s perspective it quickly goes to the 
‘outcome’ of the conversations, which urges the virtual character of the public 
sphere rather than the reality of actual meetings. For Arendt however, such 
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an idea of an aim or outcome of (inter)action is highly problematic. Arendt’s 
description of action, certainly in comparison with Habermas’s interaction, 
remains local and personal. This is an important aspect of architecture as well. 
Although addressing ‘the public’ on different scales, the architectural project (of 
public space) is always local. It offers spaces to real people, to real uses, and to 
real gatherings, meetings, exchanges of ideas. Moreover, the format of the social 
realm, which gathers communities of like-minds, aligns with spaces that promote 
a single viewpoint, upon which we touched previously. This runs counter with 
Arendt’s emphasis on the open and ambiguous space, in which every participant, 
appearing amongst peers, can take his own particular place. 
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5.16 Three iconic images of recent protests:
1. Lucy Myslikova, a 16-year-old girl Scout, standing up to a 
 far-right skinhead, May 1st, 2017, Brno, Czech Republic
2. Iesiah Evans arrested during a black-livesmatter 
 demonstration in Baton Rouge, LA, USA, July 9th, 2016
3. Markiyan Matsekh playing the piano during demonstrations 
on the Maidan Square in Kiev, Ukraine, January 2014
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5.17 Peter Eisenman, Aronoff Center for
Design and Art, Cincinatti, OH, USA, 1996
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5.18 The Christmas tree at Rockefeller Center in 1949 
(Raymond Hood, New York, NY, USA, 1929-1940) 
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5.3 ARCHITECTURE AND THE PUBLIC REALM. THE ESSENTIAL   
 ASPECTS OF TANGIBILITY AND REALITY
5.3.1 The Reality of Concerted Action
In Arendt’s emphasis on action as the very aim and activity of the public realm, 
the idea of a meta-level in which the outcomes of activities merge into a single 
perspective is suspicious from the very beginning. Her emphasis is on the 
importance of plurality, a theme that she discusses from many angles. This 
emphasis on plurality once again depends upon her understanding of action as 
the activity of public space. Arendt always comes back to this matter of actual 
doing, and resists the temptation to count all actions as a single (meta) power 
of the public.168 In other words, because of her focus on action itself, on this 
localized and somehow tangible activity, Arendt is less tempted to simply acclaim 
‘the results’ of all these actions acted in public in a single view. On the contrary, 
Arendt stresses the multi-dimensional and multi-perspectival views of the actors 
again and again. Arendt even is not focussed on the question of how a (political) 
institution can offer space for action and speech in a meaningful way, that is, 
in such a way that it also organizes contemporary society properly. Arendt thus 
strictly stays at the level of local action and speaking itself, of appearing in public, 
which does not lead to consensus but to the unfolding and the plurality of human 
beings. Even when asked about the political perspective, the aim of action and 
speaking, she still chooses metaphors in which the single participant is important 
(and is not tempted to speak about the common good or the common future, not 
even of living peacefully together).169 
Of course, for Arendt the aim of action is relevant too. Real political action, 
she states, is recognized and joined, it gains response, and only thereby will grow 
in power. If there is a powerful political movement that can resist the market or 
the state, if there ever will be a revolution, this can only occur when single action 
gains recognition, praise, endorsement and approval. ‘You can only act in concert’, 
Arendt stated in the conversation at the 1972 Toronto conference that we touched 
upon in the previous chapter.170 That means, only groups of people will affect the 
world – only if there is a chain of action and reaction will something happen. We 
can argue that only ‘concerted’ action will be effective. The ‘concert’ as metaphor 
of meaningful action is a powerful image. It immediately reveals that in this 
political realm every single action counts, and every perspective is still tangible 
and sensible. All strings and horns, all voices and tones work together towards this 
‘gesamtkunstwerk’, this total artwork – but all separate instruments are needed 
in order to create this overwhelming spectacle. To strive for consensus, we might 
argue, moves counter to this image of a concert. Consensus after all strives to 
mediate between the different voices in order to achieve the single perspective the 
political institutions can react to. Or to state it in terms of the concert: the strive to 
distil the ‘public opinion’ searches for a single tone that represents all. A concert, 
although it can sometimes reveal and articulate a single tone, always consists of 
polyphone tonal contributions. It often bursts into a whole range of tones, which 
together are adjusted and tuned, or are in struggle with each other. 
The metaphor of the concert reveals the plural character of action and 
re-action, although this image of course has its limitations. If we use the ‘concert’ 
to stress the role of the conductor, or the first violin, this is certainly beyond the 
point that Arendt argues. Concerted action is never orchestrated action – as 
Arendt states again and again. Action is unpredictable and cannot be prescribed, 
as we have already seen. One never knows beforehand how others will respond 
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to action. We can therefore better understand this ‘action in concert’ as a jazz 
performance, where the single actors can start new narratives, while others 
anticipate these changes in tone, direction, and composition. The new can only 
come into being if based upon knowledge of the music, of chords and rhythm. 
Only by playing it rightly and recognizably can the other actors in the play respond 
properly, and together create something new. This is what Arendt stresses as 
well. Action and re-action are never pre-scripted, she states. One cannot foresee 
the outcome of one’s actions. There can be an intended direction, but since one 
is dependent on the responses of others, as well as that these responses affect the 
very direction of the ‘action’ in process, the outcome of a single action cannot be 
foreseen. To evoke responses, there needs to be a shared object and concern. It 
can rightly be stated that concerted action does not require consensus, but surely 
does require cohesion, and recognition in order to gain response, engagement 
and care. Action cannot be recognized, nor re-acted to when the doer of deeds, 
the actor, and his public, his peers, are too different. There should be a ‘certain 
amount of convergence in interpretation,’ as Benhabib argues. And she continues 
with an important conclusion upon public spaces, when she states that it, from 
this perspective emerges ‘a space in which a collective becomes present to itself 
and recognizes itself through a shared interpretive repertoire.’171 We might argue 
– and that is what I will do in the next chapter – that public spaces and their 
architecture have the potentiality to offer this cohesion between the actor and his 
public. It might be clarifying to underline this aspect of the concert differently. 
Although the concert consists of polyphonous contribution, there is a limitation 
and a common ground. The limitation is in the use of instruments, which includes 
the voices as well as unexpected objects that can work as instrument, whereas 
the common ground is the music itself. The musicians together contribute with 
their particular tones to the concert, but in all their different voices and roles, 
they are in it together. This image indeed finds its echo in Arendt’s description 
of the public realm as a powerful stage for action. This ‘concert’ is brought back 
by Arendt to a local level. It is not the meta-level of meetings and exchanges that 
offer a polyphone outburst of voices, but the actual appearance amongst peers 
that forms the outline of the concert. Arendt only in the second instance comes 
up with recent ‘examples’ of the public realm – but these examples all direct to 
the local, the small, and the personal: the town-hall meetings that became part 
of the political system in the USA after the American Revolution, and the local 
councils that were organized in Hungary after the uprising of 1956 (and before 
it was crushed again by Russian intervention). It is worth stressing that it is the 
local instances that are concrete and tangible, relatively small, locally grounded 
and transparent. Only such instances offer the stage for a ‘concert to happen’. 
Something similar is stressed in The Human Condition. Arendt argues there that 
the public realm has its limitations, as is clearly the case in the original reference, 
the agora in the polis. Cities could not grow limitlessly; there is a need for a 
certain overview and common ground.172 
This of course opens ground for a possible meaning of architecture and contri-
bution of the project of architecture in respect to public space. If action is bound 
to the world and particularly to local instances, architecture is a means to create 
room for these local instances to happen. It also, as we will see in the next chapter, 
immediately reveals the world as the inhabitants have it in common, not only 
with the contemporaries, but also with generations of the past and those who will 
occupy it in the future. Architecture, in other words, is essentially a tangible and 
durable ‘space’, in which local instances can happen. The outline of this space, the 
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object of architecture, places the local instances in the world-in-common, as it 
also introduces the world-in-common within the perspective of those participating 
in the local instances, in this concerted action. 
5.3.2 The Spatiality of Appearances
As can be derived from the previous reflections upon the characteristics of 
action and the public realm, this concept cannot be considered without spatial 
descriptions. As mentioned previously, Arendt bases her reflections on the public 
spaces in the Greek and Roman city-states. These classical models of public 
space have their limits, as Arendt acknowledges, but this reference, to which she 
comes back regularly, keeps her concept very spatial and tangible. Although the 
coffeehouse and salon – Habermas’s references – certainly were concrete spaces 
too, Habermas’s focus is not so much on these spaces, but rather on the media 
that allowed shared topics to be discussed. Whereas Habermas’s interaction 
solely stresses speech (that is: a conversation about actualities as borrowed from 
shared media), Arendt stresses speech and action. (Habermas’s) conversation 
of course needs a space of gathering (of people in conversation), but the speech 
itself does not appropriate any space. It is intangible, and remains intangible. 
Arendt’s action, on the other hand, requires a space. Action, after all, is linked to 
the actor, to a human being and a human body. The human body requires space, 
it appropriates space, particularly when in movement (which certainly is the case 
in action). Besides that, much like speech it needs others who see, acknowledge 
and respond. This is the function of speech in Arendt’s concept: it reveals action 
to others, it is in function of action. The actor needs to appear amongst others, as 
he also needs space to act. Action only makes sense amongst these peers – which, 
in turn, thus requires a space where peers can gather and actors can be seen and 
heard, and in turn, also perceive others appear through speech and action. To act 
thus requires a public space, where others can see and act accordingly. This being 
amongst others of course requires, a conversation. This conversation is not meant 
to create a shared viewpoint. Bound to the uncertainty of action and the unpre-
dictability of the responses, the conversation includes (philosophical) reasoning 
and persuasion. By focussing on ‘action’ and speech, Arendt rejects the singular 
outcome that is beyond Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere. Action, Arendt 
argues, is unpredictable. What comes out of it is uncertain. Action, for Arendt, is 
an end in itself. 
Something of the difference between both concepts of the public sphere and 
the public realm can also be felt in the very term used to describe the phenomenon 
of the ‘public domain’, both in the German as in the English language. The 
translators of Habermas’s text did choose for the more ephemeral description 
‘public sphere’ as translation of the German Öffentlichkeit instead of the term 
‘public realm’, as coined decades before by Arendt. Arendt had originally written 
her book in English, and had chosen to use ‘public realm’ or even ‘public space’, 
but when she translates her book into her mother tongue (she was a Jewish 
refugee from Germany, who had to flee her country prior to World War II), she 
does not use Habermas’s term Öffentlichkeit, but Öffentliche	Raum (the German 
word ‘Raum’ can be translated as room, enclosed space). It thus clearly emerges 
from Habermas’s text that his use of the term ‘public sphere’ has to be taken 
in a more abstract and virtual sense than Arendt’s image of the ‘public realm’, 
even more so since Arendt also replaces this word every now and then with the 
description ‘space of appearance’ (in German: Erscheinungsraum), which unmis-
takably underlines the spatial characteristics of what Arendt has in mind.173 For 
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Arendt the public realm and its activity of action was bound to ‘appearance’, to 
appear to one another. Using a term like this even evokes action, movement,174 
people that do something – they appear in tangible ways.175 Appearance, we might 
state, is always a matter of time and space.
Action, one can state, differs from sole inter-action since it is both personal 
and spatial. It is the difference between the letter to the editor and the actual 
talk, between a comment on Facebook and a real conversation on the street. 
‘Action and speech,’ Arendt writes, ‘create a space between the participants, 
which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space 
of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear 
to others as they appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or 
inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly.’176 Action requires public 
space, although it is not bound to official and formal public space: it is locally 
grounded, it is where people meet, act, and inter-act (which we should better call 
re-act). In other words, the first distinction between Habermas’s inter-action and 
Arendt’s action, briefly stated, is that action is bound to concrete space in a much 
more tangible way. It is not dominated by the actualities that are offered by the 
media – from newspaper to Facebook – but by what actually happens in space, 
to the world. Action can only take places ‘out there’, so to say, in space, amongst 
peers. Although I am keen to distance Arendt from Habermas, it has to be said 
once again that her notion incorporates Habermas’s inter-action. It is nevertheless 
important for our perspective on public space that Arendt’s notion of action in at 
its core offers more implications for real space. Interaction can remain virtual, 
action can’t. Interaction can do with a virtual stage, action requires a real stage. 
In our argument to push plurality forwards as the central notion of public space, 
we need to stress finally the ‘act’ of action itself. It is true that this act affects 
peers and maybe even the world, since it forces the peers to respond, and through 
that ‘action in concert’, it also slightly but surely changes the world. But in the 
doing itself, in action accompanied by speech, the differences between anybody 
living today, anyone who has ever lived, or who will live in the future is revealed. 
Action and speech are the vehicle through which the human being – as the doer 
of deeds and the teller of stories – appears in public, and by this appearance he 
is revealed (in bits and pieces) to the world. In speech and action, the agent is 
disclosed. ‘Speech and action,’ Arendt writes, ‘reveal this unique distinctness. 
Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; these 
are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical 
objects, but qua men.’177 What distinguishes the human being from other species, 
which of course have their variations and distinctions too, is that the human being 
is able to express his distinction himself, that he is able to distinguish himself 
through speech and action. He is not merely able to express ‘something’, like 
hunger, thirst, affection,178 like other species that lack the capacity of language 
can, but that in his speech and action the speaker and the doer themselves are 
disclosed. When the plurality of the world unfolds through action and speech, this 
conversely means that words and deeds are the activities by which we actively 
reveal ourselves to others.  
Action thus is a rich entry to the notion of public space. It is spatial, personal 
and historical not only as an activity, it also presses issues of ‘plurality’, ‘time 
and temporality’, and finally ‘reality’. Action by definition binds the human 
being to the tangible world, understood as the public realm, a space where 
one appears to peers, others that are simultaneously equal and distinct. Every 
action in revealing the particularities of every human being contributes to and 
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endorses the fundamental plurality of public space, and specifically evokes the 
shared engagement with the world by people who are both equal and completely 
different. Without acknowledging the plurality of men, one easily develops 
the understanding of mankind as a whole, as is often the case in mass political 
movements. Arendt thus emphasizes the inextricable connection between human 
plurality and the public realm. When plurality is confined, there is no public 
realm; the loss of the public realm is simultaneously dangerous for plurality. 
When there is no space to appear amongst others, people are stripped from the 
freedom to develop their own unique biography in relation to others and with it to 
take part in the organized world.179
We can conclude that the centrality of action offers the following characteris-
tics for the public realm: action is an end in itself, not a means towards something 
else. Every human being is able to act – to initiate something, to participate 
in meaningful action. Every action is the start of something new, although it 
is unpredictable how this will unfold. Action makes sense only within a public 
space: it should be heard and be seen, action should lead to the possibility of 
re-action. Since action reveals the actor as well, plurality is the very character-
istic of the public realm. It is as simple as this: the sphere addresses the ‘myriad 
ways in which people participate in collective deliberation about political action’, 
Jonathan Parkinson writes,180 while the public realm emphasises the local and 
limited, the situation itself, the actual participation in (political) action. The 
public realm might not be limited solely to physical public space, but its ‘activity’ 
immediately evokes people and places, tangible situations.
5.3.3  Innumerable Views
The notion of Arendt, as argued above, at its very heart is spatial and personal, 
it is localized and bound to actual people. Although essential to the concept, 
this does not yet mean that it is bound to an actual space, to which architecture 
contributes. We now need to question at what point architecture is at stake, 
regarding the spatiality of Arendt’s concept of action. Arendt urges the activity 
of ‘action’ in The Human Condition against a background of concern: the decline 
of public space as the stage of action. With that concern, Arendt clearly does not 
think of concrete examples like processes of suburbanization, gentrification, the 
rise of the shopping mall and the business district. None of these developments, 
which I described in the first two parts of this dissertation, can be found in 
Arendt’s writings. Nevertheless, these concrete examples are parallel to Arendt’s 
concern. Public space, in her image, depends upon the possibility of ‘acting 
publicly’, that is: appearing amongst others through action and speech. Arendt is 
concerned about the increasing limitation of the possibility of such appearances. 
This limitation Arendt describes as the cause of the increase of the social realm, 
upon which we touched already. It might be good to stress once more that this 
social realm is not simply a particular spatial condition, but is highly dependent 
upon the people and society themselves, upon expectations and aims at the heart 
of a community. However, this image of the social definitely is also echoed in 
particular spaces. So let us once again trace the characteristics of the social, and 
see what this might mean for our understanding of concrete public space today. 
With the notion of the social realm, Arendt does not describe anything positive: 
the social, to Arendt, means mankind as a ‘social body’ and the human community 
as ‘society’. The state, in this perspective, is approached as a huge household 
that caters to the everyday life of its inhabitants. ‘The same historical process 
that brought forth the modern constitutional state also brings forth ‘society’, 
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that realm of social interactions that interposes itself between the household on 
the one hand and the state on the other.’181 Habermas and Arendt thus read the 
preliminary traces of the modern age utterly differently. Whereas Habermas sees 
the emancipation of the bourgeois, evolving into an independent realm between 
state and market, which somehow challenges both realms, Arendt sees the estab-
lishment of ‘society’ in-between the household and the state. This society does not 
challenge the other realms but empties them out. Or to describe it differently: it 
is household-thinking brought to the whole community. It absorbs public affairs 
in a social perspective, as it also overlooks the need for a private realm, to which I 
will return later. For our argument here it is important to understand that through 
the social realm inhabitants of the state (the participants of society) are urged to 
act alike, that is, to act as though part of a (unifying) household. All participants 
in this household share the same interests, and certainly opinions. They inhabit 
the same perspectives. It evokes, according to Arendt, a sphere of conformism. 
There is no room for plurality and exception, only for the average and the similar, 
the expected and the known. This is a thread for the possibility of action, which 
always stresses the opposite qualities: the unexpected and the unknown, the 
exceptional and the particular. It is replaced by behaviour. For Arendt, this means 
a great loss: it is the loss of the distinct and outstanding. ‘No activity can become 
excellent,’ she writes, ‘if the world does not provide a proper space for its exercise. 
Neither education nor ingenuity nor talent can replace the constituent elements of 
the public realm, which make it the proper place for human excellence.’182 
Important at this point, regarding the decline of public space, is the limited 
possibility to appear amongst peers through action and speech. This appearance is 
not simply the possibility to access certain spaces, which is discussed extensively 
in architectural and urban theory. Access is one thing (and certainly threatened), 
appearance another.183 Appearance is not so much simply ‘being-around’, it is 
the ability to act and react, to speak and hear. This requires an in-between that 
gathers actors and audience at once. ‘What makes mass society so difficult to 
bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact 
that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate 
and to separate them.’184 Arendt is particularly concerned here with the ‘world’ 
not so much as space, as we are now, but as a ‘thing’ we have in common. Action, 
Arendt argues and as I will discuss in the next chapter, is bound to the love for 
the world. What is left, Arendt asks, if this world loses its capacity to evoke shared 
engagement and concern? It will lose its fundamental capacity to be an in-between 
linking all members of a community. But when we focus on public space, as one 
of the important ‘places’ of the world, we can conclude the same concerns. It has 
lost the power to gather and to unite a people in utter plurality. At first sight, the 
‘virtual world’ of internet, forums, and social media seems to offer a new public 
sphere, where people discuss all together and immediately the actualities of what 
happens. After all, it is within these environments that people can speak out 
and discuss. But this is only at first sight. The actual contribution and responses 
to the political movements of the government have never been as intense as 
today. However, even these ‘new virtual spaces’ offer much more distinction 
than real exchange, as is today claimed. The virtual world offers ‘filter bubbles’: 
they happen to be a series of islands, distinct platforms of instant opinion and 
momentary anger, rather than structural engagement and evocation. This, in 
other words, reveals how the world has evolved in distinctive social realms, which 
do not push the participants into a public space, but actually isolate them from 
public appearance. Moreover, and this is an important point regarding the field of 
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architecture, the idea of action and speech is tied to the very spatiality and reality 
of the space of appearance, upon which we touched previously. If we have to find 
‘new public spaces’, we cannot depend upon the virtual, but we are in need of the 
tangibility and the reality of the world itself. It is at this point that architecture 
comes in. Architecture creates a tangible world of spaces, as we will discuss in 
the next chapter. Architecture, we might state, is the knowledge of the world as a 
spatial-social construction – a frame for social and bodily life, as it is for political 
life, for appearances amongst peers.  
Appearance, although intrinsically related to ‘action’, since it is through action 
and speech that ‘we’ appear amongst peers, Arendt argues, precedes action itself. 
Arendt after all talks about the importance to appear from the private into the 
public. This is a physical experience – a movement from one realm into another. 
If we think through the activity of ‘appearance’ once again, starting with this 
sense of the physical appearance, we will better grasp the image Arendt evokes. 
Arendt also stresses the tangible appearance as a physical experience, not only 
by framing public spaces as literally ‘spaces of appearance’, but surely when she 
describes appearances in terms of a movement: from the dark into the light, and 
from the private into the public. Even more so when she stresses the ‘what’ of 
this appearance amongst peers. The public, she argues, is the presence of others 
that are able to see what we see, and hear what we hear. For Arendt this is an 
important figure, since it is in this shared seeing and hearing of the same issue, 
although from different perspectives, that reality is confined. In other words, this 
is not just a matter of a conversation, it is a matter of our senses too. Seeing and 
hearing joined together are completely different from reading opinions – tweets – 
from a screen. 
At this point we need to emphasize the importance of the ‘world’ for Arendt. In 
the vocabulary of Arendt, this world is not simply a philosophical term to describe 
the intangible web of relationships between people, but is a tangible entity – and 
entity that is common to the inhabitants of the world. This is a very important 
perspective regarding the relationship between architecture and action. Action, 
after all, as we have seen, is an end in itself. It reveals the actor. But action, as 
an end in itself, also creates the public space in which (other) appearances are 
meaningful – a public space that is sustained by world-in-common.185 This rela-
tionship between appearances and the world is crucial in order to understand the 
meaning of architecture regarding political life. We will discuss this relationship 
in the next chapter, but at this point we already touch upon the literal and physical 
descriptions that Arendt uses in order to describe the very act of appearance to 
one another. The moment Arendt continues to stress the importance of such 
appearances, her image becomes even more physical: all the different peers, who 
are in their proper position, represent innumerable perspectives upon the same 
thing. She again invokes the image of a space, where the people at a particular 
moment stand in a particular place – their views differ, since they see different 
sides of the same object in their midst. The importance then, according to Arendt, 
is that things only gain reality in all its numerous aspects when revealed through 
the different perspectives of all peers present. If we in this world can speak of an 
‘objectivity’ of the world, it is only through these multiple views that establish the 
reality of the world in all its innumerable aspects. ‘To men in the reality of the 
world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; “for what 
appears to all, this we call Being,” Arendt quotes Aristotle, ‘and whatever lacks this 
appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our 
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own but without reality.’186 This is the reason Arendt is concerned about plurality 
in modern societies. It is not simply about the possibility of being different (or 
oneself), but the loss of possibilities to appear threatens the world itself. Only 
what appears in public, and can be seen and heard by others, is tangible, and 
becomes real, part of the reality of this world. As Arendt writes:
‘For us, appearance – something that is being seen and being heard by others 
as well as by ourselves – constitutes reality. … The presence of others who see 
what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and of 
ourselves.”187 
For Arendt this is at the core of her concern, the loss of the innumerable views 
upon the world and its appearances, who reveal the innumerable aspects of 
reality. It is the loss of reality itself. Reality is only constituted in the numerous 
perspectives that are apparently part of the public realm. Without appearance 
amongst others, one is deprived of the inter-action with other perspectives, and 
thus of the world. It is in this perspective that Arendt investigates the public 
realm: as the stage upon which people act and inter-act, are seen and heard, can 
see and hear, reveal themselves, but also gain reality, as they together reveal the 
innumerable aspects of reality to each other. 
Reality (the world itself) thus is only revealed through the different viewpoints 
of the spectators being present. In other words, the reality of the world is in 
the hands of public appearances, which means that only through the views of 
others – this whole unstable constellation in constant flux, of the perception 
of and exchange between actors and spectators – the world is constituted in 
all its aspects. Arendt thus argues, we might conclude, that a real public realm, 
which offers the opportunity of appearance, is characterized by the simultaneity, 
polyphonic, multi-layeredness and un-stability of countless perspectives. In a 
wonderful passage, that actually is very spatial too, she writes: 
‘For though the common world is the common meeting ground for all, those 
who are present have different locations in it, and the location of one can no 
more coincide with the location of another than the location of two objects. 
Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact 
that everybody sees and hears from a different position.’188
This is certainly not only a matter of simply confirming plurality. Arendt also 
emphasizes that only through this appearance ‘reality’ is affirmed, also from those 
appearing in public. What remains in the private realm never becomes ‘real’ since 
it is after all neither visible nor audible. What appears in public, however, acquires 
the greatest possible recognition. She than continues: 
‘Only where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without 
changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know 
they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably 
appear.’189
At this point we are back to some previous conclusions: the end of the commonly 
shared world, which we only share through the innumerable views we add to 
the common, has arrived when it is reduced to a single perspective and a single 
aspect. Arendt thus strongly warns against this reduction of public life to a 
single viewpoint or experience, and propels the importance of the possibility 
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of ‘innumerable perspectives’. The reality of the world, she argues, can only be 
experienced through the innumerable perspectives upon that world, which only 
appear and will be shared in heterogeneous public spaces. 
‘This is the meaning of public life, compared to which even the richest and 
most satisfying family life can only offer the prolongation or multiplication of 
one’s own position with its attending aspects and perspectives. The subjec-
tivity of privacy can be prolonged and multiplied in a family, it can even 
become so strong that its weight is felt in the public realm; but this family 
‘world’ can never replace the reality rising out of the sum total of aspects 
presented by one object to a multitude of spectators.’190    
We might add here that we touch upon a double structure between the world and 
appearances. The reality of the world-in-common is only established through 
the different viewpoints that are bound to appearances. Vice-versa, however, the 
world also is able to testify and memorialize action. It relates current action with 
the past and the future, offers a relative permanence to action and speech, as it 
also ‘inspire new speech and action’.191 
5.3.4 The Space of Appearance and the Public Realm
We touched once again upon a spatial requirement and endowment of Arendt’s 
notion of action. It is not only spatial, local, and personal, it also needs to be real. 
It cannot descend into the virtual realm – it is only effective when it is enacted 
amongst others in reality. This is a point that also counts vice-versa. By real action 
and speech amongst others, that is upon the stage of public space, the world gains 
its reality and reliability. It is the innumerable perspectives upon the world that 
are revealed in public space that also reveal the world and all its innumerable 
aspects itself. Public space thus cannot be virtual only; it cannot be only a political 
intangible concept within political theory. It needs real appearances in real spaces. 
By acknowledging the need for a real stage for action, we have revealed another 
aspect of the relationship between action and the public realm, and public space 
and architecture on the other. 
When arguing such a relationship between the public space (as is the concern 
of architecture and urban design) and the public realm (as the ideal behind 
such spaces, the ideal of meetings and exchange between citizens), we might be 
trapped in too strong an idealization of concrete spaces – I touched upon this 
trap previously. Arendt, however, helps us at this point. In The Human Condition 
Arendt suggests that there is a difference between the public realm and the space 
of appearance. Admittedly, Arendt herself makes this distinction only once, in all 
other places she mixes up these notions. This ambiguous way of using her notions 
is part of the critique she often rouses. However, at this particular point she felt 
the urge to differentiate between the public realm and the space of appearance – 
the latter precedes the first, she claims. It might seem that Arendt also makes the 
distinction stressed above: between a certain political ideal (the public realm) and 
actual space. We will not push this distinction toward a formula (since in the end 
it is much more mixed up than separated). It is, however, worthwhile to follow 
her distinction here for a while. It offers room to reflect upon physical space and 
architecture once again. Somewhere midway through The Human Condition 
Arendt writes that ‘the space of appearance comes into being wherever men are 
together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes 
all formal constitution of the public realm, and the various forms of government, 
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that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized.’192 Thus the 
distinction is clearly between a certain informality of appearances, and the need 
to establish a formalized public realm in regard to the durability and stability of 
the political community. The American political theorist Seyla Benhabib distin-
guishes between a phenomenological description of the spaces of gathering versus 
the ontological and institutional aspects of these spaces, or between the agonistic 
and the associational view of public space.193 This distinction is helpful, as it helps 
us to see what part of the public realm is important regarding from an archi-
tectural perspective. The aspect of ‘public realm’, which Benhabib describes as 
‘ontological’ or ‘agonistic’, certainly describes the political importance of the space 
of appearance, but – and this is crucial – the onto-logic cannot be ‘designed’. 
It is evoked by actual appearances. The phenomenological or associational 
perspective, however, is the terrain of architecture and real public spaces. In that 
sense, this distinction clearly strips the discourse on public space a bit from its 
over-estimated expectations, without immediately leaving the political perspective 
behind. The distinction thus helps to direct our view to the phenomenological 
aspects of appearance, rather than to the ambition to create political spaces. One 
aspect needs to be emphasized here: the transformation of a space of appearance 
into a public realm is not to be seen as a formula. It is not spaces of appearance 
transforming into public realms (symbolical spaces) – it is this which precedes 
the public realm. There is no public realm, in other words, without spaces of 
appearance. 
Arendt’s emphasis, however, again and again comes back to action, with 
its inherent qualities of local, spatial, and personal activity. The emphasis on 
appearance thus can be understood as phenomenological, on what actually 
happens and is distinctive in everyday space. ‘From a phenomenological point of 
view,’ the philosopher Cecilia Sjöholm writes, ‘the analysis of appearances must 
be regarded to, counter to, or as resonating with social coordinates. Beings appear 
through gestures, movements, voices, forms, shapes, and tonalities, speaking to 
the senses of spectators and auditors because something captures the eye or the 
ear.’194 These phenomenological and sensible aspects of appearance indeed bring 
these moments back to everyday spaces – not only to representative, symbolic 
and institutionalized spaces, but particularly to the café at the corner of the street, 
the square in the middle of a town, the shopping mall at the edge of the city, the 
parking lot in front of that mall, the sidewalk in front of your house – all spaces 
where we are within the proximity of others. I need to come back to that, since of 
course some places are potentially better equipped to let such appearance happen, 
but here it is important once again to state that in principal every space can be a 
space of appearance, as long as it offers proximity and openness to the plural.
The first helpful aspect of this is surely that the space of appearance is not bound 
to any particular space, to a particular square or boulevard. It nevertheless 
requires a concrete physical space, since it depends upon the appearance to one 
another, which, as we have seen, requires physical spatiality. Appearance thus 
can happen ‘everywhere’: it is not bound to spaces that we would value as central 
or symbolic.195 Appearance to one another is possible on every street corner, in 
every park, in the landscape – it is not limited to the square in front of the town 
hall, the Washington Mall or Tahrir Square. As Arendt writes: ‘wherever people 
gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily and not 
forever.’196 This aspect also reveals that the ‘space of appearance’ is temporal and 
unstable, the second aspect that needs to be stressed. It only depends upon the 
availability of peers amongst which to appear. 
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‘The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is 
the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, 
and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no 
matter where they happen to be. ‘Wherever you go, you will be a polis’: these 
famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they 
expressed the conviction that action and speech between the participants 
which can find its proper location anywhere. It is the space of appearance in 
the widest sense of the world, namely the space where I appear to others as 
others appear to me, were men exist not merely like other living or inanimate 
things but make their appearance explicitly.’197 
This temporal aspect is also emphasized in other quite distinctive perspec-
tives. Bruce Robbins, for instance, the editor of The Phantom Public Sphere 
writes: ‘In proposing that publicness is a quantity appearing in the market as 
well as the state, and in numerous spots in between, I am suggesting that no 
sites are inherently or eternally public. The lines between public and private are 
perpetually shifting, as are the tactical advantages and disadvantages of finding 
oneself on one side or the other.’198 Arendt’s writings thus do not offer a black-
and-white narrative on the relationship between the political realm and public 
space, between the exceptional and the everyday. The exceptional can take 
place in the everyday, as long as there is an interaction between appearance and 
peers. The space of appearance can be here and there, then and now. This also 
prompts our third aspect to be stressed: a loose relation to the form of space. 
Appearance is not dependent upon the right form, the right design, and the right 
location. It is certainly clear, however, that in the contemporary typologies of the 
suburban landscape, public space is scripted, pacified, domesticated. The public 
space of a gated community, a historic district, or an airport city are convenient, 
comfortable, limited. That makes it difficult for these spaces to offer the space of 
appearance, which requires the possibility of exceptions. 
5.3.5 On the Law and the Wall
Having stated that the space of appearance is bound to space, but not bound to 
a particular form and location of that space, does not mean that architecture 
(as concerned with the design, lay-out, and physical qualities of space) is not 
relevant. Obviously, aspects of the form, quality, accessibility, location, amongst 
others – all these characteristics of public space that seems to vanish in today’s 
landscapes and cities – play an important role in the possibilities of appearances 
amongst others. At first sight, we might stress, however, the relevance of design, 
since we can certainly agree with a well-known quote of the architectural theorist 
Christopher Alexander that ‘most of the wonderful places of the world were not 
made by architects, but by the people.’199 Having said that, his own approach 
towards architecture reveals something of the importance of the field. Alexander 
is well known particularly for his attempt to develop a database of ‘good’ urban 
and architectural places. This attempt shows the importance of the quality of 
spaces, and positions architecture as a field that is able to acquire knowledge of 
these spaces in order to apply it in other cases. In other words, his attempt reveals 
at least that his own position was never guided by indifference to the form and 
design of space. On the contrary, the insight that is revealed through the database 
was meant to contribute to future ‘good’ spaces.200 It does not require many 
words to state that the loose relationship between ‘the space of appearance’ and 
particular forms of public spaces must lead to indifference to the architectural 
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aspects of space. Such an indifference not only diminishes the cultural aspects 
of architecture; not only its inherent representational character,201 but also its 
essential aspects of giving form, creating spaces, and shaping the possibilities 
to be appropriated, occupied, used (which increases the possibilities to appear 
amongst peers). 
In fact, another passage in Arendt’s reflection on action redirects our view to the 
notion of the public realm – even though we previously defined it as ontological, 
and thus not accessible for architectural design. A public realm cannot be 
created by design, we stated – it is established as the result of appearances. We 
have to rethink this statement to a certain degree. When Arendt describes the 
instability and unpredictability of action, she stresses this as the very ‘frailty’ of 
human affairs. This frailty is a space that secures the action – and Arendt urges 
limitation and stability as the very characteristics of that space. This starts firsts 
with her description of the agora: only citizens were required to participate in 
that space. Action and speech requires a public of peers that can be regarded as 
equals in utter diversity. In the polis public space was understood as political 
realm, since ‘men met one another as citizens and not as private persons.’ The 
citizens, in other words, ‘receive equality by virtue of their citizenship.’202 Arendt, 
as stated previously, never limited action to a certain class or elite: everybody is 
able to act, she states. She posits the councils in Hungary after the Revolution, 
or the town hall meetings in America, as her ideal model of political organiza-
tion. These references certainly reveal aspects of limitation: town hall meetings 
are only effective if bound to a particular place. It is not possible to organize 
such meetings on the scale of the country or nation. Also in the New York Times 
architecture critic Michael Kimmelman refers to this fact when he writes: ‘In his 
Politics Aristotle argued that the size of an ideal polis extended to the limits of a 
herald’s cry. He believed that the human voice was directly linked to civic order. 
A healthy citizenry in a proper city required face-to-face conversation.’203 This 
aspect of size is obviously a serious matter in today’s megalopolises, where the 
sheer amount of people and the sheer distance between everything is a serious 
difficulty regarding the possibility of a ‘shared space’.204 It nevertheless might be 
clear that the unlimited growth of cities on the one hand does not make the space 
of appearance an easy phenomenon, nor that it has hollowed out its urgency. In 
the megalopolis plurality after all has got its place particularly to the inherent 
anonymity.205 The rise of the megalopolis, as well as the urbanized landscape 
urges to go once again at the heart of the space of appearance. As we might stress, 
appearance is only possible when peers are in proximity. This certainly does not 
mean that spaces needs to be small in order to offer a possibility of appearance – 
that perspective would bind appearance again to physical form. It only urges our 
previous statement, that appearance can take place everywhere. Even within large 
spaces little gatherings can offer the possibility of appearance. In turn, however, 
this statement has an important implication regarding architecture. We might 
understand from this that architecture certainly can contribute to these possibil-
ities of appearance. In large spaces, it is less easy to gather people in proximity, 
whereas threshold spaces offer more convenient opportunities to connect 
differences. The urban fabric of public spaces, once again, cannot be seen as a 
continuous fluidity without any edges; it needs its internal sequence and edges, 
it even might need hierarchy as well as its characteristics, apart from the lack of 
a ‘ruling’ narrative (be it the state, as in the case of the Tiananmen Square, or the 
market, in the case of a shopping mall). However, in describing the limitation of 
the public space to the citizens of the agora, Arendt particularly addresses the 
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need to appear amongst equals. Appearance, in other words, does not simply 
require the presence of others, but particularly of ‘peers’, who are not simply 
people ‘alike’ (as in relationships of kinship), but require recognition and equality. 
This requires spaces that are open for plurality in equality, where differences are 
not wiped away, but accepted, not by hierarchy but on the basis of equality. 
Secondly, and importantly for the argument we are developing, such open spaces 
that offer room for peers to meet, require a minimum recognition of common 
ground.206 Although we have posed previously that the space of appearance can 
come into being everywhere, it is certain that some spaces are more plausible 
as spaces of appearance than others. Spaces where people gather, for instance, 
offer more opportunities of appearance than vacant lots, whereas the town hall 
certainly offers more possibilities for action than the warehouse. It neverthe-
less can also be imagined that sometimes the warehouse provides a common 
ground on which appearances are possible or action is required. However, 
regarding the town hall – this is by chance a political space that is institutional-
ized. Appearances here – in the modern age in speech more than in action – are 
secured by the very political decision to organize meetings, where participants in 
the process of political decision-making are able to bring their opinions to the fore 
in order to persuade other participants. Arendt argues the need of a ‘secure’ space 
regarding appearance amongst peers, which is the third point we need to stress. 
This point brings us back to the difference between the phenomenological and the 
ontological aspects of the space of appearance. On the one hand, plurality itself 
needs to be secured in order to be a common ground for peers to meet. Action 
and speech, in other words, are not possible in spaces dominated by rulers, where 
violence is in play. 
The third aspect is the need to secure the space of appearance, particularly 
because of the fluidity and temporality of action. As Arendt writes: 
‘the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of words 
and deeds.” Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the 
public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which 
constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the 
laws were drawn around and already existing public space which, however, 
without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the 
moment of action and speech itself.’207
This certainly touches upon the ontological aspect of the public realm which 
Arendt brings here amazingly close to the field of architecture. The need to secure 
certain spaces derives from the fact that action and deeds do not last and only 
achieve tangibility when people appear to each other. Every community, from 
the smallest to the biggest, needs places where this action and speech can unfold 
on a structural basis. Although it has been stated previously that the ability to 
turn space into part of a political realm lies beyond the architectural capacity, 
the challenging perspective in the quote is the wall drawn around spaces of 
appearance. Arendt here comes up with an architectural metaphor, a reference 
to the polis, that immediately challenges the relationship of architecture and the 
public realm. She argues that walls are needed along with boundaries, in order to 
give stability and endurance to the public space as a political entity. Architecture 
is required in its quality to circumscribe space, and by doing so, immediately to 
define and secure that space. The public realm, in other words, needs the stability 
of walls and boundaries, those of laws and architecture. 
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At this point, we need to acknowledge that even the instability of action and 
speech at certain points need the stability of walls, in order not to go by unnoticed, 
and vanish without being heard and seen. 
‘In other words, men’s life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure 
that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least 
tangible and most ephemeral of man-made ‘products’, the deeds and stories 
which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of 
the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically 
guaranteed by its laws – lest the succeeding generations change its identity 
beyond recognition – is a kind of organized remembrance.”208
Emphasizing the architectural aspects of this ‘wall’ that circumscribes space, we 
now need to stress a short passage that I left out of Arendt’s quotes that I have 
extensively brought to the fore above – a very famous one, and a very clarifying 
one. Arendt once again takes up a spatial metaphor to describe what she has in 
mind: 
‘To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is 
between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who 
sit around it; the world, like very in-between, relates and separates men at the 
same time. The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and 
yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak.’209   
 
Arendt thus describes the public realm as a ‘thing’ that is in-between a group of 
people. The thing, a table, is the metaphor for what Arendt calls ‘the world-of-
things’. Seen from the perspective of the group, it is the table that they have in 
common. It connects them, since they are seated around. It also separates them, 
since everyone joining the table is seated around it, at different positions. It 
even limits the size of the group of people: the table is in common only for those 
seated around it. However, if we imagine this group seated around the table, 
we once again have an image of the plurality that is an integral part of public 
space. If appearance in public space, amongst peers, can be described as taking a 
seat around the table, and join the conversation, one literally inhabits a specific 
position at that table. In other words: all the participants that are joined around 
a table are speaking from different perspectives. That for Arendt is an important 
aspect of the public realm. ‘Being seen and being heard by others’, Arendt writes, 
‘derive their significance from the fact that everybody sees and hears from a 
different position.’210 The contribution to the public realm is localized: it is 
grounded in one’s own position, which is evoked by nature and nurture, by genes 
and particular experiences. Each human being brings his or her own perspective 
to the fore, dwells upon his or her own experiences and convictions. It is the 
world that is in common, the public realm, which at once gives room to expose the 
differences as well as to unite these in a single figure. This image certainly evokes 
an agenda for architecture: to provide objects that simultaneously connect and 
separate those gathered around it. 
The aspects of the public realm described above thus open up this notion 
towards the field of architecture. Architecture offers the means to circumscribe 
space, which offers the stability towards the public space that is needed to face the 
frailty of action. The means architecture offers to circumscribe spaces are a means 
to increase the proximity between the participants in space. This is an instrument 
of architecture, particularly facing contemporary society with its social realms. 
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Architecture after all is able to emphasize spaces of appearance – its very formal 
aspects have the opportunity to represent, negotiate or mediate differences.211 In 
other words, when we depend upon Arendt’s concept of the space of appearance 
facing the context of today’s political spheres as well as our contemporary (sub)
urban landscape, we might understand the role of architecture as one of inter-
mediation, bringing in proximity a wide ranges of differences to the public in the 
streets.212 
5.3.6 From Action to Distraction and Back Again
The previous sections have shown how Arendt’s concept of action, public realm 
and space of appearance is saturated with notions of space, reality and tangibility 
– notions that are part and parcel of the architectural project. They have also 
shown that this notion of action at some point also requires the act-of-architec-
ture: to circumscribe space in order to offer a durable, secure and stable stage 
for appearances. In the very first sections of this chapter, we made the opposite 
turn: starting by tracing the recent history of architecture, we were able to see how 
architects reflected upon aspects of public space. Therefore the question now is: 
how can we bring both lines of thought together, so that we can define the role of 
architecture more strongly, regarding Arendt’s urgent reflection upon the spaces 
of appearance? In order to answer this question, let us once again look to actual 
public spaces. 
The very moment we define ‘action’ as the activity of public space, we also 
evoke the image of political protests. Action, after all, is regularly associated with 
demonstrations and other forms of resistance to political decisions or business 
transactions. Some spaces are the regular sites of such protests: the Washington 
Mall, New York’s Union Square, the Champs-Élysées in Paris, Taksim Square in 
Istanbul, Cairo’s Tahrir Square, and so on. However, when one enters these spaces 
on regular days, there are often no protests. They can just be open spaces, often 
full of cars, tourists, shoppers, and employees rushing to their offices. No protests, 
no fierce discussions, no demonstrations, no posters – no politics at all, let alone 
appearance amongst peers. So even these spaces that we regard as central and 
political, only occasionally are used for political rallies, protests and gatherings. 
We even need to admit that in fact within these gatherings, it is difficult to 
stand out – as Arendt describes the activity of action. Most of the gatherings 
are so crowded that there is no room for action or speech, besides which within 
these actions there is often not much room for plurality: people think alike. 
It is not easy under such circumstances to catch the eye and bring something 
new to the fore. In that sense, we are trapped here in the notion of action – we 
are on the wrong track to grasp actual public spaces better. This track after all 
depends too much on the macro-political level and its rituals, which is closer to 
Habermas’s celebration of the (critical) public sphere than to the micro-political 
level of Arendt’s appearances. We need therefore to replace our initial intuition 
to celebrate the central squares and piazzas with a celebration of much more 
everyday spaces. In the first instance, we might regard this as the interesting 
distinction that is offered by the social geographer Saskia Sassen, in her reflection 
on the Occupy-movement: 
‘The urban street as public space is to be differentiated from the piazza or the 
boulevard of the European tradition, a space for ritualized practices. I think of 
the space of “the street,” which of course included squares and any available 
open space, as a rawer and less ritualized space in which new forms of the 
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social and the political can be made, rather than being routinely enacted. With 
some conceptual stretching, we might say that politically “the street and the 
square” are markedly different from “the boulevards and the piazza”: the first, 
signal action, and the second, rituals.’213 
As is clearly the case, the macro and the micro levels of politics, action and ritual, 
are in close relation with each other. The latter is preceded by the first, we might 
argue, in parallel with Arendt’s argument that the space of appearance precedes 
the public realm. The urge at this point is to start reflecting upon our idea of 
public life around the corner.214 
This certainly is close to Arendt’s everyday description of appearances 
amongst peers. Arendt never loaded this with the ideal of the public realm as 
an entity in which the nation as a whole appeared to one another. At the same 
time her stress on appearances both diminishes the great expectations as well 
as opens up new directions to understand public space. It first tempers the ideal 
behind ‘official’ public spaces as ‘democratic spaces’, of public spaces as vital 
elements in the political realm, as spaces where all people meet, discuss, and 
exchange perspectives in order to develop the public opinion. Simultaneously, 
it proposes other perspectives, putting forward public spaces as temporal and 
somehow limited spaces of appearance, places of action, room to be seen and 
heard, to hear and see. If the public realm, or the space of appearance is limited in 
size and is localized, we might do better to look to the square around the corner, 
the doorstep of an apartment block, the sidewalk of a street, the parking lot of 
a mall, the departures hall of an airport, or the waiting room of a train station. 
These spaces too, we must admit, are ‘empty’ on a daily base. That is, not empty of 
people, but empty of action. If we look closely to the social practices within these 
spaces, we immediately understand that public space is often used in what we 
might call ‘distraction’: not completely aware of those others that also cross the 
space towards their car or the nearest metro entrance, waiting for a connection 
or departure. It is only if something happens, if we bump into someone else, a 
person stumbles, the train has a long delay, a very attractive person walks by, or 
whatever, that we awaken from our distracted perception and take on a much 
more attentive attitude. The question might even be this: doesn’t even the limited 
‘ideal’ of Arendt, of public space as stage of public action, a space of appearances, 
bring us too far away from the everyday experience of public spaces and practices? 
It is this experience of public space in distraction that George Baird addresses in 
his second book on public space, that I previously announced, Public Space.215 
The book mirrors this experience with Arendt’s notion of ‘action’ as the modus 
operandi of public space. Prior to this, particularly in The Space of Appearance, 
Baird offered a few thoughts on this notion of ‘distraction’ as it is apparent in the 
writings of Walter Benjamin. Baird, by introducing Benjamin besides Arendt (and 
Habermas), stresses the fact that our common experience of the city is in a mode 
of disengagement and alienation. The figure by which Benjamin emphasises this 
‘new’ urban condition is that of the flâneur, who wanders through the city as a 
‘distanced and ironic figure’, an ‘alienated man’.216 Benjamin’s urban experience 
runs parallel with the famous 1903 essay of George Simmel on the Großstädte, 
in which he argues that the overload of stimuli in the city compels the city-
dweller to acquire a ‘blasé attitude’. The city urges the ‘individual to preserve the 
autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social 
forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life.’217 
The ‘blasé’ response of the city-dweller that Simmel thus recognizes means the 
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exclusion from the nervous system of outer stimuli, which not only affects one’s 
internal emotional life, but also one’s attitude towards others.218 In urban public 
space, relationships are often characterized by distance and reserve. This is still 
a common description of urban life today, in which the anonymity of the streets 
(and even unfamiliarity with neighbours) plays a central role. This condition 
of anonymity and distance today can also be used to describe suburban neigh-
bourhoods, which – by the very regular use of car transportation – become 
dispersed as well. This condition of public space thus prompts the question of 
how the everyday environment – in which people either need to retreat from all 
the noise and the sounds and the people, the hustle and bustle (in order not to be 
disturbed or become crazy by all the stimuli that are offered), or want to retreat 
from (because they are in the position to do so and can continue to live their life 
comfortably and securely) – offers the opportunity to act and to appear to others. 
Baird brings this question not only to the domain of urban anthropology and 
urban sociology, to public life and social relations, but also urges this attitude 
of distraction towards the field of architecture. Since the city is experienced in 
distraction, architectural settings function simply as a décor for daily life – that 
is: being unnoticed by the users. They are not enjoyed or experienced in conscious 
and attentive engagement, let alone in concentration. This raises the question 
of how important architecture actually is, particularly related to the previous 
question on public life. Is this role on the background of public life good enough, 
or is there a need to offer spaces that somehow ‘awake’ the users from distraction, 
in order to get them ready for ‘action’? And if so, does architecture have the 
capacity and instruments to do so? In other words, what aim should architecture 
have, regarding the modus of distraction and the importance of action, according 
to Arendt? 
As Baird writes in his 1995 introduction to the exhibition ‘Queues, Rendevous, 
Riots’, ‘Architecture is readily able to influence its behaviour, without that 
audience becoming aware, let alone critical of the social and political manip-
ulations to which it may be subjected.’219 Even though architecture affects ‘the 
public’, it is in a hideous way. In Public Space Baird employs a great example of 
overestimating the importance of consciousness to be evoked by architecture in 
this regard – and I will quote him here at length, since his reflection is telling. 
The example is a report by the well-known American architectural critic Paul 
Goldberger on the opening of the Aronoff Center at the University of Cincinnati, 
designed by the New York architect Peter Eisenman.[IMAGE 5.17] Goldberger writes:
‘Mr Eisenman has made a career out of pushing the boundaries of architec-
ture, designing buildings that are deliberately provocative, and he has said that 
he is satisfied if his buildings force people to take notice. “Walter Benjamin 
said that most people think of architecture casually,” [Eisenman] said during 
the televised discussion, which was taped in the atrium of his new building. 
“What I like about this building is that you cannot take it casually.”’220
Baird reviews this quote very sharply and to the point:
‘It is not surprising that an architect such as Eisenman, who is as much an 
intellectual as he is a professional, would make reference to the ideas of 
Benjamin on such an occasion. But it comes as a considerable shock to learn 
that, in doing so, he would so startlingly misconstrue the significance of 
Benjamin’s famous observation. For nothing in Benjamin’s writings would 
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ever suggest that it was advisable – or for that matter even feasible – for 
architects to attempt to shift the mode of perception of architecture in the 
opportunistic manner proposed by Eisenman. Perhaps a certain short-term 
shock, such as Eisenman seeks, will be achievable, but it is clear that in its 
inevitable aftermath, his Aronoff Center, like all other buildings in the world, 
will soon slip largely into that zone of “distracted” appropriation characteristic 
of architecture generally. What is more, even during the initial period prior 
to that, the response he seeks will more typically be that of visitors and critics 
than it will be of daily users. That an architectural thinker of his probity would 
take Benjamin’s argument so lightly is a startling indication of our profession’s 
failure to grasp its larger social significance.’221 
Although Baird’s last remark is quite telling – architectural theorists taking phil-
osophical notions too superficially, and by doing so overlooking the ‘reality’ of 
architectural questions (by which I mean the everyday reality buildings are to 
their users) – it is the remarks above that are important for us here. Architecture 
is, after the first visit to a new building, experienced in distraction. Only fellow-ar-
chitects will see the building as an end in itself, and will travel all the way to see 
(and experience) a particular building (but they are exceptional, far away from the 
everyday user). We will touch upon the spatial experience of buildings in the next 
chapter, since I consider this aspect of experience to be quite important, also in 
everyday use, but for here it is important to underline the argument Baird brings 
to the fore. Architecture sooner or later is just the regular environment of users, 
and is experienced almost without notice. It seems not so obvious that a certain 
‘disturbance’ of the experience-mode of distraction, let alone the opportunity to 
act consciously, will be delivered by a building or by the built environment as 
such, specifically when concentrating on the ‘everyday’ environment of the people. 
This reflection by Baird first and foremost argues that architecture can hardly 
be used to break through the human modus of distraction to his environment 
and lead them to a modus operandi of engagement and participation. This, I 
would argue, is the wrong question to ask of architecture. Not because architec-
ture can’t offer the counter-form of action, the stage for appearance, but since 
the opportunity to act, to appear to others as others appear to us, is offered 
on a different level. As I will investigate in the next Chapter, the physical is 
important, along with the aesthetics of the building. Architecture even has 
educative qualities, like the arts. However, it cannot be understood solely from 
this ‘teaching’ perspective, nor from an aesthetical point of view. If counted as 
an art, we easily get the wrong expectations of the engagement of the public. 
Benjamin actually comes to his emphasis on distraction because he distances 
architecture from the arts. ‘Architecture has always represented the prototype of 
a work of art the reception of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state 
of distraction,’ he writes.222 Since the work of art requires concentration, one 
has to be ‘withdrawn’ from the world in order to enjoy and experience the work 
of art. Architecture on the other hand is exposed to the world, it is facing the 
streets, which are filled with noises and signs, views and disturbances – full of life. 
The modus of concentration which is required to enjoy the work of art, cannot 
be the modus of the driver, the cyclist, the hiker, the wanderer in the streets. 
They are users rather than enjoyers of the space, caught in a certain activity and 
movement. Of course, there are moments of concentration, focal points of the 
attitude of the participant in the streets. These at least are related to traffic and 
flows, to signs that organizes the street life and mobility, but then again, it is often 
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behaviourism organizing the actual uses of the street. If there are moments of 
concentration, it depends upon various factors. Something happening upon the 
street, touching upon a famous and monumental façade, an advertisement – but, 
as Baird argues, ‘such instances will not be frequent enough, or sustained enough, 
to put into serious doubt a general pattern of public behaviour that is consistent 
with the principle enunciated by Benjamin.’223 However, Baird continues, 
this mode of distraction does not mean the same as ‘emptiness’. Quite on the 
contrary: he refers again to Benjamin, who argues that this mode of distraction 
fully incorporates the ‘bodily knowledge’ of the environment. It is, and he follows 
Benjamin here, ‘a learned mode of experience.’224 Within the distracted mode of 
experience, a modus operandi is active, that guides the figure through the streets 
and anticipates dangerous situations, while at the same time in thoughts – or in 
actual conversation through the extensive use of the smartphone today, we might 
add225 – somewhere else. Baird stresses this point a bit further than Benjamin did, 
in order to coin and investigate the opposite mode, that of ‘concentration’, which 
Baird understands as ‘having significant features in common with Arendt’s model 
of “action”.’226 His aim then is to form a hybrid between the concepts of distraction 
and action. This hybrid starts with the remark that Arendt, who contrasts action 
with behaviour, admits that behaviour belonged to the human condition as well, 
although she designates behaviour to the private realm and social realm, as 
we have seen. We might argue that in Arendt’s view, behavioural habits, which 
are incorporated in our body over time, somehow help us in the street. These 
behavioural habits parallel with the Benjamin notion of distraction, Baird claims. 
Baird’s main question therefore is if behavioural habits have taken over street 
life, does this exclude the possibility of action? In order to answer this question, 
he offers a close reading of street-habits, through a great selection of street 
photography: depicting a crowd, a few individuals, a fierce debate, a marvellous 
play, just a terrace, or real political and revolutionary actions. The images show 
sometimes exceptionally but mostly quite recognizable practices, sometimes those 
moments that have become historic, sometimes simply images of everyday life. 
The photographs reveal public life, Baird argues, as a spectrum that stretches from 
Benjamin’s distraction towards Arendt’s conscious ‘action’. Public practices, we 
can thus stress, consist of many faces and cannot be reduced to a single definition. 
They cannot be reduced to a single space. The space of appearance is not only 
present in these formal spaces that gain national and international recognition, 
but are also around the corner in a suburban neighbourhood, on a platform 
in a metro station, in a cue at the airport. Such an image is also evoked by the 
previously discussed book by Hajer and Reijndorp, In Search for a New Public 
Domain, which also explores as a sort of sub-text a great range of photographs 
covering public practices in everyday situations. Although they don’t explicitly 
discuss the images, the message seems to be the same: the public domain cannot 
be limited to conscious political settings, but occurs in unforeseeable moments 
and places, often triggered by the occurrence of something unpredicted happening 
or someone ‘strange’ appearing. A flashmob in a mall, a delay of the train, a 
homeless guy at the corner of the street, an accident on a playground: something 
that grasps the attention and disturbs the everyday behavior and comfort, 
challenges the spectator to become an actor. 
From his analysis of the selection of street photographs, Baird concludes 
that within the notion of distraction there is still the split-second possibility 
of perception, of ‘taking a position’, during which a sole spectator moves from 
distraction towards the slightly broader notion of awareness. According to Baird, 
we should not therefore render distraction and action as opposing figures in daily 
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street life, but understand both notions in relationship to each other, as the limits 
of a spectrum of being present in public space. He thus stresses both notions 
as the limits of everyday urban practices in public space by arguing that, also 
according to Arendt, only ‘some of us rise to the challenge to act’ on particular 
moments.227 Action, we can conclude, is always characterized by a conscious 
presence of the human being in public space, as is the case the other way around: 
those present only temporarily form a public. 
Arendt’s image of the public realm is that of the agora in the polis, the importance 
of the agora as a meeting point, a location of public speeches and actions. 
Benjamin obviously writes from a different perspective: it is the industrial city, 
that had expanded strongly, that had aroused the new masses. The difference 
between the polis and the mass-city of course is the anonymity of the single 
figure in public life, a distinction that can be rendered as the public figure of the 
citizen in the polis, versus the flâneur in the industrial city. One actively engaged 
in public life, the other gazing at it, as Benjamin describes.228 The question 
rightly then is how one might embed the Arendtian stress on ‘action’ within 
such an anonymous environment. This might not be too far away from Arendt’s 
description of the ‘space of appearance’, as we have investigated above. The space 
of appearance is temporal, not bound to any particular space. It is bound to the 
presence of an attentive public of peers. But can we relate this perspective to her 
notion of the more established public realm, in which there is a more prominent 
role of architecture as we have previously concluded? 
Her plea for conscious ‘action’ is urged in a positive way by the recognition of 
action in two recent happenings that occurred around the moment she published 
The Human Condition. Actually two moments that were unforeseen, but also 
quite far-reaching in their effects: first the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, despite 
the power of the Soviet Union, and second the student activism of the ‘60s, despite 
the apparent American consumer society. Today we can add the 2011 happenings 
around the world that I discussed before (despite the disappointing turn some 
of these street-revolutions took – at least in the eyes of Western democracies). 
‘These two dramatic – and historically unforeseeable – developments heartened 
her late in her career, with respect to the potentialities of a spontaneous mani-
festation of ‘action’, even in apparently unpropitious social circumstances,’ Baird 
writes.229 Public space, he therefore argues, should be understood as in-between 
these two terms. Although often experienced in distraction, public space also 
contains the opportunity of engagement and involvement, maybe even concentra-
tion and consciousness, and finally revolutionary action. It might be a split-second 
of challenge, but how brief, it is a challenge. 
We need to underline this perspective at this point. It is an important remark 
that helps our understanding of the phenomenology of public space. Baird specif-
ically stresses the every-day use as the main experience of (public) space. And 
rightly so. However, since he keeps both Arendt and Benjamin close together 
within one spectrum, this at the same time keeps the potentialities of public 
space as a political realm intact. Hence the public space is characterized by the 
coming and going of people, the temporalities of concerted action too. Most 
often these spaces are simply squares, streets, buildings, parks, but they can also 
be cafés, convention-centers, malls, parking lots, leisure centers, theme parks, 
historic districts, transit zones. Every now and then, in unforeseen ways and on 
unforeseen places, these spaces offer room for (political) action. When distraction 
and aloof behaviour is disturbed and when people are challenged and ready to act. 
‘Hands up, don’t shoot!’230 [IMAGE 5.16]
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5.3.7 Spatial Improvisations
From Arendt’s emphasis on the space of appearance and Baird’s reading of public 
life – or better said: street-life – as a spectrum ranging from distraction to action, 
we can conclude that public space is not limited to any of the political images 
that dominate the discourse. As we investigated in the first chapters, the ideal 
of public space is drawn in idealistic tones: a public exchange of ideas, to share 
perspectives, to question worldviews, fierce discussions about political issues, to 
look after one another, and to establish public opinion. But our understanding 
of public space should not depend upon these ultimate figures. Public space is a 
stage, as Arendt argues in her phenomenological reading, but the play is temporal 
and not limited to one or another central or symbolic place. The public is roused 
on the micro-scale of everyday life, in everyday spaces. And although that might 
impact the macro scale of the realm of politics, the realms of the state and the 
market, the importance is always simply bound to local instances. We might say 
this is a weak reading of public space: although it is not burdened by the aim to 
form the ultimate purpose as defined by Habermas, ‘public opinion’, it neverthe-
less still contains the important possibility of appearances, revealing plurality. 
Public spaces inherently offer the potential to start a play or to be engaged in a 
play, to start a concert, or to participate in a concert. Such a weak understanding 
of the relationship between public space and the public realm, that we urge here, 
thus is closer to the very character of action, which can never be predicted when 
and where to happen, nor be prescribed how to happen. In other words, this weak 
understanding of public space includes the important understanding that it offers 
room for the unforeseen and the unpredicted. It offers the possibility to the users 
to take initiatives, and to be involved, engaged – or simply, the possibility to act 
and enact. Public space is characterized by the opportunity of action, and due to 
the unpredictability of action, this can address both the everyday as the highly-po-
litical realm. 
We might conclude that the ideal behind public space is more about the poten-
tiality (which is a condition of space and time) of democratic practices, rather than 
the guarantee of it. And having stated that, we can also argue that it can occur 
on the very doorstep of one’s dwelling, as well as on the square in front of the 
parliament – although it is likely to start at the doorstep, and, by gaining re-action 
and participants, move towards the more symbolic spaces, where a larger public 
touches upon it and the media will cover it. Arendt, in other words, helps us to 
understand the political charge of every public life in the streets and squares, 
parking lots and landscapes – to those everyday spaces that offer room for the 
everyday life of citizens. 
Although it is clear that no architectural form can guarantee the space of 
appearance, it nevertheless is also obvious that architectural form influences the 
potentialities of spaces to offer room for appearances. It can increase as it is able 
to limit the possibilities of appearances. This of course prompts architecture – all 
architectural assignments – with political meaning. Each architectural interven-
tion somehow contributes to the possibilities or impossibilities of appearances, 
whether or not the architectural form also contributes to the representation of 
that space ontologically. The question is therefore how to distinguish, or even 
propel ‘public’ spaces, which offer the potential of appearance? Before going to 
that question in an architectural sense, it is important once again that the archi-
tecture allows a plural public. A lack of plurality is signage of the social realm, 
according to Arendt, which makes her perspective critical in respect to the organi-
zation of public space in parochial terms.231 A public of peers, on the other hand, 
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consists of a plural public, though they are recognized as equal. This equality, we 
now understand, is not something on the surface, it is not to be found in similar 
interests, backgrounds, convictions or world-views, but is a shared engagement in 
the world, a recognition of the commonness of the world. Some spaces certainly 
offer more challenges and potentialities than others, gathering a public. Cities, 
for instance, are much more likely to draw a plural public, than villages. After 
all, urban spaces are part of a network that is, in the well-known definition of 
Louis Wirth and the Chicago School of Sociology, ‘large, dense and permanent 
settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals.’232  However, even the urban 
spaces increasingly seem to disperse heterogeneity in favour of similarity. From 
gated communities to Business Districts, and from the airport to Historic Areas, 
even from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, often attract a particular group of 
people, defined by race, class, background, income, and so on.  
This of course is not all about architecture – part of it is simply organization 
and program. The architect’s task, however, is to challenge place, program and 
organization, we might conclude. The architectural intervention can be thought 
of in different ways, and it might be the ethical task of the architect to take note 
of the public, and to stress assignments against this background of the space of 
appearance, plurality and the public realm. I will return to the ethical aspects of 
architecture later. The architect is certainly not alone in this challenge, nor empty-
handed. As the architectural debate in the pivotal fifties, which I traced above, as 
well as the lessons learned from Parc de La Villette in Chapter 3, have revealed, 
there are certainly architectural elements and directions that help to ‘propel’ the 
opportunities of appearances in public space rather than to limit them. In the 
fifties, to briefly summarize, architects rediscovered the importance of [1] (central) 
spaces of gathering, [2] architecture as the representation of such spaces, [3] the 
continuity in time as well as [4] the continuity in the urban network, that is how 
such spaces of gathering contribute to the urban fabric as a whole. This latter 
aspect urges succession and sequences of spaces, which is also one of the lessons 
learned from Parc de La Villette. To remind us, from Tschumi’s design, we gained 
as ‘preliminary lessons for designers’: [1] continuity of routing both on the level 
of the city as on the level of the neighbourhood and park, [2] heterogeneity of 
program, again both on different levels, [3] ambiguity in the design of the spaces, 
which in Parc de La Villette was gained through the superimposition of different 
layers of elements, [4] continuity in time by the re-use of old elements, which 
connect the very site to its former use and meaning, and finally [5] the design 
itself, which makes from all the above a meaningful whole. 
In his book Public Space, George Baird offers three basic conditions of public 
space that, to my mind, offer a background to these previously learned lessons. In 
order to contribute to public life, public space needs to urge visibility, propinquity, 
and continuity, he argues.233 The first condition does not only underline the 
need to see and to be seen, ‘appearing to others as they appear to me’, but also 
the importance of a tangible plurality. Action surely requires visibility to gain 
response. This requires a heterogeneous space, Baird argues, despite a temptation 
within modern as well as post-modern architecture to homogenize spaces, either 
by separating functions or publics. Although Baird here first and foremost argues 
against the control of space in terms of surveillance,234 we can certainly add that 
this also is about the experience of space not controlled from a single perspective, 
as for instance principles of profit, consumption or entertainment. Arendt 
understands this as a threat to the plurality of the public realm, a curtailment 
of ‘man in the plural.’ As touched upon previously, this not only is a threat for 
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plurality, it also threatens the world-in-common. This world is experienced only 
through the innumerable perspectives on that world shared in public space. ‘The 
reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable 
perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself and for 
which no common measurement or denominator can ever be devised.’235 A true 
public space, in Arendt’s perspective as we have seen, offers ‘different locations’ 
for participants to appear, to participate, and to observe.236 The heterogeneity 
of space – the possibility to appear in one’s own proper position – thus is an 
important aspect of the condition of visibility of public space. It should be visible, 
or even better embody the multiple perspectives that can be employed within 
this space. In other words, it should embody publicness and represent the idea 
of the plural public. This does not mean that there is a particular architecture of 
the public, forms (be they ‘weak’ or ‘strong’) that can be recognized as ‘plural’. We 
will come back to architectural form in the next chapter. Regarding public space, 
what first and foremost should be (made) visible and tangible, and therefore also 
challenged, is what we might call ‘the spectacle of public life’, that is: the hustle 
and bustle of everyday life in public. Although almost always unfolding in modes 
of distraction, as we have seen, this ‘vivid’ arousal of public life is of the utmost 
importance. Public space needs a vivid exploration by the users, it needs to be 
occupied by the public. This once again makes clear that the very architecture of 
public space isn’t a tool to deconstruct the distracted gaze of the spectator. It is 
public life itself that continuously challenges the users. Playing down the role of 
architecture does not mean that the form, lay-out, and materiality of public space 
does not matter at all. Architecture also plays its role in a distracted experience: 
it does matter if a place has a focal point, is centralized, offers overview, opens up 
sight-lines or consists of height differences, if it is shiny or rough, pre-scripted or 
explorative. 
The condition of ‘visibility’ as Baird stresses might be a matter of the eye, 
the experience of publicness also depends upon the other senses. In the second 
condition he distinguishes Baird focusses on the ear: propinquity. This condition 
emphasizes the nearness of human bodies not only in place and time, but also on 
a psychological level. Anthropologists and sociologists, as well as those inspired 
by them, urban designers and architects, have offered insight into the patterns 
of human practices in public space, have tried to measure the flows and patterns 
of public life.237 Within public space individuals follow their path, sometimes 
integrate with one another, form groups, while in other instances groups disin-
tegrate into individuals again. They come and go, pop up somewhere and leave 
the stage elsewhere. They appear sometimes nearby or stay far away. Public 
transport is an exemplary example of this condition. If the underground is rather 
empty, it would be strange to choose a seat immediately next to a person one 
does not know, while during rush hour everybody stands so close to one another 
that we would call this proximity intimate if it was not in the context of a packed 
underground carriage. Despite such ‘behavioural’ measures that structures our 
public life, propinquity starts with the possibility to listen, although not yet 
part of the conversation – listen without ‘looking as if they hearing it.’238 With 
this condition, Baird emphasizes two architectural figures that offer such a 
distanced but curious relationship to what happens elsewhere: the porch and 
the overview. The porch is a space that offers ‘distinct social and psychological 
options of locations,’ Baird writes. ‘If alone, one may choose to hang back along 
the rear wall. Or, of one is in a more confident frame of mind, one may venture 
forward to the outer edge.’239 The porch, although itself located in the periphery 
of a space, offers the spectator the chance to look from a distance,240 but also to 
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slowly move from this peripheral zone into the central space. In other words, 
the porch offers the opportunity of appearances, from periphery to center, from 
almost invisibility towards central attention. Rightly, Baird briefly links this to the 
in-between realm as coined by Aldo van Eyck, upon which we touched previously. 
‘Not quite interior, nor quite exterior; not fully exposing or declaratory of public 
intention, yet forward enough not to be reclusive the “in-between realm” became 
for Van Eyck, the quintessence of a valuable architecture.’241 We might stress this 
in-between space, the threshold or the liminal space here once more. As most 
of today’s spaces are to be understood as largely social (in Arendt’s terms), the 
possibility of a plural public and heterogeneity of space obviously is at its edges, 
where it touches upon other (social) spaces – or even better, where several spaces 
overlap. The tension inherent in such an intertwining of spaces is certainly proof 
of its potentiality as space of appearance. Its ambiguity reveals something of the 
different ‘positions’ it has to offer. 
The overlook is an architectural figure that emphasizes distance over the 
possibility to move out and appear in public. ‘The architectural condition of 
overlook marries visibility to a sectional organization of space that fosters 
downward views,’ Baird writes.242 The best-known example of course is the square 
on the lower level of the Rockefeller Center in New York, which in the winter 
functions as a skate rink, in summer with other sports activities or simply as a 
terrace.[IMAGE 5.18] Important, according to Baird, is its sectional organization. The 
pedestrian on the sidewalk of either 49th or 50th street can’t look into the sunken 
plaza, since it is hidden behind sunken planters, another pedestrian area, and 
again sunken planters. Baird argues that this spatial configuration can host both 
the regular public in distraction, as well as those who are distracted from it by 
their curiosity to see what is happening on the sunken storey. 
‘The street sidewalks have the capacity to accommodate the distracted 
passerby in utterly conventional terms. But at the same time, they open a 
possible lateral downward view to a locus of some possible focal human 
interest (the sunken plaza below). The downward angle of such views, without 
the full exposure of the scene below being immediately evident. … To observe 
the scene below more fully, one must move to the sunken pedestrian zone 
behind the first planter. Here one finds oneself on another linear stretch of 
pedestrian space, but this time, not so purely a “distracted” space as that from 
which one has just departed. To be sure, It is possible to use this passage as 
a short cut, but it is also possible (indeed the spatial order invites it) to linger 
and to contemplate the scene on the sunken plaza below. To construct a public 
space that has the capacity to hold “distracted” and “contemplative” conditions 
of visibility simultaneously together in this manner seems to me a triumph of 
the orchestrated social psychology of public space.’243    
Finally Baird emphasizes the important condition of continuity of spaces, as 
he argues that the Rockefeller Center functions quite well as these pedestrian 
sidewalks are part of the regular New York Grid, and particularly of the sidewalk 
network. In other words, although the sunken plaza is somewhere in the midst of 
the urban block between 49th and 50th street, it is linked through both additional 
pedestrian paths as well as regular street sidewalks that not only form ‘the 
constituent components of the overall spatial order of the plaza’, but also ‘an 
integral component of the continuous public street grid of midtown Manhattan.’244 
The opposite figure of this fusion of an additional square and the regular (grid) 
structure is of course the mall, the gated community, and the other new (sub)
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urban figures that I discussed in Chapter 2. The perimeter boundary of such a 
building or neighbourhood abruptly ends the continuous urban public territory, 
thereby providing vivid worlds apart in a sea of no-man’s-land.245 As Baird argues, 
even the New Urbanist movement, which embraces pluralism at least in theory, is 
affected by the trends of exclusion and separation. ‘It is probably a commonplace 
by now’, Baird writes, ‘to note that such communities exclude all but the most 
homogeneous of populations, and thus seriously can be considered to be public at 
all.’246 He then continues to show that this 
‘diminished publicness has negative consequences for life inside as well as 
outside its boundaries. Even if we concede that gated communities have the 
capacity to reduce the rise of burglaries and break-ins for their residents, by 
the same token they have the troubling effect of generating social pathologies 
for some of their inhabitants. We need only to think of such social groups as 
teenagers and the elderly in order to realize that life for some groups “inside 
the gates” will be more tedious, and less engaged in the manifold reality of the 
world, than would be possible if the vibrant, if sometimes difficult, “plurality” 
that exists “outside the gates” was also to be found inside of them.’247 
It is for this reason that Baird pleads for ‘patterns of intensification’, although 
the examples he offers only address the existing urban condition (of Paris 
and Toronto). His plea seems to parallel the argument of the Barcelona-based 
architect Manuel de Solà-Morales (1939-2012), who argues that the seeking 
of coherence amongst all urban artefacts has to be the job of architecture and 
urban design. He argues that public life is dispersed today towards peripheral 
locations and interior spaces, even in the European city. De Solà-Morales goes on 
to argue that ‘precisely there … can a spectrum expansion of the communal city 
be produced that contributes to the hypertrophy of the public space itself. The 
significance of the public space lies not in the degree of its expanse, its quantita-
tive predominance or its symbolic leading role, but in connecting private, enclosed 
spaces, so that these spaces too can be turned into collective patrimony.’248 
There certainly is much openness in this definition of the architectural conditions 
that might increase the possibilities of appearances in public space. According to 
Herman Hertzberger, and with this remark we will conclude this reflection, this 
is the very task of the architect: to create places that are simultaneously recog-
nizable as well as open for occupation and change.249 This poses architecture 
as a balancing act: balancing between, amongst other pairs, a sharply designed 
proposal and a certain ambiguity of space, between recognition and openness, and 
between enclosure and invitation. In his description the balancing act is described 
as the tension between place and space, which is also the balancing act between 
the designer and the user. ‘The thing that turns space into place,’ he writes, ‘is the 
infill given it by its occupants/users. A location then becomes a “particular” place 
coloured by the occurrences past and present that lend it associations.’250 This 
perspective will come back in the next chapters, where this particular continuity 
in time, as well as the openness of the world for intervention, occupation and 
appropriation, and the challenge between designer and user will be put forward 
as crucial elements in the relationship between architecture and the public realm. 
Before opening up these perspectives, one point needs attention here: the inter-
connectedness of public and private space. 
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5.4 DARK AND LIGHT 
5.4.1 The Origins of Architecture
The story of ‘action’ in human history, Arendt argues, is characterized by a 
continuous trial of control, curtailment and limitation. The urge to limit (the 
consequences of) action is evoked by its very characteristics of unpredictability 
and unexpectedness. These attempts tried to script action in different ways: even 
the limited size of the polis, Arendt states, was meant to limit the consequences 
of action.251 In medieval times as well as in the modern era, action was captured 
in scripts of rituals or commercial activity, or by replacing action with behavior. 
These interventions try to strip action of its sharp edges, of its power to evoke 
awareness and to change. This of course is clearly visible in the totalitarian orga-
nization of the state that Arendt previously had investigated. Recent examples of 
this are the limited possibilities for inhabitants in – unfortunately amongst many 
others – Turkey or China to take note of certain internet pages (from Wikipedia to 
Twitter) during accidents or protests. The longing for control is not only a political 
threat. Economical forces also strip the possibilities of action. Again an extreme 
example is the organization of Disney World and other theme parks, where 
every inch has been designed in order to streamline processes, the movement of 
the masses, entertaining the spectators, the efficiency of events, and the selling 
of products: space is limited, heated and clearly directed. In such a space it is 
hard, if not impossible, to act. All actions after all disturb the very objective of 
the space, and therefore are simply forbidden. This is the background of Sorkin’s 
mantra upon which we touched in Chapter 2 and 3: ‘there are no demonstra-
tions in Disneyland’:252 it makes no sense, it will have no effect, it will be stopped 
immediately. Such carefully planned spaces can’t deal with the unpredictable, the 
unplanned – it disturbs the very aim of the space. 
The unpredictability of action is not only a concern of those in power, it also 
means something for the participant in public life. As Arendt stresses, to appear 
in public, and to act and re-act, requires courage. One needs the courage of 
acting within uncertain, unpredictable and uncontrollable processes. One does 
not know the effect of engagement beforehand. Arendt poses the public realm 
against the private realm: if uncertainty is the characteristic of the public realm, 
control, predictability, certainty and security are the notions that are linked to the 
private.253 Public space is described in colorful, shiny, light and vivid tones; on the 
private Arendt uses an image of darkness and withdrawal. The public establishes 
reality, the private prevents reality. This description certainly evokes an entirely 
negative image of the private realm, in favour of the public realm. It is therefore 
easy to overlook, or even diminish, the former realm in favour of the latter. Often, 
Arendt is presented as simply investigating the public realm,254 while it is true 
that she stresses the public and the private at once. Arendt actually proposes a 
reciprocal relationship between the public and the private: the public cannot 
function without a well-functioning private realm. The private, although described 
in darker tones, therefore has its own qualities in Arendt’s writings. She urges the 
private as a necessary pre-condition, as we will see, prior to public life. Arendt is 
not alone in her investigation of the private, Habermas and Sennett also study 
the private realm, but only insofar as it relates to the public.255 Arendt offers a 
perspective on the private that stretches far beyond the public realm. The private 
realm certainly requires more attention – not only in political theory and public 
life, but also in reflections upon the city and the suburb.256 
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In architectural theory, however, a more balanced view upon the public and 
private seems to be dominating the discourse. Architecture itself, is often stressed 
as the longing for a home. It is commonly accepted that the very source of archi-
tecture is the human need for protection, particularly in the post-paradise era.257 
This seems to be a reasonable perspective, particularly if we think of the very 
beginning of architecture, in the occupation of caves or in the construction of huts 
(as Marc-Antoine Laugier and lots of his Renaissance contemporaries urge as the 
very source of architecture).258 The essence of architecture thus is understood as 
providing a shelter against the danger of nature both physically and mentally. The 
human body and being is in danger ‘out there’, both literally and virtually. The 
human body after all is vulnerable, whereas the human being can’t stand infinite 
space. Architecture therefore erects walls and roofs, makes constructions in order 
to clad these. Particular spots are protected, meant to withdraw from the danger. 
Architecture’s main task therefore might be described as providing a home for the 
human being – for both body and mind.259 
Architectural theorists and historians also generally agree on the idea that 
architecture is much more than just a shelter for body and mind. In the words 
of Alberto Pérez-Gómez, architecture has to be seen as ‘a place of fruition and 
completeness analogous to erotic experience, a place for dwelling.’260 This 
comparison with the erotic experience shouldn’t surprise the reader, since it is 
also a reference to the book he previously wrote: Built Upon Love, in which he 
argues that if there is an ethical and aesthetical attitude, it needs to be built upon 
love.261 In the introduction to this book, he argues that architecture is ‘concerned 
with far more than fashionable form, affordable homes, and sustainable 
development; it responds to a desire for an eloquent place to dwell, one that 
lovingly provides a sense of order resonant with our dreams, a gift contributing 
to our self-understanding as humans inhabiting a mortal world.’262 Once again, 
despite the seeming contradiction in the quote – the contrast between mere 
‘affordable homes’ on the one side (the practical issues), and the resonance with 
‘our dreams’ on the other (the imaginary aspects), architecture is presented as 
a certain ‘natural’ urgency for the human being. Architecture is not simply a 
practical agency in order to offer functional spaces of retreat and protection; it 
contributes to the experience of purpose, Pérez-Gómez has stated elsewhere. 
Architecture helps to fit the human being on earth by an experience of purposeful 
life.263 The desire to give form to our dreams and to the gift of self-understanding 
can be seen as stressing the aesthetical aspects of architecture – or at least these 
aspects beyond the natural need of protection. This is also behind the image of 
the hut in Laugier’s Essais sur l’Architecture: to discuss, besides other issues, the 
aesthetics of architecture. 
Architecture in this view is argued as ‘naturally’, it is a ‘natural’ need of the 
human being, placed in a ‘natural’ relationship with the earth. The human body is 
bound to particular places, secured from the danger of infinite space, from nature 
and even from world, in a place that offers four walls to protect but also some 
imaginary dimension. This perspective of course echoes the four dimensions the 
philosopher Martin Heidegger pushes forward in his famous lecture for architects 
in Bamberg in 1951, in which he draws, largely on etymological argumentation, a 
unity between being, building and dwelling, although we will come back to that 
lecture in the next chapter. As the essential elements of dwelling place: the gods 
and the mortals, the heaven and the earth.264 The spirit, as well as the body, needs 
to dwell in a place where life in all its aspects is revealed in fullness – or should we 
say, is ‘at home’. These perspectives are somehow inward-looking to the human 
being and roots architecture as a necessary agency or instrument regarding 
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a natural and spiritual demand of the human being and the human body. 
Heidegger’s trial to connect being and building certainly found its fertile ground 
within the field of architecture, as did other perspectives upon that matter which 
were published in the fifties. Besides Heidegger’s attempt the French philosopher 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty needs to be mentioned, who in his book The Phenome-
nology of Perception (1945), dedicates two chapters to the question of space.265 
Building on that perspective, the French philosopher Gaston Bachelard took his 
argument further, in a book called The Poetics of Space (1957).266 These books, 
which all stress the phenomenology of space and dwelling, propose place as a 
defence against the threats of modernity, particularly by arguing that the modern 
conception of space, which affects the project of architecture and urban design, 
has lost its essential connection with existential space. In different words and 
tones, they plead for a reconnection between the existential and concrete space. In 
other words, these phenomenal investigations stress the space of the individual, 
where the larger picture, that of the community, the public, is only on secondary 
stage. Pérez-Gómez and other architectural theorists certainly do not leave this 
broader perspective aside. Immediately after the quotes above, the first opens up 
the scope towards the social body. In Built Upon Love he stresses the desire of 
the architect ‘to design a beautiful world’ as well as ‘architecture’s imperative to 
provide a better place for society.’267 And in Attunement he comes up with what he 
calls the ‘ideal’ beyond architecture: ‘When most fully realized, architecture offers 
the gift of psychosomatic completeness, true health and well-being for the social 
body, a space of appearance consonant with its actions and habits.’268 He thus also 
reach beyond the individual towards a bigger picture. However, even after these 
remarks, it is clear that the very root of architecture in his view is on the level of 
natural demand, whether physically, psychosomatically or communally. 
However, if we stress this picture from Arendt’s perspective, it is remarkable 
that the arguments on both the longing for home, as well as on the broader 
picture, still only contain aspects of the labor-view. Arendt in turn stresses the 
world-of-objects, of which architecture certainly is a part as the outcome of ‘work’. 
If the longing for a ‘home’ is the origin of architecture, then it should be the 
longing for being at-home-in-the-world. Its source is not simply the existential 
space, but it is the space needed for the community that requires architectural 
intervention and space. As from this ‘public’ space, in Arendt’s perspective the 
private realm needs attention and investigation. This perspective, in which archi-
tecture is not bound to labor but to work, urges us to look upon architecture 
differently, and will attract our attention in the next chapter. Before we open that 
perspective, however, we need to investigate the private realm as it is related to 
the public realm, in order to understand Arendt’s image of the public in a much 
more complete sense. 
5.4.2  Enabling Participation
In Arendt’s writings, the public and the private are in mutually need. The harsh 
light that is ascribed to the public realm needs the darkness of the private. Of 
course, the dark-and-light metaphor might cheat us at this point. The negative 
tone of the dark ascribed to the private indeed has its source in the privative 
aspect that Arendt ascribes to the private realm. If the private actively discloses 
the human being from participating in the public realm, this is understood by 
Arendt in a negative way. Arendt takes the word private back to this root: it means 
‘to be deprived’: to be deprived from a life lived amongst peers. 
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‘In ancient feeling,’ she writes, ‘the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the 
word itself, was all-important; it meant literally a state of being deprived of 
something, and even of the highest and most human of man’s capacities. A 
man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to 
enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such a 
realm, was not fully human. We no longer think primarily of deprivation when 
we use the word “privacy”, and this is partly due to the enormous enrichment 
of the private sphere through modern individualism.’269 
Without the company of peers, the human being is stripped of his humanity. That 
is to say: only through this appearance in the public realm, in a concern for the 
world, will men gain reality. Only through interaction with the world and through 
action in public will men understand ‘who I am’ as well as ‘what the world is’. 
The reality of the human being as well as the reality of the common world is only 
revealed through appearances in the world and inter-action with peers. Arendt is 
negative about the private at this point, since she recognized in modern life the 
increasing temptation of citizens to disengage from public life and to withdraw 
into the private realm. 
This negative perspective is nevertheless not the only perspective Arendt urges 
about the private. The metaphor of dark-and-light is employed by Arendt in 
more positive reflections upon the private, contributing in mutual ways to the 
functioning of the public realm. At least three important aspects of the private 
realm are urged by Arendt in this respect. The first regards the importance 
of private property: without a private realm, one cannot devote oneself to the 
world. It is the household that enables the citizen to enter public space. ‘Without 
mastering the necessities of life in the household,’ Arendt writes, ‘neither life nor 
the ‘good life’ is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life. As far as the 
members of the polis are concerned, household life exists for the sake of the ‘good 
life’ in the polis.’270 Arendt strongly argues this perspective through a reflection 
upon the organization of the Polis. In the polis, the ownership of a house (and 
household) was regarded as important in order to participate in the political 
realm, and therefore valued amongst the citizens in the Polis; this also meant that 
the house(hold) itself was strongly protected from all interventions by the public. 
In the classical city-state, the ‘power’ of the polis therefore was limited by the 
edges of the private realm. ‘What prevented the polis from violating the private 
lives of its citizens and made it hold sacred the boundaries surrounding each 
property,’ Arendt writes, ‘was not respect for private property as we understand it, 
but the fact that without owning a house, a man could not participate in the affairs 
of the world.’271 A private realm and private property, in other words, are actually 
indispensable to commitment to the world. It is only by having the household, 
that the citizen would be free to participate in public. The border between the 
polis’s public space and a private property therefore was absolutely respected, and 
even rendered to be a sacred space.272 The laws of the polis did not have power 
on private soil: it had no right to intervene in the life of the household, within the 
borders of private properties.  
Arendt stresses with this point not only the sharp distinction between the 
private and the public (and how important it was to keep them apart), but also 
argues that a twofold leap of freedom is needed regarding participation in the 
world. This first leap of Arendt’s understanding of freedom is delivered by the 
household – the citizen needed to be a Master of a household, the owner of a 
private property. By mastering a household, the citizen was freed from the daily 
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concerns. This seems to be close to Habermas’s analysis too. A different orga-
nization of work and household gave the bourgeoisie (or to be fair: the male 
head of the household) ‘leisure time’: the time to visit a salon or coffeehouse. 
The public sphere thus could only arise insofar as these citizens were freed from 
their daily practices and concerns, so that they could spend spare time at the 
café. This perspective certainly seems to be outdated, the moment spare time is 
a common good in society – a common good not guaranteed by others working 
for ‘them’ (the household, other family-members, slaves), but by those working 
for a surplus pay check and laws regulating the labor market. Although this could 
be a chance to participate, for Arendt it is a major concern. In the preface to The 
Human Condition Arendt stresses it as one of the three reasons to rethink ‘our’ 
activities and their relationship to the world. Spare time after all became leisure 
time – filled with entertainment, whose effect is withdrawal from the world rather 
than engagement in the world. It is important here to understand that Arendt not 
only emphasises this status of ‘being freed from’ as the condition of participation. 
Appearing in public meant not only ‘to enjoy free time’ that could be filled with 
some nice things, like hobbies,273 but requires an additional leap of renunciation: 
to think and act from the perspective of the polis. Freedom to Arendt thus means 
not only to be freed from the necessities of life (in other words, to have spare 
time), but also to be free for participation in public. The second leap requires 
engagement with the world. This is only possible, Arendt argues, by leaving one’s 
own personal interests behind. This of course once again describes the citizens 
in the Polis. They were only able to participate in public, in the discussions about 
the future of their city, by a complete devotion to the public interests. On the one 
hand, they need their private property in order to be free, but on the other, they 
also need to leave it behind, in order to think from the perspective of the city. 
‘To leave the household’, Arendt writes, ‘originally in order to embark upon 
some adventure and glorious enterprise and later simply to devote one’s life to 
the affairs of the city, demanded courage because only in the household was 
one primarily concerned with one’s own life and survival. Whoever entered the 
political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a love for life 
obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness. Courage therefore became 
the political virtue par excellence, and only those men who possessed it could 
be admitted to a fellowship that was political in content and purpose.’274 
5.4.3 The Sacredness of the Hidden
Although Arendt granted this virtue of courage, she also argued that this is all 
impossible without also having a private realm. One needs a ‘station’ in the 
world, Arendt writes in her biography of Rahel Varnhagen,275 which is the second 
aspect to be gained from her perspective on the private realm. Remember that 
in her view the public realm is the domain of freedom, while the private covers 
the necessity and the drudgery to tend to those necessities. Those who have not 
yet gained this freedom, who are ruled by the necessities of life, have in Arendt’s 
view not yet arrived at ‘true humanity’. They are deprived of participation outside 
their own subjective domain. But conversely, and this is Arendt’s second point 
regarding the private realm, a life lived exclusively in the bright glare of the 
public realm will fade. It will lose depth, its ability to appear in the world. The 
private realm offers events and activities of human life their proper place in the 
world. While the bios politikos only can evolve in the public realm, the biological 
necessities of life, as well as the related life-events, need the household as its solid 
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and secure base. Without mastering the necessities of life in the private realm, 
public life would not be possible, Arendt argues. At this point we are back again 
to Arendt’s metaphor of the darkness of the private realm. Darkness means first 
and foremost that something has been hidden from view, and is therefore shielded 
from the continuous maelstrom of public life. 
‘These four walls, within which people’s private life is lived, constitute a shield 
against the world and specifically against the public aspect of the world. They 
enclose a secure place, without which no living thing can thrive. This holds 
good … for human life in general. Wherever the latter is consistently exposed 
to the world without the protection of privacy and security its vital quality is 
destroyed.276  
If this destruction is manifest anywhere, it is in the appearance of homeless 
people living like ghosts on the streets. Being homeless not only means living 
unprotected from wind and rain, it means not having a safe place where you can 
be more or less secure and sheltered, a place to which you can withdraw in order 
to recharge, before re-entering the domain of uncertainty and danger.277 It is 
against this backdrop that Arendt stresses the importance of one’s own household 
as well as that of one’s own home as a necessary condition. The darkness of the 
house and the blinding glare of the outside depend on each other, they are inextri-
cably linked. Distinct from family life with its protective and educational aspects, 
Arendt also takes this to mean that the private realm accommodates those things 
in life that cannot appear in public. 
‘The sacredness of this privacy was like the sacredness of the hidden, namely 
of birth and death, the beginning and the end of mortals who, like all living 
creatures, grow out of and return to the darkness of the underworld. The 
non-privative trait of the household realm originally lay in its being the realm 
of birth and death which must be hidden from the public realm because it 
harbors the things hidden from human eyes and impenetrable to human 
knowledge. It is hidden because man does not know where he comes from 
when he is born and where he goes when he dies.’278
Arendt thus argues that the distinction between public and private is that which 
must be made visible on the one hand and that which must remain invisible on the 
other. What appears in public acquires maximum visibility and hence reality.279 
However, there are some things in life that need to remain hidden: the intimacy 
of love and friendship, the experiences of birth and death. Both the physical and 
the romantic belong to the realm of necessity, Arendt claims. She thus describes 
the private as the realm of subjective emotions and mixed feelings and of the great 
events of life: birth, death, love.280 They are too closely tied up with the needs of 
the individual to be made a public matter, the scholar George Kateb argues.281 We 
also might render these ‘life events’, as they are called nowadays, as ‘unspeakable’: 
their character lies beyond language, beyond experiences that can be shared to the 
public at large by speech. These are private experiences, which cannot publicly be 
shared nor need not be announced – they need to be shared in the private sphere, 
amongst family and friends. Arendt thus emphasized that the private should 
remain private: these events ask for celebration or mourning, disillusionment or 
astonishment, not for public action. Put differently: the private realm provides 
space for the ineffable, the issues we cannot discuss or negotiate, or indeed 
the ones we cannot stop talking about. Those issues need a safe place, among 
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personal ‘things’ and their inherent memories. ‘The only efficient way to guarantee 
the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private 
property, a privately owned place to hide in.’282 
Public life needs the private realm to recover, to reform, in order to reappear 
and participate in public again afterwards.283 Appearance always means appearing 
from a private realm into the lights of the public realm. Everything that lives, 
not vegetative life alone, ‘emerges from darkness and, however strong its natural 
tendency to thrust itself into the light, it nevertheless needs the security of 
darkness to grow at all.’284 On the other hand Arendt also emphasis that the lights 
of the public realm are in need of the interior of the private realm, as a sphere of 
education, nurturing, and all the events of life that cannot be shared publicly. As 
Arendt concludes: ‘The more completely modern society discards the distinction 
between what is private and what is public, between what can thrive only in 
concealment and what needs to be shown to all in the full light of the public world, 
the mare, that is, it introduces between the private and the public a social sphere 
in which the private is made public and vice-versa, the harder it makes things for 
its children, who by nature require the security of concealment in order to mature 
undisturbed.’285
This perspective echoes the reflections of the Viennese architect Adolf Loos 
(1870-1933) who stressed the façade as an essential element to distinguish the 
private sphere from the increasing business of the großstadt. He deliberately 
removed all representative aspects of the dwelling-program from the street, 
offering family life a rich, well decorated and comfortable interior.[IMAGE 5.19, 5.20] 
The façade was left as anonymous, abstract composition. As Hilde Heynen 
argues, if these facades reveal something, then it should be the anonymity of the 
Metropolis.286       
5.4.4 Happy Among Small Things
Arendt’s third consideration is a bit more hidden in her writings, but it clearly 
comes to the fore when we revisit her writings via a perspective Walter Benjamin 
brought to the fore. Long before Arendt constructed the private realm as the space 
of the necessities of life, Walter Benjamin had also linked the interior with life 
itself. ‘To live,’ he writes in his well-known analysis of the birth of the interior, 
‘means to leave traces. In the interior, these are accentuated.’287 To live is to leave 
traces – there is no escape from it. Whereas in the public space those traces 
inevitably fade, in the interior they remain visible and tangible for the occupant, 
and even inject colour into life itself. Immediately before the above quotation, 
Benjamin writes: ‘The interior is not just the universe, but also the étui of the 
private individual.’288 The interior is so close to man that it is like a second skin 
– a perfect fit. The things, from furniture to equipment, speak for themselves; 
they are taken for granted. The things are geared to our rhythm (of life), and vice 
versa. But there is more to it: the things are given meaning through living; they 
accommodate a story.289 And that is crucial: the interior comes close precisely 
because of the memories that attach to it. To be at home is more than eating, 
sleeping and working somewhere – it is to inhabit the house. That is to say: to 
make it your own, to leave traces. The interior orders memories, gives them their 
appropriate place. A scent can bring a lost world back to life, sounds can move or 
touch us, the sense of touch can guide us: these all converge in the space of the 
interior, thereby allowing us to share intimate experiences (for which we have no 
words).290 We can only really come ‘home’ via these traces of life, when life has 
taken possession of the interior, when we have made the interior our own, the 
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smells have become familiar and we can reappear into the world from there.
Benjamin discusses the interior in a text in which he presents Paris as a nine-
teenth-century metropolis. Modernity is starting to bring innovation – symbolized 
by the arcades with their cast-iron constructions. And the interior comes into 
conscious being, Benjamin argues, through the mutability of modernity, the 
changes to life, work, our surroundings. It originates in the need for a place of 
one’s own: a small but personal haven in a turbulent world that is subject to 
constant change. Benjamin localizes this consciousness quite precisely, placing 
it the reign (1830-1848) of French King Louis Philippe I. Although democratic 
rights had been extended and improved in France, huge corruption scandals in 
parliament and the worsening living conditions of the working classes prompted 
a second people’s revolution. Benjamin stresses that around this time the 
modern individual experienced a separation where there was not one before: 
the separation between living and working, between the (domestic) interior 
and the workplace.291 Both entities drifted further and further apart and, over 
time, became opposites. Interestingly enough, Benjamin stresses that in the 
workplace one deals with real life (although work is increasingly being carried out 
in bigger, virtual spheres), whereas within the dwelling’s interior one harbours 
illusions.292 The interior and the private person are in sharp contrast with the 
modern metropolis, modernization, crowds and public life. The latter invokes the 
former: the interior as flight. The interior is a safe haven, a familiar domain, in 
which one can cherish one’s personal history in an otherwise cold and threatening 
environment. A similar analysis – no doubt inspired by the same Parisian 
experience as that of Benjamin, whom she met in the early 1940s in Paris, 
when both were on the run from German terror – can be found in The Human 
Condition, when Arendt argues that what may be irrelevant in the public realm 
can be extremely relevant to the individual. Arendt links this to the perceived 
decay of the public realm in France, as a result of which: 
‘the French have become masters in the art of being happy among ‘small 
things’, within the space of their own four walls, between chest and bed, table 
and chair, dog and cat and flowerpot, extending to these things a care and 
tenderness which, in a world where rapid industrialization constantly kills off 
the things of yesterday to produce today’s objects, may even appear to be the 
world’s last, purely humane corner.’293
Arendt is not sceptical about the need for such a place in the world. On the 
contrary, she here has an open eye to those elements in the domestic private 
realm that are able to turn a house into a home: the personal belongings that are 
collected by the inhabitant that, in the words of Benjamin, are to be seen as the 
traces of life.294 Although it is just a minor passage in The Human Condition, it 
is clear that she recognizes both the importance of private property like a house, 
as well as the appropriation of the house into a certain domestic shelf, a stage 
for family life, a familiar place.295 The home protects the familiar, through its 
very privacy.296 The private realm, including its privative aspects, protects its 
inhabitants against the bright light of the continuously changing world. It is a 
familiar domain – a familiarity that is tangible in the interior. Its value is that 
this familiar space enables the resident to be at home in the world. After all it is 
also the realm of education, a place where man learns how to behave in public, 
moreover how to participate in the public realm.297 This is how we can describe 
the domestic sphere as well: first, it offers protection of the body and private life, 
and second (but no less important), it offers storage space for the traces of life. 
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The intimate and overwhelming events of life that Arendt stressed as the events of 
the private realm, the elements that need to be secured by the walls surrounding 
it, these events need to take place in spaces that are filled with our personal 
history and affinity, our memory and mementos. That’s where we are at home and 
feel comfortable.298 
Four years after the first edition of ‘Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century’, from 
which I quoted above, Walter Benjamin wrote a new version of the essay. The 
same quote returns, albeit with a different emphasis this time. The sentence starts 
off the same: ‘The interior is not just the universe of the private individual; it is 
also his étui.’ But then the text continues with a slight shift in focus: ‘Ever since 
the time of Louis Philippe, the bourgeois has shown a tendency to compensate 
for the absence of any trace of private life in the big city. He tries to do this within 
the four walls of his apartment.’299 You might argue that the former analysis 
focuses on the traces of life that irrevocably take possession of the interior and 
are therefore accentuated. It is described as something that just happens. In the 
revised text, the arrangement of the space and the articulation of the traces have 
become a deliberate activity on the part of the occupant. The space and the things 
have a symbolic meaning, which is realized in a deliberate act of the individual. 
The occupant uses the interior as an instrument with which to mediate between 
life and the world. The interior has become a space of self-awareness and self-pre-
sentation, a form of social imagination. The interior reveals the occupant; it 
constitutes the presentation of the self to the world. The occupant is read through 
the interior. The collection and arrangement of furniture, paintings, wallpaper, 
carpet and books reveals the occupant’s taste and style. It presents (real or 
constructed) wealth, a rich past or a distancing from that past. It says something 
about the occupants’ development, or indeed their aspirations in that direction.
It has to be said, as a brief closing remark of this reflection upon the relationship 
between the private and the public, Arendt is practically alone in her description 
of the private realm as the space for the necessities of life (among which she 
counts not only household chores and labor, but also the economic thinking 
that dominates society) and the public as the domain of freedom. In today’s 
prevailing liberal view of society those realms signify the reverse: the public as 
the space of restriction (being considerate of one another), the private as the 
domain of ultimate freedom. To come home is to take off our masks and to do 
as we please. This is the place where: ‘we can do or not do just what we want, 
unobserved, undisturbed.’300 At the same time the distinction between public 
and private appears to have been hollowed out. Television brings the public 
debate into the living room, while the contestants in reality shows bare virtually 
all. Mobile phones prompt intimate conversations in the public space, whereas 
music enables individuals to isolate themselves, even in a public environment. 
Cameras watch our every move, while hardly any area of life remains hidden 
now that governments and hackers can monitor all of our movements via the 
Internet.301 Today’s technology in other words offers a completely new blurring of 
the boundaries between public and private. It seems to offer control to the private 
person, to reveal aspects of private life within the public sphere, but it also means 
we drastically lose control over what appears in public for the eyes of peers (or 
even what is revealed for the eyes of those nearby). 
Modern technology, in completely different ways, reflects Arendt’s concern about 
the sharp distinction between public and private. This also means something 
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regarding architecture, particularly stressing the boundary between the public 
and the private. Architecturally speaking, the theme of boundaries is nevertheless 
not new, as we have seen previously. Jane Jacobs, in her famous study of street 
life in her New York neighbourhood, and Richard Sennett on his analysis ‘weak 
boundaries’, that is illustrated with scenes from New York, have both urged the 
threshold as the crucial element, not simply of architecture, but of the city.302 
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WORLD. TO BE GATHERED 
AROUND A TABLE
400
Architecture is mainly bound to the category of ‘work’, I stated in the previous 
chapter. It is important to have this perspective in mind: the message after all is 
that architecture is not simply the fulfilment of particular needs, but always deals 
with a perspective that reaches behind that need, behind urgent requirements. 
Architecture is in-between the private and the public, labor and action. It connects 
both sides of the human being. It creates the world, which is according to Arendt 
is always shared with others. It offers permanence to that world-in-common in 
a context of continuous change on the one hand (labor) and unpredictability on 
the other (action). It is this perspective upon work and the world it creates that is 
central in this chapter. 
In the previous chapter we investigated the related concepts of action and 
public realm/space of appearance from a range of different perspectives. Although 
it is clear that for Arendt this pair of concepts are about plural mankind living 
together in a community, and how such a community is able to move forward to 
the future, how its political life needs to be understood, from our investigations 
it became clear how this requires concrete space and thus architecture, both 
phenomenologically as well as ontologically. Architecture, ontologically seen, 
represents the public and with that representation establishes public meaning and 
importance to the public realm, whereas architecture, if we regard the practices 
of appearances, either makes room or unfortunately disturbs the possibilities of 
appearances amongst peers. Although we were able to define aspects of concrete 
space that seem to enhance the possibilities of appearance, the question that was 
left on the table, however, was how architecture contributes to public space, not 
so much in its concrete forms and structures, constructions and interventions, but 
much more ontologically spoken. At this point, Arendt urges the perspective of 
work. Without the activity of work, she argues, action withers away. Without being 
written down, narrated in stories, or pinned down in reports (all activities that 
Arendt regard ‘work’, action vanishes quickly. Besides that: action is engagement 
in the world. The world, for Arendt is always a common-world. It is what the 
community, consisting of plural individuals, has in common. The activity of action 
– that is to appear amongst peers through words-and-deeds – therefore is bound 
to the world. The world is the object and subject of action, that is of political 
life. This picture of the activity of work and how that is related to the common 
world as object and subject of action, is absent in Habermas’s perspective of the 
public sphere, as we have seen. In his image it is bound to the virtual spheres 
of state and market. Arendt’s perspective nevertheless is the very perspective 
that offers an ontological bridge between the concept of the public realm and 
the field of architecture. Architecture, after all, can be understood as the very 
quintessential activity of human beings of transformation of the earth into that 
world-in-common. It offers objects that last, spaces that are open to (or prevent) 
gatherings, and thus is of central meaning to communities. 
This chapter starts with a fascinating book of the Portuguese writer José 
Saramago. In his book The Cave he actually covers the gap between what has been 
the topic of chapter 2 and 3, the modern and post-modern attempts to diminish 
public space and capture it in environments of commerce and entertainment, 
of control and security, and how this prevents the user to be active, engaged, 
surprised on the one hand, as it also stresses the very objects, craftmanship and 
mass production in regard to such a development. In other words, what Saramago 
stresses in his book is how the world-in-common is related to the objects that 
materialize this world-in-common. After this introduction to the chapter, I will 
investigate two previous attempts to introduce the thinking of Arendt within the 
field of Architecture. The first is of Kenneth Frampton, who already during the 
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‘70s developed a provocative reflection upon the economic influences upon archi-
tecture, and how these are a threat for the ‘permanence’ that the architectural 
intervention has to offer to the world. It is fascinating, but it leaves architecture 
within the realm of labor and work, without stretching out to action. The second 
trial is more recent: Pier Vittorio Aureli urges Arendt’s perspective in order to 
push forward his statement of the ‘absolute architecture.’ Again fascinating, and 
particularly strong in its anti-capitalist message. His argument on the particular 
straight-forward form of architecture, which resists the capitalist picture, is 
fascinating. Nevertheless, he fails to grasp the micro-scale that is inherent to 
Arendt’s concept of action, and thus of the local space in which appearances in 
word and deed make sense. 
After these reflections upon previous trials, this chapter sets out to define the 
aspects of ‘work’, particularly through the lens of the art-work. Art, according 
to Arendt, after all is a particular form of work, since it essentially has no other 
goal than itself. Its aim is the thing itself. Art, therefore, pushes forward what 
essentially can be said about other things that surround us. The final paragraphs 
then set out to challenge architecture along these lines that previously had been 
stretched. Architecture, we will conclude, has something to offer to the public 
realm: amongst many others permanence, tangibility, plurality, exposure, 
spatiality, continuity, form, and change. Architecture is transition – not only 
the change of a particular space into a place, but also transition from inside to 
outside, from public to private, and from forth to back. This transition evokes 
these mentioned experiences, particularly those where the senses are at work. As 
we will see: this is an important experience. It thickens, to state it with the Finnish 
architect Juhani Pallasmaa, our understanding of the world.  
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6.1  THE CAVE
In his novel The Cave the Portugese writer José de Sousa Saramago draws 
the late working life of potter Cipriano Algor against the background of what he 
generally calls ‘The Centre’.1 While the story develops, the reader discovers what 
‘The Centre’ is: a huge building located in the city, containing everything that can 
be imagined. It’s a shopping mall as well as apartment building, an office and 
leisure-dome, far bigger than similar buildings known; and still expanding. Most 
visitors of the Centre are inhabitants too, or vice versa: the inhabitants are the 
visitors. Employees are obliged to live in the building, while a job is guaranteed 
to all inhabitants. For the inhabitants there is no reality outside the Centre – 
even their windows (if they have one in the façade of the building, most of the 
apartments are facing the interior) cannot be opened. Living in the Centre does 
mean the loss of any need to go anywhere else. From everything needed, that you 
possibly want to have, or you are eager to experience, to everything that might be 
imagined can be found in the Centre: it’s commercial catalogue consists of fifty 
five A4 volumes, each containing 1,500 pages. In other words: The Centre controls 
the life of the inhabitants and employees: from their house to the fireplace, from 
bed to desk, from work to leisure, from cafe to church, from birth to death. 
Saramago, in his typical style without punctuation, draws a stunning 
description of the Centre at the very moment when the potter Cipriano Algor 
has to move to there. After years of resistance, he now is bound to live in the 
apartment of his daughter Marta and son-in-law (a security-employee of the 
Centre) Marçal. 
‘We’re here, Marçal said unnecessarily, when he put on the hand brake. The 
Centre was not visible from here, but it appeared before them as soon as they 
turned the corner of the street where they had left the car. As chance would 
have it, this was the side, part, face, end or extremity reserved for residents. 
It was not a new sight for any of them, but there is a great difference between 
looking for looking’s sake and looking while someone is saying to us, Two of 
those windows are ours, Only two, asked Marta, We can’t complain, some 
apartments have only one, said Marçal, not to mention the ones that only 
have windows with a view of the inside, The inside of what, The inside of 
the Centre, of course, Do you mean there are apartments with windows that 
overlook the inside of the Centre itself, Lots of people actually prefer them, 
they find the view from there much more pleasant, varied and interesting, 
whereas from the other side you just have a view over the same rooftops and 
the same sky, … They entered another lift. There are two speeds, explained 
Marçal, we’ll go slowly to start with, He pressed the relevant button, then 
button number twenty, Let’s go to the twentieth floor first so that you have 
time to appreciate the view, he said. The part of the lift that looked out over 
the Centre was entirely made of glass. The lift travelled slowly pas the different 
floors, revealing a succession of arcades, shops, fancy staircases, escalators, 
meeting points, cafés, restaurants, terraces with tables and chairs, cinemas 
and theatres, discotheques, enormous television screens, endless numbers of 
ornaments, electronic games, balloons, fountains and other water features, 
platforms, hanging gardens, posters, pennants, advertising hoardings, 
mannequins, changing rooms, the façade of a church, the entrance to the 
beach, a bingo hall, a casino, a tennis court, a gymnasium, a roller coaster, a 
zoo, a racing track for electric cars, a cyclorama, a cascade, all waiting, all in 
1.
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silence, and more shops and more arcades and more mannequins and more 
hanging gardens and things for which people probably didn’t even know the 
names, as if they were ascending into paradise. And is this speed only used so 
that people can enjoy the view, asked Cipriano Algor, No, at this speed the lifts 
are used as an extra security aid, said Marçal, Isn’t there enough security what 
with the guards, the detectors, the video cameras, and all the other snooping 
devices, Cipriano Algor asked again, Tens of thousands of people pass through 
here every day, it’s important to maintain security, replied Marçal.’2 
The Centre is still expanding. Slowly but surely it absorbs all urban activities of 
the streets in the surroundings, the lives of the ordinary people living around it 
and the sales of the small shops which still try to compete. As stated, when people 
get to work in the Centre, they are obliged to live there as well, the resulting 
effect of the Centre on the city and its surroundings slowly becomes visible: 
there are magnificent artificial agricultural fields, in order to feed the Centre, 
huge Industrial Zones in order to produce the products sold by the Centre, and 
in-between those zones an emerging slum where the unhappy people live that 
can’t work at the Centre or afford an apartment there – a zone where you’d better 
not slow down while driving through. ‘Here, every now and then, and in the name 
of the classical axiom which says that necessity knows no law, a truck laden with 
food is held up and emptied of its contents before you can say knife.’3 Against 
this environment that increasingly becomes violent, or better said, is unpredict-
able, the interior of The Centre is rendered as ‘better’ – in the sense of controlled 
‘perfection’ and ‘safety’. I quote again at length:
“Contrary to what Marta and her father had expected, there was not just one 
corridor separating the blocks of apartments with view onto the outside world 
from those with a view inside. There were, in fact, two corridors and, between 
them, another block of apartments. … Marta said, These people never see the 
light of day when they’re at home, Neither do the people who have apartments 
with a view onto the inside of the Centre, replied Marçal, But as you said, at 
least they can find some distraction watching the view and the people moving 
about, while the others are practically enclosed, it can’t be easy to live in an 
apartment with no natural light, breathing canned air all day, Well, you know, 
there are plenty of people who prefer it like that, they find the apartments 
more comfortable, better equipped, just to give you a few examples, they all 
have ultraviolet machines, atmospheric regenerators and thermostats that 
can regulate temperature and humidity so accurately that it’s possible to keep 
the humidity and temperature in the apartment constant day and night, all 
year round, Am I glad we didn’t get one of those, I don’t think I could stand 
living there for long, said Marta, We resident guards have to make do with 
an ordinary apartment with windows, Well I would never have imagined that 
being the father-in-law of a resident guard at the Centre would prove to be the 
best fortune and the greatest privilege that life would offer me, said Cipriano 
Algor.”4
Life, in other words, is taken to the very interior of the Centre. It is capsular-
ized, to state it with the Belgium philosopher Lieven De Cauter, it is taken to 
simulation, the spectacle, to a hyper-reality.5 It is the evacuation of the unpred-
icatability, the raw and rough character, and the harsh light of public space 
captured in the control of the interior, and the moulds of its program. 
2.
Ibid., 229-232
3.
Ibid., 4
4.
Ibid., 232
5. 
Lieven De Cauter, ‘The Capsule and 
the Network. Preliminary Notes 
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Musch and Eireen Scheurs (eds.), Re: 
Generic City, OASE#54, (Nijmegen: 
Uitgeverij SUN, 2001), 127
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During the story it becomes clear that this strive for control and perfection also 
means the end of the job of the potter. Algor is a supplier of the Centre, but 
his products increasingly have to fulfil standards of perfection. Since he is a 
craftsman, producing all his pottery by his own hands, none of the produces he 
makes are exactly the same, let alone ‘perfect’. The Centre cannot deal with the 
diversity of his produce; they require identical products. The ‘Centre’ designates 
the contract with him, which means that for the potter there is no other chance 
than to make himself a living in the apartment of his daughter and son-in-law, 
within the Centre itself, which he actually dislikes. The strive for perfection leads 
to a decline of craftsmanship (how paradoxical that actually sounds).
Obviously the potter in this novel a symbol of life closely connected with nature, 
the earth and traditions, while the ‘Centre’ symbolises life dominated by economic 
worldview and modernity: the novel is about the struggle between natural and 
artificial life. Such a struggle is a ground figure of modernity, as Marshall Berman 
argues in his book All that is Solid Melts Into Air.6 Modernity is balancing 
between the past and the future, local traditions and circumstances and processes 
of globalisation.7 This balancing often urges paradoxical experiences, Berman 
argues, but certainly not in the story of Saramago. The undertone is distrust, if not 
disgust, of the Centre and everything that belongs to it (mass-production, place-
lessness, artificiality, control), in favour of what apparently loses terrain (crafts-
manship, tradition, local geography, authenticity, surprise). In other words, the 
story narrates an unbalanced struggle: modernity is always the winning hand, but 
at the consequence of a literally soulless life. 
Saramago’s novel is one of the books that startled me, particularly evoked by 
his style, but much more by the relationship he draws between production and 
public space. Saramago shows that the changing emphasis on similarity and 
interchangeability of the products surrounding us, as well as their effect on the 
workshop (and all issues related to labor and work), relates to the increasing 
emphasis on security and entertainment within public space are simply two sides 
of the same coin. The transformation of our landscapes and cities, as well as the 
modification of furniture, pencils, fashion, flowerpots and pans are signage of 
an increasing economic attitude to the world, effect of the capitalist approach to 
life and community. Although this view does not have to surprise us (until his 
death in 2010 Saramago was a pronounced but peculiar Marxist) and although 
it seems reasonable, this relationship between public space and the objects 
surrounding us, is rarely so clearly stressed. Some of this perspective certainly is 
tangible in the work of Richard Sennett, who has written a lot on the changes in 
cities and landscapes, as well as more recently on the attitude to work and crafts-
manship and cooperation.8 Interestingly enough, Sennett has announced that 
the latter two books will be followed by one that again takes the city as its focus. 
In other words, Sennett also stresses the close relationship between work (and 
the products of work) and the cities that we produce. Saramago’s novel makes 
tangible and imaginable how these aspects are to be related: it shows how the 
economic principles empties life – both the individual life as well as the life of the 
community; the life of the city as well as that of the countryside; of the craftsman 
as well as of the citizen. What this perspective moreover reveals is the drastic 
change of attitude to the world – which as a notion is brought to us by Arendt, 
addressing both the object as well as the world-of-objects, the landscape and 
cities, as well as the product of work – due to such an economic approach. The 
attitude is emptied out, which causes the loss of the world itself. Losing a personal 
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relationship with the things surrounding us causes a sense of rootlessness in the 
world, and vice-versa. 
With that image, The Cave offers a literary echo of one of the main issues Arendt 
challenges in her book The Human Condition: if everything is perfect no politics 
is needed. If everything is controlled by economic laws, and thus does not require 
action and speech on the future, even personal reflection can be excluded: there 
only is a need to consume what is offered. One goal dominates in The Cave: the 
(economic) success of the Centre (although it is not clear who’s after that, which 
might another echo of Arendt’s The Human Condition: the power, invisibility 
and elusiveness of the no-man-ruler, bureaucracy). Everything that disturbs this 
goal is swept away. Within the Centre, there is no real room for unfolding your 
own life, developing your own stances, let alone practicing your own opinions or 
expressing your own individuality. Just be happy in your apartment and with all 
the possibilities the Centre offers. Individual happiness and collective happiness 
are one – there cannot be room in-between. Workers, residents, owners and 
visitors are understood as one happy family: they work together on this single goal 
(even if they are only spending time there): the success of the Centre – because its 
success lies in their own success, future, and happiness. 
Saramago, to my mind, has offered a literary version of The Human Condition, 
stressing public space, the importance of work, the threat of the social realm, 
although The Cave misses the hopeful undertone that is important in Arendt’s 
perspective: the power of action and its inherent promise of change, which was 
the central notion of the previous Chapter. In this Chapter we will investigate 
the other aspects that came to the fore in this novel: the relationship between 
production and public space – or in Arendt’s terms: ‘work’ and ‘the world’.
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6.2 BETWEEN ARCHITECTURE AND BUILDING
6.2.1 ‘That is Architecture!’
In architectural theory it is quite common to differentiate between architecture on 
the one hand and mere building on the other.9 To briefly describe this distinction: 
the latter categorizes the everyday constructions, the sheer functional, whereas 
the first addresses the outstanding constructions, those that offer a cultural 
‘surplus’. John Ruskin, the famous Victorian art critic, for instance, opens his 
book The Seven Lamps of Architecture, with that statement: ‘Architecture is the 
art which so disposes and adorns the edifices raised by man, for whatsoever uses 
that the sight of them may contribute to his mental health, power, and pleasure. 
It is very necessary, in the outset of all inquiry, to distinguish carefully between 
Architecture and Building.’10 In what follows in his introduction it becomes clear 
that the lack of a sharp distinction between the two would cause architecture 
to cease ‘to be one of the fine arts’.11 Building is obviously assembling building 
materials into an edifice. It only becomes architecture if it reaches to that cultural 
‘surplus’: ‘No one would call the last architectural which determine the height of a 
breastwork or the position of a bastion. But if to the stone facing of that bastion be 
added an unnecessary feature, as a cable moulding, that is Architecture. … It may 
not be always easy to draw the line so sharply, because there are few buildings 
which have not some pretence or colour of being architectural; neither can there 
be any architecture which is not based on good building; but it is perfectly easy, 
and very necessary to keep the ideas distinct, and to understand fully that Archi-
tecture concerns itself only with those characters of an edifice which are above and 
beyond its common use.’12 A similar statement is made by the British architectural 
historian Nikolaus Pevsner in his well-known Outline of European Architec-
ture when he writes ‘A bicycle shed is a building, Lincoln Cathedral is a piece of 
architecture.’13 This distinction seems to simply follow common sense. It is rather 
obvious that the cathedral is a meaningful building, even meaningful beyond 
the religious community using the building as their gathering place and place of 
worship, whereas the shed just is a functional entity, meaningful only for the users 
on a particular moment. The shed does not shape the community, the Cathedral 
does. It is nevertheless revealing to see that Ruskin wrote in his introduction that 
even the Church-building cannot be counted as architecture, if it is not more than 
the building pieces assembled together into a functional building. Only if the 
design adds a surplus, the church building can be counted as architecture. This 
also counts for Pevsner’s take. It is not the cathedral an sich that is understood 
as architecture by him. It is Lincoln Cathedral. That means: it is a particular 
building, and Pevsner’s judgement thus only can be applied to this particular 
case. Interestingly enough, the opposite is illustrated in a way more generic way. 
By taking the functional shed as example of this category of ‘building’, Pevsner 
suggests that the distinction between mere building and architecture has to be 
understood as the distinction between the generic and the particular. In other 
words, if we talk about architecture, we talk about the distinctive and particular 
within a sea of generic buildings. Architecture depends upon a distinctive quality, 
which is often tangible in our everyday language too: it has to be ‘designed with a 
view to aesthetic appeal.’14 As the philosopher Karsten Harries, who has written 
extensively on architecture, remarks on Pevsners view: this does not exclude the 
bicycle shed from the field of architecture. We perfectly can imagine (and we 
even can mention examples easily) bicycle sheds that are ‘designed with a view to 
aesthetic appeal.’15 
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Also the architect and architectural theorist Kenneth Frampton takes, in his 
article ‘The Status of Man and the Status of his Objects’,16 (that reflects upon a 
pivotal moment in his career as a theorist), the distinction between architecture 
and building, for granted. We touched upon Frampton and this particular text 
already in the previous chapter. Frampton after all describes Hannah Arendt’s 
book The Human Condition17 as pivotal for his journey through the field of archi-
tecture, architectural theory and architectural history, as well as this article as 
crucial in his own oeuvre. Although he also is influenced by the the Frankfurter 
Schule, as we will see, he until today, cites Arendt as the main frame of his 
thinking.18 All later works are influenced by Arendt, he argues, which he urges as 
the very reason to place this text ahead of all other writings in the anthology of 
his collected writings he published in 2002.19 However, back to the distinction 
between mere building and architecture, that is fundamental to the perspective 
he develops in this article. Fair enough, we can argue, it is part of everyday 
language. Even the Oxford English Dictionary provides two definitions, Frampton 
states. The first definition is architecture as ‘the art or science of constructing 
edifices for human use’ and the second is architecture as ‘the action and process 
of building’.20 Intuitively, the former is understood as the cultural perspective 
linked to the inherent knowledge and history of the profession. After all, the 
use of the word ‘edifice’ suggests large and stately, even monumental buildings, 
whereas the latter definition emphasizes the art of construction, in which, strictly 
spoken, architects are not necessary, since it is embedded in (local) traditions 
and approaches. With the reference to the Dictionary, Frampton somehow urges 
the distinction between building and architecture as a distinction between the 
vernacular and the monumental. By introducing the term of the monumental, 
Frampton not only urges architecture as the exceptional (like Ruskin), but also 
the meaningful (like Pevsner). Frampton indeed comes close to the example of 
the cathedral in Pevsner’s perspective, we might argue. The cathedral after all not 
only is meaningful for the religious community, it also is important for the local 
community, whether or not involved in that religious community. The cathedral 
is a landmark in the city. It is able to structure a wider area, since it dominates the 
skyline. The cathedral, in other words, is a significant building, which is expressed 
in the appearance of the building itself. The height of the building, the towers, 
the ornaments, the structure – they all signify this wider (and often simultane-
ously also the narrower) meaning of the edifice. Philosopher Nelson Goodman 
urges these elements of representation as the distinction between architecture 
and building. ‘A building is a work of art’, he writes, ‘only insofar as it signifies, 
means, refers, symbolizes in some way. That may seem less than obvious, for the 
sheer bulk of an architectural work and its daily dedication to a practical purpose 
often tend to obscure its symbolic function.’21 Goodman is quick to relate this 
aspect of representation towards aesthetics, since buildings can gain significance 
also through occurrences, happenings, events, or other developments too. ‘Even 
when a building does mean, that may have nothing to do with its architecture. A 
building of any design may come to stand for some of its causes or effects, or for 
some historical event that occurred in it or on its site, or for its designated use: 
any abattoir may symbolize slaughter, and any mausoleum, death; and a costly 
county courthouse may symbolize extravagance.’22  
The ambivalent understanding of architecture by architects and the public is 
generally accepted. Most professionals within the field of architecture understand 
their position as a balancing act between functionality and service on the one 
hand and artistic, cultural and innovative ambitions on the other. Nevertheless, 
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to stress the distinction between the two perspectives is a quite inadequate under-
standing of architecture and the concept of culture as such. It limits culture to the 
artistic and thus suggests that architecture is only a cultural phenomenon when it 
reaches beyond the everyday practices of construction to focus on its aesthetical 
(or cultural) ambitions. This idea is fuelled by an architectural culture, consisting 
of magazines, museums, galleries, blogs, and so on, focussing on buildings, 
models, drawings, oeuvres that stand out. Architecture has become part of a 
museum-culture, part of the realm of aesthetics and the fine arts. To be published 
or make public appearances, in this perspective, seems to be the primary measure 
of cultural value. And since it is almost impossible to imagine it differently, this is 
the very image that also is stressed in architectural education. To stand out and to 
be original, not to say authentic, is valued as a merit of architectural design.
At this point, I however would oppose this generally accepted view, and would 
stress the distinction between architecture and mere building as a hideous 
distinction that not only blurs the ethical and political aspects of architecture, but 
also masks the understanding of the ‘mere building practices’ too. Architecture 
as such, and with this term I mean the whole field of building practices, should 
be understood, conceived and analysed as a cultural, social and political practice. 
To my mind, only through a broad and inclusive way of understanding architec-
ture, we do right to the political meaning of the field and its building practices. 
In all architectural assignments, whether ambitious or not, the designer cannot 
simply be concerned with the aesthetic aspects, but moreover needs to pursue an 
ethical outlook on the activity of building, designing, proposing, initiating the new 
itself. In order to grasp this perspective, we need to develop a more profound and 
convincing understanding of architecture as a cultural praxis.
Already from the very early treatises on architecture, building is understood as a 
cultural assignment. Artistic considerations play a major and even maybe a central 
role in the design, as already Vitruvius (approx. 80-70 BC – 15 BC) argues. In his 
De Architectura libri decem, he puts venustas (delight) forward as a foundational 
aspect of well-building, besides two other aspects: firmitas (stability) and utilitias 
(commodity).23 In his investigation of the architectural profession, Vitruvius 
argues that well-building always needs to incorporate these three aspects. In his 
text there is no such distinction between the genuine and the particular. Every 
assignment is addressed; every building project needs to take into account the 
threefold aspects. The lack of this distinction of course is not surprising. It only is 
from the early Renaissance onwards that the divided view upon building practices 
gets a foothold. Exemplary of the development in the Renaissance is the reflection 
of Filippo Brunelleschi (1377-1446), the famous builder of the dome of the 
Cathedral of Florence as well as the inventor of the perspective within painting, 
on his position as designer. He positions himself vis-à-vis his craftsman on the 
site. Previously there was not so great distinction between the craftsman and the 
master-builder. The craftsman knew what to do, even without a clear address 
or drawing of the master builder: they acted based on their own experience 
and the then regular style. Brunelleschi saw himself as the designer, distinct 
from the craftsman ‘on the ground’. He expected craftsmen to only execute and 
develop what was already known. This would allow him, as architect, to be able 
to challenge and develop new ideas, developing new perspectives and challenging 
the existing, rather than applying existing knowledge through already known 
approaches.24 The art historian G.C. Argan states that Brunelleschi ‘abolished the 
traditional hierarchical form of the mason’s lodge where the head was the co-or-
dinator of the specialized work of the various groups of skilled workers who made 
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up the lodge of the masters’. This had a major effect on the work of all participants 
in the building process. ‘Now, there was only one planner or inventor’, Argan 
continues, ‘the others were merely manual laborers. When the master mason rose 
to the status of sole planner, whose activity was on a par with the other humanistic 
disciplines, the other members of the team of masons fell from the rank of maestri 
in charge of the various aspects of the job to that of simple working men.’25 
While Vitruvius was able to draw his drawings after the building was finished, 
since his craftsmen on the construction site knew how to resolve all kind of 
questions that occur during construction (where Vitruvius would be present too), 
Brunelleschi required the drawing beforehand in order to address the craftsmen 
at the site, offering them insight in how he wanted the building to be constructed 
and what particular form the details and ornaments needed to have. Brunelles-
chi’s awareness surely contributed to the image that emerged in the 18th century, 
and specifically within the Romantic age, of the designer as a genius – a solitary 
designer, uniquely gifted with imagination and creativity, distinct from the 
masses, able to propose new and original ideas. 
In his influential article, ‘The Modern System of the Arts’, the German-Amer-
ican philosopher Paul Oskar Kristeller argues that the 18th century gave room 
to a distinction between fine arts and applied arts. As he argues, this is a major 
differentiation, which affects the appreciation as well as the assessment of art 
extensively. ‘The Greek term for art (τεχυη) and its Latin equivalent (ars) do not 
specifically denote the “fine arts” in the modern sense, but were applied to all 
kinds of human activities which we would call crafts or sciences.’26 Where in the 
antique world arts and crafts were united, strongly connected to craftsmanship 
and expertise, like in the profession of the goldsmith, as well as with a certain 
usefulness (for instance within the religious practice of a church, or in order 
to present or portray of a prominent citizen), during the 18th century the idea 
emerges that art is by definition both autonomous and useless.  
At first sight one might categorize architecture as a profession of applied 
arts. Architecture after all only by exception is ‘useless’. Architecture genuinely 
gives room to use, to program, to adaptation. Besides that, also the image of the 
architect as a genius, a solitary designer, is beyond reality too – this image, as 
evoked by the architect Howard Roark, the hero in Ayn Rand’s novel The Foun-
tainhead,27 is still alive in the image of the ‘starchitect.’28 However architecture 
is created not by a solitary designer, an ‘autonomous architect-hero’, but by 
cooperation, by a team of professionals, an architectural office, and a range of 
others involved in the process of design and construction.29 Architecture is a 
collective effort. Even new ideas applied in architecture are not dependent on a 
single genius, but emerge in a complex way, where previous and utterly different 
experiences and building practices join forces together, and merge into new and 
clarifying insights. 
However, it is telling that the history of the arts also counted architecture as 
being part of the fine arts, besides sculpture, painting, poetry, and music. Back 
then, the philosophers and others reflecting upon the specificities of art had no 
hesitation to include architecture in the fine arts. The importance of aesthetics 
regarding the built environment was beyond dispute. I will come back to the 
important artistic aspect of architecture later in this chapter, however, in the 
18th century, thus, everything becomes part of a rapid transition forward. The 
invention of the perspective did change painting, both in its structure as well 
as in the content displayed. The Reformation pushed the people out of their 
traditional and collective structures, which gave room to an increasing idea 
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of the self and the subjective (and, according to the famous statement of the 
anthropologist Max Weber, to the capitalist system that still structures Western 
societies).30 The Enlightenment banished the religious from its central position 
in society (in Europe, at least). All these signs of early modernity gave room to 
the position of aesthetics and beauty as autonomous aspects of the arts, and 
idea that was enhanced by the propelling of aesthetics as one of the core themes 
of philosophy. In other words, the 18th century was a period of huge cultural 
movements, affecting the position of the arts in society. Within the frame of the 
increasing fragmentation of society, the artwork was valued as distinctive. As the 
philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff writes in his reflections upon the changes in 
the art-world during the 18th century: ‘The early Romantics were the first great 
secular analysts and critics of modernity – the first to believe that seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century developments represented something distinctly new 
and different, and then to give a secular analysis and critique of those develop-
ments. Their typical analysis was that the coming of modernity represented the 
destruction of all the old social and physchological unities. Modernization is 
fragmentation – fragmentation of the old economic relationships, fragmentation 
of the old political arrangements.’31 This fragmentation evoked an experience 
of disappointment amongst the Romanticists, Wolterstorff continues. ‘The 
emotional undertone of the Romantic social analysis was disappointment: disap-
pointment with the new science, disappointment with the new capitalist economy, 
disappointment with the French Revolution and the rational politics there on 
display.’32 In other words, the rapid modernization cause not just fragmentation 
but also alienation from known structures and approaches. Wolterstorff refers to 
the thesis of Max Weber, arguing that the root of modernization has to be found in 
an instrumental rationality to the world. Only artistic creation, since it stems from 
imagination, withdraws from this instrumental approach. Of major importance in 
this perspective is that this imagination offers something that is unified, which is 
unique in the midst of these continuous processes of fragmentation. The artwork, 
in other words, is valued specifically since it is a whole, an un-fragmented entity. 
This un-fragmented character of the artwork indeed plays a central role in the 
dissertation of the philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, in which he coins 
the very term aesthetics.33 As Karsten Harries writes, Baumgarten argues that 
a ‘successful work of art’ has to be seen as a ‘world’.34 With this term ‘world’ he 
means a ‘perfectly ordered cosmos’, which means that nothing can be added nor 
subtracted without destroying the whole. It is as it should be, it is complete and 
self-justifying. Urging aesthetic delight as the end of art was revolutionary. As 
the painter Nicolas Poussin (1594-1665) wrote: ‘La fin de l’art est la delectation.’35 
Although the demand of unity, that is an inherent part of the aesthetical turn, 
was not remarkable, since it also is marked by Aristotle as characteristic of the 
work of art, it is Baumgarten’s emphasis on perception that has affected the 18th 
century reflection on aesthetics. The beauty of the artwork has to be understood 
as sensible perfection, which means that the artwork stresses the perception of 
the viewer. Since it is experienced as a whole, a distinct world an sich, it does not 
refer to anything else behind. The work of art is a whole in itself – or better said: 
it is individual, an end in itself, and able to absorb the perceiver.36 ‘Ever since 
Aristotle,’ Harries writes, ‘unity has been demanded of the work of art. To be sure, 
we must allow for complexity, tension, and incongruity, but order should triumph 
in the end, so what at first may appear not to belong, striking us as discordant, 
finally is recognized to have been absolutely necessary.’37
30. 
Thomas Sedlacek, Economics of Good 
and Evil, The Quest for Economic 
Meaning From Gilgamesh to Wall 
Street) New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 45-46
31. 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 
The Social Practices of Art (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 31
32. 
Ibid., 32
33. 
Harries, The Ethical Function of 
Architecture, 21
34. 
Ibid., 20
35. 
Quote via ibid., 20
36.
Quote via ibid, 21-22. 
37.
Ibid., 21
416
This perspective on the very outstanding characteristic of the works of art in a 
time of fragmentation affected the artwork as well as the artist. The artwork, 
becoming an end in itself, needed to be enjoyed in an attitude of attentive disin-
terestedness. The change of this attitude towards the artwork of course is visible 
in the emergence of the museum and the concert-hall during the 18th century: 
buildings where the artworks could be set apart and secured, and where citizens 
could enjoy (not to say absorbed by) the artworks in solitude and silence, un-in-
terrupted – of course prepared by the very architecture of the building (stairs, 
atriums, white boxes) to leave the hustle and bustle of the city and gain the 
attitude of disinterestedness. The artist changed from genuine craftsman, amongst 
the carpenter and smith, to an exceptional figure in society. The artist gains status 
aparte, which means that he is expected to be a genius combining the talents of 
imagination and creativity and the ability to produce artworks that grasp, and, 
to some extent, express authentic (and somehow recognizable) experiences. The 
distinct position of the artwork not only was left to the work of art as a world 
apart, but also as a medium of expression for the artist, or recognition by the 
observer. The artwork became the medium to utter the personal expressions and 
impressions of the artist, their original view of the world, their urgent, fantastic, 
sublime, playful reflections on nature, culture, society and human life.38 These 
works of art are expected to have an impact on the observer – to see the world 
with different eyes. ‘A visit to an exhibition of paintings may transform our vision,’ 
Nelson Goodman argues. The ‘excellence of a work is a matter of enlightenment 
rather than of pleasure.’39
One of the few times that Arendt in her writings actually gives attention to ‘archi-
tecture’ is when she offers a stunning analysis of this Romantic ideal beyond the 
artist and the Romantic emphasis on the authenticity of the individual. Almost as 
a side note of her analysis of the emerging awareness of the ‘self’, she mentions 
‘the astonishing flowering of poetry and music from the middle of the eighteenth 
century’ as well as ‘the rise of the novel’ during the 19th century. And she continues 
with the statement that The Romantic age not only is the heyday of these forms 
of the art, that dwell upon the individual and his vicissitudes and emotions, it 
also is characterized by the fall and ‘decline of the more public arts, especially 
architecture.’40 It is this remarkable observation that we need to draw attention to. 
Architecture, firstly, thus is recognized by Arendt not as art per se, but as public 
art. As she mentions it, a brief remark, it seems to be very obvious. This obvious 
perspective, however, is challenged in the Romantic attitude. Architecture even 
loses its public meaning. In other words, the decline of the public realm and the 
rise of the social realm also affected the obvious character of architecture, which 
is the second perspective Arendt urges here. The very obvious, that architecture 
is public, is threatened by a Romantic attitude towards the arts. The fall of archi-
tecture is at the cost of more social forms of art: poetry, music and especially 
the novel. Although Arendt does not describe this fall of architecture with many 
words, we can imagine what might have been the case: it lost its self-evidence. 
The field became fragmented, particularly by the perplexed responses to the tech-
nological developments, the loss of shared styles, and the search for a personal 
handwriting in architectural design. The evident public character of architecture 
thus fluctuates under the pressure of society, as well as by the lack of self-under-
standing by the professionals, I would add. As is the case in other arts, also in 
architecture, the designer gained a central role, bearing the burden of expected 
geniuses – a perspective still tangible architectural practices today.41
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I will come back on this public role of architecture, and how we still can 
understand the public aspects of architecture – it is not yet lost under the burden 
of a Romantic view. However, at this point, we need to go back to the statement of 
Kristeller we touched upon previously. According to him, the awareness of the arts 
as a realm apart of society primarily becomes clear in the erection of particular 
schools of art, the well-known Academies des Beaux Arts. Until that moment, the 
arts were taught via classical ateliers and workshops, where the master and his 
pupils together worked on the works of art. Through this master-pupil system the 
knowledge and skills were conveyed in the practice itself.42 The academies were on 
the contrary places where several fields of the art were simultaneously taught. The 
art-student not only could learn painting or sculpture, but also music and archi-
tecture. In other words, in the academies the similarities between the different 
fields of the arts were recognized and emphasized, rather than the differences. 
Both music and paining, poetry and architecture need the talent of imagination 
and creativity. Kristeller stresses the academies as clear break with the past. 
‘Whereas modern aesthetics stresses the fact that Art cannot be learned, and thus 
often becomes involved in the curious endeavour to teach the unteachable, the 
ancients always understood Art as something that can be taught and learned.’43 
Also seen from the field of architecture, the erection of the academies of art as 
schools of architecture should be seen as pivotal. As Kenneth Frampton argues, 
the Enlightenment previously had given room to the division of architecture from 
engineering. Already in 1671 in Paris the Académie Royale d’Architecture was 
erected by king Louis XIV on instigation of Jean Baptiste Colbert. The architec-
tural students of this academy were, Frampton writes, 
‘to dedicate them to the “what”, that is, to the reification of public structures 
commissioned by the State.’44 About 70 years later Jean Rodolph Perronet 
erected the Ecoles des Ponts et Chaussées. The engineering students of this 
Ecole Polytechnique ‘were to concern themselves largely with the “how”, 
namely, with the processual means of gaining permanent access to the 
realm.’45 
This distinction between architecture and engineering, between designing public 
buildings and designing infrastructure, Frampton quotes from the study of fortifi-
cations of studies Vauban by the historicists Michel Parent and Jacques Verroust, 
had its roots in the fortifications of medieval towns: the defence of towns and 
castles was the work of architects, ‘whereas the engineer was expected to not only 
build the siege machines but also handled them.’46 According to Frampton, it was 
just a logical consequence of the changing technics and the impact on the different 
realms of the craftsman, to lead the field of architectural design to this division 
in architects and engineers. ‘The progressive invasion of the city of artifice by the 
machine – first the siege engine and later the locomotive, and then of course the 
electric tram and the automobile – accompanied the ultimate dissolution of the 
walled city in the middle of the nineteenth century. Aside from its monumental 
rhetoric and its simultaneous reduction of honorific built form to the status of 
being a rentable commodity, the Ringstrasse that came to replace Vienna’s forti-
fication in the second half of the century was coincidentally the initial proving 
ground for the horse-drawn tram.’47 [IMAGE 6.2] Seen from the perspective of the 
realm of art, the students of the academia were concerned with the ‘higher’ 
questions of aesthetics: style and composition, rhythm and ornament, nice and 
fine architectural assignments like museums and monuments. The engineers on 
the other hand were busy with (new) infrastructures like waterways, railways, and 
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the works of art that accompany these structures such as bridges, stations, locks 
and docks. Their work lead to new innovations in construction, developing new 
materials like wrought iron and concrete. The architects, in other words, were 
to dedicate themselves to the cathedral, the engineers to the bicycle shed. The 
concern of Camillo Sitte, which we touched upon in Chapter 3, can be understood 
in this perspective. Behind his urging city-form, well-designed open places, and 
coherence,48 is the perspective of a designer educated at an academy, who is 
confronted by the increasing influence of the processual thinking of the engineer 
on the urban plan. Two ways of approaching the field, two different educational 
systems collided at that very moment in Vienne.
The situation in Vienne shows how the engineers have affected urban and 
architectural form. The architects somehow tangled up in an extensive discourse 
on the ‘right’ style of their designs, a question that of course was roused by the 
first experiences of modernity both in the everyday life in the city, as well as in 
the developments in technics.49 The engineers therefore could take the lead: 
they designed and built infrastructure projects such as stations and bridges, 
making use of developments in technics and materials. With these projects, they 
contributed to the insight in these new developments, as well as developing new 
methods of building and construction. Obviously these built projects attracted 
attention, and even lead to the assignment for the well-known engineer Gustav 
Eiffel to contribute to the 1889 World Fair in Paris with the Tour	d’Eiffel; a 
structure that still has a major impact on the city, annually attracting around 7 
million tourists to climb the stairs or take the elevators to the top. The engineers 
after all affected the profession of architecture unquestionably. Nevertheless, the 
distinction made by Brunelleschi between the architect and the craftsman and 
the distinction of the 18th century between the architect and the engineer, is still 
tangible and affects today’s field – at least in the different education programs 
around the world. Still, however, it is the aesthetic argument surrounding the 
profession, as can be witnessed in architectural culture today: the blogs, websites, 
magazines and Pinterest boards all presenting and discussing the latest projects. 
This aesthetic perspective is important, but if it is the only perspective left to us 
discussing architecture, it has become a threat for the profession. As can be seen 
in the blogs and magazines: architecture is mostly limited to nice photographs 
and renderings, moreover many of them are limited to presenting the façade, the 
exterior of the architectural object. Architecture in this perspective has lost its 
relevance to the everyday world, and has become a ‘hobby’ of people desperately 
searching for the latest development in architectural form, the newest application 
of technics in architectural space, and the most spectacle as an event architecture 
can offer.50 
6.2.2  The Moot Point: Towards a Critical Architecture
For Arendt this term ‘hobby’ has a negative sound. The term pops up twice in her 
discussion of the term ‘labor’. Labor, as she had defined the term, is bound to the 
body and bound to the biological cycle of nature. Labor is needed to survive, it 
is a necessity of biological life and of survival. Labor for Arendt is an unworldly 
activity. It is needed to survive, but is does not create a ‘world’. To create a world, 
that is, a world-in-common, the activity of ‘work’ is needed. The produce of work 
is characterized by endurance. The homo faber creates products that somehow are 
to be used, but they are also ends in themselves. A table makes lots of activities 
possible: to sit around it, to provide a place to have dinner, to have conversa-
tions, for children’s plays, for playing games, to office-workers sitting behind a 
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computer, but the table survives these uses for a long time. It is not consumed by 
the way it is used (regularly). That short-term consumption is the very difference 
with the scope of labor. A bread is certainly the end of the bakery-process, but 
the bread is not an end in itself. The bread only survives a couple of days. It 
either is consumed or spoiled. According to Arendt, the rise of the social realm 
is bound to the increasing impact of the animal laborans on the world, which 
is tangible in the omnipresent economic approach to almost everything. As she 
already describes at the very end of the 1950s, the ‘consumer society’ is a serious 
threat, affecting the lifespan of cultural objects and, therefore, also the capacity 
to create a common world.51 The consumerist approach impacts the way we deal 
with products that previously survived the tides: they now get a short endurance 
too, are means in an economic system of mass production, means towards the 
increase of turnover and profit of the manufacturer. But this is not only a matter 
of production, it also is a matter of our relationship with the objects that surround 
us. A table now only will organize family life for a couple of years before being 
replaced by another, more fashionable piece. This world-less thinking affects 
the attitude towards the world, Arendt argues. Even in the spare time of the 
laborer, the freedom from laboring, Arendt writes, is spent today ‘in those strictly 
private and essentially worldless activities that we now call “hobbies”.’52 The 
laborer loses himself in unworldly activities, Arendt states: interiorized activities, 
solely bound to the personal interest of the being. So if we call architecture a 
‘hobby’, as sometimes has been the case, we stress the field as becoming a playing 
field solely for personal interests and pleasures. This perspective certainly is 
exaggerated, there is nevertheless reason to be concerned, as several critics have 
argued. Peter Buchanan, for instance, recently argued in Architectural Review 
that the spectacular forms are ‘empty gestures’. ‘Architecture, once the encom-
passing mother of the arts’, he writes, ‘completed by painting and sculpture and 
carrier of cultural significance and meaning, has become reduced to superfluous 
spectacle.’53 The ‘clumsy works’ and the ‘idiotic concepts’ are not ‘relevant for the 
pressing problems we face,’ he continues. ‘Instead it all deteriorated into a quest 
not for lasting relevance but rather for immediate impact and exciting novelty 
in dynamically gesturing form.’54 Previously mentioned philosopher Karsten 
Harries actually offers an extensive analysis of aesthetics as final measurement 
of architecture, and concludes that if this would be the case, architecture by 
definition is world-less. ‘To the extent,’ he writes, ‘that the aesthetic approach 
governs building, works of architecture will turn a cold shoulder not only to their 
neighbors but to the world that would constrain them with its demands and 
necessities.’55 His argument, in other words, is that the aesthetics in architecture 
is different than aesthetics in the arts. Whereas the arts can offer a pure idea of 
beauty, in architecture aesthetics is always impure. Buildings after all never can be 
autonomous artworks, but are constricted to necessities of construction, building 
codes, and use. Buildings are not there to be enjoyed in disinterested contempla-
tion, but they will be occupied, moulded, and will become worn out over time – if 
people are even aware of them, Walter Benjamin urged, upon which we touched in 
the previous chapter.56 
Let us once again go back to the text of Kenneth Frampton, which I already 
earlier used to show briefly the historical roots of the distinction between architec-
ture and mere building. This text is, quite seminal since it, as one of the first texts, 
introduces the thinking of Arendt towards the field and history of architecture. 
The text actually shows how omnipresent the attitude of the animal laborans is 
within the contemporary production of buildings. However, the text also shows 
the crucial role of the Frankfurter Schule, with philosophers like Theodor Adorno, 
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Herbert Marcuse, and (later) Jürgen Habermas, in Frampton’s references. The 
article starts with a quote of Adorno and ends with the Festschrift of Habermas 
for seventieth birthday of Marcuse, as George Baird did remark sharply.57 That 
Frampton brings the Frankfurter Schule and Arendt close together somehow 
is remarkable. Arendt herself also took a distance from them, and vice-versa. 
However, Frampton starts, after that quote of Adorno, directly with the famous 
distinction of human activities Arendt urged in The Human Conditon. He never-
theless leaves ‘action’ for what it is – although he first urges the distinction 
between the public and the private – and concentrates on labor and work.58 Labor 
is repetitive, processual, impermanent and private, he argues. Work, on the other 
hand, is static, public and permanent. This distinction between labor and work 
echo’s the distinction between mere building and architecture, he then states. ‘An 
architect could hardly fail to remark,’ Frampton writes, ‘on the correspondence 
between these distinctions and the fundamental ambiguity of the term “archi-
tecture”.’59 The ambiguity he urges at this point is reflected in the two different 
definitions in the Oxford English Dictionary, that I have presented previously. 
In what follows, Frampton develops a great insight in the recent history of archi-
tecture, challenging the ambiguity of the profession as the increasing influence 
of the animal laborans upon the homo faber. A crucial reference to Arendt for 
Frampton in this respect is her concern about the cyclic processes of the labor, 
which is destructive for the durability of the world. As she writes: 
‘As far as the homo faber was concerned, the modern shift of emphasis from 
the ‘what’ to the ‘how’, from the thing itself to its fabrication process, was 
by no means an unmixed blessing. It deprived man as maker and builder of 
those fixed and permanent standards and measurements which, prior to the 
modern age, have always served him as guides for his doing and criteria for his 
judgment. It is not only and perhaps not even primarily the development of 
the commercial society that, with the triumphal victory of exchange value over 
use value, first introduced the principle of interchangeability, then the relativ-
ization, and finally the devaluation, of all values. … It was at least as decisive 
that man began to consider himself part and parcel of the two superhuman, 
all-encompassing process of nature and history, both of which seemed doomed 
to an infinite progress without ever reaching any inherent telos or approaching 
and preordained idea.’60  
This continuous accelerating process of production and consumption not 
only is very destructive to nature and the earth, it also causes worldlessness. 
It undermines the durability of the world of things, as it also is not capable 
to establish a permanent place in it for human inhibition. In this perspective, 
Frampton argues that the world-of-things began to disintegrate the very moment 
that each object was understood as a means to another end, mainly as a means to 
gain profit. Only art is disclosed from this trend, since it has to be an end in itself, 
if not ‘vulgarized in the idiosyncratic vagaries of kitsch.’61 Frampton here indeed is 
close to Arendt’s reflection upon the world-of-things. Also Arendt argues that the 
result of work somehow always is rendered as an instrument towards something 
else, as the table is meant to be seated around in a particular social setting. 
Although this use only in the long term will ‘destroy’ the object, the life-time of 
the object however is drastically shortened if not the use is the end, but a certain 
economic model (which is not part of the attitude of the homo faber, but of the 
animal laborans). Art, in a certainly idealistic image, withdraws from all this, 
since it is an end in itself. Arendt, in line with the development of the arts since 
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the Renaissance, thus discloses art from the very figure of means-towards-an-
other end.62 Frampton urges this development within the field of architecture, 
questioning whether it also is affected by this thread of instrumentalization, and 
if so, if there is anything left in architecture that can be rendered worldly. The 
first thread Frampton exemplifies renders the impact of the process of construc-
tion and usage on the design of buildings: tower cranes affect the form, elevators 
and escalators likewise,63 building regulations, and measures of transportation 
prescribe the possibilities. These restrictions are, Frampton argues, in todays 
practice far more affective on architecture than reflections on space and place.64 
Architecture – and here Frampton urges the loss of non-functional and non-con-
structional aspects of building, the reflections on space, place, culture, and 
aesthetics – has lost its worldliness and ‘comes to be subsumed under play’. That 
Frampton uses here the term ‘play’ has a history in this text, since he previously 
refers to the New Babylon project of the Dutch artist Constant Nieuwenhuijs as 
exemplifying the worldlessness of modern architecture and their preoccupation 
with temporality and movement.[IMAGE 6.3] This project not so much is example of 
the capitalist instrumentalization of architecture, but more an articulation of 
the utopian strings inherent in the project of modern architecture, which also 
detach the profession from the world. In the New Babylon project, as is well 
known, there is no such thing as a home, there are only private rooms that can 
be occupied for a while. There only is a way forward, and no need to return to a 
certain point of beginning. There is no work either, there only is play, Constant 
argues.65 In this picture of worldlessness, architectural form has lost significance, 
Frampton argues. Architecture after all is depicted by the representation of a 
contextual collectiveness, while his image of New Babylon imagines the opposite: 
it represents the construction as freeing the human being from its rootedness not 
only from the earth but also from its place in the world, articulating the temporal 
condition of modern life. In such a perspective, Frampton seems to argue, archi-
tectural form only can be understood as a highly individual question, part of the 
playfullness of the designer. However, the loss of worldliness and representative 
susceptibility for collective value that Frampton traces definitely finds its echo 
in the analysis of the profession by Arendt, describing the fall of architecture as 
public art in the Romantic age, as we have seen previously. Facing the Romantic 
attitude, as well as facing the Modern attitude or facing a capitalist system, 
the public-ness of architecture needs to be defended, we might argue. It urges 
Frampton to question the future of architecture: 
‘Whether architecture, as opposed to building, will ever be able to return to the 
representation of collective value is a moot point. At all events its representa-
tive role would have to be contingent on the establishment of a public realm in 
the political sense.’66 
Although this seems to be a quite pessimistic view, it in itself urges the intriguing 
combination of collective value, representation, public realm, and politics. 
Frampton does not leave the reader with this question, but opens up two perspec-
tives that might help us to direct this question. He first refers to the valuing of 
Arendt of the council system, the soviets that gave the name to the latter state of 
the Soviet Union,67 and secondly to the concept of communication as urged by 
Jürgen Habermas. ‘Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework can 
only occur in the medium of symbolic interaction itself, that is through removing 
restrictions on all communication,’ Frampton quotes Habermas. ‘Public, unre-
stricted discussion, free from domination, of the suitability and desirability of 
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action-ordering principles and norms in the light of the socio-cultural repercus-
sions of developing subsystems of purposive-rational action – such as commu-
nication at all levels of political and repoliticized decision making processes – is 
the only medium in which anything like “rationalization” is possible.’68 Both 
perspectives, Frampton argues, urge a ‘decentralized, “cantonal” conception’ of 
the political realm. It urges to ‘return us to the dependency of political power 
on its social and physical constitution, that is to say, on its derivation from the 
living proximity of men and from the physical manifestation of their public being 
in built form. For architecture at least, the relevance of The Human Condition 
resides in this – in its formation of that political reciprocity that must of necessity 
obtain, for good or ill, between the status of men and the status of their objects.’69 
In the preliminary version of this article, that he published as ‘Labour Work & 
Architecture’ in 1969, this perspective was not yet at the table. The moot point in 
this article, however, is even more telling. ‘If, as Hannah Arendt concludes, the 
victory of animal laborans is complete,’ Frampton writes, ‘then it is necessary 
for us to continually question what concept architecture can possibly signify in 
an age which, although individualistic, in one sense is paradoxically preoccupied 
with the life process of the species. In doing this, I would submit, we shall need 
to distinguish carefully both culturally and operationally between acts of “archi-
tecture” and acts of “building” and to discretely express both “labour” and “work” 
within each building entity irrespective of its scale. Only in this way perhaps can 
we hope to eventually evolve and impart to the society a coherent structured 
language of the environment that is both operationally appropriate and a true 
reflection of our human consciousness.’70 In both perspectives, that actually are 
quite pessimistic about the possibilities of the architectural manifestation and 
representation of human proximity and community, the telling component is the 
distinction between architecture and building, I would argue. His brief history of 
architecture certainly has to be valued on the level of revealing how much labor-
thinking has shaped the building industries, both building practices and design 
practice is undeniable. This perspective vice-versa affirms Arendt’s own analysis 
of the modern age: the increasing influence of ‘labor’ over ‘work’, and with that, 
the replacement of the public by the social. However, the question remains if we 
can expect from architecture resistance towards the animal-laborans approach as 
well as a position to reflect, represent, and form public world. 
The article ‘The Status of Man and the Status of his Objects’ actually can be 
read as the anacrusis of Frampton’s well known book Modern Architecture, a 
Critical History. Arendt is not so present in this book, which already might be 
concluded from its subtitle. The book offers a more in-depth interpretation of the 
two lines in architectural history from the 18th century onwards, and how these 
affected architectural practices even until today. However, as he admits in the 
introduction to this volume, his position is mainly evoked by the Marxist inter-
pretation and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School.71 The overview he offers 
stresses how functionalism and instrumentalism had stripped bare the building 
of its meaning and significance, while the form of the building was highly affected 
by the instrumental approach and production processes. However also the ‘new 
directions’ in architecture that came to light in the 70s and 80s, the post-modern 
approach with its emphasis on form cannot convince Frampton. He values the 
emphasis of post-modernism to resist the reductive aspect of modern archi-
tecture, as well as their openness to local issues and vernacular, the exemplary 
project of post-modern architecture he describes however as the ‘conscious 
ruination of style and the cannibalization of architectural form, as though no 
value either traditional or otherwise can withstand for long the tendency of the 
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production/consumption cycle to reduce every civic institution to some kind 
of consumerism and to undermine every traditional quality.’72 The impact of 
economic thinking, of the instrumental approach towards the built environment 
gained a new foothold in the architectural discourse in the 70s and 80s. As he 
continues: ‘Today the division of labour and the imperatives of ‘monopolized’ 
economy are such as to reduce the practice of architecture to large-scale 
packaging.’73 After the first publication of this book in the 1980s, Frampton has 
issued newer expanded versions. In the second edition he actually added a chapter 
in which he proposes another direction to go: ‘Towards a Critical Regionalism,’ a 
term he borrowed from Alexander Tzonis and Liliane Lefaivre, who had described 
the work of Dimitris and Susana Antanokakis under that title.74 The direction 
Frampton sketches can be read as an attempt to continue the ‘modern project’, 
that in the eyes of Jürgen Habermas still was still in-complete,75 without falling 
in the trap of the ‘normative optimization’ and ‘the naïve utopianism of the early 
Modern Movement’76 as well as from the corporate modernity that dominated 
the American city. Frampton argued that the local culture, which is one of the 
distinctive aspects of architectural projects, should be approached critically. 
Critical regionalism therefore is based on a paradoxical approach, Frampton 
admits – it urges the tension between a rooted culture and the universal civili-
zation in a time when ‘global modernization continues to undermine, with ever 
increasing force, all forms of traditional, agrarian-based, autochthonous culture.’77 
However, as the critical approach urges: ‘we have to regard regional culture not as 
something given and relatively immutable but rather as something which has, at 
least today, to be self-consciously cultivated.’78 Frampton actually evokes critical 
regionalism as fragmentary and a ‘marginal practice’, that brings building back to 
a grounded and bounded tectonic and tactile reality.79 
6.2.3 Absolute or Obsolete Architecture
Frampton is not alone in challenging architecture vis-à-vis the increasing 
influence of economic principles in contemporary society. Based upon the writings 
of Arendt the Italian architect and theorist Pier Vittorio Aureli offers a great 
attempt to enhance resistant practices in his 2011 provoking book The Possibility 
of an Absolute Architecture, published about 35 years after Frampton urged his 
plea for a critical architecture.80 Aureli however does not mention Frampton in his 
book, and develops his perspective separately. Interestingly enough, Frampton 
had mentioned the work of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe as an example of the 
‘reduction of building to the status of industrial design on an enormous scale.’ 
[IMAGE 6.4] And Frampton adds: ‘Since its concerns are with optimizing production, 
it has little or no interest in the city.’81 For Aureli however, Mies van der Rohe – 
specifically due to his indifferent approach to form as well as the scale upon which 
his projects operated – is exemplary of what he is after: an architecture of the city. 
His architecture is stubborn, withdraws from everyday principles of economic 
thinking, Aureli argues. It defines a part (that functions within other parts that 
form the city), ‘without making its style.’82 Despite these different interpretations 
and evaluations of the architecture of Mies van der Rohe, they both long for a 
resistant architectural practice that is quite similar. Aureli starts his book with a 
few sentences that can be read as the acknowledgment of what had happened in 
the meantime. ‘Architecture has become popular in recent years,’ Aureli writes.83 
Since the wake of the nineties, architecture has been able to attract attention 
from people around the globe. Projects like the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, 
The Walt Disney Concert Hall, both designed by Frank Gehry, the CCTV building 
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in Beijing by OMA/Rem Koolhaas, and The Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg by 
Herzog & DeMeuron, to just mention a few, have brought architecture back on 
the agenda of city planners and in the minds of the people. In the article ‘Towards 
the Archipelago’, published previously to his book, Aureli argues that these 
projects, nor the popularity of architecture, should not be taken for granted. On 
the contrary – there are lots of reasons to approach architecture critically.84 What 
is remarkable, Aureli argues, is that the growing popularity is inversely propor-
tional to the increasing sense of political powerlessness and cultural disillusion-
ment many architects feel about their effective contribution to the built world.’85 
Despite a cloudbursts of possibilities of forms that technically and economically 
can and are being built currently, today’s profession has lost a certain sense of the 
political and social aspects of form. In a previously published article, he writes ‘we 
need to seriously address the unequivocal social and cultural power architecture 
possesses to produce representations of the world through exemplary forms of 
built reality.’86 Aureli’s concern at this point surely is an echo of Frampton’s ‘moot 
point’, although he exemplifies it differently. 
Aureli develops his new perspective upon architecture by showing how 
economic principles have taken over the development of the city. The term city 
actually stems from the Roman word civis, which itself stems from an Indo-Eu-
ropean etymological root that means to settle which also is the root for civitas. 
Civis also is the root from civitas, the Roman word that refers to the political 
gathering of citizens or the right to citizenship.87 Although also the Greek Polis 
was a political form of community, there is a difference to mention. The Greek 
example consisted of a community of people that shared the same origin of place, 
whether the Civitas was a gathering of free individuals that recognized and shared 
a public realm – they did not necessary have a shared place of origin. A third term 
that Aureli mentions is that of the urbs, that in the Latin language simply refers 
to ‘material organization of buildings’. It indicates a city, but only in its material 
form: an agglomeration of houses. If there was no civitas nor polis, no institution 
that gathered the inhabitants politically, the inhabitants of the agglomeration only 
shared the material condition of the space, the structure that supports the agglom-
eration. This structure is infra-structure, Aureli argues. ‘The infra of the urbs is 
the space of connection and integration. In other words, urbs is infrastructure, the 
network that, starting from the reality and necessity of the habitat, unfolds and 
aggregates the house within an organic whole that bypasses any political spaces. 
Its primary purpose is the functioning of the private space of the family, which it 
connects to the infrastructure.’88 In the Roman city, urbs and civitas thus are to be 
seen as two complementary aspects, that nevertheless in the wake of time began 
to overlap. Aureli argues that this overlap has been a central dilemma of cities 
from then on: the demand of the good functioning of the city on the one hand, and 
the demand for politics at the other. Today – or actually from the extension plan 
of Ildefondso Cerdà for the city of Barcelona (1859) onwards – the two terms lost 
contact: the modern approach to the urban environment concentrates on the urbs 
and forgot to also stress the crucial aspects of civitas, which certainly is tangible 
in the process of urbanisation during the last century.89 Urbanisation, according 
to Aureli, is the unlimited spread of urbs over the landscape, the political realm 
has been absorbed by the economic, totalizing principle. This principle, as Aureli 
argues, ‘does not act in the public interest, but in its own interest; furthermore, 
it cannot be questioned because its sphere is not the public space of the polis but 
the private space of the house.’90 Aureli stresses the plan and ideas of Cerdà as a 
major shift in the approach of city-planning, which is fully explored and applied 
in the 20th century extension-plans for European cities and the urbanization of the 
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landscape in North America. Although in the principle of urbanization there is in 
theory no room for differences, in practice the increasing influence of capitalist 
thinking left room for two deviations: the enclave and the landmark. The enclave 
shows that capitalism segregates when it comes to the distribution of wealth 
that is gained through labor, control and exploitation. The landmark, the iconic 
building, also is bound to the economical approach to the urbanized landscape. 
These are not monuments in the ancient connotation of the word, but they are 
following the economical principle of urbanization. They are approached in an 
instrumental perspective, stripped from meaning except the representation of 
‘corporate economic performance.’91 The affect is ‘indifference of cohabitation’, 
Aureli argues, which ‘is a way of living in urbanization.’92 Aureli’s critique of urban 
planning today once again affirms that today’s ideology, despite the post-mod-
ernist rejections of all Great Narratives, is the capitalist perspective. Economic 
principles are now at the root of all urban developments, even those that seem to 
articulate particular ‘communities’. However, the affect is, as Aureli thus urges, 
indifference. In other words, the urban attitude is not simply distraction, as 
Walter Benjamin argued and we touched upon in the previous chapter, the new 
urban environment even evokes indifference. Distraction still can be embedded in 
the world, but indifference as an attitude certainly is world-less, common-less. 
The investigation of the ancient ideas on the city obviously parallels Arendt’s 
investigation in the public realm of these cities. In between the lines and 
sometimes explicit, the voice of Hannah Arendt can be heard in the text of Aureli. 
The increasing influence of labor on the realm of politics, the decline of ‘work’, 
the concern about ‘scientific’ approaches to everyday life, the affect of instru-
mental and economic thinking – it is all part of Aureli’s history of urban planning. 
Aureli however, does not leave us only with his analysis of the history of city 
planning and concern about the current situation, he also proposes a way out in 
what he calls ‘absolute architecture.’ The time has come, he states, to ‘drastically 
counter the very idea of urbanization.’93 Instead of focusing on the territory, on 
the infra-structure of organizing spaces and materials, he focuses on the single 
architectural project. ‘There is no way back from urbanization,’ he writes. ‘The 
search for the contemporary agora is a pathetic endeavor that only manifests the 
weakness of our political understanding of the city’.94 Due to urbanization, the city 
has to be seen as separated parts that are juxtaposed. Aureli then revisits a term 
coined by the German architect Oswald Matthias Ungers: the city as archipelago. 
‘In contrast to the integrative apparatus of urbanization, the archipelago envisions 
the city as the agonistic struggle of parts whose forms are finite and yet, by virtue 
of their finiteness, are in constant relationship both with each other and with the 
“sea” that frames and delimits them.’95 In his perspective the architectural project 
thus plays a central role. It is not a prescribed urban form that limits architecture, 
it is the other way around: the city emerges in the confrontation and struggle of its 
separate parts. In order to make his point, he uses an intriguing quote of Arendt, 
taken from her essay ‘Introduction into Politics’: 
‘Man is apolitical. Politics arises between men, and so quite outside men. 
There is no real political substance. Politics arises in what lies between men 
and it is established as a relationship.’96 
In the construction of Aureli’s perspective, this is a pivotal quote. It informs him 
to focus on the single architectural project, rather than on the in-between that 
emerges after the juxtaposition of projects. ‘The political occurs in the decision of 
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how to articulate the relationship, the infra space, the space in between,’ Aureli 
argues. ‘The space in between is a constituent aspect of the concept of form, found 
in the contraposition of parts.’ He then formulates his conclusion: ‘As there is no 
way to think the political within man himself, there is also no way to think the 
space in between in itself. The space in between can only materialize as a space of 
confrontation between parts. Its existence can only be decided by the parts that 
form its edges.’97 This perspective urges Aureli to focus on the singularity of each 
architectural project, not distracted by any other urgent issues than the project 
itself. In other words, the archipelago city only can exist by architectural projects 
that are singular, or, in Aureli’s terms, ‘absolute’.
With this overview, I of course do not mean to discuss the argument of Aureli in 
every detail, but to sketch the frame in which he understands the political aspect 
of architecture. His view on urbanization today is neither nostalgic nor cynical, 
whereas his proposal is provoking and evoking. It above all is architectural, which 
is quite rare in the debate on the changing condition of the city and its public 
spaces. Aureli’s proposal clearly can be understood as rooted in the European, 
or even Italian, tradition of reflection upon architecture and the city of Giovanni 
Battista Piranesi, Ludwig Hilbersheimer, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, Aldo Rossi, 
Oswald Matthias Ungers, and the early Rem Koolhaas. In their projects, archi-
tecture often is a singular intervention, stressing the limits and their inherent 
conditions. With his proposal Aureli offers a way to understand architecture once 
again, against the background of the most important developments of the last 
decades within the urban territory. The construction of his point actually is not 
only a theoretical perspective, it also is beyond the projects of Dogma, the archi-
tectural office where he is principal. Of course, there is a distinction between more 
or less abstract theory, and how this is applied in practice. However, in the case 
of Aureli and Dogma, the written texts and the drawn projects are much in line 
with each other, their relationship is evident. Until now, Dogma actually only has 
produced so-called paper-projects: nothing has yet been build. The office itself 
calls the projects forms of ‘architectural theory’, and rightly so. 
The most important instrument in the work of Dogma is the drawing.[IMAGE 6.5] 
Each project is presented through a series of similar iconic, even heroic drawings 
and collages, which can be understood as echoes of Etienne Louis Boullee’s 
theoretical projects, or the famous drawings of his contemporary Giovanni 
Battista Piranesi. Although established in Brussels, the work of Dogma also can be 
understood in the Italian tradition, in relationship to the well-known Analogous 
City Panel by Aldo Rossi [IMAGE 5.11] or the series of drawings by Franco Purini.98 
Aureli and his partner Martino Tattara, the principals of Dogma, after all where 
educated in Venice, before opening their horizons at the beginning of the 21st 
century at the Berlage Institute in Rotterdam and beyond. Once again, through 
their very particular way of presentation, once again, their works immediately 
remind the observer of the great tradition of drawing in architecture, and how 
drawings have contributed to architectural theory.  
In their projects, they propose a different way of organizing the urban realm, 
distinct from and critical to the former economic perspective.99 We certainly 
can state that their approach is ‘architectural’: it organizes the urban condition 
through formal interventions, through singular architectural projects. With a 
dogmatic focus on the straight line and the rectangular corner, their projects 
consist of enormous buildings that literally cut their way through the existing 
urban landscape, intersecting the existing fabric with clear and simple (but 
not simplistic) form. ‘Instead of being an icon of diversity per se, an absolute 
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architecture must refuse any impetus to novelty and accept the possibility of 
being an instrument of separation, and thus of political action,’ Aureli argues 
on the formal matters.100 The most powerful and critical projects therefore are 
those that literally intersect in an existing pattern. As Aureli argues himself: 
‘The possibility of an absolute architecture is thus the possibility of making the 
city and also the possibility of understanding the city and its opposing force – 
urbanization – through the very finite nature of architectural form.’101 Via their 
drawings, it becomes clear how they understand their projects. The projects not 
only rearrange the urban fabric on the scale of the landscape through their very 
size and indifferent positioning, particularly on the small scale of the street and 
the cell, the everyday environment is rearranged. The most convincing drawings 
therefore are those that reveal both scales at once, showing how the non-con-
formist intervention co-exists with the small scale re-arrangements, and how the 
strict on the large scale is combined with plurality on the small scale. What is 
remarkable to these drawings, and what makes it different from the approach of 
the 1960s approach of brutalism in architecture, with its focus on the so-called 
‘superstructures’, is that in these drawings not the structure is articulated, but the 
life within the structure. Repetitive elements deliver and indifferent structures, 
that by their occupation show significance. Beyond their projects there is the basic 
rule that strict planning on one scale allows freedom on other scales. It only can 
offer freedom of occupation on the level of the individual cell by the very strict 
application of rigid structure on the scale of the multiplication. That is what the 
drawings clearly show: they narrate the way how repetitive structure offers possi-
bilities, create conditions for occupation and habitation. The drawings, to my 
mind, moreover exemplify how Aureli understands the political and the formal as 
the two aspects of ‘absolute architecture’: it is all about separation and connection, 
limits and relations. The drawings moreover show that such ‘indifferent’ forms 
can be instruments of connection and separation at once: they re-arrange the 
urban plan, are forcing distinctions and make new connections possible, reveal 
the existing similarity and reify new possibilities, and finally create new and plural 
conditions. 
Certainly, the advantage of Aureli’s proposal is that it brings architecture back 
within the question of urban development and the architectural project. After 
all, much of the theorists warning for the current social and political develop-
ments, leave it with that. It is not so easy to understand how architecture makes 
a difference – what the significance is of the architectural project. Although we 
cannot take the projects of Dogma as 1:1 examples of the concept of ‘absolute 
architecture’ of Aureli, these projects certainly reveal some of the ideals he has 
in mind when drawing his way out of the threats of urbanization. As is clear, 
the strength of the projects is the revelation of the various contexts of the inter-
ventions. This immediately becomes clear in both ends of the spectrum of their 
work. On the one end there is the project for the new capital of South Korea, a 
competition they won in 2005. In this project, they from the onset could define 
the whole form of the city. Although their huge rectangular blocks intersect with 
‘existing structures’ and thus create differences in the landscape, that can be either 
a perfect condition for nature, parks, industrial zones or whatever, the strength of 
confrontation with the existing and intersecting on the small scale that is tangible 
in other projects is lost in this project. This also counts for a project that comes 
most close to construction: the project they delivered in 2011 on invitation to 
participate in a competition on social housing in Flanders. Their ideas on the very 
frames of the housing itself is interesting (the project is called ‘frames’), but since 
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it does not act on the very large scale and only on the small scale delivers clearness 
in form and structure, also this project has lost its tension and criticality with the 
existing structures. It does not confront, nor reveal the current condition of the 
urbanized landscape of Flanders.102  
This remark actually reveals that the projects of Dogma need the confronta-
tion with the situation in order to stand out. This certainly shows that even the 
provocative aspect of the projects, the seemingly indifferent positioning of the 
projects within a situation actually is based upon a site-specificity that is based 
upon contrast, confrontation and tension. The projects are not indifferent at all, as 
previously stated. They are rooted, arguably more than projects that simply follow 
the existing rules and patterns. The same can be said about the proposal Aureli 
develops in The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture. His proposal originates 
from a strong distinction between architecture and building. An Absolute 
Architectural project needs ‘buildings’ as its counterplan. Aureli’s distinction 
between architecture and mere building is not just formal, neither is it based 
upon aesthetics or significance like in the perspectives of Ruskin and Pevsner. 
His distinction is the withdrawal from the economic principles that currently 
master spatial planning and architectural practice– building is based upon the 
current economic principles, whereas architecture is based upon (autonomous) 
architectural principles. Architecture stands out as critical project, facing and 
revealing the economic principles beyond building. This view brings Aureli close 
to Frampton, we might conclude. Architecture withdraws from the instrumental 
perspective that is the very root of building, absolute architecture withdraws from 
the instrumental perspective that is the very root of urbanization.   
6.2.4 The Political and the Archipelago
Although the attempt to bring the form of the city back as a matter of architec-
tural projects certainly can be valued, Aureli’s reading of political substance needs 
more attention. At least two questions come to mind regarding the city. The first 
question stresses form of the city as result of the multiple ‘absolute’ interven-
tions that will ‘form’, whereas the second urges the very ‘space of appearance’. 
The first question urges Aureli’s view beyond the single project, He is quite clear 
about his rejection of the overall plan for the city. One can imagine that rejection, 
particularly when we look to the opposite practice: the masterplan that urges a 
particular form of the city. Such a detailed masterplan leads to either totalitarian 
approaches and simplification, or to failures on the ‘groundlevel’ of everyday use 
and adaptation. It is either strict, and leaves no room for the unpredictability 
of construction and development, or it is prescriptive on the use, and leaves no 
room for appropriation. The image Aureli evokes as an alternative is that of the 
City as Archipelago, an image he borrows from the German architect Ungers. This 
archipelago city is imagined by Ungers as ‘islands [which] are not just scattered 
fragments but are ‘antithetically’ established, meaning they are bound as a whole 
precisely by the way they react dialectically to each other. In this sense they form 
the possibility of an agonistic place, where the architecture of the city manifests 
and frames (limits) the possibilities of diversity by making diversity dialectical 
rather than hypertrophic.’103 This image of the archipelago is thus not simply the 
juxtaposition of different outspoken projects on the one hand, it also does not 
consist of the infill by singular projects of a prescribed infra-structure. It is both 
at once. In the archipelago, tension between the ‘islands’ is crucial, since the 
urban plan is not developed along the lines of relationships. The relationships 
are somehow at random. They emerge as the result of the juxtaposition. In this 
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future image, there therefore is much more room for chance and differences, 
none of them can be planned, nor foreseen. It is very well possible that fragments 
that overlap and intervene, open up and close down. However, the relationships 
are antithetical, not smooth but violent, not smart but brutal. This image of the 
future archipelago city is actually to be valued as simultaneously rejecting too 
much expectation of city planning, as well as bringing back the task of urban 
development to achievable plans, that is, to the architectural project. With that, 
Aureli acknowledges the limits of the architectural profession and ability of ‘the 
architect’. It does not fall in totalitarian planning ideals, nor in too idealistic ideas 
of a connecting public space, places of community, and whatever.104 Nevertheless, 
these merits are merits on their own, and not solely related to the view on the 
archipelago city, nor on the civitas as such. The overall image of the archipelago 
city remains based on points of density in the vast sea of the urbanisation itself.105 
The second aspect we therefore need to examine is the very relationship 
between these points of density on the map – the in-between space. Do they offer 
a possibility to establish a ‘space of appearance’, we actually might question? Such 
an in-between space emerges randomly, according to Aureli: randomly by the 
juxtaposition of elements. Certainly, the focus on the fragments can be valued, 
since the sheer size of the contemporary urbanized landscape does not offer any 
possibility for significant public spaces. The fragments somehow draw the public 
to a smaller scale, which might increase the possibilities to appear to one another. 
However, Aureli does not urge that aspect of political life. The political is in the 
architectural intervention, not in what happens in-between. He is right, in my 
opinion, to urge the political aspects of architecture (although Arendt would urge 
that as pre-political), but this does not mean that the in-between has no political 
potential. Aureli uses Arendt’s previous mentioned quote in order to support his 
perspective. Let us once again look at this quote. ‘Man is apolitical,’ this quote 
runs in Arendt’s text. ‘Politics arises between men, and so quite outside of men. 
There is no real political substance. Politics arises in what lies between men and it 
is established as relationships.’106 Aureli concludes from this quote: 
‘The political occurs in the decision of how to articulate the relationship, the 
infra space, the space in between. The space in between is a constituent aspect 
of the concept of form, found in the contraposition of parts. As there is no 
way to think the political within man himself, there is also no way to think the 
space in between in itself. The space in between can only materialize as a space 
of confrontation between parts. Its existence can only be decided by the parts 
that form its edges.’107
This response to Arendt’s quote actually does not convince me. The tempting part, 
to my mind, of Aureli’s conclusion is to think of architectural projects as interven-
tions that urge – by chance – relationships. These relationships, in the concept 
of juxtaposition, are somehow unpredictable. To my understanding, Aureli urges 
them as open to occupation by the inhabitants. This also is visible in the drawings 
of Dogma, that I previously described. They stress the occupation of the structures 
of the intervention itself, as well as the confrontation between the intervention 
and other (existing) structures (although the relationship with the fabric wherein 
the intervention takes place is not occupied in the drawings – the new relation-
ships are rather weak). The essence of juxtaposition, I would argue, as well as 
bring it closer to other writings of Arendt, therefore is that unforeseen spaces of 
appropriation and appearance can emerge – spaces that naturally bring people 
together, to use, enjoy, live, and therewith bring them naturally in proximity. In 
104.
Aureli, The possibility of an Absolute 
Architecture, 45
105.
Ibid., 178
106.
Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics’, 95 
[Italics in original] Besides that Aureli 
leaves out the italics in his quotation, 
he also made a little mistake: in his 
quotation the last sentence is ‘Politics 
arises in what lies between men and 
it is established as a relationship.’ 
Arendt however does not render 
politics as a relationship but in the 
plural, as relationships. 
107. 
Aureli, The possibility of an Absolute 
Architecture, 27
430
other words, the drawings of Dogma reveal that there is not simply parts and a 
relationship in confrontation between these parts, but that all sorts of spaces, 
in-between spaces, thresholds, boundaries, edges, corridors, connections, stops, 
and so on and so forth come into being – often indeed by chance. In other words, 
there not a relationship but relationships, which materialize not simply as how the 
parts relate to each other, but as spaces in themselves. 
Aureli thus concentrates on the buildings as a matter of architectural inter-
vention, since the in-between, the political in itself, he argues, has no substance. 
To me, however, this limitation seems to me a superficial reading of both Arendt 
as well as the capacity of the architectural project. There might not be political 
substance, but there are relationships, which are the essence of the realm of 
politics to Arendt. They, I would stress, are the essence of the architectural project 
as well. If the architectural project means intervention in (existing spaces), 
erecting boundaries and urging differences, why would there be no room to 
rethink applying that to the in-between space, between different parts, too? Why 
should we leave out this in-between space as part of the architectural project– or 
even as singular object of the architectural project? The in-between space after 
all does not have to be the result-by-chance of other architectural interventions 
– the relationships that are established, or that can be established, between the 
different parts can very well be part of the architectural project, or can be an 
architectural project in itself. Already the way architectural interventions relate 
to their immediate surroundings (as we can see in the drawings of Dogma), are 
part of an architectural project. As we’ve seen in the previous chapter, these 
boundaries, edges and limits are crucial regarding the idea of public space as a 
space of appearance. Boundaries and thresholds, in-between spaces and edges, 
can be a space in itself. Within the concept of the archipelago city, which often is 
rendered on a large scale, these boundaries as well as the in-between spaces that 
are urged as completely random, lose the possibility to articulate the essential 
character of these outlines, as well as the possible spatial qualities, particularly on 
the small scale. Contrary to Aureli we therefore might stress that the act of archi-
tecture is not the autonomous and absolute intervention, but is the possibility to 
intervene with objects and their interest (or their in-between-ness), which means, 
to challenge how these objects are related to each other and the world. 
But if we urge the in-between space as part of – or object of – an architectural 
project, how then to reflect upon Arendt’s statement that ‘there is no political 
substance’, which urges Aureli to focus on the parts rather than on the infra-struc-
ture in-between? In the text ‘Introduction into politics’, Arendt starts to stress 
the difficulty within society, both on the level of politics as well as in other realms 
of (public) life, to acknowledge the plurality of mankind. The very quote Aureli 
uses indeed is part of these preliminary reflections of the text, urges a distinction 
between the singular man and the plurality of men. Politics is part of the latter. 
If there only is man, which to Arendt is not limited to the single person, but also 
can be the single person multiplied, there is no politics. If there is no plurality, 
political action and speech is not needed. ‘Politics deals with the coexistence and 
association of different men,’ Arendt writes. ‘Men organize themselves politically 
according to certain essential commonalities found within or abstracted from an 
absolute chaos of differences.’108 The history of philosophy and theology, however, 
have had difficulties to acknowledge the plurality of men, the latter because 
of the idea that the human being is created in the image of God, which means 
that the plural of man is man multiplied,109 and the first because of the philoso-
phers assumed that there would be something in man itself that would urge the 
community, equality, and rights. Arendt opposes this view, since it is based on 
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kinship and similarity. There is nothing political in man, she than argues. Politics 
only rises between men (which thus is plural), indeed as relationships between 
absolute differences. The intriguing sentence in the midst of these two statements, 
that there is no political substance simply means that it is not something 
graspable, but that it only comes into being in relationships between differences. 
These relationships, nevertheless are in-between men. This perspective urges 
Aureli to concentrate on the different parts, rather than the relationships, 
although this also can be evoked that he quotes a ‘relationship’ between the parts, 
whereas Arendt describes multiple ‘relationships’ arising between men. There is 
no singular relationship, but rather numerous relationships. If we apply this to the 
city, as Aureli does, the very intervention can both diminish or increase the poten-
tialities of these multiple relationships, which in turn prevent or propel spaces to 
function as a ‘space of appearance’, I would argue, which makes this in-between 
an urgent architectural question. 
Aureli’s view moreover does not find ground in the rest of the text of Arendt, 
nor in her other writings. In ‘Introduction into Politics’ Arendt actually stresses 
another term that, as I will argue, offers a broader, and to my mind, a more solid 
foundation for a view upon the political aspects of the architectural project. After 
her argument that it is not man but men that urges politics, Arendt is quick 
to relate the fundamental plurality of men to her notion of the world. It is not 
kinship, nor similarity amongst people, but the world that brings together and 
unites a community. 
‘Wherever human beings come together – be it in private or socially, be it in 
public or politically – a space is generated that simultaneously gather them 
into it and separates them from one another. Every such space has its own 
structure that changes over time and reveals itself in a private context as 
custom, in a social context as convention, and in a public context as laws, 
constitutions, and the like. Wherever people come together, the world thrusts 
itself between them, and it is in this in between space that all human affairs 
are conducted.’110       
This quote actually urges three perspectives that we can relate to architecture and 
the in-between space. Firstly, in this quote Arendt starts to stress the laws and 
constitutions, the conventions and the custom that offers the form, limits, and 
the structure of spaces of gathering – all depending on the proper realm of the 
spaces. This stress on the instances that structure the spaces of gathering on each 
level somehow echoes Arendt’s remark on the role of laws and walls in the Polis 
that we touched upon in the previous chapter.111 Arendt argues here that these 
interventions in space – setting the limits and rules of debate, securing the place 
of gathering itself – has to be seen as pre-political. Architecture and law-making 
in the Polis preceded the actual appearances and public life. These perquisites 
have to be established before one can actually speak of a ‘space of appearance’. 
Architecture, as the product of making, precedes the space of appearance.’112 
In other words, architecture and lawmaking are pre-political, Arendt argues. 
Architects and lawmakers set the limit for space and debate, for political action. 
So what Aureli puts forward as a political gesture, stressing the ability to connect 
and separate, to limit and differentiate, in the eyes of Arendt belongs mainly to the 
pre-political. It is needed to circumscribe the ‘spaces of appearance’. At this point, 
we might indeed admit that Aureli’s reading is right: to offer the possibilities 
of a space of appearance, the limits have to be set. Whether this intervention is 
political or pre-political, I will investigate later. At this point we might state that, 
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like quite a lot of our human activities, architecture cannot be stored in a single 
category of Arendt. By the very intervention of architecture in the earth, the world 
is created – and this world is, as Arendt argues, both the object as well as the 
subject of politics. At least some aspects of architecture are part of the world itself 
– they are not only responsible for its constitution and limitation, which is the 
activity of work, but also to be understood as part of political action itself: it needs 
public debate, and it affects the world on the long term. This urges the archi-
tectural project with political meaning. Secondly, the term ‘world’ by Arendt is 
rendered as an in-between – not so much an in-between space, but an in-between 
that has substance and that offers the stage for all human affairs. In other words, 
the in-between, which is established through relationships, parallels the world. 
The relationships not so much are random, but they depend upon the world that 
unites the community. If there is no world-in-common, no political relationships 
are possible. We can argue, as I will do later, that this definitely is part of the 
architectural project: to give form, substance, and permanence to the world. The 
world, which has political substance, is thirdly important as the very stage of the 
space of appearance. Whereas Aureli understands Arendt’s argument as a reason 
to plea for the absolute character of architectural interventions (the parts), Arendt 
connects it here with the world-in-common, which establishes and secures a space 
of appearance. Certainly, as we touched upon in the previous chapter: this space 
of appearance cannot be guaranteed through architectural interventions, it can 
come into being everywhere. However, the world and the space of appearance are 
interrelated, while this perspective of the space of appearance is absent in Aureli’s 
writing. We therefore certainly can argue that his concept of political meaning 
of architecture is rather abstract: it lacks this aspect of the space of appearance. 
His absolute architecture might be a way to withdraw and probably withstand the 
power of the market-approach to building and the city, but does it offer room for 
the ‘space of appearance’? Does it offer room for inhabitants to appear amongst 
others, strangers but peers? As Arendt argues: ‘Strictly speaking, politics is not so 
much about human beings as it is about the world that comes into being between 
them and endures beyond them.’113 The world, in other words, always is related 
to objects that offers endurance and commonness, but also to the inhabitants 
that appear on the stage of the world amongst others. If we lose this perspective 
of both objects and inhabitants at once (which I think is the case in Aureli’s 
perspective and Dogma’s extremely large and strict interventions), it will mean a 
threat for the human being itself. ‘Human beings in the true sense of the word can 
exist only where there is a world.’114 In other words, the city, as opposed to urban-
ization and in addition to the archipelago-city, certainly is about the confron-
tation of parts, but also the in-between of relationships has political substance 
and cannot be rejected to be objects of architectural projects. The parts and the 
in-between together form this world, which is object of architectural intervention.
6.2.5  For the Love of the World
The position of Frampton and Aureli take in the field of architecture seem to differ 
as day and night. Whereas Frampton evokes the critical approach to building as 
an architecture that has to be understood as a locally bounded, tectonic and tactile 
and even marginal practice, Aureli directs architecture in a completely different 
direction. The ‘absolute’ urges the architect to the formal and the large scale, to 
repetitive structures that evokes tensions with the existing pattern of urbaniza-
tion. However, hidden behind these different directions, there are remarkable 
similarities to be mentioned. In both of their works, architecture is marginal – not 
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only Frampton with his rather small projects that he proposes as examples of 
critical regionalism, also the absolute is understood as points of substance in the 
vast sea of the urbanized landscape and city. Both texts clearly evoke a distinction 
between the good and the bad: the good to withstand or approach critically, or 
even to expose and reveal the bad. Certainly only a few of the daily practices fulfill 
the expectations of the good. Both texts, we also can state, we thus once again 
touch upon the distinction between architecture and building.  
Frampton most explicitly embraces the distinction, which he also reads in 
Arendt’s differentiation between ‘labor’ and ‘work’. In Aureli’s statement the 
distinction is rendered as the ‘instrumental’ versus the ‘political’, which in the 
Arendtian terms probably might be translated as ‘labor’ versus ‘action’. However, 
if we close-read Arendt’s distinction, this parallel is problematic. Admittedly, 
the distinction Frampton makes between building and architecture, the first as 
being captured by economic principles and the second somehow critical to these 
principles, echoes in Arendt’s narrative of the increasing influence of the animal 
laborans attitude on the work of the homo faber. Arendt indeed argues that 
economic principles applied upon ‘work’ affects the very objects of work, that 
previously were characterized by a longue durée, with ideas about consumption, 
which is uses in short term. Arendt certainly recognized Frampton’s parallel 
in the field of architecture, the moment he presented this text during the 1972 
conference in Toronto, with Arendt present in the audience, upon which we 
touched on in Chapter 4. No responses by Arendt to Frampton’s presentation are 
known, but it is telling that it is included in the book afterwards that published 
a selection of the papers presented.115 However, although the impact of labor-
thinking upon the attitude of architects, developers, commissioners and all other 
parties involved in architectural (and urban) projects is beyond doubt, this does 
not mean that architecture (or this part of the field that Frampton regards as 
mere building) completely is to be understood through this labor perspective. The 
distinction Arendt makes between the human activities on earth after all is neither 
a distinction between the economic and the artistic, nor between the obvious and 
the outstanding. And even if we acknowledge that Arendt definitely values ‘action’ 
as the ‘highest’ activity of the vita activa, she nevertheless avoids describing the 
activities through a bad versus good scheme. Arendt values the characteristics of 
each category, and challenges them similarly. If we have to summarize the distinc-
tions, it would be as follows: labor is circular and consumptive, work linear and 
durable, and action interruptions in time, affective rather than materialized.116 
The distinction between labor and work, and work and action, is thus neither the 
creativity, nor the complexity, nor the appreciation of the actual work or product. 
It solely is the temporality of the produce, its inherent durability. The works of 
work outlive the producer.117 That is an important perspective, regarding the 
human condition: the human being is born into an existing world, surrounded by 
things that already were there and will be there when he dies. For Arendt this is a 
very important aspect of the world: 
‘Work and its product, the human artefact, bestow a measure of permanence 
and durability upon the futility of moral life and the fleeting character of 
human time.’118
‘Without this transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, 
strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm, is possible. … It 
transcends our life-span into past and future alike; it was there before we came 
and will outlast our brief sojourn in it. It is what we have in common not only 
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with those who live with us, but also with those who were here before and with 
those who will come after us.’119 
With work, the human being thus creates the ‘world of things’. Human beings 
appear – or as Heidegger would stress, are thrown – into a world of objects. 
These objects somehow relate to each other, as well as with the human beings in 
the midst of them.120 Through the work of human beings, they intervene in that 
world with objects: they add new objects, but they also destroy objects. They relate 
to the objects and, as Arendt stresses as we will see in a moment, through the 
objects also to one another.121 The object, the ‘thing’ thus plays a central role in the 
political theory of Arendt. Things provide a world-of-things, a world-of-relation-
ships, and by their very thing-ness provide men the permanence and the reliability 
it must have as the residence of mortal man and the community of men. Arendt 
is deeply concerned about this common world. The world, as she stressed, and 
the permanence it offers, is pre-condition for all political life. Action and speech 
establish a web of human affairs, which only can be sustained by the world-in-
common. This world-in-common, in other words, ‘anticipates, embodies, and 
acknowledges the primary, politically constituted human reality that is necessary 
for action and speech to be meaningful.’122
As we already understood from the critical positions of Frampton and Aureli, 
the increasing importance of the field of economics impacts the world-of-things, 
and thus also threats the realm of politics, the community and personal lives. 
It changes the essential characteristics of the world of things. Particularly its 
durability is under tremendous pressure in the nowadays- society. ‘Their proper 
use’, Arendt claims, ‘does not cause them to disappear and they give the human 
artifice the stability and solidity without which it could not be relied upon to house 
the unstable and mortal creature which is man.’123 How properties are threatened 
today, however, in the West cannot be compared to the attitude that can be 
touched upon in other parts of the world, or can be understood from historical 
studies. Because of growing economic pressure and laws, the production of things 
has become more and more the production of instruments instead of products 
that are to a certain extend an end in itself. The personal dimension of the things 
with which we surround ourselves and with which we furnish our world vanishes 
when ‘arts and crafts’ are replaced by mass production. That means, according 
to Arendt, that the ‘world of things’ nowadays is produced since it is a means 
towards another end, to fulfil a certain need. After use, while the need is fulfilled, 
there is no reason to sustain the thing, it is regard useless or at least worthless and 
can be thrown away. A personal relationship between the owner and the object 
is lacking. Due to this development, the lifespan of the ‘world of things’ is under 
pressure – and with that, according to Arendt, one of its most important aspects: 
its capacity to establish a durable world in which the human being can appear 
amongst others, the capacity to gather, the capacity to connect the generations of 
inhabitants to come and already are gone. 
Although understanding building as the need for shelter and the instrumental 
approach of the animal laborans thus seems obvious, this interpretation never-
theless overlooks what actually is distinctive in Arendt’s categorization: the 
durability of that which is produced. The permanence of the world-of-things is 
its very essence. Both architecture and building, although for a major part serves 
biological necessities, creates the world that unites the people, as I will investigate. 
Even building has not yet lost its character of offering durability for a longer 
period – it is not yet spoiled by pure consumerism.124 It therefore still belongs to 
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the category of work according to Arendt’s definition, I would argue. So if we take 
this term of Arendt, the ‘world’ as the horizon of our journey through the field 
of architecture, we have to concentrate on this activity of ‘work’. Traditionally 
Architecture after all produces objects that last. In this sense, we cannot make a 
distinction between building and architecture, as if the first would belong to the 
activity of labor, and the second to the activity of work (or action). In that sense, 
we have to reject the views of our sparring partners. Frampton literally, and 
Aureli in between the lines, consistently distinguish between building and archi-
tecture. They connect it to the distinction between labor on the one hand, which 
produces in their view the majority of the building stock, and work (Frampton) 
or action (Aureli) on the other hand that produces the objects that stand out or 
that are to create a political substance and resistance. Architecture, ranging from 
project inception to the design of representative buildings, and ranging from the 
bicycle shed to the cathedral, belongs to the category of work. To my mind, this 
perspective is also the basis of a remark George Baird makes on Frampton’s first 
reflections upon Arendt’s writings within the context of the field of architecture. 
In the margin of this publication in Meaning and Architecture, George Baird 
sharply comments on the challenge Frampton offers to architecture as opposed 
to building; to represent the collective (or better said: where he argues that we 
have to expect that from architecture as opposed to building), that if the victory 
of the animal laborans indeed is true, also architecture has become obsolete.125 
Although you can explain this comment in many ways, I would stress this 
direction: architecture and building are the two limits of a spectrum, not distinct 
nor unrelated, but interlocked like communicating vessels. If building has given 
in, then architecture as well. To my mind, the image Aureli draws is the opposite: 
urbanization has given in, architecture then needs to rise.  
Surely, the threefold distinction Arendt emphasizes is exaggerated, at least in our 
everyday experiences. And we also might have a case if we don’t want to limit the 
field of architecture to solely the production of objects that last. ‘Building’ also 
can be seen as political action to a certain extent, and the human need for shelter 
urges architecture to serve this biological necessity, which might be possible 
to mirror ‘labor’. I will come back to this perspective in the next chapter, but it 
is good to broaden the scope already at this point. However, at the core of the 
profession, architecture as well as building both must be understood as belonging 
to making. Therefore, what both Frampton and Aureli brilliantly expose in the 
core of their writings, is the unparalleled influence and the danger of ‘labor-
thinking’ on the profession of architecture. Through their analysis of the ‘limitless 
instrumentalization of everything that exists,’126 which is a tough criticism on 
Capitalism and its habit to render everything only valuable when profitable – 
remember, it is 1958! – , Arendt again questions the withdrawal from the world. 
The lack of durability of the human artifice leads to a radical worldlessness, 
Arendt argues. A worldlessness that is experienced as homelessness.127 Even in 
the personal home, this homelessness becomes apparent: people are continu-
ously on the move, changing the interior, replacing furniture (with the help of big 
chains like IKEA), searching for improvement of life, home, and new experiences. 
Property, which for a long time has been understood as ‘sacred’, also has become a 
means towards another end, be it the social upheaval of the status of the owner or 
the search for economic profit through gathering and selling properties.
Beyond such developments from history until today Arendt recognizes a 
process of ‘world alienation’, a withdrawal from the world. ‘Nothing in our 
time’, Arendt writes, ‘is more dubious … than our attitude to the world.’128 This 
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alienation of the world, she characterizes the modern attitude of the human 
being.129 ‘The world lies between people,’ warns Arendt, ‘and this in-between – 
much more than (as is often thought) men or even man – is today the object of 
the greatest concern and the most obvious upheaval in almost all the countries of 
the globe.’130 Arendt actually argues that this withdrawal from the world, which 
does not mean only alienation, but also non-thinking, since thinking in her view 
is roused by the actualities of the world) might not be a problem of the individual, 
but it certainly is multiplied. ‘With each such retreat an almost demonstrable 
loss to the world takes place; what is lost is the specific and usually irreplaceable 
in-between which should have formed between this individual and his fellow 
men.’131 
Even the most recent trend in production, which seems to urge a perspective 
that takes care of the world once again through the emphasis on the narrative 
of the maker and the visibility of the workshop, cannot be taken for granted. 
This trend values local production and requires products that are uniquely, 
handcrafted, and well-designed. If production and product gain ‘personal 
qualities’, the relationship between the product and the owner is shaped 
differently. The idea is that this will change the attitude towards objects once 
again, from consumerism to a certain care about the objects surrounding us. Nina 
Rappaport in her extensive study on the history and future of factories argues that 
local production stresses the relationship between the produces and the consumer 
differently. ‘Knowing the supplier and supply chain’, she writes, ‘contributes to 
consumer loyalty and benefits both sides of the consumer/supplier cycle so that 
the consumer becomes more aware of the social and environmental impact of the 
supply chain.’132 One does not need much imagination that this different attitude, 
in which loyalty is central, also is based on a different attitude to the world. 
This trend, nevertheless, also can be understood in the search for meaning in a 
globalized economy. A search for products that affect lives, that one can associate 
with personally, against the background of a time where everything is replaced 
quickly and the world transforms continuously. This seems noble, but easily can 
turn in just new directions to earn money and make a profit from one side, and 
to gain an ‘identity’ on the other. Of course, both aspects are not bad at all, but 
the combination of both is a curse for products. Trends easily change, after all. As 
can be seen everywhere, even this attitude can become a fashion and fades away 
quickly.
However, what can be learned from this ‘new’ trend and its emphasis on the 
personal relationship between maker and owner, between workshop and city, is 
something that finds its echo in Arendt’s remark on the French interior, where 
everything is kept as it is, as the safe-guide in a world of increasing fragmentation 
and rationalism. The objects play an important role in this quote: life is nurtured 
between bed and chest, table (and cat).133 
The distinctive aspect of the category of work thus is the durability of its produce, 
a durability which for Arendt is a prerequisite for political action. Human life, 
according to Arendt, is only possible through the transformation of the ‘earth’ into 
a world. ‘The world,’ Arendt writes, ‘is not identical with the earth or with nature, 
as the limited space for the movement of men and the general condition of organic 
life. It is related, rather, to the human artefact, the fabrication of human hands, 
as well as to affairs which go among those who inhabit the man-made world 
together.’134 She builds this distinction between earth and world upon the work of 
her teacher Martin Heidegger.135 But whereas in his perspective it is not entirely 
positive, for Arendt the world seems to be a positive anchor point. It has a central 
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role in her writings, particularly when she stresses this world as in common (with 
others). This world-in-common, or as she also calls it, the world-of-things is the 
aim and object of action and speech. Arendt here joins Karl Jasper’s positive 
value of communication as opposed to Heidegger’s ‘existential solipsism’. Speech 
is needed in order to reveal the act of action.136 In other words, being-in-the-
world for Arendt is always is being-in-the-world-with, while Heidegger never has 
taken the step towards a valuing of the others with whom we are in the world. 
In his writings, the world nevertheless is important, particularly as the source of 
knowledge. He does not situate knowledge in cognition, like Descartes did, but 
in existence itself, an existence that is situated in the world. Knowledge of the 
world inherently emerges from human beings acting, dwelling, living in the world, 
being-situated-in-the-world. Since we dwell in the world, as distinct from the 
idea that the world is ours to behold, we know the world existentially. It becomes 
familiar: we know how to respond, to handle. This instrumental responsiveness is 
essential for Heidegger’s understanding of the world as a network of instrumental 
relationships. We are, somehow, practically involved in the world: the entities we 
touch upon we encounter not as merely objects, but as equipment, through their 
function.137 Arendt’s view seems even more directly bound to the world. She even 
renders a withdrawal from it not possible: ‘No human life,’ she writes, ‘not even 
the life of the hermit in nature’s wilderness, is possible without a world which 
directly or indirectly testifies to the presence of other human beings.’138 We cannot 
escape nor avoid the signs and tracks of our fellow human beings. For Arendt 
this is not problematic, on the contrary. Arendt replaces the solitude of Dasein, 
central in Heideggers oeuvre, by the condition of plurality of the public realm, 
and moreover introduces ‘action’ as the activity related to this public realm. Our 
being-in-the-world-with-others is not the condition of in-authenticity, according 
to Arendt, but is the space in which we appear as acting and speaking human 
beings. What specifically lacks in Heideggers categories is the aspect of inter-ac-
tion – that what Jaspers Arendt learned about revalaltory communication. Action, 
for Arendt, is not Heideggers’ equipmental or instrumental approach to the world, 
but always inter-action with the world.   
For Arendt, the most important aspect of the ‘world-of-things’ is that it has 
enduring power, which is required for the political activities she urges. She values 
the world thus positively as the space in which we appear to our peers as acting 
and speaking human beings amongst others, where we can be seen and heard 
through action and speech. The world therefore also has a representational 
aspect: ‘it must acknowledge the human ideals and principles that orient action 
and speech in appearing, or “shining forth,” as the world had in common,’ Paul 
Holmquist writes.139 Unlike Heidegger’s instrumental approach to the world, 
for Arendt the world seems to be an end in itself. Or to rephrase this statement: 
as I have argued in the last chapter, according to Arendt action and speech 
are ends in themselves. They are not to be understood as instruments towards 
another end. However, as Arendt also argues, action and speech are bound to the 
world. It is not only the world that makes appearance amongst peers possible, 
it is also subject and object of action and speech. Action and speech is always 
in inter-action with the world and our peers. It is the world that brings human 
beings together, not only with their contemporaries but also with our predeces-
sors and forebears. Action and speech thus need the world as stage. The world 
itself however is created through the intervention in the earth (and the world) by 
the activities of work. The world only is significant when it offers permanence, a 
durability that cannot be found in the earth. ‘If the world is to contain a public 
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space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it 
must transcend the life-span of mortal man.’140 Action and speech does not make 
sense after all if the subject and object of its engagement can change overnight. 
It is in respect to the transformation of the earth into a durable and stable world 
that Arendt comes up with the notion of culture.141 ‘The earthly home,’ she writes, 
‘becomes a world only when objects as a whole are produced and organized in 
such a way that they may withstand the consumptive life-process of human beings 
living among them – and may outlive human beings, who are mortal. We speak of 
culture only where this outliving is assured.’142 For Arendt, all culture starts with 
‘world-making’.143 
6.2.6 The Challenge of Culture
The word culture is, as one can imagine, rather important regarding the world-
in-common. Although becoming fluid today, it still promises a certain coherence 
between space and time. As it includes the fields of the arts, and through the 
arts also reifies action, it somehow bridges from the category of work towards 
the category of action. Culture, and cultural buildings are not easily brought 
back to the black-and-white spectrum Arendt draws. Culture, after all, seems 
to be as much part and parcel of political life and its concern for the world, as 
well as supporting the homo faber in his production, development, innovation, 
articulation of the world-in-common. In this perspective it is understandable 
that the Belgium philosopher Lieven De Cauter and the urban designer Michiel 
Dehaene plea for another realm in-between the public and the private: that of 
the cultural.144 In their reflection upon the notion heterotopia, as coined by the 
French Philosopher Michel Foucault, they refer to the reading of the Polis by 
Hippodamus, that indeed categorizes the cultural and religious buildings as a 
third realm, in-between the public and the private. This realm differs from the 
market (private) and the state (public) and offers room for a myriad of buildings 
and landscapes: churches, temples, cemeteries, schools, sportsfields, museums. 
Interestingly enough, they argue that these buildings and places not simple 
distinguish in space, but also in time. They unlock the holy-day-spaces, as they 
argue: they are not about the everyday, nor about the spaces of power, but about 
the spaces of specific moments during the day, in life.145 It is a suggestion worth 
keeping in mind. A echo of it can be found in Arendt’s discussion on the arts, as 
we will touch upon later, when Arendt discusses the need to make arts accessible 
to the public. The frailty of work of arts, however, require specific spaces (sacred 
or cultural buildings) that protect these objects. Artworks, Arendt argues needs 
to be ‘stored in sacred places – temples and churches – or by entrusting them to 
the care of museums and preservationists.’146 It is, however, also important at this 
point that Arendt does not create a specific realm for these buildings, although 
she must have touched upon Hippodamus’s description of the Polis and this third 
space. It after all is Aristotle himself who, although briefly, discusses the theory 
of Hippodamus on this third space in his Politeia.147 For Arendt the cultural 
and sacred spaces simply belonged to the private realm, even if they clearly 
contributed to the citizens to prepare for and recuperate from participation in the 
public realm.148 
Arendt, in turn, comes up with a challenging reading of culture as well – a 
reading that also places it in-between work and action. Before I can introduce 
that challenge in a clear way, we need to once again look briefly to the distinction 
between architecture and mere building. It’s quite tangible in that distinction 
that the first is related to a cultural practice, whereas the other part is understood 
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as providing an economical service or offering an engineering advise. The need 
to distinguish between both outer limits of the spectrum obviously is urged by 
the developments at both edges. On the one hand, we can trace the increasing 
drive to optimize the economic profits of building in many ways, whereas the 
architecture perspective is understood in parallel with the arts, that is, belonging 
to the relative freedom of the art world, in which the designer actually becomes 
more important than the design. In architecture the cultural value is evident, 
whereas within the building-scope this cultural aspect only latently exists (and 
often is dismissed as being expensive, un-efficient, un-functional). In the first 
the architect is the general authority, and has the position of the author, while in 
the second the architect simply is one amongst other specialists who contribute 
to a project as advisors in a building assignment. The problem in both cases of 
course is a misunderstanding of this aspect of ‘culture.’ It is thought as something 
additional, rather than something inherent to every intervention in the world. 
This might offer a perspective in which the distinction between architecture and 
building can be left behind and accepted without comment. After all, if ‘culture’ 
is limited to art or to artistic, our view upon the profession is narrowed. If we 
start to rethink architecture solely in relation to the work of art, we actually leave 
most of the products of making and intervention in the world behind, as well as 
the complexities of everyday life, that are subject of the architectural project as 
well – or that appropriate architecture at a certain moment, changing the building 
according to its actual needs. However, culture is not limited to the work of art nor 
to aesthetics. It is the other way around: art is part of a wider range of products 
– and only in this wider scope we can talk about culture. Moreover, culture 
somehow is in Arendt’s distinction between labor, work, and action bridging 
between the latter two. Not only since they construct the world as pre-condi-
tion for political action, but also since it is through this form of culture, through 
the production of a world that ‘testifies and memoralizes action’, offers them ‘a 
relative permanence’, and inspires the actor, that action is enabled.149 Or to state 
it differently, that action makes sense. Even more: we acknowledged previously 
that the relationship between world and action is a loop. The world not only is a 
pre-condition of political life, its future also is the concern of political action. The 
argument I therefore want to investigate is that architecture – and from now on, 
I mean with that architecture and building, unless otherwise stated) ideally is a 
cultural praxis that intertwines in a single project artistic and cultural ambitions 
with the human condition of everyday life. Even the simplest and most modest 
constructions are important, culturally spoken. As Hannah Arendt argues in The 
Human Condition, and later specifically investigates in essays on issues related to 
culture, also everyday objects convey public and political significance.150 
This perspective – to understand the whole building-industries as part of culture 
– might hollow out the challenge that is beyond every ‘cultural ambition’. Arendt, 
nevertheless, offers us a different insight in the term ‘culture’, that at once brings 
every architectural intervention in the world under high voltage. The word 
culture, Arendt writes in her essay ‘The Crisis in Culture’ actually stems from the 
Roman word colere: ‘to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend, and preserve.’151 
This somehow suggests an attitude of loving care for the things that surround us, 
both in regard to the natural environment as well as the cultural artefacts from 
the past. The things surrounding us need our care and attention, protection from 
the overwhelming power of nature and natural growth that can even destroy the 
strongest concrete slabs over time. It needs a progressive approach: it is never 
finished, but needs constant attention, maintenance and renewal. Arendt writes: 
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‘Just as surely as a house built by men according to human laws will fall into 
ruin as soon as men abandon it, so surely the world fabricated by men and 
constituted according to human and not natural laws will once again become 
part of nature, and will be surrendered to catastrophic destruction when 
man decides to become part of nature himself – a blind but highly precise 
instrument of natural laws.’152 
Also in The Human Condition Arendt urges the need of continuous interference 
with the world:
‘The reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact that 
we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by which they 
were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the lives of their 
authors. Human life, in so far as it is world-building, is engaged in a constant 
process of reification, and the degree of worldliness of produced things, which 
all together form the human artifice, depends upon their greater or lesser 
permanence in the world itself.’153
However, culture is not only about the loving care for and tenderness towards 
the world. Arendt is quick to bring the Greek position to the fore. The Greeks 
were themselves mostly aligned to the production of artefacts, a production that 
inherently meant the application of power and knowledge in order to disturb, 
violate and even tear down natural processes (of course, the Greeks could only 
apply that in a limited sense, compared to the seemingly ultimate power we have 
at our disposal).154 Both perspectives belong together: turning the earth into a 
world needs the Greek power coupled with the Romans’ care for what is already 
there. Culture thus is production and preservation. Arendt offers here a crucial 
insight, that continuously needs to be recalibrated and re-appropriated. We might 
understand this as the challenge of culture – the cultural challenge to all interven-
tions in the world. Culture is what is already there and what we add to this world 
of things. It embraces the existing and aims for innovation and improvement. 
Both aspects of culture come together in the human being, as Arendt writes, 
‘insofar as he is not only a producing but also a political being.’155 When urging 
the cultural perspective, we urge the producing and the political being at once. 
They belong together. Production is about the establishment and maintenance of 
the world through the work of our hands, we might state. Politics however is also 
about the establishment and maintenance of the world through action and speech. 
Culture, in other words, bridges between ‘work’ and ‘action’. Culture places the 
products of ‘work’ in a larger construct, stressing their significance beyond their 
own realm and places them in a political perspective. This also counts the other 
way around: it stretches the realm of politics towards the tangible interven-
tion and maintenance of the world-in-common. The world, we also can state, is 
simultaneously stage and subject of action and speech. So to put this strongly: in 
politics, preservation and action, care and the capacity to initiate come together. 
The careful handling of the past, which makes it vital today, offers the condition 
of acting into the future. Architecture, evidently, plays a major role in that present 
vitality of the past.   
Arendt develops her startling insight even further: ‘As such, [the political 
being] needs to be able to depend on production, so that it may provide lasting 
shelter for acting and speaking in their transience – and for the perishability of 
mortal life in its perishability. Politics is thus in need of culture, and acting is in 
need of production for the purpose of stability.’156 In other words, since political 
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action is characterised by frailty, the world needs to be permanent in order to give 
room to the instability and unpredictability of human actions and inter-actions. 
This challenge that confronts culture is bound to all worldly objects. All produce 
of work, in other words, contain political meaning and significance. These objects 
form in a literal and metaphorical sense the world that human beings share – it 
also shapes the political realm. These objects offer the stability that is required for 
a meaningful appearance amongst peers. 
This is precisely the reason that we need to reject the distinction between archi-
tecture and genuine building. As seen from the perspective of the political realm 
there is no difference. The political perspective challenges each part of the 
building industries. There cannot be a single aspect left from this perspective, as 
if ‘building’ can turn its back the political realm. This of course does mean that 
we cannot leave ‘building’ where it is, neither can we dismiss the ideas beyond 
‘architecture’. Even if we declare the regular building industries as the way we 
produce culture today, even if we declare the building industries as the result 
of culture today, which of course is true in some way, we have to admit that this 
form of culture-making is heavily dependent upon an economical view of building 
practices. As said before, the economic models are not the problem an sich, it 
is urging the economic aims as the very end of the building process – as if there 
is no urban context, no past to remember, no future left, no generations after 
us that also need to find their place in the world. If economic efficiency is the 
single outlook, we’ve lost sight on the common world that binds the past with the 
now, the here with there, the current with the future. Seen from the perspective 
of Arendt, stressing her argument on the political significance of the world, the 
regular building-industries and the genuine approaches in building need to be 
challenged urgently. The same counts also for the part of architecture within the 
building industries. If ‘building’ does not understand its value, what about archi-
tecture? The aesthetic approach, and if we follow Pevsner as discussed above, with 
his distinction between the bicycle shed and the cathedral, this approach is what 
distinguishes architecture from mere building, indeed urges architecture to play a 
role on a strict cultural and artistic level. But even these architectural approaches 
might have become obsolete, as Baird already urged in response to Frampton. 
There are actually two threats that empty-out the meaning of architecture in 
this respect. The first is visible in these instances that architecture is used as an 
economic instrument as well. Architecture is understood as a means to create an 
identity which can be applied to (a part of) a city, a mall, or a company. Of course, 
representation of identity is not something new in architecture. The meaning of 
architecture has always surpassed the sheer technical design of buildings and 
spaces – even in its most technical appearance the responsibility of architec-
ture reaches further than the occurrence of the single detail or building. Roman 
villas, Gothic churches, and modern factory-building all represent something 
of the commissioner. Or better said: it tells something the commissioner wants 
to communicate. The grandeur of the villa shows the richness of the owner, the 
height and light of the Gothic church emphasises the holiness of the Lord, the 
modern corporate building shows how progressive and advanced this particular 
business is. Nevertheless, the difference perhaps is first that these identities suffer 
from the same disease as fashion and furniture: it is volatile. For a short period 
of time it attracts attention, but quite soon it fades away, becomes out-of-date if 
not obsolete, and needs to be replaced by something else that attracts attention. 
Frampton’s question I quoted previously as to whether architecture ‘ever [will] 
be able to return to the representation of collective value’ in order to set up a 
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shared public realm resonates here, since architecture evidently has been affected 
by consumerism as well, at least because it becomes tangible in the continuous 
production of images within its field that are disseminated to the public. Archi-
tectural consumption is affected by the emergence of a range of websites and 
social media that need to publish new projects, renderings and diagrams, not just 
day by day, but even hour by hour, to attract visitors and advertisements. This 
creates a specific architectural public desiring the constant consumption of archi-
tecture. In other words, architecture has turned into entertainment; it creates 
objects of consumption that obscure the establishment of a new political realm. 
Second, we need to see how the urges of identity apply a whole set of organisa-
tional principles of efficiency, smoothness and temptation towards certain spaces 
and buildings. These principles reveal to be totalitarian: there is no room for 
alternative approaches and interpretations. Architecture as a means of attraction 
and leisure, of development and growth, reduces architecture to a singular view 
upon the world, which strips architecture bare of public meaning. The aim of 
consumption and an emphasis on economic profits and benefits turns architecture 
into a means to another end in the short term, beyond functional and program-
matic issues.157 Most clear is the eagerness to understand architecture as part 
of the ‘creative industries’ discourse that, through the writings of the economist 
Richard Florida and others,158 has become a specific economic narrative. Such 
framing of the profession of course influences the economic lifecycle of buildings 
and designs and also affects contemporary architectural design approaches. The 
increasing impact of consumer society upon architecture seems to deepen the gap 
between ‘artistic’ aspects of architecture and everyday practices. The demands of 
consumer society also enhance aspects of originality and creativity as key drivers 
in processes of distinction and branding.
This brings us to our second threat of architecture becoming obsolete: not only 
when the mere building is left out of scope, this diminishes the political aspects 
of all architectural practices, but also when the architecture-part is limited to the 
perspective of the artistic this will be the case. Artistic in this case, under influence 
of the Romantic age, as we have seen, is bound to the designer and its oeuvre. 
Often the wish to create an identity by the commissioner and the name of a single 
designer joins forces. Well-known architects are invited to design buildings from 
Dubai to Beijing, from Chicago to London, from Bogotá to Laos. The design and 
even the building has become an element of their portfolio, a stone in their oeuvre, 
while for the commissioners the very architecture of their properties has become 
a matter of identity, iconic landmarks (the well-known name also can be a matter 
of significance in the building-market, to advertise with, or what Aureli called 
‘corporate economic performance.’)159 and a place in the oeuvre of the architect. 
The emphasis here is thus upon the design as original idea of an individual 
architect. Artist and artwork, architect and architecture are merged. This threat 
is not only applied to the ‘starchitects’ operating on the scale of the globe, upon 
which we touched previously, but also plays a role in more locally grounded 
practices. Also in these situations the architect can be the ‘star’. If aesthetics is the 
sole perspective to judge a project, or to decide about form and matter in a project, 
architecture has lost its meaning as well. It has become alienated from the world. 
As Harries writes: ‘To the extent that the aesthetic approach governs building, 
works of architecture will turn a cold shoulder not only to their neighbours but to 
the world that would constrain them with its demands and necessities.’160 
If the world needs to be the aim, what then does that mean for the project of 
architecture? In the next paragraphs, we will meander through Arendt’s view 
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on the world-of-things and specifically on the works of art. These perspectives 
will reveal a couple of merits that Arendt particularly expects from works of art. 
The final paragraphs of this chapter then will explore these merits through the 
scope of the architectural profession. At this point, however, we might conclude, 
that addressing the significance of architecture through a distinction from mere 
building, as is the case in architectural culture today, leaves most of the building 
projects out of sight. But what about the other projects, that form by far the main 
part of the building industries? It is as if these projects and practices are not 
worth discussing and questioning, while simultaneously these for a great deal 
determine the everyday environments of citizens: their houses and streets, their 
offices and shopping malls, their hospitals and sports facilities, even their town 
halls and central squares. Building somehow is neglected by architectural profes-
sionals, neither being presented in the cultural realm, nor published in general 
newspapers and magazines, as also it is not discussed within academia, they are 
also left un-challenged. As if architecture is a case of architects only, and other 
collaborators are not responsible for the transformation and maintenance of the 
world. Architecture in the broadest sense of the word, however intervenes in the 
everyday environment of citizens, which is the responsibility of all involved in the 
process of building. Architecture is always the result of a collective endeavour, 
as I will investigate in the next chapter. However, if we challenge the political 
aspect of architecture, this is a goal of all building assignments, a challenge to all 
practices, and to all involved in these practices. Particularly, of course, for the 
designer, since the design, in the end, needs to connect the interests of the diverse 
stakeholders in a singular intervention in the world. Therefore, urging architec-
tural significance solely through the particularities of architectural artistic (as 
Ruskin did, as we have seen), through the merit of delight and aesthetic appeal 
(like Pevsner urged, as we have seen), means narrowing the scope of architecture. 
It loses its basis in everyday life, as well as in the political realm, in order to fill 
a certain position in the realm of the arts. Often this realm is rendered a world 
apart, as we have seen, distinct from everyday objects and experiences. Arendt, 
although she acknowledges the distinctiveness of the artwork, she also keeps 
everyday objects and artworks close together within the category of ‘work’ and in 
their shared significance for the world. All products of making construct the world 
that human beings have in common. Art is part of that construction, it only is 
special in so far as the works of art have the capacity to push the characteristics of 
all other objects of ‘work’ to their very end, since it is particularly the work of art 
that is an end in itself. 
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6.3 THE POLITICS OF ART 
6.3.1  The Most Worldly of All Tangible Things
As seen from the distinction between labor and work, there indeed might be no 
essential difference between mere building and works of architecture, between 
everyday objects and works of art. These all are products of making, results 
of work. For Arendt artworks are specific objects, with a specific quality. The 
importance to claim the similar origin of the everyday objects and the works of 
art is the political significance that Arendt assigned to both. They turn the earth 
in a world, offer durability to the temporalities of political action, and form the 
stage for appearances amongst peers. In the image of Arendt, works of art have 
this capacity particularly since they are an end in themselves: they are not used for 
other means, which means that they are not worn-out over time. Such an image 
of course mostly addresses classical forms of art: sculpture and painting, whereas 
music, poetry and the newer forms of art like photography, video, and manifes-
tations has a very different relationship with this aspect of the longue duree. We 
will come back on that, but let us first follow Arendt’s reflection upon objects of 
art as pivotal objects regarding communities. Arendt connects the longue duree 
to aspects of beauty, to their aim of aesthetic appeal. Artworks are meant to 
challenge the human experience of aesthetics. Nevertheless, the case of aesthetics 
is not limited to art only, as the philosopher Cecillia Sjöholm, who recently 
magnificently investigated the relevance of aesthetics in Arendt’s writings, argues: 
‘Questions of aesthetics … cannot be reduced to art. We experience aesthetic 
phenomena in our everyday lives, in nature, in the sciences, and so on. Following 
Kant, we may talk about all those phenomena that appeal to our judgment as 
belonging to the field of aesthetic inquiry.’161
Now that we have argued not to distinguish between architecture and building 
but to stress the profession as a whole, it is time to value the fundamental artistic 
aspect of building. Although Arendt does not make distinction between regular 
objects like the table on the one hand, and a works of art on the other (if we solely 
look to the way they are made), the art work nevertheless stands out because of 
a series of reasons. I will stress four reasons at this point, which clarify how the 
work of art emphasizes the importance of the world-of-things in regard to the 
public realm. In other words, the art work enlightens the political aspects of all 
worldly objects.  
The first of this series of perspectives Arendt draws is actually that the work 
of art enhances and enlarges the permanence of the world – we touched upon 
that aspect already briefly. Although the produce of work is characterized by a 
resistance towards the consuming life-processes, and thus are characterized by a 
certain longue durée, objects regular are use-objects. There are other ends that are 
fulfilled through the object. Objects are used towards other ends, and therefore 
will wear out over time. They will change slightly in appearance and quality, until 
the moment that they have lost their appropriate form, or have deteriorated too 
much, and need to be demolished. But even stronger, as Frampton has argued, 
the permanence of the objects that surround us are increasingly produced for 
short-term use. Thinking about furniture, for instance, chairs and tables have 
become products of mass production: quite cheap to purchase, often fashionable, 
and therefore also easily replaced (even if the object is still properly working 
towards the end it has been produced and bought). It is against this background 
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that the artwork can appear as different. The work of art after all is not a 
use-object. It is created as an end in itself. That is the very reason that Arendt 
qualifies the artwork: it has an inherent permanence. Admitted, this perspective 
dwells upon the 18th century change in attitude towards the arts, as I described 
above. Arendt embraces the importance of the artwork, since it has no other goal 
to fulfil then to exist. Artworks, as Arendt argues, are ends in themselves and 
therefore are potentially immortal.162 They are not used in the regular meaning of 
the word. 
‘Among the things that give the human artifice the stability without which 
it could never be a reliable home for men are a number of objects which are 
strictly without any utility whatsoever and which, moreover, because they 
are unique, are not exchangeable and therefore defy equalization through a 
common denominator such as money.’163 
Artworks are there to be enjoyed, not to be consumed, neither to be traded. As 
soon as the artwork becomes a modus of investment, other expectations are added 
to the object. Strictly spoken, the panel, sculpture, painting, or poem doesn’t 
have any other aim than to be enjoyed. However, back to the argument Arendt 
offers; if we strictly look to the art-work itself, we can argue that it can survive the 
ages, particularly since it is not worthless after fulfilling its initial goal. In other 
words, it lacks an economic lifespan, it is just there. As Arendt writes: ‘because 
of their outstanding permanence, works of art are the most intensely worldly of 
all tangible things; their durability is almost untouched by the corroding effect of 
natural processes, since they are not subject to the use of living creatures.’164 The 
artist is, Arendt therefore writes, the only true ‘worker’, since his produce, the 
artwork, essentially is ‘useless’.  
‘From the viewpoint of sheer durability, artworks clearly are superior to all 
other things; since they stay longer in the world than anything else, they are 
the worldliest of all things. Moreover, they are the only things without any 
function in the life process of society; strictly speaking, they are fabricated not 
for men, but for the world which is meant to outlast the life-span of mortals, 
the coming and going of the generations. Not only are they not consumed 
like consumer goods and not used up like use objects; they are deliberately 
removed from the processes of consumption and usage and isolated against 
the sphere of human necessities.’165 
Useless, by the way, doesn’t mean that the work of art isn’t useful in any sense. 
Artworks can be ‘used’ in many different ways. This use to Arendt is different than 
to be consumed. Artworks are there to stay. Their very beauty preserves them 
from oblivion. ‘Beautiful things can perdure’, the political philosopher Kimberley 
Curtis writes, ‘not because they are the same to all of us, timeless and true in 
that universalist way, but because they are powerful but specific time-bound 
responses to universal dilemmas embedded in the human condition. In this sense, 
beautiful things have a coercive and contingent quality; their durability, as their 
beauty, derives from their capacity to illuminate both the historically specific and 
universal shape of our human dilemma’s.’166 In other words, beauty evokes the 
challenge ‘how to save and cherish’. Nevertheless, this aspect of the longue durée 
and the importance of power most easily can be applied to sculpture and painting, 
rather than to music and poetry, since the first two are producing tangible things, 
part of the world-of-tangible-things. However, we might argue, even writing 
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(which produces at least texts and books) and music (offering repeatable perfor-
mances) are producing artworks that unite people over time. 
At this point we might stress once again that the delight of art has to be distin-
guished from a way of enjoying art more akin to entertainment; that we might 
call to be pleased by the work of art. Arendt relates pleasure to the entertainment 
industries, to life, to the need to fill spare time with that distracts. ‘Culture relates 
to objects’, Arendt writes, ‘and is a phenomenon of the world, and pleasure relates 
to people and is a phenomenon of life.’167 What the entertainment industries 
offers, quite contrary to the world of art, ‘are not values to be used and exchanged; 
rather, they are objects of consumption as apt to be depleted as any other such 
object. Panem et circenses [bread and circuses] – these two indeed go together: 
both are necessary for the life-process, for its sustenance and its recovery; both 
are also swallowed up in this process, that is to say, they both have to be produced 
and performed time and again if this process is not to come to an eventual halt.’168 
Arendt thus argues that the offerings of the entertainment industries are bound 
to the biological cycle of nature, life and the human body. The work of art, on 
the contrary, is bound to the longue durée of world. It serves the world with 
permanence. Arendt stresses this distinction, since the pleasure industries have 
a great impact on the world of art as well. The longing for leisure affects not just 
the approach to art by spectators, nor the aim of the artists involved, but also the 
status of art within society. In other words, it affects the realm of culture, and by 
affecting cultural objects, it also is a trait for the world. 
Arendt clearly, although not dissecting this aspect, understands the attitude 
towards art should be characterized by disinterested attention. I already touched 
upon that perspective above, when discussing the change in attitude towards 
the arts in the 18th century. It is this changing attitude that, for a great deal is 
influenced by the writings of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, who 
stresses the aesthetic judgment as being disinterested.169 Once again, this word 
can be mistaken easily. It does not mean ‘inattention’ – how Kant propels the 
term is ‘not-self-interest’. Moreover, as he argues, and Arendt stresses, interest 
means inter-esse, which means ‘what is between us’, which thus can be public. It 
is in this perspective that Kant describes disinterested judgment as ‘taste’,170 upon 
which we will come back in the next chapter, where we will dissect the public roles 
of the architect. At this point it is important to note that art requires a ‘disinter-
ested’ approach, and that this dis-interested attitude essentially offers room for 
a public sharing of taste. Art, there for contemplation – disinterested contempla-
tion. Disinterested has to be clearly distinguished from un-interested, which is not 
interested at all. The disinterested attitude is interested, but not to consume the 
object of attention. It is attentive and open, it is not possessive, it is an interest-
edness for the sake of the object itself.171 It approaches the art work to desire the 
object and to maintain it, not to the use for another goal beyond the object itself: 
no self-fulfilment, no political activism, and even not the very personal expression 
of the self.172 Note at this point that this image of disinterestedness also is beyond 
Arendt’s description of participating in public action and speech. Also political 
action needs to be rising from a disinterested attitude: it is not about personal 
interest and possession, about self-expression nor self-fulfilment. Arendt even 
urges courage as needed for appearance in public space. It is possible that one 
need to act against the own interests.173 
For Arendt, after all, it is important that art does not fulfil a certain aim, 
while it also is important that the attitude of the individual spectator and of 
culture as a whole does not spoil the object itself.174 So the disinterested attitude 
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is needed in order to be attracted, but not in order to possess it, to be pleased or 
to consume. Nevertheless, also the art world is susceptible for consumption. ‘If 
the entertainment industry lays claim to products of culture – and this is exactly 
what happens in mass culture,’ Arendt writes, ‘the immense danger arises that 
the life-process of society … begins literally to devour the products of culture.’175 
Arendt than continues to argue that this does not happen through the cheap 
reproduction of art works, which are spread all over the world – and here Arendt 
certainly has thought about the famous article of her friend Walter Benjamin, on 
the works of art in a time of reproduction. However, when the artwork is altered 
and popularized, this certainly empties out the original. It affects the possibility of 
enjoyment of the artwork. If the image is printed on all sorts of consumer goods, 
the object itself somehow vanishes. If assessing a painting or a sculpture, it is not 
easy to get rid of the images of these knockoffs in mind.
Such a concept of art, which emphasises the longue durée, beauty, and art being 
an aim in itself, in some cases is at odds with contemporary forms of art from 
the 60s onwards. Video-art, event-art, graffiti art, conceptual art, and so on are 
not meant to last permanent ‘objects’.176 Their aim often lays beyond the object 
itself, often stressing personal or political perspectives. The inherent temporal-
ities of these mediums are challenging the profession as well as their different 
aims. These objects and ‘interventions’ are not so easily stored in museums or 
art galleries, neither can they fulfil a lasting role in public space or in the urban 
fabric. Even the media used in these forms of art are fluid as well: advertisements, 
newspapers, webpages and performances. What does last other than the impact 
it makes on the spectator? These forms of art moreover change the position of the 
spectator, from an approach in disinterested contemplation, towards the direct 
address of the viewer, to evoke the spectator to engagement. We very well can 
argue that quite a lot of today’s art is to be seen as political activism (besides the 
personal expression of personal and intimate feelings, which is, admitted, another 
story). In all of these ‘works’, the object and making of the object seems to be less 
important in favour of the message of the art work, or the making itself is the 
message. Whereas the making itself, the craftsmanship of the artist, is no longer 
the key towards the produce, the political stance seems to take that place. Even in 
the recent renewed interest in crafts and the ‘making’, this often is proposed as a 
political stance. Artists are actively present in public debates, using their works of 
art as medium to stress political action and engage the public. 
The contemporary ideas on art surely stress the boundaries Arendt draws 
between the different forms of human activities. It also clearly stresses the 
importance of permanence, as Arendt argues. This permanence is a difficult 
matter as art has become personal expression or political activism. Arendt clearly 
has in mind these tangible objects that, although the hand of the maker is visible, 
evokes public resonance, that is, it is acclaimed through the commonly owned 
‘taste’ in the Kantian sense of the word.177 Only when the ‘beauty’ of the object 
evokes this common experience, the object will reach for its potential immortality.
6.3.2 Thickening Our Understanding of the World
The last few decades, craftsmanship and tangible production in which the 
artist itself is involved is re-valued. As Richard Sennett writes in his book The 
Craftsman, ‘Craftsmanship may suggest a way of life that waned the advent of 
industrial society – but this is misleading. Craftsmanship names an enduring, 
basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well for its own sake.’178 This renewed 
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interest in the crafts also means that there is a new interest in art as created and 
tangible objects. In the wake of the reflections above, the tangibility of the object 
clearly is an important aspect of Arendt’s reflection on art. There is, however, 
much more to say about the importance of tangibility than only the inherent 
durability of tangible objects. This other aspect of tangibility, which is the second 
perspective Arendt draws, comes to the fore as we think of the world-of-things 
as the stage of appearance: it establishes a certain experience of the reality of 
the world. Like human beings need to appear to the world, also objects appear 
in the world. ‘Everything that is’, Arendt writes, ‘must appear, and nothing can 
appear without a shape of its own; hence there is in fact no thing that does not 
in some way transcend its functional use, and its transcendence, its beauty or 
ugliness, is identical with appearing and publicly and being seen.’179 The world, in 
other words, is full of recognizable shapes. Nothing will appear without having a 
shape. It is tangible, as it were – although also a text can appear, a poem, and a 
movie. But even these ‘objects’ have a certain shape. Moreover, as poems show, 
they often are formed by their very shape. Arendt thus stresses that the shape 
is accessible in the very appearance of the object. Nevertheless, how this shape 
affects us is more ambiguous, as we will see. However, first we need to understand 
that the very occurrence of appearance in Arendt’s perspective has at least three 
important affects. First, as I stressed in the previous chapter, the appearance 
amongst peers assures the human being of their own reality. Only by being seen 
and being heard, and by seeing and hearing, the self is revealed and approved. 
What remains hidden in the shadow of the private realm, Arendt urges, does 
not gain reality. The second effect of appearance is that the plurality of men is 
revealed. By appearing in public, by acting and speaking, it becomes visible and 
audible that everybody speaks from different viewpoints and experiences. A third 
affect is that this does not only count for the views upon each other, and hearing 
other voices, it also helps to affirm the reality of the world. ‘The presence of others 
who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world 
and ourselves.’180 This somehow does mean that a multitude of views is needed in 
order to affirm the reality of the world, and to reveal the multitude of aspects that 
are inherent the world. This is the important image at this point: the similarity as 
well as the plurality of views, seeing the same object, but from different instances, 
occurrences, perspectives, trying to grasp it through different experiences. ‘Only 
where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their 
identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness 
in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.’181 Shapes are, 
we might conclude, in their essence layered – what can be seen from one’s 
perspective is hard to see from another. Small objects with clear shapes in a way 
are more easily understood as a whole, than huge objects, for which one needs 
other perspectives and investigation to grasp the shape as a whole. Nevertheless, a 
public is needed in order to grasp all aspects of a certain object. 
This perspective on tangibility and plurality, we might deepen by revisiting the 
metaphor of the table, that we touched upon already in the previous chapter. 
Although this metaphor of the table does not explicitly address works of art, but 
moreover stresses the importance of all objects that together form the world-of-
things, it nevertheless shows how the object arranges the different perspectives 
around it. The object gathers, evokes, connects, and separates. 
‘To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is 
between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who 
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sit around it; the world, like very in-between, relates and separates men at the 
same time.182   
 
In the previous chapter, I emphasized how spatial Arendt’s idea of the public 
realm actually is. Her writings are full of spatial notions, when she describes 
this realm, and what happens in public. The table in this metaphor reveals that 
spatiality perfectly: sharing the table means sitting in different positions, joining 
a conversation means participating from a specific place. Arendt stresses the table 
as an in-between that connects and separates. This aspect actually reveals not 
only the spatiality but also the tangibility of the table, and even its specificities. 
The Finnish architect Kari Juhani Jormakka, who taught architectural theory in 
Vienna, argues that the specific design of the table is decisive. The surface, the 
form, the height, of the table depends on the design, in which a specific aim is 
addressed. A table for dinner is different than a coffee-table.183 
The table, however, is an object that is in-between the participant, in-between 
the different positions. By its in-between-ness, it connects and it separates. This 
remark is important, a crucial aspect of the world-of-things. Specifically, by this 
image of the table, we can understand this importance. The table is an everyday 
object, nevertheless it plays important roles in the life of human beings. Tables 
often have a central position in a living room, a dining room, a meeting room, a 
foyer, at a terrace. The table offers space for both formal meetings and informal 
gatherings, for intimate talks and for public conversations on television. The 
table as an object that arranges the possibilities of appearances. It gathers a 
public around it, and it offers a particular place to each of them. It shapes the 
relationships between the different seats around the table. The table relates, but 
also separates. It first separates the one conversation from the other. The setting 
around a table makes the very locus of the conversation clear. Nevertheless, it 
also separates the participants from each other. The table makes it impossible to 
transgress the boundaries between the particular locations of the participants. If 
one is willing to come too close to another participant, one needs to violate the 
very setting of the conversation. ‘The public realm, as the common world, gathers 
us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak.’184
The metaphor of the table shows how important the tangibility of the world-of-
things is, beyond offering permanence to the stage of action, it also provides the 
means of inter-locating, of separating and simultaneously relating human beings 
that appear in public. This metaphor of the table therefore emphasises public 
space as common ground for a community. This community however is not always 
present, nor is it a fixed whole. There are different gatherings around the same 
table, and the people gathered around can easily change. This affects the conver-
sations, surely – but the table stays the same, and maintains its function.  Often 
tables can be re-arranged, can made larger or smaller, in order to offer the best 
circumstances for the imagined meeting. Nevertheless, the table stays as a recog-
nizable object that those gathered around have in common. That is why Arendt 
renders and emphasizes this commonly owned ‘world’ as essentially being an 
in-between: gathering and simultaneously separating human beings, not only the 
contemporaries, but also generations, the past and the future. For Arendt it is the 
world that places us between and binds us with our contemporaries and connects 
us to our predecessors and the generations to come, but at this point we are back 
to the urgency of permanence (and maintenance).
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Interestingly enough, the appearance in public thus not only constitutes the 
plurality of men (as we have seen in the previous chapter), it also offers an 
experience of reality of the world. This experience of the world and its real 
substance, certainly is a singular and individual experience (which thus differs 
from person to person, it is not an experience multiplied to everybody), only 
is revealed through appearances amongst others. The reality of the world is 
constituted through the ‘public’. The multitude of views of the public present 
reveal the reality. This also counts the other way around. Only through a 
multitude of views, characterized by the different positions every member of 
the public has in the world, the world can be understood in all its diversity – the 
world reveals its ‘realness’. Arendt, we might state, draws an intricate relationship 
between appearance, plurality and objects in common. Appearance is not only 
about appearance to one another, it is also objects appearing to us, in our midst. 
The reality of the objects only is revealed through resembling and assembling of 
the very object from different perspectives. This ambiguous aspect of the world-
of-things of course more clearly is revealed in the work-of-art, than in a singular 
table. We might entertain different associations evoked by a certain outspoken 
or everyday design of a table, the stories told about works-of-art, however, easily 
exceed those told about the table. 
For Arendt in this case, the aspect of beauty is still crucial to the work of art. 
Beauty that is recognized and commonly shared not only prevent the work of 
art for oblivion (and with that, losing its permanence), it also unites differently. 
It is not about a beauty beyond the world, a ‘pure’ aesthetics, not a beauty 
depending upon a dream world, but a beauty based on appearances. As political 
philosopher Kimberly Curtis argues, this appearance that ‘catches our breath’ 
is bound to a ‘fullness that moves us’, a fullness of ‘the world’s particulars and 
their pregnancy.’185 The reference to the particulars of course refers back to the 
particular shape of each object that appears to us either as ugly or as beauty. 
However, what appears to be beautiful transcend the single object, and places the 
spectator in the world itself. It is the task of art and their very aesthetics, Curtis 
somehow argues, ‘to plunge into another angle on our shared world, bending, 
widening, making more thick, intensifying, as Arendt put it, our sense of the 
real.’186 As from this perspective, it is important to understand that this thickening 
our understanding of the world, only can function, if art offers plurality too. Since 
the world is not singular but plural, not one dimensional but layered, art has 
the function to reveal utter diversity. Art somehow urges us to change position 
around the table, and look from different perspectives. Art offers ‘rivals for my 
sight’, as the French philosopher Maurice Merleau Ponty argued. And Curtis adds: 
‘Our perception of the world is tumultuous, transgressive, a ribald succession 
of plunging and eclipsing, always manifesting astonishing variants on the same 
pregnant world.’187
Therefore, the world-of-things, and specifically works-of-art requires active 
involvement, not just the view of a passive observer or consumer. In order to 
reveal different aspects of the work of art, as well as to enjoy the art-work, one 
needs to be engaged in the art work (although we also can argue that the artwork 
is the engagement of creator, public, curator, conservator, preservers in one object 
or project). One needs to cultivate a specific aesthetic sensibility by not taking 
everything for granted, or just search for pleasure and celebration. Baumgarten, 
who coined the first definition of aesthetics back in the 18th century, already argues 
that beauty relates to sensible attitude.188 ‘To call beauty sensible’, Karsten Harries 
writes, ‘is to insist that our experience of it involves the senses; beauty depends on 
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perception.’189 Once again, this is not only a matter of a disinterested contempla-
tion, it also requires a sensible engagement with the art object, in which all senses 
are at stake. 
‘Nothing perhaps is more surprising in this world of ours than the almost 
infinite diversity of its appearances, the sheer entertainment value of its 
views, sounds, and smells, something that is hardly mentioned by the thinkers 
and philosophers. … This diversity is matched by an equally astounding 
diverseness of sense organs among the animal species, so that what actually 
appears to living creatures assumes the greatest varity of form and shape: 
every animal species lives in a world of its own. Still, sense-endowed creatures 
have appearance as such common, first, an appearing world and second, and 
perhaps even more important, the fact that they themselves are appearing and 
disappearing creatures, that there always was a world before their arrival and 
there always will be a world after their departure.’190 
6.3.3 To be Put on Display 
If we stress this argument slightly different, it is clear that in order to reveal the 
art-work as well as the reality of the world, the views and experiences of others 
are needed. Like action and speech, art needs to appear publicly in order to gain 
reality. Art, by definition, is bound to public space. It needs to be seen, heard 
and experienced by a multitude of people, in order to be revealed to the single 
observer. Actually, in the work of art ‘permanence’ becomes tangible. As Arendt 
writes: Nowhere else does the sheer durability of the world of things appear in 
such clarity, nowhere else therefore does this thing-world reveal itself so spectac-
ularly as the non-mortal home for mortal beings.’191 The importance is that this 
aspect becomes tangible: ‘It is as though worldly stability had become transparent 
in the permanence of art, so that premonition of immortality, not the immortality 
of the soul or of life but of something immortal achieved by mortal hands, has 
become tangible present, to shine and to be seen, to sound and to be heard, to 
speak and to be read.’192 
Although art can be collected by private collectors (and thus stored in private 
residences, archives), essentially art is a phenomenon of public space. It is, as 
we might argue, is interrelated with politics.193 Art and politics are interrelated, 
but also independent. Art after all cannot serve political issues, in the eyes of 
Arendt, without perishing. Art, we might argue, always constructs a relationship 
between the singular and the multitude, it engages the single and the public 
attending and reflecting upon the object, which can be understood as a similar 
capacity as politics. For Arendt, the work of art is not a social phenomenon, it’s is 
a political phenomenon.194 Like action and speech, also art only by appearance in 
public, in a common world, ‘can fulfil their own being.’ However, if the artwork 
remains hidden in the private life and in private possession, Arendt states, it loses 
its ‘own inherent validity.’195 As can be seen around the world in auctions and 
even in the theft of artworks, it will not lose its marketplace value – but that, for 
Arendt, is quite opposed to ‘fulfil its own being.’ Art would not leave a trace in 
the world if not being put on display, in order to be touched upon and enjoyed by 
the public. For Arendt, this is the very reason that artworks need to be protected 
from individual possessiveness by being put on display in public ‘in sacred places 
– temples and churches – or by entrusting them to the care of museums and 
preservationists.’196 
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Though culture is not defined exclusively by art, as I argued previously, art plays 
an important and central role in the notion of culture. For Arendt, art is not only a 
matter of cultural awareness and sustenance, it is a political gesture too. ‘Culture 
indicates that the public realm,’ Arendt writes, ‘which is rendered politically 
secure by men of action, offers its space of display to those things whose essence 
it is to appear and to be beautiful.’197 This is not only a cultural requirement, this 
also has political significance. Only when art is on display, it can leave traces 
in the world by its very beauty, which is ‘the very manifestation of imperish-
ability’, Arendt argues. The greatness of action and speech, would be futile, would 
even vanish, without ‘the beauty, that is, the radiant glory in which potential 
immortality is made manifest in the human world.’198 We might argue at this 
point that Arendt is not so much concerned about the art work itself as a central 
figure of culture, but by the role art works play in the world and in the public 
realm. ‘Arendt does not distinguish between bourgeois art forms of the eighteenth 
century and the politically aware avant-garde of the 1960s; she sees the latter as 
a direct development of the former. Modern art started with a rebellion against a 
class society that made political agency available only to the few. Works of art bear 
witness to an inherent conflict that cannot be reduced to banalization. The uneasy 
relation between artist and society is carried into the works of art themselves 
and is part of their appearances. In modernity, the novel allows for agencies to 
present themselves in ways that would not have been visible in politics – not 
through making claims or demands, but through making visible.’199 Art works 
publicly expose and somehow represent the tenderness and care for the world 
that is in common, while also revealing the necessity to intervene in that world to 
fulfil the needs of today. Or to state this differently: art works, to the extent that 
they are exposed and accessible to the public, articulate the ‘love for the world’, 
the worldliness of human beings, and the significance of the public realm. ‘The 
work of art is so eminently dependent on the public realm,’ Dagmar Barnouw 
argues in an excellent investigation of Arendt’s writings, ‘and participates so 
importantly in establishing and articulating – making visible – the political space 
because it signifies most intensely, most persuasively, most durably, the world of 
appearances.’200 
If the work of art is bound to public space, we might argue that this means that 
the aspect of plurality, which is the key notion of public space as I discussed in 
the previous chapter, also is inherent to the works of art too. The world is full 
of things that, as Arendt argues, have a shape of their own. Also the experience 
of the world is an experience of plurality, we might argue. Our perception of the 
world is formed through its plurality. This plurality, as Arendt argues in The Life 
of the Mind, and as we already touched upon previously, is perceived though our 
senses. As Cecila Sjöholm argues, Arendt’s ‘stress on appearances introduces 
sense-perception, embodiment, and appearance – in short, what we could call 
aesthesis – as aspects of the public sphere.’201 Aesthetics in arts, in other words, 
goes far beyond the experience of beauty. It is an experience that is open to 
the world. However, the plurality of the world of things thus echoes the plural 
character of society, and reveals how the ‘world is constituted by a multitude of 
appearances.’202 What art makes visible and tangible, we might state, is the ‘sheer 
joy to be found in a multitude of appearances.’203 At this point, we thus touch upon 
the previous aspect of art: enhancing, thickening our understanding of the world. 
We might add to this remark, that art thickens our understanding of the common 
world in all its plurality. Moreover, the plurality of the artifice not only influences 
our perception of the world, it also conditions the human being. 
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‘The world in which the vita active spends itself consist of things produced by 
human activities; but the things that owe their existence exclusively to men 
nevertheless constantly condition their human makers. … Whatever enters the 
human world of its own accord or is drawing into it by human effort becomes 
part of the human condition. … The objectivity of the world – its object- or 
thing-character – and the human condition supplement each other; because 
human existence is conditioned existence, it would be impossible without 
things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they 
were not the conditioners of human existence.’204
 
Architects of course cannot read a passage like this without hearing the echo 
of Winston Churchill’s famous quote: ‘we shape our buildings, and afterwards 
our buildings shape us.’ Churchill actually stated it in parliament during a 
debate on the rebuilding of the Commons Chamber. He actually stated that the 
particular rectangular form of the room caused the two-party system in the UK.205  
Appearing in a world that is characterized by plurality thus conditions the human 
being. The levelling effect of globalization and economic thinking, the impact of 
efficiency on the world-of-things, and the impact of measures of security in today’s 
landscape and cities – as also the roman The Cave of José Saramago explores – is 
not just a matter of limiting the number of differences, it also has an effect on the 
human condition.  
Although plurality is at the core of appearance, Arendt does also stresses the 
necessity of a certain common ground in society. She finds that common ground 
in Immanuel Kant’s notion of taste, that we touched upon earlier. In agreement 
with him, Arendt presupposes the existence of a common sense rooted in the 
human community – in Latin the sensus communis, literally the sense that is 
commonly owned or ‘community sense’.206 Common sense helps us to orient 
ourselves in the world in commonness, but this common sense is not simply 
sense-data, it is a sense based in commonness. ‘Judging according to the sensus 
communis does not mean agreeing on a common theme or solution but rather 
striving toward a sense of realness,’ Cecillia Sjöholm writes. ‘Such sharing can 
only be achieved through a certain readiness to be impinged on with regards to 
sense-perception; the question of judgment is intertwined with that of how we see 
things.’207 This sensus communis appears through the development of what Kant 
calls taste: the knowledge beyond the human capacity to judge or to differentiate 
between good and less good. ‘Taste decides among qualities, Arendt writes, ‘and 
can fully develop only where a sense of quality – the ability to discern evidence of 
the beautiful – is generally present. Once that is the case, it is solely up to taste, 
with its ever-active judgment of things in the world, to establish boundaries and 
provide a human meaning for the cultural realm.’208 Taste thus does not depend 
upon the knowledge of truth but upon the capacity to convince. Therefore, taste 
depends upon the human ability to judge from different perspectives, which is 
only possible on the basis of a sensus communis. The capacity to judge can only 
exist and is fed in the public realm where people appear to each other and where 
the things can be seen and understood from different perspectives.209 Arendt sees 
a close relationship between political and aesthetic judgment, action and speech, 
before gaining responses, also it is about convincing peers to act-with-the-actor, 
to act-in-concert. What cautiously comes to light at this point is the evocative 
aspect of works of art. Art, in other words, evokes different viewpoints, offers 
other perspectives. It therefore helps the spectator to look from different perspec-
tives. It enhances the views the spectator has with opening up un-thought-of and 
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before un-accessible viewpoints. It imagines and makes tangible the differences 
that can be touched upon. It urges the viewer to approach things differently, to 
see other aspects and to embrace other angles. It is not only thickening the under-
standing of the world, it also is broadening the scope of the spectator. Enabling 
the viewer to position oneself for a moment differently, to explore different paths 
and other points of view. The role of the artist, besides producing objects that last, 
is using his creative brain: to broaden the scope and push existing boundaries.210 
We therefore might state: art educates (the human being to be a good citizen) 
– although this word education evokes an ‘active’ attitude by the public. The 
‘educative’ task, however, starts with the way artworks condition the human 
being, like other objects do. This point is clearly addressed by Cecillia Sjöholm, 
when she thinks through Arendt’s view upon aesthetics. 
‘Our perception develops through art. The importance of art lies in the way that 
it is implicated in the reality we perceive, extending shadows from the imaginary 
world to the world of the living. Art is made to appear, sometimes through the 
invisible threads of disappearance through its sensible qualities, it makes public 
space a product of aesthetics, implying an invisible web of forms of being that 
help produce our perception. When the public sphere is minimized and exploited, 
art escapes more and more into intimate details. At the same time, these details 
are made public. Since the public sphere is conditioning our view of things, art in 
general upholds a pivotal place for the development of perception. If public space 
did not exist, it would appear that there would be no art. But Arendt argues the 
other way around. Without art, public space would be even more perverted. In 
times when public space is threatened, those that act politically or with their art 
will appear shadowy, as if they occupy mere corners of our vision rather than the 
focal point of our consciousness. But the marginal character of art in public space 
is an illusion; art occupies a crucial role for both the maintenance and function 
of publicness. Art and literature displaces the way in which publicness is to be 
conceived.’211  
Works of art in this perspective are exemplary too: they are ends in themselves, 
and therefore equipped to reach forward, to open up new perspectives and to push 
the boundaries of the known. At this point, we are back to the Greek approach to 
culture actually emphasises this educative aspect. It evokes the Roman approach 
of tenderness. Art transcends and incites the established and known societal 
structures and constructions and explores the thresholds of human creativity. Art, 
in the Greek sense, needs to experiment, reflect and unmask, stimulate, inspire 
and imagine, open up new perspectives, without losing the ability to communicate 
with the public. Art educates the public to look from different viewpoints.212 
The crucial perspective on the arts and culture that the Greek offers us is this 
aim of evocation, communication and education of the human being into a 
citizen. Culture, in the broadest sense refines and enhances our personal taste. It 
educates us to distinguish between the good and the less good, helps us to think 
from different perspectives and moulds our capacity to judge, which is not only 
important with respect to the evaluation of the artwork but also a crucial political 
capacity. 
Art works need a public, since they are articulations of the permanent world, 
since their tangibility is revealed through sensory perception, and since they 
express ‘love for the world’. This is a matter of paintings and sculptures, drawings 
and poems, music and models – fragile works, as we can imagine. Only a few 
of the art works produced can survive in public space: a few artworks in parks, 
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on central squares, at the entrance of a village. The materiality of these works 
is resistant: stone or bronze, metal or wood, although the latter material needs 
maintenance quite often, or the concept of the work of art is the deterioration over 
time. Even the bronze art works require maintenance – also they are weathering, 
aging, or are threatened by thieves or vandals. The relationship between art and 
public space, therefore urges culture as process of development, progress as 
well as maintenance once again. All artworks not only need to be protected from 
individual possessiveness, but also from natural processes, given that everything 
that exists will deteriorate. This is the very reason that works of art need to be 
stored in ‘in sacred places – temples and churches – or by entrusting them to the 
care of museums and preservationists.’213 Here we touch again upon the double 
meaning of culture. Culture, as we have seen, is the continuous balancing between 
maintenance and intervention, restoration and renewal. It is part of culture to 
approach artworks with a tender care. Part of this attitude, however, requires 
the intervention of architecture. Architecture after all creates these spaces where 
artworks can be put on display and presented publicly, as it immediately offers 
the very protection from the public works of art need – as through their outer 
appearance to the world, these buildings represent the artworks, that are shielded 
inside, to the public. 
Arendt nevertheless does not reflect on the museum as institution extensively. 
She just recognizes the need of protected space to secure the fragility of artworks. 
These spaces are culturally and politically relevant, as we have seen. Lewis 
Mumford therefore argued that museums were a symbol of the cities capacity to 
care for its past and to maintain monuments, which has to be seen as ‘one of the 
great values of the big city.’214 We can briefly address the art institution and its 
role in society from the point of view from Arendt. The first role for the institution 
taking care of those artworks that are assigned as singular and important in a 
particular culture. That what stands out needs protection. Besides that, artworks 
are regularly fragile. A building and all sorts of other necessities are needed to 
protect them against the climate and light, against public use and theft. 
A second role for the art-institution in society comes to the fore: the museum 
is not only for protection of the art work, but actually also needs to make artworks 
accessible. That is: it opens up to the public, and helps the public to approach 
art. The doors are opened, a tour is provided, there is a place to store bags and 
jackets, the right light is directed to the art-works, an exposition draws lines 
through series of art-works, and so on. The building offers the right mood for 
the spectator, by its very design. It often is designed in a way to separate the 
visitor from the everyday experience, from the hustle and bustle of the street 
and city in which it is located. The path to the museum already contributes to 
that separation: the grandeur of the building, stairs in front of the entrance, the 
entrance itself, the spaces and the stairs, the white walls and how the light comes 
in. Some museums are located far away from cities, in the woods or along the 
coast – the time it takes to visit the venue is part of the experience of being away 
from the city and its requirements. It all helps the visitor to change the view from 
instrumental to contemplation, to set the right atmosphere in order to enjoy the 
artworks. The museum itself, we might argue, is ‘a symbol of permanent place and 
of suspended time.’215 Modern art somehow stressed the authority of the museum 
as art institution. It does not fit in the regular art-history, nor does it fit in the way 
museums regularly present art. Modern art does not fit in the regular categories 
of the arts – they even stress the boundary between art and ordinary life. It 
stresses the permanence that once was secured by the museum buildings. The 
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quiet steadiness of the art-object is replaced by performances, rapid impressions, 
temporal installations, ephemeral ideas. ‘Where no museum can meet the old 
expectations any longer, each museum allows exhibitions to let these incompatible 
demands have their say in a sequence of every imaginable conception.’216 
The museum, however, still is a powerful figure in society and the art world, and 
specifically the few museums that play a major role in that landscape: the MoMa, 
the Guggenheim, the Getty, the Tate, and so on. The names have even become 
brands that are spread successfully to other places. Besides the museum as a 
treasure house, which treasure is the collection of unique objects, the museum 
thus has become an institution that mediated between the arts and the public. 
They offer the means to approach and understand art. Not only by being a 
building where art is on display, but also by their selection procedures, curatorial 
practices and research activities. After all, selecting works for the collection, or 
curating an exhibition, is somehow telling a story. To curate and exhibition is to 
set the lines and to draw narratives, in order to regale the public by new perspec-
tives, awe and recognition. The museum we might state, also has an educational 
task as well. The way the museum offers artworks back to the public is contrib-
uting to the capacity of taste, of judging between good and less good, to gaining 
affinity with beauty. 
Yet, the very ‘process’ of making the art work accessible to the public of course has 
a major effect on the world of arts, which cannot be under estimated. From the 
moment the museum took over (to some extent) the role of temples and churches 
since the 18th century by being a place of art collections and exposing artworks, the 
museum influenced extensively the way art has been judged. Objects that were 
added to the museum collection gained the status of art, whereas those outside the 
museum were overlooked. Older works, that were previously on display and in use 
somewhere else, now selected for being part of the collection of a museum, lost 
their social context as well as their role amongst the public through their use. In 
other words, the museum has become the institution that judges the art world, in 
a sense that being bought by a museum counts for an artist as proof of ‘success’.217 
At least, the effect of being in the picture of the museum world has consequences 
for the market value of the works.
But this is only a reflection, by now, on the institution of art, which is the 
museum. However, this is also a matter of architecture. It is through architectural 
intervention how the relationship between the works of art, the spaces of art, 
and the world and the public is established. The grandeur of the first museums 
somehow competed with the grandeur of churches, temples, and town halls, 
whereas newer museums sometimes compete with shopping malls and airports. 
It does matter if the museum-spaces are hidden behind impressive steps, or are 
brought into the vicinity of a shopping public.218 
At this point we come close to the plea of De Cauter and Dehaene to understand 
of sacred and cultural spaces and places as realm in-between the private and 
public in which space and time are in close relationship, but set apart from the 
everyday experience and use.219 Since they read this in-between realm as ‘other 
space’, through the lenses of Foucault’s notion of heterotopia, they urge the ability 
of this realm not only to offer alternative space, but also alternating spaces.220 
These alternating practices, that are enabled in these ‘other spaces’ are distinct 
from action, that belongs to the public realm, and labor and work, that belong 
to the private, as they argue, could be described by the activity of ‘play’ – a term 
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they borrow from Johan Huizinga’s well known book Homo Ludens (1938). Play 
requires liminal spaces, they argue: ‘a space that, in its formal separation from 
the rest of the world present a realm of instability and possibility. That space 
which is the seedbed of culture, its condition and possibility – from ritual to 
theatre – provides a clearing within the conventional order of society, sheltered 
from the normalizing forces of the everyday.’221 This perspective actually helps 
to understand Arendt’s image of the cultural and sacred spaces, not simply as 
storage spaces for the arts, where they can survive the tides, but also as contrib-
uting – indeed – to the recuperation of the human being, and to encourage him 
to appear in public. It is in this way that – as De Cauter and Dehaene argue, the 
culture precedes political life, and the cultural space precedes the legal public 
space.222 Although this image helps to understand the merit of cultural and sacred 
spaces, their image nevertheless directs towards the image of the public sphere as 
urged by Habermas: these ‘other space’ after all is a contested space, they argue, 
that is threatened by the state and the market.223 They of course urge these spaces 
against the contemporary state of the cultural and sacred domain in Western 
society.
6.3.4	 Reification,	Condensation,	Transformation,	
	 Transfiguration,	Imagination
Until now we have touched upon the permanence, the importance of tangibility, 
and the need of public exposure. These are all in-direct relationships to the realm 
of the political. These aspects establish this realm by offering the world a certain 
permanence, against the overwhelming power of nature and of the cycle of nature. 
Or they unfold the reality of the world. It urges us to see from different perspec-
tives, in order to enlarge our understanding of the world and its appearances. 
The arts, as exemplary for the world-of-things, in that sense create the stage, the 
prerequisite for significant political action and speech. The Human Condition, 
however, somehow also urges a perspective that offers a more direct relationship 
between political action and the arts. ‘The objective status of the cultural world,’ 
Arendt writes, ‘which, insofar as it contains tangible things – books and paintings, 
statues, buildings and music – comprehends, and gives testimony to, the entire 
recorded past of countries, nations, and ultimately mankind.’224 Arendt thus 
values the homo faber in this perspective, as a crucial figure. On the one hand, 
the animal laborans needs the homo faber to ease labor and remove pain. On 
the other: ‘if mortals need his help to erect a home on earth, acting and speaking 
men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity, that is, the help of the 
artist, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, because 
without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, would 
not survive at all.’ 225 Action and speech, those activities that Arendt counts to be 
political, doesn’t leave traces if not reified in art-works, in stories or paintings, in 
documents and movies. 
‘[Action and speech] do not “produce,” bring forth anything, they are as 
futile as life itself. In order to become worldly things, that is, deeds and facts 
and events and patterns of thoughts or ideas, they must first be seen, heard, 
and remembered and then transformed, reified as it were, into things – into 
sayings of poetry, the written page or the printed book, into paintings or 
sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents, and monument. The whole 
factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its continued 
existence, first upon the presence of others who have seen and heard and 
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will remember, and, second, on the transformation of the intangible into the 
tangibility of things.'226   
This once again seems to refer to quite classical works of art that depicted 
happenings from the past, celebrated victories of the army, honoured the great 
deeds of the emperor and his troops. Arendt, looking to the activities of men, 
argues that the happenings of the world are not urged by the cycle of nature, 
nor by the intervention of the homo faber, but only are put in motion by action 
and speech. ‘Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political 
bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history.’227 This of 
course is first urged by the community that is the context of political action 
and speech. Only where people gather to form a unity, act and react, and thus 
acknowledge their common ground, remembrance of a certain past of that 
community is possible. This means a certain agreement on that past and the urge 
to remember. Stories told need recognition and acclaim. They should urge the 
need to every now and then re-tell the story and therewith pass this remembrance 
of history to next generations. This secondly is important, since action and speech 
don’t have any substance of their own: they only can be traced if it is reified in 
narratives, paintings, sculptures, and so on. To make sense of happenings is to 
find a story-line, we might argue. That is the very capacity of art: to stress the 
story-lines of things happening. Without works of art, after all, like poems or 
prose, monuments or paintings, action and speech will remain superfluous. The 
artwork thus at least is useful for mankind as the tangible and durable reification 
of action and speech.228 In this perspective, it is worth noting a slight change in 
the terms Arendt uses in respect to use-objects in the first parts of her exploration 
of the products of work in The Human Condition. As Patchen Markell notes, she 
first urges objects with the notion of ‘durability’, but when it comes to the works 
of art, she uses the term ‘permanence’. As he argues, this image is pivotal, it 
means that physical durability of the genuine object has been supplemented with 
‘permanence’, ‘which is a function of the “memorability” of tangible things.’229 
In this process of remembering, art works – tangible objects exposed in public 
space – play a major role. Particularly of course the statues of heroes from the 
past that are erected on central spaces in the urban fabric. However, we also 
immediately think of architecture in this case, particularly on monuments and 
memorials, those architectural and figures and landscapes that give room to 
remembrance of certain happenings in the past. These monuments urged the 
Viennese architect Adolf Loos his famous call: ‘That is Architecture!’230 With that 
statement, he actually argued that architecture, in the sense of a work of art, was 
limited to the monument, since the monument – in the example he gives of small 
rectangular hill found in the woods – somehow immediately is recognized as a 
place of remembrance. The visitor immediately fell silent, he argues. The very 
form of the monument urges respect. For Loos, this recognition is the very essence 
of art. All other assignments, according to him, cannot represent such commonly 
understood meaning, and therefore cannot be counted to the arts. 
However, monuments regularly represent a heroic or terrifying past, and 
are able to gather and unite the public is not only grounded in the shared 
remembrance, but also in a shared recognition. The very form of the object 
evokes recognition, it represents the happening urged to be remembered – this 
representation of course is fuelled by the regular activities organized on that spot, 
which often are presented to the public through mass media. People visit these 
works, often particular sites or constructions, to honour that very happening. 
226.
Ibid., 95
227.
Ibid., 8
228.
Ibid., 167
229.
Markell, ‘Arendt’s Work’, 32; Arendt, 
The Human Condition, 170
230. 
Adolf Loos, ‘Architectuur’, in: Hilde 
Heynen, André Loeckx, Lieven De 
Cauter, Karina Van Herck (red.), 
‘Dat is architectuur’, Sleutelteksten 
uit de twintigste eeuw (Rotterdam: 
Uitgeverij 010, 2004), 62
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 6: WORLD
461
The Vietnam Memorial by Maya Lin at the Washington Mall is a great example, 
[IMAGE 6.5] alike the memorial on Ground Zero to remember the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the Twin Towers, designed by Ron Arad. Even for those who don’t 
know somebody personally involved, to see the names on the wall or on the 
banisters around the void, even feeling the carved letters, to slowly walk down 
the path in Washington, or to stare to the falling water at Ground Zero, one 
experiences respect, awe, reverence, even sorrow and pain. 
For monuments and memorials, the power of architecture indeed cannot be 
underestimated. Often one would think of the particular shapes that evoke awe by 
the spectator: a classical language, rhythm, height, symmetry, grandeur. Recent 
memorials, however, have explored other aspects of (landscape) architecture too. 
The Vietnam monument, mentioned previously uses a slope to create the wall 
with names – it cuts the soil of the Washington Mall. The Ground Zero memorial 
uses impressive walls of falling water, to accentuate the voids that remain as 
remembrance to the towers. The sound of the water drowns out the noise of the 
city. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, designed by the 
American architect Peter Eisenman, covers a whole urban block, remarkably 
located at the Hannah Arendt Straße in the urban space that formerly gave 
room to the Berlin Wall, with dark concrete slabs.[IMAGE 6.6] The slabs, although all 
are 92 cm wide and 2,3 m long, all differ slightly in height since they are tilted 
differently. Also the ground level – the paths in-between the pillars – go up-and-
down. Walking down these paths at length, the visitor is experiencing alienation 
and disposition. In his reflection on his winning design, Eisenman argued that, 
according to him, it was impossible to offer a ‘regular’ monument. What can 
represent the slaughtering of so many people? So many times a single human 
being? ‘The enormous scale of the holocaust, and Hiroshima after it, is such that 
any attempt to represent that horror by tradition architectural means is inevitably 
inadequate.’231 There is no symbol that can express the depth of the holocaust. 
He therefore explains his project as follows: ‘The memory of the holocaust today 
can only be a living condition in which the past remains active in the present.’232 
The core idea is that people walking through the monument, amongst the slabs, 
indeed experience something of alienation and solitude.233 Not that this can evoke 
something that is reminiscent of the holocaust, but being separated from the 
urban fabric and becoming a single human being, alone –will be evoked by the 
monument. ‘The time of the experience of the individual will be the same today 
as it is fifty years from today. The monument grants no further understanding of 
the holocaust because no understanding is possible.’234 Representation in this case 
is not immediately bound to an object: it is the totality of objects that evoke an 
experience that tries to share the impossibility of the monument. 
These examples of monuments somehow show that the appearance of a 
thing bears meaning beyond the material, construction, and program itself. 
Meaning and material form belongs together – material form reifies its meaning 
into tangible objects. Of course, meaning is pushed towards its very end in the 
monument, where meaning even overshadows the thing itself. This does not 
mean that form is not important. On the contrary, it is the form, and particularly 
form that is experienced as beautiful, that offers the form its meaning within a 
community over time. Arendt stresses that aspect of beauty by taking the example 
of a cathedral.  ‘The cathedrals,’ she writes, ‘were built ad maiorem gloriam 
Dei; while they as buildings certainly served the needs of the community, their 
elaborate beauty can never be explained by these needs, which could have been 
served quite as well by any nondescript building. Their beauty transcended all 
needs and made them last through the centuries; but while beauty, the beauty 
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of a cathedral like the beauty of any secular building, transcends the needs and 
functions, it never transcends the world, even if the content of the work happens 
to be religious.’  
The relationship between action and speech and the way these are reified in art 
of course is not just a matter of memorials and monuments that decorate squares 
and parks. In previous times the painting and sculpture were important too, as 
well as poems and reports. ‘The specific content as well as the general meaning 
of action and speech’, Arendt writes, ‘may take various forms of reification in art 
works which glorify a deed or an accomplishment and, by transformation and 
condensation, show some extraordinary event in its full significance. However, 
the specific revelatory quality of action and speech, the implicit manifestation 
of the agent and speaker, is so indissolubly tied to the living flux of acting and 
speaking that it can be represented and ‘reified’ only through a kind of reproduc-
tion, the imitation or mimesis, which according to Aristotle prevails in all arts but 
is actually appropriate only to the drama, whose very name (from the Greek verb 
dran, ‘to act’) indicates that ply-acting actually is an imitation of acting.’235 
Today the newspaper and television, photo and movie play a major role in 
documenting the history and passing the remembrance. Live registration of 
action and speech. The camera and the new media somehow have democratized 
remembrance – it is not any longer the exclusive domain of the artist. Every 
human being has the opportunity to document the happenings of one’s own life, 
although the happenings of a society, of a people, of a history now is the domain of 
journalists and historians. 
One of the important urgencies that journalists and historians share with 
artists is the will to explore the human capacity of story-telling, and particularly to 
reveal particular narratives in a wider scope. These stories, as told in the narrative 
of an article, a documentary, a painting, a sculpture, and so on, are important 
for the human appearance in action and speech. As Arendt emphasised, to be 
involved in action means also being involved in a process that is elusive and 
uncontrollable. Besides the response to actions being unpredictable, also our 
actions become part of a ‘web of actions’, it intermingles with actions of other 
persons responses and re-actions. It even can become part of a train of actions 
and re-actions that urge for other aims and other perspectives than intended. 
This web of actions cannot be seen in its totality, even its direction is not easy to 
understand, until the moment that others try to unravel the chain, or actors have 
withdrawn from the stage.236 As Arendt writes in her essay on Lessing: ‘In contra-
diction to other elements peculiar to action – above all to the preconceived goals, 
the compelling motives, and the guiding principles, all of which become visible in 
the course of action – the meaning of a committed act is revealed only when the 
action itself has come to an end and become a story susceptible to narration.’237 
Painting a picture and carving a sculpture are part of that process of unravelling, 
like the playwright at the stage is. Even more, Arendt pushes the play forward as 
the imitation of the political sphere. ‘This is … why the theater is the political art 
par excellence; only there is the political sphere of human life transposed into art. 
By the same token, it is the only art whose sole subject is man in his relationship 
to others.’238 Arendt stresses particularly the tragedy, since it represents, as she 
writes, a process of recognition. What is important in this respect, is that this 
finding the words and images is not to master the past. It cannot be mastered, 
Arendt argues, only glimpses of that past can be evoked by the right words 
and images. ‘We can no more master the past than we can undo it. But we can 
reconcile ourselves to it.’239 Today, however we might argue that the movie has 
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taken over, although tdhe spectator is quite passive in this relationship. However, 
lots of films over the last decades have been screened, dissecting the chain of 
responses that are evokded by individual action and resistance.240 
Clearly the role of art as narrator goes beyond political action. As already touched 
upon it also relates to history, and, as we can state, also the future. Arendt once 
wrote that literature spanned from stories that reveal the ‘no longer’ to those that 
address the ‘not yet’. Marcel Proust exemplified the first category, whereas Franz 
Kafka represented the second.241 As Arendt argues in The Human Condition art 
is evoked thought. She immediately states that although thoughts are related to 
feelings, art is not an expression of particular and personal feelings. This Arendt 
recognized amongst her contemporary art world, in which art more and more 
is seen as a private expression of the artist.242 For Arendt, as I stressed earlier, 
the artwork as individual expression is nothing more than a hobby of the artist, 
which is in a way meaningless for the public as a whole. It does not address 
the world. Arendt is quite concerned about the contemporary arts, particularly 
since they lost, as she writes in ‘The Crisis of Culture’ ‘their most important and 
elemental quality, which is to grasp and move the reader or the spectator over 
the centuries.’243 This we first might read as being moved by the work of art, so 
that we literally are touched, that we are moved emotionally, that our senses are 
thrilled, and our thoughts are challenged. However, what Arendt states over here 
is also the power that goes beyond our personal approach. It grasps the spectator 
now and previously, tomorrow and in the future. That power is part and parcel 
of the very worldliness of art. There exists a common world in-between the 
spectator and artist, the reader and the writer, which is evoked by the art work 
– although the very experiences differ from person to person. Their nevertheless 
is a commonality in this experience. The narrative grasps the viewer – but this 
spectator is not a singular figure. He represents the world, Arendt argues, even 
more, he represents the ‘worldly space which has come into being between the 
artist or writer and his fellow men as a world common to them.’244 
Art, in a particular way, makes the world fit for action and speech. As Arendt 
writes: ‘In order to be what the world is always meant to be, a home for men 
during their life on earth, the human artifice must be a place fit for action and 
speech.’245 Art, of course, contributes that that ‘home’ fit for action and speech by 
offering objects that ensures the permanence of the world. But moreover, art also 
contributes with objects that offer possibilities of speech. This is an important 
aspect that Arendt urges. In her speech on Lessing, she argues that the world 
by itself is not humane, ‘just because it is made by human beings, and it does 
not become humane just because the human voice sounds in it, but only when it 
has become the object of discourse.’246 The public realm is the very space of that 
discourse, a space where the discourse continuously goes on. This is not a matter 
of babbling, but of engagement with the world. ‘We humanize what is going on in 
the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking 
of it we learn to be human.’247 Art, with is character of narration, contributes that 
process of ‘humanizing’, particular since it finds it very ground in the thought of 
the artist. But although ‘works of art are thought things, … this does not prevent 
their being things.’248 In order to create art, thought transforms the feelings, until 
the moment that they ‘are fit to enter the world and to be transformed into things, 
to become reified.’ Once again, we see here this model of reification: action needs 
the reification of the arts, thoughts do as well.249 Art and reification are intermin-
gled – arts in certain senses reifies what otherwise remains ungraspable. Arendt 
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further stresses this process of reification, when she argues that this reification 
is not just ‘mere transformation’, but that it actually has to be seen as ‘transfig-
uration, a veritable metamorphosis in which it is as though the course of nature 
which will that all fire burn to ashes is reverted and even dust can burst into 
flames.’250 These latter words are a reference to the poem ‘Magic’ by Rilke, which 
somehow describes the burning power of the arts. However, the importance of art 
thus is the making tangible of what otherwise would vanish easily. The tangibility 
in this respect offers existence and permanence to the thought-thing, the 
remembrance, or – indeed – the imagination of possibilities. Thought, we might 
argue, in this respect, is the capacity of imagination: to imagine after all being able 
to see things that are not yet, but also those that are no longer. By making them 
tangible, fit for appearing in the world, the artist contributes to the conditioning of 
the public realm. 
As a brief conclusion, at this point, we need to stress the threefold understanding 
of reality and how it is revealed that is behind Arendt’s reflection upon the works 
of art. First it is our individual senses that reveal the world to us, particularly 
if they are joined together and form the sixth sense – this assures us from the 
reality of the world. Secondly, not everything that is real also appears (although 
what appears needs to have a shape on its own). The human web of relationships, 
which is real, does not appear. Lots of the phenomenon that do not appear never-
theless influence the world beyond imagination – we touched upon a few of such 
phenomena: commodification, consumerism, cupidity. Some of the phenomena, 
however, like that of the human web of relationships, can be made tangible 
through the work of art. The table, for instance, somehow reifies the relation-
ships of the people gathered around for dinner, work or conversations. Finally, 
it is these perspectives together, the sense-experiences of the world (which not 
only experience the objects that appear to us, but somehow also the phenomena 
beyond) which are shared, shapes the commonness of the world, shapes the 
sensus communis, which helps us to orient in the world. 
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6.4 THE PROMISE OF ARCHITECTURE
6.4.1  Matter that Matter
Now that we have discussed the role of art in relationship to the world, we first 
need to again stress that even if Arendt understands works of art as exceptional, 
Arendt does not set them apart in a distinctive category. The activities of the artist 
still belong to ‘work’, she states.251 Moreover, Arendt urges the relationship with 
works of art and other objects that form the world-of-things. Works of art only are 
exemplary examples of objects created by work. What the world-of-things offers 
to the human being is ultimately visible and tangible in the artworks. This of 
course can also be stated vice-versa: where art delivers permanence to the world, 
objects do so too (even despite the more extensive use of everyday objects, and 
their shorter lifespan). Art can teach us a sense of the world; other objects can do 
as well. Of course, it is not the single object, nor the single art-work that bears this 
capacity. It is the series of objects that surround us, as well as the series that art 
works that are being put on display, that form the world-in-common and the stage 
for appearances, that teach us differences, plurality, remembrances, and offer us 
the experience of reality of the world. We therefore better can state: the world has 
the potential to offer these experiences – the exceptional work of art and regular 
objects alike and together. 
Although the activity of ‘action’ is at the core of The Human Condition, it also 
is true that the real objective is the world.252 It is the world that is shared and that 
forms the stage for appearances, the context of action and speech. But not only is 
the world the décor and ground of action and speech, it also is (often) the object 
of action and speech. In other words, the shared world, according to Arendt, is the 
ultimate horizon of the realm of politics. The world is both the stage of action, as 
well as it is the world of matter. ‘Action and speech’, she writes, 
‘go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain 
their agent-revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively ‘objective,’ 
concerned with the matters of the world of things in which men move, which 
physically lies between them and out of which arise their specific, objective 
interests. These interests constitute, in the word’s most literal significance, 
something which is inter-est, which lies between people and therefore can 
relate and bind them together. Most action and speech is concerned with this 
in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that most words and 
deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to being a disclosure 
of the acting and speaking agent.’253
In Arendt’s view of the public realm, objects thus play an important role. In many 
cases ‘objects’ are able to unite the people in a common aim or concern. A lovely 
medieval inner city can bring together a range of different people with different 
backgrounds and interests, protesting against the threat of increasing mass 
tourism. One of the last parks left in the core of a metropolis can evoke days of 
protests against a government that has launched the plan to cover every square 
inch of it. A community garden attracts different inhabitants of the neighbour-
hood. Tangible things around us evoke engagement within us. If threatened, we 
are concerned, upset. Things can move us. 
Arendt of course is also aware of the intangibility beyond these objects. How 
the objects are related, and how this all together is related in a ‘web of human 
relationships’, is the second condition of the public realm, as she argues: 
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‘Since this disclosure of the subject is an integral part of all, even the most 
‘objective’ intercourse, the physical, worldly in-between along with its 
interests is overlaid and, as it were, overgrown with an altogether different 
in-between which consists of deeds and words and owes its origin exclusively 
to men’s acting and speaking directly to one another, This second, subjective 
in-between is not tangible, since there are no tangible objects into which it 
could solidify’ the process of acting and speaking can leave behind no such 
results and end products. But for all its intangibility, this in-between is no less 
real that the world of things we visibly have in common. We call this reality 
the ‘web’ of human relationships, indicating by the metaphor its somewhat 
intangible quality.’254 
Arendt here thus stresses objects as significant elements in the web of human rela-
tionships and therefore of political life. To my mind, this concern finds its echo 
in the more recent trial of the French philosopher Bruno Latour to re-connect 
academia, the sciences, and amongst them also the political theorists, back to the 
reality of everyday life. In his introductory article ‘From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik’ 
to the collection of essays, wherein this attempt is gathered, he argues that most of 
the political theorists overlook the importance of objects for our daily life. I quote 
Latour at length:  
‘It’s not unfair to say, that political philosophy has often been the victim of 
a strong object-avoidance tendency. From Hobbes to Rawls, from Rousseau 
to Habermas, many procedures have been devised to assemble the relevant 
parties, to authorize them to contract, to check their degree of representa-
tivity, to discover the ideal speech conditions, to detect the legitimate closure, 
to write the good constitution. But when it comes down to what is at issue, 
namely the object of concern that brings them together, not a word is uttered. 
In a strange way, political science is mute just at the moment when the objects 
of concern should be brought in and made to speak up loudly. Contrary to 
what the powerful etymology of their most cherished world should imply, their 
res publica does not seem to be loaded with too many things. Procedures to 
authorize and legitimize are important, but it’s only half of what is needed 
to assemble. The other half lies in the issues themselves, in the matters that 
matter, in the res that creates a public around it.’255 
And he continues a bit further with a striking image of the concern for the world 
as aim of politics: 
‘To be crowded with objects that nonetheless are not really integrated into 
our definition of politics is even more tellingly visible in the famous fresco 
panted by Lorenzetti in Siena’s city hall. Many scholars have deciphered for 
us the complex meaning of the emblems representing the Good and the Bad 
Government, and have traced their complex genealogy. But what is most 
striking for a contemporary eye is the massive presence of cities, landscapes, 
animals, merchants, dancers, and the ubiquitous rendering of light and 
space. The Bad Government is not simply illustrated by the devilish figure 
of Discordia, but also through the dark light, the destroyed city, the ravaged 
landscape and the suffocating people. The Good Government is not simply 
personified by the various emblems of Virtue and Concordia but also through 
the transparency of light, its well-kept architecture, its well-tended landscape, 
its diversity of animals, the ease of its commercial relations, its thriving arts. 
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Far from being simply a décor for the emblems, the fresco requests us to a 
subtle ecology of Good and Bad Government.’256 
This reminds us of the strong relationship in the writings of Arendt of culture and 
the world, upon which we touched previously. All culture is world-building, we at 
that moment concluded. This of course also means that there is a strong relation-
ship between the realm of politics and the urge of culture. Taking care of the world 
that already exists, to maintain it carefully, to be concerned about the world is one 
of the main aims of action and speech. In a final quote of Latour, this perspective 
is put under pressure in today’s circumstances: 
‘Modern visitors, attuned to the new issues of bad air, hazy lights, destroyed 
ecosystems, ruined architecture, abandoned industries and delocalized trades 
are certainly ready to include in their definition of politics a whole new ecology 
loaded with things. Where has political philosophy turned its distracted gaze 
while so many objects were drawn under its very nose?’257
The writings of Arendt, to my mind, urge these questions too. Particularly if we 
stress these thoughts towards the field of architecture. We even can call her model 
of the public realm architectural. It is not only very spatial, as we discussed in 
the previous chapter, it also is characterized by the world-in-common: mate-
rialized with objects that somehow relate to each other and to those appearing 
in it. In other words, the public realm in Arendt’s view is both spatial and 
tangible. Arendt’s res publica, we might state in the light of Latour’s stress on the 
importance of ‘things’, is not an intangible sphere, it is a space, filled with objects 
that matter to us. 
Having stated that the model of the public realm Arendt describes can be 
understood as ‘architectural’ does not mean that the public realm is in the hands 
of architects – we concluded that already in the previous chapter. It is somehow, 
but to a limited sense: architecture increases or diminishes the possibilities of 
appearances. The public realm, nevertheless, is strongly related to the (public) 
spaces that architects and their commissioners design, develop, and construct. 
Architecture is intervening in the earth and in the world, in order to make it fit for 
human inhibition. The very practices of inhibition (and with that appearances) 
turn these spaces into spaces of appearance, which turns the web of object- and 
human relationships in a world that mediates between human beings. This of 
course means that architecture, in its broadest sense, always is a cultural and 
political practice. It is intervening, which always is accompanied by a certain 
violence, in existing structures and organisms, while it also immediately – and the 
cultural aspect urges this – needs to take care of the existing world and ecologies. 
Despite the attention Arendt delivers to cultural objects and practices, and despite 
her emphasises on the exemplary character of artworks, she only urges the role of 
architecture in a limited sense. To state that architecture plays a major role in the 
construction of the world, however, is to state the obvious. It is not easy to think 
of another product of making, another product amongst objects and things, that 
has so much influence on the world and its appearance, the world as we know it, 
the world as it appears to us, as architecture. Architecture organizes this world, 
both the exceptional places since it gives form to museums and cathedrals, to 
parliaments and memorials, as well as the everyday environment, since it gives 
form to housing neighborhoods and parking lots, to shopping malls and business 
256.
Ibid., 6-7 
257.
Ibid.’, 7 
472
districts. This all there, simply out in the open, around the corner, in front of 
the door. It is not hidden within the four walls of museums and galleries, where 
one needs to decide to go to. Architecture can hardly be possessed by a single 
one, it cannot be hidden, it is somewhere and it somehow appears in public, or 
it should be hidden after huge walls and behind trees in the midst of a ranch, an 
estate or a garden. But even the garden, ranch and estate, that parcel of the globe 
that has been occupied by private possession, somewhere has edges with public 
space, often articulated by walls and fences, porches and gates. And, if we look 
differently, since the world is not only what exists and has significance at this 
very moment, it also connects the human being with the past and the future. The 
aspect of time and permanence is the public significance of even the hidden archi-
tectural construction in the midst of a ranch or estate. 
This is the very contribution of every architectural project to the world: to 
offer permanence in time, to connect the past, the now and the future. This 
also is the very argument that all assignments are culturally – maintenance and 
renewal – significant. All objects of architecture that we construct contribute to 
the experience of permanence. Even the smallest building occupies a place in 
the world for a while, and conditions the world for a certain family (and their 
servants) as well as for generations to come – even if the estate is meant to be 
withdrawn from that very world-in-common. Architecture, which ranges from 
the house to the organization of the landscape and the formal border that is 
represented through the wall or the fence, is an intermediary between the human 
being and the common world, between the private and the public, here and there, 
now and times that will come. 
However, this statement that ‘every construction of architecture’ poses 
questions to the edges of the profession. On the one hand to constructions 
that evidently are temporary: stages for a festival, temporal constructions for a 
biennale, proposals that never will be built, and all other parts of what some call 
‘paper architecture,’ parts of the profession that does not leave immediate ‘objects’ 
out there, but are stuck in drawings and proposals. Even these contributions are 
important to relate to the experience of the world. Although they do not literally 
contribute to the experience of history, as the inner city of Rome does, they offer 
provocative insights in possible futures (or how in previous times the future was 
thoughts). These temporal constructions and paper-proposals can offer more 
extreme experiments and statements, and therewith offer innovation and renewal, 
discussion and reflection. They evoke imagination, fuel the important conversa-
tion about the world, and connect to the future. 
In the final paragraphs of this chapter, the field of architecture is investigated, 
particularly through the question of what it effectively contributes to the world-
in-common. Together these paragraphs form a kaleidoscopic perspective upon 
the field, sometimes in extensive discussion with particular views, sometimes 
through the sketch of a certain horizon, and sometimes offering an overview of a 
particular theme. Each of these paragraphs can be a distinctive study, offering an 
opening to more reflection and investigation. However, what is presented here can 
only be a brief reflection upon these particular themes, grasping bits and pieces 
from the field of architecture, relating them with Arendt’s reflection upon the 
world-in-common. 
6.4.2  Worldliness and Architecture 
Architecture in the perspective of Arendt might lack the very exemplary aspects 
of art, since architecture is not without function. It is not detached from 
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use-practices that threaten the permanence of the object, since by their very use, 
buildings slowly but surely deteriorate. Clearly enough, there is not so much more 
permanent and public than architecture. Although not always and not everywhere 
the existing structures have been handled with care, architecture nevertheless 
offers a strong connection with the past and the future. Furthermore, architecture 
essentially might be utilitarian, that is, it serves a certain purpose. Nevertheless, 
architecture also stretches beyond that purpose towards the realm of the cultural 
and artistic: ‘the function of a building may be purely utilitarian,’ the architects 
Robert McCarter and Juhani Pallasmaa write in their apology of architecture, 
‘or purely ritual and symbolic, yet it always serves a specific intention. But in 
addition to its utilitarian purposes, architecture has a significant existential and 
mental task; man-made structures domesticate space for human occupation by 
turning anonymous, uniform and limitless natural space into distinct places of 
human significance.’258 It is important in this case that the meaning of a particular 
building somehow is related to the function of that very building. Nevertheless, 
this relationship is somewhat ambiguous. Functions, after all, can change, and 
today even more easily than before. In most cases, architectural forms stay the 
same, while new functions adapt to these shapes. This has been stressed by the 
Italian architect Aldo Rossi, who stressed this fluidity of function as compared 
to the architectural forms on the level of the city, but also from a very different 
view by the French architect Bernard Tschumi. ‘Architecture is constantly subject 
to reinterpretation,’ he writes in an article meaningfully entitled ‘De-, Dis-, Ex-’. 
In no way can architecture today claim permanence of meaning. Churches are 
turned into movie houses, banks into yuppie restaurants, hat factories into artists’ 
studios, subway tunnels into nightclubs, and sometimes nightclubs into churches. 
The supposed cause-and-effect relationship between function and form (“form 
follows function”) is forever condemned the day function becomes almost as 
transient as those magazines and mass media images in which architecture now 
appears as such a fashionable object.’259 In an interview with Enrique Walker, he 
added to this perspective that the actual occupation only can offer meaning to 
the architectural project. Meaning, he argues, is actually not in the hands of the 
architect. ‘Architecture acquires meaning only after it is inhabited – used and 
misused. Its meaning changes all the time. As an architect, one can encourage 
certain conditions for this use and misuse that will potentially entail a meaning, 
but one has absolutely no control over meaning. If certain things are used in one 
society for one purpose and in another society for another purpose, they do not 
have the same meaning; if the context is gone, the meaning is gone. … I always 
insist on the notion that architecture may have a meaning but form does not.260
However, thinking of architecture in the world, and the exceptional capacity of 
mediating between the human being and the world and its inhabitants, between 
the past and the future, it obviously has to be said that, compared to art, archi-
tecture does not need to be put on display. It simply is there. Architecture ‘can’t 
help exposing itself’, we might state with the Belgium architectural critic Geert 
Bekaert. He interestingly adds that even when architects try to be more present, 
‘when it is made too present, it becomes annoying.’261 This of course urges the very 
everydayness of architecture. It is there when we are at home, it is on our way to 
work, it is at our work, it is there when we go shopping, and it also is there when 
we need to be ‘lifted-up’ and go to a museum (or a church). The architecture of all 
these places might not attract our attention, we might experience it in distraction, 
particularly if it is our everyday environment. We can walk, cycle, drive around 
without really noticing the environment. Although experienced in distraction, it 
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nevertheless conditions us as human beings. Architecture is the context of daily 
life from which we cannot withdraw. This, we might state, is the merit of archi-
tecture, as compared to the art: it literally forms a world-of-things, it stresses the 
distinction between at home and in the world, it shapes the spaces of our life: the 
world, the public space, the home, the neighbourhood, the city, the landscape. It 
offers room for appearance in public, for the movement in the world, although, as 
history has shown, it also can destroy the possibilities of meaningful appearances 
and movement. Geoffrey Scott argues: ‘The functions of the arts, at many points, 
overlap; architecture has much that it holds in common with sculpture, and more 
that it shares with music. But it has also its peculiar province and a pleasure which 
is typically its own. It has the monopoly of space. Architecture alone of the Arts 
can give space its full value. It can surround us with a void of three dimensions; 
and whatever delight may be derived from that is the gift of architecture alone. 
Painting can depict space; poetry … can recall its image; music can give us its 
analogy, but architecture deals with space directly; it uses space as a material and 
sets us in the midst.’262   
The importance of spatiality of the world – not only in the tangible sense, but 
also in its virtual entity – cannot be underestimated. Thinking itself is bound 
to space, just since the human being is bound to the world, bound to time and 
space. ‘Thought itself seems in some essential way to be spatial and structural,’ 
the architectural theorist Colin Davis writes, ‘just like architecture. It is spatial 
and structural because it is the expression of beings who can only experience and 
understand the world through their spatial and structural bodies. The objective 
world proposed by science probably exists, but we can never know for sure. The 
only world that we can know directly is the subjective world of our bodies and 
minds, the world of our dwelling, and it is this world that architecture shapes and 
modifies.’263 Therefore, architecture has in my opinion more than every-thing else 
the distinctive capacity to connect the human being with the world, as well as with 
its peers that also appear in the world, in an immediate and sensible way. As the 
architects McCarter and Pallasma argue: ‘architectural space mediates between 
the world at large and the human domain, the physical and the mental, the 
material and the spiritual. Architecture’s task is to provide our domicile in natural 
space. Architecture creates horizons and frames of reference for the perception 
and understanding of the world.’264 The French philosopher Bachelard even puts 
this more strongly: ‘[The house] is an instrument with which to confront the 
cosmos.’265 
Having the distinction of Arendt between earth and world in mind, we 
actually miss in these two perspectives the particularities of the world. Surely, 
buildings offer shelter, are protecting the inhabitant from heavy weather and 
all sorts of other dangers that can be imagined. ‘Mentally, we cannot exist in 
limitless, anonymous, undefined and meaningless space, McCarter and Pallasmaa 
state.266 The architectural intervention thus indeed might first be understood as 
intervention in the cosmos, somehow against nature, in order to make place for 
dwelling, for the human being to survive. This place is both existentially as well 
as mentally needed, they argue. ‘Man-made structures domesticate space for 
human occupation by turning anonymous, uniform and limitless natural space 
into distinct places of human significance. Equally importantly, they make endless 
time tolerable by giving duration its human measure.’267 This idea of architecture 
as creating places which somehow brings together space and time derive from 
the 1951 lecture ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ that has evoked lots of responses 
within the profession of architecture.268 The lecture was addressed to an audience 
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of architects, who gathered to discuss the housing crisis after the war. Heidegger, 
in his lecture comes up with a totally different crisis of housing: the crisis of 
dwelling.269 Architecture ought to make room ‘for settlement and lodging’, he 
argued. By the definition of a boundary, architecture frees the space, so that it can 
be occupied. ‘A boundary is not that at which something stops, but, as the Greeks 
recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presenting.’270 
During the lecture Heidegger exemplifies the architectural intervention by 
analysing the construction of a bridge – an image that has become well known in 
the meantime. 
‘The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not just 
connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as the 
bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from 
each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks 
stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the 
banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the 
landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and bank and land into each 
other’s neighbourhood. The bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the 
stream. Thus it guides and attends the stream through the meadows. Resting 
upright in the stream’s bed, the bridge-piers bear the swing of the arches 
that leave the stream’s waters to run their course. The waters may wander on 
quiet and gay, the sky’s floods from storm or thaw may shoot past the piers 
in torrential waves – the bridge is ready for the sky’s weather and its fickle 
nature. Even when the bridge covers the stream, it holds its flow up to the sky 
by taking it for a moment under the vaulted gateway and then setting it free 
once more.’271
The moment the bridge is constructed is also the very moment of possibilities of 
use: 
‘The bridge lets the stream run its course and at the same time grants their 
way to mortals so that they may come and go from shore to shore. Bridges 
lead in many ways. The city bridge leads from the precincts of the castle to the 
cathedral square; the river bridge near the country town brings wagons and 
horse teams to the surrounding villages. The old stone bridge’s humble brook 
crossing gives to the harvest wagon its passage from the fields into the village 
and carries the lumber cart from the field path to the road. The highway bridge 
is tied to the network of long-distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum 
yield.’272 
Heidegger thus stresses how architecture unlocks a place, that is, it reveals charac-
teristics that already were present but not yet tangible. The essence of the lecture 
nevertheless is that modern architecture has lost this connection with a particular 
place, and this on the one hand can be seen as an effect of modernity, but also 
impacts the human being. The core essence of the lecture can be summarized, 
as Colin Davis does, that ‘all beings, including human beings, need somewhere 
to be.’273 This of course comes close to the previously discussed fundamental 
‘thrown-ness’ of the human being. Heidegger argues that one needs to exist 
somewhere, that is, is rooted somewhere, to be able to think, as well as to build. 
Due to modernity the human being nevertheless has become uprooted, causing 
the alienation of the human being, and the destruction of place, which stops 
people to really dwell (and modern architecture is somehow presented as a proof 
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of that uprootedness). The alienation of the world thus causes a crisis of dwelling, 
encompassing an existential crisis. Although Heidegger also plays the metaphys-
ical card emphasising ‘place’ as a ‘square’ that in its four vertexes assembles the 
heaven and the earth, the mortal and the immortal. The dwelling-crisis particu-
larly causes the decreasing eligibility for these four aspects that Heidegger sees as 
the very characteristics of dwelling. 
As said, the lecture has evoked lots of responses by architects. Hilde Heynen 
in her revealing study of modernity and architecture shows the spectrum of 
responses, with on the one hand Peter Eisenman and Massiamo Cacciari, who 
argued that architecture is not capable to mediate once again between the human 
being and a particular location, and on the other hand Christian Norberg-Schulz, 
who defended the opposite position. With the introduction of the term Genius 
Loci he urged architecture to take note of the ‘ghost’ of a particular place, the char-
acteristics of the context through which it is distinguished from other locations.274  
As has become clear before, Arendt’s distinction between earth and world is 
derived from the writings of Heidegger. Somehow alike Heidegger, she also was 
critical of the developments in technology and science. This is particularly visible 
in the introduction to The Human Condition, where she not only discusses the 
achievement of Yuri Gagarin as a sign of the withdrawal from the world, but 
also stumbles upon the contemporary sciences and the impenetrable language 
that often is used to discuss their findings. However, Arendt’s direction is not 
back to the earth (and the mysterious character of the earth). On the contrary, 
if Arendt stresses the alienation of Modern man, it is not alienation of the earth, 
but withdrawal from the world. The human being is not rooted in a particular 
place on earth, but is part of the web of human interactions and relationships. The 
earth, in that perspective, is only one of the many more relationships there are 
and that condition the human being. It is, in her view, not man living on earth, 
but men living in the world.275 When we think once again of this notion of the 
world, we immediately see how the world is detached from a particular place, as 
well as being regarded as a shared world. There is no world without technics, tools 
to intervene in the earth in order to make a place to dwell, moreover, to make a 
place to appear to others. This notion of the world thus not only acknowledges 
(development of) technique, of tools and instruments, but also binds the human 
beings first and foremost to other human beings, and the individual to the earth. 
The world changes by every object that is added or removed. It can be constructed 
everywhere, everywhere it is needed. Although Arendt does talk sometimes about 
the ‘the undisputable thereness of objects’,276 this does not mean that she also 
stresses the particular place of objects on earth. She stresses the reality of the 
world, the tangibility of objects, which, since they are real and tangible, are ‘there’, 
that is, in the world as distinct from the virtual realm of ideas. The ‘thereness’ 
thus is important as aspect of the world whose reality is real and thus requires to 
be ‘there’. This aspect however mainly stresses the very difference with the world 
of ideas, which is intangible, constructed through the human activity of thinking. 
Architecture, in other words, reveals the world. It has revelatory capacity, to show 
the world to its inhabitants.   
It depends on human beings – inhabitants of the earth – to construct the 
world, and to the inhabitants of the world, to maintain the world. It depends 
upon human beings to produce a common world, objects that enable appearance 
and withdrawal. Arendt of course does not plea for an ‘anything-goes’ mentality 
towards the world and nature. Since the world is in common, not only with 
contemporaries, but also with the past and the future, and if this longue durée is 
the essence of the common experience and the prerequisite for appearance and 
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politics, as we have argued previously, care for the world is crucial. Here we touch 
upon Arendt’s definition of culture once again: culture challenges how ‘we’ treat 
the world by this double perspective of renewal and maintenance, intervention 
and care. Acknowledging that violence to the world is needed in order to make 
it fit for human inhibition also in the future, to give room to new requirements, 
but never without leaving care for the existing behind. The care that is inherent 
in culture for the existent world immediately also affects the way we deal with the 
world. This is an important correction, I would argue: the world first and foremost 
binds us together, even before it binds us to the earth. We even might argue that 
it even binds us more to particular ‘things’, than to a particular place. It binds us 
for a while to a home, to a particular location, from which we appear in the world. 
In that sense, we have to reject the views that urge architecture to deal with the 
Genius Loci, which was introduced by the Norwegian architect Christian Norberg-
Schulz as we have seen before, if this means that we have to reveal the particular 
characteristics of a natural place and if stated that this will solve the uprootedness 
of the human being. Architecture needs to relate to the world, rather than to the 
Genius Loci. If it urges to deal with the particular characteristics of the world in 
a particular place, if it tries to restore the worldliness at a particular place, which 
to my mind is behind the Critical Regionalist approach of Kenneth Frampton, 
who urged architects to deal critically with local characteristics (in architecture) 
as we touched upon previously, we might agree upon that perspective. This little 
direction surely does not exclude the trial to strengthen, by one or another archi-
tectural or worldly intervention, the relationship earth-world, as for instance 
is done in the famous Kaufmann House Falling Water by Frank Lloyd Wright, 
the urban plan of Onkel Tom’s Hutte by Bruno Taut and Hugo Häring, or in the 
Fredenborg Housing project in Denmark by Jørn Utzon.[IMAGE 6.8, 6.9, 6.10]
Besides the Jewish perspective, as urged by Levinas, which might be behind 
Arendt’s perspective too, her own uprootedness, caused by her forced emigration, 
probably offered her even more insight: that to be bound to the world does not 
mean to be exclusively bound to a certain place on earth. Bound to the world 
probably means to occupy and to be engaged in a particular place for a period of 
time. World-bound, for Arendt is world-orientated, to be engaged in the world 
and to be involved in its happenings. 
The architectural intervention in the world certainly affects the world and the 
earth. Admittedly, Arendt does not so much stress the ecological effects of the 
world, and how the world violates nature. She acknowledges this violence, but 
never the less is mainly concerned about the world, and how this common world 
seems to vanish. However, as previously discussed, her notion of culture, which 
somehow mediates between her categories of work and action, provides the frame 
for these interventions: the cultural perspective forces a handling with care, but 
also to handle anyway.277 This of course also counts for the way we deal with 
the earth. The care that is applied to the world, as common to the community 
of people, also means a careful approach to the natural sources that also affect 
human life. To apply modern means, to strive for certain goals, but not to lose 
oneself in these means, and also to be aware of the possible destructions, side 
effects. It always needs to be oriented on the world (and its inhabitants).278 
Heidegger’s impact on the field of architecture is still tangible today, for instance, 
in the writings of McCarter and Pallasmaa. In their book Understanding Archi-
tecture, they emphasise that, ‘for our mental constitution and environmental 
perception, as well as for our innate structuring of the world.’279 Architecture 
places someone on a particular place – it is from there on space is discovered, 
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explored. However, the very experience of space is through a ‘mosaic of places’, 
they argue. This means, as I would stress, through a series of other places that 
are revealed by other means and interventions. Architecture’s first aim might be 
to conquer space, mediating between nature and the body, it’s primary calling 
is creating the world, that is, to create a common world. With McCarter and 
Pallasmaa, we might understand that the experience of the world is not smooth 
and continuous space, but rather a ‘mosaic of places, next to and nested inside 
each other; it is not a continuous, unstructured and homogeneous space devoid 
of meanings.’280 The experience of the mosaic of course is still the perspective 
of the individual. Their text somehow stays on the level of the experience of the 
individual. ‘Physical space becomes habitable and lived space as we turn it into a 
collection of places, and project specific meanings on these experiential entities; 
natural space is articulated into experiential places. We cannot even grasp, 
describe or remember space as such, but we grasp and remember places.’281 
At this point, I guess that we can enhance Arendt’s understanding of the world, as 
well as the argument of McCarter and Pallasmaa. Arendt urges the common-ness 
of the world beyond individual experiences and urgencies. We might state that 
the mosaics of all inhabitants superimposed upon each other deliver a structure 
of the world that is meaningful.282 It brings together the mosaic places into a 
fabric of ‘interventions’, that is: products of making. The term fabric, here, means 
to my understanding, that there is a certain entity that is able to join together a 
whole spectrum of differences, join together all sorts of patterns, connections, 
distinctions, ruptures. We might state at this point that essentially architecture 
is intervening in space, by making place. The very merit of architecture then is 
creating the world as a fabric, or landscape – a permanent structure that joins 
places together. Not in a finite whole, but in infinite opportunities of appearances 
to one another. Looking the other way around: the space of appearance, as we 
have touched upon previously is also not particularly smooth not continuous, but 
consists of all sorts of (temporal) places. These too, together can be described as a 
mosaic as well. 
Architecture indeed offers a mediation between the natural circumstances, 
but it is also the proper place from where one approaches the public realm and 
appears into the world. One does not appear from a particular place on earth, 
but in the world. It is architecture’s merit, as distinguished from other activities 
of work, even from the artwork, to place the human being so directly and so 
experientially in a relationship with the world and our fellow human beings, the 
generations of the past and those that follow us. The city in this respect is the most 
prominent and permanent assembly of the production of places: streets, squares, 
parks, landscapes, buildings and interiors. Particularly in the city, the experiences 
of the mosaic of places has a strong permanence, since constructed structures 
survive ages. They even give room to change in use and context, and are able to 
transform within their own limits. And, even more, there is no other cultural 
artefact that influences and establishes so extensively the everyday human and 
their particular experiences and therewith, also, the cultural and – as urged above 
– moral horizon of a community. 
The first important perspective upon architecture, as urged to us by the writings 
of Arendt, we might therefore define as the appearance of architecture in daily 
life. Although we often experience architecture in distraction, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, this does not mean that the appearance does not matter. 
On the contrary – particularly if experienced in distraction, as an everyday 
commodity, architecture determines extensively our view of the world: we are 
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still conditioned by the landscape, the city, our neighbourhood, our home, our 
school, the path to work, and so on. We can distinguish here both a passive and 
an active determination, I would argue. The active one is simply that architecture 
places the inhabitant in the world, literally. The world just opens up differently 
for those living in a gated community as compared to those living in a suburb 
that is accessible to everyone. One sees the world differently from the 38th floor 
of a Skyscraper in the business district of Shanghai than from the 3rd floor of an 
apartment building in the outskirts of that city. In other words, how our own place 
is related to the world determines quite a bit of our view of the world, or even 
more, of our experience of the world. If we cycle to school, take public transport, 
or go by car it affects our view too. Particularly if we take these commodities for 
granted, since neighbours, friends, family, colleagues more or less live and work 
in the same conditions, and we are not or only in a minor way confronted with 
otherness. One of the main responses in the fields of architectural theory and 
urban sociology to the separation that is described by these examples is to stress 
the superfluous character of such environments – I extensively discussed these 
perspectives in my journey through the American landscape in Chapter 2. The 
tone of this Chapter somehow was pessimistic: the exclusion of otherness in the 
domain of dwelling, working and leisure seems to propel a negative spiral that 
emphasizes security over openness, and anxiety over curiousness. The extension 
of that journey in Chapter 3 showed that there might be hope for a ‘solution’, 
since today there is more interest in differences and plurality. Urban cores, that 
always have been the locus of plurality, are even embraced today – although this 
engagement seems to have an undertone of economic profit and expectation. 
In all these discussions, architecture is latently existent. It is urged, since urban 
planning and design is the job of architecture, but nevertheless, architecture 
cannot stop anxiety, nor can it evoke ‘real’ moments of exchange between people 
of different backgrounds. That is all part of the perceived and lived space, we 
might argue with a reference to the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, not of the 
conceived space.283 
6.4.3 Representation(s) of Time
The passive way architecture defines our perception of the world as, like all other 
objects, and specifically works of art, it has an inherent narrative. Architecture 
represents something. Architectural forms somehow communicate a certain 
message: it reveals something of its relationship to the world, to its contexts, to a 
certain culture – as well as revealing something from that culture. The message of 
the building is rooted in the context at large. Architecture cannot withdraw itself 
from that context, but in most cases it just emphasises this context.284 Vincent 
Scully somehow also urges this division between the active and the passive aspects 
of architecture, when he first argues in his book Modern Architecture: ‘Modern 
architecture is a product of Western civilization. It began to take shape during 
the later eighteenth century, with the democratic and industrial revolutions 
that formed the modern age. Like all architecture, it has attempted to create a 
special environment for human life and to imagine the thoughts and actions of 
human beings as they have wished to believe themselves to be.’285 Architecture 
thus actively tries to embody a particular world-view. This is what architects do, 
together with their clients and other parties involved in a building project. The 
architect strives for possibilities to accommodate the current needs, according to 
the current values. But there is more – particularly in modern architecture, this 
also is how they understood their work actively. Modern architecture often was 
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defended with a reference to the zeitgeist – architecture needed to fit properly 
in that very period: it could evoke a future perspective, but could not re-address 
the past. This modern agenda has been criticized from post-modernity onwards. 
However, this is not just the architect that takes the zeitgeist as a certain style, 
it also – but a bit more hidden – is part of culture an sich. In what we have seen 
above, architecture makes time present and tangible. It reveals the continuity of 
time, which so important to Arendt’s concept of the world-in-common, connecting 
the past with the now, the now with the future. This presence of time is tangible 
in the change of approaches, styles, materials, deterioration, ruins and new 
additions. As is clear, however, due to new techniques, materials, demands, each 
time has its way of organizing, of emphasis on process, design, and construc-
tion – which all affect the outcome of the particular architectural project. In this 
specificity the presence of time exists: everything after all is simply bound to that 
very time and location, to that particular team of client, designers and construc-
tors. All parties involved agree upon these aspects that are underneath the 
approach, the aim, and the limits of the project. This affirmation to the prevailing 
cultural, political and economic values, however, often it is hidden and left unsaid. 
It’s in the air, so to say. It is this ‘air’ that in the end is expressed in the building 
too. This, we might argue, is an image of the passive way architecture shapes our 
view of the world. As Scully continues: ‘Modern architecture has mirrored the 
tensions of this state of mind and has itself embodied the character of the age that 
produced them. It has acted much more than a simple reflection of its society. 
Like all art, it has revealed some of the basic truths of the human condition and 
again, like all art, has played a part in changing and reforming that condition 
itself. From its first beginnings it has shown us to ourselves as modern men and 
told us what we are and want to be.’286 Architecture thus reveals something of the 
urgencies beyond it – the value systems that have shaped buildings. And by their 
very being, these buildings form the conditions of those communities in the midst 
of which they has been placed. 
Therefore, at this point, we at least need to stress the importance of the 
‘well-conceived’ space (although for Lefebvre and his Marxist theory, this was 
the very category to be critiqued). With well-conceived, we do not mean to state 
that all parts of a neighborhood need to be clean and ordered. Those spaces in 
neighborhoods, at the edge of towns, or in abandoned areas, that first seem to 
be a mess, on secondary view can propose opportunities. The most well-de-
signed environments after all (and if we have to pinpoint these, we can think of 
Singapore, The Netherlands or Switzerland, also bare the seed of boringness and 
over-design – if everything is static, nothing can happen or no personal initiative 
will be allowed). This only immediately reveals how certain appearances evoke 
thoughts and expectations. Therefore, what is meant with the well-conceived is 
at least that some of the collective and public facilities and structures are well 
designed and easily accessible. We might argue that this needs to be the case 
for all constructions that are being built. ‘Aesthetic intention and the creation of 
better surroundings’, after all, ‘are the two permanent characteristics of archi-
tecture,’ as the Italian architect Aldo Rossi states.287 However, in a time that 
aesthetic intention is not applied to all structures, let alone if the aspect of the 
better surroundings can be applied to all structures as well, we might make a 
difference if in a certain neighbourhood a school, a library and a football-playing 
field stand out, if there are bicycle lanes and sidewalks to be occupied, if there 
is a nice green structure, a playing field, or other well-designed facilities. It is, 
for instance, telling if the library has an impressive hall with books all around, 
as well as a nice counter where one can read, study and meet. It communicates 
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diversity, creativity and dynamics if the school has an open auditorium as its 
central core. The building can reveal permanence in a world that is experienced 
as fluid. This point might seem to introduce the argument of the absolute archi-
tecture of Pier Vittorio Aureli, that I discussed earlier, but only on a smaller scale: 
a few outstanding buildings will save the neighbourhood. But on the contrary: 
whereas Aureli stresses the differences, and the autonomous architecture as 
an counter project that is able to reveal the mere practices surrounding it, the 
argument that I develop here is that it is the public buildings in particular that 
need ‘thoughtful’ architecture.288 It of course is not limited to public buildings 
only – these buildings also challenge the neighbouring properties, as they do their 
neighbouring properties, and yes, together they challenge a whole borough, neigh-
bourhood, area to understand the intermediate function of architecture. This of 
course is also a challenge for the owner of the petrol station, the coffee-corner, the 
restaurant, the supermarket, and even of the factory that is settled on distance of 
the city. Their architecture does matter too. 
However, to start somewhere affecting the world-view of inhabitants, public 
buildings are exemplary, just like the artworks being exemplary to all objects. If 
buildings are architecturally outstanding, this is not meant to reveal the mere 
character of the environment, but in order to ‘shape’, to state it with Churchill, 
the users. The architecture of such well-designed buildings and other facilities, 
after all, represent a certain world-view too. They are tangible messages about 
the connection with the world beyond their very location. The architecture 
represents how society values such facilities. Even in a distracted experience of 
such buildings or landscapes, one is affected by their very appearance. If architec-
ture shapes the world, the inhabitants of that world are shaped by architecture, 
by how architecture relates to its location, to other properties, to the urban fabric, 
to infrastructure, how it behaves to the past, and how it offers possibilities of 
occupation and appropriation. Generally spoken, at this point we can agree with 
Ronald Beiner when he challenges architecture: ‘if the effect of an ensemble of 
architectural creation is not the constitution of some kind of polis, at least ideally, 
then the idea of architecture as a source of citizenship is a hollow one.’289
One of the features that architecture represents unmarked certainly is the 
durability – if not permanence – of the world. ‘Architecture’, the Finnish architect 
Juhani Pallasma argues, ‘detaches us from the present and allows us to experience 
the slow, firm flow of time and tradition.’290 This experience particularly is 
experienced in cities, and, as Aldo Rossi argues in his book The Architecture of 
the City, vis-à-vis the background of monuments. As we already have seen in the 
previous chapter, he starts to make a case of typology – that most architectural 
forms are based on a principle. Over time the forms used and designed change, 
but the change is within certain limits. These forms essentially are based on a 
fundamental type. In the second part of his book, he changes the focus to the 
experience of the urban form. There is not so much in the world more durable 
than urban form, that is, the structure and form of the urban fabric. It is as though 
we are in the city now, but through these patterns, and even due to the historical 
buildings and particularly the monuments, we still partly experience the past. ‘The 
past’, he argues, ‘is partly being experienced now.’291 In his concluding chapter, he 
actually comes up with a brilliant summary of permanence of the city as a process 
of involvement, engagement, and affection: 
‘Urban Architecture … is willed as such; thus the Italian piazzas of the 
Renaissance cannot be explained either in terms of their function or by 
288. 
I refer here to the intriguing 
definitions that both Ludwig Mies 
van der Rohe and Louis Kahn offered. 
The first urged architecture as ‘the 
thoughtful bringing together of two 
stones’ (Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, 
‘On Restraint in Design’, in: New 
York Herald Tribune, 28 June 1959), 
the second as ‘the thoughtful making 
of spaces.’ (Quote via Jeremy Till, 
Architecture Depends (Cambridge 
Mass.: MIT Publishers, 2009), 118)
289.
Ronald Beiner, ‘Our Relationship 
with Architecture as a Mode of 
Shared Citizenship: Some Arendtian 
Thoughts, in: Techné, Research in 
Philosophy and Technology, no1 
(Virginia Tech, Fall 2007)’
290.
Pallasmaa, ‘Architecture of the Seven 
Senses’, in: Steven Holl, Juhani 
Pallasmaa, and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, 
Questions of Perception, Phenome-
nology of Architecture (Tokyo/San 
Fransisco: A+U Publishing Co. Ltd./
William Stout Publishers, 2006), 31
291.
Rossi, The Architecture of the City, 
57-59
482
chance. Although these piazzas are means in the formation of the city, such 
elements which originally start out as means tend to be come ends’; ultimately 
they are the city. Thus the city has as its end itself alone, and there is nothing 
else to explain beyond the fact of its own presence in its own artefacts. This 
mode of being implies a will to exist in a specific way and to continue in that 
way.’292 
This I think is sharp description of the objects that surround us – this process 
certainly is not limited to urban form, neither to the Renaissance city, nor to 
Classical Architectural forms, but is also applicable to the objects in our home, 
those things that matter to us – are transformed from being a result of work, 
produced to fulfil a certain end, towards a thing that evokes our ‘affection’, to 
which we are attached, that is, towards a certain end. However, these sites where 
the past literally is perceived, offer certainly a different experience of the world 
than these neighbourhoods that seem to suggest that everything can be replaced 
elsewhere overnight: cardboard houses that do not even touch the ground – their 
message is simply that they can be changed easily. 
6.4.4 The Case of Krier
This cardboard architecture does not have to be rejected, somehow. For a certain 
moment of time, in a specific case, this can be the perfect answer to a spatial 
request. There is something to say for an architecture that has less impact on the 
environment, both literally at that very spot, as well as on the broader scale by 
making use of renewable materials, elements that can easily be changed, removed, 
reworked and replaced. The durability of the world Arendt urges, however, cannot 
be replaced by an ultimate emphasis on sustainability. Permanence is the goal – 
and this permanence particularly is bound to the experience of the past, and the 
recognition of the future in that what architecture offers today. The experience of 
the past has been questioned in Modern architecture at least until the emergence 
of Post-Modern architecture in the early 70s. To my mind, one of the most 
eloquent and prominent defenders of this view is Léon Krier, whom we already 
touched upon in the previous chapter. In his academic work he emphasizes the 
importance of the durability of urban forms, and blames modern architecture to 
have a ‘blind spot’ in this occasion. He underlines the importance of the durability 
of urban form with a wonderful quote from Arendt, taken from The Human 
Condition, which we already discussed previously: 
‘If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one 
generation and planned for the living only. It must transcend the lifespan of 
mortal man, without the transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, 
no politics, strictly speaking, no common world and no public realm is 
possible.’293 
Krier refers to this wonderful quote, which seems to literally challenge the field 
of architecture, since he recognized in the modern approach to architecture first 
an aversion of traditional architectural styles, and second a decreasing lifespan 
of architectural objects. Both observations seem to challenge the characteristic 
of the longue duree. Krier urges architects to turn back to traditional styles of 
architecture, and specifically to the style of the architecture of the Classic period. 
His statement somehow is that modern architecture has proven not to be durable, 
since their lay-out turned out to be a too-perfect fit for a particular program, 
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and thus does not offer room for change in time. Modern architecture, rightly 
so, has offered trials, big failures, but also great successes. The buildings proved 
to be adaptable, to new circumstances and new uses. Krier is not alone in his 
critical perspective upon modernism, and particularly on functionalism, as we 
have seen in the opening paragraphs of the previous chapter. Other perspectives 
either stress flexibility, sometimes at the cost of a durable structure, in other 
cases stressing the construction versus the finishing (or infill) of the building, 
by offering more (space) than required, in other cases by stressing the spatial 
experience as lasting.294 Léon Krier nevertheless is the most pointed and sharp 
defender of the reactionary ‘return to the future’. Krier always, and certainly 
stubbornly, has stressed his view, even if it was against the majority of thinking 
in architecture, as well as rousing disdain and disregard as a response. His 
perspective, although vented with flair and humor, has been followed with every 
move. One of the revealing discussions he joined actually has been transcribed. 
In this conversation with the American architect Peter Eisenman, the latter stated: 
‘I think a beautiful building is a modern building.’ 
And Krier responds: 
‘That is a contradiction in terms.’ 
Eisenman: 
‘Who is to judge?’ 
Krier: 
‘You!’ 
And Eisenman again: 
‘Then there are no judges?’ 
Krier answers: 
‘One must be one’s own judge because other judges are unreliable.’ 
Eisenman than comes up with a harsh judgment made by Krier: 
‘But you once said that people who design modern buildings will probably 
burn in hell. You then become their judge.’ 
Krier defends his statement: 
‘Yes. Rather, they force others to live in their hell.’ 
And Eisenman again: 
‘How can you know that? Who puts you in touch with those facts?’ 
And Krier finally: 
‘I just observe how and where architects live; they rarely live in their own 
buildings or in new towns. That is only a fine point.’295  
In his writings and through his built projects, he urged to re-introduce classical 
architectural forms, whereas, briefly spoken, modern architecture has done 
everything possible to get rid of these forms. Krier actually stressed the classical 
approach to architecture as one full of architectural wisdom and knowledge, 
based on ages of experiences with (city) building.[IMAGE 6.11] His arguments therefore 
often come down on joking with the achievements of modern architecture. ‘Some 
people are about to keep alive a little awareness, memory and intelligence’, he for 
instance writes in the final lines of his article ‘The Blind Spot’, ‘in an age where 
under the joint banners of ‘education’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘security’, the memory 
and faculties of what we know as humanity are systematically drowned in the 
immensity of entertaining stupidity on the one hand, brutality and destruction 
on the other, where “without restriction can nowhere be anything produced of 
importance”.’296 
Krier developed actually an attractive technique in order to communicate 
the deficiencies of modern architecture as compared to the classical examples 
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immediately: a series of cartoons, called ‘Drawings on principles of urbanity 
and the public sphere.’ The cartoons for instance show generic forms of modern 
architecture for even a house, a school or a concert hall, lacks of detailing, and 
homogeneous environments, immediately opposed by classical examples that 
show different typologies for each program, appropriate pluralism in structure 
and construction of urban environments, details revealing themselves through 
movement, whereas in comments he writes that the difference is in the approach 
to scale, being qualitative (in the example of the classical form) or quantitative 
(the modern approach).297 According to Krier, the modern approach cannot 
be regarded architecture at all. ‘Architecture’, he writes, ‘consists essentially 
of a body of knowledge concerning the material transformation of nature into 
buildings and in turn, the translation of an imitative system of building into an 
art of building.’298 The addition of ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’ is rubbish, he argues. 
But he even is more concerned by the lack in education, but also in practice, of 
attention to this ‘circulation of knowledge about the transformation of nature and 
making architecture. Therefore, ‘architecture and building,’ he claims, ‘which once 
promised the ultimate shelter for man against the afflictions of nature, is reduced 
to a mere problem of packaging and industrial gadgetry.’299 It has lost, in other 
words, its power of producing space (shelter for the body), and is replaced by mere 
design. This of course is not just the bankruptcy of architecture, but also of the 
city. Krier, as well as his younger brother Rob Krier, therefore aims to reconstruct 
the city along ‘romantic-reactionary lines’, a return to the preindustrial world.300 
Specifically, the early examples of his own work, as for instance his contribution 
to ‘Roma Interrotta’ (1977) [IMAGE 5.11, 5.12] or his proposal for the 1976 competition 
on Parc La Villette in Paris shows emphasis on public space and monumental 
structures: axes and colonnades cutting through a fine maze urban fabric, public 
buildings, quite monumentally designed by abstracting and reconsidering 
classical examples, strategically placed amidst the vast mass of urban housing. 
The Roma Interrotta plan even comes up with a new type of public building, 
that is building and square at once. ‘It provides’, Krier writes, engines for urban 
centrality and marks both the plan and skyline of the city.’301 Through such images 
well-defined public space emerges, that nevertheless clearly appear as part of 
a fabric too. Besides these squares that sometimes are dominated by a covered 
structure, colonnades, obelisks also the attention to ‘natural’ environments of 
lakes and rivers, accompanied by the designs of bridges and embankments, walls 
and boulevards, attracts attention. It is remarkable that this quite fresh approach 
is lost in the newer projects, as for instance the urban lay-out of the British New 
Town Poundbury, in favour of a more direct application of the classical forms 
and structures of cities and buildings. It is even more remarkable, that although 
he suggests that urban fragments should accommodate the pedestrian – it’s 
size should not be bigger than about 10 minutes walk, within this distance the 
primary services should be located and that the city should be constructed out 
of such autonomous fragments (that share the secondary services on the level of 
a borough, and some urban functions, like the airport, the administration, and 
cultural facilities, on the level of the city)302 – the perspectives he draws in order 
to present his own work often lacks people visible, or when visible, it is never busy 
on the streets. The extinction is the 1987 painting on Atlantis, where the stairs 
and the balconies, and even the temple on top are heavily crowded – this painting 
actually reveals how empty Krier’s cities are in his other drawings. 
The cartoons Krier draws on urban structures show how he distinguishes between 
monuments – the public buildings – on the one hand, and the other structures 
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on the other. He reveals this point actually quite well also in the discussion with 
Eisenman, cited previously. Eisenman asks Krier:  
‘Why is architecture about living in buildings? Building concerns shelter, 
construction, defying the laws of gravity, providing accommodation. Building 
can solve many functions – whether it is a building as an ocean liner, a 
building as a castle, or a building as a log cabin. A work of architecture is 
necessarily a building, but in itself a building is not a significant condition to 
define architecture. That is, since a building is not architecture, architecture 
must be something more than building, in the same way that literature is more 
than journalism. But if we would agree that people do not need to live in archi-
tecture but in buildings, then what is architecture if it is not a necessary part of 
living?’ 
Krier responds: 
‘It is, obviously, not enough to have fine houses; a city also needs temples and 
monuments. Architecture is not concerned with the private realm. It shapes 
the public domain, the common world.’ 
Eisenman tries it once again: 
‘Would you agree what if we built a “public” wall, anything could be clipped on 
behind it?’ 
Then Krier comes with a certain final answer: 
‘Even if it becomes a public enterprise, housing is not a subject for “archi-
tecture”; it is not monumental. Twisted minds wanted housing to be the 
“monument of the twentieth century.” But housing is the sum of private 
functions that even in great number become no more interesting when put 
on public display. There is nothing grand, ceremonious, or important about 
housing. That is why its monumentalization is always painfully boring, 
meaningless, and false.’303 
This answer on the one hand seems to parallel the distinction once made by 
Kenneth Frampton that we discussed previously: the distinction between architec-
ture and building as being evoked by labor (which is dominated by the economic 
perspective) and work (that creates the works of art). The monumental belongs 
to architecture, the everyday does not. Of course – as his drawings show – the 
everyday is needed in order to form together with the monumental the civitas, but 
the essence of the civitas are the monuments that somehow symbolises the res 
publica. This perspective becomes even clearer in the book Architecture, Choice 
of Fate? where he explicitly argues that ‘all traditional architecture clearly distin-
guishes between public and/or sacred buildings, on the one hand, and utilitarian 
and/or private buildings, on the other. The former express the qualities of insti-
tutions – dignity, solemnity, grandeur for the res publica and the res sacra; the 
latter, the more modest private activities of housing, commerce and industry 
in the res private and the res economica.’304 Here we hear also the echo of Pier 
Vittorio Aureli – although we have to admit that it has to be urged vice-versa 
– Krier long ago made this point, whereas Aureli’s argument on absolute archi-
tecture is from a few years back. However, we even might find another parallel 
in the thoughts of Arendt, now making a distinction between the everyday as 
part of work and the monumental as part of political actions, particularly when 
she explicitly excludes the social from the realm of politics. In the discussion 
in Toronto, that has been helpful in exploring the work of Arendt in Chapter 4, 
the issue of social housing (sic) is taken as example of this division between the 
political and the social. First Arendt’s friend Mary McCarthy questions Arendt 
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about her very image the public realm of action and speech. 
‘What is somebody supposed to do on the public stage, in the public space, if 
he does not concern himself with the social That is, what’s left?’305
Others support McCarthy, by arguing that this distinction between the political 
and the social is not defendable consistently. Arendt however replies by stating 
that life is changing constantly and that this means that every time, and even 
every location urges different issues to be discussed in public. She also argues 
that public debate only can deal with uncertainty – if things are certain, there is 
nothing to be discussed. I will come back to that issue of (un)certainty, but here 
Arendt actually offers a great example of what she has in mind: 
‘There are things where the right measures can be figured out. These things 
can really be administered and are not then subject to public debate. Public 
debate can only deal with things which – if we put it negatively – we cannot 
figure out with certainty. Otherwise, if we can figure it out with certainty, shy 
do we all need to get together? Take a town-hall meeting. There is question, 
for instance of where to put the bridge. This can be decided either from above, 
or it can be done by debate. In case there really is an open question where it is 
better to put the bridge, it can be decided better by debate than from above.’
But than she adds: 
‘On the other hand, it seems to me also quite clear that no amount of speeches 
and discussions and debates – or what is unfortunately taking their place: 
research committees, which are an excuse for doing nothing – that none of 
these things will be able to solve the very grave social problems which the big 
cities pose to us.’
Another of the participants, Albrecht Wellmer, joins the discussion now:  
‘I would ask you to give one example in our time of a social problem which is 
not at the same time a political problem.’
Arendt replies by taking the housing problem as an example: 
‘The social problem is certainly adequate housing. But the question of 
whether this adequate housing means integration or not is certainly a political 
question. With every one of these questions there is a double face. And one 
of these faces should not be subject to debate. There shouldn’t be any debate 
about the question that everybody should have decent housing.’ 
Then George Baird helps Arendt with stressing the situation in Britain, buy stating 
that the disconnection between actions by the British government regarding the 
housing stock, and the inhabitants actually living there. Arendt appreciates his 
intervention:
‘I think this example is helpful in showing this double fact of which I have 
talked in a very concrete way. The political issue is that these people love 
their neighbourhood and don’t want to move, even if you give them one more 
bathroom. This is indeed entirely a debateable question, and a public issue, 
and should be decided publicly and not from above.’306 
Of course, this conversation brings us in another direction, but Krier distancing 
himself from the housing question reminded me of this conversation. There might 
be a distinction between the public and the sacred place on the one hand, and the 
everyday structures of housing on the other – this does not mean that the latter 
is not a public issue at all. Particularly the everyday environment of inhabitants 
has to be the topic of discussion in public space. It matters where ‘we’ will build 
the bridge. It matters how our everyday environment is designed (and this cannot 
float on a few iconic buildings, I would argue). If we tend to engage with the world, 
if we need to embrace the (architectural) objects surrounding us, not to spoil them 
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but to keep them, I would argue that we cannot make a harsh distinction between 
the everyday street and the market square – not on the basis of Frampton and 
Aureli, neither as urged by Krier. 
I particularly would argue that Krier in his scheme’s and theory is focussed way 
too much on historical forms that together shape the structure of the town. 
Monumental buildings are connected through streets and squares, in his image. 
We can celebrate this more holistic approach: a series of single buildings does 
not form a city, a civitas. There is need for an underlying structure: the relation-
ships between the buildings need emphasis and articulation. Nevertheless, in the 
schemes of Krier, the façades of the buildings that form the urban structure are 
more related to city-scape and the classical or traditional architectural language, 
than to the programs behind the facades. In other words, the façades are a means 
towards the structure of the town, and hide, somehow, the programs behind 
in a disconnected interior world. This is an important perspective, challenging 
the limitation Krier seems to puts forward regarding the representation of the 
longue duree to traditional or Classical architectural styles. There is no reason to 
not believe the possibility of modern architecture to represent the continuity of 
time. Permanence still is a feature of architecture, not limited to the traditional 
language of architecture, despite the increasing emphasis on the contempora-
neity of architecture and the decreasing lifespan of architectural objects. We even 
might be critical of this language, particularly after the concern of Frampton and 
Aureli, since the classical style architecture has become an economical means 
in the hands of developers, and is often used only to offer a nice ‘view’, covering 
heavy programs of mass consumption that are as temporal as ever. The question 
might even be such ‘fake’ Classical façades does not do harm to the idea of the 
longue duree. We will come back to this issue, but this already shows how the 
term longue duree can be understood in significantly different ways. The quote 
of Arendt, that was put forward by Krier, in my opinion does not support his plea 
per se. It certainly emphasizes the importance of the longue duree for the public 
realm (‘If the world has to contain a public realm…’), but does not say anything 
about current assignments, and how these should relate (both structurally and 
formally) to the existing structures, nor how they should look like. As is very well 
known, contrasting forms added to existing structures reveal the continuity of 
such an old structure even better than the existing structure alone (and renovated 
perfectly). New additions, new forms, new materials, in other words, can reveal 
the longue duree of the existing in very clear ways, and therefore help to offer 
experiences of permanence of the world. Moreover, such additions or new inter-
ventions not only link to the past, they also connect with the future, particularly 
through their new forms, materials, innovation.307 
Moreover, to my mind, there should be another important aspect added, and that 
is the urge Arendt offers on the very shape each object needs to have: a shape of 
its own.308 By emphasizing this aspect – that everything has a shape of its own 
–, Arendt stresses the joint notions of appearance and recognition. Appearance 
and recognition belong together. What appears needs to be recognized, in order 
to contribute significantly to the world. If we stress this pair to the classical 
architectural style, we first might admit that here indeed every ‘building’ has its 
own shape. A town hall does not look like a house, a temple not like a bathhouse. 
Krier, in a couple of his drawings, urges how form became formless in modern 
architecture, where villa’s and offices, town halls and theatres apparently looked 
the same. On the other hand, also Krier’s proposals have a loose relationship 
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between program and form (note that the strongest relationship between these 
two pairs actually can be found in functionalism, where this relationship is 
emphasized through the formula Form follows Function). The classical city after 
all, which is his ultimate reference, is not just a matter of form. It is the interplay 
and interaction of form and program, of the scale of the urban and the scale of the 
single building, the façade as separating and connecting private to the public, the 
urban structure and the multiple elements cities consist of. In other words, it is 
not just the classical form that offers the required permanence to the public realm. 
It is the presence of ‘shapes of their own’ within a larger structure that is charac-
terized by a series of thresholds, of tension between public and private, connection 
and disconnection. Streets and squares will not function as public spaces if there 
is only a thin façade that smoothly structures it, and that has no relationship at 
all with the spaces behind. Public space will become superfluous too, if there is no 
threshold that connects an interior-space and the exterior world. I therefore agree 
with George Baird when he describes the works of Léon Krier as quite ironic, 
specifically when the architecture purely relies on the ‘iconographic power of the 
facade.’309 As Baird states, the Krier proposal, particularly that of the Atlantis 
project, but is even clearer in the building of Poundbury, which is planned on the 
very edge of Dorchester, seems to offer a resort, a space of withdrawal from the 
harsh light of the world. ‘It is, after all, in the first instance a resort, not a quarter 
in any traditional sense’, he writes of Krier’s Atlantis project; ‘It thereby places its 
author’s increasingly historicists formal vocabulary at the service of a recreational 
consumerism that cannot be conclusively detached from the values of Baudril-
lard’s Disneyland.’310
For Arendt, as we’ve seen, the relationship between an object and its 
appearance is very direct. As Patchen Markell urges: ‘In fact, Arendt goes one 
step further: she even suggests that the usefulness of an object and its appearance 
are not separate aspects of the object – as though an “appearance” were like a 
decorative façade, layered on top of but not deeply connected to an instrumental 
structure but inseparably related: “The standard by which a thing’s excellence 
is judged,” she says, “is never mere usefulness, as though an ugly table will fulfil 
the same function as a handsome one, but its adequacy or inadequacy to what it 
should look like.” To attend to a thing’s appearance, in other words, is not to turn 
away from but to enrich the question of what it’s good for: usefulness is more than 
mere usefulness.’311  
The importance of the longue duree of architecture, as its very contribution to 
the world, to my mind is beyond dispute. However, this idea of the longue duree 
certainly cannot be brought back to a particular style of architecture, as if the most 
appreciated of the public will survive the tides of use, taste, and renewal. As we 
have touched upon previously, the permanence of architecture, and with that the 
representation of time, is as much part of build environment of various cities, as 
well as in the knowledge that is inherent in architectural typologies. Moreover, 
the representation of time cannot be limited to the past only, buildings, drawings, 
models, and all other outcomes of architectural thinking immediately connect 
with the future. 
However, architecture is not just the mediation in time, between generations, 
it also mediates in the present. It is able to engage people to a certain place too, as 
is argued by Rossi. Buildings offer special places in the community, particularly if 
they are outspoken, well-designed, welcoming and accessible. People are simply 
able to attach to buildings and sites. This of course is not a new viewpoint. The 
Canadian architectural theorist Alberto Pérez-Gómez for instance argues that 
309.
Baird, The Space of Appearance, 
345, 339
310.
Ibid., 344; The Atlantis project 
actually is one of the early projects 
of Léon Krier. More recently Krier 
emphasis even more strongly the 
architectural language of the Classical 
approach as the ‘only’ just way to 
build the city. One might argue that 
he has taken his approach more 
seriously. His sketches are revealing 
and often hilarious. 
311.
Markell, ‘Arendt’s Work’, 31-32
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 6: WORLD
489
‘it was the architect’s job to make you feel at home in the city, to intensify your 
purpose and belonging, through the institutions that framed daily life. Indeed, 
this was the part of life that truly mattered, as it involved our social body, our 
being with others that reflected back a sense of purpose through our actions.’312 If 
there is matter that matters, architecture matters above all. It mediates between 
the individual and the world, the family and the political, the private and the 
public. Architecture determines the worldview and world-experience. ‘Architec-
ture,’ Pérez-Gomez specifies later, ‘was responsible for circumscribing social life 
and establishing limits within which one could place oneself.’313  
6.4.5  The Architectural Event 
When we look at the essential qualities of architecture in this respect, the 
second perspective we need to acknowledge is this aspect of establishing limits. 
By defining the limits, architecture intervenes with a certain ‘violence’ in the 
world and the earth. Architecture after all is a profession of discrimination. It 
erects walls in order to distinguish – distinguish between the outer ends that 
I mentioned above: the here and the there. This of course is also a distinction 
between private property and public property, or between different spaces in 
public, or to distinguish between space in the private realm. It is the distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between spaces that are shaped to house a particular 
function and spaces that are left for collective and plural use and occupation. 
Architectural intervention thus makes distinctions in space. Distinctions that are 
sharp or weak, between public and private, of within the public and the private. 
This means that by architectural interventions there is not just ‘the public’ and 
‘the private’, but a range public and private spaces. Often, the distinction between 
public and private is urged as a ‘binary’ code, as Arendt does. One term offers 
what the other lacks, and vice versa – and a sharp line is imagined between both 
entities. That is, as I have argued in the former chapter, is not true – the boundary 
is way more blurred. There definitely is a pivotal moment of an edge that is seen 
as private and what certainly is public, but as also is clear, it is not just a matter 
of black and white. Some spaces are more private than others, also some spaces 
are more public than others. The public-private distinction, in other words, is 
a continuum: the edges are blurred, and most spaces have public and private 
aspects. Architectural interventions create differences within these spheres as 
well, not only between these realms. However, that is not what should be urged at 
this point. As we will see, also Arendt defines a ‘space’ in-between: the threshold. 
This threshold, that I will discuss in a moment, actually articulates the tension 
between the different entities on both sides of the boundary. It suggests that 
spaces inherit certain aspects and qualities: distinct conditions, images, positions, 
and possibilities. What emerges here, as an image, is very relevant for the under-
standing of ‘what architecture does’. When I suggest that ‘what architecture 
does’ fundamentally can be described as making the distinction between two 
entities, that means that architecture actively creates conditions. The fundamental 
conditions are public and private, but often the distinctions made are not that 
oppositional, but can better be described as being more or less public or private, 
although sometimes the distinction needs to be as sharp as possible. 
This reflection upon the very act of architecture renders the image of the 
simultaneity of space and frame at once. The architectural intervention is a spatial 
intervention, it distinguishes differences, creates edges, borders and thresholds, 
and with that conditions spaces. The intervention itself delineates and pulls a line. 
This line both separates and connects in the same gesture the distinct conditions 
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on both sides. How this line is designed and materialized, which means, how 
it organizes both the separation and the connection physically belongs to the 
very core of architecture. These interventions in space thus divides infinite 
space into several distinct (but often also connected) entities and/or enhancing 
specific conditions of (the) space(s). Architecture thus creates ‘space’, one could 
say, or probably better said: spaces. Often, as we have seen already previously, 
architecture is understood as unveiling place as opposed to space: identifiably 
places excavated out of infinite space.314 But stated like this it is not completely 
true. It is not demarcating a place that can be identified, an enclosed court in a 
sea of inifinite space. What happens outside that enclosed wall also changes of 
character and identity. The creation of one entity after all immediately also creates 
another as well. This ‘sounds bizarre’, Henri Lefebvre admits in his book The 
Production of Space.315 We almost automatically hold it true that ‘space’ is prior 
to the intervention of place. It is important however, to be more precise here. 
Architecture is not the god-like creation of space out of the cosmos, infinite space, 
it is intervention in the earth and the world, to put it in Arendt’s terms, in space 
that is already more or less identifiable, but not yet ready to be occupied. So what 
we actually mean by the statement that by interventions (in space) spaces are 
produced, it means that the conditions have been changed, which gives room to 
other activities, experiences, and is offered for occupation. This not only counts 
for only one side of the wall, the conditions of the other side change as well. In 
other words, and to bring it back to Arendt’s perspective, the world itself changes 
by every intervention. Every line that is drawn, every wall erected, every roof 
lifted, adds to the world a changing condition, not only of the space enclosed or 
covered, both also of the spaces connected to it. This is even a matter of these 
architectural interventions that in the end do not create more or less enclosed and 
covered spaces, it is also true for the construction of monuments, obelisks and 
bridges. Once again, the sharpest distinction between particular distinctions is 
that between public and private. Architecture however also distinguishes within 
each realm. It differentiates the street from the square, the atrium in the shopping 
mall from the parking lot, and the private garden from the living room. 
As touched upon previously, the capacity to discriminate, to limit and secure 
space and create room, Arendt understands as pre-political activity: ‘Before men 
began to act, a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all 
subsequent actions could take place, the space being the public realm of the polis 
and its structure the law; legislator and architect belonged in the same category.’316 
Arendt speaks here about the origins of the Greek polis (which differs from the 
Roman situation and reflection upon that, where law-making was part of the 
political life of the city-state). However, she thus argues that public spaces first 
need to be designed, which is the work of architects, and defined, which is the 
work of legislators, before political life can take place within it. The wall somehow 
is the physical articulation of the law: it literally stresses the boundaries of the law, 
to where the law is applicable. By this articulation, it creates united space differen-
tiated from other spaces. We might state that the promise of architecture is in the 
making visible and tangible of united space – the very capacity of architecture is 
the make physical the virtual aspects beyond reality, that nevertheless affects the 
world extensively. By materializing these aspects, they also become accessible by 
human beings – that is, ready to discuss and to stress. 
Arendt however argues that this design and definition was not object of 
discussion – it was just recognized as prerequisite for a meaningful appearance 
in action and speech. ‘The wall originally was identified with this boundary line, 
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which in ancient times was still actual a space, a kind of no man’s land between 
the private and the public, sheltering and protecting both realms while, at the 
same time, separating them from each other. The law of the polis, to be sure, 
transcended this ancient understanding from which, however, it retained its 
original spatial significance. … It was quite literally a wall, without which there 
might have been an agglomeration of houses, a town (asty), but not a city, a 
political community. The wall-like law was sacred, but only the enclosure was 
political.’317 This intriguing perspective thus unites wall-making and law-making 
on their very basis of defining the boundary line, that is important in order to 
define both the public and the private realm. The design and definition, by setting 
the limits, has a major impact on the debates and possibilities. Therefore, Arendt 
argues, ‘it is true that Plato and Aristotle elevated law-making and city-building to 
the highest rank of political life.’318 Interestingly enough, Arendt continues from 
here to discuss the Socratic school, which embraced these activities of legislation 
and foundation. ‘To them, legislating and the execution of decisions by vote are 
the most legitimate political activities because in them “act like craftsman”.’ For 
Arendt this means actually a withdrawing from the intangibilities of action and 
speech, in favour of ‘making (poiēsis), which they prefer because of its greater 
reliability.’319 For Arendt this is once again a response to the unpredictability and 
uncontrollable aspects of action, trying to predict, control, and secure and the 
outcome of political processes. 
Nevertheless, this example shows how intrinsically work and action are 
related, and that the edge between both categories is blurred, or even might be 
rendered as continuous. Architecture in the end might be focussed on the making, 
but a huge part of the profession is less tangible. I will discuss this in the next 
chapter, when I will focus on the more intangible aspects of architecture and 
particularly on the role of the designer. At this point, however, it is good to know 
that architecture of course is about making, about constructing building, but that 
it also is about taking initiatives and launching proposals, which we might parallel 
with action and speech. At least, these aspects of the architectural profession are 
accompanied with action and speech. 
However, Arendt once had urged the writings of Karl Jaspers as ‘spatial’ and 
therefore ‘political’. To think spatially, she argued, is to think politically. Not 
because it is concerned by a specific site, space, or (political) program, but because 
it is bound to the world and the people in it.320 Of course, the spatial in Jaspers 
writings, as well as in her own writings, cannot be brought back to the archi-
tectural matter of space and place, it nevertheless urges the very spatiality that 
is bound to the world and the people in it. The human being is a spatial being, 
bound to space and place. Intervention in space, spaces created for inhibition, 
therefore need to be politically urged. Architecture, by definition, therefore needs 
to be stressed politically, in all events. This particulary is the case, since the 
architectural intervention in space is meant to create room for things to happen. 
Essentially architecture is a profession that not only constructs a place, but also 
creates room to be left open for occupation and appropriation, or to state with the 
formidable title of one of the books of the Dutch architect Herman Hertzberger: to 
create space and to leave room.321 
In a more precise way, this also is what the philosopher Edward Casey puts 
forward as essential to architecture, based on a close reading of the works of the 
French architect Bernard Tschumi, who designed the Parc de La Vilette in Paris 
that I extensively investigated in a previous chapter. Tschumi himself has often 
described his architecture as ‘events’, more a happening than a thing.322 Casey 
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then writes: ‘In the case of architecture an event is not only something that takes 
place (a lieu); it also gives place (donne lieur), gives room for things to happen.’323 
Tschumi himself urged his statement by arguing that architecture is as much 
about the space as about the events that take place in that very space. Having 
that quote in mind, Casey continues by stressing the dynamics of events: there is 
always movement at stake in the ‘events’ that happen in space. 
The American architect Robert Venturi, although stressed differently, also argued 
that the passage is the architectural event, not of architecture itself. As a response 
to modern architectural approaches, which can be characterized by the slogan 
‘form follows function’, and therefore by a design-approach that ideally works 
from the inside outwards, he urges the designer to work in both directions. In 
modern architecture the ideal was a smooth conversion from outside to inside 
and vice versa, which was often symbolized by huge glass walls and the use of 
exterior materials in the interior. Venturi questions this ideal of smoothness by 
stressing the tension that emerge by erecting a wall, by making a division, and 
by creating different conditions. The outer space, the public façade, as one can 
argue obviously, needs another architectural treatment than the intimate space 
of a home on the other side of the wall. The requirements that the interior-space 
request from the ‘wall’ after all are in most cases of a very different order than 
the requirements requested by the space on the other side. As the philosopher 
Roger Scruton argues: ‘the boundaries of the private [realm] … consist in shelter 
and protection, and in the intimate vigilance of inner walls. The inner walls of a 
house are the most important sign of the domestic life that takes place in it. The 
color scheme, pictures, and ornaments tell us how the occupant perceives the 
boundaries of the family. For some, these boundaries are open into another, larger 
world. For others, they provide a mirror, which points always inward, the security 
of home.’324 Venturi thus rightly urges the different conditions of both sides of 
the wall, which of course fit in his ideal of an architecture that is complex and 
that even gives place to contradictions, when he pushes forward the argument on 
designing in both directions. 
‘Designing from the outside in, as well as the inside out, create necessary 
tensions, which help make architecture. Since the inside is different from 
the outside, the wall – the point of change – becomes and architectural 
event. Architecture occurs at the meeting of interior and exterior forces of 
use and space. These interior and environmental forces are both general and 
particular, generic and circumstantial. Architecture as the wall between the 
inside and the outside becomes the spatial record of this resolution and its 
drama.’325 
The wall is a moment of change. The very materiality and spatiality of the wall 
mediates between the outside and the inside, whereas the particular architecture 
articulates the moment of distinction, passage, and tension. We might argue that 
beyond the wall, it is the door, the window, the threshold that go beyond that 
event.326 After all, the designing of architecture is more than just giving form 
to space or material, it is making divisions between spaces and giving place, 
structure, and order to things. Of course, it is only by means of that division – 
the wall – that space, the place, is created, with a spatial condition of its own.327 
But if it is the wall that unites within itself the tension between the private and 
the public, between indoors and outdoors, this only really becomes visible in the 
window, and felt in the door. There, on the threshold and in the movement of the 
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door, and by the very passage of the threshold, the essence of the entire archi-
tectural construction is concentrated. Not only the boundary is penetrated here, 
but it also becomes accessible and can be crossed. This is where the conditions 
of indoors and outdoors collide, without there being any material to intercept 
that collision. The threshold, in other words, is the articulation of the capacity of 
objects to connect, whereas the wall is the articulation of separation. Together 
they might articulate the essence of architecture: to connect and separate at 
once. This phrase certainly reminds us of the very essence of the world, in 
Arendt’s perspective, which also has the capacity to connect and separate at once. 
Architecture here thus comes to the fore as the very intervention in the world 
that is able to enhance that capacity of the world (although also the flipside is 
completely clear too: it also can disturb the capacity of the world to connect and 
to separate). However, we now also have gained the insight of another perspective 
of Arendt, the very space of appearance. It requires, we can state, a ‘space’, a 
movement through that space, to appear. This threshold-space in-between the one 
condition (of withdrawal) and the other (of appearance) necessary is a tangible 
space, a liminal space in-between. It is this tangibility of the liminal space that 
generates the alteration from one condition to another, as well making this 
alteration tangible. It is through such a passage of a threshold-space that Arendt’s 
appearance amongst peers gets tangibility. As previously argued: the safety and 
security of the private and the blinding light of the public need each other, and 
they are inseparably connected by the door and the threshold. This is not only 
an architectural image, but it is the very architectural moment beyond the space 
of appearance. The space of appearance requires articulation of the particular 
conditions, which is the very chance of architectural intervention. Architecture 
is able to articulate the very moment of transition, and with that it is able to urge 
awareness of this moment, of appearance in public. 
This address of the wall as a moment of change, a matter of space, time and 
tension, reminds us of the description of Arendt of the wall that circumscribed 
the public realm in the polis, as already quoted previously. Arendt of course urges 
the public face of that wall, since this exterior is important for the city. However, 
its first function was to demarcate the private, to hide the interior of the private 
realm, which has no public significance. She then writes that the exterior 
‘appears in the realm of the city through the boundaries between one 
household and the other. The wall originally was identified with this boundary 
line, which in ancient times was still actual a space, a kind of no man’s land 
between the private and the public, sheltering and protecting both realms 
while, at the same time, separating them from each other.’328 
Also in this perspective, the moment of passage is a moment of space and time: 
the threshold is urged as in-between, as a no-mans-land: it therefore neither 
belongs to the public or private. Transgressing the boundary, we might think, was 
literally an event, a passage from the public to the private, or an appearance from 
the private into the public. In his reflections on the threshold, Dutch philosopher 
Cornelis Verhoeven discusses the Roman word for threshold, ‘limen’. According to 
him, ‘sublimis’, which means ‘exalted’, derives from ‘super limen’ and thus has a 
connection with the step over the threshold.329 ‘Sublime’ is what the experience of 
stepping over the threshold might be, moving from the private domain, from the 
very own spot in the world, and stepping into the public world, as well as coming 
home. Sublime is the experience beyond the edge. The threshold and the door 
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symbolize this – they give it space, articulate the transition and tension. A line 
that becomes space. 
It is remarkable how close Arendt’s reflections on the private domain are to 
Adolf Loos’s ideas about living in the modern metropolis (around 1900). The 
Viennese architect emphasizes the boundary between public and private, and 
turns it into a feature, to shield the interior from public life. The dividing line 
between public and private, between inside and outside, is once again sacred. 
The house offers a platform and an enclosure to accommodate the vicissitudes of 
family life. Expressionless and inaccessible, the house defends itself against the 
constant flux and transience of public life. At the same time, Loos plays a complex 
game with this boundary, by placing the most intimate spaces directly behind the 
façade and by offering a view of the entrance, while blocking the outside view in 
other, less intimate spaces.330
However, threshold spaces are not only to be found at the façade, at one’s 
doorstep, but actually also can be found within the sphere of the city. In the 
modern city, however, as J.B. Jackson has argued, the threshold is fading away, 
along with the the ‘rites of passage’ that accompanied once these moments 
of passage. In his critique on the modern design of cities, which aim towards 
smoothness and equality, he urges the importance of differences: 
‘But the real consequence of the rebuilding of our cities is not architec-
tural: it is the emphasis on accessibility, the gradual but total destruction 
of the distinction between the life of the street and the life lived behind the 
façade. What has taken place is the elimination of those immemorial rites 
of passage that were once the hallmarks of our culture. Those architectural 
monuments – the church, the university, the office or place of work, the public 
building, the restricted residential area, all once characterized by a degree 
of isolation and internal privacy, are now wide open and accessible to the 
street. The elimination of rites of passage started modesty enough with the 
drive-in business. Then the territory became a parking lot; the church became 
a building open to all, offering instant salvation; the library let us into the 
stacks; the public building welcomed us with consumer-friendly decorations; 
the supermarket did away with clerks; the hospital let us wander at will. The 
doorman, the receptionist, the head waiter, the host all vanished, and the only 
rite of passage that survived was the insertion of a magnetized credit card.’331 
A certain urge also comes to the fore in the intriguing study Een Drempelwereld 
Dutch philosopher René Boomkens, although this perspective might be typified 
as a bit more hopeful. Boomkens urges the importance of the threshold, partic-
ularly as an ambivalent space between the public and the private. Against the 
background of a city and landscape that challenges both the public and the 
private realm, the in-between space offers the openness for ‘a collection of urban 
practices’. These practices that Boomkens urge as important for public life, might 
very well consist of the marginal practices in front of garages, on parking lots, or 
at street-sides, alike those that Margaret Crawford has described in her article 
‘Everyday Urbanism’. These are not the regular and official ‘rituals’, that often 
are described as the public life. This not immediately seems to be the ‘appearance 
in action and speech’, nor as the ‘exchange of ideas’, but it is these practices that 
offer the possibility of appearance and of exchange. It is these practices that 
thicken our understanding of the world, by their very visibility of plurality and 
temporality. As Crawford writes, the marginal spaces that are occupied by ‘street 
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vendors and garage sales, in the often illegal demarcation of specific uses, in 
temporal events, and so on, … continuously change meaning. [They] are contin-
uously reorganized and reinterpret by users (obviously even the seasons does 
affect this).'332 Although, Crawford argues, these spaces often are perceived in 
distraction, and therefore do not easily reveal their meaning for public life, their 
meaning however unfolds through the repetitious acts of everyday life. The spaces 
are not symbolically representative, neither are they architecturally outspoken 
or articulated – it is nevertheless these marginal, or threshold spaces, that offer 
meaning and diversity to the contemporary city.333 As Boomkens argues: ‘The 
threshold space is the domain where the modern experience can actually take 
place as an open and unpredictable connection between the modern individual’s 
free development and his individual identity’s incorporation into an open network 
of meaningful collective contexts, the mass culture of the urban public domain. 
Modern experience depends on the survival of the association between and the 
relative autonomy of the private and the public sphere. It will be doomed if one of 
them tips the scales.’334  
6.4.6  To Feel Out Space
As we have defined the wall and thresholds as architectural events par excellence, 
we nevertheless might define the purpose of architecture as the spaces and places 
that are created by these events. Walls, floors, roofs, terraces, windows, doors, 
stairs, balconies – all these architectural elements are contributing towards a 
certain demarcation of edges and boundaries that by their very intervention create 
different possibilities. The more defined the space is, the more it can be controlled 
in form, in climate, in sphere, in appearance, and, to some degree, in use. Thus, 
the more defined space is, the more it is controlled ‘top-down’. Vice versa this 
also seems reasonable: the more ambiguous spaces are (less clearly defined and 
controlled), the more open they are for occupation and appropriation by the users. 
However, to formulate ‘space’ as the purpose of architecture has not been common 
in architectural theory until the 19th century. Of course, previously the aim of 
architecture was to create space too, but space itself was seen as void, somehow 
the residue of the architectural treatment of the outer walls. The architectural 
historian Adrian Forty in his excellent book Words and Buildings, calls the first 
approach to ‘space’ in architecture, that originally comes up with the attempt of 
the German architect Gottfried Semper.335 Semper is the first to introduce the 
term ‘space’ in the field of architecture during the 1890s. This notion, like the 
notion of ‘time’ as well, thus is intimately connected with the development of 
modernism, as a tool to distinguish the modern from the traditional or classical 
approaches.336 Semper suggest that the material in architecture, the walls, the 
facades, the floor, the ceiling, is secondary to space. ‘The wall,’ he wrote, ‘is that 
architectural element that formally represents and makes visible the enclosed 
space.’337 Adrian Forty shows that the notion Semper and his contemporaries 
actually discuss as ‘enclosed space’ is the German word ‘Raum’, the term that also 
is stressed by Martin Heidegger as we’ve touched upon. In the German language, 
however, ‘Raum’ not only signifies a material enclosure but also describes a phil-
osophical category, a property of the mind.338 Through the translation of ‘Raum’ 
into the English ‘space’, Forty suggests, certain ambiguity in the everyday usage of 
the term in the field was roused. However, as Forty states, Semper might depend 
upon the theory of aesthetics of the philosopher Hegel, since ‘enclosed space’ in 
Hegel’s theory was a matter of functionality, and therefore distinct from the ability 
of aesthetics and idea-bearing, specifically in architecture.339 Hegel thus suggests 
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that material, and it’s structure, composition, textures, it’s beauty represents 
ideas, but space in itself lacks the ability to be representative. When Semper thus 
suggests that ‘space’ is the future of architecture, he immediately but implicitly 
questions the role of representation in architecture. As Forty shows, these aspects 
are addressed in different lines – and as we will see, in both of these lines the 
bodily experience of space is central too – that emerges from the German debate 
at the closing of the 19th century as well. First is a perspective that is derived from 
Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason, in which he emphasized space, 
indeed, as a completely philosophical category, a capacity of the mind. This idea 
is propelled in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, who defines space as a ‘force field 
generated by the dynamism of bodily movement.’340 The third line of approach 
actually starts with the philosopher Theordor Lipps, who emphasize space as 
being a dematerialized object. ‘The beauty of spatial forms is my ability to live out 
an ideal sense of free movement in it.’341
This idea of space as ‘enclosure’ is often is taken as the model for architecture, 
as for instance in influential book Architecture as Space of the Italian historian 
Bruno Zevi. Zevi emphasizes architecture as distinct from other professions and 
cultural fields specifically because of its spatiality. Of course, other cultural fields 
do work in three dimensions, but only architecture, he suggests, dwells upon the 
relationship of the three dimensions with the human body. ‘Painting functions 
in two dimensions,’ he writes, ‘even if it can suggest three or four. Sculpture 
works in three dimensions, but man remains apart, looking on from the outside. 
Architecture, however, is like a great hollowed-out sculpture which man enters 
and apprehends by moving about within it.’342 In other words, what architecture 
distinguishes from other fields is inhabitation of space and sculpture. It offers 
a different object-subject relationship, which acknowledges this occupation and 
inhabitation as a bodily experience of space. Zevi strongly emphasizes that this 
experience is a bodily experience – space only can be grasped, and architecture 
only can be understood through this experience of the body. Space influences 
the bodily senses, architecture thus only reveals through sum of our sensorial 
experiences.343 
Zevi here actually opposes a tradition of architectural history that focuses 
on the material and compositional aspects of architecture, but in the meantime 
overlooks its very spatiality – all these approaches that classify the structure, the 
order, the composition, the façade, the decoration – as well as theorists judging 
architecture from fields like sociology, philosophy, politics and so on, but also in 
the meantime overlooking the very specific character of architecture, lacking to 
understand that architecture develops and communicates knowledge through 
projects in time. Zevi is quick to state that the value of architecture is not limited 
to space per se, but indeed additionally can be judged through fields of economics, 
social sciences, technics, and even approached through ethics, functionality, and 
decorative arts. His aim, nevertheless, is that every judgement of architecture 
specifically should acknowledge its spatiality, specifically as ‘interior space’, he 
adds. The bodily experience, in this respect, thus means ‘moving about within 
the building.’344 He therefore remarkably but very explicitly excludes from the 
domain of architecture these forms of constructions that do not enclose spaces: 
the obelisk, the monument, and the bridge,345 as well as the images of buildings 
that precedes the building-process, the models and sketches, drawings and 
renderings, that he only renders as representations of architecture, not being 
architecture itself. The first category we had at hand previously, in discussing the 
role of remembrance as a particular aspect of the arts, which also has a strong 
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relationship with works that can be counted as architectural. On the second I 
will come back to in the next chapter, since these products of architectural work 
somehow represent the more intangible period of architectural processes, which 
find their parallel in action and speech. What is, however, the importance of Zevi’s 
limitation of architecture to enclosed space, is his argument that we only can talk 
about architecture in the sense of the experience of space, which should be materi-
alized since it is in no other way can be communicated, showed, and revealed. He 
admits that this interior-space, to which he limits architecture, not exclusively is 
the interior of a building. It can very well  be urban space as well. ‘The experience 
of space … has its extension in the city, in the streets, squares, alleys and parks, in 
the playgrounds and in the gardens, wherever man has defined or limited a void 
and so has created an enclosed space.’346 Interior space thus, in Zevi’s vocabulary, 
means enclosed space. 
However, his statement on the representation of architecture, which can never 
reveal the qualities of the ‘real’ architectural spaces it represents, brings him 
close to both Adolf Loos, Steen Eiler Rasmussen, as well as our contemporaries 
like Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Steven Holl and Juhani Pallasmaa, who all argue in 
different words that architecture will only reveal in movement, at the moment 
of entering a space, moving from one condition to the other. This perspective 
actually, in all moment in time, critiques a certain omnipresent approach to archi-
tecture, and particular architectural representation, that limits it to the realm of 
visible perception. Architecture, as we can recognize today, often is represented 
by sublime photos or renderings, often at twilight, when the sky has a particular 
luminosity, that is reflected in the building. The lights are on, the building shines 
out in its immediate surroundings. The photographer or those who were setting 
up the render, have found the perfect spots around the building to enlighten the 
particularities and the genius of the design. Such a series of images address the 
building as a whole, their aim is to articulate the particular shapes of exterior and 
interior. However, these images don’t necessarily represent how the building  is 
experienced in reality.347 Not only, since buildings are regularly walked past in 
distraction, as we have seen in the previous chapter, but also the experience of 
building is always limited to particular parts of it. We might see one façade, but 
don’t see the other three. We might see it from the street, but not in bird’s eye 
perspective. We might see the entrance hall, the atrium, a corridor and an office 
space, but we don’t see these spaces in connection to the other levels or wings of 
the building, the board room, the canteen, etc. . Our everyday experience of the 
built environment is, if not distracted, than certainly fragmented. Nevertheless, 
this fragmented and distracted experience is not limited to the visual.  
The architectural critic Mark Wigley, in an issue of the Berlin based journal 
Daidalos dedicated to the theme ‘athmosphere’ has urged bodily experiences as 
the ‘central objective of the architect’.348 Atmosphere is the term that comprises 
the different perceptive qualities of a space. However, atmosphere in itself is a 
problematic issue, Wigley admits: it entails by definition a certain ambiguity. 
The experience of a particular atmosphere is personal: the experience seems to 
differ from person to person. It therefore is difficult to capture, and particularly 
impossible to design. Experiences until a certain level can be designed, as the 
engineers behind theme parks and their ‘event-architecture’ show. This never-
theless is not so much the perspective Wigley has in mind, when he urges the 
profession to revisit this term. Indeed, atmosphere until that moment somehow 
was neglected in the debates on architecture and its merits. It nevertheless also 
is a recurring topic: Stimmung has been urged in Romanticism, it has been 
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part of the legacy of Adolf Loos, it was addressed by the Danish architect Steen 
Eiler Rasmussen in the seventies, and at the end of the nineties, at the climax of 
conceptual architecture, it emerges again as a critical note to the then current 
objective of architecture. 
Today the emphasis on atmosphere is a response to the omnipresent stress 
on the visual aspects of architecture. As touched upon before, the aesthetic 
approach that crowds the profession leads to an emphasis on the appearance of 
the building, which comes to the fore in the nice renderings and photographs that 
are used to present buildings.349 Pallasmaa argues that the limitation of architec-
ture to a graspable image is also limiting the understanding of architecture. ‘We 
become voyeurs obsessed with visuality, blind not only to architecture’s social 
reality but also to its functional, economic, and technological realities, which 
inevitably determine the design of buildings and cities. Our detachment from 
experiential sensory reality maroons us in theoretical, intellectual, and conceptual 
realms.’350
 In an issue of the magazine OASE on the theme of atmosphere, 15 years after the 
publication of Daidalos, the German philosopher Gernot Böhme – who had also 
contributed to the Daidalos-publication previously – defined atmosphere as ‘the 
space of mindful physical presence into which one enters or finds oneself, owing 
to the type of experience involved.’351 He added that the relationship between 
space and the experience of space is particularly loose. ‘Sensitivity’, he writes, 
‘hinges on the sense one has of the space where one is. Needless to say, space is 
not just my sense of it, namely the mood. The space also has an objective consti-
tution and much of what belongs to it is not part of my sensitivity. And likewise 
how I feel is not only defined by my sensing where I am, as my own mood always 
comes into play, and my body constantly brings forth feelings that shape my 
condition.’352 However, since the atmosphere if the space affects the body and 
mind, it is important to take atmosphere seriously – even if it cannot be controlled 
nor prescribed. 
The impressive book Attunement of the Canadian theorist Alberto Pérez-
Gómez, who we already touched upon, also takes this notion of atmosphere, in 
order to urge the relationship between architecture, location in the world and 
its inhabitants. He adds to what already has been described that atmosphere 
is neither objective nor totally subjective.353 It’s there, and it evokes bodily 
sensations, while how these sensations come together has a close relationship 
with previous experiences of the human being at hand. ‘The authenticity of archi-
tectural experience,’ Pallasmaa writes, ‘is grounded in the tectonic language of 
building and the comprehensibility of the act of construction to the senses, We 
behold, touch, listen and measure the world with our entire bodily existence, 
and the experiential world is organized and articulated around the center of the 
body.’354 Atmosphere indeed is perceived in sensible ways, but this perception is 
evoked by the tectonic language of the building – that is by the strong relationship 
between the spatial, material, constructional, structural and tactile qualities. In 
other words, how all the different aspects of architecture come together and form 
a whole. In the experience of space, it is the experience of a totality, where colour 
and tactile aspects of the used materials work together with the spatial structure 
and the spatial composition.  
Spaces certainly evoke particular atmospheres and images to the inhabitants and 
users. These images are particularly grasped and explored in literature or film, 
where the atmosphere of a room is used to construct the right mood for events 
349.
In his book The Sympathy of Things 
the Dutch architect Lars Spuybroek 
also stresses the lack of ‘experience’ 
in architecture, through the limitation 
of architecture to the visual aspects. 
He stresses experience mostly as 
a quality of aesthetics, which he, 
with references to amongst others, 
John Ruskin wants to re-introduce 
in architecture. His architectural 
aim is to develop a certain renewed 
gothic understanding in architecture, 
where decoration and structure 
merge, where the ribs of a column can 
transform in the girder of the arch. 
‘We reached a point where the body 
and its experience became totally 
irrelevant,’ he writes, ‘merely an 
experience to personally “have”, 
like a dirty secret. We have become 
completely alienated from the 
aesthetic in its original meaning, 
which simply concerns the feelings 
we have in the presence of designed 
things, be they paintings or teapots. 
There is no hope for a little repair 
work being enough. So much has been 
destroyed and neglected that we will 
have to reconstruct a whole edifice 
and learn to speak a language nobody 
understands anymore, and simply 
keep on speaking it until we are 
heard.’ Lars Spybroek, The Sympathy 
of Things, Ruskin and the Ecology of 
Design (Rotterdam: V2_Publishing/
NAi Publishers, 2011), 145-146
350.
Juhani Pallasmaa, ‘Toward and Archi-
tecture of Humility, On the Value of 
Experience’, in: Willima S. Saunders 
(ed.), Judging Architectural Value, 
A Harvard Design Magazine Reader 
(Minneapolis/London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007), 99
351.
Gernot Böhme, ‘Atmosphere as 
Mindful Physical Presence in Space’, 
in: Klaske Havik, Gus Tielens, 
and Hans Teerds, (eds.), Building 
Atmosphere, OASE #91 (Rotterdam: 
nai010 Publishers, 2013), 27
352.
Ibid., 27
353.
Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Attunement, 
Architectural Meaning after the 
Crisis of Modern Science (Cambridge 
(Mass.)/London: MIT Press, 2016), 18
354.
Pallasmaa, ‘Architecture of the Seven 
Senses’, 34
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 6: WORLD
499
that (are going to) happen. As Klaske Havik writes in her startling book Urban 
Literacy ‘Literary writers prove to be able to read places and spaces, cities and 
landscapes at different levels. Seen from the point of view of literary characters 
with their own memories and emotions, space in literature is almost by definition 
“lived” space.’355 These atmospheres, as we all know, are momentary: the same 
space in a movie is different when the film-music swells, as do the voices, the 
breath of person, and so on, or if darkness falls, and only a few lights are turned 
on. Coming home in darkness offers a different experience than coming home in 
a totally enlightened entrance hall. We thus might argue there is no law-of-per-
ception: this architectural tectonics evoke an experience that is both ambiguous 
and instable, strongly related to the matter of time and temporalities.356 The Swiss 
architect Peter Zumthor, in whose work the theme of atmosphere is explicitly 
stressed, argues that the human capacity to respond to atmosphere works straight 
away. ‘We are capable,’ he writes in his book Atmospheres, ‘of immediate appre-
ciation, of a spontaneous emotional response, of rejecting things in a flash.’357 
Zumthor thus somehow locates the receptive knowledge within the human body, 
a certain instinct that is needed to survive. This somehow corresponds to how 
Juhani Pallasmaa urges the human body as a receptor of knowledge – and if it 
functions well, also of responses. ‘We are connected with the world through our 
senses,’ he writes. ‘The sense are not merely passive receptors of stimuli, and the 
body is not only a point of viewing the world from a central perspective. Neither is 
the head the sole locus of cognitive thinking, as our sense and entire bodily being 
directly structure, produce and store silent existential knowledge. The human 
body is a knowing entity.’358  As is clear in Zumthor’s stress of the immediate 
capacity of the human body to respond to differences, as enhanced through 
the remark of Pallasmaa on the body as a knowing entity, we might argue that 
atmosphere always presupposes a certain motion by a human body. Even sitting 
in a room, the experience of that very space is in movement, before one sits, after 
all, one has entered the room, has walked to that chair, and has been seated. But 
even from that very moment on, motion is involved: feeling our heart beating, 
blinking our eyes, putting our hand on the elbow-rest, turning the page of a book, 
a conversation that goes on. And in the meantime, light and temperature slightly 
change, particularly if there is a direct connection with other spaces and the world 
outside. Our body again and again adapts to the change in atmosphere – in short 
how the architectural tectonics appear to us. 
However, the moment atmosphere reveals itself most strongly is the very 
moment of crossing a threshold. This moment of transition, as I called it 
previously, is the transition from one sphere into another, the appearance in 
public or the coming home at home. Such a passage is not a static moment, 
everything changes, often even the mood. The human being appears in the 
world, amongst peers, or one discloses himself from the world, and comes home 
amongst the familiar persons and things. This is a moment of movement, from 
one sphere into another, across thresholds. Such an ‘entrance’ into the world 
or vice versa is not just a mental moment of transition between our private and 
public lives, it is also something more basic: a physical and physiological moment 
of transition. Imagine that very moment of entering the home: Our eyes have 
to blink momentarily; the sound changes, as do the smells. Still holding the 
doorknob in one hand, we reach for the light switch, look for the mail, take off a 
jacket, put away a bag. All of our senses are alert. Earlier experiences, memories 
stored in our bodies, come to the fore. The distinctive aspect in this description 
of bodily experience of space and transition, of limits and movement is the inter-
mediate relationship of specifically physical and concrete aspects with other 
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intangible aspects that are virtually aroused. ‘As we enter an architectural space,’ 
McCarter and Pallasmaa write, ‘an immediate unconscious projection, identifi-
cation and exchange takes place; we occupy the space and the space settles in us. 
We grasp the space through our senses and we measure it with our bodies and 
movements. We project our body scheme, personal memories and meanings into 
the space; the space extends the experience of our bodies beyond our skin, and 
the physical space and our mental spaces fuse with each other.’359 We feel out the 
space, physically, physiologically and mentally. We take its measure and taste 
the atmosphere. In a single perception, the space impresses itself upon us, and 
reveals its reality. ‘The sensory experience of space normally arises from visual 
boundaries, light and shadow, but also the echo of a space, as well as the haptic 
and olfactory qualities that contribute greatly to the experiences of monumen-
tality or intimacy, harshness or affability, rejection or invitation.’360 The bodily 
experience of this form and formation of spaces, it is the experience of the space at 
once. 
Also the American architect Steven Holl, who in his career shifted from a 
typological approach of architecture towards one concentrated on the sensorial 
experience of space, argues that ‘architecture holds the power to inspire and 
transform our day-to-day existence. The everyday act of pressing a door handle 
and opening into a light-washed room can become profound when experienced 
through sensitized consciousness. To see, to feel these physicalities is to become 
the subject of the senses.’361 Although the atmosphere of the space can be 
ambiguous and temporal, we might argue, the experience nevertheless can be 
lasting. Many people are reminded of certain happenings in spaces by simple 
things like a particular piece of music, a certain smell, or even a certain touch. 
This lasting presence of the experience of atmosphere, Pérez-Gómez argues, 
only will happen if form and material – architectural tectonics – articulate the 
appropriate intention of that very space.362 Also Holl underlines the close rela-
tionship between architecture as building, that is: as distinct from the arts, from 
a purely aesthetic approach, and the staying power of architectural atmosphere. 
He first argues that ‘architecture, more fully than other art forms, engages the 
immediacy of our sensory perceptions. The passage of time; light, shadow and 
transparency; color phenomena, texture, materials and detail all participate in 
the complete experience of architecture.’363 He then also distinguishes architec-
ture from natural sciences. ‘Questions of architectural perception,’ he continues, 
‘underlie questions of intention. The “intentionality” sets architecture apart 
from a pure phenomenology that is manifest for the natural sciences. Whatever 
the perception of a built work – whether it be troubling, intriguing, or banal 
– the mental energy which produced it is ultimately deficient unless intent is 
articulated.’364  
The Swiss architect Peter Zumthor, in his will to capture the intangibilities 
of atmosphere in the previously mentioned book, urges a few aspects that are 
important in architectural design, which somehow can be summarized as a 
thoughtful approach to space, structure, material and the tactility of the material. 
He urges issues such as sound and smell, temperature and the surroundings, 
but also a certain tension between interior and exterior, between composure 
and seduction, differences in intimacy, and particularly also how the light falls. 
In his practice, he actually urges a different way of design – his employees, as 
is described in the extensive interview that is published in the OASE issue on 
Atmosphere, need to un-learn everything learned in architecture schools: that is, 
to rationally discuss design interventions. ‘I think it is a pity that the education of 
architects is so academic and based on rhetoric: in many cases, it does not connect 
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to the real work. Architects coming from the university make drawings, but they 
don’t really know what they are doing. They know how it looks in reality, how it 
will be, how it sounds, and so forth. I think this is not good for the profession of 
architecture.’365 Zumthor clearly believes that atmosphere only can be achieved, 
when the actual architectural design is evoked by intuition and a sensibility to 
the design itself. This approach today is exceptional. Modern architects try to 
objectify design-choices, even if they are trivial, they are presented by series of 
schemes where all decisions are granted a certain logic.366 Atmosphere, since it is 
ungraspable and partly subjective, has been a difficult phenomenon for modern 
architects, particularly since architectural schools urge students to rationalize and 
objectify their design processes.367   
This quite recent debate in architecture on atmosphere somehow does remind 
us of the urgency Arendt ascribes to the sensible perception of the art work. A 
sensible perception, I would argue, always is spatial and, as I stressed, in motion. 
After all, it addresses not only sight, but also the other senses, which makes it a 
spatial experience. The motion-part is clearly important as somehow this comes to 
the fore when Arendt starts to address the activity of thinking, in what was meant 
to be a study on thinking, willing, and judging, The Life of the Mind, but this was 
not finished due to her death. As we have already seen, Arendt starts to embed 
the activity of thinking not in the world of ideas and theory, but in the tangible 
world, which is evoked by experiences. At this point Arendt follows the French 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, although she already previously, like in The 
Human Condition, argues that thinking needs to be evoked by the humble and 
stumble of the world. She understands the thinking capacity as evoked by things 
happening, in the midst of the world. To be engaged, she argued, to be involved 
in the hustle and bustle of the world, is the incentive of thinking. Thinking is not 
roused by grasping some sort of truth beyond the world, it is not setting up a 
(closed) theory, but is roused by the world itself, by actualities, and by everyday 
occurrences, but mostly by happenings that strike our view, breath and senses. 
Arendt in The Life of the Mind stresses the importance of the five senses. In 
order to set up her argument, Arendt reflects upon the famous statement of 
Descartes on the relationship between thinking, being and certainty. But where 
he finds certainty about the world in the activity of thinking itself, Arendt argues 
that it is our senses that deliver us this certainty. When our senses are touched 
all together and all at once, when we are thrilled in a kind of literal sense, all 
sensuous experiences resemble a sort of a sixth sense, which is the sense of the 
world, the sense of reality. In other words, we are not aware of the world by one 
or other theoretical leap, but that we are assured of the reality of the world by the 
combination of smell, taste, view, hearing and touch. The world becomes real to 
us through these senses, it lifts our confidence about the reality of the world. 
Of course, it is not only our single and singular experience that informs and 
assures us about the reality of the world. Once again Arendt places the single 
human being in the midst of the community. This is an important move – most 
architectural theorists urge the individual experience, but forget to bring that 
back to the world and its inhabitants. But this is an utterly important move, in 
order to get struck in to all the personal little things that pop up. We are assured 
when we experience the single object with our five senses (and although different 
experiences, we grasp it as one identity)
‘In a world of appearances, filled with error and semblance, reality is 
guaranteed by this three-fold commonness: the five senses, utterly different 
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from each other, have the same object in common; members of the same 
species have the context in common that endows every single object with its 
particular meaning; and all other sense-endowed beings, through perceiving 
this object from utterly different perspectives, agree on its identity. Out of this 
threefold commonness arises the sensation of reality.’368 
There it is: others should agree on the meaning and identity of the object that is 
experience. What is important at this point is not just that we only can assure us 
from reality if we are part of a larger community, it is also that the perspectives in 
the community are different: we are at different points, looking at the same object. 
Arendt elsewhere emphasizes the importance of a different standpoint, of differ-
entiation. Plurality, she argues, is the heart of mankind, and thus our perspective 
of the same object is different. But only through the different perspectives, we can 
grasp the object, grasp reality. 
This remark by Arendt urges us to broaden the discussion in architecture. Often, 
as can be clearly seen upon above, the perspective on atmosphere is drawn 
via the single body experiencing space. Arendt somehow only takes this single 
experience seriously if it is mirrored to the public experiences. The reality of the 
world, to which architecture as we might conclude by now, can contribute as no 
other object(s), only is assured if the single experience is emphasized in public. 
Pallasmaa argues for instance that the phenomenal perception of architecture 
makes us aware of our own solitude.369 Architecture definitely can do, but it will 
enrich this experience by also putting the human being, the visitor, the user, the 
inhabitant, back in the world. As Steven Holl states his agenda: ‘the challenge 
for architecture is … to heighten experience while simultaneously expressing 
meaning; and to develop this duality in response to the particularities of site and 
circumstances.’370 Something similar is urged by Pérez-Gómez, when he states 
that ‘excellent architecture, one that may reveal life as purposeful, accommodates 
the space of desire without trying to foreclose it. … It accommodates and furthers 
the appropriate moods for focal actions … that allow humans the possibilities of 
being present.’371 
6.4.7	 Infinite	Diversity	
The possibility of being present of course is at the very heart of Arendt’s writings. 
Being present is appearing in public. Public space is characterized not only 
by the plurality of people appearing into it, but is itself, as we have seen, also 
characterized by objects that have a shape of their own, and that in their terms 
offer plurality as the very image of public space as well. ‘Nothing perhaps is 
more surprising in this world of ours,’ Arendt states, ‘than the almost infinite 
diversity of its appearances, the sheer entertainment value of its views, sounds, 
and smells.’372 However, the appearance of objects, and our perception of these 
objects, is questioned in philosophy since Descartes finds the only possible ground 
to say something about reality is not in reality itself, but only in his thinking. 
Reality could only be described as ‘it seems to me’. Arendt, in The Life of the 
Mind starts to discuss Descartes position, also because she is eager to overcome 
his singular and subjective position. The public as reference of the perception of 
reality is important to Arendt.  
Arendt in The Human Condition stresses this appearance in the world as an 
act of the will, for which a certain courage is required. In The Life of the Mind 
Arendt nevertheless stresses appearing in public as an urge, which she recognized 
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in all living things, men and animals simultaneously. ‘The urge toward self-dis-
play – to respond by showing to the overwhelming effect of being shown – seems 
to be common to men and animals,’ she writes. She then continues to stress once 
again the importance of the world. ‘And just as the actor depends upon stage, 
fellow-actors, and spectators, to make his entrance, every living thing depends 
upon a world that solidly appears as the location for its own appearance, on 
fellow-creatures to play with, and on spectators to acknowledge and recognize its 
existence.’373 Without the world (and its inhabitants), there would not be a proper 
place of action and speech, there would be no place of appearance. Without the 
world, there is nobody that can be met, nothing to be seen and heard, no one that 
can see and hear. It is the world that is the proper place, for the human being to 
appear on stage. This ‘urge of self-display’ is at this point in Arendt’s writings, 
the very distinction between the living beings and lifeless matter. Only the living 
being is possessed, as she writes, by an urge of self-display. This urge to appear 
in public, or amongst species that recognize this appearance, ‘answers the fact of 
one’s own appearingness,’ Arendt writes. ‘Living things make their appearance 
like actors on a stage set for them. The stage is common to all who are alive, but 
it seems different to each species, different also to each individual specimen.’374 
In accordance with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pérez-Gomez urges appearance of 
the human being not so much as an urge, but as a desire. The ‘distinctly human 
desire’, he writes, ‘is a “desire for desire, or desire for recognition.”. This desire for 
recognition is precisely what motivates Hannah Arendt’s “space of appearance,” 
the fundamental characteristic of public space and the kernel of architecture.’375 
When urging public space as the kernel of architecture, we might once again 
take the metaphor of the table, and the appearance of guests around it that join 
the conversation. As stated previously, the very revealing aspect of this image is 
not only that the table connects and separates simultaneously, but also that the 
very seating of people around it shows in tangible ways the different perspectives 
the participants bring to the table. They look from different perspectives, they 
contribute from a different place and their voice sounds from another angle. In 
other words, the participants each occupy a different place. For Arendt this is 
important, since only these multitude of views together can reveal something 
of the world. The very moment Arendt starts to think through the activity of 
thinking, this multitude of views becomes important again for Arendt. 
Also in The Life of the Mind, Arendt urges this aspect, when she argues that the 
singular perspective somehow stays in the dark. In her words: ‘Seeming – the 
it-seems-to-me, dokei moi – is the mode, perhaps the only possible one, in which 
an appearing world is acknowledged and perceived.’376 This also is the way we 
appear in the world: when we appear, we seem to others. However, how we 
‘seem to others’ is varied, it depends on the standpoint of the spectators – where 
the others sit at the table. It is not that all these perspectives together form the 
reality, that the different ‘seeming perspectives’ together lose their ‘seeming’ 
character. ‘Every appearing thing acquires, by virtue of its appearingness, a kind 
of disguise that may indeed – but does not have to – hide or disfigure it. Seeming 
corresponds to the fact that every appearance, its identity notwithstanding, is 
perceived by a plurality of spectators.’377 What distinguishes the human being 
from the other living beings of course is the appearance in action and speech, 
which is not only an appearance as a mere ‘surface’, or form, but also reveals 
something of the inner life of the human being, of the world-of-thoughts. This 
point shows exactly that the appearance in public is not only a matter of desire, it 
definitely is also something of will. One only stands up and speaks if one finds its 
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opinion fit for to be shared publicly. ‘This element of deliberate choice in what to 
show and what to hide seems specifically human. Up to a point we can choose how 
to appear to others and this appearance is by no means the outward manifestation 
of an inner dispositions; if it were, we probably would all act and speak alike. …. 
Distinction and individuation occur through speech, the use of verbs and nouns, 
and these are not products or “symbols” of the soul but of the mind.’378
The perspective upon the reality of the world Arendt sketches here depends upon 
what Merleau-Ponty has called ‘perceptual faith’: the certainty about appearance 
of other objects and our perception of them, is supported by our own appearance 
and others perceiving us. The importance here is that this ‘faith’ opens a path 
to acknowledge a shared perception of the same object, although from different 
perspectives. Moreover, this also means that the perceiving subject does not have 
to be afraid that the world is only an illusion (as is the very reason Descartes 
developed his famous ground for assurance of reality in the thinking-self), and 
that the different senses betrays the perceiving subject. On the contrary, the 
perceptual faith urges the five senses as working closely together, and that from 
this sensible perception, the realty of the world unfolds. 
‘The reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which 
includes others who perceive as I do, on the one hand, and by working 
together of my five senses on the other. What since Thomas Aquinas we call 
common sense, the sensus communis, is a kind of sixth sense needed to keep 
my five senses together and guarantee that it is the same object that I see, 
touch, taste, smell, and hear; it is the “one faculty [that extends to all objects of 
the five senses.”’ 379 
The sensus communis is important here: 
‘This same sense, a mysterious “sixth sense” because it cannot be localized as 
a bodily organ, fits the sensations of my strictly private five senses – so private 
that sensations in their mere sensational quality and intensity are incom-
municable – into a common world shared by others. The subjectivity of the 
it-seems-to-me is remedied by the fact that the same object also appears to 
others though its mode of appearance may be different. … Though each single 
object appears in a different perspective to each individual, the context in 
which it appears is the same for the whole species.’380
Arendt then continues to offer a view of her understanding of reality: 
‘In a world of appearances, filled with error and semblances, reality is 
guaranteed by this threefold commonness: the five senses, utterly different 
from each other, have the same object in common; members of the same 
species have the context in common that endows every single object with its 
particular meaning; and all other sense endowed beings, though perceiving 
this object from utterly different perspectives, agree on its identity. Out of this 
threefold commonness arises the sensation of reality.381 
Architecture certainly is bound to appearance too, since it forms the world itself. 
It is simply there, although evoked, designed, constructed, established by the very 
urge and desire of commissioners, designers, developers, and others involved 
in the building process. It is and appears to all those appearing in it. By itself it 
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affects the five senses, it even thrills the sixth sense, we might propel as a chance 
of architecture. 
However, in this world, where semblance is a serious option, how does archi-
tecture contribute to the perception of reality, not only by affecting the five senses, 
but also by urging this ‘mysterious’ sixth sense? Let us once again look to the 
metaphor of the table that I already stressed previously. If the table functions as 
an in-between during a conversation, what happens when there is nobody seated 
around it? What about the empty table? Since this is also an everyday image, one 
can imagine that the empty table is actually welcoming for use again. The chairs 
are empty, ready to be used again. The places around the table are empty – open 
for occupation once again. The table somehow shows the image of opportunity: 
here is a place to be seated, a place that can be shared with others, a place that 
offers a common experience (of speaking and listening, eating and drinking). The 
empty table is the promise of something that can happen, the image of possibili-
ties and opportunities. 
As one can imagine, these meetings and gatherings will not happen, or are 
totally different in character, if the table is lacking. Tables, either placed in the 
midst of a room, or alongside a wall, evoke attention, and welcome people to take 
a place around it. Almost naturally, the setting of a conversation is set up, fuelled 
by bottles and plates, glasses and napkins on the table. The table somehow is able 
to arrange the space. It creates a possibility of unitedness (the table unites those 
that eat together) and of openness (put your cards on the table). It also separates 
those sitting around the table from the rest of the room. Tables have many forms 
– it seems to be an obvious remark, but nevertheless, thinking about the table 
shows that these differences affect the formal or informal setting of a conversa-
tion. A small table in a café can be rather intimate, whereas a large eating table 
can offer a large group a united presence. The table set up in U-form or O-form 
is regular for meetings, but does not function too well for a real exchange of 
thoughts. The round table, on the contrary, is most appropriate for discussions. A 
low table is associated with cosiness, whereas the desk is the formal setting for an 
interview. What happens upon the table, the arrangement of glasses and plates, 
food and drinks, bottles and napkins, is telling too. At a nice dinner, initially, the 
table is set up; the silver is in its right places, as well as the glasses. Chandeliers 
are set in their position, as well as the chairs lined up. The well-set table is 
welcoming its guests. It is promising. After dinner, this setting has been distorted 
drastically. In this setting of a mess, it shows something of what happened. The 
chaos is the tangible memory of intense conversations, interlaced with foods and 
drinks.382 
By an intriguing association on this matter, the American architect Colin Rowe 
reveals another aspect of the table. He aligns Arendt’s quote on the table with a 
picture drawn by Le Corbusier. Rowe actually starts with the remark that the table 
somehow is vanishing in modern life, as compared to the central role it played in 
family and public life. In that sense, the table is even more a metaphor of what 
happened in public space. 
‘The table which has vanished has become the preeminent contemporary 
datum of life. “No longer separated, but entirely unrelated … by anything 
concrete,” the vanished table is, of course, the vanished res publica, that public 
realm which, formerly, related and separated both objects and individuals, 
which simultaneously established community and illustrated identity. So if not 
absolutely traumatic, the effective disappearance of the res publica is at least 
disturbing.’383
382. 
cf Jeremy Till, Architecture Depends 
(Cambridge (Mass.)/London: MIT 
Press, 2009)
383.
Colin Rowe, ‘The Vanished City’, in: 
Colin Rowe, As I Was Saying, Recol-
lections and Miscellaneous Essays, 
Voll III: Urbanistics, (Cambridge 
(Mass.): The MIT Press, 1996), 244
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Having said that, Rowe brings to mind the quote of Le Corbusier: 
‘Imagine a particular moment, … touching upon a small popular lunch, two or 
three acquaintances having a chat over their coffee. The table is still covered 
with glasses, with bottles, with plates, the cruet, the salt, the pepper, a napkin, 
the napkin ring, etc. See the order which places all of the objects in a relation-
ship, one with the other. They’ve all been served; they were seized by the hand 
of one or the other of the acquaintances. The distances which separate them 
are the measures of life: it is an intentional mathematical composition; there is 
no faux place, no hiatus, no mistake.384
Where Arendt’s table gathers people and makes a chat possible – or better said, 
a discussion – the table of Le Corbusier is first and foremost a platform to put 
things upon, make them manifest in the room (or on the picture, in this case), 
to articulate a certain happening, or to propel that very activity. These objects 
in hindsight convey a message. There are plates and bottles, and all sorts of 
other objects in their proper place, that by their setting emphasize the message 
of ‘lunch’, and the people around it, behind the empty bottles with their cups 
of coffee convey the message of ‘chat’. Both pictures evoke an interesting joint 
perspective: whereas Arendt concentrates on the table as platform of conversa-
tion, Le Corbusier stresses the commonalities of the objects on the table, that is: 
shared everyday objects that are able to gather people through recognition.385 This 
thus completes Arendt’s image, whereas she urges the multitude of aspects that 
belong to the world, Le Corbusier somehow shows how the objects also function 
as commodities, evoking certain use and attitude. Both aspects need to be stressed 
together. They appeal in the same sense, as Rowe argues – and I quote at length: 
‘For, with their alternative images of the table what they both specify is a field 
for interaction. The table (I think they both imply) promotes a convergence of 
interest; and, with the surrounding persons sufficiently primed (this is Corbu’s 
contribution), it becomes apparent that the table, as a version of the res 
publica, is the great agent, perhaps the only agent, which is likely to produce 
political settlement, interesting dialogue, useful dialectic, and important 
debate. The table, which in both cases, is the evident field of interaction, is 
also, surely, that essential ground which is postulated by Gestalt psychology 
as the primary datum of experience. It is that ground in terms of which figure 
emerges into prominence, which serves as a framework in which figure is 
suspended, which ‘relates’ and ‘separates’, which not only supports figure but 
also qualifies it. So Arendt and Le Corbusier, with a comparable table, present 
us with two quite different grounds. Arendt’s ground is mostly socio-political 
and her figures, I am sure, are mostly individuals; while Corbu’s ground is 
mostly socio-aesthetic and his figures, one might guess, are mostly objects. So 
the one table is mostly about people and the other mostly about things; but, 
since they are both related to compatible arguments about freedom and order, 
private happiness and the more public structures which act to guarantee it, 
personally I find it immensely easy to place these two tables side by side in the 
same restaurant and to imagine a movement between them, listening to their 
different conversations and deriving invaluable impressions from both.’386
Both parallel pictures of tables reveal something of the world-of-things that is 
commonly owned by men. It gathers and separates, not only through the table 
itself, but also by the very setting of objects on the table, that can evoke certain 
384.
Rowe, ‘The Vanished City’, 244; 
The quote of Le Corbusier is taken 
by Rowe from, Précisions, Paris: 
Crès, 1930, p.9: ‘Observez un jour … 
observez dans un petit cass-croute 
populaire, deux ou trois convives 
ayant pris leur café et causant. La 
table est couverte encore de verres, 
de bouteilles, d’assiettes, l’huilier, le 
sel, le povre, la serviette, e rond de 
serviette, etc. Voyez l’ordre fata qui 
met tous ces objets en rapport les un 
avec les autres; il sont tout servi, ils 
ont été saisi par la main de l’un ou de 
l’autre des convives; les distances qui 
les séparent sont la mesure de la vie: 
C’est une compositon mathématique 
agencée; il n’y a pas un lieu faxu, un 
hiatus, une tromperie.’ [Translation 
from French, HT] 
385.
The understanding of commonali-
ties in this direction is not far from 
the stress Arendt offers, as we have 
seen before, on appearances and 
recognition, of objects that have their 
own proper shape. ‘Everything that 
is’, Arendt writes, ‘must appear, and 
nothing can appear without a shape of 
its own; hence there is in fact no thing 
that does not in some way transcend 
its functional use, and its transcen-
dence, its beauty or ugliness, is 
identical with appearing and publicly 
and being seen.’ Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 173. To my mind, this 
perspective also stresses the need for 
a shared recognition of appearances, 
of commonality that is within the 
objects surrounding us. 
386.
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approaches. Nevertheless, appearing in an occurrence around the table, around 
the different objects that evoke a certain response, reveal at once the plurality 
of those involved, the layered-ness of the world-of-things, and the reality of the 
world. 
Both perspectives also address the ‘reality’ of architecture, with first starts with 
the materiality of the intervention in space. It is the tangible object, that is the 
agent in the gathering. It offers shared expectations, and arranges the gathering 
in space, it arranges the situation in such a way that it evokes the gathering, the 
dinner, the conversations. Secondly also sets up relationships between the objects 
and human beings in that space, the ‘events’ that will violate the space and vice 
versa.387 [IMAGE 6.15] This of course is not different in architecture than in building. 
Both practices are again the same if we look from this perspective. Architec-
ture – and I thus also mean building – is maybe the most far-fledged instrument 
of constructing a world in the human hands. Buildings not only provide 
durability, they also function as objects that are able to gather people, which offer 
permanence and evoke diversity. What it actually does, when in intervenes in 
nature, is to be seen as acts of discrimination. Architects erect walls in order to 
create different circumstances, inside and outside, public and private.388 Architec-
tural interventions by their very definition always separate and connect – separate 
a certain place from space, connect (and attract) a certain group of users. A wall 
divides space in two, a door connects both. A place is paved with stones and 
covered with a roof, and suddenly it’s a gathering space in a village, a square or a 
courtyard. A porch is erected, and people are attracted to enter. 
Architecture, however, is not just the frame or the décor around or at the 
back of what happens inside or outside. It also arranges the spaces, and arranges 
the objects in the room. They get their proper place within the space. Like the 
objects on the table convey a certain message, also the architecture of the space, 
as well as the arrangements of ‘things’ in the space represent something. It can 
be inviting or rejecting, it can be familiar or alienating, it can evoke a certain 
attitude or approach, or it can leave us cold. The appearance of space affect the 
human being, although these appearances are not often layered in itself, and, 
even by their shape and size, can only be grasped through multiple viewpoints. 
Buildings are multi-layered, surfaces can be shallow and deep simultaneously.389 
Upon this ambiguity, I will come back in the next chapter. At this perspective, also 
the Japanese architect Yoshiharu Tsukamoto offered an intriguing insight in his 
text ‘Commonalities of Architecture’. He argues that this idea of commonality is 
not so much talked about in architecture, but that the idea is quite powerful for 
what architecture actually does. Only Louis Kahn uses the term, when he delivers 
an argument that people are regularly moved by ancient constructions. Kahn 
argues that human beings are connected to one another by things, and specifi-
cally by those that transcend time and place. These are commonalities, he argues. 
Similar ideas Tsukamoto finds in some thoughts of Jørn Utzon, who argues that 
‘the present is linked to the past by the intelligence of human begins embedded 
in architecture.’390 At this point we touch upon another reflection on durability. 
The world – that is: this world-of-things that the human being inherit – contains 
human intelligence, and the human being deals with that intelligence unnoticed. 
This idea of shared human intelligence that somehow can judge the surroundings, 
although not directly linked to architecture, is also pushed forward by Arendt in 
her reflection upon the need of politics in the quote I already used earlier. ‘Politics 
deals with the coexistence and association of different men,’ Arendt writes. ‘Men 
organize themselves politically according to certain essential commonalities 
found within or abstracted from an absolute chaos of differences.’391 The world-
387.
cf. Bernard Tschumi, ‘Violence 
of Architecture’ and Bernard 
Tschumi, ‘Spaces and Events’ in: 
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in-common is essential in this perspective: it enables a reality in which action 
and speech can take place, makes sense and is effective. This commonality of this 
reality depends upon the ‘fabricated common world.’392 
392.
Holmquist, ‘Towards an Ethical 
Technique,’ 22
7.
DESIGN. ARCHITECTURAL 
AGENCY BETWEEN WORK, 
ACTION AND THINKING
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Hannah Arendt wrote her book The Human Condition in order to think through 
human activities on earth. In her introduction to the book, she brings this back to 
the simple aim that the book is ‘nothing more than to think what we are doing’. 
As became clear in the previous chapters, behind this question there is a serious 
concern about the world. The world-in-common is the object of political life, 
the activity of action. The world, however, is established by ‘work’, the work of 
the maker, the craftsman, which creates objects with a certain lifespan, offering 
permanence to the world as the stage for political life. Labor is the enduring 
activity which is bound to survival – it is too much focused on the singular person 
to create a world-in-common. Arendt reads the history of the West against 
this background, and argues that this history shows that the West not only 
overlooked/undervalued the particular characteristics of action by applying the 
work-attitude framework to the realm of politics (an instrumentalized pattern), 
but also that the permanence of the world-in-common was threatened by 
applying the cyclic attitude of labor to the realm of work. Until now, we have been 
concerned with the world-as-it-appears to us, or particularly, to the city and archi-
tecture, and what it contributes to that world-in-common. In this chapter, we turn 
our scope to the world-as-it-comes-into-being: to the processes behind the world 
that materialize the human inhabition of it. In this sense, we simply follow the 
trajectory that Arendt defines in The Human Condition – we now need to look, 
as she did, to the activities behind architecture as a world-constructor: to simply 
‘think what we are doing’ as architects.
This chapter therefore dives into (contemporary) architectural practices, which 
first require further clarification. It is, after all, not only architectural practices 
that define the build environment. All sorts of constructions – from the smallest 
to the largest – are collective efforts. It is not a matter of simply the ideas of an 
architect, but instead the ideas of architects, clients, politicians, civil servants, 
users, developers, activist groups, constructors and many others that form an 
inherent part of each design process, and are thus behind all sorts of buildings. 
And although we mention it here as ‘ideas’, these are of course much larger than 
simply ‘design-ideas’ or conceptual images of the very building at hand. There 
are local traditions and building conventions to consider, possibilities offered 
by technology, limitations in the budget, limitations in a particular site, specific 
building requirements, rules of local governments, and so on. In other words, 
behind every building lies a complex matrix of codes, rules, considerations, and 
reasoning which cannot be reduced to a ‘simple’ decisive idea. However, behind 
each building there is a ‘design’, whether it is made by an architect or not. There 
are ideas of how to offer space to a particular program, how to use a building 
or how to position it in an existing structure. Regularly, the architect generates 
a design in which all of these different requirements come together, creating 
a potential scheme and structure wherein all these aspects are brought into a 
particular balance, upon which every participant in the building process can 
agree. As it can be imagined, the attitude of the architect is important in this case, 
as is the attitude of the commissioner who somehow ‘chooses’ the architect to 
generate this design.
If we challenge the world in terms of the scope of architecture, it therefore is 
customary to focus on the process of design. In this chapter we again look at the 
distinction between work and action. Architectural design is evidently a form 
of ‘work’, but it also important to ask whether aspects of design can instead be 
understood as a form of ‘action’. In the second part of this chapter the scope is 
widened further, by taking into account Arendt’s threefold use of the activity 
of ‘thinking’ – which she had excluded from The Human Condition, instead 
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becoming the topic of her unfinished study The Life of The Mind. This threefold 
model of thinking offers a challenging perspective in rethinking the characteristics 
of architectural design, as it also challenges the ‘roles’ the architect can take within 
the processes of the reification of the world. 
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7.1 Hans Teerds, Entrance Pavilion for the Cemetery 
of Blankenberge, Blankenberge, Belgium, 2010
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7.1 IN-BETWEEN CITY AND CEMETERY
My experiences in architectural practice are somewhat limited. Besides a couple 
of years working on different projects, ranging from the design of public spaces 
towards the renovation of an old wooden countryhouse, I worked for about seven 
years on the design and construction of an entrance pavilion to the cemetery 
of Blankenberge, a coastal city in Belgium. The assignment started with the 
wish to improve the sanitary services. It thus was a rather small assignment, 
but within the context of a cemetery, the theme challenged me. A cemetery, 
after all, is a special place within the plan of a city. Although cemeteries are not 
often our favourite places to visit, they have a common meaning for everyone, 
even for those that not have buried loved ones there. If the cemetery stands to 
represent something, it is the mortality of the human being and the finite nature 
of life. It makes death tangible in the plan of the city; visible to those who pass 
by. The cemetery is mostly visited as a place to consciously mourn – sometimes 
momentarily during the burial of someone, or for others more regularly in visiting 
and taking care of a grave. In Blankenberge, a little square (used as parking) 
connected the cemetery with a road that directly leads to the center of the city. 
The edge between square and cemetery was articulated by an enclosing wall, along 
with the entrance as an open fence. In this case, there was only space available 
at the entrance to the area of the cemetery, where it is of course inappropriate 
to walk immediately into the toilets at the threshold between city and cemetery. 
From the beginning onwards, the idea was that we needed to define and shape 
the entrance as a threshold, but that we also needed to hide the mass used to 
create this threshold. As we found out in the beginning, there was room to slightly 
extend the program. There was a small office for the two employees who take 
care of the cemetery hidden at one of its edges. The replacement of this office 
would grant the employees more visibility, which could also be better traced by 
visitors gaining an overview of what happens at the cemetery. By designing the 
two functions as separate pavilions on each side of the entrance, and by adding 
two covered (but open) places offering some seating to the visitors, an in-between 
space was created. This in-between, framed by two little pavilions, also represents 
the in-between between city and cemetery: an emphasized threshold, a space 
of its own. The two buildings were literally understood as masses moulding 
this in-between, and were completely covered with a relatively dark, horizontal 
wooden slats – hiding also the entrances and windows behind. The horizontal 
lines deceive the spectator: the buildings seem to be larger than they really are. 
Although the project was limited in its scale and complexity, the actual process 
of design to completion took more than seven years. To state this as being an easy 
process would be an understatement. All sorts of problems needed to be tackled 
during the path to construction: from cultural differences to a lack of experience 
on my part, a tight budget versus greater ambitions, and a changing program with 
changing employees (and even changing political tides) on the side of the commis-
sioner: the municipality of Blankenberge. I nevertheless did everything myself 
(since the budget was so tight): from drawings to negotiations, from formalizing 
all of the specifications to the chairing of meetings at the construction site and a 
final review of the executed work. It has been a challenging training ground, and 
I would certainly organize things differently next time now I have a sense of the 
traps that might be present along the way, but it was worth it.
I feel very privileged to have designed a little building such as this. Although 
it is small it has a broader meaning, one that hopefully contributes unconsciously 
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to the experience of visitors to the cemetery, enriching their passage from city 
to cemetery and vice versa to the liveability of the city. The significance of archi-
tecture in this case is almost tangible. Everyone can understand the importance 
of the threshold between these distinct conditions. Although I did not have to 
convince the commissioner of the significance of thoughtful design, the budget 
was not raised to the height that I felt was reasonable. 
However, together ‘we’ could make a building that expresses the threshold 
as a zone of transition. Indeed: together, we could make this building. When 
thinking of the final result, the question is nevertheless: how did we end up 
here? Even in this simple building it is not just me as the designer; there was 
an intensive discussion with other actors and stakeholders regarding how the 
building needed to be. Flipping through my sketchbooks for the project, there is 
a clear ‘development’ of drawing and thinking. Nevertheless, it is in ruptures that 
the final form has been found. Ruptures are somehow the signage of the aftermath 
of a good discussion, or a brainwave, or other intangible developments that 
cannot really be reproduced. Needless to say, the commissioner of the building 
(the city-architect of Blankenberge and his assistants) has had a major impact. 
Not only in their responses to my proposals, but also by stressing the limitations 
of the budget and clarifying their objectives. The talks with the Flemish architect 
I needed to consult were also important in order to build, as a Dutchman, in 
Flanders. There was also the contractor and his suppliers, with their specific 
knowledge of wood, foundations, and electrical appliances. Although their input 
was important, it is not easy to define how this affected the final result, however 
their knowledge translated first into the design, the drawings, and into the final 
built reality. 
I started the project together with Hannes Vandermeer, a Flemish landscape 
architect I did not know before. However, from our first meeting onwards, we 
shared the same outlook on the assignment. We discussed extensively the layout 
of the cemetery and its unique position in the city. The new pavilion should not be 
simply an incident, we thought, but part of a plan for the whole park, and should 
stress the in-between position of the cemetery between city and landscape. The 
next phase was finding the right location for the sanitary unit. After studying 
several locations, the entrance itself seemed to be the most logical option. While 
working on this entrance-zone lots of possibilities were considered: a single 
pavilion, a double-height pavilion, a double-height pavilion with a viewpoint, a 
literal porch, a long pavilion, two short pavilions, or a meandering wall that could 
in some points offer space for the program. As time passed and it became clear 
that the overall vision would not be translated into a concrete project without 
the re-design of the entrance. Unfortunately, the landscape architect needed 
to withdraw as discussions on the pavilion continued. However, we began the 
discussion by urging the need for other facilities at the entrance, upon which the 
municipality also agreed that the space for employees could be better moved to 
a more central location. On their side, the commissioner also looked through the 
previous sketches, and expressed a preference for one of the previous proposals: 
the design of a pavilion that actually created a porch. This proposal was indeed 
humble, seeking only to enhance the overall experience of the cemetery itself, 
through offering only a few new walls that (after aging) would soon fade away and 
merge to be part of the landscape where the trees and tombs are dominant. Part 
of the strength of this design was that it could be understood as part of a family 
of interventions, but since these other interventions could not be executed, what 
would be the strength of this single intervention? I therefore agreed upon the wish 
of the municipal architect to articulate the boundary between city and cemetery 
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more strongly. Looking back, we can see that this was the right move at the right 
moment. It became clear that the entrance still needed to provide room for cars 
and even trucks to enter the cemetery, and following more insight into the possi-
bilities of the budget we slowly moved towards a completely wooden construction 
of two pavilions to emphasize ‘heaviness’ and mass using slats as façade, and to 
cover the sheltered with seats. The character of the intervention became increas-
ingly clear during the process, particularly while deciding upon materials for the 
façade, the interior, the floor, lighting, and windows. Thinking of materials allows 
us to materialize our ideas. It articulates tangibility, the textures and the tectonics 
of what will eventually become a real building.
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Content Exhibition, Berlin, Germany, 2003
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7.2 TO THINK WHAT WE ARE DOING
7.2.1	 Reification	of	the	Public	World	
In the previous chapters, particularly in the second and third (where I discuss the 
contemporary landscape and city), and in the fifth and sixth (where I discuss the 
notions of ‘public space’ and the ‘world’), I focussed on architecture as it exists 
in the built environment; constructions that literally form the world and our 
everyday environment. This investigation also includes reflections on architecture 
as a process. Architecture, of course, is not only the built environment. Archi-
tecture is also the construction of the built environment. To state it in terms of 
the architectural historian Fil Hearn, it is all of the Ideas that Shape Buildings:1 
landscapes, cities, gardens, squares, streets – even our past and future. Ideas 
here should not be taken too strictly. Buildings do not always come into being 
as a result of outspoken ideas. Changing requirements, needs, businesses, etc. 
require interventions in the built environment, while the process of design is 
often also defined by the search for ideas, or the search for shapes that facilitate 
the required program in relation to the immediate situation of the site. Techno-
logical possibilities, cultural standards and economic principles along with other 
codes and conventions all contribute to forming the built environment as well as 
to new architectural proposals. All of this belongs to the world of architecture, 
or better said, to the ‘thinking’ of the architect. This ‘thinking’ of the architect is 
the object of study in this chapter, which will focus much more on the process 
behind construction than on the actual built situation. This shift in view from the 
object to the work behind the object will not offer a ‘solution’ to the urgencies 
stressed in the first chapters, nor will it offer instruments to handle political, 
social, economic, cultural and contextual questions. As was stated in the previous 
chapters, there is no single solution or fixed answer. The relationship between 
the tangible world (created by architecture) versus the political realm (the space 
of appearance and the public realm) needs to be continually discussed. There 
are only lines-of-thought, fields of attention, and perspectives to be discovered, 
adopted and adapted. The Arendtian lines of thought bring us now to the 
activity that lies behind every building and landscape; behind all architectural 
artefacts. Conceiving the architectural object is of utmost importance regarding 
the commonness of the world. Architecture is not only the tangible construction 
of the world, but is also the idea ‘to construct’; the future interventions in the 
same tangible world. It is a project, a design activity, it is the need and eagerness 
to intervene in the world; developing interventions that adapt to the world 
according to observable and imagined future needs. Emphasizing architecture 
means not only to emphasize the built environment, but also the ideas behind 
this environment, as well as the will to intervene and to adapt circumstances to 
new and future needs. If this will to intervene is a central notion in architecture, 
architecture greatly regards the developments of plans and designs for future 
intervention.
There is no architectural artefact without design, although obviously not every 
design is drawn beforehand, let alone drawn by an architect, urban designer or 
landscape architect.2 It is an important fact that building and construction cannot 
exist without a plan. If architecture is part of the world, and if this world is matter 
that matters, the content of these plans and how these plans are conceived are 
significant. This is not only significant in architectural terms, but is significant 
for the public as well. Better said: these plans are politically important. This 
somehow substantiates the pessimistic and slightly optimistic narratives explored 
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Fil Hearn, Ideas that Shaped 
Buildings (Cambridge (Mass.), MIT 
Press, 2003)
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of architecture too. After all, even 
such local and folklore practices are 
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more hidden. These non-architec-
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(Southern, Central and Eastern 
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by local traditions and vernacular 
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Strauven, Aldo van Eyck, The Shape 
of Relativity (Amsterdam, Archi-
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Another Modern, The Post-war 
Architecture and Urbanism of Candi-
lis-Josic-Woods (Rotterdam: NAi 
Publishers, 2005), 70-107]; See also 
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from, or as correction to an overly 
autonomous approach to architecture. 
Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture 
without Architects. An Introduction 
to Non-Pedigreed Architecture 
(Garden City/New York: Doubleday 
& Compagny Inc., 1964); See also 
today’s interest in slums, for instance 
shown in the stunning book by Urban 
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Iwan Baan on the occupation of the 
un-finished Torre David in Caracas: 
Alfredo Brillembourg and Hubert 
Klumpner (eds.), Torre David: 
Informal Vertical Communities 
(Baden: Lars Müller Publishers, 2012)
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in chapter two and three on the state of contemporary landscapes and cities 
and their diminishing public spaces. Behind the ‘new’ and often commercial 
spaces of the mall and the theme park, the business district and the edge city, the 
historic district and the gated community that replace the formerly public spaces 
of streets, squares and parks, are plans, designs, and ideas on how to organize 
space and to what end this organisation serves. These spaces are not necessarily 
always (completely) designed by architects, but there is often a plan that is 
carefully executed. It might be in these cases that design resembles engineering: 
applying formulas or following well-known paths or empirically proved methods 
and schemes. The design might be fuelled by economic models focused more 
on efficiency and increasing profit (ideas about ‘how to sell things’), by the aims 
of security and exclusivity, ideas about identity and authenticity, or location 
and local traditions. Ultimately however, there are designers designing spaces, 
objects, and structures, whether they are architects or not. In other words, it is 
not only ideas about architecture, the world, or businesses that are decisive in 
architectural design. All sorts of restrictions and opportunities are at stake in 
the path of design. Even within the frame of architectural perspectives, there are 
innovations, developments, conventions, restrictions and opportunities to be 
dealt with, offering surprisingly new perspectives to the architect for meeting new 
challenges.3 Architects are always facing a set of restrictions, but there always 
is a horizon of opportunities and possibilities. Although the playing field of the 
designers and engineers involved might be narrow, set within the strict borders 
offered to them by their commissioners, there is always room for design. However, 
since design is a matter of human beings – and not robots – working on particular 
assignments trying to find the right answers to the client’s request, this means 
that there is room to highlight the design, the aims and the methods incorporated 
by those that are actually drawing the plans, as well as by those actually executing 
the project. Since human beings are involved, there is room to reflect on ‘what 
he or she is doing’. To emphasise the room to think and reflect might involve the 
introduction of a form of working ethics within the processes of development and 
design. This is partly true and the ethics of architectural design form part of what 
is discussed in this chapter. However, this turning toward investigating ‘what 
we are doing’ is not only part of an ethical outlook, but also addresses the field 
on a more general level. Phrasing the idea beyond a chapter like this of course 
immediately reminds us of Arendt’s very brief summary of The Human Condition: 
her aim to consider ‘what we are doing’.4 The Human Condition does not work 
towards providing a ‘working ethics’. The narrative of this book works on a much 
more general level. It does not address the single laborer, nor does it stress a 
particular worker. It describes the human being as a laborer, it describes what it 
initially means to work. The book does not address a particular laborer or worker 
at specific moments to act differently. Instead, it offers an analysis of the structure 
of today’s communities, and also urges us to reflect upon the more particular 
questions of our own attitudes to the world. To think about ‘what we are doing’ 
thus not only urges a philosophical outlook but also evokes moral questions. It 
first urges for a broader view; to explore the what-question and to understand 
what it means to be involved in architecture. Secondly, by mirroring this under-
standing, this what-question immediately evokes the how-question: how do we do 
what are doing? 
The need to reflect on ‘what we are doing’ within the field of architecture, partic-
ularly if we want to stress the public aspects of architecture, is therefore offered 
as part of the Arendtian line of thought that we develop here. Arendt outlines the 
3.
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close relation between production and labor: the product and the work behind 
it. Accordingly, to reflect on what we are doing also means to reflect on how we 
are doing what we do. Arendt stresses that particular aspects of distinct forms of 
human activity affect the very product of that activity: the attitude of the laborer 
(and his focus on the short term, replace-ability, and consumption) threatens the 
permanence of ‘things’ if applied to the activity of work, while the attitude of the 
worker (and his focus on production, end-products and control) threatens the 
aim, character and objective of action, if applied to the realm of politics. Once 
again, Arendt does not describe these threats to a single person, as if the single 
homo faber would approach his work like an animal laborans, a labourer can 
never construct a house that lasts, and if a craftsman could not also appear in 
public. What threatens the world is the attitude of the laborer, and their under-
standing of the objects that surround us as nothing more than disposables as 
part of an ongoing economic cycle, manifesting in society as they are applied to 
the production of objects and other aspects of life. What threatens politics is the 
replacement of inherent characteristics – the uncontrollable and unpredictable 
aspects of action – by ideas that belong to ‘work’; by the eagerness to control 
action and to secure the path that leads to a particular aim. Arendt argues that 
each of these realms have their merits and practices, and is problematic when 
applied to another realm. It is not the single person that applies the means and 
aims of one category to the other. It is society as a whole, driven by an economic 
attitude that applies the characteristics of labor to the production of all products, 
which uses it as a lens to understand and direct decisions made in politics.5 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, when thinking of architecture, we 
are somehow bound to the category of work. At this point, however, we need to 
challenge these categories. Aspects of ‘work’ might also be understood as ‘action’ 
and ‘speech’. Moreover, in order to understand the activity of design, we also need 
to challenge the activity of thinking. The means of conceiving a building, after all, 
is often challenged by a combination of working with the hands (drawing) and 
the mind (reflection). Arendt excluded ‘thinking’ from The Human Condition, but 
studied it later, in her unfinished study on the nature of thinking, The Life of the 
Mind.6 
In the previous chapter I concentrated on architecture – to design, to construct 
and to build – as belonging to the category of making. The first image Arendt 
offers of ‘work’, particularly in the first part of the chapter on work in The Human 
Condition, is one of ‘fabrication’ and ‘reification’. This fabrication is not smooth 
or natural; rather it forces the homo faber to violate natural processes and to 
destroy nature.7 If we think of architecture with the help of these notions, we can 
immediately agree upon the idea that architecture is reification. It takes materials 
from the earth, processes them ‘violently’, and brings them together in order to 
form spaces that can be occupied, inhibited, and used. For architecture trees are 
cut, raw materials are excavated, heated, melted, poured out, mixed, rolled, cut, 
and so on. Through forcefully intervening in the earth in one place (although 
this part often lies out of sight within the profession), architecture intervenes 
elsewhere by bringing together these processed materials to construct a home, 
street, or bridge. If work is reification, we can state that the work of architects can 
literally be described as the reification of social, cultural, disciplinary, political, 
typological, and technical ideas, along with wishes, requirements, adaptations, 
conventions, traditions, etc. When an assignment is offered, the architect will 
conduct extensive conversations with the commissioner and with future users, 
who will share their dreams, needs and expectations as well as the requirements 
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the building needs to fulfil. The work of the architect is therefore to imagine 
the future life of that building – to reify the dreams of the commissioner. The 
architect uses stories and references (taking his client on a tour or showing 
examples of possibilities) moulded many times over in order to draw proposals 
that can be presented to the client. This moulding represents the moment of 
reification: from intangible to tangible, from formless to form and shape, from 
being hidden to be exposed in public. Drawing and other forms of communication 
are quite important in this instance. The pencil (or indeed the knife, the saw, the 
mouse and drawing pad) is therefore the instrument of reification. What comes 
out of the mind of the architect cannot stay in the abstract world of ideas. It needs 
to be materialized; made present in the world. It needs to arrive tangibly in the 
form of sketches and drawings, which help the client to discuss their direction 
and interpretation of the ideas and requirements. Reification, in other words, is 
a process that develops slowly through the solipsist activity of drawing as well 
as through conversation with stakeholders in the design process. The process of 
reification leads to constructions that in themselves reify the ideas (and needs) 
beyond the building itself.  Construction reifies the commissioner’s wishes and 
dreams into a tangible, stable, durable, useable form, immediately revealing ideas 
about the function of the building. The house reifies the home, where its form 
reveals the life of the house. It makes the working place tangible in the world, 
through which it reveals how society approaches work.
If architecture is reification, it reifies both the dwelling place and the communal 
space. It reifies the need of the individual to protect himself from the elements as 
it also reifies the structures that enable people to appear in public (to state it in 
terms used by Arendt). If we use the perspective outlined in previous chapters, we 
need to state that the first does not mean anything if it is not accompanied by the 
‘larger’ reification of the second. Architectural reification lifts the single human 
being from his natural circumstances and dangers to place him in a worldly 
structure; one that connects the single with the multitude. 
7.2.2 The Work of Our Hands 
Work, secondly, is described by Arendt as the ‘work of our hands’ through which 
we are ‘lord and master’ over materials and objects.8 This notion of course is very 
close to what has been stated above about processing materials in order to make 
space. However, to be ‘lord and master’ seems to suggest a broader understanding 
of this of processing materials. It is the ‘masterly-processing’ of materials. Work, 
in other words, requires skills. In the previous chapter, we already touched upon 
a particular quote from the German architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, in 
which this ‘masterly’ position is also tangible, where he argues that architecture 
comes into being the very moment two bricks are carefully brought together.9 This 
perspective clearly stresses the careful and thoughtful aspects of architecture. It is 
does not bring materials together randomly or by chance, but it is done according 
to a plan. It is not just creating any space; it is the thoughtful creation of space. Or 
we can better state: it is masterfully done. It requires skills. Bringing two bricks 
together moreover evokes an inherent idea of working with our hands. Bricks have 
already themselves taken materials from the earth and processed them violently 
in such a way that they gain resistance against the spoiling power of nature. But 
secondly, it also urges the image of taking the bricks and bringing them together; 
creating order out of chaos by human intervention through bodily work. To see 
architecture as the work of hands, of bodies constructing (stone) walls is outlined 
8.
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in a colloquial passage written by the German architect Rudolph Schwartz, in 
which he emphasizes the relationship between construction and the human body:
‘The art of building is … done with the whole body. The labourers lift up the 
materials, place them one on top of the other and join then together. They 
execute movements which correspond to the forms of the growing part of 
the building and then deposit these movements in the building materials. In 
this way the act of raising turns to upright structure. The workers go over the 
wall with the trowel, and out of their stroking motion comes a skin of color 
or plaster. They saw and plane the wood, draw and forge the iron. Each limb 
of the body moves in its particular way and all of them together create the 
building as a second body.’10 
This ideal image of conceiving a building and constructing it somehow by one’s 
own hands was certainly not the standard image of architectural practice the 
moment Schwartz wrote this passage (at the end of the 30s). At first hand, it 
seems to be drained with nostalgia. After all, since Philippo Brunelleschi distanced 
himself from his craftsmanship, and thereby also from the actual construction 
site, there is a gap between the office of the architect (where buildings, urban 
plans, and other ‘objects’ are conceived through drawings and models), and the 
real site where the building actually is constructed. As Robin Evans has argued, 
‘architects do not make buildings, they make drawings for buildings.’11 The quote 
of Schwartz nevertheless also can be understood differently at second thought: 
the importance of the relationship between body and construction actually urges 
a connection between designing, building, thinking and making – something 
Martin Heidegger also urged as touched upon in the previous chapter.12 There are 
still practices and architecture schools or programs that emphasize these relation-
ships by offering design-and-build courses and services.13 However besides these 
few offices and educational programs, we might interpret this quote differently: 
not so much as describing an actual construction site, but as describing architec-
tural knowledge in its root form, founded on the relationship between body and 
material, between body and space. Around 80 years on from Schwartz’s writing 
of this remark, actual construction is still referred to in Dutch and German as 
‘handwerk’.14 Even at the moment robotics are being introduced in all sorts of 
production processes, including within the construction industries, a great deal 
of building is nevertheless still done by the hands of craftsmen on site. Architec-
ture might be enriched by all sorts of computational models and pre-fabricated 
materials, but on the construction site it can still be described as the careful 
bringing together of bricks by skilled hands. Even within more contemporary 
methods, construction needs craftsmen to join together steel trusses, to pour 
concrete, to cover the naked wall. In other words, the profession still depends 
on, for most of its assignments and building methods, craftsmen working on the 
construction site; on human bodies mastering materials to create space.
However, the contemporary construction site is also threatened by redefining 
embodied work as labor. Where craftsmen formerly constructed the building 
from foundation to finishing, today the process of construction is divided into bits 
and pieces, where particularly skilled craftsmen execute only a limited number 
of operations. Behind this process, increasing requirements of control and 
efficiency are also at stake. A similar process can be observed in mass production, 
where the fabrication process is divided to small repetitive tasks for each of the 
employees. According to Arendt, however, this means to break ‘work’ into to 
mechanized tasks, which are perfectly controllable and most efficient (as a result, 
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we can add, that particularly due to this process these tasks are susceptible to be 
taken over by robots in the near future). This means that the direct relationship 
between the homo faber and his product has been lost, in favour of control and 
efficiency.15 Work has become labor, Arendt argues. Mechanization uses only 
the labor capacity of the human being; the power and efficiency of rhythmical 
repetition that the single body can offer. Mass production, which is of course 
the most tangible form of this thinking, channels ‘natural forces’, Arendt argues, 
understanding production as a continuous, almost natural process. Within 
this perspective, all standards that come from the category of work have lost 
their relevance. It is this process of diminishing the homo faber into an animal 
laborans and that an impact on the world. This transformation might even be 
understood literally, if we see images and hear stories of and the terrible work-
ing-conditions of dressmakers in Bangladesh or India, cell-phone production 
in China, or even the de-humanized environments of business districts at the 
outskirts of many cities in Europe.16 ‘One thing is certain’, Arendt writes in a 
colloquial passage, 
‘the continuous automatic process of manufacturing has not only done away 
with the “unwarranted assumption” that “human hands guided by human 
brains represent the optimum efficiency,” but with the much more important 
assumption that the things of the world around us should depend upon 
human design and be built in accordance with human standards of beauty. 
In place of utility and beauty, which are the standards of the world, we have 
come to design products that still fulfil certain “basic functions” but whose 
shape will be primarily determined by the operation of the machine. The 
“basic functions” are of course the functions of the human animal’s life, but 
the product itself – not only its variations but even the “total change to a new 
product” – will depend entirely upon the capacity of the machine.’17
The impact of changes likewise on the art of construction is beyond discussion. 
Efficient production of building materials affects the formal possibilities of 
buildings, as does the efficient production of buildings themselves. In other 
words, the propelling emphasis on efficiency behind building practices is tangible 
– affecting the full range of construction, from the production of materials to 
the process of building itself, from the implementation of tools and instruments 
to the limitations of manpower. Efficient use of cranes and other instruments 
needed on the building site has affected the layout of streets and the architecture 
of slabs. The size of the lorry limits the possibilities of spatial articulation. On site, 
the limited responsibilities of each craftsman has a large effect on the quality of 
the final object. These aspects place more questions on the possibilities and the 
position of the designer. Insisting upon these remarks does not mean however 
that we must overlook the opposite effect as well. The invention of new materials 
has obviously had its impact on architecture – it is not an overestimation to 
describe this impact ‘beyond imagination’. Without the introduction of reinforced 
concrete, steel trusses, cranes, elevators and escalators, there would have been 
no skyscrapers and warehouses, the large span of the Golden Gate Bridge would 
not have been achieved, nor the sculptural forms that Brutalism has offered to the 
world.18 
This is an important horizon. Within the field of architecture there clearly is 
a strong relationship between instrument and process, tool and objective, (new) 
materials and result. This urges us once more to consider ‘what we are doing’ 
as architects, since it questions the role of the designer in-between these codes, 
15.
Here we are once again go back to 
José Saramago’s novel The Cave, 
in which this aim of efficiency is at 
the core of the narrative, which we 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
The aim of control, perfection and 
efficiency is at the cost of differences, 
variation, and the presence of the 
homo faber in the work itself. José 
Saramago, The Cave (London: The 
Harvill Press, 2002)
16.
Arendt, The Human Condition, 150; 
Klein, No Logo, 234-264  
17. 
Arendt, The Human Condition, 
151-152; Arendt quotes here John 
Diebold, who was an American 
businessman, a pioneer in the 
field of automation. John Diebold, 
Automation: The Advent of the 
Automatic Factory (New York: Van 
Nostrand, 1952), 67, 38-45
18.
See for instance Adrian Forty, 
Concrete and Culture, A Material 
History (London: Reaktion Books, 
2016); Nick Bullock, Building the 
Post War World. Modern Architec-
ture and Reconstruction in Brittain 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2002) 
526
conventions, standards, rules and developments. What role can the architect 
have? What position can design occupy in-between these forces? What if these 
developments disturb the significance of design? Arendt, after all, argues in the 
quote cited above, that the ‘world around us should depend upon human design 
and be built in accordance with human standards of either utility or beauty.’19 This 
can be used as a perfect description of architectural work: providing the design for 
particular objects in the world without making a particular distinction between 
utility or beauty, but searching instead for the perfect balance between the two. 
Although the architect as a worker today can be distinguished from the craftsman 
on the construction site, Arendt would not regard their ‘work’ differently. This 
distinction is not so much that of a clean office and a dirty working space. Both 
aspects of architecture are regarded fabrication and reification, and still can be 
understood as ‘the work of our hands’, to be ‘lord and master’ of materials. Most 
of the fabrication of architectural offices is obviously focused on this particular 
aspect of the world that Arendt stresses in the quote above; the need for human 
design behind every object that enters the world. There is ‘office-work’ preceding 
the work on the construction site. ‘The actual work of fabrication,’ she writes, ‘is 
performed under the guidance of a model in accordance with which the object 
is constructed’. This model can be an image held by the eye or in the mind, or 
a blueprint in which the image has already found its tentative materialization 
through work.’20 It is obvious architectural work can be best understood as 
mainly focused on this development of ‘designs’. It is these ‘designs’ that are the 
thoughtful and careful aspects of architecture: bricks are not coming together 
randomly, they are placed carefully, according to a pre-conceived plan. Spaces 
are made in particular forms, according to a thoughtful plan. This does not mean 
that construction is not a part of architecture; architecture is limited by thought-
fulness and carefulness in the act of construction. This would limit architecture 
to the deliberations of the mind. I will come back on this aspect of thinking and 
reflexivity as an aspect of architectural design in the last part of this chapter, but 
at this point we need to reject such a limitation. Architecture should be regarded 
in all of its broad aspects, from the daily study of precedents to the careful task of 
drawing, from the reflection upon requirements to the evaluation of a construction 
site and discussing of possibilities with a client. All of this belongs to the category 
of work, and it is important to state that clearly, particularly when facing contem-
porary practices in the building industries in which architectural offices receive 
very limited assignments from their clients; to only deliver the design, sometimes 
only the design of the façade of a particular building, while the efficient layout of 
the building and the execution of the design is offered to consultancy offices. This 
is a limitation of architecture in delivering beauty; an artistic statement, an iconic 
image, without offering responsibility for the whole; the layout, the processing, 
the construction, the integration of interior and exterior appearance. This is once 
again a limitation of architecture in terms of the ‘beauty’ of ‘buildings’, or even to 
make them acceptable to the public. Although this seems to address architecture 
on the level of thinking and imagination, it actually rejects the unity of design 
and overlooks characteristics of architecture that are otherwise hidden. It does 
not understood architecture as a complete entity, the design process as work of 
hands and reflections of the mind, reflections upon program, situation and future, 
and the work of hands to offer a program its proper appearance in the world in 
its particular place – an appearance that is not limited to the façade but one that 
unites outside and inside, from the interior to the exterior. It is disconnected from 
the building itself as something made and conceived separately – in other words 
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it stays superficial, limiting architecture to the thickness of its skin. It clearly 
approaches architecture through the lens of labor: after all, the skin can be quickly 
re-designed if it is no longer in style. This is again an example of what is discussed 
above in the division of processes in making small parts, and the loss of a worldly 
understanding of fabrication. ‘The mastery of structure and material and the 
presence of skilled craftsmanship are essential to good architecture,’ Pallasmaa 
states. ‘The general weakening of our sense of tectonic reality – a weakening 
intimately related to the emphasis on surface and appearance – is caused partly 
by the diminishing role of craft in construction but even more so by the growing 
power of contractors and by the increasing importance of short term economics at 
the expense of architectural value. Architecture is too often viewed as a short-lived 
speculative commodity, rather than as a cultural and metaphysical manifesta-
tion that frames our collective understanding and values. Although projects that 
question or deride this significant social role are now celebrated. But architecture 
cannot escape its foundations in real experience: ‘In an age of simulation and 
virtual reality, we still long for a home.’21
It is remarkable to note that the ‘space where the architect works’ is regularly 
is called an ‘office’ (or ‘bureau’ in Dutch, which in English means a ‘desk’). By 
using this term ‘office’, it is clear that the ‘work’ of architects today can be mainly 
described as ‘office-work’: a desk, a desktop, and lots of meetings. Some architects 
have called their office an ‘atelier’ (like the French Architect Jean Nouvel, who 
has called his firm Ateliers Jean Nouvel) or ‘studio’ (like Herman Hertzberger, 
who called his firm Architectuurstudio Herman Hertzberger), while architec-
ture-schools have named particular parts of their buildings a ‘laboratory’ (like the 
Architectural Laboratory of Princeton University, where students can test building 
systems, technology, materials). These alternative descriptions of the architec-
tural office and of education spaces certainly evoke a different atmosphere: it 
refers to the working places of artists (where the artist creates his artworks, where 
assistants work together, or where the master-craftsman teaches skills to his/
her protégés), or it refers to the working place of the scientist; where the new and 
the unknown is discovered, tested, and stressed, and where future knowledge 
is produced. Sometimes even the word agency is used, which evokes the image 
of action (and protest), to be active not inside the office or behind a desk, but 
outside, and to work with collaborators, inhabitants, and other interested parties 
on the revival of post-industrial spaces, abandoned environments or another 
given part of the city. However, all of these words evoke spaces that offer room for 
working with hands and working together. These are not offices with a corridor 
and a range of spaces apart, but large spaces that make communication possible – 
to see and hear what happens elsewhere, to collaborate, to bump into each other, 
to use your hands, Within these large spaces lie models and drawings. There are 
photographs and memos, rough sketches, working drawings, books – all of which 
shows work-in-progress. These spaces breathe a different atmosphere too. Archi-
tectural offices are more often not clean, white, well-organized spaces (although 
some offices reveal images of their working-spaces as if celebrating a minimalist 
outlook), but are instead rough spaces, where smells and soundreveal the making 
of models, the cutting of wood, card, and foam.
However, imagine the situation of an architect receiving the assignment from 
a client to design a particular building, for instance the entrance pavilion to a 
cemetery. The architect starts to have conversations with the client, with users 
of the cemetery, as well as with the employees that actually work there or with 
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neighbours, and begins to start analysing, sketching, drawing more precisely, 
building models, sketching again, adjusting the design by talking again to the 
parties involved, sketching again, and drawing the design more precisely yet 
again, but at a certain level he/she comes back to the commissioner with an initial 
plan, after which the process develops in cycles of design adjustment until the 
appropriate ‘form’ has been found.22 The process described here relates to the 
image of ‘the romantic loner’, as the sociologist Robert Gutman has described 
it, which was the case in my project in Blankenberge. In this case, the architect 
acts as a ‘free, independent practitioner, operating more or less on his own, 
and cultivating personal relationships with an understanding and appreciative 
client.’23 However if an office with several employees receives an assignment the 
process will work differently. Where the employees present their research and 
their design proposals for approval to the architect involved, there is internal 
debate and discussion within the office; collaboration on the project addressing 
the given assignments, insights gained by employees or by the ‘master-architect’ 
to direct the employees in proceeding with their work. This image is of course 
much closer to everyday reality, in which architecture must always be stressed as 
a collective effort. ‘The design of our built environment emerges from collective 
action,’ Dana Cuff states in her reflection upon architectural practices. ‘Typically 
design is believed to be an individual’s creative effort, conjuring up images of 
late nights at the drawing board. Indeed, this is a significant part of making 
buildings, but it is not sufficient to explain the design process. Those who argue 
that the individual architect determines what the building will be, and all such 
issues of practice, clients, and collective action concern how the design will be 
implemented, are simply separating content from method, form from means, 
while overlooking the integral balance necessarily struck between them.’24
The process of drawing and redrawing is initiated by the work of our hands. It 
is taking sketch-paper and draping it over the plan of an area, picking up lines 
that are important in the environment not just once, but several times, each time 
emphasising different aspects, until one is able to grasp the essential local char-
acteristics. It is to take pictures of the environment, to make notes and sketches 
that emphasize its remarkable aspects. It is taking the drawings of the plan, the 
sketches, and the photos and superimposing them, drawing them again or making 
collages. It is printing the map on a different scale and drawing the context once 
again. It is making brief sketches of ideas that come to mind for a possible inter-
vention. It consists even of making sketches that may not immediately seem to fit, 
but are nevertheless produced by the hand. It is drawing the required program-
matic spaces and their relationships, exploring different relationships, and super-
imposing them on their given location. It can be the analysis of a building that 
is near, or programmatically/architecturally close, to what comes to mind. Such 
sketches can be quick, one over another, drawn with a soft and thick pencil. Other 
architects will use a hard and sharp pencil, as well as a ruler. One will use gridded 
paper with a marker, whereas another will use fine liners of differently-sized pen 
points. The dark and quick lines reveal emotion, while straight and light lines 
evoke precision. The Finnish architect Juhani Pallasmaa stresses that this process 
of design, of drawing lines on paper, of emphasising characteristics, of propelling 
possible interventions as a form of embodied imagination, developing a special 
relationship between what is drawn by the hand and what is evoked in the mind 
of the designer. Architecture, he writes, ‘is a product of the knowing hand. The 
hand grasps the physicality and materiality and turns it into a concrete image. In 
the arduous processes of designing, the hand often takes the lead in probing for a 
22. 
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form of the intervention, which is 
materialized in plans, sections, ideas 
about atmosphere, sequence, routing, 
and so on.  
23. 
Robert Gutman, ‘Architecture: The 
Entrepreneurial Profession’ in: Dana 
Cuff and John Wriedt(eds.), Archi-
tecture from the Outside in, Selected 
essays by Robert Gutman (New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
2010), 37
24. 
Dana Cuff, Architecture, The Story of 
Practice (Cambridge (Mass.)/London: 
The MIT Press, 1992), 13
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 7: DESIGN
529
vision, a vague inkling that it eventually turns into a sketch, a materialisation of 
an idea. The pencil in the architect’s hand is a bridge between the imagining mind 
and the image that appears on the sheet of paper.’25 In his book The Thinking 
Hand he stresses this relationship between hand and mind, particularly with the 
activity of drawing in mind. He argues that the mediation between image and 
mind through pencil and hand vanishes at the moment of design. Imagination 
takes over, and the hand materializes what is imagined. The architect, he argues, 
does not see only lines, rather ‘he is envisioning the object itself, and in his mind 
holding the object in his hand or occupying the space being designed. During 
the design process, the architect occupies the very structure that the lines of the 
drawing represent.’26 Nevertheless, the process of sketching and imagining is 
uncontrollable. Drawing, he states, is an embodied act – an ‘act’ here is as unpre-
dictable as an ‘action’ described by Arendt. ‘When sketching an imagined space, 
or an object being design, the hand is in a direct and delicate collaboration and 
interplay with mental imagery. The image arises simultaneously with an internal 
mental image and the sketch mediated by the hand. It is impossible to know which 
appeared first, the line of the drawing on the paper or the thought, or a conscious-
ness of an intention. In a way, the image seems to draw itself through the human 
hand.’27 This ‘work of our hands’ is, according to Pallasmaa, translates literally 
to ‘work with our hands’. The sociologist and urban designer Richard Sennett, 
in his well-known 2008 study on craftsmanship, also stresses the importance of 
‘handwerk’ when he quotes a ‘young architect’ employed at MIT who observed 
‘when you draw a site, when you put in the counter lines and the trees, it becomes 
ingrained in your mind. You come to know the site in a way that is not possible 
with the computer. … You get to know a terrain by tracing and retracing it, not by 
letting the computer “regenerate” it for you.’28 It is very significant that Sennett 
presents this remark as stated by an architect (a practitioner, not a theorist) who 
is young (it is not a matter of false nostalgia) who works at MIT (which is a very 
innovative and progressive school of architecture). The point is that architecture 
– intervention in the world – requires effort, extensive research, close reading, 
and careful mapping of traces. Architecture, as it is rooted in the world, is not so 
much about the ideas of the genius; the image of the Romantic age of the artist 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, but is instead descriptive of extensive 
‘handwerk’, reiterating the challenges of existing ideas and desires.  
Lots of architects have reflected on the important matter of drawing for the 
profession of architecture in similar perspectives. ‘For me,’ Samuel Mockbee 
argued for instance, ‘drawing and painting are the initial influences for the 
making of architecture. The sketch is always out front. It sees ahead and deeper 
into what is already on the paper.’29 To most architects this perspective is recog-
nizable, although every architect may use different words, produce different 
drawings, and even use different tools to draw. The American architect Steven 
Holl is well known due to his watercolours.30 [IMAGE 6.13] Le Corbusier, as well as 
Oscar Niemeyer, was able to draw using only a small number lines to illustrate his 
preliminary ideas. Herman Hertzberger is known because of his series of sketches 
that mediate between the overarching idea and the subservient ideas or details.31 
The fine-lined drawings of Alvaro Siza, which sometimes address his projects but 
often reify scenes from a café, profiles of people, or portraits, have also gained 
attention.32 [IMAGE 7.2] Interestingly enough, Siza argues that these sketches, although 
having nothing to do with architecture, help his work to look better, to see and 
to understand. Drawing, he states, is a tool used to develop the acuity of vision. 
The capacity of the architect, he argues, is to be able to see.33 However, this list 
of architects and their particular methods of notation are obviously random 
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and very limited, since they focus only on hand drawings and sketches. This 
particular imagination of the design process and the work of our hands belongs 
to a particular way of designing in which, as Mockbee stated, the hand visualizes 
what is in the mind of the designer, or seems to capture ideas before they are even 
understood by the same mind. It is, in other words, a reciprocal process – the 
mind is in conversation with the hand. Mockbee urges that such sketches, for 
him, always embody emotion. They are not conceptual, rational, nor theoretically 
driven. ‘In the beginning,’ he states, ‘it is important to allow the imagination to 
move freely without any influence from a preconceived form. It’s a mark that 
suggests the possibility of an idea. For me, it’s the act of drawing that allows the 
hand to come into accord with the heart.’34 This of course urges a certain form 
of ethics in architecture, a stance that is more close to the actual work of the 
designer. This perspective, although different, is also stressed by the architect 
Lina Bo Bardi. ‘Architecture, as an art of design, lives off drawing,’ she states. 
‘However, not in the sense of an artwork [but] in the [mathematical] sense it had 
in the Renaissance.’ She insists on avoiding pictorial representation, criticizing 
students who ‘draw in threaded lines; when not in impressionistic chiaroscuro’ 
and architects who use ‘spectacular presentation’. Instead, she calls for simplicity. 
To her, drawing has a moral purpose: ‘Professional ethics start with artistic 
modesty.’35  
 
Although drawing is stressed here to urge architectural design as a work of our 
hands, this of course is not the only way to propel imagination and to grasp the 
assignment at hand. There are multiple ways to design and multiple tools that can 
be used, for instance the use of physical 3D models. Models sometimes are used 
to investigate the project as an object, or to explore smaller details, to stimulate 
the light or to make something tangible in order to test what was initially in the 
mind of the designer. Whereas drawing is a quicker instrument used to visualize 
what is imagined, the advantage of the model – which of course is a much slower 
instrument for materializing ideas – is its third dimension: its physicality. Once 
again, this is a matter of the hand working on the project as if it were an object in 
a workable format. The promise of the model is that it can be viewed as a whole. It 
can be held at eye-level so that the designer can see (perhaps through) the object 
at eye-level as well. It has its own materials, depth and texture. It immediately 
evokes the imagination, as do lines on paper – it shows immediately how certain 
we can be about ideas regarding section and sequence, layout and structure, 
coming together or needing to be revisited once more. Models are often more 
easily understood by non-architects as well, while most of the drawings produced 
by the architectural office only serve to enlighten the profession itself. However 
the model is also not completely realistic. Due to pragmatic and practical circum-
stances, adaptations are needed in terms of materials and construction. Often, 
as an instrument of production, models abstract what is meant, emphasizing 
particular aspects of light, space, or exterior, and are simply cut out of card, 
wood or foam. The sociologist Albena Yaneva, who studied the practice of Rem 
Koolhaas and his office OMA, emphasizes that the tables full of models from 
previous projects in his Rotterdam office are central points in the space. The start 
of each project is always a gathering of several architects and engineers arranged 
around such a table.36 This symbolizes that to work on new cases is not so much a 
completely new start, but is instead the act of building upon previous experiences 
and proposals. The model used as part of the working methods of Koolhaas is also 
important, as he has revealed in the exhibition Content,37 where he showed the 
colloquial amount of working models made by his office, such as for the proposed 
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extension to the Marcel Breurer-designed building of the Whitney Museum in 
Manhattan. Every idea and every slightly different detail in a design is reified in a 
model. This series of models offers Koolhaas the opportunity to judge the design 
quickly, and to direct his assistants in the right direction.38 [IMAGE 7.3] This series of 
models shows that Koolhaas is searching for buildings as objects, for architecture 
as a type of spectacle, for mind-blowing structures and impressive construction. 
OMA’s models also show that there is no alternative so easily accessible to the 
human mind, so easily affecting our imagination of possibilities. As Adam Caruso, 
one of the principals of the London based office Caruso St. John (which works 
often with models), argues: ‘Working with models is an open way of working; 
we [he refers to Peter St. John, the other principal of the office, HT], both can 
easily make changes to the model. … A model embodies ideas quite literally. It 
forces you to resolve things in three dimensions to some degree. But it is simul-
taneously still “open”: you can see other things, discover other possibilities in 
it.’39 As he continues his explanation for choosing the model as in instrument of 
design, he argues that the model is closest alternative to an empirical investiga-
tion of acquired ideas, one that allows us to transform these ideas towards real 
architectural interventions. As he explains in reference to their project Brick 
House (London, UK, 2001-2005): ‘We studied a range of lighting situations in 
different parts of the house. You can only get a feeling for this through a kind of 
empirical investigation. Trial and error, investigating again and again how light 
falls in the models. With Photoshop and drawing you just can lie. There is no 
cause and effect. With rendering programs there is, but they are too hyperreal 
for us. Working with a model is much faster: you can cut a window in a wall, or 
you can put tracing paper on the skylights and see what the effect is. And it’s 
real!’40 Caruso thus not only stresses the ‘reality’ of the model – the physicality 
and its three-dimensionality, but also urges the immediate relationship between 
what the hands are producing and what the mind registers. What models offer, 
compared to the drawing, we might state, is this accessible view of the whole and 
its physicality. This concept of accessibility is important: it is partly evoked by the 
abstraction that is needed to build the model, by the tension between the urge for 
realism in its physicality and the adaptations made for scale and aim, between 
the object in itself as well as its means towards another end. It can be completed 
through imagination – or better said: it evokes imagination.[IMAGE 7.4] This is the 
most important characteristic of the model, Peter Eisenman argues in his preface 
to the catalogue of the 1976 exhibition Idea as Model, the capacity to render the 
imagined visible and to provide space for the unexpected.41 Moreover, models – as 
well as drawings – have a life of their own. They are not simply tools in a process 
of design, nor are they simply a representation of a particular proposal, but they 
have their own merits, their own role within the architectural office (a role that 
differs from office to office), and they can even be an end in themselves. This is 
an important insight: in the field of architecture, the end is not only the construc-
tion of a particular building, but also the in-between moments or processes that 
may not lead to a constructed building are part of the field. Models, sketches, 
drawings, diagrams, and all other products that come out of the hands of the 
designer contribute to architectural knowledge, to the imagination of the future, 
to propelling potentialities – or better said: insight into the world.   
Even today, this particular form of architectural work and practice is for a large 
part still the work of our hands, despite the work of our hands being increasingly 
replaced by the computer, the CAD model and the 3D printer. It is important to 
see how models and drawings are still present in architectural offices, even in 
38.
Rem Koolhaas, Brendan McGetrick, 
Simon Brown, Content (Köln: 
Taschen Verlag, 2004) See also 
Jan Willem Neutelings and Michiel 
Riedijk, At Work. Neutelings 
Riedijk Architects (Rotterdam: 010 
Publishers, 2005) 
39.
Job Floris and Hans Teerds, ‘On 
Models and Images. An Interview 
with Adam Caruso’ in: Anne Holtrop, 
Job Floris, and Hans Teerds (eds.), 
Models, The Idea, the Representa-
tion and the Visionary, OASE #84 
(Rotterdam: NAi Publishers, 2011), 
129
40.
Ibid., 129
41. 
Peter Eisenman, ‘Preface’, in: Richard 
Pommer, Kenneth Frampton and 
Silvia Kolbowski (eds.), Idea as 
Model, (New York: Rizzoli, 1981), 1
532
those offices that are completely are digitalized, where drawings almost never 
are printed, and where models are also digital, where models are assembled not 
by the designers themselves, but printed or outsourced to specialist firms. To be 
surrounded by tangible ‘products’ in the office-space seems to be important, not 
only to reveal produced buildings to clients that come to visit the office, but also to 
make present the ‘end’ of the work for the workers themselves. Whereas drawings 
offer only particular viewpoints (and therefore fragmented imagery of the object) 
the model presents the entire project. As Pallasmaa argues, ‘physical models are 
incomparable aids in the design process of the architect and the designer. The 
three-dimensional material model speaks to the hand and the body as powerfully 
as to the eye, and the very process of constructing a model simulates the 
process of construction.’42 This insight suggests that, even in a time of increased 
automation and instrumentalization, to approach architectural design still as 
hand-work, to work with hand-cutted (working) models as well as with hand-
sketched drawings, remains at the root of our divergent contemporary practices.
However, I wish to take us back once again to the process of design as it is meant 
to become, to lord and master over materials and space. The intriguing aspect of 
the final plan is that, despite the interaction with the client, with future users, with 
neighbours and all other advisors, it can be described as the particular view of a 
particular designer. This counts more for the initial plan, presented and adjusted 
afterwards, but the final plan is still something that cannot be described as the 
single answer to a question. Another designer, although similar in contact with 
the client, users, and others involved, may come up with a completely different 
proposal. Even the same designer would not come up with the same plan twice. 
In other words, the plan that is presented represents the best response to the 
assignment the designer can think of at that particular moment. This ‘best 
solution’ of course is affected not just by the program and the request of the 
clients (architectural design is not maths), but by the architect’s subjective inter-
pretation of his/her assignments, which is informed by the experience and skills 
of the designer, by his/her worldview or architectural convictions, by personal 
taste or objectives. 
We might describe this aspect of design as the subjective aspect of architec-
ture. The term subjective may of course move us in a wrong direction. After all, 
our experience of architecture is also subjective. No two human beings share the 
exact same experience while entering a space. The subjective nature of sensuous 
experience, which is discussed extensively within the fields of philosophy, 
psychology, and anthropology, is important within our reflections upon the 
relationship between architecture and the world.43 However, at this point we 
address the subjectivity of the design activity – the subjective reflection upon the 
assignment, the subjective judgment of a particular site, the subjective desire 
that fuels the design process and so on. As already mentioned, no two architects 
will draw the same proposal, even if they are given at the very same moment the 
very same assignment. In other words, the assignment-brief will already be read 
subjectively. It might be unexpected to stress this point, but the subjective nature 
of this aspect of design is important. Against certain developments in the broader 
field of architecture, developments that try to make design more objective and 
more evidence-based, we have to understand that the subjectivity of design; ideas 
that are craved, discussed, challenged, proposed, and accepted by people, binds 
this work to the world. I even will go as far as to call it the worldliness condition 
of architectural intervention. Architecture is work, not labor. Or better stated, it is 
‘reflective work’44 which cannot be automated – or which can only be automated 
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at the cost of its worldliness. Arendt’s notion of the ‘world’, even if we see it as 
the ‘world-in-common’, does not thrive upon objectification. On the contrary, 
it requires the subjective reflection of the professional. The act of caring for the 
world, which Arendt stresses as the very essence of culture, requires subjective but 
knowledgeable interventions. 
This remark should not be read as a plea for a design-ethics of ‘everything 
goes and anything is possible.’ On the contrary, we can better understand this 
as an observation, which is also supported by the critical response of Arendt to 
mass production and the trend to divide every process of making into small, 
simple steps (which shows a tendency towards objectification and efficiency, as 
we touched upon in the previous chapter via José Saramago’s novel The Cave). 
Each of these steps requires a simple operation carried out by someone involved, 
handling a machine or putting some parts together. There is responsibility, 
but only on the level of the single jackscrew. This model produces only similar 
things, there only is a single prototype that is simply multiplied to unprecedented 
levels. The opposite approach means that the worker is addressed in his skills 
for delivering something for which he can take full responsibility of the whole 
product. Such production depends on personal knowledge and craftsmanship that 
is acquired in the past, first and foremost through work carried out on previous 
projects, but also through childhood experiences and the architectural education 
obtained. Here we touch upon another aspect of the relationship between the 
human body and construction, as is emphasized in Schwartz and Mies van der 
Rohe’s perspectives. This is not simply limited to my own experiences, although it 
is substantiated by being involved in construction, and the production of sketches, 
drawings and models. The knowledge of space, which is partly related to the other 
subjective aspect of architecture; the sensuous experience of space and place, is 
challenged by the expertise that is embodied within the field of architecture, an 
expertise that is acquired over time. This begins with the pre-modern period, in 
which the architect was not yet separate from the construction site, later followed 
by the personal experiences of spaces and materials. The human body and mind 
acquires this information, while architectural education and training helps to tap 
into what has been referred to by Michael Polanyi as tacit knowledge; to make it 
profitable and ready for use.45 The conception of a building and the construction 
of it, along with the knowledge of how to build it, has become part of architectural 
knowledge, which is processed in the drawings that are offered to the craftsman 
on the site.
However, particularly in situations within architectural practice, the proposed 
design always reveals the particular position of the designer facing the acquired 
project. This position always reflects the program and location, on program and 
representation. The design, to state it vice versa, reveals something of the position 
of the designer themselves. This also makes it difficult for designers to look at 
their designs from a distance and to truly reflect upon what they are doing. I will 
return to this last remark later, since it is an important aspect of architecture 
acting as a public good; to be able to critically judge one’s own designs. 
7.2.3 Innovation and Instrumentalization
Juhani Pallasmaa, Richard Sennett, Samuel Mockbee and Adam Caruso, all 
stress the importance of physical working with hands: to draw, to sketch, and to 
construct models. Mockbee, as we have seen previously, goes one step further. 
He also urges architects to actually work with and amongst their clients. As is 
well-known, his Rural Studio stands shoulder to shoulder with their clients at the 
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construction site. Although prepared in their office space, their drawings are often 
adapted at the construction site itself, depending upon the available materials 
and remarks of the client. [IMAGE 7.5] This direct relationship between preparation 
and adaptation, and the dependency upon available materials is encouraged by 
the environmental philosophy of the office. They work with cheap materials, often 
donated as left-overs or salvaged from elsewhere, such as from stray bales or car 
tires. Rural Studio was established in the early nineties, after experience in his 
own private architectural firm Mockbee/Coker of the increasing amount of work 
for wealthier people, where it became difficult to find the necessary funding to 
develop affordable housing for the very poor inhabitants of the American South. 
With his studio at the Auburn University, he was able to combine pedagogical 
insight with social compassion, bringing students into the field to design and build 
houses or small collective buildings, for which they even needed to find funding 
in order to construct them.46 Students thus were learning not simply to draw a 
building, but to draw it with the client literally looking over their shoulder, the 
person for whom the building had to work. This characterizes Mockbee’s ideal 
of the architect: to work together, architects and clients alike, with materials ‘as 
found’ or ‘as given’. This character of course has to do with the critical and social 
position Mockbee has taken in the field of architecture: to work against poverty 
with the poor themselves, to be critical towards the status quo. As Mockbee 
argues, the spirit behind Rural Studio was an eagerness to ‘push architecture, 
social improvement, education, arts, and ideas about the environment.’47 For 
Mockbee, as we have seen, architectural design is a process of aligning the hand 
with the heart.
The more common approach in architecture, however, is for architects to 
design and draw, and for craftsmen on the construction site to take the drawings 
and construct the building according to the plans given to them. Although the 
architect will be involved in the construction via attending meetings, explaining 
ideas, and checking the actual construction, the role of the architect is in general 
quite distanced from the actual construction. The main instrument possessed by 
the architect to process the construction of the imagined building is the drawing. 
Similar to the model, the drawings is also an abstraction of reality, particu-
larly since it brings a 3D reality into 2D representations of layout and sections, 
renderings of particular viewpoints. ‘Projections’, as Stan Allen calls the drawing, 
‘are the architect’s means to negotiate the gap between idea and material: a 
series of techniques through which the architect manages to transform reality 
by necessarily indirect means.’48 As buildings become more complex and the 
architect becomes more distanced from actual practice, more instruments are 
needed to gain information as well as to communicate imagination. There are of 
course many other instruments than the drawing that can be used, as touched 
upon previously: drawings, working drawings, collages, photographic surveys, 
infographics, diagrams, mass models, sketch models, games, and so on. There 
is of course also a second layer of tools active in the hands of the designer: the 
literal extensions of the hands of the architect that draws lines and cuts foam: 
pencils, rulers, straight edges, French curves, compasses, paper, as well as card, 
wood, foam, knifes, scissors, glue, and so on. Most of these instruments and tools 
are tangible – indeed things that can be grasped, transported, presented, used, 
thrown away and taken up once again. However, diagrams and infographics also 
show that a new instrument, the computer, has entered the practice of architec-
ture. Caruso, in the interview quoted above, stresses the impact of the computer, 
and reveals that he does not yet embrace the possibilities the computer offers.49 
He places particular emphasis on rendering-programs, which he states as being 
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hyperreal. He makes this remark just before he stresses once again the importance 
of physicality, which is represented in the limited character of the model – which, 
as is known, is the preferred design-instrument of his design-method. He does not 
only like the tangibility of the model, but also the certain amateurism of cutting 
and gluing, as is clear in his examples of their working with models. Cutting 
windows or taping their openings afterwards shows a clear image of work-in-
progress, of investigation and exploration of possibilities, of having new ideas 
or defining alternatives before testing them immediately. The computer model 
and its rendering programs do not have the same limitations. Windows can be 
made everywhere, they can be made immediately bigger and smaller if needed, 
and even in the middle of such a process the outcome is always smooth and crisp; 
suggesting finality. It is hyperreal, Caruso states, since it has lost the resistance 
of the hand-mind connection, which although somewhat difficult and inefficient, 
has the quality of immediately understanding of our actions.50 Or, to state it 
differently: it lacks the sensuousness of what we are doing, although the newest 
techniques try to overcome this through augmented reality or even the possibility 
to be bodily and sensibly stimulated in the actions within virtual reality. 
These new techniques, particularly developed and applied during the last 
decades, effectively and actively thrive upon the hands of the designer from what 
has been made apart. I mean this in a literal sense first and only in a second 
instance metaphorically: most of the steps in design described above are being 
done in and with the computer, and do not end in producing a particular drawing. 
Of course, the hand is doing things with the keyboard and the mouse, just like a 
drawing pencil on a drawing-board, but the result is tangible (outside the frame of 
the computer) only at the end of the process. In the newest processes, there does 
not need to be a tangible working drawing that shows the wall in the construc-
tion site: it is processed in real-time to the constructor (or even to the robot that 
laser-cuts the required pieces) without the interaction of a craftsman. Of course, 
neat diagrams are produced, along with nice renderings and other images that 
may even reach photographic quality. However, in the newest techniques the 
craftsmen is not involved, and the architect only serves to communicate the 
ideas to the commissioner and the public. The new techniques affect not only the 
process but also the final product of making, we can argue. Architectural design 
moves slowly from the series of sketches and drawings to smooth and clear-cut 
diagrams, to 3D computational models, mappings and analysis, to visualizations 
and the elaboration of data.51 Architectural design thereafter loses its character 
of processing a series of trial-and-error developments that form a tangible series 
of in-between products, rather than only a singular, crisp-ended project. There is 
something hidden in the series of hand drawings, sketches and models, which can 
be put on the table to literally represent a series that reveals the development of 
ideas and reflections – something that is no longer tangible within the use of only 
diagrams and infographics as a replacement.52 
Although these new instruments and design methods can still be described as 
‘work of our hands’, Pallasmaa and Sennett also urge for criticism in the intro-
duction of the computer within the design process, particularly regarding the 
loss of the hand-mind connection, as we have seen before. The computer, they 
argue, can be of help, but ultimately design is a product of ‘hand-werk’. It is 
driven by the body and mind and by embodied knowledge. ‘The architect moves 
about freely in the imagined structure, however large and complex it may be, as 
if walking in a building and touching all its surfaces and sensing their materiality 
and texture’, Pallasmaa states in his aforementioned book The Thinking Hand. He 
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surprisingly adds an important note: ‘This is an intimacy that is surely difficult, 
if not impossible, to simulate through computer-aided means of modelling 
and simulation.’53 In other words, the computer cannot replace the intimacy of 
addressing all of the senses at once, something that happens by pushing a pencil 
on paper and drawing a line, nor can it replace the power that is needed to handle 
the knife and to cut the card or to fold the paper – or indeed the precision that is 
needed (as I experienced to my annoyance) to glue transparent plastics onto a frail 
wooden structure. ‘By reinforcing visual manipulation and graphic production, 
computer imaging further detaches architecture from its multisensory essence; 
as design tools, computers can encourage mere visual manipulation and make 
us neglect our powers of empathy and imagination.’54 The architectural historian 
Antoine Picon also reinforces this point, because he not only recognizes the gap 
between the intuition of the architect or urban designer (trained in the using that 
which exists between paper and reality) versus the computerized reality and its 
changes to architecture and materiality via computer aided design, but also that 
new ‘forms’ are possible to produce nowadays that do not fit within the ordinary 
perceptions of the people that will inhabit the project.55 This urges Picon to stress 
architecture’s responsibility to the world once more. Architects need a critical 
attitude to what they do and how they do it, to what they add to the world and to 
the everyday spaces of the people inhabiting it.56 
 
Arendt is rightly presented amongst philosophers that are critically investigating 
contemporary technological developments, and is critical about the impact of 
new technologies in the world. However, this does not mean that she rejects 
technical developments. On the contrary, the third image that Arendt provides 
of the human activity of work is innovation, which she immediately relates to 
the urgency to develop instruments that help to master nature and materials; 
tools that reduce the burden of labor and propel the work of the homo faber.57 
Innovation somehow belongs to the heart of human nature – it always retains an 
important aspect of the evolving civilization and culture. Innovation is evoked by 
the eagerness to change situations in order to make them more comfortable, more 
adaptable, more workable and less dangerous. Innovation means the invention of 
new instruments for homo faber. To develop tools, Arendt argues, is an activity 
bound to the world. Innovation is part of the worldliness of the homo faber. 
Tools, as Pallasmaa argues, are extensions of the human being; extensions of 
working hands. Instruments help to enhance particular skills and to empower 
human capacities. In architecture the use of tools is quite common. On the 
building site, there of course are the huge range of regular tools – even tools 
that are for most human beings quite familiar: the hammer, the screwdriver, the 
drilling machine, lamps, heaters, scaffolding, cranes, concrete mixers, and so on. 
Also in the architectural office, there are instruments in use: the computer, sketch 
paper, pencils, markers, knifes, printers and plotters, etc. Although drawings 
and models can be understood as final products as well, they can also be seen as 
means towards another end. Most models and drawings, however, represent steps 
in the process of design, used to investigate certain ideas, and to share these ideas 
to others involved in the processes of design and construction.   
The computer, and in particular drawing programs and communication programs 
(as well as the meeting between the two in the today’s fashionable BIM-model), 
is regularly presented as a contemporary instrument that is beneficial to design 
and for working together, as well as enabling complex, otherwise unbuildable 
non-Euclidian geometries to be made.58 The computer as an instrument of archi-
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tectural design thus has a mixture of objectives, on the level of the actual design 
affecting the formal outcome of the design process, as well as on the design as a 
communal effort or in trying to overcome the subjective aspects of architectural 
design. I will come back to the latter objective later, but a good example of the 
first objective might be the ambition of Lars Spuybroek to re-introduce the formal 
ambitions of the Gothic style in architecture, as he has extensively discussed in 
his books The Architecture of Continuity and The Sympathy of Things.59 [IMAGE 
7.6] Although a certain form is also part of the work of Kas Oosterhuis in his more 
recent explanations of his objectives, the idea of form is less present in favour of 
an idea of working together real-time on a very complex and fluid project, while 
a fluctuating spatial experience in time seems to be introduced. Interestingly 
enough, the formal ambitions of Spuybroek are extensively embedded in archi-
tectural theory and history, and the perspective of Oosterhuis departs from the 
field of architecture particularly by stressing the technological possibilities of the 
virtual environment offered by the increasing speed and capacity of the computer 
and of social networks. 
These tools, however, may gain status not as a means to a certain end (which 
clearly describes tools), but as ends in themselves. However, Arnedt argues that 
an ongoing emphasis on efficiency and automatization shifts this perspective and 
turns it upside-down. The human being has become an extension of the tool. Both 
Sennett and Pallasmaa, in their emphasis on ‘embodied work’ and ‘craftsman-
ship’, warn against a similar threat, probably due to a certain resistance towards 
today’s practices, and particularly to the effect of the computer on architecturual 
design. This is somewhat similar to Arendt’s response to automatization in 
America’s during the 1950s.
This concern also lies behind the critical texts written by Pallasmaa and 
Sennett. Pallasmaa criticizes today’s architectural practices, not only in The 
Thinking Hand (in which he is concentrating on the design process), but also in 
his reflections of superfluous objectives in architecture today, for instance in The 
Eyes of the Skin, in which he focuses on the sensuous experience of spaces.60 In 
both perspectives of attention, he urges for the full embodiment of architecture, 
not only in the sensuousness of buildings and spaces, but also in the sensuous-
ness of design itself. These two aspects belong together, according to Pallasmaa: 
‘When sketching an imagined space, or an object being designed, the hand is in a 
direct and delicate collaboration and interplay with mental imagery. The image 
arises simultaneously with an internal mental image and the sketch mediated by 
the hand.’61 Pallasmaa’s concern, which compels him to stress the importance 
of the embodiment of architecture, is of course triggered by the introduction of 
the computer in design. He does not deny the benefits of the computer within 
architectural design; rather it is the particular un-embodiment of architectural 
design through the full-use of the computer that threatens the object of architec-
ture. ‘The hand with a charcoal, pencil or pen creates a direct haptic connection 
between the object, its representation and the designer’s mind; the manual sketch, 
drawing or physical models is moulded in the same flesh of physical materiality 
that the material object being designed and the architect himself embody, whereas 
computer operations and imagery take place in a mathematicised and abstracted 
immaterial world.’62  
Sennett provides a bit of a broader societal scope in The Craftsman, stressing 
the importance of material culture within today’s society. This brings him close 
Arendt’s concern in The Human Condition. As he argues himself in the prologue 
of his book, the reader is urged to see his contribution as a critical response to 
Arendt’s treatment of work in The Human Condition. Sennett has been a student 
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of Arendt at The University of Chicago, and he opens this book by touching upon 
her somewhere on a street in the Upper West Side of Manhattan in 1962, just 
after the Cuban missile crisis, when ‘the world was on the brink of the atomic 
war.’63 This missile crisis worried them, Sennett tells, but also confirmed Arendt’s 
conviction that what people make should be a topic of public debate. Sennett 
later writes: ‘She wanted me to draw the right lesson: people who make things 
usually don’t understand what they are doing.’64 In The Human Condition Arendt 
indeed urges the need for political reflection on what is actually done, after she 
first makes the case that the human being only knows what he makes himself. 
However in the contemporary situation, she argues that this is not true anymore. 
Or better said, this is not true anymore in regard to the sciences: the concern of 
Arendt here is not so much about focusing on the craftsman creating objects, 
but instead on the scientist investigating the smallest details and the largest 
outlooks. The long-term impact of the knowledge developed cannot be predicted 
during the moment of investigation and development. Science has offered an 
insight into the smallest details, which can actually have an impact on the biggest 
scale possible, and can even lead to the destruction of man himself. The nuclear 
developments act as proof to her, as Sennett also writes, that one cannot expect 
reflection from the scientists and engineers themselves. The scientific attitude is 
actually an eagerness to know, that is: to do whatever is possible. She thereafter 
argues that the need for reflection upon what man can or can’t do should be 
discussed publicly. Sennett rightly questions if the public is ‘skilled’ enough to 
understand the problem at hand, and his answer is that reflection should be 
part of the role of the craftsman and the worker. He then proposes that his book 
is making the case that ‘people can learn about themselves through the things 
they make, that material cultures matter.’65 He proposes this as a correction to 
Arendt, a correction that may not only have been evoked by the ‘distrust’ felt 
by Arendt in the worker as Sennett argues, but also since (as he has shown in 
his previous books on cities and city life that we’ve touched upon previously) 
he has an even deeper pessimism than Arendt toward the vitality of the public 
realm. To my mind, Sennett is too brief in his rejection of Arendt’s concern. 
This is not only because Arendt is not addressing the craftsman per se (instead 
the scientist is discussed – both in Sennett’s anecdote, but also in her book The 
Human Condition), but also that there is a real tension in society between devel-
opments in science and in public reflection upon such developments, where it 
is not immediately obvious that the scientists themselves are able and willing to 
start a public discourse on their own approaches, methods, and investigations in 
terms of their cultural and societal impact. Moreover, Sennett’s negative reading 
of Arendt’s ‘distrust’ does not value the pivotal role played by material culture and 
its various aspects in her writings. In The Human Condition she argues that ‘what 
we make’ conditions the human being. The world helps us to survive, but it is not 
simply a prerequisite for public life. It affects the human being extensively, the 
human body and mind, and also the human community and public life. Because 
of this affect, Arendt stresses that a continuous process of public reflection is 
required. This is particularly the case when considering the increasing influence 
of the labor attitude within the realm of work, where responsibilities are unclear 
or scattered. Sennett does not follow Arendt in this distinction between labor 
and work. He even argues that he wants to ‘rescue the animal laborans from the 
contempt with which Hannah Arendt treated him.’66 The perspective he draws 
is as follows: ‘The working animal can be enriched by the skills and dignified by 
the spirit of craftsmanship.’67 Although Arendt also uses the term ‘craftsman’, 
she uses it simply as a synonym for the notion of the homo faber. In the writings 
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of Sennett, the position of the craftsman is to be understood as somewhere 
in-between the animal laborans and the homo faber – we might state that the 
distinction is blurred. A baker can of course be a craftsman in his own view, just 
like a carpenter may be as well. As long as the image of the craftsman emphasizes 
a certain repetition in their work, where expertise builds upon this repetition in 
practice, a skill can be developed over time. The actual aim of Sennett is revealed 
in the last chapters of his book, in which he challenges craftsmen to also reflect (as 
part of an ethical attitude) upon their work. With his emphasis on the craftsman, 
he highlights the importance of the development of skills in order to become a 
good craftsman. Concerning the attitude of the craftsman, for Sennett, this always 
is a matter of the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad’ craftsman in terms of the skilled or the 
unskilled craftsman, the craftsman that does not rest in his/her behaviour and 
repetition, but instead seeks to innovate and experiment. This idea of crafts-
manship is stimulating, particularly within the field of architecture, where the 
term urges architects to properly deal with materials and spaces, with details 
and construction, to work physically and mentally on the development of a plan 
that fits the human being. Nevertheless, the question remains if Sennett’s model 
also covers the researcher in a laboratory. There is a certain expertise, which 
in the sciences is not immediately covered by repetitive skills but mainly lies in 
specific knowledge, often captured in a language that is distinct from everyday 
speech. Bridging the gap towards the public will be difficult, obviously not only 
from the scientist to the public, but also the other way around. We might argue 
that Sennett’s model indeed offers a challenge to the sciences – but Arendt’s 
perspective does this as well: to make it a part of public discussion, the scientist 
will need to appear in public and make his attempts known in a language that is 
commonly understood.
However, this model of craftsmanship is difficult and even limiting – 
particular when thinking of jobs that hardly require any particular skills, or 
those that do not offer the possibility for reflection and innovation, the types of 
experiment and talent urged by Sennett as the aspects of craftsmanship. This 
craftsmanship only partly covers the image of labor and work – and thus leaves 
part of the activities of the human being uncovered. Moreover, Arendt does not so 
much stress a difference between the animal laborans and the worker if it regards 
the capacity to think, to reflect, and to act ethically. She was concerned about this 
capacity, surely – but this concern is applicable to all jobs. Here Arendt stresses 
in particular the limitations of the role at can be inhabited by the worker, if his 
position in the production process is limited to the smaller parts of fabrication, 
parts that in themselves do not have a certain independency.68 We also can state 
that if the repetition of labor enters the field, love for the world is losing terrain.
In other words, Sennett’s attempt to rethink craftsmanship is not that far from 
Arendt’s urge to address work as distinct from labor. Similarly to Arendt, Sennett 
is also concerned about developments in technology and technics. If Sennett 
pushes for reflection as part of the attitude of the craftsman, this is in practice 
quite difficult, particularly regarding the implementation of new technologies. As 
for instance in the case above, discussing the importance of ‘handwerk’ in design, 
Sennett shows his concern towards the lack of the ‘embodying’ of the object of 
study. ‘Instrumentalization’ of the design-process starts to affect the outcome of 
the design process, Sennett warns, from the misunderstanding of scale, to troubles 
with materiality and the failure to grasp actual space and its requirements.69 This 
concern is outlined in many more passages which also address concern for the 
cycle of the sciences, which is not often driven by the eagerness to know, nor by 
love for the world, but rather: ‘the passion to race drives science; those in the 
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grip of this competitive obsession easily lose sight of the value and purpose of 
what they are doing. They are not thinking in craftsman-time, the slow time that 
enables reflection.’70 
7.2.4 The Architectural Entrepeneur
Until now, we have spoken about architecture and the architect with the image of 
gaining a commission to design an architectural artefact in mind. In this image, 
there is a particular client with a certain need, who chooses a specific designer 
to offer a proposal that answers this need. We need to describe this process 
cautiously – particularly regarding the client and the specific designer – since 
the proposal offered has as much to do with the client’s preferences, knowledge 
and approach as with those of the designer. A client is not likely to choose an 
architectural firm that offers designs which do not fit to the profile they have 
in mind. Prince Charles specifically asked Léon Krier to design Poundbury; his 
reactionary response to contemporary urban planning. On the other hand, Krier is 
not likely to be asked by Apple to design their new head office in Sacramento – a 
commission offered to Norman Foster, whose high-tech approach to architecture 
is much closer to the image Apple has built for itself. In other words, the view held 
by the client towards architecture foregoes the design of the building. Architects 
often and rightly urge their role not as one of simply designing, but also as one 
of educating the client. For instance, they may offer the client insight into their 
spatial needs and the ways in which architecture is able to respond. Although this 
applies in most cases, behind all great buildings that fill the lists of architectural 
wonders are strong clients with a particular vision for what their building needed 
to be and which architect was best placed to fulfil that need.71 Seen the other 
way around, those thadt particularly knew which architecture could answer the 
needs not yet clear.72 Good architecture, in other words, requires good clients, 
good commissionership, and a strong feeling of working together. This reveals 
the inherent relativity of architecture: if the response to a particular need differs 
from office to office, from designer to designer, and even from client to client, 
it is clear that there is no single ‘truth’ out there. Architecture does not offer a 
singular solution, but offers multiple directions in which particular responses can 
be found. As I argued previously: this diversity of responses belongs to the worldly 
aspects of architecture. The wide range of different options produced in response 
to particular questions become more clearly tangible in competitions, which are 
a regular occurrence in architectural practice. Clients sometimes ask a selection 
of offices to present their approach to architecture and to show their portfolio in 
order to judge their knowledge of particular issues or their architectural style. 
Sometimes offices are already asked to develop a first direction on the basis of the 
requested program and the characteristics of the site. The client then choses the 
direction (practice) he likes the most. Sometimes these competitions are more 
open; juries are asked to make judgements and even the public is sometimes 
able to vote. The Guggenheim Museum recently sought to open a branch in 
Helsinki for the design of the building they launched in 2014 as part of an open 
competition. An unbelievable number of 1,715 anonymous entries was hand in, 
from which the French office Moreau Kusonoki Architects was chosen as the 
winner.[IMAGE 7.7] Unfortunately, in 2016, the project was cancelled – it nevertheless 
remains staggering to have had 1,715 different responses to the Museum’s need 
and vision for the particular characteristics of the proposed site in Helsinki.
The image that comes to mind here is of course once again the subjective aspects 
of architecture. Subjective qualities are not only rooted in the design approach 
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of the architect, but are also decisive on the level of the client and other parties 
involved in commissioning projects. The American sociologist Robert Gutman, 
who addresses the architectural profession extensively, has urged this point as 
pivotal to the image of the profession in society. Architecture cannot be compared 
to other businesses or to other services in society like those offered by lawyers 
and doctors, nor can it be compared to strict engineering work. The subjective 
part in architecture, both on the level of the architect and the client, makes the 
profession vulnerable.73 He therefore urges architects to think more realisticly 
about the features of their work and to be honest about the difficulties of promises 
made in architecture. He also argues that this vulnerability emphasizes the need 
of the architect to ‘go out in the community and seek work; he cannot rely on 
people coming to him.’ Architecture, he continues, has to be seen as an entre-
preneurial profession: ‘The challenge to the architect is to find a way of creating 
a desire on the part of the public to use his services in preference to the services 
of another type of building designer.’74 The architect, in other words, needs to 
reach out to the public, primarily due to business-reasons, but also due to other 
reasons made clear by Arendt’s writings which I will discuss later. However, at 
this point it might be clearer to state that in order to get (new) commissions, the 
public – the potential clients – have to be informed about particular approaches 
and knowledge shared on behalf of the architect. The idea of creating desires, 
the perspective offered by Gutman, is frequently entering the market, showing 
the possibilities of the office and the particular elements your office has to offer. 
There is, in other words, a continuous need to profile the office to the public 
at large. However with his idea of ‘creating desire’, Gutman also means that 
the architect has to expand his/her scope, rather than narrow it down to the 
‘beautifying’ of what other practices have designed, which is the same trend in 
building practices argued above and in the previous chapter. Gutman refers to 
architectural firms as good examples of expanding the scope of their portfolio 
within project development itself, or that start to present themselves as experts 
in exhibition design. Other more recent examples can be mentioned more easily: 
offices that also take responsibility for construction work on site, for construction 
management, or even for building maintenance and business development. Other 
offices such as OMA have established distinct research branches. Furthermore, 
other architects have expanded their expertise to completely different design 
practices, such as graphic design or product design. Others have tried to find a 
niche in the market whose needs require a particular form of expertise. Examples 
of this include assignments in healthcare and transportation, which are so 
complex that previous experience in similar projects is often requested by the 
clients. Other offices also experiment with particular materials or construction 
techniques, from 3D printing to cardboard, and from CNC-milling and clay 
moulding.  
The article written by Gutman is intriguing: describing a market for architec-
ture that is weak and suspicious, one that urges architecture to simultaneously be 
more honest in its achievements, as well as to its inherent qualities which need to 
be made public. He substantiates this question and perspective further in tracing 
two responses to the shrinking market: the architectural practice understood as 
a (regular) business enterprise, and on the other hand the architect presenting 
themselves as an artist. Gutman is concerned about both of these directions. 
The first is often unable to distinguish itself from other service providers in 
construction and building design and may not easily discuss issues of aesthetics 
in personal terms, while the second is often captured by an image of autonomous 
architecture, as developed throughout the twentieth century, as well as by ideas of 
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self-expression.75 Gutman of course urges a path in-between the two: architecture 
as an entrepreneurial processes as well as a form of artistic practice – architecture 
as, in his words, ‘makers of buildings who are also makers of form.’76 
Arendt also asserts the view that the ‘market’ is closely related to the activity of 
‘work’, which represents the fourth aspect of work she provides in The Human 
Condition. In her discussion of the market, it is clear that Arendt is concerned 
about the impact of the market on the product and production of work. The 
market, as she argues, has become the public space of the idea of politics in the 
modern age, which is not based on action and speech, but on law-enforcement 
and governmental administration. The central component in this system is not 
the citizen, but the homo faber, who works ‘for the people at large.’77 This is not 
particularly modern, Arendt admits, as antiquity also knew of such ‘communities’, 
where the central public space, the agora, was not a place where citizens would 
meet, but ‘a market place where craftsmen could show and exchange their 
products.’78 ‘Tyrants’, Arendt argues, tried to frustrate the agora as the meeting 
place of citizens, where citizens idled ‘their time away’ by talking about public 
issues. They thereafter sought ‘to transform the agora into an assemblage of 
shops like the bazaars of oriental despotism.’79 Arendt stresses that these spaces, 
unlike today’s shopping malls and districts, were characterized by the visibility 
of production. Not only the goods were on display, but also the processes of 
production were exposed – similarly to the medieval trade and crafts districts she 
cites. 
The visibility of production within these markets collides with what Arendt 
calls the ‘splendid isolation’ of the worker. The homo faber is only able to relate to 
other people ‘by exchanging his products with theirs’.80 Togetherness as offered in 
public space, like ‘acting in concert and speaking with each other’, is not possible 
for the workman: ‘Only when he stops working and his product is finished can he 
abandon his isolation’.81 It is therefore the case that production itself needs to be 
isolated from the public realm. The particular concern Arendt urges here is not so 
much the presence of spectators but, particularly in the modern age, the rise of the 
social, in which the competence and the excellence of the homo faber comes under 
suspicion. This is particularly the case when enforcing the division of operations 
in the process of production, operations that can be handled by unskilled labor 
where the expertise of the homo faber is hollowed out. This compels Arendt 
to assert that work cannot mean teamwork. The only company available to the 
carpenter and the potter is the patron – an assistant relationship, where the 
master educates his unskilled assistant until he/she acquires the same skills. In 
his book The Craftsman Richard Sennett also discusses the relationship between 
masters and assistants, using the particular example of the famous violin builder 
Stradivarius to show how important it is for the craftsman and the durability of 
his practice to be able to share ideas, approaches, and sensitivities.82 However, 
such a relationship within the workshop is not structural, it is temporal; it is only 
there until the assistant is able to master their ideas and materials as well. 
At first sight this image drawn by Arendt seems outdated, particularly when 
addressing the production of small objects, like that of the carpenter in his 
workshop constructing a table, or a potter shaping clay into a vase. Arendt’s 
remark about teamwork does not seem able to be easily applied to the field 
of architecture – architecture is almost by definition a matter of teamwork. 
Constructing a building is a common effort, not only a matter for an architect 
working in isolation in his office. Even within the office there is a form of 
teamwork, where the master architect makes decisions and other architects 
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produce proposals. At second thought however there are other aspects worth 
evaluating. The first aspect is probably a common experience amongst workers. 
If constructing a wooden table, one is indeed concentrated on the material and 
the tools at hand. Even if spectators are around, while working the mind stays 
focused on the hands; how they threat the wood, and how the ideas in mind are 
materialized. In the process of design, the mind also is concentrated on what 
the hands are doing. Only after having finished a sketch, or a series of sketches 
that investigate a certain aspect of the future building, can it be understood and 
presented. Designing clearly is not only when the hands touch paper, a keyboard, 
or a knife to cut cardboard, but is also a process in the mind, as famous myths of 
design often state: the breakthrough in a process of design comes in the middle 
of the night, or when taking a shower. However, even these untraceable and 
unpredictable moments require the sketchbook to capture the idea with words or 
sketches. Only these can be presented and discussed, the isolation of the worker 
can be abandoned only if the actual ‘work’ is stopped and that particular ‘product 
is finished’. Although design work is thus almost always a collective effort, a 
continuous discussion between designer(s), assistants, clients, tenants, the public, 
and the actual act of drawing is pursued in isolation
It is interesting to see that The Craftsman is intended by Sennett to be the first 
book in a series of three – the second book actually investigates, ‘the pleasures 
of co-operation’.83 The last book is announced as one which investigates the city. 
Since it is preceded by these books on craftsmanship and cooperation, we can 
imagine that this book will present the city as a work of human hands, one of both 
craftsmanship and common effort. In similar thoughts, architecture can indeed 
be described as both the work of the craftsman as the process of collaboration in 
order to construct the building. If we look to the construction site, it is a coming 
and going of diverse craftsmen – from carpenters to plumbers, electricians and 
bricklayers. They are actually informed through the working drawings made by 
the architect involved, who will also check to see if everything is done according to 
these drawings. If we then look to the production of these drawings, this is again 
a somewhat common effort, in which commissioners (as we have seen), advisors, 
and constructors, together with the architect place the required information as 
clearly and completely as possible on paper. 
Here we touch upon a second aspect of Arendt’s urge for the isolation of the homo 
faber. Work, in the image of Arendt, reifies ideas. It is therefore the case that the 
single craftsman must master this idea. ‘This isolation from others,’ Arendt writes, 
‘is the necessary life condition for every mastership which consists in being alone 
with the “idea”, the mental image of the thing to be.’84 Within the classical image 
of the design and building process described above, the architect is the figure 
that needs to be ‘alone with the idea,’ which from a general viewpoint defends, 
updates, and adjusts the original idea, until it brings together all sorts of complex, 
and often mutually contradicting wishes, needs and requirements, ultimately 
controlling the actual construction if it fits the original idea. The architect here 
thus works in a certain isolation (although this isolation might be in the form of 
an office with multiple employees working on the project), using the drawings 
as products with which he is able to relate to others (although admittedly not so 
much a relationship of exchanged products).
I specifically define the description above as one of common and traditional 
architectural design processes, since the architect here has been given the general 
role of design and coordination. Arendt’s concern about exposing production is 
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not so much in the spectator’s interest, but in those that diminish the boundaries 
between being a spectator and being an actor. The rise of the social realm, Arendt 
writes, urged spectators not to be ‘content with beholding, judging and admiring,’ 
but to ‘wish to be admitted to the company of the craftsman and to participate as 
equals in the work process.’85 This could only be achieved when the ideas beyond 
work were not valued; the expertise and knowledge needed to progress towards 
real objects. This actually involved the division of labor, in which unskilled 
workmen were made responsible for only a small part of production. As stated 
before, this happened also in architecture: it easily can be seen that tasks in archi-
tecture are split into smaller sub-assignments, where the architect loses control 
over the whole. Nowadays, a contractor or a building manager organizes the 
sub-assignments towards a finished whole. Their role and outlook is very different 
to that of the architect and their unifying view, hovering the process. In this ‘new’ 
constitution, the architect is simply asked to produce ideas rather than designs, 
or to produce designs rather than be involved in the execution of construction. In 
such processes, the wholeness of the idea, as well as the consistency between the 
idea as a ‘product’ and the constructed building as a ‘product’ is often lost.  
Within such ‘new’ processes where the role of architecture is limited towards 
delivering only ideas, architecture is better understood as only an additional 
quality to the building process. Architects develop ideas through which the 
building can differ from another building: nice brickwork details, an attractive 
cantilever, or a surprising shape. This additional quality can be understood as a 
means of attracting attention, so that the market value of the building rises or to 
make it easier to convince municipalities to permit the developer and contractor 
to construct the particular building. Architecture is therefore asked to produce 
shiny images and tempting views of an uncertain future. The market value lies, 
in other words, not in that architects are ‘makers of building who are also makers 
of form’, but instead in their power to create tempting images. Within this 
perspective we might state that architecture has its particular value in its ‘image’, 
which is attractive commercially, through which the architect is also valuable, 
since he is able to produce this image.86 
According to Arendt, this term ‘value’ depends on the ‘exchange market’, 
since value always is relative: valuable only in terms of exchange. It can only be 
determined in relation to other products offered by the market. In other words, 
the display within the market of goods is essential to increasing the value of 
the products themselves. Only if the goods are exposed and the products made 
public can their value can be established: ‘For it is only in the exchange market, 
where everything can be exchanged for something else, that all things … becomes 
“values.” This value consists solely in the part of the public realm where things 
appear as commodities; it is neither labor nor work, capital nor profit, nor is it a 
material which bestows value upon an object, but only and exclusively the public 
realm where it appears to be demanded or neglected.’87 Predating the commercial 
society which emerged during the earlier stages of the modern age, the ‘exchange 
market’ could be understood as a public realm ‘connected with the activity of the 
homo faber.’88 It was a meeting place where the products were central, and where 
the craftsmen related to other craftsmen and other people through their products. 
However, the commercial society changed this perspective from ‘conspicuous 
production’ to ‘conspicuous consumption’, which affected the relationship 
between the producer and the product, as well as between that which exists 
between the product and the public. ‘The people who met on the exchange market, 
to be sure,’ Arendt states, ‘were no longer the fabricators themselves, and they did 
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not meet as persons but as owners of commodities and exchange values, as Marx 
abundantly pointed out. In a society where exchange of products has become the 
chief public activity, even the laborers, because they are confronted with “money 
or commodity owners,” become proprietors, “owners of their labor power.”’89 
In the first part of this quote, Arendt argues that although the workshop of 
the craftsman previously required isolation from the public realm, it was the 
craftsman himself that represented the link with the public realm. He himself 
entered the market in order to sell his products. This personal relationship 
between the craftsman, his products and the public was particularly important. 
The craftsman could be approached immediately and could be held accountable 
for his produce. Arendt therefore highlights that due to modernity and mass 
production, the distinction between production and community, between the 
producer and the public, has increased. Arendt also argues that the disappearance 
of production from public view causes problems with regards to the public respon-
sibility of producers and consumers. Production has been moved out of sight, 
first to the edges of the city and later to other regions and countries, or today 
to the free-trade-zones in what are often referred to as ‘third-world’ countries. 
To the craftsmen, the clients became invisible (and as vice-versa). Products 
were produced only for the market, and the market pushed private-use towards 
consumption. This clear process of hiding production has resulted in a lack of 
responsibility felt both by the producers as well as the consumers, highlighting 
issues such as the deplorable circumstances of the laborers, lack of labor-rights, 
the use of child-labor, and pollution of the environment. 
The second part of Arendt’s quote emphasizes that the central role of the 
market in society not only changes products from use-objects to consumable 
goods, but also affects people themselves. It changes the whole scope of society. 
Craftsmen were once valued because of their production and the quality of their 
produce. Laborers were valued because they could offer labor-power. However 
all of this, from the products to the labor force, was not intrinsically valuable 
since value is always relative to other commodities offered. It is valued on the 
exchange market, related to other products, to the skills of other craftsmen, and to 
other laborers offering their labor-power. Arendt actually opposes this notion of 
‘value’, which is relative, to the notion of ‘worth’, which is intrinsic to the product 
itself. ‘Worth’, as she states, has a longer tradition but has since been replaced 
in commercial perspectives by ‘value’, giving particularly room to the economic 
sciences. The introduction of value however, actually requires the devaluation 
of the objects themselves. Arendt presupposes this, referring to the distinction 
between value and worth by the philosopher John Locke, in which the ‘worth’ 
of objects is distinct from their ‘value.’90 In other words, the worth of the object 
is intrinsic to the object, whereas value is something added to it. The ‘intrinsic 
worth of a thing’, Arendt stresses, ‘can be changed only through the change of the 
thing itself – thus one ruins the worth of a table by depriving it of one of its legs 
– whereas “the marketable value” of a commodity is altered by “the alteration of 
some proportion which that commodity bears to something else”.’91 Arendt quotes 
Locke in this instance, adding that such a distinction is obvious, but that it has 
disappeared in modernity: ‘This distinction [between worth and value, HT] exists, 
of course, in all but the most primitive societies, but in the modern age the former 
disappearance more and more in favor of the latter.’92 This intrinsic worth is lost, 
again due to modernity and the increasing emphasis on the exchange-market, 
since everything is made in relative terms to other commodities. Arendt argues 
that the loss of ‘intrinsic’ worth has caused a ‘deep source of uneasiness’, not so 
much in terms of relativity, ‘but rather the fact that homo faber, whose whole 
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activity is determined by constant use of yardsticks, measurements, rules and 
standards, could not bear the loss of “absolute” standards or yardsticks.’93  
Arendt is concerned at this point: her image of the world and the importance 
she attributes to durability are in danger if there intrinsic worth no longer exists. 
Arendt also states that without standards and universal rules, no world could 
be erected by men. The world, in other words, is threatened on the one hand by 
instrumentalization, which judges the world and its commodities through their 
usefulness, and on the other hand through the perspective of the market, which 
judges the world and its commodities through their exchange value. Both perspec-
tives are tied closely together, and according to Arendt, the last actually develops 
from the first. 
It is at this point that Arendt introduces works of art as a particular realm of the 
homo faber: as yet unspoiled by instrumentalization or the exchange market. 
Arendt describes art as ‘a number of objects which are strictly without any utility 
whatsoever and which, moreover, because they are unique, are not exchange-
able and therefore defy equalization through a common denominator such as 
money; if they enter the exchange market, they can only be arbitrarily priced.’94 
As touched upon in the previous chapter, the question remains if this perspective 
still counts for the arts and for the production of works of art. Art is not judged 
by its usefulness and its value on the exchange market (as we have at least seen in 
theory), but draws also from the perspective of use as well as of value. An artwork 
is intended to be enjoyed in solitude, and not to be used or consumed. Neverthe-
less, we can also argue that art has grown away from the homo faber perspective, 
for instance in viewing the close connection between the artist and the client as 
lost. This simultaneously increases the importance of the art-market, in which 
the work of art has become a marketable commodity; an object in which to invest. 
In the ideal view, art is not produced for clients, let alone for investors. It is 
produced for itself, and only in a second instance is there a client, or a museum 
that presents the artist to a general public of spectators. However in theory this 
seems to be different. Not only does art solely produce objects that withstand 
the times and tides, but it also incorporates productions that are temporarily on 
show, and which within short notice gain urgent attention. There also the inherent 
urgency to acquire attention and to appear in the market so that clients (be it 
private collectors or public museums) can buy the pieces. In other words, art 
produced for art’s sake must nevertheless appear in the market in order to enable 
clients to buy it; to gain attraction and interest by the public or to make a name for 
yourself. Commissioned art-work is also a common figure – although one needs to 
have already established at that point a certain level of public acknowledgement. 
Building owners sometimes ask artists to do something in their entrance corridor 
or to beautify a façade. Municipalities ask for interventions in urban space to 
brighten up a park or square. NGO’s ask artists to draw attention to certain social 
issues through paintings or other manifestations. Museums might also ask artists 
to produce something for their particular exhibition. In all of these cases, the 
artist is asked because of the particular qualities of the art works – because of the 
name he has made for himself. The artist, we might state, however, has created 
a certain freedom around himself: what assignments are interesting to accept? 
What fits the oeuvre? How will it allow the artist to express himself? etc. 
Such ‘freedom of practice’ of course is more difficult in architecture. As I stated 
in the previous chapter, architecture has something to offer. It is the most 
public construction of the world; essentially enduring the tides, it offers lasting 
experiences, articulates spaces to meet and to withdraw, and so on. However, it is 
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also vulnerable to the threats of labor-thinking: it suffers from instrumentaliza-
tion, partitioning, and client-contractor relationships. In architecture indeed the 
relationship with clients has been a central issue. Only a very small part of archi-
tectural production is produced without a commissioner. The series of drawings 
by Daniel Libeskind or the early paintings of Zaha Hadid were created without 
someone commissioning them. They are produced as experiments with form and 
expression, with content and approach. Although they have been important within 
the profession (and not only in the practices of the aforementioned architects and 
their offices), these represent experiments carried out early in their careers. Some 
offices launch unsolicited projects for which they search for a client in order to 
actually be able to construct them. In other words, the relationship with particular 
clients cannot be underestimated. Not only due to canonical architecture, which 
certainly had visionary commissioners, but also the other way around. The crisis 
in architecture in the 70s, which was stressed by Gutman in his reflection on the 
future of architecture, was caused by clients disappointed by high architectural 
promises, and their unfulfilled expectations.95 We can state that is was not only 
the dismissal of architects as the chief designers which gave way to engineers 
and constructors, but also the design of certain buildings (plants, warehouses, 
dwellings), as well as the establishment of professions located in-between the 
client and the architect (such as building managers, project developers, and so on) 
which rose out of this disappointment. Architect were limited to their role within 
the building process, while the sorrows and concern of clients were ‘managed’ or 
taken over by these new professions.  
In our focus on the work of the hands of the architect, and of the tools and 
instruments of architecture, we might easily tend to think of the architect in his 
office, his atelier, or studio, behind a screen or a piece of sketch paper. Admittedly, 
in the image of Rural Studio and some of the more contemporary practices, the 
architect is also actually constructing and building on site. The standard image 
however is that the architect receives a commission from a client, and then starts 
working, designing, drawing, consulting, presenting, and even constructing. This 
of course is a very limited and romantic perspective. It urges for close relation-
ships with clients, and also imagines design as the making of things personally, 
or the making of personal things. It is the divided perspective that actually seems 
to be the common view of the ‘market’ today, where there is much less direct 
contact with the client if a building manager is in-between, or if there is the need 
to produce for the market (if the future user is not yet known) where the project 
developer is also the client. However, in all of these cases, architecture depends 
upon clients, whether they are the future users or not. 
This image of the dependency relies particularly upon clients, which are 
stressed by Mockbee as one of the weak points of architecture. ‘Architects should 
always be in the initial critical decision-making position in order to challenge the 
power of the status quo,’ he urged. ‘We need to understand that when a decision 
is made, a position has already been taken. Architects should not be consigned 
to only problem-solving after the fact.’96 He therefore presses for the awareness 
of designers in their dependency on the status quo. This perspective is of course 
also supportive of the writings on space by Henri Lefebvre97 which we already 
touched upon, and it is also part of Critical Theory, upon which both Jürgen 
Habermas and David Harvey, also touched upon in previous chapters, stand. 
There are power relations in society, and architecture is in most cases dependent 
upon these power relations. Mockbee tried to overcome these relations not just by 
working for the poor but also with them, as well as by urging his students to find 
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funding for the projects to be constructed with them. The practice of Mockbee 
and Rural Studio, although still is quite rare in architecture, has inspired others to 
approach architecture in a more active way as well. Particularly since the financial 
and economic crisis, these alternative practices have gained attention and value. 
In the aforementioned book Spatial Agengcy, Awan, Schneider and Till give 
a succinct overview of contemporary practices along with historic examples of 
such an active approach to architecture.98 These offices often work together with 
inhabitants on all sorts of aspects of a project; projects that are also often initiated 
by the architect themselves, or by inhabitants, citizens, or other professions that 
recognize the potentiality of a certain place or practice. These projects are often 
‘close to home’, affecting the direct environment of those that initiate the project. 
Their aim cannot be easily valued through the market, but they can neverthe-
less be of great ‘worth’ to those inhabiting the space. These elements suggest 
that alternative practices are often small practices. The aforementioned book is 
full of examples of small initiatives, which through their approach, materials, 
and aesthetics suggest a degree of temporariness. It is hard to see how these 
practices also can be applied to bigger and more complex projects. Even offices 
that have been better involved and have developed alternative practices often 
turn to standard approaches when offered a position by developers or political 
institutions within the development process of a larger project. Stan Allan also 
supports such a shift in architecture. ‘One of the urgent consequences of this 
more pragmatic approach would be to move us away from the private world of 
the architect’s design process, and its preoccupation with questions of meaning, 
and the politics of identity, to an open discussion of architecture’s agency in the 
public sphere.’99 Here we again touch upon the need for architects to leave their 
offices and appear in public. Not just for business reasons, but also to discuss their 
approach to the world. It is not simply the particular desire of the designer, it is 
something that needs to be made public in order to be part of the debate over the 
future. However, besides that urgent publicness of architecture, at this point we 
might state that such ‘new’ developments in architecture that occupy this niche in 
the built environment requires a certain type of pragmatism from the architect. 
Architecture here is not about big gestures and sublime desires, but about the 
pragmatic response to particular needs, or even to recognize and propel these 
needs and possibilities, and to act pragmatically and publicly.
However, particularly in these alternative practices, the architect is not just 
addressed as a designer, but also as a professional that has knowledge and 
expertise to share. The architect understands the spatial aspects of urban and 
social issues, and is able to respond actively to these needs. In other words, the 
architect is required to be someone able to initiate change, to make unsolicited 
proposals, or to gather inhabitants to work together on spatial interventions. To 
state this differently: the architect as an initiator deals with the human condition 
of natality; the capacity to start anew and to propose new ideas. Natality, we might 
state, is the very condition of design and construction. At the root of architecture 
lies ‘the principle of beginning.’100 To take initiatives and to reveal the full range of 
possibilities can be understood as part of this action as well. It is work and action 
happening at once. This position actually fits the architect very well. The word 
‘architect’ itself not only means master-builder, but also ‘beginner’ (of new and 
previously unconceived buildings). This is a crucial perspective that renders the 
architect as both master and beginner, as someone who knows what to do as well 
as someone who knows how to start something new. Taking the initiative is, as 
Arendt argues, one of the main characteristics and merits of all human activities, 
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but it is ‘action that has the closest connection with the human condition of 
natality. … Since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not 
mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from meta-
physical, thought.’101 The proposal of an idea, to display it publicly, is in my 
opinion a form of action. One needs to work on the presentation of the idea (or the 
range of ideas); and this is strictly a form of working. However in the moment of 
appearance in public, of pitching ideas, public speaking is crucial. One does not 
have control over the outcome. It is unpredictable how the public, the politicians, 
the neighbours, the engaged society, or the professionals, will react. Therefore, 
taking the initiative might be the capacity of the designer or the responsibility 
of the commissioner, but it is also always a question to the public. It is worth 
discussing publicly. Initiatives regarding where to intervene and how to intervene, 
in order to set borders and define spaces, affect the world, and are therefore a 
matter of public concern.
It is particularly within this perspective that Awan, Schneider, and Till reveal, 
in these ‘alternative practices’ the aspect of ‘beginning’ that has clearly come to 
light. Where it is hidden in the regular processes of building and construction, the 
ability to initiate is at the heart of architecture acting as an agency. The architect 
as an agent, as Awan, Schneider and Till argue, affects change ‘through the 
empowering of others, allowing them to engage in their spatial environments in 
ways previous unknown or unavailable to them, opening up new freedoms and 
potentials as a result of reconfigures social space.’102 I would summarize these 
aspects of the profession as entrepreneurial, in that they implore the architect to 
leave his safe cocoon and begin to participate in society. This is not only in order 
to create market demand for of business reasons. As Gutman argues, during 
the financial and economic crisis from 2008 onwards much more ‘alternative’ 
practices were established and sought publicity. This moving out into public view, 
actively participating in processes of change, is also the aspect of architecture that 
needs to originates from love for the world and its inhabitants. It is at this point 
that the active role of architecture in creating a world-in-common, creating a 
shared world through common effort, is particularly visible in bottom-up projects, 
becoming tangible at the scale of its inhabitants and their everyday environ-
ments. Admittedly, we do not talk here about the importance of aesthetic quality. 
What is pivotal however, is that the space becomes visible as a common effort 
and a shared responsibility. Nevertheless, questions remain over what specific 
knowledge and expertise architecture has to offer such (bottom-up) local and 
social processes.
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7.8 Rural Studio, constructing the Shiles House,
Hale County (AL), USA, 2002
7.9 The Prinzessinnengarten, Berlin, Germany, 2009
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7.3 ARCHITECTURAL AGENCY
7.3.1  The Joy of Action and the Experience of Change
After discussing works of art as ‘the most intensely worldly of all tangible things’, 
Arendt directs her thoughts towards the activity of ‘action’. As is clear for now, in 
The Human Condition, Arendt emphasizes the distinction between labor, work 
and action for several reasons. The most important is that beyond these activities 
different approaches to the world are tangible, and by mixing these approaches, 
or better said, by applying these approaches to a different domain of action, the 
promise of each realm is threatened. Arendt reads modern society through this 
lens, and understands that the development of the consumerist society results 
from the animal laborans entering the workspace of the homo faber, which 
affects production and the product itself. She also saw aspects of the animal 
laborans in the realm of politics, by placing life itself at the very aim of political 
action by making it easier and more long-lasting. The same counts for the homo 
faber entering the realm of politics, judging the world through evaluating the 
aspects of usefulness and beauty.103 ‘Fabrication, but not action or speech, always 
involves means and ends; in fact, the category of means and ends derives its 
legitimacy from the sphere of making and fabricating where a clearly recognizable 
end, the final product, determines and organizes everything that plays part in the 
process – the material, the tools, the activity itself, and even the persons partici-
pating in it; they all become mere means toward the end and they are justified as 
such.’104 Arendt regards both approaches as a form of alienation from the world 
itself, which is the appropriate aim of action, and thus repeatedly highlights the 
strict division between activities, unless her critics otherwise stated that in real life 
these categories of activities are often blurred. As outlined in the previous chapter, 
culture in the writings of Arendt is positioned between work and action. Culture, 
after all, is the careful approach to the past, as well as the creation of the world 
as distinct from the earth. Culture, can therefore be seen as the starting point for 
politics.105 
Until this point, I have stressed the impact of labor-thinking on architecture, 
and have argued that architecture, from the primitive hut to the airport building, 
from the square to the park, from building to landscape, and from design to 
construction, should be approached through the category of work. If we lose this 
perspective, we tend to limit architecture to the beautification of buildings or to 
simply designing aspect of construction. Architecture is worldly construction, 
which contains both the development of ideas, plans, designs, as well as the imple-
mentation of these as interventions in the world. The source of architecture is not 
only the love for construction, for usefulness, or its aesthetics, nor is it simply the 
combination of these three categories of building according to Vitruvius. It is love 
for the world and its inhabitants. 
However, as touched upon above, architecture also can be understood as an 
agent of renewal, change, and activism, twisted with a certain sense of anarchism, 
rejecting the status quo and acting publicly. I have categorized these entrepre-
neurial aspects above as active participants in society. Some of the urgencies 
behind these practices can indeed be categorized as responses to the economic 
and financial crises that hit the world from 2008 onwards (in The Netherlands), 
which have had a major impact on the business case of architecture. Of course, 
this direction was not new in architecture. Particularly in the work of Team 10, 
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and specifically in the work of its Italian member Giancarlo di Carlo, participa-
tory processes were developed. However, from 2008 onwards, statistics for the 
architectural market in The Netherlands were beyond imagination: big offices 
became small offices, and investments in buildings and other architectural 
artefacts were halved, while the number of architectural offices doubled. Of 
course, all of the fired employees from the big offices who did not find another 
job elsewhere started their own office. These figures show how urgent it was to 
go out and actively search for demand in the market, and to expand the focus to 
other business cases. This response seems to follow what has been traced above 
during the seventies by Gutman: some offices started to develop different methods 
of design and construction, and others expanded their horizon to graphic design, 
whilst others started to do unsolicited work, and others started close collab-
orations with project developers next to their offices, or even became project 
developers themselves.106 
Nevertheless it is not right to say that these practices are only appropriate in 
response to the limited situation in the market. Beyond these practices, there is 
surely concern for the environment and for social empathy. This is tangible in 
the words of Mockbee that we have touched upon previously, or in the changing 
conditions of society and its impact on cities and spaces.107 The obvious question 
at this stage is whether these alternative practices ultimately show how political 
architecture actually exists. These approaches often are praised because of their 
aspects of protest; for their particular activist participation in the public space, as 
I have described in Chapter 3. ‘It’s time to translate ideas into action’, as stated by 
Ronald Shiffman and Jeffrey How architects (landscape architects, designers and 
planners) in their response to the Occupy movement. ‘As designers and planners 
who create places, what can we do to protect and promote the public realm? How 
can we help bring about a more just and egalitarian society?’108 Their answer 
asks architects to share their knowledge and outlook with local communities, in 
helping them to recognize, judge, reclaim and occupy public spaces; to remove 
barriers that complicate not only their accessibility but also their participation, to 
allow for differences in open space, and to ultimately reveal inequalities in society. 
They press for architects and urban designers to ‘act as engaged citizens through 
participation and leadership in their neighborhoods, communities, and profes-
sional forums.’109 This calls for (architectural) action, thereby explicitly urging the 
architect to engage politically and socially with their own community, to share 
his/her knowledge and to empower their communities. 
‘Action’ is regularly read as a certain form of resistance against the ruling 
powers. The images that often first come to mind consists of protest, resistance, 
of a critical response, one that emphasizes alternatives to the status quo. In 
his reflection on architecture Mockbee is explicit in this idea, as are Shiffman 
and Hou in their agenda for the future architectural inheritance of the occupy 
movement.[IMAGE 7.8] This reading of action as public activism certainly echoes 
Jürgen Habermas’s image of the public sphere as a counter-sphere. As we have 
seen previously, in the chapter emphasizing the differences between Arendt’s 
model of the public realm and Habermas’s model of the public sphere, this 
counter-sphere has been rendered by Habermas as a critical sphere, acting 
against both the state as well as the market. This model has been inspired by the 
philosophical traditions of the Frankfurter Schule, the philosophical family of 
thinkers such as Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and later 
as part of the younger generation, Jürgen Habermas. The Frankfurter Schule, 
was indebted to the perspectives of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, developing 
a broad critical response to philosophy, sciences and culture – critical partic-
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ularly to the economic developments in political and everyday life. Aside from 
Habermas’s ideas regarding the public sphere, the Frankfurter Schule has been 
very influential within the field of architecture. Even before the notion of the 
public sphere was introduced, architectural discourse already pressed for the need 
of architecture to act as a critical practice. Particularly in the United States during 
the 70s and 80s, the architect and theorist Peter Eisenman, along with theorist 
Michael Hays, introduced Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfürter Schule 
into the architectural discourse. This is also the case for Hilde Heynen and her 
important book Architecture and Modernity, A Critique, who takes the Critical 
Theory as her starting point.110 Critical Theory finds its basis in Marxist theory, 
and develops critical responses to capitalist society, social emancipation and 
mass society. Eisenman and Hays were particularly inspired by the Italian archi-
tectural historian Manfredo Tafuri and the philosopher Frederic Jameson, who 
translated the principles of the Frankfurter Schule towards the context of archi-
tecture. Based on their writings, Eisenman and Hays, along with Michael Sorkin 
and Kenneth Frampton, urged for a critical response to ‘reality’ in the project of 
building, and explored such resistances in the architectural concepts of post-mod-
ernism, deconstructivism and critical regionalism. However, as George Baird 
remarks in ‘Criticality and Its Discontents’ (his reflection on the shifting American 
discourse during the early 2000s), their impact on the discourse largely remained 
theoretical: or in the form of architectural installations on show in museums, or 
explored in writings and drawings.111 Nevertheless, Baird, as he responds with his 
article to the Eisenman protégés Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting who in their 
‘Notes Around the Doppler Effect and Other Moods of Modernism’, advocated 
for an end to critical theory in favor of a projective approach to architecture, 
warning that this more pragmatic perspective might loose aspects of critique 
and theory. In their text, Somol and Whiting don’t so much distance themselves 
from any definition of architecture, but rather distance themselves from the 
autonomy of architecture. That is to say that they distance themselves from the 
view that architecture is a professional field depending completely on its own 
rules, convictions, and conventions. They are at the very core of the discipline, but 
even these positions depend upon perspectives, developments, and powers from 
beyond the discipline. ‘If critical dialectics established architecture’s autonomy 
as a means of defining architecture’s field or discipline’, they write, ‘a Doppler 
architecture acknowledges the adaptive synthesis of architecture’s many contin-
gencies. Rather than isolating a singular autonomy, the Doppler focuses upon the 
effects and exchanges of architecture’s inherent multiplicities: material, program, 
writing, atmosphere, form, technologies, economics, etc.’112 Not only by using this 
metaphor of the Doppler Effect, which opposes a dialectic method (developed by 
the philosophers of the Frankfurter Schule), but also with the distinction between 
‘hot’ and ‘cool’ modes of the discipline (as outlined by the cultural theorist 
Marshall McLuhan), they distance themselves from the critical approach. ‘Critical 
architecture is hot in the sense that it is preoccupied with separating itself from 
normative, background or anonymous conditions of production, and with artic-
ulating difference.’ Opposed to this, a cool approach to architecture is actually 
much more blurred, relaxed and easy. It even requires ‘the participation of the 
user.’113 Baird responds to this with the question of whether it might in fact be 
too relaxed. Where is architecture left if it simply goes with the flow? After all, he 
writes, ‘without it [that is: the aspects of theory and critique, HT], I predict that 
this new architecture will devolve to the “merely” pragmatic, and to the “merely” 
decorative, with astonishing speed.’114 
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In the text of Somol and Whiting Baird, we can read the influence of the ‘real-poli-
tiker’ Rem Koolhaas, as he calls the Dutch architect. Indeed, Koolhaas has 
repeatedly emphasized his approach to architecture as one of engaging reality, 
and his practice as one that is ‘surfing the waves of capital’; a ‘go with the flow’ 
form of economic, cultural and political circumstances,115 and stresses that ‘our 
most interesting engagements are uncritical, emphatic engagements, which 
deal with the sometimes insane difficulty of an architectural project to deal with 
the incredible accumulation of economic, cultural, political but also logistical 
issues.’116 At the very core of Koolhaas’s architectural perspective, there might be 
the conviction that ‘in the deepest motivations of architecture’ there is ‘something 
that cannot be critical.’117 We do not have to agree upon Koolhaas’s perspective to 
admit that the relationship between architecture and the critical stance against 
reality is uneasy within architectural projects. The tools that the architect has 
at hand, or viewing architecture itself as a tool, is a rather difficult means of 
criticality regarding the existing situation, the required program, or the desires 
of the commissioner and the wishes of a community. Projects may actually offer 
only a weak form of criticism. This is why Manfredo Tafuri, an Italian philosopher 
who discusses architecture extensively, urged that the critical view lies within the 
typology of buildings. New typologies can be understood as critical towards the 
previous versions; they develop, and although they also contain codes and conti-
nuities, they contain cultural stances.118 However, regarding the possibilities that 
are critical within architecture, Mockbee argues that, ‘courage has gone out of the 
profession, but we tend to be narrow in the scope of our thinking and underesti-
mate our natural capacity to be subversive leaders and teachers. In other words, 
the more we practice, the more restricted we become in our critical thinking and 
our life styles. Critical thought requires looking beyond architecture towards and 
enhanced understanding of the whole to which it belongs.’119
This type of difficulty, although very different, is also tangible in the call for action 
by Shiffman and Hou. Their statement, although one that can surely be described 
as echoing Critical Theory in its resistance towards the status quo that defines the 
capitalist society, distances itself from the theoretical approaches of Eisenman and 
Hays. In his writings, Eisenman is mostly concerned with architecture itself, and 
never describes the architectural project as an instrument of social engagement 
and renewal, while Shiffman and Hou appear to push architecture away from 
its autonomous status toward a concern about design. They urge architects to 
share their architectural knowledge with the wider community, to empower the 
participation of the community in public issues, to solve barriers and to reveal 
inequality (in terms of public space). Although their message springs from a social 
commitment with local communities and from resistance to both the market and 
also to the higher levels of the political realm and bureaucracy (that allow spaces 
to be privatized and to formalize inequity in society), it is not clear how concrete 
architectural projects can respond to these threats of inequality, exclusivity, and 
commerce in democratic societies. Their manifesto addresses architecture as a 
body of knowledge rather than as a design practice. It therefore does not answer 
the final question asked by architectural journalist Michael Kimmelman at the 
opening of the book, to which Shiffman’s and Hou’s have added as an epilogue, 
how and what to design: ‘How do we create [public space]?120 In other words, they 
do not propel a specific architectural approach, but rather propel architecture as 
a form of social engagement. Their critical response to society is also seen in their 
engagement with the occupy movement. 
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This is somewhat echoed in the overview offered by Awan, Schneider and Till in 
the aforementioned book Spatial Agency, as well as in their online database of 
alternative practices; of bottom-up-projects and do-it-yourself approaches which 
accompany the book, which can therefore be read as an agenda for an architec-
ture of engagement, pressing for a certain approach towards the architectural 
field. Their collection nevertheless also reveals the difficulties of the relation-
ship between the architectural project and the critical stance against the status 
quo, particularly since the offices collected seem to offer a limited architectural 
stance, being limited particularly to small and often temporal practices.121 This 
is of course unsurprising, since most of the examples are rooted in particular 
communities, with which the architect develops the project in close collaboration. 
The outcome of these projects is often close to the architecture of Rural Studio, 
where the approach to projects is similar. These examples often have a social 
agenda or propel an environmental outlook. An exemplary project – although 
not developed by an architect –  is Prinzessinnengarten in Berlin, where an 
empty lot was transformed into an urban gardening site, initiated by two local 
students and with the help of hundreds of neighbors.122 [IMAGE 7.9] One of the first 
examples of the recent interest in urban gardening, the project is temporal – as 
long as the lot stays ‘empty’. The project emphasizes this approach: the plants are 
in barrels or boxes, often from unexpected (and re-used) materials, and the cafe 
is located in shipping containers. Festivals attract people to the place, and lots 
of volunteers take care of the greenery, flowers, vegetables, paths, seeds, coffee 
and meals. In other words, it is locally sourced: the quality and the potentiality 
of the site was recognized not only by the initiators, but also by those that came 
after the first advertisement requiring help to clear and clean the site. Together 
with these volunteers, the site was appropriated, the plants were ordered, and 
a greenhouse was built. The appearance of all of this appears to show literal 
resistance – resistance to the crisp, clean, fresh order that is inherent in corporate 
architectural projects. Projects like the Prinzessinnengarten show the absence 
of an overarching detailed plan, and therefore also show the unpredictability 
and indeterminate aspects of this architectural approach, which is otherwise in 
mainstream architecture covered by even more drawings, details, descriptions, 
and rules. These alternative projects offer a working landscape, an intervention 
of use and adaptation, places to meet, to eat, and to work together (in urban 
farming). Although this stimulating environment offered by Spatial Agency 
reveals that an alternative approach to architecture, to the city, to communities, 
and to social and environmental problems is possible (and is not limited to a few 
offices), the difficulty which it also reveals lies in how to upscale this approach 
to larger and more complicated projects. Or should we conclude that this archi-
tectural approach is destined to be applied solely in community-based, relatively 
small interventions into public space? The overview, besides activating architects 
as agents in (public space), shows how difficult it is to take a critical position 
within larger and more complex architectural projects. Therefore, we might 
question if architectural agency can also be thought of in different perspectives, in 
a way that can also be applied to more corporate and complex projects.  
 
The call for action by Shiffman and Hou, as well as these alternative practices, 
invite architecture to understand itself as an agency, with architects as actors 
amongst other participants in public space. It urges architecture to act as a 
body of knowledge rather than as merely a building or design. Some aspects 
of this perspective appear to align with Arendt’s particular approach to action. 
In her reflections upon the student protests of the 60s, Arendt emphasizes the 
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community base of action: students gathering and affecting other students at 
other campuses. This highlights the common base upon which action grows: 
a type of public realm is established that allows participants within these 
communities to appear to each other and to ‘act in concert’. This actually evokes 
the experience of ‘joy in action’, Arendt states, as well as the experience of ‘being 
able to change things.’123 She cites examples of co-operative systems that have 
already been applied in Denmark and Israel, or the ‘system of self-management’ 
in Yugoslavia, as well as the council-system that worked for a short time after the 
revolution in Russia, where the proper networks and systems that allow partic-
ipants to appear in public space through action gained a response.124 Arendt 
understands these local communities to be effective forms of bottom-up organiza-
tion that can affect not only their everyday environment, but other levels in society 
as well. It is therefore the case that Arendt urges the council towards self-organi-
zation, which, through local or particular initiatives, is free and spatial, allowing 
for appearance, and enabling action and response. We might state that the 
alternative practice in architecture seems to create a similar basis of collaboration 
within a single project. Participation in the development of design and construc-
tion forms a ‘world’, be it local or limited, where participants can meet, discuss, 
appear, and act. The project itself, a truly collective effort that can be described as 
a common, not only attracts participants to the process of intervention, but can 
also offer a space of appearance. The common engages inhabitants to continue 
their collaboration and to sustain the possibility of appearance, enduring their 
relationship with the world. 
However, Arendt also distances herself from other forms of organization, 
which she describes as staying on the level of amateurism and never reaching for 
impact on other levels in society. ‘To prevent a misunderstanding that easily occur 
today’, Arendt writes, ‘I must say that the communes of hippies and dropouts 
have nothing to do with this. On the contrary, a renunciation of the whole of 
public life, of politics in general, is at their foundation; they are refuges for people 
who have suffered political shipwreck – and as such they are completely justified 
on personal grounds. I find the form of these communes often very grotesque, 
… but I understand them and have nothing against them. Politically they are 
meaningless.’125 It is the sixties, hippies, squatters, and others formed small 
communities, living together and sharing everything, sometimes also promoting 
social issues like the housing shortage. Arendt clearly distances herself from 
these communities – for her they were not organized politically but socially.126  In 
contrast, she proposes the councils, with which she refers to as the organization 
of public life in Hungary during the short period after the revolution in 1956, and 
she also engages with the American system of town hall meetings that was set up 
after the American Revolution. ‘The councils desire the exact opposite, even if 
they begin very small – as neighborhood councils, professional councils, councils 
within factories, apartment houses, and so on. … The councils say: We want to 
participate, we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and 
we want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country.’127 
The councils work if they guarantee the participants in having a public space, 
where one is able to share thoughts and opinions, but is also able to decide which 
of the participants would be chosen to represent them in other councils or on 
other public spaces.128 
This critical remark of Arendt on the hippiecommunities asks for alternative 
architecture not to distance itself from ‘reality’. This is echoed in Manfredo 
Tafuri’s remark on the difference between avant-garde and experimental archi-
tecture. The first is, according to Tafuri, always absolute, withdrawn from reality, 
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trying to replace reality with a new, different reality. Experimental architecture 
on the other hand, opposes existing approaches in architecture, attempting to 
shift the general direction and challenge accepted practice. Experimental archi-
tecture is not a statement: it is engaged in the existing world. It is not a turn away 
from the world, but a turn towards it, engaging in its reality.129 This turn towards 
the world is also emphasized in the introduction to the overview of ‘alternative 
practices’, where Awan, Schneider, Till argue: ‘agents acts with intent but that 
intent is necessarily shaped and reshaped by the context within which the agent 
is working.’130  This also forms a part of Mockbee’s statement on architecture and 
social compassion. ‘Physical poverty,’ he writes, ‘is not an abstraction, but we 
almost never think of impoverishment as evidence of a world that exists. Much 
less do we imagine that it’s a condition from which we may draw enlightenment 
in a very practical way. … Architecture won’t begin to alleviate all of these social 
woes. But what is necessary is a willingness to seek solutions to poverty in its own 
context, not outside it. What is required is the replacement of abstract opinions 
with knowledge based on real human contact and personal realization applied to 
the work and place.’131
Arendt’s critical response to the ‘hippie communities’ obviously sprang from the 
lack of worldliness she saw in these communities, as well as from her critical 
attitude towards the social agenda that was often behind these activist and 
anarchist practices. Her well-known book On Revolution, which on the one hand 
analyses the American and the French revolution, but on the other hand distances 
itself between these two in favor of the American (since the American tried to 
develop another political system out of the revolution whereas the Frenchman 
failed to do so), in the second instance there is a harsh critique regarding the 
social agenda as perverting the essence of politics.132 Arendt does not urge the 
protesters to withdraw from the social system, but instead advocates a turn to the 
world and its relationships, emphasizing the need to think about public partic-
ipation and political structures. The social agenda empties the realm of politics 
with its focus on life and social improvement (belonging to the labor perspective 
of becoming dominant in society). On the contrary, the aim of politics is the world 
and its sustenance, where the social agenda is bound to life and its survival. A 
politics based on social issues, she argues, is a politics based on compassion. 
However Arendt rejects this motivation as the basis of a political system. 
Compassion is a private matter, part of one’s private life, it cannot be a matter for 
the public life of a community, she argues. Behind her rejection of ‘social issues’ as 
‘political issues’ lies again her distinction between labor and work as well as that 
which exists between labor and action. This also reinforces her critical response to 
the ideologies of capitalism (which we touched upon previously) and of socialism. 
Both are rooted in a labor approach to the world, and so both are expropriate their 
inhabitants. Capitalism is turning people into ‘slaves’ of consumption, whereas 
communism makes them completely dependent upon the state.133
As stated previously, some of the projects presented as ‘architectural agency’ 
could be supported by Arendt’s reflections. But what about the ‘call for action’ 
of Shiffman and Hou? Their social agenda is obvious, and might be critically 
judged by Arendt as not suitable for public action. However, their call is also first 
and foremost not an aim to withdraw from reality in order to address the great 
(social) injustices in society. Moreover, what they emphasize is the importance 
to make visible – even tangible – what is hidden in capitalist and/or consumerist 
mass society. It tries to address publicly the effect of mass society within the 
community. Their approach, I would argue, particularly regarding what they 
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expect from architects, can be viewed along with the aspects that Arendt brings 
to the fore. Although critical of the system, their aim is to empower society’s 
inhabitants to act; to appear in public space, to reclaim spaces, to withdraw 
barriers of participation, to occupy. Particularly in terms of the relationship with 
a local community, this sharing of knowledge with the community recognizes 
opportunities to go out and unite, to enable appearance, which form the aspects 
that echo Arendt’s critical approach to protests. This is an important aspect of the 
call to ‘act’ sounded by Shiffman and Hou: where empowering means not acting 
only from behind a particular community, but a means of strengthening the given 
community from within. It is not designing or designating a particular future from 
above, but is instead standing side by side and sharing architectural knowledge. In 
other words it is not top-down in its aim to bring the community to a higher level 
of action toward future perspectives. 
Empowerment is also an important feature that Awan, Schneider and Till 
recognize in their alternative practices. ‘The agent’, they write, ‘is one who effects 
change through the empowerment of others, allowing them to engage in their 
spatial environments in ways previously unknown or unavailable to them, opening 
up new freedoms and potentials as a result of reconfigured social space’.134 The 
latter term, ‘social space’, refers to the threefold distinction Lefebvre understands 
when regarding spatial issues, and as touched upon before, presses for the trans-
formation of space not only as in the hands of architects, but as a collective and 
mutual effort, in which the users themselves are as affective as the ideas of the 
designer. However, to make this accessible and to empower the act of participa-
tion along with all of the other aspects expected from Shiffman and Hou in archi-
tecture, should we categorize this as political action, or as another aspect of the 
pre-political condition of architecture?
What does this mean if we bring the question of architectural action back to the 
Arendtian terms of ‘work’ and ‘action’? The relationship between the Arendtian 
terms of ‘action’ and ‘architecture’ is quite difficult. Although Arendt is also very 
critical about the status quo, she does not promote ‘action’ as the formation of 
an alternative sphere. Arendt views ‘action’ as proposing something close to the 
fundamental natality of life. It is to offer something new; to start again, to take 
initiatives, to act in public so that others can react and support. Only if action 
becomes ‘action in concert’ can change be expected. It is particularly within 
this last view that the importance of ‘action in concert’ or ‘empowerment’ is at 
stake. Empowering the community with architectural knowledge certainly helps 
the community to actively engage in public space, helping them to act out their 
concerns towards public space. This empowerment of the people might be seen 
as pre-political, encouraging the given set of inhabitants and cultivating public 
participation amongst them.135 Within such community, acting in public gains 
a response either in terms of applause or rejection. To occupy a space in order 
to change it, to remove the barriers that exclude particular groups from partic-
ipating, can surely be described as a form of ‘action’, but all of this can only be 
described as architecture in a limited sense. However, to take the initiative and 
expand upon ideas about the future of these spaces, to bring these concepts to the 
fore in public space in order to be discussed, might then be described as archi-
tecture intervening actively in public space; urging for a new form of discourse 
for the future. These can be described as the political aspects of an architectural 
project, of architecture as ‘action’. 
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Until now we have asked if architecture can be understood not solely as ‘work’, 
but also as ‘action’. Although this question is addressed by practices that show 
a similar approach to the profession as Rural Studio, as well as in the ‘Call for 
Action’ by Shiffman and Hou, we cannot answer this question by viewing the 
possible aspects of action only within these practices. These practices actually 
reveal aspects of architecture that remain hidden in the other parts of the archi-
tectural field. ‘Alternative practices’ bring different aspects of the architectural 
project to the fore, where in ‘mainstream’ architecture (and whatever it incorpo-
rates) other aspects are central. We’ve touched upon the centrality of architecture 
and construction as collective effort, its rootedness in a particular situation (based 
upon local context, community and condition), the public agenda of a project, as 
well as the unpredictability of the architectural process. Mainstream architecture 
on the other hand promotes the value of design, the centrality of a plan, the role 
of the designer, the tangibility of the object, and the durability of architecture. If 
we compare these alternative and mainstream approaches (which is admittedly a 
simplification in both limits of the spectrum), we can state that the first concept 
deals more strongly with the process of architecture, whereas the second places 
an emphasis on architecture as an object. The process-driven approach might 
offer more room for ‘action’, whereas the second appears to be limited to ‘work’. 
However, the first leads to objects as well, whereas the second also outlines the 
process that leads to the tangible object – a process that is, after all, the job of 
the architect. In other words, these aspects are central in establishing the role in 
the second too, but are more hidden, while the aspects that emphasize the object 
are also present in alternative practices. The emphasis on temporal intervention, 
environmental questions, social issues, and other important aspects of the object 
(which I have discussed in the previous chapters), sometimes remain out of sight. 
In contrast to this, the aspects of the process, the fundamental public agenda, the 
humble position of the designer, and the unpredictability of design and construc-
tion need to be stressed more clearly in the everyday approach to architecture. 
Particularly in terms of the public aspect of architecture, its fundamental 
publicness should be addressed at this point. Whether architecture is political or 
pre-political, it is by definition public. It intervenes in order to change the earth 
into the dwelling place of human beings, or it intervenes into the world in order 
to maintain it. It creates objects that define the living space of inhabitants today, 
yesterday and tomorrow. It intervenes in space in order to erect boundaries or 
different conditions, and so on. The project of architecture therefore never is 
private but always public. Therefore, the architectural plan needs to be made 
public, and not simply presented as part of the exchange market, in order to 
enable its inhabitants to acquire a new home, the firm new offices, its investors 
new properties, and its architects new assignments. It should also be presented 
within the public realm in order to enable inhabitants, civilians, and all other 
stakeholders to discuss the project politically. Since architecture intervenes in 
the world, from time to time the architect needs to suspend work on the design 
in order to make drawings, texts, models, diagrams, movies and sketches that 
present the idea to the public. The architect has to stop working in order to 
present the plans to the world, to discuss them and to listen to feedback – 
even from those that are not involved in the design-process itself. Often, these 
moments are formalized, as projects require permits from (local) governments, 
are published in newspapers, or are presented to the neighborhood as part of 
a fair hearing. However, these moments of presentation to the public, to gain 
support or gather opinion, are in architecture not valued as central moments, but 
are often described as resistant, needlessly difficult and bureaucratic. The public 
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presentation, however, can also be described as ‘action’. The plan, after all, makes 
tangible the future treatment to the world that is at hand, which will define the 
world for future generations. This treatment, since it is not only a private but 
also a public matter, needs to be discussed publicly, stretching beyond political 
approval it need be. 
The reason to stress the significance of the work of the architect is that at the 
root of architecture, which mainly consists of work and can be understood as 
pre-political, but should also be at least partly-considered as a form of ‘action’, 
which therefore is political. This political aspect particularly urges architects to 
consider their approach to the project; to think not only of what has to be done, 
but also of how it should be done. Architectural design is after all a significant 
activity in the world, as it exists and will exist.
7.3.2 To Think Spatially About the World
Architecture contributes to the world-in-common. This ‘contribution’ is highly 
affective, as is argued previously: the objects of architecture are both public and 
spatial. Political and spatial qualities actually belong to each other, as Arendt 
argued in her reflection upon Karl Jasper’s writings. The world is spatial and is 
characterized by its inhabitants.136 This public character of architecture today 
however is questionable. Architecture was once the most public of the arts, but 
it has lost this status acquired in the Romantic age. Arendt does not really clarify 
this remark with ‘contemporary’ examples, only adding that it is replaced by 
the novel that is interested in the social and the intimate.137 We can therefore 
plausibly state that if we look around today, the loss of this public character to the 
scattered appearance of architectural objects, listens to the even more scattered 
discourse within the architectural profession on its aims and objectives, particu-
larly when we touch upon the tension that exists between society and the archi-
tectural profession. There seems to be a lack of shared perspective; no common 
ground upon which architects, society, and the public can construct the world 
together. This lack of shared perspective is not only present between the profes-
sional field and society, but even within the architectural field it is hard to find 
shared perspectives. Architects might even disagree upon their starting points as 
fundamental assumptions differ from practice to practice. Some architects regard 
architecture to be an autonomous field, others argue that it is heteronomous, 
depending upon (amongst others) societal, cultural, and economic contexts. 
Others argue that architecture needs to engage in social issues, or understand it 
as a highly personal objective. The outcome of each assignment can be tempting 
and stylish, dynamic or formal, traditional or futuristic, extravert or introvert, 
understated or monumental, morphed and blurred, welcoming and securing, 
tiny or enormous – it only reveals in architecture today how important seemingly 
trivial details can be: the particular hand of the designer, the taste of the commis-
sioner, the approach of the contractor, the preference of an alderman, and so 
on. Today, the impasse between the professional and the public is tangible in 
the form of competitions, where besides a professional jury the public is also 
allowed to choose a ‘winner’. The choice of the public often differs as does the 
choice of the jury. Or to state it differently, the ‘taste’ of the public differs from 
that of the professionals. Architecture cannot be reduced to a matter of taste 
(if we understand this as a narrow definition, as we will see); the gap between 
‘the public’ and ‘the professional’ has a long pedigree in architecture. It is also 
tangible in Jane Jacobs’ resistance against the plans of Robert Moses,138 or in 
the sharp reflections of Tom Wolfe on the profession.139 However, where more 
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common ground could previously be found, at least amongst architects, today 
the profession itself is scattered, and it seems to be a house divided against itself. 
This position makes it hard to turn architecture into a public issue – or even to 
understand it as a public issue. It prevents architects from understanding ‘what 
they are doing’, to grasp the very public character of their profession, as it also 
hides the public aspects of architecture from public view. These discussions 
urge architects to continuously redefine their self-understanding vis-à-vis with 
society, to discuss the roles they could inherit, the positions they take.140 Today, 
the question of the roles of the architect and the role of architecture is again on 
the table. It can be seen in attempts to engage with public issues, in ‘empowering’ 
communities, and in all sorts of other engagements with the world. In these 
movements, small amounts of the public character are at least once again 
revealed.  
This brief reflection upon the increasing gap between architecture and the public 
from the Romantic age onwards, (as we have seen in the previous chapter)141 
propelled by modernity, leads to the question as to whether architecture can ever 
gain this public character again? It is this question that Frampton also formulated 
in his reflection upon The Human Condition. ‘Whether architecture,’ he writes, 
‘will ever be able to return to the representation of collective value is a moot 
point.’142 
In order to sketch an outline of the relevance of the public character of archi-
tecture as a process, as a product of making, and as a construction of the world 
that needs to be set within the public discourse, we might start with the argument 
which we have touched upon previously: architecture as pre-political activity. As a 
reminder: Arendt talked about the establishment of the Greek Polis. Before public 
life was at stake, public space needed to de secured. Public spaces simultaneously 
require a wall (which articulates the boundaries of public space) and a law (which 
organizes public life).143 This perspective of the act of architecture therefore 
stresses the potential of erecting walls and articulating boundaries, of articulating 
spaces that offer room for appearances, and spaces for certain communities that 
are formative for that community. Architecture in this perspective not only offers 
the potential for the community to organize itself, but also to articulate the given 
community. This is of course not only a matter of outer walls (edges, boundaries, 
porches, changes in materials or even patterns in the pavement, and so on), but 
also of buildings that symbolizes that community. The cathedral of Pevsner, upon 
which we touched in the previous chapter, certainly has such meaning, as does 
the town hall of a local community, or the canteen of a soccer club. Nevertheless, 
this is of course related to the origins of the Polis. What about the already existing 
Polis, and the initiative to add a courthouse, a canopy or a temple to the agora? In 
other words, do we need to see architecture as pre-political only? Is this definition 
too narrow? We can certainly argue that there are at least a couple of aspects of 
the initiative, design, and construction of a wall, a public building that are politi-
cally-defined as well. I will come back to this later, but at this point we can argue 
that if Arendt refers to architecture as pre-political, this is only in a situation that 
is pre-political; before there is a polis that can house a political body. However 
the moment there is a polis which offers room to a particular political body, every 
intervention in this polis needs to be discussed in public, amongst those partici-
pating in the political body. 
The pre-political activity of constructing a wall preceding the establishment of 
a certain communal space is of course related to the activity of work. It is after all 
an intervention in the world, moreover in constructing a world-in-common. It is 
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important to once again stress perspective as our second fundamental consider-
ation. As we argued in the previous chapter, it is important to keep this in mind, 
and to not only stress the limitations of architecture understood as work. Work 
in all sorts of perspectives is indeed pre-political. It creates a world-in-common 
which represents the stage for public life. It offers to this world the permanence 
needed for the instability and unpredictability of public life, of appearances, of 
action and of speech. 
However, architecture is certainly a cultural activity, which as stated 
previously, is somewhat understood within the activity of work, but stretches 
towards the activity of action and the realm of the political. This is the third 
perspective: as architecture strongly contributes to the twofold image of culture, 
intervention and care, to the renewal and maintenance of the world-in-common, 
it also needs to be an issue of public and political concern. 
Finally, we can also argue that behind the intervention that is at the heart of 
the architectural project, aspects of ‘action’ can also be traced. I would argue that 
the initiative to intervene, or the reasoning behind the design, evokes a form of 
sketching and drawing that is political in itself. This is the reason it needs to be 
discussed further in public. It changes the world and affects the polis. Moreover, it 
creates the polis. ‘If the architecture of urban artefacts,’ the Italian architect Aldo 
Rossi writes in the final paragraphs of his well-known 1966 book The Architecture 
of the City, ‘is the construction of the city, how can politics, which constitutes the 
decisive moment, be absent from this construction? … Who chooses the image of a 
city if not the city itself – and always and only through its political institutions.’144  
These four considerations of architecture and the political realm can be 
summarized with the conclusion that the pre-political and the political, along with 
work and action, co-exist within architecture. The construction of a wall is pre-po-
litical and political at the same time. 
These considerations certainly emphasize the gap between architecture and 
the public once more: one that cannot be taken for granted. Architecture is too 
important to leave it with that. Architecture requires serious effort to bridge 
this gap, relying on architects to involve the public in their proposals, but also 
requiring effort from the public to be involved in their environment (or better 
said, to be involved in the world). 
Through this challenge we also can observe from a slightly different angle. 
The merit of work, Arendt argues, is to offer permanence to the world, as well 
as a sense of ‘being at home’ in the world. As we have seen previously, works of 
art are particularly important in this respect.145 Building upon this perspective, 
we can argue that the merits of architecture place particular stress on the spatial 
aspects of the world. Or to state it differently: architects think spatially; offering 
a particular understanding and knowledge of and for the world. We can take 
this literally, since it occurs when architects talk to clients: they immediately 
think or imagine spaces for a certain purpose or wish. That is what happens 
when architects visit a particular site; they immediately think of the spatial 
characteristics, and how these can be adopted, exposed, or countered within 
the required intervention. That is also what happens when the architect touches 
upon a particular problem in the news – they think in terms of spaces that might 
help to counter the given problem. This is also what happened when I and my 
colleague conducted our first visit to the cemetery in Blankenberge – and also 
during the many other visits that followed. We immediately questioned the 
structure of the cemetery. Although it was blurred, if not hidden, we recognised 
its spatial qualities. It is because of this that we could read the space (although 
143. 
Arendt, The Human Condition, 198
144. 
Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the 
City (Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 
1982), 162
145.
cf. Hannah Arendt, Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 
1992), 76
AT HOME IN THE WORLD CHAPTER 7: DESIGN
563
we understood it better after studying the plan, reading about the history, and 
seeing how the cemetery has been expanded over time). Our training as architects 
and landscape architects helped us to think of spatial interventions through 
which these qualities could be revealed, and how these interventions could help 
to improve the spatial quality of the cemetery, or how the structure could be 
made tangible and or could help to increase the functionality and comfort of the 
cemetery, so that it could be more than just a cemetery but also an environment 
that offers the possibility to stay for a while; to find some rest and quietness. 
Spatial thinking is also triggered beyond actual assignments, as for instance 
through reading about developments in society in a newspaper, or evoked by 
particular items in the news. When architects read about the changing methods 
of teaching at primary schools, to take an example, they think about the conse-
quences this has for the school building and for the classroom. They are able to 
develop the spatial conditions that offer the correct room for these new methods 
of teaching.146 This might also be what happens when architects arrive somewhere 
and all they see is a parking lot with a blank wall and a small entrance-door. They 
think about the possibilities of that space, and how this could be achieved in far 
more welcoming and socially-secure ways. This is what happens when architects 
participate in a debate; they come up with spatial examples that make abstract 
ideas more tangible. This is even of use in situations of war, where architects (and 
their spatial knowledge) are able to trace where bullets may have come from, or 
who might be responsible for certain bombings.147  
We might state that to think spatially is to think in a particular way. Of course, I 
will discuss this later in this chapter, as the capacity to think spatially is a certain 
talent which is somewhat enhanced through training and education. However, 
to think spatially is particularly valuable because it is closely related to the 
experiences of the human body. This body is spatial in itself; it requires a space in 
which to function. The human body always relates to space in particular ways, and 
it is this which is inherent in experiences that are highlighted within the practice 
of architecture, that are dissected in order to construct a certain level of expertise 
and knowledge regarding the spatiality of the world. As the German architect 
Rudolph Schwartz argues in addition to the relationship between the body and 
actual building:
‘What then comes into being is first and foremost circumscribed space – 
shelter, living space, ceremonial space, a space which replaces the space of the 
world. We could almost say, and indeed it is true, that building is based on the 
inner spaciousness of the body, on the knowledge of its extent and the form 
of its growth, on the knowledge of its articulation and of its power to expand. 
Indeed it is with the body that we experience building, with the outstretched 
arms and the pacing feet, with the roving glance and with the ear, and above 
all else in breathing. Space is dancingly experienced.’148 
Space is bound to the human body. We experience space though our bodily 
senses: through our feet dancing in the room, our hands touching the doorknob, 
our eyes looking out of a window, our ears hearing the wind blowing in the 
curtains, or the smell of coffee that even offers an experience of taste. However, 
again via the Schwartz perspective, although delightful and obvious, it is bound 
to the individual experience, to the relation of the individual and particular space. 
It therefore lacks the same outward look as previously discussed, where it is no 
longer the individual and the earth, but the human being and the world, where the 
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human body is placed within the world which is in common with others, as the 
spatial experience of the room and of bodies. When we argue that architecture is 
rooted in the world and that the very aim of architecture is one of creating spaces, 
we might conclude that the aim of architecture is the spatiality of the world itself. 
If we argue that architects think spatially, we argue that they think about the 
world in spatial ways; imagining the world-in-common by imagining spaces. 
To me, this is a pivotal point that requires a slightly different approach to the 
public character of architecture, in addition to the four considerations we have 
defined above. Arendt also values the importance of spatial thinking. As we might 
expect, her idea of ‘spatial thinking’ was not so much related to architecture, but 
to politics. We have already touched upon this perspective briefly: ‘spatiality’ 
comes up in Arendt’s writings as she dissects the writings of one of her teachers, 
the German philosopher Karl Jaspers. She characterizes his thinking as ‘spatial’, 
and she clarifies what she has in mind with that characteristic: it is bound to the 
world and to its inhabitants.149 In other words, Jasper’s thinking is spatial, not 
because it is rooted in a particular space that exists (this is of course important 
against the background of the German pre-war emphasis on the heimat, which 
somewhat affected the thinking of her other teacher Martin Heidegger), but 
because it always relates to the world and its inhabitants. On the one hand this 
lifts Jasper’s thinking away from those that define the authentic self as rooted in 
a particular place or distinct from the humble and stumble of everyday reality, 
but also from those that never leave the realm of ideas and theories; whose ideas 
never become tangible. In Arendt’s perspective, to think spatially is to think about 
the world and its inhabitants; of the table and all of those sitting around it. The 
world is spatial, and the inhabitants of the world need this spatiality to take their 
particular positions around the table; to take their position in the world. It also 
means that this thinking is not focused on the individual self, but on the world 
that is in common, and on the plurality of its inhabitants that share the world, and 
how they relate to the world (and others).
Although Arendt stresses here the writings of Jasper, the work of a particular 
philosopher, we can view this as a perspective of the architectural approach to the 
world. If something needs to be used to characterize architecture as public art, it 
is the calling to think and act spatially, to imagine the world-in-common through 
spaces, as we defined above. We can now deepen this perspective by adding that 
thinking spatially is to think about the world and its inhabitants. Furthermore, 
architects not only think but also propose and act; they intervene in the world 
from a perspective that is bound to the world and its inhabitants. We might 
argue that the ‘ethical function of architecture’, from the title of Karsten Harries’ 
reflection upon the architectural profession,150 if it is bound to the world and 
its inhabitants, is to make these inhabitants ‘feel at home in the world’. Harries 
explains the title as follows: ‘Should architecture not continue to help us find our 
place and way in an ever more disorienting world? In this sense I shall speak of 
the ethical function of architecture. “Ethical” derives from “ethos.” By a person’s 
ethos we mean his or her character, nature, or disposition. Similarly we speak of a 
community’s ethos, referring to the spirit that presides over its activities. “Ethos” 
here names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling. By 
the ethical function of architecture I mean its task to help articulate a common 
ethos.’151 With this in mind, we can more clearly state our conclusion: architec-
ture’s aim is to make inhabitants feel at home in the world, as it also serves to 
offer them common spaces of appearance and to find their way in the world. 
This ethical outlook finds its support in, as Paul Holmquist argues, its ‘capacity 
to spatially reconcile the perspectives of human plurality into a common reality 
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throught fabrication.’152 This perspective means that architects should not to 
limit their perspectives only to architectural intervention, composition, or space, 
but to all of these aspects, perspectives, and ideas, which needs to be challenged 
against a background of ‘the world and its inhabitants’. By urging that ‘spatial’ 
refers the world and its inhabitants, it incorporates the web of relationships that is 
fundamental to the world and its inhabitants. 
This also means that architects offer proposals for transformation of the 
world by changing the web of relationships, but that their role (although not their 
impact) is somewhat limited (‘One cannot change man … but one can change the 
constitution of the world,’ Paul Holmquist writes. And he add a beautiful quote 
of Arendt: ‘… and “hope that the rest will take care of itself.”’153  After their ‘work’ 
(the intervention), it is up to the inhabitants to occupy this intervention. By 
their occupation of the architectural object, by their use of it, the object changes 
indefinitely. Only through this occupation and use the architectural projects 
may they become part of the world-in-common. ‘The architect only starts’, the 
British architect and educator Jeremy Till writes in his fascinating book Archi-
tecture Depends, ‘what time and others continue’.154 Till argues that architecture 
which incorporates these aspects of continuous change and transformation in the 
built environment, allows its users and inhabitants to more easily appropriate 
the buildings and spaces – and for examples of ‘unfinished’ architecture that 
he recognizes (for instance) in the early works of Herman Hertzberger.155 This 
challenge to architecture, as Till sees it, should not be read as a challenge to the 
object of design, but rather as challenge to the attitude of the designer. Architects 
should account for the appropriation of use over time. Transformation will 
inevitably happen through occupation. In other words, there is a close relation 
between world and how it is produced by its inhabitants. The architect plays a 
significant (but not the final) role in this production. This perspective echoes 
the notion of social space coined by the French Philosopher Henri Lefebvre. The 
notion of spatiality, insofar as it depends upon the world and its inhabitants, 
acknowledges that architects are not the only ‘spacemakers’ in the world. Space, 
somehow, is a ‘shared enterprise’156 – from the very beginning to the conception of 
(future) spaces, it is not only architects who conceive spaces, but commissioners 
are also involved, as well as other stakeholders. This also accounts for the use 
of space. Existing space is continuously redeveloped in dynamic processes. The 
architect is not the only one in charge. The use is defined by the users, and this 
will inevitably affect the space. They will change the panels or add other elements, 
disturbing and redesigning the patterns and compositions of all of these spaces.157 
A final point that can be made here is that space is always to be seen as political. 
As Awan, Schneider and Till describe: it is political because it affects the lives of 
its inhabitants and users. There is no neutrality in space: ‘This apparent natruality 
and abstraction is simply not the case: social space, as inherently political, is 
charged with the dynamics of power/empowerment, interaction/isolation, 
control/freedom, and so on.’158 This is of course particularly true for the (architec-
tural) practices that more extensively involve the public, outlined for instance in 
the aforementioned example of the Prinsessinnengarten. This is also articulated 
through the aesthetics of temporality as well as in the unfinished character of each 
project, which is particularly suited to these sorts of projects. 
Nevertheless, this also questions the ‘world’ as we described before as 
offering continuity in time (and space), even amongst generations. Instead 
of an ethical outlook towards the aim of a design process, we might also state 
that what is central in the alternative practice – the production of the interven-
tion as a collective and community effort – is in mainstream practices hidden 
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(or neglected) within the time-frame of production but is still happening. The 
building will be transformed over time by its given users; by the public as well as 
by its owners (who will make the drastic transformations, however the users will 
change the building on a daily basis through their presence and engagement). 
In other words, the world is inevitably in a continuous state of transformation. 
This transformation can be seen as the adaptation of the world to the practices 
of the now and the future. Transformation, in other words, is needed in order to 
guarantee the permanence of the world. The monumental buildings that colour 
our memory of cities for ages, that form the background of our urban experiences, 
and which are stressed by Aldo Rossi as the very continuity of time and space,159 
reveal this paradox. Historical cities are examples of the smooth transformation 
between the simultaneous processes of endurance and transformation. 
Although these reasons clearly stress the importance of understanding 
‘spatial thinking’ in a broad sense, with Arendt in mind we might add to this the 
important perspective of the world itself. It does not only affect the lives of its 
inhabitants (as it forms the spaces of house and home, street and mall, school and 
hospital), but it also impacts the world, which is not only ours, but something we 
hold in common through time. Once again, to think spatially is to think about the 
world and its inhabitants. If we need to emphasize ‘what architects do’, for now it 
can be seen through this perspective: architects think spatially about the world, 
which exists not only in the present but also in the past and future, not only in 
terms of objects, but always in terms of objects in relation with their inhabitants, 
which for them represent not just their spaces and objects, but their home.
7.3.3 ‘Even If Nobody is Watching!’  
Now that we have several reasons that address the ‘ethical function of architec-
ture’ in the world and its inhabitants, particularly in all sorts of spatial aspects, 
it is necessary to stress once again the very activity of design. Design is the 
instrument of architecture, the instrument to intervene and transform – an 
instrument that intentionally initiates transformative processes. Design also 
can be described as the lenses through which architects think. If they think 
spatially – as I have argued architects do – it is not just thinking ‘in’ spaces, it 
is also thinking in materials, techniques, installations, as well as in contexts, 
histories, cultures. They think of uses and users, of skylines and the ground level, 
of elevators and escalators, of lighting and sustainability. They think of forms, 
relationships and sequences, of compositions, structures and elements, of routes, 
roofs, and entrances. In other words, architects think in terms of possibilities 
and interventions, imagining what ‘it’ might become. This is not simply a matter 
of ‘imagination’ – this imagination must be fuelled by architectural knowledge. 
Against this background, architectural design today is increasingly emphasized 
as craftsmanship. Design as a practice that can be trained, developed and 
enhanced.160 Rightly so, architectural design indeed requires the development of 
skills. It also requires the expanding of one’s imagination. Architectural thinking 
is intentional thinking, which requires knowledge of spaces and interventions, of 
the history of the profession, of architecture, the city and the landscape, as much 
as it requires the ability to imagine its future.161
Richard Sennett also argues that craftsmanship not only means to acquire 
a particular skill, but also a certain reflection upon the impact of what one is 
doing. An ethical attitude is part of craftsmanship.162 If we think of architectural 
design as a practice, we might argue that design and reflection are two different 
elements within the architectural office. We might argue that this reflection is part 
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of the design process, but that reflection also requires distance to the process of 
design. ‘Every good craftsman conducts a dialogue between concrete practices 
and thinking; his dialogue evolves into sustaining habits, and these habits 
establish a rhythm between problem solving and problem finding.’163 The design 
itself is the application of certain skills upon a particular assignment – the skill 
of a continuous process of analysis and drawing, of re-drawing and enhancing, 
of stressing imagination and limitation. The outcome of that process, which is 
simultaneously cyclical and parallel, relating to different scales, searching for new 
insights, is the – in the eyes of the designer – best possible answer to a particular 
question of a client or brief. As is clear: this answer changes from designer to 
designer, based upon skill, insight, theoretical outlook, previous experiences and 
objectives. Inherent to the design is thus a certain position, as well as the personal 
traits of the designer.
It becomes clear that architecture is a practice that needs to take responsibility 
for the world. I would state, therefore, that architectural practice cannot operate 
without a reflective component, although everyday practice reveals how difficult 
it is to integrate moments of reflection within the hustle and bustle of the office 
and the design trajectory. Nevertheless, architecture not only needs to make 
designs public and enable the public to respond to proposals, it also requires it 
to be a reflective practice in itself. Architecture, by ‘acts-of-the-will’, impacts the 
world and its inhabitants with its proposals, interventions and constructions, not 
only for today, but also for tomorrow. Architecture transforms the existing, and 
therefore impacts on the future. We might conclude that architects (and others 
involved in the process of construction), bear a responsibility to the public as 
well as public responsibility. That is: architects bear responsibility for the world. 
The responsibility to deal with the world, particularly in the case of (registered) 
architects. To join a register of architects, to get permission to build in a certain 
state or city, is taking responsibility, to act professionally, to develop a responsible 
attitude to the world. In everyday practice, in moments of extreme stress and 
busyness, the architect still has to take this world into account. This opens up an 
ethical perspective on the profession, urging the architect to communicate with 
the public, to engage the public in their plans, to offer accessibility of the plans to 
the public.  
Again, others who produce products that enrich the world, that intervene in 
the world, that add, replace or even destroy objects, must also bear this respon-
sibility. But architects, with their practice of spatial formation, are playing hors 
category of worldly practices – beyond categorization. 
If we start to think of an ethical perspective, it is clear that this must to be applied 
to all building assignments. All interventions that affect the world have to be seen 
as architectural – there is nothing that can be disclosed from this perspective, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, a conclusion that is reiterated by the several 
perspectives upon the worldliness of architecture and architectural design 
offered in this chapter. Most of the aspects addressed in the previous chapter are 
not tools that can immediately be applied in order to construct a ‘world’ which 
offers permanence, a sense of reality, or an image of plurality. These are aspects 
inherent in architecture, but nevertheless disappearing in our understanding of 
the profession today. There is no single answer or approach, no particular form 
or shape, no single material or texture that offers a final answer to the problems 
faced. It is not possible to rationalize architecture (that is: we can make it more 
rational, but we cannot bring it back to a formula, to maths) particularly as the – I 
repeat again – ‘ethical function of architecture’ is the world and it inhabitants, 
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which are two phenomena that are inherently plural. It cannot be rationalized, but 
it is urged to be ‘relationalized’ - to be engaged with the world and to relate to its 
inhabitants. Architecturally we can speak of the socio-spatial relationship. This 
relationship can be discussed, investigated, it can be addressed and discussed, 
but can never be reduced to mere statistics and other finite scientific perspectives. 
Human life, and particularly that of a community, cannot be brought back to a 
formula. We might have increasing insight into the effect of form and color, of 
climate and tectonics, but lived space, as well as perceived space, always differs 
from the conceived space, to state Lefebvre’s reflection on ‘social space’.164 The 
socio-spatial relationship cannot be prescribed.
This conclusion is the very reason to stress the cultural component of archi-
tecture. As we stated in the previous chapter that a distinction between archi-
tecture and building does not make sense in regard to the ‘construction of the 
world’, here we understand the reach of this perspective. Even the ‘mere-building’ 
practices must be challenged by the same cultural perspective. The artistic 
aspect of architecture offers room to adopt local qualities and characteristics of 
community, without reducing it to a finite form and prescribed experiences and 
usage. If understood from this perspective, the artistic (that is to say that every 
architectural object differs, since it is designed for that particular spot and with 
that community and usage in mind) offers the freedom to discover and explore, 
to occupy and appropriate. Admittedly, some architectural approaches offer more 
space to discover and explore, to occupy and appropriate than others. But in its 
totality, the plurality of architecture is one of the tangible aspects of the limitless 
differences fundamental to the world. This, once again, raises discussion of the 
very publicness of the process of architectural design. It is offered to the world 
not as a science of facts (which are difficult to discuss), but as a way to deal with 
differences (which are urgent to discuss). 
I will return to this ‘scientific’ aspect, but we must first stress the public 
perspective that is inherent to all architectural assignments as an ethical 
challenge. If architecture is artistic, but should not be treated solely aestheti-
cally, and if architecture is a service, but cannot be treated in the limiting way 
of just another expert at the table – what then? At this point, I would recall the 
writings of Geoffrey Scott and Tom Spector on the humanist and ethics of archi-
tecture respectively.165 They do not so much differentiate between architecture 
and building, between the everyday and the exceptional, but urge architecture as 
craftsmanship, whose inherent drive is to achieve good work. As Sennett writes: 
craftsmanship ‘is focussed on achieving quality, on doing good work, which is 
the craftsman’s primordial mark of identity.’166 Scott and Spector both argue 
for this perspective too, by taking the three-fold elements of well-building as 
proposed by Vitruvius, which they regard as still valid for all assignments. Archi-
tectural aesthetics is not something separate to the structural and the functional 
question in a project. They argue not for the division between the genuine and 
the exceptional, but between the genuine and the excellent. This is not simply in 
line with Vitruvius’s principle of well-building, but also offers a more balanced 
approach to the built environment, in which the three aspects play a simulta-
neously crucial role.  Unlike Ruskin, Scott and Spector don’t see the aesthetic 
aspect of architecture as just useless decoration beyond common use, neither 
do they put it forward as the ultimate decisive characteristic as Pevsner did, but 
understand it as an integral aspect of building. The aesthetics of architecture is 
related to its other aspects, to commodity and firmness. Architectural aesthetics, 
as Scott argues, is urged by a pure aesthetic impulse. This impulse nevertheless 
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does not culminate in a purely aesthetic result, ‘for it has to deal with a concrete 
basis which is utilitarian.’167 And as Spector stresses, only these projects that 
are well-designed, where aesthetics and use, aesthetics and construction, join 
forces, leave us speechless.168 Therefore, if we stress the profession of architec-
ture as the urge of well-building, we stress a whole field of professions that are 
involved in (the transformation of) the built environment. All participants in the 
building industries are included in this perspective. This helps each participant 
to position themselves vis-à-vis the aim of well-building, in order to apply the 
aspects of commodity, firmness and delight into every assignment at hand. This 
makes reasonable sense, since this brings architecture and building back to a 
single perspective. Both intervene in the world that is in common, which means 
that both bear responsibility for the world in common, for the care for the world, 
its past and its future. Whenever we split the building industries into a part that 
is playing around in the realm of the arts, and a part that is disclosed from such a 
delight, the challenges that occupy the first do not apply to the second. This means 
that both distinct realms lose their indebtedness to the world. The first loses its 
contact with the reality of users and society, the second loses the understanding of 
each assignment as an intervention in a common world. Keeping both sides of the 
spectrum of building close together at least encourages each participants in the 
building industry to do their best and deliver a good job.
Although Vitruvisus’s terms firmitas, utilitas, and venustas are still 
understood as valid today, there are certainly aspect that can be added to these 
three term, which are evoked through the new issues faced by contemporary 
practice. Spector introduces two extra themes, context and style, as relevant 
for architecture today. The latter is less important for our perspective, the first, 
however, anticipates the increasing globalized playing field of architectural 
design.169 Although architecture can be understood as ‘the most context-sen-
sitive of the arts’, from the very beginning of modern architecture the idea of 
context has been questioned and emphasized. It started with transgression of the 
local boundaries through international publications, conferences that brought 
together similar outlooks, and exhibitions showing similarities of approaches and 
attitudes – and thereafter architects that travelled the world, conceiving projects 
in different countries and for different cultures. Modern architecture became 
an ‘international style’, which in turn evoked the responses of ‘postmodernism, 
traditionalism, historicism, and environmental- and social-activist movements’, 
which ‘all have contributed formidable critiques of modernism’s unsympathetic 
attitude toward pre-modern buildings and urban patterns.’170 The question of 
context is today embraced more than ever, particularly in the situation where 
heritage has been promoted as the central assignment of the future in the West, 
as well as the unsurpassed growth of cities in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Both situations, however, show how difficult it is to deal with local circumstances 
without falling into the trap of nostalgia or in a perspective that only duplicate the 
achievements of Western architecture in a very different cultural circumstance. 
This somehow, to my mind, is also behind the now famous slogan coined by 
Rem Koolhaas, ‘Fuck Context’.171 As in his other writings, this is not a paradigm 
to be followed, it is simply an observation. It once again shows his attitude of 
the ‘realpolitiker’.Simply a sharp reading of todays’ situation, particularly on the 
increasing assignments in architecture and the city for huge, often non-site-spe-
cific programs, like warehouses, malls and airports. 
The question of style is a bit more difficult, but is definitely worth 
challenging. Spector urges style as a theme that mediates between architecture 
as an expression of the self, and ‘the self to be not an isolated individual but a 
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participant in community struggle.’172 Behind this remark there is the acknowl-
edgement that a single individual only can acquire an incomplete picture of 
the world via others, which is ‘to accept that one will never conclusively prove 
anything, that only only constructs provisional, fallible, although hopefully 
durable narratives.’173 This view resonates with the introduction of the metaphor 
of the table by Arendt, discussed intensively in the previous chapters, which 
shows that only ‘where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without 
changing their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they 
see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.’174 
Despite the unease about style in the modern and contemporary Western world, 
there still is a certain ‘approving of the fact of style’, Spector states.175 Spector 
argues that ‘style’ has to be understood as a ‘coherent vocabulary of techniques, 
forms, and conventions.’176 A style urges others to participate in it – and with that 
perspective Spector tries to overcome arbitrariness in design, and it also enables 
other to follow a certain approach, it makes the architectural response to certain 
questions and assignments accessible to discussion.
Particularly because of this latter aspect, I would support Spector's 
proposal as a category to be added to the Vitruvius trias. Architecture, when 
seen as constructing and intervening in the world, has to be seen as serving the 
inhabitants of the world, the public. This means that all works of architecture 
should also be seen as being a public servant. The ethics behind each building 
project is not only on the level of the construction, the utility, the aesthetics, the 
context and the particular approach to the design-assignment that acknowledges 
the tension between the singular designer and the collective world, but also on the 
public responsibility inherent to architecture. How does this particular project not 
only serve the client, but also contribute to the world-in-common? Each building 
project serves the public, it contributes to the world-of-things, to the world in 
common, the world that we inherited from previous generations and that we offer 
to the next. The architect, in this sense, is challenged to be a public servant. As 
Mockbee urges:
‘If architecture is going to inspire a community, or stimulate the status quo 
into making responsible environmental and social structural changes now 
and in the future, it will take what I call the “subversive leadership” of acade-
micians and practitioners to remind the student of architecture that theory 
and practice are not only interwoven with one’s culture but with the responsi-
bility of shaping the environment, of breaking up social complacency, and of 
challenging the power of the status quo.’177
Although the public view does not necessarily always rival the status quo, it 
challenges the attitude of the architect to always look further than the clients 
interests. It urges an ethical perspective upon architecture. ‘Go above and beyond 
the call of a “smoothly functioning conscience”;’ Mockbee challenges architectural 
students, to ‘help those who aren’t likely to help you in return and do so even if 
nobody is watching!’178
Spector’s view on ethics in architectural design is conceived on the basis of 
contract-theory, which is based on the writings of the English philosopher 
Thomas Hobbes, and adjusted by contemporary philosophers John Rawls and 
David Gauthier. In architecture, much is organized through contracts: the rela-
tionship with a client and with the contractor all are covered by well-defined 
contracts. However, the contract with society is implicit rather than defined by 
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applicable rules. It is a matter of ethics, Spector argues. He mirrors this contract-
model to the model that can be derived from conflict-theory, in which in lack of 
a contract between the professional and society, the context is taken as starting 
point. Since there is a matter of power relationships at stake, there always is a 
possibility of conflict in these situations. Conflict-theory is critical to profession-
alization, which is seen as a mechanism of control and self-defence.179 Spector 
rejects conflict-theory, as within architecture the conflict is not so much about 
a struggle for power, but a struggle for ‘beauty of the built environment in the 
face of the an-aesthetic values of capitalism, or how to represent the interests of 
groups that are not present during design, or how to bring meaning to desultory 
suburban landscapes.’180 Spector takes this struggle as an image of the architect 
today: the position of the architect is always a little uneasy, positioned somewhere 
between the client on the one hand and the public on the other. If architecture is 
not just a mere provision of a service to the client by an ‘expert’ on space, a role 
that can be understood both in a limited as well as in an expanded sense, but 
within the context of aesthetics, culture, thus acknowledging a relationship with 
the public as well, then there is an inherent conflict in each assignment. Spector 
argues that the ethical outlook of the architect on his profession therefore can 
either be based on the conflict-theory, which sprang from the writings of Karl 
Marx, or from the contract-theory, based on the writings of Thomas Hobbes and 
John Rawls. Spector rejects the first: the conflict-theory originally addresses the 
conflict between classes, with an aim of resisting the ruling power. Spector reads 
this, when applied to the field of architecture, as simply protecting ones own 
interests, which he argues is egocentric.181 The conflict theory does not validates 
the public interest of architecture. He therefore accepts the contract-theory as his 
starting point: 
‘The ethical dilemmas faced by architects arise from the conditions under 
which architecture is practiced. The conflicts between private and public 
interests that come to the fore in design deliberations typically cannot be 
resolved without ignoring or arbitrarily narrowing the scope of legitimate 
claims. The conflict model tempts architects to accept the truth that “power 
rules” and to quit worrying about making arbitrary decisions, but architects 
have demonstrated an unwillingness to give in to such temptation, and 
with good reason. A contractual model, grounded in the notion of profes-
sional ethics, generates a more satisfying response to the dilemmas posed by 
professional practice: why fraudulent practice is unacceptable, why profes-
sionals worry over their “duty”, why changing the terms of practice is such 
a hazardous undertaking, and how professionals can justify exclusivity on 
ethical grounds.’182  
Certainly, one of the main problems with the contract-theory is that there is no 
‘real’ contract with the public. A contract requires two ‘solid’ parties, but there is 
no solid ‘public’ – there is no ‘public will’ – that can be one of the parties in the 
contractual relationship. Spector certainly choses the contract-theory since he 
finds the conflict-model too indifferent. In his text, however, it is clear that his 
model is somewhere in between: it promotes a responsibility to ‘the public’, but 
also argues that design always means dealing with conflicts of interests, which will 
never be in harmony. Decisions have to be taken, and these decisions never can do 
‘right’ to all interests. This last remark is greatly important for the reflection upon 
architecture and ethics Spector develops, a perspective that I would stress as well. 
I, however, don’t opt for the contract-model. Arendt’s image of public life relates 
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much more to conflict than to contract. To participate is to have the courage to 
appear amongst other, and to engage in unpredictable processes that even can 
turn against one. ‘The public’ are not one of the stakeholders at the table during 
the design-process, or could be in the form of the (local) board or government 
that have to give permission to construct the proposed building. Although in the 
democratic political system the (local) board or government can be understood 
as representing the public, in reality the public often feels misunderstood by 
(local) authorities, particularly regarding a project ‘in my backyard’. The contract 
with the public can therefore be understood as ‘virtual’. An ethical outlook could 
be that the architect is required to inform himself about public opinion, and not 
take so much for granted what the commissioner, the politician, or studies on 
a neighborhood bring to the fore. This might also be the perspective of Spector, 
since he promotes the ‘public will,’183 although it is not clear how virtual or solid 
he understands this aim. However, as already stated, this is a difficult outlook. The 
will of the public is divided, and it is not easy to grasp into a single perspective. 
What might be of profit for one (a new motorway which helps to avoid a traffic 
jam), can harm the another (since his house needs to be demolished). In other 
words, the public is fragmented, and its voice is dispersed, interests often 
countering each other. Since there is no ‘public will’, the public cannot be offered 
authority in the process of design.
Another option might be that the architect always regards architecture as 
a public project – not because of a certain public, nor a particular pubic will, 
but because the architect bears responsibility for the common world and its 
inhabitants. Since the world connect us with our neighbors, our predecessors and 
our successors, the public interest of each intervention in the world is evident. 
Because of his work, which is intervening in a given and common world, the 
architect bears the responsibility to that common perspective.184 The common 
perspective demands that the architect thinks from as many positions as possible, 
as I will argue later, where his approach should be balanced between the Greek 
and the Roman attitude towards culture: in imagining the future and an acknowl-
edgment of history and community. As is clear, this perspective acknowledges 
the distinct perspectives and opposite interests within an ethical outlook on the 
design-process. This perspective acknowledges much more the conflict-model, 
where the ethical aspect here must be found in a professional attitude and 
knowledge of the profession, that enables the architect to act and decide within 
this field of contradictory interests. 
Architectural design, as Spector argues and we can certainly agree upon, will 
always fail to fulfil every requirement, and therefore the design is always char-
acterized by a certain uneasiness. This can be agreed upon: this is not only a 
matter of different stakeholders (also those not literally at the table), but it is 
inherent in the Greek and Roman perspectives too. Intervention in most cases 
are at odds with the significance of taking care of the given world. The question 
of ethics, in this view, is thus a question of balancing requirements, as well as 
accepting this fundamental unease. We can agree upon this ‘contract-model’, 
since it at least positions architecture as publicly relevant. However, the need for 
a ‘virtual contract’ is a sign that within modern times, as Arendt argues, reason 
and rationality have parted company.185 Spector, to my mind, does not really give 
reason to value the ‘contract with society’, other than that it is a fundamental 
issue within architectural practice. He starts his analysis with the remark that 
the obligation of the architect ‘arises from and responds to two sets of needs. 
Individual members of society require someone to construct buildings that 
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presumably accord with their needs, and the public at large requires someone to 
protect it from the potentially devastating effects of poor and insensitive building 
practices.’186 Arendt’s notion of the world-in-common offers more context and 
tangibility to the responsibility of architectural designers than a general but 
virtual ‘contract’ with the public against ‘the danger of shoddy and insensitive 
buildings’187 might offer. It is not simply another contract at the table, besides 
those with the client and the contractor, that urges the architect to act responsibly 
in regard for  ‘the world out there’. The architect himself bears responsibility 
for the world and its inhabitants, of which the architect and his designs are part 
and parcel. Architecture is a public matter, but it is important not to regard this 
as something distinct, something to be added to the desires that fuel the design, 
another perspective that needs to be taken into account. It is inherent to the 
work, it is at the table all the time, and thus should always be part of the conver-
sations around that table. The architect, like the commissioner, the user or the 
contractor, should not distinguish themselves from the public – their views should 
be shaped by an understanding of being an inhabitant of a world-in-common. 
By arguing that architecture is a public matter that needs to be made public, we 
at once argue that besides being part of the public, the architect is also a public 
figure. The architect bears responsibility with his concrete proposals and designs 
to reveal possibilities and shape the future of the world, affecting its inhabitants. 
The necessity is to present these proposals in a way that the public, not trained 
in reading drawings or reading architectural texts, is able to understand and to 
discuss. ‘Architectural design as well as writing and criticism, should acknowledge 
the need for civic responsibility,’ also Pallasma argues, and he adds to this 
statement a remarkable direction for architecture to go.188 ‘Architecture should 
strengthen the reliability and comprehensibility of the world. In this sense, archi-
tecture is fundamentally a conservative art; it materializes and preservers the 
mytho-poetic ground of constructing and inhabiting space, thus framing human 
existence and action. Through establishing a horizon of existential understanding, 
architecture encourages us to turn our attention away from architecture itself: 
authentic architecture suggests images of ideal life.’189 If architecture, indeed, is 
a public art, and it should be part and parcel of public debate, as I argued above, 
this is not simply a matter of chosing a particular form and material. It is not 
a matter of organizing a public-questionaire on the different proposals after a 
competition. The public debate about architecture, as Pallasmaa rightly argues, 
should move away from the architectural temptations of shiny renderings. What is 
at stake in this discussion is future life in the world. How is this world-in-between 
understood, and how does it simultaneously relate and separate its inhabitants? 
What intervention will strengthen the world-in-common? What intervention 
maintains the world as well as proposes a careful renewal?  
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7.4 ON TWISTS AND TURNS
7.4.1 The Fundamental Uneasiness of Architectural Design 
There is something crucial in the notion of uneasiness that Spector describes 
in the position of the architect. The architect is always in between something. 
Thee design is serving the client, but also resistant to a singular perspective 
on the building assignment. It is not only an answer to the needs of the client, 
it also responds to a particular place. The commissioner may come along with 
(architectural) references, but also the designer has his experiences, wishes and 
preferences. It is intervening in the world, but also taking care of the world. 
Architecture thus – the architect, the architectural office – always acquires an 
in-between position, which requires a balancing of the interests of the project 
and an acknowledgment of the impact of the project in different directions. The 
uneasiness can first be traced in the relationship between the architect and the 
commissioner, but is also characteristic of the process itself. In the example of the 
pavilion, that opened this chapter, the project-group was very small. It was me, 
the designer, and my colleague, the landscape-architect, in the first part of the 
process in discussion with the city-architect of Blankenberge and his employees. I 
had a wonderful collaboration with the fellow designer: our individual ideas were 
quite close to each other, and could be merged together in a single perspective 
rather fluently. Later, there was me as the designer, in conversation with the 
municipality as the commissioner, alongside an engineering office that did the 
structural calculations. Later a Belgium architect stepped in to offer advice 
and knowledge on the local situation, and in the final phase the contractor was 
involved with his knowledge of constructing in wood and questions on how I 
actually wanted some of the details. This was a very easy organization – all advice 
and responses came to my desk, and I had to define how this (new) information 
should be implemented in the design, how the design needed to be transformed, 
or how the design could even be made better – or more realistic – through the 
processing of this information.
Design processes differ as day and night: this was a small project, and thus 
could be done by a single designer. Regularly this is not the case. Often there are 
more designers, an office, more advisors and experts, more people hired by the 
commissioner to guide or to comment on the project. And of course, particularly 
in these larger interventions, the project-team can be beyond imagination. The 
projects may start with lots of discussions with a large group of people, it may 
start with a project brief that even has more than 1000 pages of specifications. 
To structure a complex process like this is actually a profession in itself. As is 
very clear, particularly in these projects, within the complex organization of an 
architectural project like this, there is a tension between the advisors and the 
designers. This tension can be in the office, where there are engineers that do the 
maths, and designers that try to come to a coherent design that answers the needs 
of the client and that assembles the information, requirements and characteristics 
of a particular location and program. What is here described as coherent often 
means that it is also coherent for the office of the designer, within the oeuvre of 
the bureau. Particularly when a chief designer has a name to protect, a name that 
attracts particular clients, the ‘style’ of that designer is important. Although they 
may run offices with 50, even 1000 employees, the name of the chief designer, the 
‘starchitect’, is important: from Norman Foster to Jeanine Gang – it is their name, 
their approach, their style, that the client want to have attached to their building 
and that cities want to add to their image. The uneasiness presented by Spector is 
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tangible in every detail of this process, although most probably disappeared from 
the level of the chief designer. If it is his signature that one wants, he or she does 
not approach his own language, attitude, style critically. Designers, of course, will 
be critical on the result of the design, since it is their name that is bound to the 
designs that often are made by employees. The chief-designer will every now and 
then give comments, give directions to go, and finally will approve the design, 
before it is presented to a commissioner, the city, the public. There is of course 
uneasiness in the tension between the design-assistants and the architect in 
chief, as well as between the intentions of the design-office and the other parties 
at the table. Does the aesthetic ambition unite the participants, or is it an end in 
itself? Do the aesthetics have a social basis, or is it part of the ego of the architect? 
I would argue that in all of these moments, such uneasiness is important: it 
challenges the architect to find a balance between the personal and the public, the 
functional and economic aspects, the aesthetic and the ethical aspects. Where we 
speak of balance, we might better think of the highest achievable quality of the 
project, so that it indeed serves the client but also takes care for the world.  
The complexity of these ‘traditional’ project-designs today has been countered 
not only by particular managers, but also by computational programs, that allow 
the participants to work together in real-time. I will discuss this later, since by this 
approach, it is possible to exclude the uneasiness of design, that I would stress as 
an important factor for those dealing with the world. Today, assignments can also 
be very different, where architects take initiatives by themselves, stress certain 
conditions that can be improved, and try to tempt possible parties to be involved 
in the process and to invest in the project. In these projects the architect seems to 
be free to do whatever he thinks is just, but since he is supported by other parties 
that need to be involved and thus also to be satisfied, the freedom is not unlimited. 
It is different, of course, when money no longer matters. This may well have been 
the case in the projects of the famous architect and developer John Portmann in 
Atlanta, San Francisco and elsewhere. If you are your own commissioner, it is not 
so easy to arrange the talking-back essential to a project, the resistance to certain 
decisions by the commissioner. Only society – and how it is organized – is then a 
player that need to be faced. And this is an important point: in each project there 
is the public realm, the world and its inhabitants, that – although silently – ask 
the most troublesome questions. Is intervention needed? Is this form the best this 
place, this situation, this program, can get?    
This matter of balancing between particularly the public and the private aspects, 
between the ego of the architect and the wishes of the commissioner, between 
the commissioner and the user, between the subjective and the objective, has 
been a central theme within architectural practice as well, particularly during the 
seventies and eighties when ‘participation’ became the buzzword within archi-
tectural and urban design. Urban renewal processes tried to involve (future) 
inhabitants in the design-process. Particularly the work of the Belgium architect 
Lucien Kroll is distinctive in this period – his buildings for the Catholic University 
of Louvain in Brussels have become the very image of participation in architec-
ture.[IMAGE 7.10] As he writes on his approach: ‘We instinctively avoided every kind of 
authoritarian imposition threatening the landscape: bureaucracy, closed working 
methods, isolation, factory processes, ordering systems, etc. This did not amount 
to a deliberate renunciation of art or architecture but rather to acceptance of 
a world of openness, cooperation, osmosis, empathy, mimesis and fluidity.’190 
The theme of participation is back on the agenda today, as we have seen in the 
statement for a projective architecture that is evoked out of uneasiness with a 
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particular emphasis on the autonomy of architecture, as well as in the collection 
of ‘alternative practices’, where architecture it understood as an agency that 
empowers inhabitants and allows them to participate in processes of change in 
their own environment that rises out of social concern. Between these time-pe-
riods, as well as today, (re)newed emphasis on architectural form can be found, 
as well as a new interest in the specificities of architectural knowledge, and a 
re-evaluation of artistic approaches that become tangible in the differentiated and 
broad approaches of conceptual, rational, formal, and computational architec-
ture. These approaches in architecture spring from a certain uneasiness with the 
profession: they can be understood as challenging the particularity of architecture, 
and often aim to make the design-process more objective. In other words, what 
actually is inherent to architectural design in all its diversity is a fundamental 
experience of uneasiness with architecture, architectural design, the architectural 
intervention. Although this urge is understandable, this uneasiness is inherent to 
the ungraspable process of design. As I have argued previously, the subjective is 
undeniably and inseparably bound to the architectural intervention in the world, 
it only can be countered at the cost of applying the labor attitude to the design 
process. After all, architectural design, as it deals with the world, always deals 
with facts as well as (personal) impressions, with information and (individual) 
expressions, with the past and the future, the now and imagination. In other 
words, design only for a part of it is traceable and verifiable. Its core is subjective. 
The hand of the designer – which interprets and makes use of his imagination 
– cannot be excluded from the result. As we nevertheless see, this ‘hand of the 
designer’ also makes architectural design vulnerable for the exchange market, as 
well as offers a certain difficulty in the communication to the world, in explaining 
the ideas, images and plans to the public.  
The design-process does not follow a strict journey, a linear path in time, a 
prescribed manual. The design-process is characterized by ruptures, twists and 
turns. Looking backward on the design process of the entrance pavilions of the 
cemetery in Blankenberge, these ruptures are clear, but not graspable. Lots of 
drawings have been made, besides little models and sketches. But how do you 
move from one sketch to the other? Often it might be to stress a single idea that 
stood out in the previous drawing, or that came to mind through association. 
The sociologist Robert Gutman, upon whom we touched previously, stresses 
this as a continuous process of replacing one design for another, erasing the 
previous. The design process thus hurts somehow, it is self-critical, he states in 
his ‘psychodynamic’ reading of the design process. This capacity to be self-critical 
is essential to the designer, he argues: not to be satisfied too easily.191 Neverthe-
less, what is drawn and what is tested through drawing and modelling, is in the 
hands of the drawer. Or better said, it comes out of the hand of the drawer, which 
is driven by architectural knowledge and evoked through the human capacity of 
imagination.192 The aim of the design-process, with all its twists and turns, the 
investigation of side-paths and details, with all its ungraspable moments that in 
the end seem to be significant, is meant to come to a point where an architectural 
project can be defined as addressing all the aspects involved in the assignment.
The personal aspect of architectural design often evoke the question as to whether 
architecture is or can become a scientific practice. This desire is further evoked by 
the dependency upon practices in the field, as within the academic sphere. Archi-
tecture is pushed forward not by theories, but by local and personal practices, 
that recognize similar approaches to other offices. Architecture, particularly 
at ground level, within offices and particular assignments, creates innovation 
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and opens up new perspectives. In other words, highly personal approaches, 
initiated through subjective fascinations, pushes architecture forward. This often 
is a matter of chance: a particular assignment arrives at the right time on the 
desk of a particular architect. Architect and commissioner find each other, work 
well together, and therefore enrich the world with new constructions and other 
perspectives, new insight and innovation. As in the case of the widely known 
Rietveld-Schröderhuis in Utrecht, which is not only the result of a wonderful 
working-together by the architect Gerrit Rietveld and the commissioner, Mrs 
Schröder, but also the coming together of the particular knowledge of Rietveld as 
a carpenter, a furniture maker, and the ambition and ideas of Schröder. [IMAGE 7.11] 
However, there have been many proposals that have tried to diminish the 
personal factor in architectural design. The personal after all makes the design 
un-accessible, ungraspable, subjective. A great example, but not so much adopted 
by the professional field, can be found in the writings of Christopher Alexander, 
and particularly in The Timeless Way of Building and A Pattern Language. As the 
title of the first of this series of books suggest, Alexander was looking for aspects 
in architecture that can be regarded as timeless. Too often, we might argue, archi-
tecture is vulnerable for all to fashionable forms and structures, which means: it 
will not satisfy for long, and soon will be outdated. On the basis of the theoretical 
foundation that was laid down in his first book, Alexander presents ‘a possible 
pattern language’ in the second part of the study.193 It is important that he already 
presents this language firstly as one amongst other possible languages that could 
be derived from the previous study, and secondly that he literally understands 
it as a language that not only helps to design, but also to talk. ‘You can use it to 
work with your neighbours,’ he writes, ‘to improve your town and neighbour-
hood. You can use it to design a house for yourself, with your family; or to work 
with other people to design an office or a workshop or a public building like a 
school. And you can use it to guide you in the actual process of construction.’194 
This quote stresses the need for a particular language of architecture amongst 
other languages, meaning that Alexander admits that there is a particular subjec-
tivity involved in architectural design. The need of a language, which means: to 
speak and to act (design) coherently, is to be able to explain it to the neighbors. 
This is an important remark, which stresses the subjectivity to always come back 
to the level of everyday conversations. This does not mean that architecture 
should be simplified in order to be explained to the neighbours, but that what 
is said, explained, and aimed for, through the language, should be accessible 
(and imaginable) not only to architects, but also to a lay-public. The language 
Alexander presents is based on his own experiences, he writes, distilled from his 
own building and planning practices, particularly in the design of the Campus of 
Oregon University in Eugene, as he has investigated in The Oregon Experiment, 
a book he published as the final part of the triptych.[IMAGE 7.12] However, and this 
is actually shown by the detailed number of patterns presented, the systematic 
presentation, the ‘scientific’ approach here, is beyond the subjectivity to bring all 
lessons learned and derived from personal practice into a coherent and significant 
system.
Alexander’s approach to structure the process of design, or better said, to 
offer classified information to the designer, is to stress empirical reflection on 
the different aspects of architecture – what models work, what patterns of urban 
structures effect public life positively, how to design an entrance, and so on. 
Although his ‘language’ did not really attract many followers, his aim of acquiring 
more information on what actually ‘works’ in practice, has had many followers, 
up until today. We already touched upon the Danish architect Jan Gehl, who 
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precisely investigated and described public spaces that attract people, that can 
be seen as not only transit-zones, but also as places of destination. One also 
can think of the work of Aldo Rossi, upon whom we also touched, as well as his 
Italian contemporary, Giorgio Grassi, and their investigation on architectural 
typology.195 There is the investigation into density, the data on healthy environ-
ments, and so on – all sorts of information that has become available to architects 
and others within design-processes, to be inserted, to propel acknowledgeable 
possibilitiess.196 
Another approach can be mentioned too: the trial to open the design-pro-
cess to other experts within the theme that underlines a certain project. New 
information technology offers a computational approach to design, in which 
all participants can work together on a single drawing, so that the knowledge 
of each is immediately inserted into the project. Traditionally – which is also 
how the design for the entrance-pavilion to the cemetery can be described – the 
architect is the central figure in the process. The architect needs to acquire the 
right information from all experts, and bring them together in a certain order 
and hierarchy. The design is presented to the participants, to other designers in 
the office, to the commissioners, to experts in the field of construction, acoustics, 
light, physics, and so on – even also to governing instances – responses are gained 
and processed in the next phase of design. This cycle continues, until the project 
is built and delivered to the client. The design-process somehow is a process 
of continuously re-working all the acquired information. As can be imagined, 
sometimes information that is acquired half-way through the process stresses the 
ideas until then, and the hand of the designer is very influential on what actually 
is done with the acquired information. The new computational models, as for 
instance the well-known BIM-model, somehow try to objectify the design-process 
by stressing the processing of information. Although within these models the 
designer still can hold a general position, a veto on the aesthetics, the positions 
of all participants nevertheless is more or less the same. They add their insights 
into the same model, so that the new information is immediately processed in 
every detail of the project. This, of course, also counts to changes in programs 
or requirements – a simple change of parameters, as the users explain often, 
immediately implements these changes in the design. 
These approaches are interesting, and offer new insights to architecture, even 
new forms to the profession, as is in the case of computational design. One of 
the main questions that needs to be asked in all this, I would argue, is how to 
keep the uneasiness of design ‘alive’. If architectural design is seen as to just a 
case of applying the right architectural form to best answer the question of the 
assignment of the case, then it starts to be like the filling in of a formula, following 
strict paths in a certain linear way. Whilst this may be efficient and propelling, 
it leaves no room for creativity, nor for the critical attitude of the designer. But 
even more, one can argue that in these cases where the computational program 
is presented as the solution to overcome the deficiencies of design, a critical 
perspective upon the project itself, as well as a fundamentally self-critical attitude 
towards design, easily vanishes. In these cases, although evoked by an uneasiness 
about the all-too-personal hand of the designer, a perspective upon the ethics of 
architecture is left behind. An ethical stance, however, is part of the profession 
itself, and cannot be outsourced to computers or robots – although computers and 
robots can be programmed to prevent the human being from failing (in certain 
ways). 
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Uneasiness however, I stress once again, is at the heart of each intervention in 
the world. It is the essence of the balance between violence and care, that Arendt 
defines as the heart of culture. It is in the tension between a personal ‘language’ 
and ambitions and the particular architectural assignment, between the service 
to clients and the ‘ethical function of architecture’ to serve the world. As Diane 
Ghirardo argues: the first question that needs to be addressed in all assignments 
is if there is any need of the design.197 Or as the theorist Ignasi De Solá-Morales 
writes (on the particular spaces he calls Terrain Vague): 
‘the role of the architect is inevitably problematic. Architecture’s destiny has 
always been colonization, the imposing of limits, order, form, the introduction 
into strange space of the elements of identity necessary to make it recogniz-
able, identical, universal. In essence, architecture acts as instrument of organi-
zation, of rationalization, of productive efficiency capable of transforming the 
uncivilized into the cultivated, the fallow into the productive, the void into the 
built. When architecture and urban design project their desire onto a vacant 
space, a terrain vague, it seems that they are incapable of doing anything 
other than introducing violent transformations, changing estrangement into 
citizenship and striving at all costs to dissolve away the uncontaminated magic 
of the obsolete in the realism of efficacy.’198 
These perspectives actively encourage the need to start design with a critical 
question to the self, to commissioners and to others involved. Design starts to 
postpone the eagerness to design (an eagerness that is part of the designers very 
character).
Uneasiness – and resistance – nevertheless is also a propelling aspect 
of design. As stated previously, the creative aspect of architectural design is 
important. The scientific method somehow always is a methods of general-
izing results. Even in the well-thought through project of Alexander, the very 
knowledge acquired in the University of Oregon case is a particular situation, 
with a particular public in a particular time. How can information gained from 
this case also help other cases? Well, it can, but only by creatively working on the 
information, mirroring the Oregon situation to the case at hand, to a different 
context. Creativity is needed in order to face the plurality of the world and its 
inhabitants. To generalize, as Arendt has stated upon the social sciences, is a 
threat: it discloses what actually matters, that is what is different, outstanding, 
maybe even disturbing.199 Architecture, on the contrary, by its very heart and 
essence has to deal with the different, the outstanding, the characteristic
This means that inherent to architecture is a fundamental subjectivity. Only 
a ‘subjective’ response can deal with the outstanding. Other responses search for 
similarities and generic trends. Although it is good to have these in mind during 
a design process – an important part of architectural knowledge is certainly the 
knowledge contained in precedent, which makes the study of architectural history 
an important part of architectural education – the design-response should select, 
judge, adapt, challenge, and adjust precedents to particular characterisics of the 
site, program, ambitions and context of study. 
Subjectivity, however. is not only fundamental to architecture, it also is a 
valuable aspect of architecture. The subjective core of design offers the world 
diversity, which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is fundamental to 
the world. Diversity, we might state, is the insoluble worldliness condition of 
architecture: to enhance diversity, to reveal differences of the world, and to 
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offer distinctive conditions for its inhabitants are at the very heart of the archi-
tectural project as a world-building profession. This subjectivity, however, also 
evokes uncertainty and again uneasiness for the designer. It is not only one 
of the uneasy aspects to be explained, presented, and communicated when 
architectural projects are made public, it also – if rightly understood – causes 
uneasiness at the very moment of design. The uneasiness is not simply the close 
relationship between the design and the designer (which makes it difficult to 
judge the design from different standpoints, to present the design publicly, and 
to be open to comments), but also from a historical perspective. Lets explain 
this through an example, how the (recent) history of architecture promotes (or 
should promote) a valuable uneasiness amongst designers, by looking towards 
the post war urban extensions of The Netherlands (and certainly also abroad). 
Almost all cities in The Netherlands have these neighborhoods: build at the end 
of the fifties and during the sixties, characterized by often low-rise and sometimes 
high-rise apartment slabs within a green urban layout. They are based upon the 
Modernistic principles of the Athens Charter, which we discussed in Chapter Five. 
In The Netherlands, the General Extension plan for Amsterdam (1934), designed 
by Cornelis Van Eesteren is most well-known.200 [IMAGE 7.13] It formed the layout for 
the garden cities built in the West of the city immediately after World War II, as 
well the Bijlmereer, built at the end of the seventies. These neighbourhoods were 
rationally planned on the basis of mathematics, combined with new technologies 
and construction methods. Although designed with good intent, in some cases 
articulating social ambitions and emancipatory ideologies, these neighbourhoods 
seem to fail to survive new insights into architecture and the built environment, 
or have become dangerous neighbourhoods, at least in the eyes of spectators. 
Some of these neighbourhoods and buildings have been torn down, and replaced 
by other buildings that offer more diversity and a stronger conceptual whole, or a 
seemingly more authentic image.201 The mathematic approach, based on function-
ality, no longer provides the world that is in common. It does not offer the image 
of ‘ideal life’, as Pallasmaa portrayed architecture previously, in the eyes of the 
contemporary inhabitants. Today, diversity is required. This example promotes 
the idea of a particular uneasiness beyond architecture: it shows how important 
the architectural project is in the long term. It forms a world, an everyday space 
for families. However, it also shows how it can fail, how poorly it can provide 
a living space for its inhabitants today, let alone a public space in which the 
inhabitants can meet, can appear to one another. In the Dutch cases it, after all, 
is not too bad, if compared for instance to the banlieus in France. This example 
also reveals the distinction between built form and architectural ideas. Even the 
mathematical, technological, rational approach, in which the handwriting of the 
designer seems to be limited, rapidly becomes outdated. In other words, architec-
tural ideas – even those that seem rather objective – appear to be fluid. Insights 
and ambitions changes with the times and tides of architectural fashion. The 
architecture itself however remains to be decisive for its inhabitants for a longer 
period. This should also give the architect today a certain prudence. How long 
can the shiny apartment complexes and office towers that are being built from 
Shanghai to Dubai, the spectacular shopping malls being built from Istanbul to 
Los Angeles, stand the tides of taste, the changing images of good life? [IMAGE 7.14] 
For how long are the material appearances supported by the ideas behind them? 
The history of architecture thus reveals how the profession is characterized by a 
continuous development of ideas, insights and aims. But none of these seem to 
have a certain finality, and can become outdated soon. 
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The profession, to push this argument forward, is defined by uncertainty, which 
also urges the uneasiness of the design process. It does not need many words to 
argue that architectural design, since it is imagining the future, is by definition 
based on dealing with uncertainties. Design, after all, can be described as trying 
to define the future, to prescribe certain processes, and to steer in a particular 
direction. To be responsible for such power certainly evokes aspects of uncertainty 
– particularly when considering the last couple of decades of architectural history, 
which has revealed the possiblity of large failure with the best intentions. ‘In 
architecture,’ the architectural critic Ada Louise Huxtable writes, ‘the Law of 
Unexpected Consequences applies.’202 
The design process itself can be described as a process of uncertainty. Design, 
after all, is not a linear process, but with its twists and turns it shows how 
ungraspable the process is. Even in the small assignment of the pavilion described 
above, new insights came along the route, largely effecting the design. To deal 
with a changing program and increasing insight, of which the twists and turns 
of the design-process are the tangible and intangible witnesses, requires skill. It 
means that along the process ideas cannot be poured in concrete, but need to be 
flexible or even need to be able to be put aside, exchanged for other directions.
7.4.2 To Think Them Anew 
This ability to deal with the uncertainty of design – which for a large part is also 
the capacity to understand what one is actually proposing – is certainly part of 
the skill the craftsman develops over time. Despite the need to streamline design 
processes, facing the complex projects that are being constructed around the 
world today (I would not deny that need), I nevertheless would stress the activity 
of design as a particular human capacity that we have to value as central to the 
architectural project, and which cannot be taken over by bots and computers. We 
might call this capacity ‘talent’, since it is clear that not everybody possesses the 
capacity to design. But I also mean something different here. As stated previously, 
the need for a creative assessment of the materials and information at hand is 
important, particularly because of the fundamental plurality of the world and 
its inhabitants. Something personal is important. But how to understand this 
personal input against the uneasiness that is fundamental to the architectural 
project and that is evoked in the very act of design? I would here like to promote 
designing as a particular form of thinking, willing and judging. Or to state it 
differently: designing is this relationship of the hand and the mind within which 
imagination as well as experience and skill (architectural knowledge previously 
acquired) is utilized to think, to judge, define and propose. 
In his image of the good craftsman, which we discussed previously, Richard 
Sennett stresses the continuous dialogue between practicing and thinking. It 
is doing with the hands what is conceived in the mind, but it also is reflecting 
with the mind upon what is achieved with the hands. This internal process of 
conceiving, making, reflecting not only integrates the ethical attitude in the 
work and the approach to work itself, as is argued above, it also means that 
working in practices is a continual learning process, in which work does not 
become behaviour or automation but nevertheless establishes skill and insight. 
‘Every good craftsman conducts a dialogue between concrete practices and 
thinking; his dialogue evolves into sustaining habits, and these habits establish 
a rhythm between problem solving and problem finding.’203 Architects, if they 
are experienced, have developed their own way of designing, of approaching 
assignments, of stressing problems and investigating possible solutions. It is their 
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own skill that has been developed over time, that becomes rooted in the relation-
ship between the eye, the mind, and the hand. Of course, this particular approach 
can also become a fixed way of doing, which loses its flexibility as well as the joy 
of surprise. It is, as Sennett shows, a continuous dialogue, to shape the skills even 
after decades of experiences in the field.
Whereas the image of craftsmanship encourages a dialogue between working 
and thinking over time, it might also be taken as a model of the design process 
itself: a dialogue between the mind and the drawing hand – how the mind steers 
the hand, how the hand draws on paper, and how the mind reflects upon what 
is achieved on paper.204 The mind engages with what happens on paper: it urges 
the direction the hand goes, but can also be surprised by what comes to the fore 
if the hand withdraws from the paper and reveals what has been drawn. Some 
figures, previously sketched out in the mind, on paper turns to reveal something 
else than the mind had imagined. That is, probably also the reason why drawing 
is still needed, not only to communicate ideas with others, but also with the self: 
although things can be thought through in the mind, paper often disturbs this 
ideal picture– what has been drawn on paper offers new perspectives and opens 
other insights, sometimes just because things on paper are not as ideal as in the 
mind, or the hand cannot draw as nicely as one can imagine in the mind. 
Reflecting upon this process that balances the mind’s imagination and the skill 
(and knowledge) of the hand, which Sennett calls the dialogue between thinking 
and working, urges the question of how to understand this ‘thinking’ aspect of 
design, this intangible process in the mind, that directs our hand and reflects 
upon what appears on paper.205 In The Human Condition Arendt did not address 
this aspect of thinking, since, as she argued in the prologue to this volume, she 
was not completely convinced if thinking was a capacity that could be ascribed to 
everybody.206 Nevertheless, also in The Human Condition, the activity of thinking 
is tangibly present, particularly through the metaphor of a dialogue in which the 
‘I’ is in conversation with the ‘self’.207 The Eichmann trial, which she covered for 
The New Yorker, again roused Arendt’s concern about the thinking capacity: 
Eichmann did not show any trace of this thinking capacity, this conversation with 
the self. If she was struck by something in this trial, it was indeed this ‘absence 
of thinking’. Her review of the process roused critical responses, particularly 
since she argued that whoever does not think also cannot feel guilty – does not 
understands his wrongdoings, cannot grasp what he is doing. That is what she 
called, the banality of evil: ‘it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness,’ she writes in 
her reflection upon the critical responses.208 For Arendt this was the incentive to 
take up the challenge to think through this activity of thinking, which she then, 
for her study, divided into three different activities of the human mind: thinking, 
willing and judging. As has been stated previously, only the first two unfortunately 
were thought through, before she died suddenly in 1975 – from her thoughts on 
judging we are dependent upon a few articles that address this capacity of the 
human mind, as well as on notes for lectures she offered students of the New 
School in New York and at the University of Chicago.       
However, particular aspects of her thoughts on thinking and judging are very 
relevant to put forward as urgent aspects of the design process. Arendt actually 
starts to admit that the capacity of thinking should be thought of as a general 
capacity of the human being. Man, she writes, has the incentive to think. ‘By this 
I mean,’ Arendt writes, ‘that man has an inclination and, unless pressed by more 
urgent needs of living, even a need (Kant’s “need of reason”) to think beyond 
the limitations of knowledge, to do more with his intellectual abilities, his brain 
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power, than to use them as an instrument for knowing and doing.’209 However, 
assuming that everybody has the capacity to think also means the opposite: 
everybody also has the capacity to refrain from thinking regardless of how smart 
someone is. This of course is what she recognizes in Eichmann, an ordinary man, 
not a wicked one.  
Arendt therefore also distinguished, a distinction she borrows from Immanuel 
Kant, between thinking and knowing, between reason and the urge to think, 
between theorizing and the will to understand.210 Knowing of course, seems to be 
something that can be acquired. Although it certainly is through that knowledge 
is limitless, it is something that can be shared. Knowing is possessing, one can 
argue, it is roused by the ‘thirst for knowledge’. Arendt therefore argues that 
knowing can also be regarded as world-construction. It collects ‘things’ that can 
be shared, that can be acquired by others as well. ‘The activity itself leaves behind 
a growing treasure of knowledge that is retained and kept in store by every civili-
zation as part and parcel of its world. The activity of knowing is no less a world-
building activity than the building of houses.’211 Thinking is not about acquiring 
knowledge or mere wisdom. The activity of thinking does not possess something. 
On the contrary, it is urged by a need to think, the urge to understand, which is 
evoked by real experiences.212 Or as Arendt writes to her friend Mary McCarthy: 
‘thinking starts after an experience of truth has struck home, so to speak.’213 
Thinking, according to Arendt, is a human capacity, which requires solitude and 
contemplation. But, in opposition to the philosophical tradition, and especially 
also to her teacher Martin Heidegger, it is not a solitude that has to be seen as a 
withdrawal from the world in order to conceptualize the ‘truth’ beyond the world, 
nor is it rational and logical reasoning in order to conceive a cognitive truth, as 
scientists mostly see it. Thinking, according to Arendt, addresses reality itself: it is 
evoked by daily (sensible) experiences as well as the ‘interruptions or outbreaks of 
history’. So thinking is not ‘just having some thoughts in mind,’ nor developing a 
certain theory – especially not following particular dogmas. With thinking Arendt 
thus did not mean ‘theorizing’, or ‘reasoning’. Reasoning has a particular aim – its 
process is closed, based on a particular doctrine or goal. Thinking, on the other 
hand, does not offer a final ‘code’. On the contrary, thinking for Arendt was the 
capacity to break with existing strains of thoughts and to think for ‘oneself’. 
The political theorist Wout Cornelissen traces in Arendt’s writings three forms 
of thinking.214 Arendt herself did not conceptualize these three forms, but his 
distinction is clear, and enlightens three aspects that we can surely use as a frame 
to challenge a ‘thoughtful’ – to use once again the word of Mies van der Rohe – 
approach to architectural design. 
The first form he traces is what we touched upon already, the dialogue between 
‘me and myself’, distinct from voices around. As Cornelissen argues, this is the 
motif that is already present in her early writings, and remains until dissecting 
‘thinking’ itself in The Life of The Mind. This  is the most common image in 
Arendt’s oeuvre, an image that is linked to the figures of Socrates. The second 
motif he traces is based upon Immanuel Kant’s notion of ‘enlarged mentality’. 
‘Whereas dialectical thinking presupposes a duality, the “two-in-one”, Cornelissen 
writes, ‘representative thinking attempts to “represent” the plurality of perspec-
tives that are present in and constitute the public realm.’215 The final motif is only 
tangible in Arendt’s biography of Walter Benjamin, where Arendt writes about 
‘poetic thinking’, or ‘thinking in metaphors’. 
These three forms of thinking are substantial in architectural design as we 
will see. As stated previously, thinking, for Arendt, is not so much philosophy 
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per se. It is evoked by actualities. ‘The inclination or the need to think … even if 
aroused by none of the time-honoured metaphysical, unanswerable “ultimate 
questions”, leaves nothing so tangible behind, nor can it be stilled buy allegedly 
definite insights of “wise men.”’216 The need to think, Arendt argues, and here 
she clearly urges thinking as an internal dialogue, is only roused if something 
is absent. ‘Thinking’, Arendt writes, ‘always deals with objects that are absent, 
removed from direct sense perception.’217 The sense perception offers ‘food for 
thought’, Arendt argues, but the very moment of sensible perception, no thought 
is needed. This absence of the object of thought, once again, is very important for 
Arendt. This means that thinking is a particular process of imagining the object 
that is absent. ‘An object of thought,’ Arendt continues, ‘is always a re-presenta-
tion, that is, something or somebody that is actually absent and present only to 
the mind which, by virtue of imagination, can make it present in the form of an 
image.’218 While thinking is roused by absence of the immediate object, it is never-
theless described by Arendt ‘examining and reflecting upon whatever happens to 
come to pass, regardless of specific content and quite independent of results.’219 
This examining is sometimes called meditation, but can also be described as 
pondering: it goes in circles, without any end – or it should be the very moment in 
the circle that the same question is pushed forward once again. It can be described 
as consciously tasting food or wine: it goes in circles around the mouth, thought-
fully dissecting the elements, which sometimes rouse memories, sometimes offer 
the experience of being paralyzed by the unthought-of great combinations of 
different tastes that the taste-organ explores. This going in circles is important. 
Thinking somehow never stops. The urge to think requires the human being to 
think again and again. ‘The need to think can be satisfied only through thinking, 
and the thoughts which I had yesterday will be satisfying this need today only to 
the extent that I can think them anew.’220 This also means that thinking is open 
to surprise, to unpredicted perspectives, and does not fall short in doctrines and 
prejudgments – on the contrary, it takes such doctrines and prejudgments in 
order to ponder them. The aim of this internal dialogue, as described by Arendt, 
is a living in agreement with oneself. Or as said by Socrates – whom Arendt cites 
in agreement: ‘Since I am one, it is better for me to disagree with the whole world 
than to be in disagreement with myself.’221 In other words, thinking is clearing 
the mind of general collective thoughts, common premises, the presuppositions, 
opinions, and prejudices. Prejudices can be important as first responses, but 
always have to be thought through again. 
In her description of ‘thinking’, Arendt argues that the thinking mind, with 
its capacity to imagine the absent objects, take up the words our language offers 
us, wherein concepts are hidden – frozen, Arendt actually states. Thinking is 
pondering this word, thinking it over, and unfreezing the concepts that are hidden 
within it. In a nice passage, Arendt takes up the word house, which, as she states, 
can mean an apartment in the city as well as a family house in the suburb, it can 
mean a cottage in the village or a palace for a king. A tent, however, is not a house. 
She then writes: 
‘The house in and by itself … that which makes us use the word for all these 
particular an very different buildings, is never seen, neither by the eyes of 
the body nor by the eyes of the mind; every imagined house, be it ever so 
abstract, having the bare minimum to make it recognizable, is already a 
particular house. This house as such, of which we must have a notion in order 
to recognize particular buildings as house, has been explained in different 
ways and called by different names in the history of philosophy. … The point 
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here is that it implies something considerably less tangible than the structure 
perceived by our eyes. It implies “housing somebody” and being “dwelt in” 
as no tent could house or serve as a dwelling place which is put up today and 
taken tomorrow. … The word house … is a word that could not exist unless one 
presupposes thinking about being housed, dwelling, having a home. As a word, 
house is shorthand for all these things, the kind of shorthand without which 
thinking and its characteristic swiftness … would not be possible at all. The 
word house is something like a frozen thought which thinking must unfreeze, 
defrost as it were, whenever it wants to find out its original meaning.’222 
This thus does not mean deliberately thinking, it means meditation upon the 
concepts, trying to grasp whatever meaning is enclosed in it. Arendt stresses that 
this thinking process can either arouse us, that is, awaken us, or it can paralyze 
us, that is perplex us. The aim of thinking is not so much to come to a particular 
result – the end however can be that the new insights offer us something fresh and 
satisfying, or something new but disturbing, if not frightening. Thinking takes the 
frozen concepts and reveals their hidden perspectives – it means that thinking 
can have ‘a destructive, undermining effect on all established criteria, values, 
measurements for good and evil, in short on those customs and rules of conduct 
we treat of in morals and ethics.’223 Courage is needed for this conversation, 
particularly with the opportunity that thinking disturbs us. According to Arendt, 
however, this conversation with the self needs to be seen as a conscious thinking, 
that is a thinking that is aware of the self. It is through such a conscious thinking 
that the conscience is formed, this inherited ethical outlook that steers the human 
being in his actions, but only so far as the human being does not refrain from 
thinking.  
This pondering on thinking, as we might call it, actually raises the question of 
whether the process in the mind within the dialogue between the hand and the 
eyes of the mind can be understood as ‘thinking’ at all, since designing is not 
just a dialogue within the ‘I’ and ‘myself’, this ‘two-in-one-discourse,’224 but 
also stretches to the hand and the paper – it does something, it has a particular 
goal. However, on the other side, designing is not merely reasoning, nor can 
it be described as a thirst for knowledge. Even more, much of what has been 
described as the activity of thinking can also be recognized while designing. If 
it is not thinking, designing at least parallels this activity. Designing is not a 
linear process that, through reasoning, leads to a particular end. Designing itself 
goes much more in circles until the moment decisions are made, although one 
might ask of circularity if this is still true within these design-processes that are 
organized so that each participant works in ‘real time’ within the same drawing. 
Design, however, regularly goes in circles, not knowing where to look, but again 
and again pondering upon the question at hand, the site, the structure and the 
proposed program in order to produce possibilities and to alter findings. Although 
it actually makes something – that is: drawings, models, schemes – what happens 
is that the mind translates these drawings into images of real spaces and real 
experiences, or vice versa, it imagines real spaces and steers the hand to grasp 
what is imagined in the mind. The hand draws 2D what the eyes of the mind see 
in 3D, an imagination that is fed by one’s own experience in the field, but even 
more by singular sense perceptions upon previous experiences. Can we take that 
as indeed thinking, roused by absence, using imagination to re-present the object 
that is absent? Thinking stops doing, Arendt states: it absorbs the attention. 
Maybe on short notice, we can see that in design too: the designer is easily 
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absorbed by the design-process, where sometimes the hand has to stop in order to 
let the mind go over what actually has been achieved on paper. And if Arendt talks 
about the power of thinking to arouse or even to paralyze the thinker – this is 
what happens in a design process too – mostly when being away from paper or the 
office, as is known from anecdotes of having ideas that seem to be a break-through 
during the night, while taking a shower, or sitting at a bar (that’s why sometimes 
these ideas are drawn on napkins, beverage coasters, paper bags that can be found 
on the plane, and so on). It also is through this process that even such break-
throughs lose their shininess after waking up the following morning and thinking 
them through once again. As Arendt states about ‘thinking’, a design idea ‘which 
I had yesterday will be satisfying … only to the extent that I can think them anew’ 
today.225 Finally, design-thinking, if we can call it that, can also be described as 
‘defrosting’ and activating of a broad horizon of aspects of architecture: while 
designing buildings, all sorts of knowledge and experiences comes to mind: 
typologies bound to particular program, previously experienced atmospheres, 
knowledge of plans, sections, sequences, routings of other buildings, a range of 
examples of entrances, of living rooms, of atriums, of the relationship between 
building and landscape, notions about space, context, structure, use, knowledge 
of sound, climate, construction, texture, and so on. Paired with ambitions bound 
to the particular project the architect unfreezes these notions and knowledge 
consciously, in order to bring them together anew and convincingly. He unfreezes 
the notions, he unfreezes knowledge, in order to find out how their essence can be 
understood in relation to this particular assignment and situation. 
Design until now is described as the dialogue between the hand and the mind, 
fuelled by certain considerations from elsewhere (given in the assignment, or 
urged in the imagination of the self), which is accompanied by a dialogue within 
the designer, between the me-and-myself. Both dialogues go in circles, the 
one feeds the other, and vice versa. The description however reveals that this 
limitation to the dialogical model is not true. It already urges that within design, 
the architect also thinks from other perspectives: it is in a certain conversation 
with others involved in the design process. This seems to be evident – there are 
after all meetings organized in which the designer presents his design, where 
he discusses the design and takes note of the comments and responses to it. If 
designing, he would have his client and other stakeholders in mind, if it is not 
for ideological reasons, it should be for entrepreneurial reasons (if not running 
the risk of a cancelled project that does not meet the requirements). Moreover, 
as we have urged previously, architecture is never a private matter, not from the 
commissioner or from the designer. It always intervenes in the world, affects the 
public realm, addresses the public. Therefore, while designing ‘the world and its 
inhabitants’ should be present at the drawing table – present in the thinking and 
the drawing, in each dialogue and conversation. Although not literally present, 
the public should be imagined at the very moment the mind steers the hand, and 
while the hand – skilfully – draws. In other words, design requires, beyond the 
capacity to think dialogically, the capacity to think from different perspectives, 
this ‘enlarged mentality’ that is part of Arendt’s second motif of thinking. 
The description however also urges the third motif of thinking: what evokes the 
future images is imagination, which is fuelled by precedents and ‘metaphors’. 
Cornelissen describes this motif as follows: ‘What it fundamentally refers to 
is the recognition that thought is conducted in language, and that language 
is essentially metaphorical. In The Life of the Mind, Arendt devotes two full 
chapters to metaphor. By thinking in metaphors, that is, by “transferring” 
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(metapherein) words we use to grasp visible experiences within the external world 
of appearances to invisible concepts within the internal world of the mind, we 
may establish or re-establish some form of correspondence between ourselves and 
the world.’226 This certainly is also a model that is beyond architectural design. 
By taking architectural knowledge, that is the language of architecture as it is 
inherent in precedents, in concepts and spaces, in elements and structures, in 
materials and techniques, and transferring these to the particular assignment at 
hand, the designer grasps experiences in order to ponder them in the mind, as 
well as establishes a correspondence between the design at hand and the reality of 
the world. 
Designing thus somehow uses this “two-in-one” perspective, to initiate a conver-
sation with the self on all sorts of aspects that are at stake in the assignment at 
hand, as it is also immediately urged to think from different perspectives, as it 
also ‘thinks in metaphors’, poetically. It ponders references and imaginations that 
come to mind. It draws possibilities and challenges them regarding use, construc-
tion, materials, economic possibilities and other pragmatic questions. Design, 
in other words, bridges between the three motifs that are hidden in Arendt’s 
reflection upon thinking. It is a dialogue with the self, we might state, which is 
initiated through the enlarged mentality, the ability to think from other perspec-
tives, as well as by the pondering on precedents, metaphors, and other conceptual 
images and imaginations that are constitutive for the desire that fuels the activity 
of design.  
7.4.3 To Design is to Judge
Designing has to be described as going in circles. At certain moments, however, 
decisions are taken. That’s when a particular possibility that is investigated 
satisfies the designer, not just today, but also tomorrow. These moments in which 
decisions are made are contrary to thinking, which just keeps on pondering. It can 
better be described as judgment: taking decisions is judging upon the materials 
at hand. In these moments, the mind investigates within the proposal whether 
it matches the ambitions and requirements that are embedded in the project. 
Judging is the third term that Arendt would have stressed in her investigations 
of the faculty of the mind, close to her second motif of thinking upon which we 
touched in the previous paragraphs. 
The first important aspect of judgment, as compared to thinking, is that 
judgment is always concerned with particulars. Thinking deals with the general, 
but if it has to steer actions, to take initiatives and to propel beginnings, decisions 
should be made about the particulars: the doing, the aim, the moment, the place. 
In judging, the pros and contras are being weighed in order to come to action. 
Judgment is described mostly as the ability of the human being to ‘tell the right 
from wrong, beautiful from ugly.’227 Of course, judgment is not separate from 
thinking. It depends upon the faculty of thought. Arendt ‘pondered’ that statement 
strongly in the article cited extensively above, ‘Thinking and Moral Consideration’, 
which she wrote after the controversy roused by her review of the Eichmann 
trial. Moral judgment, she argues, depends upon the conscience, which is shaped 
by this conscious mind. Conscious literally means, Arendt states, ‘to know with 
myself,’228 that is: this dialogue between the ‘I’ and the self urges a conscious 
mind. ‘Consciousness is not the same as thinking; but without it thinking would 
be impossible.’229 The conscience, which is often urged as ‘the divine voice of 
either God or reason’230 is thus proposed here as depending upon this dialogue 
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between the I and the self, the courage to think, to be aroused and to be paralyzed. 
Conscience actually means ‘a kind of knowledge that is’ not only acquired through 
thinking, but also ‘actualized in every thinking process.’231   
For ‘design’ we however do need another perspective, which is offered by 
Arendt too. Arendt looked for other instances, since conscience is not of help in 
the political realm. She therefore develops the notion of taste, which, as compared 
with the ‘voice’ of conscience, is rather ‘silent’. The conscience offers ‘universal 
and moral principles’, taste however urges a situational case study.232 Arendt 
touched upon ‘taste’ via the aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant. In his model 
of aesthetic judgement, Arendt recognized a parallel with political judgment.233 
‘Could it be that taste belongs among the political faculties?’ Arendt asks in her 
reflection upon culture. ‘Could it be that this right love of beauty, the proper kind 
of intercourse with beautiful things – the cultura animi which makes man fit to 
take care of the things of the world, and which Cicero, in contradistinction to the 
Greeks, ascribed to philosophy – has something to do with politics?’234 
Arendt describes taste as the faculty of the human being to 
‘decide what the world qua world is supposed to look and sound like, how it 
is supposed to be looked at and listened to, independently of its usefulness 
or our existential interests in it. Taste evaluates the world according to its 
worldliness. Instead of concerning itself with either the sensual life or with the 
moral self, it opposes both and proposes a pure “disinterested” interest in the 
world. … Taste decides among qualities, and can fully develop only where a 
sense of quality – the ability to discern evidence of the beautiful – is generally 
present. Once that is the case, it is solely up to taste, with its ever-active 
judgment of things in the world, to establish boundaries and provide a human 
meaning for the cultural realm.’235 
Judgment of the materials at hand is the central faculty in the public realm: to 
judge actions and speech in order to respond properly. ‘The greatest danger of the 
realm of morals and politics, then, is indifference, the refusal to choose between 
right and wrong, the withdrawal from judging as an activity supported by and 
supportive of community.’236
The relationship of this idea of ‘taste’ of what is at stake in politics find its 
source in the conviction that within politics, as is the case with aesthetics and its 
quest for meaning, there is no ultimate truth. To be grasped by beauty is not to 
be grasped by truth, but by something convincing. Beauty cannot be theorized, 
reasoned, but it needs convincing speech, it needs to be narrated, convincingly 
presented. Therefore, deciding what beauty actually is is first and foremost a 
political activity, which also depends upon (action and) convincing speech. Taste, 
in other words, should not be taken here as the very personal outlook on the 
world, by which I decide what I do or don’t like and on which no discussion is 
possible. Taste, on the contrary, Arendt explains, is general. It, and Arendt quotes 
Kant here, ‘brings clearness and order; it makes the ideas susceptible of being 
permanently and generally assented to, and capable of being flowed by others, and 
of an ever progressing culture.’237 This faculty of taste thus is not simply intuition 
or talent, but can and needs to be trained and enhanced. We might even state that 
intuition, which seems to be at hand in the very moment of the mind steering the 
hand, the hand drawing lines, is formed through taste – it becomes part of the 
skills of the craftsman. 
Judgment, for Arendt, is not reasoning, it is also not applying some sort of 
theoretical frame. The arguments beyond judgment are not linear but holistic. 
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Arendt stresses a few aspects important in this capacity to judge. Judgment is 
not so much about ‘truth’, that is, not about truths in a Platonic sense, or in a 
Hegelian perspective: something which is beyond reality, which is in warfare with 
reality. Judgment on the contrary is about ‘reality’, and this reality only appears 
(or becomes real) when different viewpoints are shared, and where they are 
seen from different viewpoints. The faculty of taste is important in this respect, 
Arendt argues. In order to activate ‘taste’, Kant urged another way of thinking, 
which does not encircle the self, but makes others present in the process of 
thinking itself. Seen from this perspective, it is not enough, Arendt writes, to be in 
agreement with one’s own self, but which consisted of being able to “think in the 
place of everybody else” and which he therefore called “enlarged mentality” (eine 
erweiterte Denkungsart).’238 This process of thinking thus literally re-places the 
‘I’ to other positions, but doesn’t replaces the I with another, or the one subjective 
perspective with another perspective. It moves to other places around the table 
in order to think from these places. In order to move oneself to another position, 
one needs this ‘enlarged mentality’. Arendt saw this ‘enlarged mentality’, Seyla 
Benhabib states, as ‘the model for the kind of intersubjective validity we could 
hope for in public realm.’239
Arendt thus argues that judgment is the ability to look from different perspectives, 
‘to think from the standpoint of everyone else’ as well as the ability to ‘reflect 
upon one’s own judgment from a universal standpoint’. Here we once again touch 
upon the metaphor of the table: by making judgments, one not only looks from 
the single perspective of one’s own place, but also – almost literally – places 
oneself in another position at the table, in order to look and descend from there 
as well. Arendt urges this perspective particularly, since this active thinking from 
different perspectives, which she defines as judgments, means that judgment 
doesn’t apply to my very singular perspective, but seeks agreement with other 
perspectives. ‘The power of judgment rests on a potential agreement with others, 
and the thinking process which is active is judging something is not, like the 
thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me and myself, but finds 
itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone in making up my mind, in an 
anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come 
to some agreement.’240 The goal of the ‘enlarged mentality’ therefore is not to be 
empathic but to search for political agreement and acclaim. Judgment derives 
its validity, writes Arendt, only through such agreement. Only through such 
agreement judgment ‘can liberate itself from the “subjective private conditions,” 
that is, from the idiosyncrasies which naturally determine the outlook of each 
individual in his privacy and are legitimate as long as they are only privately held 
opinions, but which are not fit to enter the market place, and lack all validity in 
the public realm.’241 Judgment thus takes these private opinions, and confronts 
them with opinions that are gained from other perspectives. Contrary to thinking 
as previously defined, which was roused by something absent, judgment therefore 
requires the ‘presence’ of others, Arendt argues. 
‘This enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend 
its own individual limitations, on the other hand cannot function in strict 
isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others “in whose place” it must 
think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom 
it never has the opportunity to operate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on 
the presence of the self, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of 
others. Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is never 
universally valid.’242 
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Arendt clearly has the public realm in mind, in which others are present through 
action and speech, and where the judging spectator has to take a decision on their 
own position, on which perspective to support, on what is the right thing to do. 
This is applying the political activity of judging, by hearing what one says, but 
also by being able to place oneself in that position, in order to judge the validity 
of that perspective. This process of judgment thus is an addition to the dialogue 
motif of thinking, the Socrates model, as we defined previously. It is urged by 
being present and hearing voices and seeing actions, being affected by what one 
sees and hears. In this perspective the human faculty of imagination is decisive. 
Imagination is needed in order to replace oneself into another position. It is 
also needed to make the absent present, that is to re-present the absent object. 
Imagination makes the invisible visible for the eye of the mind. ‘To “think from 
the perspective of everyone else”,’ Benhabib writes, ‘is to know “how to listen” to 
what the other is saying, or when the voices of others are absent, to imagine to 
oneself a conversation with the other as my dialogue partner.’243
Political activity and participation, we might state, require the ability of the 
human being not only to look from their own limited position, but also to move 
oneself to another position. This process of replacing oneself of course somehow 
tries to accept and actualize other perspectives too in one’s judgment, it never-
theless does not exclude one’s own position. ‘In aesthetic no less than in political 
judgments, a decision is made, and although this decision is always determined 
by a certain subjectivity, by the simple fact that each person occupies a place 
of his own from which he looks upon and judges the world, it also derives from 
the fact that the world itself is an objective datum, something common to all its 
inhabitants.’244 Nevertheless, judgment cannot be taught, educated. It is developed 
in practice, since it deals with particulars.245
The Greeks called this enlarged mentality, which enables us to look from 
different perspectives, ‘insight’, Arendt states, by which she means that it is not 
based on ‘speculative thought’, but by ‘common sense.’ This does not so much 
mean something that is commonly acceptable, but much more related to the 
senses of the body itself. In French, Arendt states, common sense is called ‘le bon 
sens’, which literally means ‘the good sense’. Arendt takes this ‘good sense’ quite 
literally: a sense besides the five bodily senses, which ‘discloses to us the nature 
of the world insofar as it is a common world, we owe to it the fact that our strictly 
private and “subjective” five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves 
to a nonsubjective and “objective” world which we have in common and share 
with others.’246 Arendt therefore argues that common sense should be taken as 
‘community sense’: it is shared within a particular community.247 This also means 
that taste is seen within this community – it is not distinct from it. This commu-
nity-based idea of taste today is quite difficult, as for instance Habermas argues. 
‘The sounding board of an educated stratum tutored in the public use of reason 
has been shattered; the public is split apart in minorities of specialists who put 
their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose recep-
tiveness is public but uncritical. Consequently, it completely lacks the form of 
communication specific to a public.’248 Even beyond this shattered condition, a 
community-based taste requires training of this public, which today is at stake 
as well. ‘Clearly we need a kind of civic education that emphasizes the distinctive 
nature of these public questions in architecture, and we need to raise public and 
professional taste. Western democratic societies no longer have the design tastes 
of kings or despots or robber barons or civic aristocrats to rely on. In a democratic 
age civic and aesthetic education will be the final arbiters – the education of 
architects, planners, public officials, and private corporations, to be sure, but also 
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the education of the general public, which now has the power to intervene at so 
many places in the process of planning and design.’249 
Arendt’s idea of ‘common sense’ is quite intriguing. She does not urge it as an 
extra mental capacity (of the mind), but literally a sense for the world, rooted 
in a human community. ‘Judging’, Arendt therefore adds, ‘is one, of not the 
most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others come to 
pass.’250 As an important conclusion, Arendt urges in her Lectures on Kant that 
such political judgment therefore need to be generally ‘communicable’. Since 
this sensus communis is shared with others, rooted in a community, it is open 
for dispute and communication.251 ‘The faculty that guides this communicability 
is taste … The condition sine qua non for the existence of beautiful objects is 
communicability; the judgment of the spectator creates the space without which 
no such objects could appear at all.’252 
Judgment is only possible if one not only takes part in the conversation from 
one strict place at the table (to use this metaphor once more), but is also able to 
imagine oneself sitting in another chair, without losing the particular position 
at the table. To think from other viewpoints requires different and challenging 
capacities from the human being: courage (to think for oneself and to judge 
from one’s own perspective), imagination and creativity in order to explore 
different viewpoints), experience, ‘culture’ or community (on the basis of which 
a judgment obtains validity) and finally communication (the community should 
be able to discuss the judgment, the judge should be able to explain its decisions). 
Judgment, to stress it differently, is possible only within a community. Besides 
thinking, besides this idea of ‘to think for oneself’, the community, not to say 
common ground, is needed in order to judge. Although judgment needs courage, 
imagination, creativity and experience, judgement only gets its validity within the 
context of a certain culture and community, and only through communication. 
Arendt’s thoughts on political judgement also offer a model to understand the 
moments of decision within the process of design. This of course is not to our 
surprise, since the very root of her thoughts on political judgment are borrowed 
from aesthetical judgment. Also Benhabib argues that this idea of judgment is at 
stake within the ‘domains of law, aesthetics, medicine, therapy, music, the military 
and the hermeneutic interpretation of texts’ judgment is at stake.253 Design 
requires decisions, judgment over all the materials on what is important, what 
should be articulated, how to connect and how to separate parts, the environment, 
the private and the public. But as she states, within these mentioned domains 
‘we seem ready to admit that those exercising judgment are in a possession of a 
special body of knowledge, and of a particular expertise or experience related to 
the frequent exercise of this body of knowledge. The exercise of judgment in these 
domains evokes immediately a distinction between the experts or the practitioners 
and a lay public that is neither in possession of this specialized body of knowledge 
nor experienced in its exercise.’254 Obviously, this is at stake in architecture too. 
Since it is the job of the architect to deal with architecture on a daily base, since 
he is educated and experienced, he has acquired expertise over time, knowledge 
of materials and conditions, of precedents and references (since architects histor-
ically have dealt with space, and the knowledge acquired through these efforts 
is embodied through education and practice), has trained his imagination in 
possible futures, has the capacity to take initiatives of change, is familiar with 
interventions in the world – and the design of all this – he might be understood 
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as an expert of spatial and material design. The architect knows what it means to 
draw a line. 
In design the combination of (developed) taste and such mentioned skills 
helps the designer to judge more quickly, to trust his intuition while reading 
a drawing, visiting a site, talking to a client, and hearing comments from a 
particular audience. The perspective however of the public, or the ‘world and 
its inhabitants’ as the horizon of design, urges us to think of political judgment 
rather than aesthetical judgment as the model of architectural design and deci-
sion-making. To design is to take all sorts of information, and to look from 
different perspectives – to (almost literally) take the position of other stake-
holders, and not in the least the very horizon of architecture, the world and its 
inhabitants, and to be able to communicate about it, to force public discussion. 
Designing is thinking in the place of anybody else, but not in order to come to an 
average outcome. A decision is needed on the materials, on the insight gained 
through the ‘acts of displacement’. This decision can be made through previously 
acquired architectural knowledge – but since it responds to all possible viewpoints 
(around the table), it also can be expected that the decision is communicable to a 
wider audience. However, to make a decision, to judge the acquired information, 
evokes again this uneasiness. There is always something in the decision that could 
not get the aspired position, form, attention. To judge, after all, cannot mean to 
please every participant. 
This model of design = judgment allows the architect to involve ‘the public’ 
even in the first sketches. The horizon of the public is not something to add to his 
‘thinking’, but is at the core of that ‘thinking’. Architectural thinking, we might 
state, is thinking from the perspective of the world-and-its-inhabitants first.  
7.4.4 The Public Practice of the Professional
In this model of design  = judgment, the architect, while part of and partici-
pating in the world, is challenged as a professional. Architecture is needed as a 
profession, with a particular body of knowledge that is gained through history 
and practice. The American philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre coined the term 
‘social practice’ in this respect. The term ‘practice’ is generally taken as ‘an action 
or performance, but the term also implies a method of action, in the sense of 
habitual, customary, or routine,’ Dana Cuff writes in her reflection upon archi-
tecture as a practice. ‘A professional practice,’ she continues, ‘is the customary 
performance of professional activities. This definition suggests … [that] architec-
tural practice emerges through complex interactions among interested parties, 
from which the documents for a future building emerge. … The idea of routinely 
performed activities suggests that the actions stem from routine knowledge and 
that they mean something within a specified context. Practice is the embodiment, 
indeed the expression, of the practitioner’s everyday knowledge.’255 We might 
state that it is not only the professional’s everyday knowledge, which is crucial, but 
also the everyday knowledge of the public, the community, the commissioner and 
user, is essential. The architect has knowledge, both as a professional as well as a 
human being, but also needs the knowledge that is inherent in communities and 
their participants, the users and inhabitants. Their knowledge of everyday use is 
crucial. 
With the term ‘social’ MacIntyre argues the participant in a social practice 
is not a stand-alone figure. ‘By a “practice”,’ he writes, ‘I am going to mean any 
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form lf activity are realized in the course 
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of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human power 
to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the end of goods involved, are 
systematically extended.’256 The established ‘practice’ thus means that there is 
already a certain know-how developed in the past, as well as certain approaches, 
which all contribute to the shared knowledge of that specific activity. The new 
practitioner has to relate to that knowledge, even if these achievements from 
the past are challenged by the individual participant, or by the entering of 
other players to that field, it is a certain set of knowledge that is challenged, 
transformed, and appropriated. In other words, practitioners are never without 
context: they work in social circles, that is amongst other professionals, within the 
history of the very profession, but also in relation to the world, to which their work 
is applied, to the community of inhabitants, to which their work is constitutive. 
That also is the reason MacIntyre does not call it simply ‘practice’, but emphasizes 
the social character of these activities. Participating in a social practice means 
inserting oneself into a practice that already exists, that has a history and a 
tradition, even if this tradition is highly challenged by new forms of communica-
tion, new methods of working, new tools of production, new materials with which 
to create. In other words, to participate in architecture means to deal with an 
established body of knowledge, ideas about craftsmanship, perspectives on good 
and bad practices, better and worse performances – and even if one is going to 
challenge all of these, one relates to it as well. However, in all this, social practices 
depend upon a certain community of practice , which all contributes to an accu-
mulative understanding of knowledge. 
The gap between architects and public, upon which we touched above, therefore 
needn’t surprise us. The only surprise might be that the complaints of the public, 
as given words by Jacobs or Wolfe, often is the blaming of the architect not of a 
position in an ivory tower, but to be captured by dogmatic systems that hinder 
the grasp on reality and to see the world as it is, its social – or in the perspective 
of Arendt, public – structures, and to respond adequately. Architecture is 
vulnerable for ‘blind spots’, as Léon Krier blamed modern architecture as we have 
seen before.257 These blind spots of course are general threats for every expert in 
every domain: to stop looking, hearing, seeing, sensing – to stop thinking and to 
replace that with only reasoning or applying a particular theory. In medicine this 
pitfall can be life-threatening; in architecture it is world-threatening. This then 
is the challenge to architecture: not to fall in love with oneself nor with what one 
is doing, nor to fall in love with architecture (and its limited scope), but to fall 
in love with the world and its inhabitants. It is particularly this dealing with the 
world and its inhabitants that urges the architect not simply to judge because 
of expertise, not simply applying aesthetical judgment, but to see each decisive 
moment in design as applying political judgment on the material at hand as well. 
By taking the world and its inhabitants as the horizon of architecture, which thus 
urges political rather than aesthetical judgment, a couple of aspects of this world 
are at stake. First, architecture deals with the everyday spaces of the people. This 
challenges the role of the architect within these spaces.258 Although the architect 
can be described as being an expert in spatial issues, he does not have the ultimate 
knowledge of the space at hand. The space is rarely inhabited by the architect 
himself. His distance can be refreshing, but it is also easy to overlook the aspects 
that matter to the inhabitants. This of course is the point made by the French 
philosopher Henri Lefebvre, upon which we touched previously. The delineation 
of space is not particular for architects, he argued, since all people appropriate, 
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demarcate and engage with space. There is, in other words, no such a thing as the 
authority of the architect in space.259 
Secondly, the world is defined by differences and plurality. This urges archi-
tecture, despite its body of knowledge that exists to back up the designer, and 
despite the skills that are developed over time by the designer, to be thought of 
anew in each assignment. After all, not only is the program that needs to be added 
to the world different, but the particular place in which the new program will be 
embedded is different. The world and its inhabitants at that particular place are 
different, which means that general thoughts are not applicable, but should be 
defined according to these particular differences. Architecture is dealing with 
differences and uncertainties, which as stated previously urges the designer to 
take an uncomfortable position, to make design uneasy. 
Lastly, although the need to rethink this particular place and this particular 
program, and to come up with a particular proposal is clear, this proposal is never 
the only intervention possible. Design does not lead to any truth – it is thoughtful 
and careful, in the words of Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Louis Kahn, but there 
is no truth behind the proposals the architect does. It is for this reason that the 
design needs to convince the world for its applicability – it needs to convince 
the world and its inhabitants that this proposal is the right intervention in the 
right spot (on the right moment). Architecture, like speech in the public realm, 
therefore is urged by the needs to seek agreement amongst the public.260  
These aspects encourage not only taking decisions on the basis of expertise, they 
also require the capacity to judge politically. This perspective immediately situates 
all architectural intervention – ranging from the small bottom-up initiatives in 
neighborhoods to the vast top-down infrastructural projects for our territories, 
and from the first commissioning initiatives to the long-term exploitation – under 
the high tension of a political perspective. Space is political, and intervening in 
space thus implies a political position. This urge to take a position is obviously 
not a prerogative of the architect, but as a professional intervening in space the 
architect is constantly challenged to articulate his position.  
It therefore is that within design the architect not only needs his skills and 
expertise, he also needs the enlarged mentality of which Arendt speaks as the 
capacity needed for political judgment. While designing, the architect needs to be 
able not only to look from other perspectives, but also to take these other places as 
positions to think from, to place himself in the other places around the table. This 
is at stake when the architect thinks about the assignment, when he needs to think 
from the perspective of others, from client to future users. Every perspective, 
however, should be rooted in the understanding of the world and its inhabitants, 
the perspective of the public, as the ultimate horizon of the architectural project. 
Although the public is not literally at the table, the architect still has to find ways 
to make them present, to imagine his project as part of the world, in the moments 
of decision. Imagination of course is central in this process of architectural design. 
To imagine the future and to dwell upon possibilities of use and engagement. To 
imagine the public and what is convincing from this perspective. To imagine the 
past, and how architecture takes care of it, to imagine the world and to understand 
how the intervention maintains the world as a common entity. ‘The imagination 
is today’, Arjun Appadurai writes, ‘a staging ground for action, and not only for 
escape.’261 Imagination brings the absent to the mind, re-presents it as an inner 
image. Imagination is always particular and concrete – it does not stay on the 
level of abstractions, but really imagines ‘this’ particular object, use, aspect. 
Imagination therefore itself is also communicable, Arendt argues.262 
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The need to imagine the public within the design process as present at the table, 
besides all other stakeholders, is not just another moral perspective, an ethical 
stand. It is an active demand, since exploring this perspective and activating 
this imagination will help to communicate the design, the judgement, in the 
end. As is the case in political judgment, the architect needs to seek agreement 
amongst the public on his design. The architect, in other words, needs to go out 
in public, needs to appear amongst others, in order to explain his proposal. This 
is evidently a moment of unpredictability and vulnerability. To present the design 
is to make oneself vulnerable to the judgment of others. However, to make public 
the proposal means to start a process of argumentation in order to persuade the 
public to agree upon that proposal. In this respect, the ability to communicate 
about the project, the profession, the starting points, and the aims is pivotal. It 
should be presented in ways that involve the public and help them to reflect upon 
it, if not literally participate. Only in this way will the gap be bridged between the 
expert and the layman, which here is actual and urgent because it is the layman 
whose life is affected but the intervention of the expert.   
Of course, the above descriptions of design, the design process as circular, where 
the subjective part is urged as part of the worldliness of architecture and in which 
judgment is urged as the very moment ‘the public’ is at the table too, somehow 
is an ambivalent description of a design process. With its focus on a singular 
designer and design as a matter of dialogue, mostly between the eyes of the mind 
and the work of the hand, it can even be dismissed as romantic. The reality is 
more complex, although this model is still valid for larger offices, where a master 
architect directs assistants, who actually conduct the investigation into parts of 
the design. Even in these cases, the assistants do the work, have their internal 
dialogue, but after all have to explain what has come out of their specific inves-
tigation, and how it contributes to the project. However, it might be so that in 
other cases, design processes are less circular, and can better be described as an 
amplitude, in which the design process goes from one aspect to another, smoothly 
or with interruptions, but in which progress is tangible. It could even be that this 
description fits architectural design mostly, particularly since designing works 
towards a certain end, as well as this end sometimes already becomes vaguely 
visible to the eyes of the mind at the very beginning of a design process. As I 
narrated about the first couple of visits to the cemetery in Blankenberge, it quickly 
became clear how height differences could be enhanced in order to make the park 
clearer and more comfortable. Architects think spatially, and often also in terms 
of interventions. From the first call and meeting with a client, the readings of the 
program brief, the visit to the site, the investigation of references, and so on, the 
architect begins to imagine the future building – and this imagination of course 
directs the thinking process. This direction forwards to a certain end is certainly 
part of the computerized design processes, in which all participants work together 
on the same drawing. Such a process cannot go in circles, although it can and will 
go in twists and turns, but it will steadily go forward. However, in all these cases, 
the thinking itself goes in circles, as there are particular moments of judgment 
on the materials at hand too. There are also other examples known, or architects 
who develop the design of the building only in their mind, and start drawing only 
at the very end. Other designers use particular methods in order to grasp the 
assignment better, or to evoke imagination, or to prevent them to take pre-cooked 
approaches and decisions, to challenge them to look for different directions that 
are not immediately at hand. In each design process, however, whichever methods 
are used and whichever tool is developed, there is thinking involved as well as 
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reflection, there is judgment on materials at hand, and decision on what form, 
what intervention, what direction, what approach will fit best in this case, to the 
client’s needs and to fit other requirements involved in the project. Particularly 
these moments of judgment – which are central in all forms of design processes – 
are urging the ‘enlarged mentality’ of the designer or whoever is to judge (particu-
larly in more commercially driven or within computer aided design processes, it is 
not always clear who has the authority to judge. Even if there is a designer, it is no 
longer automatically the ‘designer’ who decides upon the design).
Now that we have urged this ‘enlarged mentality’ as a central tool of the mind 
within design processes, as a characteristic of the (public) professional, in order 
to do right by all parties involved in the development of a building, but also as the 
very tool that also imagined the public as a party involved in the design, it is also 
important to stress that this ‘thinking’ from other places should not be understood 
as searching for an average position, exactly in the midst of all other places around 
the table, nor does it search for ‘truths’ or does it expect ‘objectified’ judgments. 
The required decision is not a matter of balancing so that each position is 
represented, nor that ultimate truth is revealed. As Benhabib writes, the ‘capacity 
for judgment is not empathy, … for it does not mean emotionally assuming or 
accepting the point of view of the other.’263 This is particularly not the case in 
architectural design. On the contrary – designing is, like judging, not mathemat-
ical. It is not seeking out averages or compromises; it works with particulars, 
which means that the outcome needs to be particular as well. Design requires 
imagination – imagination to think from other perspectives, but also imagination 
to think intentionally about the future. And although imagination is (and remains) 
‘subjective’, ‘it is not an evil,’ Alberto Pérez-Gomes writes, ‘distorting device that 
can be replaced by an objective consensual framework.’ As he argues, imagination 
is the faculty through which ethics are introduced into design, as it is the faculty 
of the human being that introduces love and compassion. ‘The embodied author 
with specific cultural roots is also capable of poetic speech, of making beyond the 
confines of a narrow style, ideology or nationality.’264 Design essentially cannot be 
rationalized, nor can it be robotized. Designing is a process in which the designer 
looks from all positions at the table, in order to make a political judgment, that is, 
a judgment that is communicable and searches for agreement, but one also rooted 
in imagination, love and compassion, in which a poetic dimension is tangible. 
In this judgment the expertise, the knowledge of architecture – of what it means 
to draw a line –is needed. We might state: this knowledge of architecture, as it 
is activated in the social practices of architecture, is one of the positions at the 
table. At these moments the taste of the designer which is grounded in a particular 
community, upon a ‘sensus communis’, pairs forces with skills, experiences and 
the capacity to apply a body of knowledge. Taste, developed in conversation 
with others, in a particular context, in a particular time, will help to overcome 
the solely subjective perspective without losing its particulars. In the moment 
of design, taste joins forces with architectural knowledge and the skills of the 
designer, which is translated into intuition, in order to judge the insights gained 
from all other perspectives. Although this very moment can be experienced as a 
black box (since it is not mathematics and cannot be ‘proven’ or even processed 
anew), it is also urged by the need of communicability. This communicability is 
not something that Arendt develops solely in the context of judgment, but also is 
hidden in the chapter on Work in The Human Condition, Patchen Markell states. 
Also the produce and production of work gained overtime a certain publicness 
and the need of communicability. Where work had originally been addressed as 
263. 
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264. 
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a matter of form-giving mastery exercised in isolation, by the end of the chapter 
homo faber’s sovereignty has been qualified in at least one crucial respect: his last 
act, it seems, is to show his work in public – that is, to surrender it, figuratively or 
literally, to its users and judges.265 
The very activity of architectural design needs, besides work, the activities of the 
mind: thinking, willing, and judging. Designing, which is the work of hands, also 
requires continuous dialogue between the hand and the mind, between what 
the hand offers to the eyes of the mind, and the directions the mind gives to the 
hand. This is a matter of thinking, willing and judging at once.266 Thinking can 
be linked to the investigation of the commission, the field, the site, the context, 
while willing is the development of a particular (architectural) aim in response 
to a certain site and assignment. Judgment of course is in-between both entities, 
judging the investigation as well as reflecting on the developing process. If we take 
political judgment as a model of making design decisions, it requires the capacity 
of the enlarged mentality, through which the designer is able to displace himself. 
We might describe this as a dialogue between all sorts of parties involved in the 
project – even those that are not literally at the table, ranging from the client to 
the future user, the context to the public, the social practices of architecture itself, 
as well as other cultures themselves. These invisible aspects, these participants 
that does not literally contribute to the design, which are not literally stake-
holders of a project, require the faculty of imagination to see, with the inner eye, 
their position at the table, and to hear, with the inner ear, their important voices. 
Since judgment is dealing with the relationship between reality and plurality, the 
ability to judge architecturally is also the ability to reframe commissions, tasks, 
and projects into public realities. This perspective first urges the need make 
the ‘public’ present within the process of design, but also to make the architec-
tural design present in public. Architecture is a public endeavor – it is political 
by definition: it affects the world and its inhabitants, and therefore needs to be 
discussed politically, made present in the political discourse. 
265.
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It has been a long trajectory, from the entrance to The Retreat at Twin Lakes 
in Sanford (FL.), the gated community that figured as the starting point of this 
journey, to the drawing boards and minds of architects, at the end of the previous 
chapter. Besides the gated community, we touched upon other forms of enclaves 
in the new urbanized landscape, understood that the enclave offers a world-in-
itself, although withdrawn from the world-in-common. We stopped in the city, 
in order to investigate the new interest in urbanity and plurality, but we also 
considered the backside of this development: again an increasing segregation in 
society. We touched upon architecture in all this: the architecture of the enclave, 
of critique upon that enclave, of the infrastructure in-between, and how archi-
tecture is used to promote cities, places, particular programs within the renewed 
urban downtowns. As a final step of these explorations through the landscape and 
the city, we analyzed the design of Bernard Tschumi, in order to see how archi-
tectural intervention is able to open up a site for distinctive uses and different 
publics. Yet we also came to understand that no place can live up to the ideals of 
public space being a meeting place for all, a space that gives room to all sorts of 
practices. It was at that moment that Hannah Arendt joined us along the route. 
Arendt stressed the importance of the local and the small, rather than the virtual 
and the meta –we came to understand that public space is meeting-space, space of 
appearance amongst others. Although this is often taken as a metaphor, it cannot 
remain just that; if we take the notion of the public realm as essential to the realm 
of politics, there is clearly a need for actual spaces, where people appear to one 
another. Arendt would state that this is performed, through action and speech – 
yet this also requires real spaces. At this point, architecture comes in again. Archi-
tecture offers room for things to happen, it plays the vital role of separating the 
public from the private.
Arendt also offers another argument: since action and speech do not have any 
substance of their own – they require more than just recording in order to leave 
traces – they require a certain permanency as a context. Action and speech are 
bound to the world (in Arendt’s terms, she means with it the world-in-common, 
which actually is a world-or-things) – they are played out in public space, but 
they have the world-in-common as object. This only makes sense if the world has 
a certain permanence, and does not change overnight. It is objects, made by our 
hands, the results of fabrication, that offer this permanence to the world. Arendt, 
in this perspective particularly stresses works of art, since they are not spoiled 
through use. All other products of work are somehow not an end in themselves, 
they are meant to be used. Arendt stresses that this is not just that they are useful, 
nor that they can be misused, but that they wear out and deteriorate. The work 
of art differs principally from this: it is an end in itself, and thus theoretically is 
the most ultimate permanent product of our hands. To bridge this perspective to 
the field of architecture, we have to admit that architecture is meant to be used, 
and thus that it wears out over time. Even the most permanent structures, that 
since ancient times have determined the appearance of cities like Rome or Athens, 
or archeologic sites like Petra or Machu Picchu, deteriorate through weather 
conditions, climate change, and environmental pollution. The latter clearly counts 
for artworks as well: if they are not protected from the elements, their lifespan is 
even shorter than the bold structures of stone, concrete, steel, wood, and glass. 
However, besides this condition, the durable aspect of architecture might be 
found in those features that are not merely useful – although the not-useful in 
architecture should not be thought of as something added to the useful structure. 
Architecture is not something exceptional added to constructions, it is the whole. 
In other words, architecture integrates aspects of use and aesthetics, functionality 
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and sensuous experiences, of the everyday and the extraordinary. And through 
that wholeness, architecture articulates aspects beyond its function. It particularly 
reifies permanence, and so it is, in the everyday environment, the presence of 
permanence. 
Arendt not only stresses works-of-art as being an exemplary product of work, 
they also represent the fundamental condition of the world’s plurality. Works of 
art appear as forms of their own, as they are produced by artists shaping their 
materials – from words to stones, from paint to music, but also count for more 
activist practices – through their own experiences and their own interpreta-
tions of the world, and their own incentive to create. Moreover, and this is the 
aspect that is central in Arendt’s scope: no-one sees the works of art the same, 
since everyone looks at it from their own position in the world. It is only through 
multiple interpretations, that we might touch upon the reality of the work of art 
(and of the world). This of course counts for architecture as well – even more so in 
the everyday environment, which is shaped through architectural interventions. 
Architecture comes close to the human body: it offers literal contact with the 
world, sensuous experiences of private and public spaces. Architecture thickens 
our understanding of the world. Such reflections brought us to the understanding 
that the aim of architecture is the world (and its inhabitants), which is stressed in 
the final chapter, ‘the act of design’. If the world and its inhabitants are the goal 
of the profession, what does this then mean for the way we design; for the subjec-
tivity of architecture and how that might relate to the public practice that archi-
tecture is? This is how we ended up at the drawing board, and within the minds of 
architects. 
With this journey in mind, what happens when we now look backwards? With 
the drawing board in mind, we challenge the practices of architects and urge 
them to act as public figures, to approach assignments against the background 
of the ‘world and its inhabitants’. We touched upon that latter perspective as 
a description of what Arendt called ‘spatial’. This spatiality is by definition 
political – in the context of the world and the people in it, ‘space’ is essential to 
appearance. Arendt speaks here particularly of a thinking – Arendt uses this 
metaphor in order to describe the writings of the German philosopher Karl 
Jaspers – that is spatial, that aims to create spaces in which ‘the humanitas of 
man can appear pure and luminous.’1. I argued that this ‘spatiality’ very well can 
be taken as the ultimate aim of architecture too: architecture in its essence is 
bound to the world and the people in it, and its ultimate perspective is to create 
‘spaces of appearance’. There are three essential directions for architecture hidden 
in this brief description. 
The first is offered by Arendt’s use of the term ‘world’, she literally stresses 
that ‘world’ and ‘the people in it’ belong together. This emphasis underlines how 
Arendt understands the world. World, for Arendt, always is in common. It is what 
we, and our predecessors, have made from the earth, the natural circumstances 
of the globe, in order to make it fit for human life. This effort mainly consists 
of things, that offer a context of permanence in contrast to the cycle of nature. 
The world is created through ‘work’, Arendt argues – and here we have another 
distinction, between labor (which is the activity bound to survival), work (which 
is the activity that create things that last, and thus together form the world), and 
action (which is the action bound to the realm of politics). Architecture is one of 
the most important tools in this perspective. It literally creates circumstances of 
living, as well as offering a permanent place on earth for the people that inhabit 
the world. But since the world is never the world of a singular individual, it 
1.
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always is commonly owned, not only with our contemporaries, but also with our 
predecessors and with those that will come after us, the community of men is the 
fundamental frame through which we need to understand architecture. Archi-
tecture does not originate in the individual and his needs (nor his survival), but 
in the community: it offers common ground to a community by articulating what 
is in common (and creating spaces of appearance) and simultaneously helps the 
human exist in the world, amongst others.
The second direction is the term ‘space of appearance’. I shortened the 
description Arendt offered about the work of Jaspers to this term, which she 
uses to describe the space in which action can unfold. Careful not to leave 
the humanitas behind, spaces of appearance are ultimately the spaces where 
humanitas can come to light. I preferred however to use the shortened version 
since that is the term Arendt uses again and again in order to describe the public 
sphere, where people meet politically through action and speech. Action and 
speech only make sense if acted and spoken in public, amongst others who are 
able see and hear and to respond. This is the brief description of political life: 
appearing in public, participating in the ongoing debate through action and 
speech, enacting re-action and responses – it is this action and re-action, action 
in concert, that offers the possibility of change. This ‘space of appearance’ is not 
something that can be left to the virtual realm: it is about real appearances, and 
thus requires real spaces. Although such ‘spaces of appearance’ can come into 
being everywhere, the very moment people appear to one another in action and 
speech, this nevertheless offers a framework for the architectural project. To 
contribute to the world-in-common means to contribute to communal spaces, 
wherein the ‘space of appearance’ is possible to occur. To create spaces of 
appearance is the aim of architecture. 
Thirdly, if architecture is bound to the world, and spaces of appearance are its 
ultimate aim, this influences the professional perspective of the architect. These 
two aspects hold ethical connotations. The ambition of the architect, which is 
translated in the ambition of the architectural project, is not neutral. It simulta-
neously is clear that the architect only is in charge to a certain level. Architecture 
after all is a common effort: the vision of the client, the rules of the municipality, 
the limits of the financier, the wishes of users, and so on, all play a part in the 
decision making process. How the architect responds to these other players in the 
processes of taking initiatives, developing ideas, constructing designs, is informed 
by his ethical position. The aim here is to challenge all projects from a public 
perspective. As I have argued, this is part of what Arendt (although building 
upon the esthetical theory of Immanuel Kant) called the ‘enlarged mentality’, the 
political attitude beyond doubt. This capacity to look from different perspectives, 
to literally replace oneself to perspectives of others, belongs to the heart of archi-
tectural design. It is not simply required to be able to think from a perspective 
of the user, the neighbour, the commissioner and so on, it is part of the essence 
of architecture as a profession build upon imagination. Political thinking, in that 
sense, is part and parcel of the capacity to imagine, without which architectural 
design does not make sense. Therefore, it is an ethical challenge to position the 
project of ‘architecture’ in the world and the people in it, and to construct the 
potential spaces of appearance. But it also is simply the required method in order 
to make architecture, instead of art or simply building. This latter remark refers 
to a common distinction made in architectural theory and everyday language, 
between architecture as an artistic profession, and architecture as a service-pro-
fession. The first creates architecture, the second only mere-buildings. From the 
perspective developed above, it is clear that this distinction cannot hold. Not only 
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because it is ethically questionable, but also since it overlooks the essential char-
acteristics of design and construction.   
If we take ‘the world and its inhabitants’ as the very horizon of architecture, we 
might derive from our trajectory through the dispersed landscape, the segregated 
city, and the field of architecture, seven statements that somehow deepen our 
understanding of the ‘space of appearance’, the agency of architecture, and the 
essential characteristics of the architectural project. These statements together 
form a ‘fragmented’ conclusion – as stated in the introductory reflections, this 
study is not meant to deliver a theory. Arendt opposed strongly the inclination to 
theorize, with which she meant the ambition to come to a closed system, wherein 
all possible questions and problems are (meant to be) answered and solved. 
The choice to conclude in statements is meant not to close the discussion, but 
to contribute to the ongoing debate within the field of architecture, philosophy 
and political theory. It is open ended, like the work of architecture itself: design 
never is done. Each statement will be briefly introduced through a particular 
quote of Arendt, which is then addressed from an architectural perspective. The 
statements can be read separately, and are to be understood as challenges to 
re-think particular issues, to reflect upon certain practices and phenomena. They 
are meant to push arguments further, or propose new perspectives in approaching 
the discussion, and thus to evoke responses and re-actions. 
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1. 
‘The reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of 
innumerable perspective and aspects in which the common world presents 
itself and for which no common measurement or denominator can ever be 
devised. For thought the common world is the common meeting ground of all, 
those who are present have different location in it, and the location of one can 
no more coincide with the location of another than the location of two objects. 
Being seen and being heard by others derive their significance from the fact 
that everybody sees and hears from a different position. This is the meaning of 
public life, compared to which even the richest and most satisfying family life 
can offer only the prolongation or multiplication of one’s own position with its 
attending aspects and perspectives.’2  
According to Arendt, the central condition of the public realm is plurality. The 
journey through the contemporary landscape and city, as described in Chapter 
2 and 3, has shown how plurality, in particular, remains a central question 
regarding today’s public places. The post-modern suburban landscape is divided 
in enclaves, between residential, working, and leisurely environments that 
together do not form a city, nor a landscape. In the enclave-world this plurality 
obviously is threatened. Enclaves, after all, arrange spaces through similarity: 
what is considered strange – the stranger – is, as far as possible, excluded from 
these spaces. In the enclave landscape, similar people live in the same neigh-
bourhood, do their shopping in the same mall, go to same café. Therefore, in 
the debate on contemporary landscapes, it is most often the aspect of discrim-
ination behind this system that is addressed: increasingly ‘public spaces’ are 
only accessible to a selected group of people, whereas others, the strange and 
the poor, are bound to the left-over spaces, which then turn into ‘dangerous’ 
no-mans-lands in-between the more exclusive spaces. Even in the city, where 
plurality is presented as an essential foundation behind the economic theories 
that a decade ago offered a new narrative on the future of the city, plurality is at 
stake. It is the backside of the new popularity of density, proximity, and choice. 
Lots of cities quickly turns into enclaves too – enclaves for the lower classes in 
the outskirts, the inner cities for the higher classes. The problem touched upon in 
these chapters is not only this division of space, but particularly the impossibility 
of the ideals behind democracy, where people with different backgrounds and 
different narratives in live gather together and exchange ideas. The democratic 
ideal behind public space thus is a space actually used by the broadest variety of 
people possible. The focus in the contemporary debate on public space is thus 
mostly concentrated on the issue of accessibility: are strangers welcome? Arendt 
is also very critical upon the inclination to organize a community by similarity. 
The essential characteristic of political organization to Arendt is indeed plurality. 
The decisive characteristic of the Greek Polis, which is the reference Arendt 
dwells upon, is the break with kinship as the principle of organization beyond the 
agglomeration of houses. Arendt argues that the resistance against plurality is 
not something new, but already was at stake in the successors of the Greek and 
Roman City states, as it is today in the contemporary organization of nation states 
and their bureaucracies: they are organized like families, in social realms, Arendt 
argues. 
However, for Arendt plurality is the essential characteristic of the public 
realm. Yet this does not entirely depend upon the accessibility of the public 
realm, since Arendt calls for an alternative understanding of these differences. 
2.
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Today plurality is often understood in a limited way as the differences between 
classes, races, gender, ownership or the various views upon politics, God or 
capital. Arendt, however, urges a plurality that simply enlightens the differences 
between men. Thus Arendt’s plurality depends upon the human being itself. This 
plurality might not be immediately visible: it comes to the fore through action 
and speech. We reveal our utter differentness through the way we act and how we 
speak, where we stand and what our perspective is. Arendt argues that everybody 
acts and speaks distinctly, fueled by nurture and nature, by experience and 
experiences, by our very location in the world.
This plurality, Arendt thus argues, is crucial particularly because of the 
opportunity of others being around ‘who see what we see and hear what we hear.’3 
That is the very difference between the private and social realm: to be amongst 
likeminded only offers repetition, prolongation, multiplication. To participate 
in public life, amongst others, offers the possibility to be heard and be seen by 
others, from other positions, and to acknowledge these positions and get to 
know the common world. Participating in public life in this way assures the 
reality of the world, Arendt argues, and that is the essential characteristic. ‘Only 
where things can be seen by many in a variety of aspects without changing their 
identity,’ Arendt writes, ‘so that those who are gathered around them know they 
see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.’4 The 
world becomes real for those participating in it, as well as the other way around: 
only what appears in public becomes real as well, since only then can it be seen 
and heard by others. ‘Everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by 
everybody and has the widest possible publicity. For us appearance – something 
that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves – constitutes 
reality.’5 
Arendt is thus not so much concerned about the possible or restricted acces-
sibilities of public space, but the social dimension of the enclaves, which require 
and expect like-mindedness and therefore restrict the possibility of action and 
speech, through the emphasis on, for instance, the individual or entertainment. 
Action and speech, however, is the joint-activity, through which plurality unfolds. 
Architecturally spoken, this means that the enclave, as an architectural figure, 
indeed offers a limited version of public space and public life. To be surrounded 
by likeminded fellow human beings within a simulated environment, does not 
contribute to the experience of reality – the reality of the world and the reality of 
the self.  
Participation in the world and the condition of plurality of public space are 
intertwined. To participate in public, through action and speech, establishes 
plurality,	whereas	the	plural	public	offers	the	participant	the	experience	of	
reality of the world and of the self. It therefore is not so much the accessibility 
of public space that is at stake, but the possibility to appear in public and to 
inhabit one’s own position within that space.
3.
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2. 
‘The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the 
manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal 
constitutions of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, 
the various forms in which the public realm can be organized. Its peculiarity is 
that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the 
actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but disappears not only 
with the dispersal of men – as in the case of great catastrophes when the body 
politic of a people is destroyed – but with the disappearance or arrest of the 
activities themselves. Wherever people gather together, it is potentially there, 
but only potentially, not necessarily and not forever.’6 
To appear amongst others, who are different in both word and deed, is the 
crucial moment and movement in Arendt’s perspective. I call this ‘moment and 
movement’, since this is what brings it close to the profession and agency of 
architecture. Appearance is a particular moment and experience that essentially 
reveals differences, although within the frame of equality. Appearance only make 
sense if it is amongst peers, who are able to respond to what they see and hear. 
This is important, since action and speech do not make sense without being seen 
and heard – without response action does not impact the world. Action, if it will 
not immediately vanish, needs to be seen by others – and it only will have impact 
when it develops into ‘action in concert’. This image Arendt derived from the 
agora in the Greek and Roman city states, a central square in the city, surrounded 
by all sorts of public buildings, where the citizens were expected to participate in 
the matters of the city. Admittedly, the citizens that were allowed to participate 
were a very limited group of householders. Most inhabitants of the city, in other 
words, were excluded from the deliberations about the city on the agora. Although 
Arendt uses this reference, she is quite clear in her insistence that participating 
in the world is a capacity of everyone, and that to not participate means to miss 
the opportunity to become fully human. The important point here is that Arendt’s 
notion of action and speech is bound to real spaces, although not to one or a few 
particular places, like the agora. On the contrary, sensible action and speech can 
potentially happen anywhere where people are gathered, though only for the time 
being that people are gathered there. As is clear in this image of space: the space 
of appearance is not fixed or formal, nor a space that endures: it is flexible and 
limited, yet also local and tangible, bound to human bodies in space. Although 
it can be understood as detached from any particular space, it is not virtual. It 
requires tangible space: since it does not rely solely upon conversation, debate 
or discussion during which opinions are shared (this can be left to media, be it 
the newspaper, television shows, the internet or social media) but is also about 
being heard and seen. This requires a ‘space’ where one appears to another, where 
action can be seen, judged and re-enacted. 
The space of appearance also requires movement: to appear is not a permanent 
existence nor experience, but rather is to be understood as transition from one 
realm to another. Arendt literally describes it as a transition from the darkness of 
the private realm into the lights of the public. The dark-and-light in this metaphor 
is not simply a distinction between good and bad, it rather is a distinction between 
the realm of the hidden (and what needs to stay hidden) and the realm in which 
everything becomes visible. Moreover, as Arendt argues, no one can live solely in 
the public realm. Life loses depth, becomes shallow, transparent. To participate in 
6. 
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the world, one needs a private place in order to recover, recuperate, be educated, 
and be prepared for participating in the world – besides this the private also gives 
room to aspects of life – birth and death, pain and love – that need to remain 
hidden, and cannot appear in words and deeds. But as nobody can survive the 
harsh light of public space, a life completely lived in the private sphere loses its 
reality too. It loses contact with the plural perspectives upon the common world. 
Thus appearance is the act of appearing in the world, the transition from one 
sphere toward another (and backward again). 
These perspectives, which locate the space of appearance in real spaces (although 
in rather fluid and temporal ways) and appearance itself as an experience of 
transition, are related to architecture. Architecture does not create the space of 
appearance itself. Its capacity is limited to actively generating conditions for the 
space of appearance to occur. Architecture can embed space in larger structures, 
can make it easily accessible, can stress centrality or connectivity, can offer space 
fit for occupation. The reverse is also true: architecture can hinder the space of 
appearance coming into being, by restricting space, use, access, occupation.  
This once again leads us to our reflection upon the enclave-landscape and 
the segregated city. When taking ‘action’ to mean a horizon of public space, it 
is clear that this is bound to particular spaces, bound to particular bodies of 
actors and spectators, and bound to particular publics. Action requires public 
as it also requires space, but it does not require a particular space – that is, a 
particular space designed for action only. Since the space of appearance is not 
bound to potentialities or restrictions, nor any fixed and symbolic place, it can 
happen at any corner of the city, even in front of garage boxes in suburban 
gated communities. When people bump into each other or gather together, it is 
potentially there. Action, in other words, is a local activity – or better said: it is 
localized, bound to a certain place and space. This also means that the space of 
appearance is limited, limited in size by what can actually be seen and heard. 
There is, in other words, a need for spatial and temporal proximity. The space 
of appearance is only there if a public is able to see, hear and interact between 
themselves. It comes and goes with the public’s gathering together (or being, by 
chance, in a space close together when something happens). This means that 
such meaningful gatherings potentially occur through something (unpredictable) 
happening in a particular space: an event in the park, a manifestation in a square, 
a protest in the street, a flash mob in the mall, an accident on the interstate, a 
delay in the train. This actually offers room for a less pessimistic perspective 
upon the possibilities of public realm in our current urban condition, even in 
the dispersed landscape. If action and speech is available around the corner, it 
is possible anywhere where ‘a public’ can emerge, where spectators can become 
actors, sharing experiences of actions or occurrences in space. 
In the quote above, Arendt introduces a distinction between the public realm and 
the space of appearance. The latter somehow describes what happens, is phenom-
enological. The first, however, offers a much more ontological perspective, urging 
the ‘realm’ of organization. However, to experience this appearing to others, is the 
fundamental experience of the public realm, relating those appearing, and being 
appeared, to the world-in-common. The moment of appearance, in other words, 
is the experience of being seen and heard - of plurality and potential change. 
This experience is thus essential, and architecture can contribute to it. Although 
the space of appearance is not fixed to any particular space, architecture can 
contribute to the potential experience of appearance, by stressing the threshold 
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between one realm and the other, particularly the threshold between private and 
public , which essentially needs to be crossed back and forth.
Hannah Arendt’s concept of the ‘space of appearance’ is spatial, local, 
temporal and articulated. Since it is bound to the gathering of people, it is 
not in the hands of architects to create these spaces. However, what archi-
tecture does is to generate the potentialities of spaces, to become a ‘space of 
appearance’ once in a while. The opposite is also true: architecture is able to 
hinder a space from becoming a ‘space of appearance’.
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3. 
‘The political realm rises directly out of acting together, the “sharing of 
words and deeds.” Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship 
to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which 
constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the 
laws were drawn around an already existing public space which, however, 
without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the 
moment of action and speech itself.’7 
The act of architecture is to intervene by shaping the world – erecting the 
boundaries between the public and the private. Architecture therefore both 
separates and differentiates yet also connects and unites. Through these very 
interventions, spaces are formed – spaces that can be used, that bring people into 
a certain proximity, and that eventually can function as a space of appearance. 
Although in the beginning Arendt strongly differentiates between tangible spaces, 
that are shaped through our hands, and the space of appearance, she now urges 
the importance of ‘institutions’ and ‘physical interventions’ in maintaining the 
public realm, the potential space of appearance, in existence. In other words, 
although the space of appearance is bound to the flows of a public gathering, it 
is nevertheless important to sustain the potentiality of public spaces in order to 
gather a public. Moreover, the wall of the polis is not simply a fixed border that 
secured the public space of the polis, it also literally reified this space: made it 
tangible. The public realm is not simply the experience of appearances only; it is 
a crucial aspect of political organization. Only through acting together, the world-
in-common is established. But although this action and speech thus establishes 
the world, it in itself needs a permanent place of encounter. A secured space, 
where action is visible and speech can be heard, in order to gain response, and 
reaction. After all, architecture is the construction of the wall, and symbolizes the 
intervention on the earth that establishes space and shapes the world – and thus 
represents public space; makes it tangible, visible, and contributes to its charac-
teristics. This aspect we can call the pre-political aspect of architecture. It secures 
a space, in order to offer room to political life. Nevertheless, this pre-political 
aspect is not merely a technical intervention: architecture after all represents; it 
articulates aspects, conveys a message. The philosopher Karsten Harries rightly 
argues that the very task of architecture is ‘to help articulate a common ethos.’8 
Architecture thus is able to communicate the importance of the public realm. 
Common facilities are crucial – even those of the lowest esteem like the sandpit, 
or the basketball court, play a role in the optimistic perspective that journalist 
Thomas Friedman draws: of life in local communities and public spaces in an 
age of acceleration and globalization.9 Even in times of communities falling 
apart, such spatial and tangible facilities are little magnets in the (sub)urban 
fabric. To create space is crucial: particular spaces have the capacity to mediate 
between inhabitants, to engage people to a certain place, particularly if it offers 
attractive, welcoming and accessible spaces. Such places ‘intensify’ the experience 
of ‘purpose and belonging’, in the words of the Canadian architectural theorist 
Alberto Pérez-Gomez.10 A particular important aspect of this experience however, 
is also the durability of architectural interventions in the world. These spaces and 
objects not only mediate between users today, but also connect them with the past 
and the future. Arendt’s notion of ‘action and speech’ needs a durable world as 
its stage. Action does not make sense if the world changes over night, she argues. 
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This experience of (relative) permanence seems to be increasingly important when 
regarding communities in an age of acceleration. A community only can thrive if 
there is a common structure behind it, that is durable and reliable. 
The merit of architecture, in regards to the world-in-common, is its 
spatiality, durability, and tangibility. By articulating these values, it stresses 
the public realm as the essential experience of political life and the ‘space of 
appearance’ as its cornerstone.
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4. 
‘These four walls, within which people’s private life is lived, constitute a shield 
against the world and specifically against the public aspect of the world. They 
enclose a secure place, without which no living thing can thrive.’11 
The space of appearance is challenging and rough. To appear in action and speech, 
after all, requires attention – it requires participation in an ongoing discourse, in 
inter-action with others, gaining support or resistance. The space of appearance 
challenges those appearing in it, to again and again be alert, move forwards, to 
transcend borders and to play it hard. Arendt acknowledges the public realm as 
an exhausting environment of participation. Courage is needed, she even states, in 
order to appear. In the quote above, she stresses the need of a private place in the 
world, which functions as a shield against the comprehensiveness of the world. 
In the protection of the private realm, one is able to recuperate, to reflect and to 
recover, to be educated and to be prepared, in order to appear in the world once 
again. Human life is destructed if it is ‘consistently exposed to the world without 
the protection of privacy’.12 Privacy thus is a necessary condition for the human 
body – privacy and publicity therefore belong together, they are intrinsically 
linked. 
Practically seen, this can be understood as an act of balancing. The home 
functions as the base from where the world is explored, from where one partic-
ipates in the world. In Arendt’s writing, this perspective also resembles her 
distinction between labor, work and action. Whereas action is bound to public 
space, labor belongs to the private sphere. It is concerned with survival, to eat, 
drink, and reproduce, particularly aspects that also are bound to the hideousness 
of the domestic realm. Work somehow is in-between: Arendt often has ‘work-
with-the-hands’ in mind, which somehow requires isolation from the world. 
However, production literally forms the world, much in the same way that the 
craftsman also needs to go out with his produce, in order to sell them at the 
market. 
Architecture is obviously not the only profession dealing with the world, the 
public, and the private realm, and nor the only profession offering the circum-
stances to somehow be ‘at home’ in the world. The ‘somehow’ here is important. 
Arendt’s aim ‘to be at home in the world’, does not particularly refer to the 
philosopher Martin Heidegger’s emphasis on the importance of the dwelling 
place, which has had an important influence on architectural discourse. In 
Heidegger’s perspective, dwelling means to to be rooted somewhere on earth, 
to be somewhere, to exist. Heidegger places this existential need for a dwelling 
place against the threats of modernity, that had made the human being alienated 
from spaces, footloose. For Heidegger, moreover, the world with all its rumour 
and developments, the they of the world, disturbs the authenticity of the self.13 In 
Arendt’s notion of the world, however, change, disturbance, and the They are at 
the very root of her perspective. Although the world is characterized by its longue 
durée, it nevertheless continuously changes by what we, human beings, add to it. 
Each generation deals with the world, changes it according to new circumstances 
and requirements, adds to the structure and demolishes those things that have 
become invaluable. If ‘to-be-at-home’ means to be in a place where ‘everything is 
in its place’, which somehow is behind the perspective Heidegger developed, one 
can never be ‘at home’ in the world. These two terms simply contradict each other. 
The world always challenges this condition of ‘being-at-home. To be at home in 
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the world means to deal with it – not to withdraw but to engage with what is ‘out 
there’. 
This is the meaning of being at home in the world: to trust the permanence 
of the world, to explore the communal world (through the development of daily 
patterns), to adapt to the new, and even to add things to the world by oneself. 
For this, a home is needed. Thus if architecture contributes to the community 
and to communal life, it is via the threshold between the public and the private 
realm, which on the one hand shapes the potential space of appearance but 
immediately also makes it possible to withdraw and to appear. This is the moment 
of appearance, of transgression, which is crucial: it is a movement, an experience 
of the common world and its tangibility, which ‘thickens our understanding of the 
world.’ 
Thresholds are matters of space, time, and tension, as well as moments of 
change, charge and transgression. They are the essential tool of architecture 
in establishing relations to the public realm. 
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5.
‘Particular questions must receive particular answers.’14 
Architecture deals with the world – a world-in-common that is shaped through 
time by particular human interventions. Human beings have responded to natural 
conditions. Because of the particularities of these conditions around the world, 
as well as depending upon the attitude towards the earth and the world; the 
development of certain techniques and cultures, the interventions differ from 
place to place, from culture to culture. Architecture, in other words, deals with 
differences. In architectural theory this is called the very ‘context’ of architecture, 
which consists not only of the particular local situation, but also the historic, 
cultural and political situation. Architecture by necessity deals with particu-
larities. There is no generic in architecture, nor any neutral space. it is formed 
by its commissioners, shaped by particular program, evoked by the architect, 
constructed by a constructor – on particular places in a particular moment of 
time. This certainly means that architecture – although it is technically possible 
– can’t generate generic designs as response to a particular situation. Architec-
ture, on the contrary, by its very heart and essence has to deal with the different, 
the outstanding and the characteristic. This makes it impossible for architecture 
to become completely robotizised, although much effort is done by particular 
architects to develop scripts in such a way that they themselves are removed 
from the process, to make it more objective. However, this apparent difficulty 
with the subjectivity of architecture, cannot be solved by leaving design simply to 
parameters. Although the parameters change from time to time and place to place 
(and thus there always will be a different outcome), the process leaves no room for 
any subjective interpretation (or the subjective of the writer of the program). This 
interpretation, however, is crucial in design. The balance between parameters is 
not fixed, it requires interpretation of the designer. We therefore even might state 
that it is fundamentally subjective: it after all is the particular view of the designer 
(design team) as a response to a client’s needs regarding a particular situation 
(in space and time). This subjectivism needs to be carefully exploited. Diversity 
is at the root of of architectural worldliness – this is the calling of architecture: to 
reveal differences of the world and offer distinctive conditions for its inhabitants, 
and to establish ‘thresholds’ where these differences are becoming tangible. 
This does not mean that particular figures which contribute to the exploration 
of threshold-experiences can be traced. Park de La Vilette, which we discussed 
in Chapter 3, offered insight into a range of tools that the designer, the French 
architect Bernard Tschumi, had used; ranging from the diversity in program; the 
connection between different routes; the embedding in the urban structure; and 
the superposition of very different aspects, constructions, paths. The main tool, 
however, was that Tschumi was able to bring these aspects together, not in a solid 
design, but in an open-ended superimposition. This offered ranges of ambiguous 
spaces, which held the potential for occupation by the users. And so in Chapter 5 
we came to touch upon George Baird’s reflections on public space. He urged three 
aspects: visibility, propinquity and continuity, as key factors of the transition from 
a distracted public towards a public that is able to appear to one another. These 
are urgent directions to be applied in the design of public space, but nevertheless 
cannot be ‘laws’ that are robotically implied in all urban design assignments. 
The worldliness condition of architecture is subjectivity.
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6.
 
‘The earthly home becomes a world only when objects as a whole are produced 
and organized in such a way that they may withstand the consumptive 
life-process of human beings living among them – and may outlive human 
beings, who are mortal. We speak of culture only where this outliving is 
assured, and we speak of artworks only where we are confronted with objects 
that are always present in their facticity and their quality, independently of all 
functional or utilitarian aspects.’15 
Architecture essentially creates spaces and differences by defining boundaries. 
Paradoxically it also immediately creates, articulates, and celebrates connections. 
A boundary is not simply the defining outline of a space, the ‘four walls that 
constitute a shield against the world’, it also is the membrane, the threshold to 
other spaces and to the world. These thresholds can be thin and transparent, 
thick and if stretched, even become spatial, a space in itself. To understand 
boundaries as thresholds is important, not only as the moment of transition 
from one realm to another, but also as the essential image of newly established 
relationships. Architecture does not simply create spaces: it creates spaces in a 
particular order. A building is ordered to give room to particular programs (even 
to different programs over time). The world is ordered alike – to offer room and 
structure for the community of human beings. Such order can’t be limited to a 
particular appearance: neither to Classical principles, nor to the Modern rejection 
of these principles. There is order in the chaos of medieval urban centers as well 
as in do-It-yourself communal projects – even if they appear orderless. There is 
infra-structure, (limited forms of) hierarchy, and differences in permanence and 
durability. 
This aspect of permanence, is particularly stressed by Arendt as important for the 
world-in-common. The important characteristic of the commonness of the world, 
according to Arendt, is that we not only share the world with contemporaries, but 
also with predecessors and successors. This commonness is prerequisite for all 
political life. Culture plays a significant role here. Culture as a term, in Arendt’s 
writing, bridges between the human activities of work and action, between 
production of things and political participation. Culture thus has a double face. 
First, for Arendt culture orders products-of-work in such a way that it offers 
permanence to the world, as home for men. In this respect Arendt urges the 
work-of-art, which, as an end in itself, should not be vulnerable to processes 
of consumption. As consumption and mass-production has joined forces (and 
Arendt saw this developing), the lifespans of products are shortened, and with 
that the possibility of establishing the world. A cultural approach, according to 
Arendt, should withstand this development within new processes of production 
and intervention, through the fundamental characteristic of caring for the world. 
Even in the age of acceleration and globalization, culture is able to offer the 
experience of being-at-home in the world. 
Secondly, culture reaches from the activity of work to the activity of action and 
speech, not only because objects (and particularly works-of-art) can represent 
and reify action and speech, but particularly since through intervention, culture 
can literally construct the world-in-common. To imagine the future, to take care 
of the past, to stress the present, to challenge change, to recognize possibilities 
– this all is at the very heart of culture, of works-of-art. By defining order and 
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bringing interventions and objects together in particular relationships, a certain 
permanence is enforced upon the world, against processes of deterioration, decay, 
and consumption. 
If we bring both perspectives to a reflection upon architecture, we must first stress 
the permanence of buildings. If architecture is permanent, it merges the aspect 
of un-useful (as we could learn from the work-of-art) with the functionality of 
architecture. There is a healthy tension here within the architectural project: it 
is meant to be used, but never can be brought back to that particular use only, 
since it also shapes the world for decades, or even better, ages. This particularly 
is important since the intertwined relationship between culture and the world 
becomes at stake. It is not only a matter of adding things to the world that last, it 
is also a matter of a reciprocal relationship. We shape the world, while the world 
shapes us. Cultural artefacts shape our view of the world, whereas our world 
simultaneously is shaped through our view, through the artefacts we contribute to 
it. Our view is shaped through the way we deal with the world in both conscious 
and unconscious ways. 
Architecture plays an important role in this respect: after all it shapes the 
everyday environment of people – although these often are experienced in 
distraction – as well as the extraordinary places, which are visited in conscious 
ways. Both, nevertheless, leave marks on the particular experiences of the world. 
The human senses play an important role in this respect, since the human being 
has a sensible relationship with the world. This sensibility is not a matter of intel-
lectual rhetoric, but of inhabitation, of a sensible experience of the world. This 
experience shapes our understanding of the world, as it also offers the experience 
of reality. The five bodily senses, Arendt argues, working together, offer a sort-of 
sixth sense, which reveals to us the reality of the world. The world, this common-
ly-owned world, is not a matter of objects and relationships that surround us, but 
of sensuous and immediate experiences through which reality is revealed. Arendt 
therefore also stresses this sensible experiences as the unfolding of common 
sense, a sense based in the community of human beings. The sensus communis, 
Arendt writes, ‘alone deserves credit for the fact that our private and “subjective” 
five senses and their data are fitted to a non-subjective, ‘objectively” common 
world that we may share and evaluate together with others.’16 
We might add that no other cultural object influences the five bodily senses so 
extensively and continuously than architecture. It is not only the capacity of 
outstanding edifices to deliver representational spaces and constructions that bind 
together human communities, but also the task and capacity of every building 
and construction, since they create the everyday environment. From this point 
onwards, we can define architecture as a cultural praxis, which suggests order, in 
order to create a world which is resistant to processes of time, which articulates 
relationships, which offers room for things to happen, and with all this offers the 
sensible experience of reality. This is the political urgency of architecture: it offers 
the apprehension of reality in which the five bodily senses are simultaneously 
addressed. This also is a calling to architecture: it needs to embrace this sensuous 
character of building. The main task of architecture as a cultural practice is, 
therefore, to understand every intervention in the light of society and culture, the 
world and its inhabitants, in which purely functional and economic considerations 
are relevant but not decisive. ‘Without, however, the beauty of cultural things’, 
Arendt writes, ‘and without the radiant splendour in which a politically articulated 
16. 
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permanence and a potential imperishability of the world manifest themselves, the 
political as a whole could not last.’17
Architecture	is	a	cultural	practice,	since	it	offers	room	for	things	to	happen.	It	
articulates relationships and orders the world, as it also enables experiences 
of reality through spatial, aesthetic and sensuous experiences.  
17. 
Ibid., 202.
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7. 
‘This enlarged way of thinking, which as judgment knows how to transcend 
its own individual limitations, on the other hand cannot function in strict 
isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others “in whose place” it must 
think, whose perspectives it must take into consideration, and without whom 
it never has the opportunity to operate at all. As logic, to be sound, depends on 
the presence of the self, so judgment, to be valid, depends on the presence of 
others. Hence judgment is endowed with a certain specific validity but is never 
universally valid.’18 
Architecture addresses two important perspectives upon the world. It is the 
construction that offers order, that resists processes of time. It offers spaces for 
living and working, for communal practices and rituals – it constructs the world. 
Architecture, however is not only built structure, it also is the ideas behind it: the 
processes of taking initiatives, developing ideas, imagining possible futures, the 
activity of design, the drawing of sketches and working drawings, the detailing of 
constructions and the construction of proposals. These latter activities are crucial. 
It is through this process of imagination and design that the world is created. The 
cultural perspective Arendt offer, stresses a particular order to give permanence to 
the world – an order that calls for a care of the past and openness for the future. 
The crucial process of design (as well as all other aspects of taking initiatives 
and developing plans), can be challenged with a reference to Arendt’s reflections 
upon political judgment. Politics, Arendt states, is not a realm of ‘truth’ but of 
validity and persuasion. Political judgment, Arendt states, is bound to a certain 
community. One judges ‘as a member of this community and not as a member of 
a supersensible world.’19 To judge rightly, one needs to take other perspectives, 
which are present in in the commonly-shared world too, into account. This is not 
simply thinking-about other perspectives, but literally re-thinking from these 
other perspectives. Judgement, Arendt thus argues, not only thinks from the own 
position in the world, but also thinks from the place of others. It is not enough 
to simply hear what one says, but the one who judges needs to replace oneself, 
in order to judge the validity of that very perspective. Here Arendt again offers 
a description of the value of the space of appearance, which is essentially plural, 
since everyone appears in it, in its specific position. We only can think from other 
perspectives if we participate in this space of appearance, if we are able to detect 
other positions in the world. 
This ability to replace oneself certainly urges the importance of imagination. 
Judgment requires imagination: the capacity to see from other positions and 
to imagine these perspectives at hand. However, this process is not built on 
speculative thought, Arendt states, but requires ‘common sense’. In Arendt’s 
perspective, this means a sense grounded in the community. Judgment, therefore, 
Arendt argues, needs to be communicable and public. Moreover, since it has 
positioned oneself in different positions, it takes the public into account, and 
becomes immediately communicable. It can also communicate from different 
positions. Nevertheless, the crucial point here is, that judgment is not simply the 
average of all positions investigated: it judges, it makes up its mind and passes 
judgment. This judgment on one hand is based upon the community-sense, and 
thus is communicable, yet also requires a position in itself. It is not a technical 
nor technocratic process, but requires the judge to be involved, and to judge 
upon reasonable expertise. To judge starts with acknowledging diversity. It needs 
a space to reflect, think, approach differences, as it eventually also introduces 
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expertise. However, a prerequisite of such judgment is its communicability: it 
needs to be accessible and plausible for other ‘stakeholders’ as well. 
Here we are back to architectural design and intervention. Designing is judging 
over the materials at hand. But since it deals with the world, which is common 
to its inhabitants, it is by definition ‘political’. It bears responsibility to the 
commonness of the world, the experience of reality, and the shape of public 
space, as it is also responsible in its interaction with the past and its imagination 
of the future. Designing, therefore, is taking these perspectives into account: 
not only that of the personal preferences of the designer, the client, and other 
stakeholders; but also the world as it has become today through the actions of 
predecessors; the world as it is common to us; and the world as it will be in the 
context of (a sensible) future community. Thus designing is replacing oneself, 
in order to be able to inhabit the perspectives of other stakeholders, to make a 
reasonable judgment. But as is clear; after thinking from different positions, the 
architect needs to judge not by a simple technocratic balancing of perspectives, 
but based upon his expertise as architect; upon his architectural knowledge of the 
world gained over time; through study and analysis, experiences and training. 
This immediately urges the designer to make designs (and design-steps) public, 
to make them accessible to the public in order to discuss these proposals. Design 
needs to be communicable, since it needs to be publicly discussed.20 There is 
nevertheless a tension between judgment and stakeholders in the process: design 
takes decisions and they will always evoke dissent.
As might be clear, this being-a-public-figure of the architect requires an extra 
leap from the profession and the professional instruments of communication. 
Although drawings and models can explain often more than words, they might 
also hide more than is required. The tension between the professional and the 
public offers room for architectural criticism, which investigates architecture as 
public intervention in the world-in-common. Architectural criticism somehow has 
a double urgency today: it needs to publicly express the significance of architec-
ture for the world, as well as challenge the architect (and all those involved in the 
architectural project) to understands its public calling.
Architecture	is	by	definition	a	public	(and	thus	political)	practice.	It	therefore	
requires, besides imagination and architectural knowledge, common sense, 
an	enlarged	mentality	and	critical	(self-)	reflection.	
20.
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Together these statements do not offer a closed theory. After all, each could be 
extended with dozens of other quotes, that re-phrase similar thoughts, or add 
additional perspectives. Nevertheless, these seven quotes of Arendt, followed 
by their brief discussions which turn towards architectural statements, are 
able to largely cover what has been investigated, explored, discovered, and 
concluded in this study. Moreover, they are presented in a particular order, and 
form a direction to understand architecture within its pre-political and political 
framework, to understand its public face (and fate), and to understand it’s cultural 
aim: ranging from the question of the public realm and the space of appearance, 
to the understanding of the architectural profession as beholding a particular 
knowledge of the world, which is used and explicated in processes of research and 
design. Through this direction, that stresses ‘the world’ as the aim of architec-
ture, and ‘the public’ as frame of architectural design, it offers a response to the 
basic question proposed in the introduction of this study, in line with Arendt’s 
ambition behind The Human Condition: ‘what are we – architects and architec-
ture – actually doing?’21 Architecture, so might be the answer, contributes in a 
crucial way to the experience of the public and the commonness of the world. As 
a cultural practice, it also is a public practice in itself. This of course immediately 
formulates an ethical frame regarding the architectural project: it is not an end 
in itself, but it contributes to the world and its inhabitants. It contributes to the 
possibility ‘to be at home in the world’. This frame actually proposes the capacity 
of architecture to represent the commonness of the world – and to offer the 
experience of commonness. The essential figure here is the ‘space of appearance’, 
which is not created by architecture, but emerges only through the gathering 
of people. However, architecture contributes to the possibility of this ‘space of 
appearance’ to emerge (as it also can hinder this space to emerge). The crucial 
architectural element in this perspective is the threshold – architecture after all is 
the art of creating differences, erecting borders, making enclosures, and making 
new connections and establishing relations. 
21. 
Arendt, The Human Condition, 5
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